

# **The Serbian Diaspora and Youth: Cross-Border Ties and Opportunities for Development**

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## 1 Introduction

The Republic of Serbia has traditionally been a country of emigration for economic and political reasons (IOM, 2008: 25). Serbia is also well known for its intellectual diaspora and highly skilled abroad (World Bank, 2008: 195). According to the World Bank, Serbia ranks as one of the top emigration countries with an estimated 2.3 million emigrants abroad, or approximately 22% of its total population (ibid.: 3-4). Other estimates, however, range between 3,2-3,8 million Serbians living abroad (MARRI, 2006). The Serbian Ministry for Diaspora (MfD)<sup>1</sup> are the highest, estimated to be between 3,9-4,2 million Serbs abroad and based on a broad definition of diaspora (IOM, 2008: 23). Serbia is also a top recipient of remittances, with an estimated 4.9 billion USD of remittance entering the country yearly, or 14% of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (ibid.: 195). Estimates of countries of destination place Germany as the highest recipient of Serbian emigrants, followed by Austria, Switzerland, the United States and Turkey (IOM, 2008: 16).

The Serbian population has been declining linearly from a 1998 high of 7.58 million to a 2009 low of 7.33 million (Eurostat, 2010). Population projections show that the number of those aged 5-19 will continue to decline as well (Izvorski & Kahkonen, 2008: 67). These numbers indicate an ageing population and high emigration rates in general. Unemployment continues to be an issue, with raw numbers and percentage rates increasing since late 2008 (Serbian Ministry of Finance, 2010). Labor market activity of those aged 15-64 has also decreased yearly from 68.9% in 2003 to 60.6% in 2009 (Eurostat, 2010). High unemployment, low labor market participation rates and decreasing numbers of youth may lead to further migration from the country to live abroad, an indicator of the potential for Serbia to continue to produce emigrants and increase its reliance on immigration and return. In turn, management of labor migration has been addressed by the Serbian Government's (2009) *Migration Management Strategy*.

Young men and women have been seen to have higher potential than other age groups for migrating abroad (IOM, 2009). In a 2009 report for the non-governmental organization (NGO) Grupa 484, Pavlov (2009) reported on the results of a survey that estimated the emigration potential of young Serbs. Pavlov's survey found that 44% of those aged 15-24 and 27% of those aged 25-29 were potential migrants. Moreover, according to IOM (2009), over 35 percent of the youth population of the districts of Pcinjski, South Backa and Belgrade have migrated internationally. Both studies noticed that the reasons for leaving or considering leaving were linked to employment and the economic situation.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> The MfD was established in 2004 as the primary ministry for engaging with Serbians abroad. More information available online at: <http://www.mzd.gov.rs/Eng/Default.aspx>

<sup>2</sup> Other studies on migration propensity appear in a thorough literature review appearing in Kupiszewski (2009).

Nonetheless, many Serbian men and women living abroad continue to maintain close ties with their family and friends in Serbia as well as contact with other members of the diaspora. Remittances are one way in which the diaspora maintains close connections by assisting in the wellbeing of their relatives, purchasing real-estate, as private investment or as consumption (IOM, 2007). Contact with other members of the diaspora is maintained through cultural and professional diaspora associations, as many as 1000 of which are spread across 191 countries (IOM, 2008). These diaspora associations are envisaged as a starting point for directly engaging with the diaspora and maintaining close connections that can enhance the developmental opportunities of Serbia.

The current paper produced by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) is part of a larger joint program that aims to address these issues by analyzing data about the diaspora and proposing policy initiatives. The joint program was implemented by the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the Republic of Serbia, the Spanish MDG Achievement Fund for Youth, Employment and Migration, the International Labor Organization (ILO), The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), and The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) under the title of Youth Employment and Migration (YEM) Joint Program (JP). IOM has been specifically tasked with assisting in the implementation of various outcomes, including assisting in the crafting of policies on the management of labor migration, including return, which is linked to employment policy and labor market strategies of the Republic of Serbia (ILO, 2010). Additionally, IOM is specifically tasked with raising awareness of youth for existing local services and the risks of irregular migration. Other joint tasks (in cooperation with ILO, UNDP and UNICEF) include creating a knowledge base and targets for youth employment and migration to inform policy, and finally for the strengthening of local partnerships to implement social programs and meet targets. The current paper will address these initiatives based on an interpretation of data collected from a unique, first-of-its-kind survey of the Serbian diaspora.

## 1.1 Aims

The aim of this study is to retell the data provided in a way which answers fundamental questions related to migration and diaspora policy in Serbia, particularly focusing on youth (those aged 15-30). The questions have to do with how the Serbian government can engage with the diaspora based on a description and analysis of the data. The primary questions asked throughout the paper are organized into three broad themes:

- 1) Why did people leave? When did they leave? What preventative policies can be put in place for the future? What do the youth need in order to prevent their departure?
- 2) Will they return? If so, for how long and what will they contribute? How can Serbia attract people back? What would entice people to move back to Serbia? What would they need when they come back, after expectations have changed?

- 3) If the diaspora do not wish to return, what relationship with Serbia can be maintained? Will the diaspora send money and remittances? Can we predict how much they will send? How can the Serbia government maximize the opportunities which arise from youth emigration?

## 1.2 Methodology

The survey was conducted by the Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia (RSO). It was dispersed in targeted countries of destination by means of mass media. The survey examined a representative sample of the Serbian diaspora based on preliminary requests sent to destination countries. A large number of responses were received, and was designed in Autumn 2009 and conducted in December 2009. The data collected are comparable with other surveys in Serbia (such as the regular Labor Force Survey done by the RSO) and international labor and migration surveys. The survey specifically targeted destination countries with large Serbian populations to achieve a large number of responses. The survey sample is quite large and can be considered to be significant and representative of the diaspora as a whole. Nevertheless, caution should be exhibited in interpreting results as certain segments of the Serbian diaspora may be underrepresented (including refugees and irregular migrants, see Section 3.1). The survey traced a series of demographic, economic and migration parameters which are reviewed in the second and third sections of the current report.<sup>3</sup>

Previous studies on the Serbian diaspora have been carried out by Bauralina, et. al. (2006), IOM (2007, 2008, 2009), Kupiszewski (2009), and Martinez, Endo & Barberis, (2006). These reports will be referenced throughout the current survey and serve as comparison. Group 484 has also produced a series of articles on specific aspects of the Serbian diaspora and youth in Serbia through its Research Interest for Migration Management in Southwestern Serbia project.<sup>4</sup> It is also suggested that policy makers refer to these documents as well to further understand the trends in Serbian labor migration beyond the current survey.

What this analysis has done is compared responses to elucidate which factors are generally important across the entire sample, as well as youth aged 15-30, highlighting results which can be relevant for sound policies. We describe the broad trends within the sample which can be generalized to the whole diaspora population and to diaspora youth aged 15-30. Significant

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<sup>3</sup> The data used in this report come from two sources. There is no significant difference between the data sources, although the raw numbers may differ. The original, or raw, data include responses from 1182 respondents included in an SPSS file and were used to generate the Figures and Tables in this document. Some Figures in this document come from the Statistical Office of Serbia (2010) and are cited accordingly. The analyzed data from the Statistical Office of Serbia included only 1005 respondents. This discrepancy is also noted by ILO (2010: 23). Any differences in percentages are minor and do not impact the overall analysis. For any detailed questions see The Statistical Office for the Republic of Serbia.

<sup>4</sup> Available on their website: <http://www.grupa484.org.rs/>

gender differences are noted when they are different from the sample. A more detailed micro-analysis based on age and gender allows us to see the differences between different sub-groups in the sample. Information on the demographic and socio-economic characteristics of the sample, including age, skills, relationship status, plans for the future and plans for return help provide an estimate of those willing to return and their expectations after they do return. However, there are some limitations to generalizing from the sample which will be addressed throughout the paper.


The current paper is targeted at central-level government officials as well as local-level officials, service providers and institutions offering direct support to youth and potential migrants. The direct beneficiaries of the proposed policies, in addition to the stakeholders listed above, are Serbian youth, potential emigrants in Serbia and the diaspora residing abroad. Indirect beneficiaries of the proposed policies may be other governments and their citizens, sharing best practices, international and intergovernmental institutions, and the Serbian population. The second section of the paper describes the main demographic characteristics of the sample. The third section describes the migration parameters of the sample. The fourth section outlines a series of policy options based on an interpretation of the findings. Recommendations for future research and potential replication of the survey are given in the fifth section.

## **2 Main Demographic Characteristics of the Sample**


Male respondents represent the majority of the sample (68.4%) with just under a third of the respondents female (31.6%) (See Figure 1). The majority of the sample is between 25-44 years of age (66.7%) (See Figure 2). Youth represent much of the sample with 42.2% of the sample being between less than 24 years of age until 34 years old. 30% of the sample is between 35-44 years of age. Elderly respondents represent the smallest section of the sample with 2.9% being over 65 years of age. The remaining ages represent approximately a quarter of the sample, with 45-54 years (17.3%) and 55-64 years (7.6%). Figure 3 lists the percentage of those aged 16-30, broken down in five year categories, demonstrating that the majority of youth are between 26-30 years of age with an average of 26 years. There is no observable relationship between age and gender in the sample.



**Figure 1: Gender**




**Figure 2: Age**



The gender difference in the sample may indicate that Serbian women, for a variety of reasons, have withdrawn from migrating because they participate in the labor market at home in Serbia, or culturally defined gender roles in Serbia do not permit women to participate in the labor market, either at home or abroad, requiring them to stay at home and tend to children and the elderly (for more on what motivates migration see Section 3.2).

**Figure 3: Youth Ages 15-30**



The spread of ages and gender indicate that those of working age (25-64), or 91.6% of sample, have the human, financial and social capital to migrate abroad for a period of time which is commensurate with their expectations, needs and desires. Underrepresentation of diaspora youth less than 24 years of age may suggest that the social and financial capital necessary to migrate is only accumulated over some time, i.e. it comes through some saving in Serbia. This stage of sufficient social and financial capital seems to have been accumulated by the age range 25-44, likely because of the growth of human capital following education, the support of social networks and the accumulation of saved financial capital necessary to migrate. Underrepresentation of those older than 65 may indicate lower initial migration rates, mortality of the diaspora or a return to Serbia for retirement as the diaspora age.

Nearly two-thirds (63.3%) of the sample is married, suggesting an attached and stable community which desires to establish themselves in the country of destination. The survey data do not demonstrate the percentage of the sample which has their spouse with them; however 27.7% of the sample reported that their spouse was very important to their decision to move abroad. Just over one-quarter of the sample (28.3%) is single, with 67% of youth aged 15-30 being single, which are those who have more potential for mobility than the married group. In other words, single respondents may be more mobile and flexible in their migration patterns, leading to increased potential for onward migration away from Serbia or return to Serbia if circumstances change. Only 8.5% of the sample is divorced, another group which may have the potential for mobility either away from or to Serbia.

The top ten destination countries for the Serbian diaspora, according to the World Bank (2998:195) include Germany, Austria, Switzerland, the United States, Turkey, Croatia, Sweden, Italy, Canada and Australia. The largest number of Serbian emigrants are estimated to be in Germany, with approximately 900,000 members of its diaspora there (ibid.: 6). According to the survey, and consistent with World Bank estimates, the largest percentage of respondents (60.3%) resides in countries within the European Union, primarily Switzerland and Germany (See Table 1). The majority of those residing within the EU are between 25 and 44 years of age. Following members of the diaspora in the EU are those residing in the countries of the former Yugoslavia (11%), the United States of America (8.3%), Canada (6.3%), Africa and the Far and Middle East (6.3%), Serbia (5.2%), Australia (1.7%) and Russia and the former Soviet Union (1.2%). More than a quarter (27.1%) of the diaspora live in Switzerland, Germany and the United States. Half of the diaspora (48.6%) live in those states plus Austria, Sweden and Canada. Almost the entirety (88.7%) of the diaspora live in Australia, Europe and North America (with China and the UAE as notable exceptions) with the remaining living in countries from around the world.

