With the Minsk II agreement stalled and EU sanctions tied to its full implementation, it is getting increasingly hard to see Moscow's endgame in Ukraine.
Russian President Vladimir Putin is not looking for an easy exit from the Ukraine conflict. He is digging in for the long haul to secure his end goal: a "structural lock" over Kyiv's security and foreign policy in a re-engineered Ukrainian state.
Russian President Vladimir Putin is not looking for an easy exit from the Ukraine conflict. He is digging in for the long haul to secure his end goal: a "structural lock" over Kiev's security and foreign policy in a re-engineered Ukrainian state.
President Vladimir Putin's call for a new world order to end US global hegemony has generated some catchy headlines, but as a policy initiative it has been a dud.
The Kremlin is currently engaged in a delicate diplomatic dance to get Western sanctions lifted without creating an appearance of ever asking for it. It is driven both by despair over the mounting economic costs from sanctions and the desire to maintain Putin's skyrocketing approval ratings, now largely fueled by the confrontation with the West.
As President Vladimir Putin and his Ukrainian counterpart, Petro Poroshenko, prepare for their face-to-face meeting in Milan later this week, their hopes for a lasting peace settlement for Ukraine and Western sanction relief for Russia hinge on Paragraph 4 of the Minsk Protocol, signed in the Belarussian capital on Sept. 5.
Vladimir Zhirinovsky often speaks truth to power. His recent initiative to dispense with direct presidential elections and anoint Vladimir Putin the country's supreme leader for life is not without merits. It could be an improvement over what we have today.
At a pro-Kremlin youth camp at Lake Seliger on Friday, President Vladimir Putin said it was imperative to force Kiev to end its military operations and engage the separatists in eastern Ukraine in a dialogue on "substantive issues on the rights of people in those regions."
To an outside observer, Russia may appear to be punching above its geopolitical weight in Ukraine. Despite appearances though, the Kremlin's policy-making process is breaking down under the strains of one-man rule. What looks like audacity and forcefulness is more often merely the byproducts of improvisation, knee-jerk reactions unrestrained by due government process.
Despite their rhetoric, Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko and President Vladimir Putin need each other in order to save face as the cost of Russian military intervention or separatist defeat mount. Putin's gambit to destabilize eastern and southern Ukraine and impose a Bosnia-style confederate system is failing. He also facing steep economic costs from Western sanctions against Russia.
In 1994, New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman, describing the prospects for the U.S.-Russia relationship, argued that Russia could be either "a sort of France," "a sort of China" or "a sort of Iran." It took Moscow 20 years, but it has transitioned through all three of these options.
The Kremlin's support for armed separatists in eastern Ukraine may come back to haunt it as the chaos fuels terrorism fears and strengthens Ukraine against a pro-Russian satellite state. Security officials are increasingly worried about instability being exported to Russia from eastern Ukraine. Regional authorities in Rostov and Belgorod are aghast at the prospect of heavily armed gangs roaming the land and wreaking havoc on the Russian side of the border.
President Dmitry Medvedev went to the World Economic Forum in Davos last week to woo global investors to Russia with claims of significant economic improvements on his watch. He outlined an ambitious 10-step strategy to increase investment in Russia. The laundry list of economic plans unveiled by the president included efforts to privatize dozens of state-owned companies, to create an international financial hub in Moscow and to set up a sovereign fund to reduce investor risks. Medvedev’s strategy is well-intentioned and competently crafted. Read the story.
I have argued on these pages that the tandem’s creative ambiguity as to which one of them will run for president in 2012 is now turning into a source of political instability in Russia. Yet looking back on 2010, the tandem’s purposeful uncertainty could actually be good for the country’s democracy, despite the destructive potential of the clannish rivalry. Vladimir Putin’s decision in 2007 not to change the Constitution to allow himself a third presidential term and his subsequent repositioning as the most powerful prime minister in modern Russian history with all the constitutional powers of a popularly elected president is perhaps the most under-recognized and undervalued contribution to the development of the country’s democracy. Read the story here.