**Table 1: Top Twenty Countries of Residence**

Country	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Switzerland	121	10.2	10.2
Germany	101	8.5	18.8
United States	98	8.3	27.1
Austria	93	7.9	34.9
Sweden	88	7.4	42.4
Canada	74	6.3	48.6
Serbia	61	5.2	53.8
Slovenia	56	4.7	58.5
Italy	53	4.5	63.0
United Kingdom	50	4.2	67.3
France	44	3.7	71.0
Netherlands	40	3.4	74.4
Republic of Macedonia	37	3.1	77.5
United Arab Emirates	29	2.5	79.9
Croatia	23	1.9	81.9
Australia	21	1.8	83.7
China	16	1.4	85.0
Norway	16	1.4	86.4
Czech Republic	15	1.3	87.6

Bosnia and Herzegovina	13	1.1	88.7
Other	133	11.3	100.0
Total	1182	100.0	100.0

Nearly three-quarters of the sample (73.5%) was born in Serbia, the rest being born within the area of the former Yugoslavia (19.4%) and a small percentage being born abroad (7.1%). Of those who were born in Serbia, 86.5% are Serbian citizens, with 9.1% holding foreign citizenship, and a very small percentage (4.5%) retaining the citizenship of the former Yugoslavia, meaning they hold the citizenship of states which were not formed before 1991. A majority of persons (92.3%) responded that they are of Serbian nationality, with the rest (7.7%) claiming a different nationality.

In terms of mobility, 88.2% of the sample has not changed residence abroad within the past year, i.e. they have not moved from one country to another. The majority of those who have changed within the past year (11.8% of the total sample) are between 25 and 34 years old and single, the section of the population with the most potential for mobility. Additionally, 14% of women, versus 11% of men, have moved in the past year, and appear to be single with higher education.


Additionally, those with higher educational qualifications or those still in school have moved more in the past year (17% and 15%, respectively) than those with less education (5% for secondary education and 5% for high education). There is no general significant difference between where the diaspora resides now and where they did a year ago. However, there is one specific difference worth noting. Some 2.5% of respondents noted that they lived in Serbia one year ago, while 4.6% note that they live in Serbia now. This suggests that some of the sample either returned permanently or temporarily from their destination abroad.

## 2.1 Education and Training Background


The high education attainment of the sample (47.8% of the sample attended a faculty, academy or higher school, see Figure 4) corroborates other research which demonstrates the majority of the Serbian diaspora are highly educated, which has significance for brain drain and depletion of intellectual resources and skills (see Section 4). The majority of those without higher education in the sample have a secondary education (24.6%) or a high school education (10.3%). Amongst those aged 16-30, the majority have university education or at least secondary education (See Figure 5).<sup>5</sup>

<sup>5</sup> The survey does not specify whether those without education in Serbia have been educated abroad or have no formal education.

**Figure 4: Current Level of Education Outside the Republic of Serbia**



**Figure 5: Youth Level of Education Outside the Republic of Serbia**



**Table 2: Crosstabulation of Youth Currently Studying or Training for a Formal Degree at a University or Similar Institution**

			Are you currently studying or training for a formal degree at a university or similar institution?			Total
			Yes	No	No answer	
Age Youth	16-20	Count	6	1	3	10
		% of Total	2.1%	0.3%	1.0%	3.4%
	21-25	Count	27	22	11	60
		% of Total	9.3%	7.6%	3.8%	20.6%
	26-30	Count	52	129	40	221
		% of Total	17.9%	44.3%	13.7%	75.9%
Total	Count	85	152	54	291	
	% of Total	29.2%	52.2%	18.6%	100.0%	

Furthermore, over half (52.2%) of youth are not currently studying or training for a formal degree abroad (See Table 2). Almost 30% of youth are studying or training for a formal degree abroad, and although not a majority, this still has significance for which activities youth are currently engaged in. However, looking at Table 3, we can see that almost 55% of youth have a higher level of education than they did when they left Serbia, suggesting that most have received their qualifications after emigrating from Serbia. Just under a quarter (21%) have the same level of education as when they left Serbia.

**Table 3: Is your current level of education the same as when you left Republic of Serbia?**  
**Crosstabulation of Youth**

			Is your current level of education the same as when you left Republic of Serbia?				Total
			Yes	No	Don't know	No answer	
Age Youth	16-20	Count	1	4	2	3	10
		% of Total	0.3%	1.4%	0.7%	1.0%	3.4%
	21-25	Count	10	31	6	13	60
		% of Total	3.4%	10.3%	2.0%	4.3%	19.9%


	% of Total	3.4%	10.7%	2.1%	4.5%	20.6%
26-30	Count	50	124	6	41	221
	% of Total	17.2%	42.6%	2.1%	14.1%	75.9%
Total	Count	61	159	14	57	291
	% of Total	21.0%	54.6%	4.8%	19.6%	100.0%

Furthermore, nearly half (49.4%) of the general sample indicated that they had migrated for reasons other than obtaining a formal education at a university or a similar institution (See Figure 6). Those who responded that their reasons were not tied to formal education tended to be of a higher age, meaning that the disassociation of emigration and seeking education increased with age. Obtaining formal education was less important as the sample increased with age. Amongst young respondents, equal percentages respond that going abroad for education is very important and that it is not important (See Figure 7). Those who responded that formal education was important, but not crucial, for their reasons for going abroad (16% of the sample) also decreased with age. Additionally, 40% of single respondents responded that education was important for their reasons and 56% of married respondents thought it was unimportant.


In other words, younger people increasingly responded that going abroad for an education is important (around 36.1% of the sample). On the other hand, education becomes less important as age increases. In many ways, this is to be expected, as the older members of the diaspora have either achieved a higher education or find it unnecessary for their work (e.g. those who have only secondary or higher education, but who have satisfactory incomes relative to Serbian income distributions). Data on highest educational attainment attest that education is an important reason for emigration to respondents still in school, while those not in school overwhelmingly attest that it is unimportant for their reasons for going abroad. For more on reasons for going abroad, see Section 3.2.



**Figure 6: Reasons for going abroad – Formal education at a university or similar institution**




**Figure 7: Reasons for going abroad by youth – Formal education at a university or similar institution**



### 2.1.1 Education before Residence Abroad


In general, the sample was well-educated before leaving Serbia. Almost 30% of the sample received a university education in Serbia before going abroad (See Figure 8). 24.2% of the sample received an upper secondary education lasting 4-5 years. A slight fraction of the sample (5.1%) received a master level degree in Serbia. Even less (0.8%) received a PhD. Just 8.9% of the sample did not graduate high school. Almost ten percent (9.3%) of the sample did not complete a primary school education. 5.6% of the sample was without education in Serbia before leaving Serbia.

**Figure 8: Educational Attainment in the Republic of Serbia**



Fields of study vary, but in general the diaspora concentrated their study in Serbia in the fields of social sciences, economics, law, political science, sociology, psychology, and business (11.9%), computer science (5.3%), and engineering, manufacturing and construction (18%) (See Figure 9). Mathematics and health and welfare services make up around 10% of the sample. 37% of the sample is without a specific field of study or without a specific technical education and had received a general education or was without education in Serbia. Other fields, such as teaching and education, humanities, languages, biology, statistics, agriculture and services make up the rest of the sample, each between 1-4% of the total sample. Women are more prevalent in foreign languages (9% versus 1%), and social sciences such as law, political science, law, economics (19% versus 9%), whereas men are more prevalent in engineering and manufacturing (21% versus 11%) and without education or unknown (21% versus 12%).


**Figure 9: Field of highest educational attainment/training in Republic of Serbia**



### 2.1.2 Education during Residence Abroad

A majority of respondents said that their education level remained the same after leaving the Republic of Serbia. When asked if their current level of education is the same as when they left Serbia, 54.5% said yes. 38.3% of the sample said that their education level had risen after leaving, which demonstrates that education is indeed important for over a quarter of the sample. Those who did receive an education outside Serbia, almost a quarter (23.8%) received a university education at a faculty or academy (See Figure 10). 13.9% went on to obtain masters degrees, and 8.3% PhD. A percentage of the sample completed all or part of their secondary or high school education outside Serbia (about 27%).

**Figure 10: Current Level of Education Outside of Serbia**




Outside of Serbia the diaspora tended to concentrate on fields similar to those who studied in Serbia, such as social science, economics, law, political science, psychology, business, computer science, engineering, manufacturing and construction (See Figure 11).<sup>6</sup> Foreign languages and the humanities receive marginally more focus, but not significantly more. Only 17.2% of the sample is currently studying for a formal degree at a university or similar institution. Of those who are studying for a degree, 40.6% are in undergraduate or bachelor-type programs, 24.8% are master degree programs and 17.6% are PhD programs. The fields of study for those currently studying again concentrate in the social sciences, economics, law, political science, psychology, sociology and business (39.2%), engineering, manufacturing and construction (12.3%) computer science (8.8%) and the humanities (8.2%). Agriculture and foreign languages get equally 5.3% of the fields, with other fields being only marginally represented with between one and three percent of the sample each. It is unclear whether it is because certain fields of study and/or specialization are not offered in Serbia that some emigrated. This would perhaps require a very close look at the specializations to determine whether they are indeed absent from Serbian universities' curricula. However we may be able to determine that those subjects which are studied outside Serbia are indicators of what is lacking in Serbia and what is considered to offer


<sup>6</sup> The second column is labeled 'Unknown', which is different than 'No Answer'. This is an indication of those who are unaware of their field as they did not receive education beyond primary or secondary school or did not complete higher education with any specific training.

more opportunity abroad (See Section 4.2 for more on what this implies for preventing future emigration and integration).

**Figure 11: Field of study of highest degree outside the Republic of Serbia**




**Figure 12: When did you obtain your highest degree?**



Over a quarter (25.9%) of respondents completed their highest degree outside of Serbia between 2000 and 2010, with the majority graduating in 2008 (See Figure 12). Almost ten percent (9.4%) completed their highest degrees between 1991 and 2000. Less than five percent completed their highest degrees before 1990. Most of the respondents (43.3%) will have obtained their degree in 2010. 26.9% will have obtained their degree in 2011, and 14.6% in 2012. The remaining 15 percent will obtain their degree between 2013-2015, or have no estimate when they will complete their degree. These may be people who intend to obtain their degree and stay abroad.

Finally, the data on education in Serbia and abroad do not indicate the time of migration. We do not know if they lived in Serbia before leaving or when they left Serbia, so comparing data on education in Serbia and abroad yields limited conclusions. The main conclusions are that there were more respondents that completed primary, secondary and university education in Serbia than those who completed them abroad and that those who completed Masters and PhD degrees obtained them primarily abroad (See Figure 13). This has implications for policy as youth are getting their undergraduate and vocational education in Serbia and pursuing post-graduate education abroad.

**Figure 13: Highest Educational Attainment in Serbia and Abroad**



Source: RSO, 2010: 15

## 2.2 Work Experience

A broad range of professions are represented by the sample. By far the largest group are computer systems designers and programmers, engineers (civil, electrical, mechanical and chemical), economists, higher education (i.e. teachers and professors at universities), and translators and interpreters.<sup>7</sup> Other professions are indeed represented, but on average less than two percent each of the sample. It must be noted that almost all recognizable professions are present among the diaspora, which thus represents a wide range of talent and expertise at a variety of levels and skills. Most of the sample has been practicing their current occupation outside of Serbia for some time. A quarter of the sample has been practicing outside of Serbia between seven and 20 years. In contrast, another quarter of those practicing outside Serbia have been practicing for only one to four years.

## 2.3 Labour Status


At the time of the survey, 64.5% of the sample did work for pay in the previous week (See Figure 14). 42.3% of youth between 26-30 years of age worked in the reference week, with less than half of those working (18.9%) did not work (See Table 4). In general, in terms of education, those with higher education responded that they had worked in the previous week (See Figure 15). Moreover, the difference between those who worked and who did not work, in terms of education, is less in those with less than a higher education. This suggests that those with less education are just as likely to be unemployed as employed, whereas there is more chance of employment with a higher education. Finally, the longer the respondent has been

<sup>7</sup> Professions are based on field of education data. See Sections 2.1.1 and 2.1.2 for more information.



living abroad, the more likely they are to be employed (as demonstrated by Figure 15, excluding those who have lived abroad for ten years or more).

**Figure 14: Did you perform during the reference week any work for pay or profit (cash payment or payment in kind) for at least an hour?**




Source: RSO, 2010: 16


**Table 4: Crosstabulation of Work Performed in Previous Week and Youth**

			Age Youth			Total
			16-20	21-25	26-30	
Did you perform during the reference week any work for pay or profit (cash payment or payment in kind) for less than 1 hour (including work in family farm/business) even if revenue was not realized or nothing produced during the reference week?	Yes	Count	2	21	123	146
		% of Total	0.7%	7.2%	42.3%	50.2%
	No	Count	4	28	55	87
		% of Total	1.4%	9.6%	18.9%	29.9%
	No answer	Count	4	11	43	58
		% of Total	1.4%	3.8%	14.8%	19.9%
Total		Count	10	60	221	291
		% of Total	3.4%	20.6%	75.9%	100.0%

**Figure 15: Work Performed in the Previous Week by Level of Education**



**Figure 16: Work Performed in the Last Week by Years Abroad**




There appears to be a correlation between years abroad and work done during the reference week. The less they have been abroad the more likely it is that they had not worked in the reference week (See Figure 16). Those who did not work (5%) spent time in the process of opening a business. A marginal fraction (less than 1%) did agricultural work where the products were partially sold. Those that did not work did not have a personal business (farm or professional practice) for which they will resume working for. Additionally, around six per cent of those who did not work were absent from work, and have assurances that they will resume work after the reference week is over. Of those who did not work during the reference week, only 15.9% did not have to work because there was no work to be done. 5.9% were laid off or had had their contracts suspended.

In general, the majority of reasons for not working are attributed to personal reasons, rather than economic reasons. These included maternity, annual leave, illness or off-season work (See Figure 17). In other words, most of those who did not work had taken personal time for their own reasons. The duration of absence is interesting to note, as a small fraction had taken off time for more than three months (the specific amount of time was unspecified) and an

insignificant percentage will not resume work. Most of those who did receive salary during their absence received 50% or more of their weekly salary.

**Figure 17: Reasons for Absence from Work**



Of all of those who work, all have the right to revenue (profit, wages, salary). Slightly less, but still a substantial proportion, have the right to pension insurance (79.2%) and to health insurance (77.4%). The majority of respondents (66%) work in a privately registered institution. The rest of respondents work for the state (18.7%), another form of institution (7.5%) or a socially owned institution (5%). The respondents that have worked have participated in a broad range of economic activity, with production and manufacture of a variety of goods being generally well represented relative to other forms of economic activity (such as agriculture, mining, textile preparation, printing and publishing).

With regards to professional status, just about one-quarter of all respondents are self-employed, either as employee or owner. One-tenth (10.0%) of the respondents are owners or the sole proprietors of businesses, a further 5.2% are self-employed and a further 10.2% are

commissioned outworkers. Just under half of those who are self-employed (40.2%) hire others and employ other employees; in other words, far more than the 10% who are the owners of businesses. Nearly all of the remaining three-quarters of the respondents (71.9%) are employees. A clear majority of the workers in the sample working in an enterprise/institution (85.7%) are on a written labor contract. Women tend to work more for the state than men (24% versus 16%) and men tend to work for private companies than women (69% versus 58%). In general men employ others more often than women in the sample (45% versus 27%).

## **2.4 Job Search**

The respondents are nearly all of working age, with 98.2% under 75 years of age. Of those who were not working and of working age (approximately 35%), only 20.1% sought employment during the previous four weeks. More women (25%) than men (17%) sought employment in the last four weeks. It is clear that a significant proportion (65.2%) of those who did not seek employment were not about to begin a job, i.e. they were still looking, they were unemployed.

Answering advertisements in journals, newspapers, or on the Internet seems to be the most popular form of job-seeking amongst the respondents (66.7%). Contacting the national employment office of the country is deemed to be equally useful by the respondents (45.5%), followed by applying directly to employers and contacting private employment agencies (39.4%). Asking friends, relatives and others within the respondents' social networks proved to be a legitimate means of accessing employment as well (39.4%). Other methods like taking an exam, looking for land, equipment or financial resources, or employment fairs were less popular, but still utilized amongst a small percentage of the respondents. In general men tended to contact private employment agencies (41% versus 19%) and apply directly to employers (53% versus 25%), whereas women tended to ask friends and relatives (44% versus 35%), answer newspaper ads (63% versus 59%) more than men. Women (81%) overwhelmingly studied advertisements in newspapers, journals and on the internet more than men (53%). Only a few respondents were awaiting the results of a job application, recruitment opportunity or the national employment office.

Some 16% of those who are not seeking employment responded to the question of whether they would be willing to work, and, of those, nearly two-thirds (65.2%) said they would not (less than half (36.4% are currently studying at university and not willing to work, 12 respondents in total). It is unclear why they are not willing. However, if a job were offered to the respondent, 57.4% of those respondents would be available to start within the next two weeks.

## **3 Migration Parameters**

This section describes legal status in the destination country, reasons for migration, residence abroad and remittances.

### 3.1 Legal Status

Nearly half (45.1%) of the respondents are citizens of the country in which they currently live, while another 42.4% of the respondents have secured a more permanent residential status.<sup>8</sup> This indicates that the strong majority of the respondents (87.5%) has a stable status which allows them to reside in that country for extended periods or indefinitely. Of those who have lived outside of Serbia for over 10 years, 75.9% have citizenship status of their country of residence. High numbers reflect that a large percentage of the diaspora who have lived abroad for longer periods are integrated and exercise their rights in the host country. Whether they have direct and deep links back in Serbia, or whether they exercise their rights there, is not clear from the data.

Five respondents declared that they had no legal status, representing less than one percent of the respondents. No recognized refugees or asylum-seekers are represented among the respondents. A low response of those who are residing irregularly with no legal status may under-represent this group of Serbians abroad or may indicate that those with no legal status do not feel they are members of the official diaspora. There is no estimated percentage of those abroad to be staying irregularly or working in the informal market, which is an indicator of potentials for return. According to the European Council (2010b), Serbia accepted 2,465 readmissions on the basis of readmission agreements out of 2,577 requests in 2007, while in 2008 all 1,572 readmission requests were accepted, shedding some light on the numbers of irregularly staying Serbians. In parallel, UNHCR (2010) reports that in 2005, 5,828 refugees returned to Serbia, whereas at the end of 2009 2,705 returned, reflecting a decrease in returns registered with UNHCR. As of January 2010, UNHCR reports a total population of concern originating from Serbia to be 436,775 people. Finally, a crucial question to ask in the developmental context is the relationship between voluntary and forced migration, and whether voluntary and forced migrants have the same interests in contributing to local and national development (Nyberg-Sørensen, Van Hear & Engberg-Pedersen, 2002). Lacking data on refugees' impacts on development in Serbia can hinder future efforts at return.

### 3.2 Reasons for Migration

The top three reasons for going abroad are:


- 1) Chances of finding a better paid job than you had in Serbia
- 2) Chances of finding employment
- 3) Acquisition of new or other occupation skills

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<sup>8</sup> 86.5% of the sample is a citizen of Serbia as well, see Section 2.

When giving reasons for why they had migrated, respondents gave slightly more importance to the chance of finding general employment rather than finding a *specific* job (See Figure 18). In other words, the chance of finding any employment was more important than finding employment that matches their skill set. Nearly two-thirds (62.5%) responded that the chances of finding general employment were very important or important in their decision to leave Serbia, whereas 57.5% gave the same responses concerning specific jobs. The distinction is crucial, because there is risk in leaving a country for a job, and that risk is mitigated by accepting a broad range of work rather than particular professions. The most significant factor, however, in terms of reasons for leaving, was the chance not of finding employment, but of finding **better-paid** employment, with 36.6% citing this as a very important factor in the decision to leave, and a further 27.6% agreeing that it was important (64.2% together). Multiple responses were obviously possible in this question.

**Figure 18: Reasons for Going Abroad**



**Source: RSO, 2010: 9**

At the same time, however, these data should not suggest that the reasons for migration are simply to maximize personal gain and income. As noted above, the question is a multiple-response one and, indeed, migration decisions occur because of complex social factors which include factors such as the family and local communities.

There is no general difference between men and women. However women were more likely to go abroad for university than men (24% versus 18% consider it very important) and more women than men went abroad to improve language skills (20% versus 15% consider it very important). While improvement of language skills was not ranked as particularly important by respondents in general, it tends to be more important for younger respondents (those aged 24 or younger). Those who had already resided abroad for a longer period of time understandably put

less emphasis on language skills simply because they have acquired them over time, where younger respondents have not yet had that opportunity. In terms of language, skills in general are excellent: 69.4% of the respondents rate their level of the language of the host country as high.

Family reunion, or joining family or close friends in the host country, was, again, not ranked as high as employment. However, it must be noted that almost a quarter of the respondents (24.4%) did say this was a very important factor in determining whether to leave Serbia, and a further 10.7% said it was important. Amongst women, 35% thought it was very important, versus 20% for men.


Finally, other reasons cited for going abroad included political circumstances, uncertainty, war or conscription. Most of the respondents did not respond to this question (75.6%). However, the percentage that did respond (21.1%) comes from a unique demographic group. Those that cited these as reasons to go abroad are predominantly male, aged 45-54, divorced or married, born in the former Yugoslavia, have foreign citizenship, a nationality other than Serbian and have been living in a foreign country for 10-20 years, in other words, they left Serbia between 1990 and 2000.

Regarding youth, there is some variation within the sub-sample (See Figure 19). Far more of those aged 16-30 left Serbia for education than the overall sample, with 48.1% noting that this was very important or important in their decision to leave (compared to 36.1% of the overall sample). The top three reasons why youth aged 15-30 went abroad are:

- 1) Formal education at a university or similar institution
- 2) Chances of finding a better paid job than the one you had in Serbia
- 3) Acquisition of new occupational skills




**Figure 19: Reasons for Going Abroad By Youth Aged 15-30**




### 3.3 Duration of Residence Abroad

In general, older respondents have lived abroad for longer, while younger respondents have lived abroad for shorter periods of time. Those who are aged 25-34 tend to have lived abroad for average 2-5 years. Those who are aged 35-44 tend to have lived abroad for 5-10 years. Those who have lived abroad for 10-20 years tend to be older, around 45-54 years of age. Finally, those who have lived abroad for more than twenty years tend to be 55 years and older. A small percentage has lived abroad for up to two years (11.2%) with the majority being less than 24 years of age (See Figures 20, 21 and 22).

**Figure 20: Years Abroad**




**Figure 21: Years Abroad By Age**



### 3.4 Choice of Destination Country

It is interesting to note the differences in the more general responses to “reasons for going abroad” and in the responses to “reasons for going to a specific country.” When a particular country is specified, employment or other economic opportunities were noted by the most respondents as being very important (37.5%) (See Figure 22). Another quarter (22.6%) of the respondents claimed that economic opportunity or employment was important. These responses cut across all demographic characteristics, being broadly shared amongst the respondents.

**Figure 22: Choice of Destination Country**



Source: RSO, 2010: 9

While family unification was not a key reason for going abroad, it does become quite significant in terms of selecting which country in particular a migrant goes to. Just over half (50.4%) of respondents note that family or friends played a very important or important role in the selection of destination country. Amongst women, marriage, relatives, friends and acquaintances ranked as very important for half of the sample (50%), but had less significance for men (35%). It was important but not crucial for 22% men to know that other people had gone to this country, compared with 16% of women.

Employment opportunities, however, remain the most significant factor, with 65.8% of respondents agreeing that this was a very important or important factor. The role of networks, or linkages between migrants, does seem to have played a role as well, with 39% noting that having known people who had also migrated to this country was a very important factor.

In terms of networks, information shared on particular countries, while not seen by a majority of migrants as very important, does play a role in the selection of destination country, with nearly

half (47.8%) of the respondents, also noting that the reputation of the country was important in their decision-making. Whether reputation here refers to the labor market, the attitude toward migrants, etc. is hard to know, but we can conclude that here, too, the context of reception toward migrants is an important factor.

Looked at the data from a more specific angle, a number of questions related to the person who had influence on the decision to come to the host country were asked. The most important responses came from those who said that spouses and parents or other relatives were very important in their decision. 41% of women, versus 21% of men, cited their spouse as very important for influencing their decision. Friends and acquaintances, the company of employment, scholarship authorities, Serbian universities or host country universities had considerably less importance in the decision to go than spouses or family. These data suggest that spouses and family members in Serbia directly influenced the decisions to leave abroad. This in line with general theories of migration which postulate that household-level factors are important in determining the reasons for going abroad (Massey et. al., 1998).

An educational grant or scholarship was unimportant for a majority of the respondents (64.6%), except for a small percentage of people (10.7%) who used that avenue to go abroad, for without it they most likely would not have left. Additionally, as a percentage of those who went abroad to study, 7.2% regarded their scholarship as very important. Education or training opportunities in general are in general neither important nor unimportant, although a close majority responded that education was unimportant (40%), with almost a quarter (24.1%) responding that education and training opportunities were very important, predominantly for young respondents. 22.7% of the respondents said that a combination of circumstances created a possibility which gave them a reason to select their particular host country.

Finally, youth responses had some variation from the sample as a whole. Previous time in the country was seen as unimportant still (46%). A grant or scholarship was equally unimportant for nearly half of those aged 16-30 (49.5%). Knowing other people or getting to know people in the country of destination was almost equally unimportant at 42.3% and 39.5% of youth, respectively. Language learning was mostly unimportant (36.4%). The reputation of the country<sup>9</sup> was important for a quarter of respondents (26.5%), but was considered mostly unimportant (33.7%). The main important variables for going to a certain country are family or friends, including marriage (38.1%), but is almost equally unimportant (34%) (See Table 5). Education and training opportunities are equally important (35.1%), with less responding that it was unimportant (26.5%) (See Table 6). Employment opportunities were also considered very important (33.7%) (See Table 7).

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<sup>9</sup> 'Reputation' was not specified in the survey.

**Table 5: Youth Choices of Destination Country – Family, Friends, Marriage, Acquaintances**

			Age Youth			Total
			16-20	21-25	26-30	
Importance	Very important	Count	3	23	85	111
		% of Total	1.0%	7.9%	29.2%	38.1%
	Important	Count	0	3	20	23
		% of Total	0.0%	1.0%	6.9%	7.9%
	Unimportant	Count	2	21	76	99
		% of Total	0.7%	7.2%	26.1%	34.0%
	No answer	Count	5	13	40	58
		% of Total	1.7%	4.5%	13.7%	19.9%
Total	Count	10	60	221	291	
	% of Total	3.4%	20.6%	75.9%	100.0%	

**Table 6: Youth Choices of Destination Country – Education or Training Opportunity**

			Age Youth			Total
			16-20	21-25	26-30	
Importance	Very important	Count	2	21	79	102
		% of Total	0.7%	7.2%	27.1%	35.1%
	Important	Count	1	10	36	47
		% of Total	0.3%	3.4%	12.4%	16.2%
	Unimportant	Count	3	15	59	77
		% of Total	1.0%	5.2%	20.3%	26.5%
	No answer	Count	4	14	47	65
		% of Total	1.4%	4.8%	16.2%	22.3%
Total	Count	10	60	221	291	
	% of Total	3.4%	20.6%	75.9%	100.0%	

**Table 7: Youth Choices of Destination Country – Employment or Other Income Opportunity**

			Age Youth			Total
			16-20	21-25	26-30	
Importance	Very important	Count	1	16	81	98

	% of Total	0.3%	5.5%	27.8%	33.7%
Important	Count	1	18	53	72
	% of Total	0.3%	6.2%	18.2%	24.7%
Unimportant	Count	3	12	42	57
	% of Total	1.0%	4.1%	14.4%	19.6%
No answer	Count	5	14	45	64
	% of Total	1.7%	4.8%	15.5%	22.0%
Total	Count	10	60	221	291
	% of Total	3.4%	20.6%	75.9%	100.0%

### 3.5 Judgments of the Serbian Community in the Host Country


Does the respondent think that there is a significant Serbian community of equal status in the host country? It appears that the diaspora is unable to answer this question with any certainty. 30% of the respondents think that more people from Serbia with a commensurate level of education are living in the respondent's host country than in other countries. An equal number of people responded that there are less (29.2%), with the large amount of the sample (40.8%) unable to estimate. In other words, the survey sample is divided in thinking that there are more people of their socio-economic status in the country of residence than in other countries. The diaspora's impressions of their socio-economic status is reflected in these data, and suggests that the diaspora community is divided about the boundaries of their in-group and that there is no clear picture of what constitutes the Serbian diaspora and its socio-economic bounds amongst the diaspora themselves.

### 3.6 Remittances and Ways of Transfer

Of the three-quarters of the respondents who answered the question concerning remittances, almost one quarter (21.7%) of the respondents remitted more than 6,000 EUR in goods and money in the past year.<sup>10</sup> Almost equally, 18.9% of respondents sent back less than 600 EUR. The rest of the respondents (40.2%) sent back between 600 and 6,000 EUR (See Figure 23). 29% of men remitted more than 6,000 EUR, compared with 19% of women; otherwise there was no significant difference in gender.


<sup>10</sup> More specific data regarding the frequency of remitting over the year are not covered by the survey.

**Figure 23: Remittances in the Last Year**



The three-quarters of the respondents who do send remittances tend to carry it personally or use the banking system (See Figure 24). Thus a sizeable portion of the sample uses informal means for transmitting remittances as opposed to more formal means. Using the banking system was less popular but was the primary method for about a quarter of the respondents. The least popular method was having others carry remittances. This is in contrast to a study by IOM (2007) which demonstrated that intermediaries such as friends, acquaintances and bus-drivers were popular methods of transferring remittances. Furthermore, Figure 25 demonstrates that remittances increase as the duration of years abroad increases, i.e. the longer one has been abroad the higher probability they will send remittances.

**Figure 24: Services Used for Transmitting Money**




**Source: RSO, 2010: 12**

The remittances being sent back to Serbia are being used primarily for daily necessities like food, clothing, rent, utilities, etc. Housing improvements also seem to be important compared to other uses. The remittances are not being significantly used by a majority for education, savings, debt payments, land acquisition or investment (See Figure 26).


Just over one-quarter of the respondents are saving money for a house or land in Serbia (26.1%), with another 17.6% saving for a house elsewhere. Saving money to build or buy a house is the primary savings goal among the respondents, followed immediately by saving for travel. Nearly one-third (31.3%) indicate that their travels are in Serbia, suggesting that they are saving for trips home to Serbia. Just 9% are saving for travels elsewhere.



**Figure 25: Remittances by Years Abroad**



**Figure 26: Savings for Particular Goals**



Source: RSO, 2010: 12

Table 8 demonstrates that there is a correlation between the amount sent in remittances in the past year and the propensity to save. The less remittances sent, the higher probability that one will not have saved. It is possible that some who are not saving are instead sending remittances, and don't view that as saving.


**Table 8: Crosstabulation of those Not Saving For Any Particular Goal by Remittances**

			What is the approximate value of the goods and money you transmitted to Republic of Serbia over the past year?						Total
			Less than €600	600 to €1.200	1.200 to €3.000	3.000 to €6.000	More than €6.000	No answer	
Are you currently saving toward any particular	In Serbia	Count	23	12	7	5	5	3	55
		%	41.8%	21.8%	12.7%	9.1%	9.1%	5.5%	100.0%
		% of Total	10.1%	5.3%	3.1%	2.2%	2.2%	1.3%	24.1%
	In this	Count	37	24	16	3	9	11	100

goal? - Have no saving	country	%	37.0%	24.0%	16.0%	3.0%	9.0%	11.0%	100.0%
		% of Total	16.2%	10.5%	7.0%	1.3%	3.9%	4.8%	43.9%
	Elsewhere	Count	2	2	4	1	4	3	16
		%	12.5%	12.5%	25.0%	6.3%	25.0%	18.8%	100.0%
		% of Total	0.9%	0.9%	1.8%	0.4%	1.8%	1.3%	7.0%
	No answer	Count	4	4	2	5	3	39	57
		%	7.0%	7.0%	3.5%	8.8%	5.3%	68.4%	100.0%
		% of Total	1.8%	1.8%	0.9%	2.2%	1.3%	17.1%	25.0%
	Total	Count	66	42	29	14	21	56	228
		%	28.9%	18.4%	12.7%	6.1%	9.2%	24.6%	100.0%
% of Total		28.9%	18.4%	12.7%	6.1%	9.2%	24.6%	100.0%	

A majority (64.9%) of the three-quarters of the respondents who send remittances would be interested in using an internet-based service portal that assists them in transferring their money (See Figure 27). There are differences among the different age groups, however, with older respondents being less interested than younger respondents (75% of those up to age 25 are interested, compared to 41% of older respondents). There is no significant difference between men and women in using an internet based service.


**Figure 27: Using Internet-Based Service for Remittance Transfer and Sending Information**



Source: RSO, 2010: 13

Finally, if a member of the diaspora were to leave his or her country of residence within the next six months, 18.1% responded that they would bring back more than 100,000 EUR in money and goods that are available to them (See Figure 28). The lowest amount of money, less than 5000 EUR represents 18.3% of the respondents. The number of people who will return with money and goods decreases as the amount of money increases. In other words, as the amount of money that one can bring back to Serbia increases, the number of people who can bring back that amount decreases. However, once 100,000 EUR is reached, then there is a dramatic increase in the responses from the respondents. This indicates that there is a modest amount of people who can bring back money between 5000-10000 EUR (16.5%), 10000-25000 EUR (14.9%), 25000-50000 EUR (13.6%), and 50000-100000 EUR (11.4%).

**Figure 28: If you were to leave this country within the next six months, how much money and goods, do you believe, you would be taking with you?**



There is a significant gender dimension in the case of return with goods and money: almost one-quarter of the male respondents (21%) would return with over 100,000 EUR, whereas exactly one quarter (25%) of the female respondents would return with less than 50,00 EUR. Moreover, the distribution of males who can bring back money is more even than the distribution of females who can bring back money, indicating a wide variation in earnings amongst the female respondents. Such a gender differential may be important to understanding motivations to return

to Serbia and motivations to remain abroad. In addition, those who are married are more likely to return with more money than those who are single (See Table 9).


**Table 9: If you were to leave this country within the next six months, how much in money and goods, do you believe, you would be taking with you?**

	Total	Sex		Marital status		
		Male	Female	Single	Married	Divorced
Count	1005	687	318	284	636	85
- 5.000 €	<b>18.3</b>	15	25	32	13	14
5.000 - 10.000 €	<b>16.5</b>	16	17	24	14	13
10.000 - 25.000 €	<b>14.9</b>	14	16	15	15	16
25.000 - 50.000 €	<b>13.6</b>	15	11	10	14	22
50.000 - 100.000 €	<b>11.4</b>	13	9	6	14	9
100.000+ €	<b>18.1</b>	21	12	7	23	18
Don't know	<b>7.1</b>	6	10	6	7	7
Total	100%					

Source: RSO, 2010: 46

Finally, 28.5% of those aged 16-30 would bring back less than 5000 EUR if they returned in the next six months (See Figure 29). 22% would return with 5000-10000 EUR, and 13.1% would return with 10000-25000 EUR. These numbers suggest that the diaspora youth would be returning with significantly less money than their older counterparts. This implies that programs regarding money transfers or diaspora investments should be targeted at the older population and youth programs should focus on saving and retaining money for future use.

**Figure 29: If you were to leave this country within the next six months, how much money and goods, do you believe, you would be taking with you?- By Youth**




### 3.7 Plans for the Future

Almost one quarter (23.3%) of respondents think that the best option for their future is to live and work entirely in another country (See Figure 30). A smaller proportion (17.9%) regard living and working entirely in Serbia as their best option. However, 18.5% of respondents think that they should live in Serbia but work partly in another country, which is close to the 16.3% of people who think that they should work partly in Serbia but live in another country.


Looked at another way, it means that slightly more than half of the respondents (52.7%) regard an option that includes Serbia in their future plans as best for them. Almost a quarter do not know what their best option for their future is (24%). There is a difference between suggesting return and planning for return, but there is no indication in the data whether these individuals actually plan on returning.

**Figure 30: Options for the Future**



Source: RSO, 2010: 21

**Figure 31: Expectations of Stay in Destination Country**



Source: RSO, 2010: 10

Nearly a quarter of the respondents, 21.1%, expect to remain abroad over their lifetime (Figure 31). Slightly more than a quarter, 26.9%, of the respondents, expect to be living abroad for another five to ten years. Those who responded that they will remain abroad for another one to five years represent 28.6% of the respondents. Finally, just 13.2% of the respondents responded they will reside abroad for less than 12 months. Just over one-tenth of the respondents do not know how long they will be living abroad (10.2%). What these responses signal and generally demonstrate, especially amongst the younger population, is that it is likely the respondents will *either* return soon (within the next five years) to Serbia and possibly remain there *or* remain abroad for a significant time (from 10 years to a lifetime).

**Table 10: Age and Likely Time of Return**

	Total	Sex		Age					
		Male	Female	Less than 24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-64	65+
Count	1005	687	318	55	369	302	174	76	29
Doesn't know	<b>10.2</b>	8	14	18	11	10	8	7	10
12 months or less	<b>13.2</b>	12	16	9	19	14	6	7	7
13 - 24 months	<b>7.8</b>	7	9	16	11	6	4	5	-
25 - 36 months	<b>6.8</b>	7	5	11	7	5	8	9	-
37 - 48 months	<b>4.1</b>	4	4	9	3	4	3	8	-
49 - 60 months	<b>9.9</b>	11	8	13	9	9	8	16	21
61 to 120 months	<b>10.6</b>	12	8	7	9	7	18	16	17
More than 10 years	<b>16.3</b>	19	11	5	10	18	30	14	14
Till end of life	<b>21.1</b>	20	24	11	21	26	14	18	31
Total	100%								

**Source: RLO, 2010: 43**


Regarding youth, when asked how many more months or years they expect to stay outside of Serbia, those aged under than 24 tended to not know (Table 10). 56% of those under 24 are studying an institution of formal education, indicating they may not know what their post-graduation plans are. Those aged 25-34 tended to respond that they expected to stay either 12 months or less *or* until the end of life. 22.7% of those without Serbian citizenship are more likely to stay abroad until the end of their lives than those with Serbian citizenship. Similarly, many of those aged 35-44 tended to answer that they would stay 12 months or less, but a majority more responded that they would spend more than 10 years or until the end of life. Those aged 45-54 had a clearer idea of where they would be in the future, with the majority responding that they would spend greater than 10 years abroad from the time of this survey. Those aged 55-64 had less certain responses, perhaps due to expected retirement, with the majority of respondents staying from 49 months (around 4 years) up to the end of life. Finally, those older than 65 years of age would generally stay anywhere from five years until the end of life.

When asked where they expect to be living in the future, respondents were able to select from one year from now, three years from now and five years from now. Nearly three-quarters, 70.7%, of the respondents said that they would be living in the country where they live now in



one year, 48.7% thought the same three years from now, and 32.2% thought so for five years from now (See Figure 32).

**Figure 32: Where do they expect to live in the future?**



Source: RSO, 2010: 10

Thus, respondents do have an expectation of moving – but where to? Some 8.8% of respondents thought they would be living in Serbia one year from now, which increased to 14.2% for a date three years in the future, and increased to 24.7% at five years (See Table 11). There seems to be less intention of moving from one foreign country to another: just 4.1% thought they would be living in a third country one year from now, 9.7% in three years and just 10.0% in five years. Nonetheless, there seems to be some uncertainty amongst respondents, with the percentage of those who say they do not know where they will be at one year being 16.4%, 27.5% at three years and 33.1% at five years. There is a connection between intention to stay abroad and length of time abroad, i.e. the longer they have been abroad the more likely they are to remain abroad. The most important finding may be that across the sample, including age, citizenship and duration abroad, the intention to move back to five years from now increases.

**Table 11: Where do you expect to be living in the future?**

	Total	Age						Citizenship			Duration of living in foreign country				
		Less than 24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-64	65+	Serbian	Foreign	Ex Yu	Till 2 years	2 - 5 years	5 - 10 years	10 - 20 years	More than 20
Count	1005	55	369	302	174	76	29	869	91	45	113	207	225	244	216

One year from now	Country where they live now	70.7	80	69	75	71	55	66	70	77	64	62	72	70	78	67
	In Republic Serbia	8.8	4	10	8	7	11	14	9	5	9	12	9	11	7	6
	In other foreign country	4.1	2	7	3	1	1	-	4	1	2	13	6	2	2	1
	Doesn't know	16.4	15	14	13	21	33	21	16	16	24	12	13	17	12	26
Three years from now	Country where they live now	48.7	45	44	51	53	50	59	48	62	40	40	42	45	57	54
	In Republic Serbia	14.2	20	15	13	11	17	14	14	14	16	18	13	18	14	11
	In other foreign country	9.7	9	15	8	7	1	-	11	3	2	19	18	7	7	2
	Doesn't know	27.5	25	25	28	29	32	28	27	21	42	23	28	30	23	32
Five years from now	Country where they live now	32.2	16	25	35	42	39	52	31	44	29	19	23	30	39	43
	In Republic Serbia	24.7	31	24	24	22	37	17	25	21	24	27	22	24	27	25
	In other foreign country	10.0	9	13	10	7	3	3	11	8	2	23	14	9	6	6
	Doesn't know	33.1	44	38	31	29	21	28	33	27	44	31	42	37	29	27
Total		100%														

Source: RSO, 2010: 44

### 3.8 Skills Acquired

Interestingly, given the intentions of respondents to either remain where they are or to return to Serbia, respondents overwhelmingly said that the skills, knowledge and experience they have acquired since leaving Serbia could be useful in the future – but neither in Serbia nor in their the current host country (45.0% noted this for “satisfactory employment,” with just 9.8% noting the same for Serbia and 17.3% for the current host country).

Similar results were obtained for business success, better paid employment and more stable or permanent employment. Such evidence strongly suggests that the Serbian diaspora, as surveyed now, expects that their skills, knowledge and experience will be more useful outside of Serbia in the future. These data are an indirect indication that their skills and experience are either considered by them to be more valuable in other labor markets *or* that their decision to return to Serbia at a later date does not include an evaluation of how their skills will be useful for the country. This suggests that the reasons for coming back to Serbia in the future may have little to do with employment prospects and may have to do with retirement, family concerns or the local community. The link between skills, knowledge, experience and education are detailed in Table 12. In general, the higher the education you have the more likely you are to think your skills will be useful outside of Serbia. Those with less education tended not to know where their skills would be useful.

**Table 12: What do you expect the skills, knowledge and experience acquired since leaving Serbia could or will be useful for in the future?**

		Total	Highest education attainment				
			Primary and less than primary	Secondary	High	Faculty, academy or higher school	Still in school
Count		1005	21	247	104	460	173
1. Satisfactory employment	In Serbia	9.8	10	7	13	10	11
	In country you are	17.3	19	26	23	12	16
	Elsewhere	45.0	-	25	38	55	57
	No answer	28.0	71	42	26	23	17
2. Success at business	In Serbia	10.2	14	11	14	9	9
	In country tou are	17.9	14	22	23	15	17
	Elsewhere	40.9	-	21	35	50	53
	No answer	30.9	71	47	28	25	21

3. Better paid employment	In Serbia	<b>6.9</b>	5	5	6	8	7
	In country you are	<b>21.3</b>	19	30	32	15	21
	Elsewhere	<b>39.7</b>	10	18	33	49	55
	No answer	<b>32.1</b>	67	48	30	28	17
4. More stable or permanent employment	In Serbia	<b>7.2</b>	10	6	5	8	6
	In country you are	<b>21.3</b>	10	32	29	15	21
	Elsewhere	<b>34.2</b>	5	15	29	42	50
	No answer	<b>37.3</b>	76	48	38	35	23
5. Other	In Serbia	<b>1.9</b>	-	4	3	1	1
	In country you are	<b>1.5</b>	-	2	5	1	-
	Elsewhere	<b>3.6</b>	-	4	3	4	2
	No answer	<b>93.0</b>	100	90	89	94	97
Total		100%					

Source: RSO, 2010: 93

### 3.9 Knowledge Regarding Reintegration Services Offered in Serbia upon Return

In general respondents believe that returnees to Serbia can benefit from assistance. The highest number of respondents (39.6%) felt that employment assistance and finding a job would benefit. Finding adequate housing ranked a far second, at 16.1% thinking many people would benefit. Finding adequate education or training, getting health insurance and social security coverage all come in at a close third, with around equal percentages of people claiming that many would benefit from such support. A marginal amount of people (2.3%) said that many people could benefit from unspecified support.

A majority (58.6%) of respondents think that the government is best placed to supply assistance to returnees. Just under half (42%) of respondents think that private organizations are best to provide support. Almost a quarter of respondents felt that international organizations are best equipped to provide support. Assistance from church organizations and political parties are seen to be less important in providing assistance, according to the respondents.

Expectations of the kinds of return assistance and opportunities are generally low. For example, in the next 24 months, if migrants were to return to Serbia, respondents tended to feel (ranging from 22%, on broad employment opportunities, to 39%, on level of income) that employment opportunities, income levels, housing and educational opportunities would be poor (See Table 13). Nonetheless, large portions (nearly half) of respondents noted that they did not know what to expect of employment opportunities, income levels, housing and educational opportunities. Health care is expected to be reasonable (by 19.3% of the respondents), but a majority responds

that they don't know what to expect. Results regarding expectations in the next 24 months also generalize to peoples' expectations about aspects of their lives, with many people regarding employment opportunities adequate to their level of education, level of income, education and training opportunities, housing and health care as generally poor, or they do not know and cannot make an expectation.

When asked if they know anybody who has returned to Serbia in the last 12 months and what their situation is in these same aspects, respondents answer similarly – with answers noting that the situation is “bad” ranging from 21.9% in the case of training and education to 32.1% in the case of level of income, and around half saying they don't know (See Table 14). Here, too, as in respondents' expectation of their own situation should they return home, health care has the highest support, with just 16.3% expecting that the situation of healthcare is “bad,” 6.2% reporting that their acquaintances' situation is “good” and nearly two-thirds not knowing. A high “don't know” response, which appeared across all categories in both these questions, has its own interpretation – one explanation is that information flows from home are either poor or are viewed as unreliable. What is clear is that there is considerable uncertainty regarding what awaits a potential returnee – information campaigns and regularly updated economic bulletins posted on embassy webpages could very well have a place in this respect.

**Table 13: What would you expect for each of the following aspects of your life, if you were to return to Serbia at a time of your choice after the next 24 months?**

		Total	Age					
			Less than 24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-64	65+
Count		1005	55	369	302	174	76	29
1. Employment opportunities adequate to your level of education and training	Poor	<b>26.7</b>	15	29	27	28	24	21
	Reasonable	<b>18.8</b>	27	20	20	19	8	-
	Good	<b>15.2</b>	20	20	14	13	5	7
	Don't know	<b>39.3</b>	38	31	39	40	63	72
2. Other employment opportunities	Poor	<b>20.0</b>	18	19	22	21	17	17
	Reasonable	<b>20.0</b>	20	27	20	14	9	-

	Good	<b>10.8</b>	24	15	7	8	5	-
	Don't know	<b>49.2</b>	38	39	51	57	68	83
3. Level of income	Poor	<b>31.6</b>	31	35	35	25	24	21
	Reasonable	<b>12.7</b>	13	18	11	9	9	-
	Good	<b>10.9</b>	18	15	7	10	9	7
	Don't know	<b>44.7</b>	38	33	48	57	58	72
4. Educational and training opportunities	Poor	<b>22.9</b>	13	27	24	18	21	14
	Reasonable	<b>14.8</b>	22	19	17	7	4	3
	Good	<b>10.4</b>	25	14	8	8	3	-
	Don't know	<b>51.8</b>	40	40	52	66	72	83
5. Housing	Poor	<b>24.4</b>	20	33	24	16	12	14
	Reasonable	<b>10.9</b>	9	11	14	10	5	-
	Good	<b>22.7</b>	22	21	22	28	24	17
	Don't know	<b>42.0</b>	49	35	40	47	59	69
6. Health care	Poor	<b>15.6</b>	11	19	15	13	12	14
	Reasonable	<b>17.2</b>	15	19	21	14	8	7
	Good	<b>12.0</b>	9	16	9	11	13	-
	Don't know	<b>55.1</b>	65	46	55	62	67	79
Total		100%						

Source: RSO, 2010: 97

**Table 14: If you know anybody who has returned to Serbia during the last 12 months, what is their situation, as far as you know?**

		Total	Age					
			Less than 24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-64	65+
Count		1005	55	369	302	174	76	29
1. Employment opportunities adequate to your level of education and training	Bad	<b>31.5</b>	31	35	32	30	21	17
	Not so bad	<b>15.8</b>	13	18	18	14	9	7
	Good	<b>4.3</b>	4	6	4	4	-	-
	Don't know	<b>48.4</b>	53	41	46	52	70	76
2. Other employment opportunities	Bad	<b>25.0</b>	25	27	29	20	16	14
	Not so bad	<b>17.5</b>	20	22	15	17	11	10
	Good	<b>3.6</b>	-	6	3	3	-	-
	Don't know	<b>53.9</b>	55	46	53	60	74	76
3. Level of income	Bad	<b>32.1</b>	27	37	37	24	16	17
	Not so bad	<b>14.4</b>	15	18	12	14	11	10
	Good	<b>3.3</b>	2	5	2	3	-	-
	Don't know	<b>50.1</b>	56	40	49	59	74	72
4. Educational and training opportunities	Bad	<b>21.9</b>	24	26	23	19	9	10
	Not so bad	<b>13.7</b>	11	17	15	8	12	3
	Good	<b>5.7</b>	7	7	5	5	4	-
	Don't know	<b>58.7</b>	58	50	57	68	75	86
5. Housing	Bad	<b>25.6</b>	20	31	26	21	16	14
	Not so bad	<b>12.2</b>	13	13	14	10	11	3


	Good	<b>9.2</b>	15	11	8	9	3	10
	Don't know	<b>53.0</b>	53	45	52	61	71	72
6. Health care	Bad	<b>16.6</b>	18	20	15	16	8	10
	Not so bad	<b>14.9</b>	13	16	18	11	11	7
	Good	<b>6.2</b>	5	7	6	6	5	3
	Don't know	<b>62.3</b>	64	56	62	67	76	79
Total		100%						

Source: RSO, 2010: 98

In general, respondents think that there is insufficient or no support for emigrants from Serbia to be able to contribute to the welfare of the country. For example, less than 10% of all respondents think that there is sufficient support for emigrants to contribute to the welfare of the country in sectors such as employment, income, education, housing and health care. In other words, here, too, information campaigns among the Serbian diaspora would be helpful in informing potential returnees of what they can do.

If there were an organization that could assist returnees free of charge, the interest in using its services would be generally high. A range of respondents, depending upon the particular sector in question (ranging from a low of 22% for education and training to 42.6% for employment) are interested in these services as soon as possible (See Table 15). Slightly fewer responded that they would like services later.

**Figure 33: Interest in Using Free Service in Assisting Return to Serbia**



Source: RSO, 2010: 23



**Table 15: Interest in Using Free Service in Assisting Return to Serbia by Youth**


		Total	Age					
			Less than 24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-64	65+
Count		1005	55	369	302	174	76	29
1. Employment	As soon as possible	<b>42.6</b>	45	51	42	39	21	3
	Perhaps later	<b>22.0</b>	16	22	26	24	13	-
	No interest	<b>11.2</b>	7	10	8	12	28	28
	Don't know	<b>24.2</b>	31	17	24	25	38	69
2. Income:	As soon as possible	<b>34.2</b>	44	42	33	30	16	-
	Perhaps later	<b>24.1</b>	13	26	27	25	12	10
	No interest	<b>11.6</b>	7	11	7	13	32	21
	Don't know	<b>30.0</b>	36	21	32	33	41	69
3. Education and training	As soon as possible	<b>22.0</b>	31	30	22	13	9	-
	Perhaps later	<b>25.4</b>	25	28	29	24	7	7
	No interest	<b>21.3</b>	11	22	17	21	39	24
	Don't know	<b>31.3</b>	33	20	32	41	45	69
4. Housing	As soon as possible	<b>26.6</b>	35	34	22	22	17	10
	Perhaps later	<b>22.6</b>	20	26	24	21	12	7
	No interest	<b>20.7</b>	13	20	18	24	32	21
	Don't know	<b>30.1</b>	33	19	35	34	39	62
5. Health care	As soon as possible	<b>30.4</b>	36	36	26	28	24	24
	Perhaps later	<b>25.6</b>	22	29	29	21	14	14
	No interest	<b>11.0</b>	9	12	6	12	20	17
	Don't know	<b>32.9</b>	33	22	39	39	42	45

Total	100%
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Source: RSO, 2010: 100

Finally, an overwhelming majority of respondents (68.1%) would consider contributing a small percentage of remittances to a community/collective project within their hometown (such as books for schools, sports, public park or social programs). Such high numbers have significance for diaspora investment programs (See Figure 34 & Section 4).

**Figure 34: Contributing Remittances for Community Projects**



Source: RSO, 2010: 23

Regarding youth, 88.2% thought that Serbian returnees could benefit from employment assistance (See Table 16). Almost half thought that finding adequate education opportunities (49.3%) and adequate housing (42.8%) was necessary. Just about three-quarters (74.9%) think that these services should be provided by the government, 65.8% by private organizations, and 41.7% by international organizations (See Table 17). Only 10.8% of youth think that there is sufficient support for employment and income (Table 18). Other areas where youth think that there is insufficient support are education and training (33.8% think there is sufficient support), housing (26.2% think it is sufficient) and health care (44.6%). Furthermore, between 52 and 90% of youth respondents need support in all of these areas as soon as possible (See Table 19).

**Table 16: Crosstabulation of Youth Who Think Returnees to Serbia Could Benefit From Support**

			Age Youth			Total
			16-20	21-25	26-30	
Do you think, returnees to Serbia could benefit from assistance in regard to any of the following areas? <sup>a</sup>	Finding employment	Count	4	32	98	134
		% of Total	2.6%	21.1%	64.5%	88.2%
	Finding adequate education and training opportunities	Count	4	24	47	75
		% of Total	2.6%	15.8%	30.9%	49.3%
	Finding adequate housing	Count	4	17	44	65
		% of Total	2.6%	11.2%	28.9%	42.8%
	Getting adequate health insurance coverage	Count	4	16	37	57
		% of Total	2.6%	10.5%	24.3%	37.5%
	Getting adequate social security coverage	Count	4	15	35	54
		% of Total	2.6%	9.9%	23.0%	35.5%
	Other	Count	0	0	2	2
		% of Total	0%	0%	1.3%	1.3%
Total		Count	5	36	111	152
		% of Total	3.3%	23.7%	73.0%	100.0%

Percentages and totals are based on respondents.

a. Dichotomy group tabulated at value 'Yes'.

**Table 17: Crosstabulation of Youth By Who Should Provide Support to Returnees**

			Age Youth			Total
			16-20	21-25	26-30	
By whom, do you think, should assistance to returnees best be provided? <sup>a</sup>	By the government	Count	5	30	114	149
		% of Total	2.5%	15.1%	57.3%	74.9%
	By private organizations	Count	4	29	98	131
		% of Total	2.0%	14.6%	49.2%	65.8%

	By international organizations	Count	2	19	62	83
		% of Total	1.0%	9.5%	31.2%	41.7%
	By church organizations	Count	0	7	12	19
		% of Total	0.0%	3.5%	6.0%	9.5%
	By political parties	Count	1	8	20	29
		% of Total	0.5%	4.0%	10.1%	14.6%
	Other	Count	1	6	20	27
		% of Total	0.5%	3.0%	10.1%	13.6%
Total		Count	5	42	152	199
		% of Total	2.5%	21.1%	76.4%	100.0%

Percentages and totals are based on respondents.

a. Dichotomy group tabulated at value 1.

**Table 18: Crosstabulation of Youth Who Think There is Sufficient Support for Returnees**

			Age Youth			Total
			16-20	21-25	26-30	
In your opinion, is there sufficient support for returnees to Serbia to be able to settle in and support themselves and their families adequately? <sup>a</sup>	Employment	Count	0	1	6	7
		% of Total	0.0%	1.5%	9.2%	10.8%
	Income	Count	1	2	4	7
		% of Total	1.5%	3.1%	6.2%	10.8%
	Education and training	Count	1	4	17	22
		% of Total	1.5%	6.2%	26.2%	33.8%
	Housing	Count	1	2	14	17
		% of Total	1.5%	3.1%	21.5%	26.2%
	Health care	Count	2	3	24	29
		% of Total	3.1%	4.6%	36.9%	44.6%
Total	Count	2	9	54	65	
	% of Total	3.1%	13.8%	83.1%	100.0%	

Percentages and totals are based on respondents.

a. Dichotomy group tabulated at value 'Sufficient'.

**Table 19: Crosstabulation of Youth Interested in Free Service for Returnees ‘As Soon as Possible’**

			Age Youth			Total
			16-20	21-25	26-30	
If there were an organization that would free of charge assist you in your return to Serbia, would you be interested in using this service? <sup>a</sup>	Employment	Count	3	24	88	115
		% of Total	2.3%	18.8%	68.8%	89.8%
	Income	Count	3	23	66	92
		% of Total	2.3%	18.0%	51.6%	71.9%
	Education and training	Count	3	16	47	66
		% of Total	2.3%	12.5%	36.7%	51.6%
	Housing	Count	3	18	57	78
		% of Total	2.3%	14.1%	44.5%	60.9%
	Health care	Count	3	19	55	77
		% of Total	2.3%	14.8%	43.0%	60.2%
Total	Count	4	27	97	128	
	% of Total	3.1%	21.1%	75.8%	100.0%	

Percentages and totals are based on respondents.

a. Dichotomy group tabulated at value ‘As Soon as Possible’.

## 4 Conclusions & Implications for Policy

This section concentrates on answering the questions posed at the beginning of the study, namely:

- 1) How can Serbia attract people back? What would entice people to move back to Serbia? What would they need when they come back, after expectations have changed?
- 2) What preventative policies can be put in place for the future? What do the youth need in order to prevent their departure?
- 3) How can the Serbia government maximize the opportunities which arise from remittances?

This section discusses these questions in light of recent scholarship on diasporas and development to suggest a series of policy options and tools which can be utilized and adapted to suit the needs of the Serbian government in its response to this study. The IOM promotes policies which help reduce the costs of remittances, facilitate voluntary return and repatriation, temporary skills transfers and stimulating temporary or circular migration amongst diaspora populations (De Haas, 2006: 18). In turn, this study will suggest a series of policy options which are based on a series of assumptions that underlie policy decisions in general, so as to be applied to Serbia in particular. The assumptions which underlie the variety of policy options are that (Castles, 2008: 10-11):

- The diaspora are a powerful resource for development through their skills and ideas
- Diaspora remittances have a positive impact on Serbia
- The diaspora can transmit skills home which will benefit Serbia – social remittances
- Including the diaspora in temporary, circular migrations can benefit both Serbia and the destination country
- Increased economic development of Serbia may increase out-migration, but this migration will be beneficial for Serbia in the long run (this may be the process we are witnessing right now).

The evidence for the above assumptions, however, is “uneven and contested” (Castles, 2008: 11). There is a lack of solid evidence about the effectiveness of all diaspora and development policies. Where they are effective, in which countries and why they are effective is lacking in research and policy making (Nyberg-Sørensen, Van Hear & Engberg-Pedersen, 2002). Often there is a “gap between policy goals and results” which cannot be bridged (Nyberg-Sørensen, Van Hear & Engberg-Pedersen, 2002: 19). Serbian policy makers should be very careful about

which policies to adopt and what the consequences will be, weighing short-term costs and benefits as well as long term consequences. In turn, the Serbian government could work with its partners such as IOM, as well as Serbian academic institutions, to consistently monitor the outcomes and effects of the policies they adopt. Additionally, the Serbian government could co-opt the ideas, skills and talents of the diaspora itself to aid in developing policies, thus giving a voice to the diaspora and including them in the policy process directly.

A study by De Haas (2006) recognizes that diasporas are already mobilized for development, and that existing institutions and development actors can establish relationships to learn from diasporas and support collective projects. However, if the development actors' main aim is to stop migration, then diaspora populations may be reluctant to participate, a proposition which is supported by much evidence (De Haas, 2006: 92-93). De Haas demonstrates that diasporas can be engaged and involved in various ways in development policy, including:

(1) actively involving migrants and migrant organisations in policy formulation; (2) supporting capacity building and network formation among migrant organisations so as to enhance their abilities to undertake development initiatives; (3) directly sustaining development initiatives of migrants by providing financial and/or organisational support; (4) involving migrants and migrant and diaspora organisations as 'experts' or 'consultants' in development projects designed by development agencies; and, more controversially, (5) involving migrant and diaspora organisations in programmes of permanent or temporary return. ... Some of the more concrete measures that were suggested included increasing the transparency of government development strategies and goals; supporting the establishment of migrant networks while respecting their autonomy; and engaging migrants in the process of policy making and in development programmes in a variety of ways, including project identification, implementation and monitoring. (De Haas, 2006: 4; 18)

It is important to engage diasporas fairly, as Gamlen (2008: 3) has pointed out. Gamlen also demonstrates how, rather than creating entirely new diaspora policies, existing diaspora policies could be better implemented and improved. The Republic of Serbia should not place undue demands on the diaspora, and the diaspora should be left to participate in the development of Serbia as it sees necessary. Requiring the diaspora to commit large financial or social resources to causes beyond its means will be more detrimental than not asking their participation. All diaspora programs should be balanced and fair to the interests of the diaspora community.

## 4.1 Incentives to Return and Incentives to Contribute to Development

The popular perception of immigrants in many host country contexts is that of poor educational attainment, high unemployment, segregated communities, low language attainment and low socio-economic indicator (Vertovec, 2006). The data on the Serbian diaspora dispel some of these myths. The Serbian diaspora is of generally high educational attainment, has unemployment levels below that of many of the host countries (and of Serbia), have attained the language of the host country and have generally decent socio-economic indicators (See Section 2). Nevertheless, it is important to recognize the diversity of the Serbian diaspora. The Serbian diaspora have multiple competencies and multiple associations. Stephen Vertovec's (2006) study looks at the positive and negative impressions of the diaspora by both sending and receiving countries argues that within different ministries there are often very divergent views of the diaspora's benefits. One way to foster greater coherence in the policies of the Serbian ministries are through recognition of the diversity.

In general, the data show that it is not necessarily self-employed entrepreneurs who are living abroad, but primarily youth and those who have some capital at their disposal (see Sections 2 and 3.6). Almost all speak the language of the country they live and many of the respondents speak multiple languages. The Serbian diaspora is highly educated, but the motivations for migrating are primarily economic. How to mobilize the technical and financial expertise of the diaspora is of paramount importance. The diaspora can provide technical assistance in various forms, for example providing technical and financial advice to Serbian institutions, helping develop programs related to youth, volunteering with youth in the country of origin (through leadership building exercises or training exercises for youth), and institutional support in the form of financial support to volunteer efforts. The aim is to incorporate the diaspora directly in the process of enacting programs, so that their sense of ownership is enhanced and bonds are created with Serbia. The diaspora can reach an awareness which allows members of the diaspora to identify with others in the diaspora as actors in a process that is taking place to improve the conditions of Serbia.

The data clearly demonstrate that the Serbian diaspora is keen to contribute (see Figure 34) to development efforts at home but may be skeptical of the institutions and labor opportunities that exist in Serbia. However, the survey data presented does not give any insights into what special circumstances the diaspora would be interested in contributing, and what these obstacles could be. There is no sense of what kind of opportunities are seen as realistic to return to. Lending credibility to particular projects and ventures is necessary, and can be accomplished by transparency in the decision-making process and including the diaspora in the process.

Establishing the trust of the diaspora then is paramount to successful mobilization of resources. The goal though would be to expand diaspora participation not through expanded schemes or new ambitious initiatives but through existing initiatives, so that trust can be built and sustained



over the long term. Thus, the Serbian government should promote existing migrant associations abroad and assist them in developing social, economic and cultural projects in their respective localities as well as developing networks to inform the diaspora about opportunities at home:

- The Republic of Serbia should encourage the participation of diaspora associations in development activities. The government should promote these activities, publicize the associations and assist them in working effectively.
- Diaspora organizations should be included in consultations in policy areas related to migrant issues and other areas where they have direct insights and expertise.
- Diaspora organizations should be included in exploring, with other government ministries in Serbia, the ways in which a remittance scheme can enable the diaspora to channel their remittances effectively so that they have a maximum impact.
- Diaspora organizations should be consulted on any policy or initiative which encourages the return of migrants to Serbia, including the current initiative.

A series of studies by the Migration Policy Institute (MPI) and funded by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) have highlighted the role of diaspora in development from a variety of angles. Each study provides a unique analysis to aid in the development of effective policies which are relevant for the Republic of Serbia. The five studies concentrate on the role of diasporas in:

- Capital Markets and Investments (Terrazas, 2010): The survey data show that the Serbian diaspora hold financial assets beyond income and beyond remittances (See Figure 28). Mobilizing the wealth of the diaspora through capital markets is a challenge, but there are investment vehicles to support this mobilization such as deposit accounts, securitized remittance flows, transnational loans, diaspora bonds and diaspora mutual funds.
- Entrepreneurship (Newland & Tanaka, 2010): Entrepreneurship amongst the diaspora can stimulate innovation, contribute to job creation and the investment of financial capital in Serbia. There are various policy options to be explored to increase initiatives and organizations which promote diaspora entrepreneurship, including loans, competitions, investor risk-sharing, high education opportunities, regular consultations with professional diaspora and policies which allow easy movement between Serbia and a country of residence. Data from Figure 30 demonstrate that 19% of the sample would like to live in Serbia and work partly in another country, and 16% would like to live in another country and work partly in Serbia. Policies which make it easy for business owners and entrepreneurs to move back and forth between these destinations foster development.
- Philanthropy (Newland, Terrazas & Munster, 2010): Voluntary giving from individuals or diaspora associations can help fund development and social welfare projects. Online

platforms can be useful in organized and strategic giving. Donating to projects via intermediaries such as home town associations, faith-based groups, and professional associations are good ways of attracting funding. Policies can help build the capacity of these groups to participate in philanthropic giving as well as certify and monitor specific non-profits.

- Voluntarism (Terrazas, 2010): Diaspora youth may volunteer their time with grassroots organizations and community groups (although the data from this survey do not reveal these tendencies). Youth volunteer programs can provide an important and formative experience that will increase participation and engagement over the long term. High-skilled voluntarism such as TOKTEN and TRQN can also intentionally link professionals to Serbia. Creating hybrid programs which allow the participation of both high-skilled diaspora and youth should also be explored.
- Heritage tourism (Newland & Talor, 2010): Developing new tourist destinations and attractions with the interests of the diaspora in mind can attract diaspora investors, philanthropists and consumers. Public-private partnerships, marketing campaigns and specialized tour offerings can aid in attracting the diaspora to these touristic offerings.

The idea of these policies is that instead of being a negative consequence for Serbia, emigration become a resource for development. The other main idea of these policies is to recognize the importance of the Serbian diaspora and the positive contribution that they can make. There is considerable evidence that demonstrates if migrants emigrate with their families, they are less likely to return (Portes, 2007). Nearly two-thirds (63.3%) of the sample is married, suggesting a propensity to remain abroad amongst a majority of the sample, thus highlighting the importance of developing temporary and circular migration policies for the diaspora. Keeping regular contact with members of the diaspora as well as recognizing them formally through ceremonies or visits of high-ranking officials in Serbia helps inform the diaspora about what is happening in Serbia as well as allowing Serbia to be informed about its diaspora while creating visibility for both (UNDP, 2006). Developing relationships with the diaspora can be predicated on initiatives which give back to the diaspora without expecting concomitant commitment from the diaspora, as evidenced with services and associations from a range of countries (UNDP, 2006: 21-22). The UNDP has undertaken the Transfer of Knowledge Through Expatriate Nationals (TOKTEN) project, which allows for short term diaspora returns on special projects in a framework which encourages participation and voluntarism (UNDP, 2006: 24). The IOM's Temporary Return of Qualified Nationals (TRQN) program in the Balkans has also been implemented in response to the issues that arise when the diaspora cannot return permanently. IOM also has implemented the Migration for Development in Africa (MIDA) program, which helps build capacity through short term and voluntary skill sharing, similar to TRQN. Policy options which increase circularity of the skills and ideas of the diaspora can include (UNDP, 2006):

- Cooperation on joint projects

- Temporary contract employment for specific projects
- Conferences and meetings related to diaspora and development issues
- Information exchanges with the diaspora on relevant issues (as well as professional surveys of the diaspora)
- Publications that are produced by the diaspora or involve the diaspora, increasing their relevance and visibility

65% of the respondents are interested in using the internet for sending information, having important implications for information dissemination. There are various popular search engines and online newspapers which are used by Serbian internet users. Targeting highly accessed websites with pertinent information can help diffuse knowledge about Serbian policies and social programs for youth and diaspora. In addition, lists of project opportunities could be disseminated via consulates, social networks (such as bars and restaurants, etc.), and shopping malls or directly to the diaspora at a home address.

The engagement of the Serbian diaspora to return for the development of Serbia is highly politicized. However, transfer of financial and human capital does not require return, and temporary and circular migration can be effective. Overall, short run solutions to diaspora return must include material incentives and competitive wages as well as social services related to finding employment provided by the government, private agencies and international organizations (See Tables 15 & 17).

Return is often by those who are old or who have failed in their expectations (Massey, et.al., 1998). Evidence demonstrates that return is not necessary for engaging in national and local development, however when it does occur:

Evidence suggests that return after a relatively short period abroad, especially among low-skilled migrants and if caused by an inability to adapt to the foreign environment or due to unforeseen and adverse family circumstances, is unlikely to contribute to development. Return following a longer stay abroad when the migrant has saved a given amount of money to meet specific development purposes back home – such as building a house or investing in business related activities – has far better developmental prospects. (Nyberg-Sørensen, Van Hear & Engberg-Pedersen, 2002: 27)

In the Serbian case, there is a trend that the longer they have been abroad the more likely they are to remain abroad. However, across the sample, including age, citizenship and duration abroad, the intention to move back five years from now increases. Harnessing the potential of this return is essential.

## 4.2 Preventing Future Emigration and Providing an Environment for Stay

The main thesis of the Global Commission on International Migration (2005), for example, is that migration policies should not replace solid policies that address, *inter alia*, unemployment, wages, social security, inequality and education. If widespread economic reform is absent then migration policies may lead to unintended effects that work to increase the problems that already exist. When migration goes hand in hand with economic and political improvement then solutions may arise. The GCIM focus on streamlining remittance flows, facilitating knowledge networks, training and retaining professional personnel, developing cooperative institutions with countries of destination, and developing trade and investments. These broad policy suggestions synthesize development and migration, and may maximize the benefits of both.

It appears that perceptions of individual career prospects in Serbia are important for decisions to leave Serbia and to stay for long periods in the host country (see section 3.7). The high levels of respondents stating that their future plans involve a long duration outside Serbia correspond with data that indicate people are uncertain about their career opportunities in Serbia. This suggests that many respondents feel they have limited opportunities in Serbia. At the same time, however, those who are uncertain are numerous. The data suggest that if a dramatic change in employment opportunities were to occur in Serbia, and/or if people were made aware of opportunities, then people would consider returning. Programs that promote the employment opportunities in Serbia coupled with programs that encourage return and disseminate information could have significant effects in the diaspora community. However, the change must be perceived by the diaspora as particularly unique or significant, minor changes or fluctuations may not be enough to attract them back, so a long-term approach to the labor market may provoke changing return patterns. A long term approach is also necessary for the implementation of programs which ensure people are enticed to remain in Serbia after they return.

Policies of OECD countries often aim to attract high-skilled workers from around the world (See for example European Council, 2010a). This has a direct effect on the highly-skilled Serbian diaspora in the sense that they will be courted from Serbia to join destination countries. Drawing out high-skilled benefits the host country directly as education costs are incurred by Serbia (30% of the diaspora was highly-educated before leaving Serbia, see Figure 8) but are paid by another host country. This also allows host countries to gain an advantage in scientific and educational progress, as those highly-skilled use and improve their skills in a context outside of Serbia. Fields such as engineering, manufacturing and construction as well as social sciences, law and economics (see Figure 9) seem to be Serbia's main labor 'export' into host countries. This certainly has consequences for diminishing human capital in Serbia and the long-term social and economic welfare of the country. This in turn sends signals to investors and other stakeholders in the Serbian economy that their funds may be more useful elsewhere. Such an uncertain

perception of the future can be challenged by policies that attract the future professionals to remain in Serbia.

The complex interplay of economic and political forces can be affected by Serbian government involvement in lobbying and opening direct dialogues with countries of destination to address their migrant labor policies and to consider Serbia's situation when developing policies. For example:

[I]t is essential for foreign aid and investment to be more carefully directed towards countries and sectors that have been particularly affected by the loss of their professionals. Co-investment programmes are one way to achieve this. ... Cooperative relationships between labour-rich and labour-poor countries are required to promote co-investment in the process of human capital formation and the development of a mobile and global pool of professionals. (GCIM, 2005: 25)

The issue of co-development has seen currency in France, which links development measures with return measures, as well as in Serbia, where re-admission agreements have been linked with expanded visa conditions. It is too early to comment on the efficacy of such measures and it is advisable to think seriously about the consequences for such policies. Furthermore, the Republic of Serbia should lobby governments throughout the world to engage in workforce planning that addresses the gaps filled by Serbian employees in these destination countries. Filling human resource problems with employees from Serbia is short-sighted of destination countries and the Republic of Serbia could make a strong case for cooperative planning with other governments in this respect.

Wage differentials between Serbia and other countries may partially explain movement abroad. Looking at all respondents, it is clear that a key motivating factor is income. The desire to obtain a higher income is consistent with economic theories of migration, as individuals move to maximize individual gain. A program that assists in matching desires with employer realities can assist migrants in finding a job that fits their skill level.

The desire to have stable employment and job security cuts across most of the sample. According to the data on expectations, employment may be more important than income, indicating people are looking for a source of income rather than an amount of income. A program that helps place returnees and potential migrants in certain temporary positions while long term employment assistance is provided can help with labor market participation. Broad policies which stimulate salaries and provide attractive employment opportunities are necessary.

Engineers and other high skilled migrants can easily transfer skills and in consequence have the ability to exploit emigration opportunities. Other professions where skills are less transferable may be underrepresented among the respondents because they are not as equipped to move abroad. University students however are easily mobile and are still gaining potentially

transferable skills. A program which assists the highly-skilled in identifying positions which match their skills can meet this need.

Uncertainty about future living expectations increases as time goes by, but the certainty that some will be returning to Serbia in the near future (three to five years from now) increases as well (See Table 11). This implies that almost a quarter of the Serbian diaspora may return to Serbia five years from now, a considerable number, but that an almost equal (but greater) amount will be remaining abroad, most likely in the country where they live now. Those who are uncertain are the most crucial to understand, because their migration plans may include a return to Serbia. The problem with the survey is that it does not address concrete planning for return, only intention, and it is difficult to say whether intention will translate into return.

Across all ages people responded that finding adequate education is especially important. The difficulty in accessing advanced education seems to be a factor in motivating people to move (see Section 3). Programs which provide more spending on academics and scientific research work can help to alleviate many of the migration pressures identified in Figures 18 and 19. Devising career-building opportunities for youth will be essential to containing their outflow. Finally, equitable access to services from the full range of diaspora upon their return must be ensured to avoid local disparities of support. Social programs should be run by the government or private institutions with the support of international organizations (see Table 17). Building trust in these institutions is essential.

The Serbian government can benefit from providing incentive to Serbian academics abroad. Those with Masters and PhDs can be encouraged to train and consult with the government or to pursue topics related to Serbia in their dissertations or research work, participate in joint research projects with Serbian academics in country, or for the establishment of new research institutions (UNDP, 2006: 28). Special engagement with those who have achieved their education primarily abroad could entail their involvement in areas related to their special expertise, especially in those fields found in Figure 11.

The high number of respondents with a higher education indicates that there may be a lack of opportunity upon graduation, and that this lack is prompting graduates of higher institutions to work and live abroad. Equally, the high number of respondents showing that education was unimportant may mean that many felt they could find jobs that do not require specific higher education (See Section 3 for more on reasons for going abroad). Moreover, many are leaving for education abroad (this seems to contradict the first sentence of this paragraph). As the Serbian population will continue to demand higher education, so too will they demand opportunity to utilize their newly gained skills. Moreover, as the number of youth who have a successful high school education expands, so too will the demand for appropriate higher education, and in consequence institutions to accommodate these skills. It is expected then that the number of young Serbs who request higher education will lead to more mobility and more options for mobility.

For example, students now have a tremendous amount of mobility potential as university courses are standardized across the EU. These adjustments in EU higher institutions will make it easier for Serbian youth attending university to transfer their abilities across the EU and move around the Union. There are two implications for this kind of student mobility – they will settle in another country within the Union or further abroad or they will return to Serbia to utilize their skills (for more on plans for the future and return see Sections 3.7 and 3.8). Enticing Serbian youth back after their studies abroad is necessary for Serbia to maintain and broaden its skill base. Furthermore, universities are increasingly competitive within the EU and within the world. They compete to attract the best students, and given the data in this survey, the best of Serbia may have responded. By marketing Serbian education systems abroad, Serbia can attract the increasingly mobile students and scholars of the world as well as develop networks of the high-skilled (Filipovic & Putnik, 2010).

Thus, Serbia should focus on recruiting and retaining foreign students in an effort to circulate knowledge and increase the participation and partnerships with other universities, especially capitalizing on opportunities with European programs (Kuptsch & Pang, 2006). In turn, the visibility and recognition of Serbian universities will create market opportunities which would hypothetically translate into less migratory pressure on citizens, leading to decreased migration potential of parts of the population.

Finally, it should be noted that development can be the cause for more mobility (Castles, 2008). More development means that mobility increases, and the Serbian government must recognize that more mobility may occur as Serbia improves its socio-economic position in Europe.

### 4.3 Remittances

Carling's (2004) study of the ways that remittances are susceptible to policy interventions, and which policies have been successful in the development context, developed an extremely succinct table outlining policy options for governments. The table appears in Table 20 below and is replicated from Carling (2004: 6) and based on his extensive literature review. This table can serve as a useful guide for Serbian policy makers in deciding which policies work better or worse in the Serbian context. Carling's report is an excellent resource for policy makers and should be consulted further in reference to the following table. In addition, this report draws out below some of the policy conclusions which are evident from the survey data.

**Table 20: Carling's Inventory of Policy Measures to Enhance the Development Impact of Remittances**

Objective	Measure
Capturing a share of remittances for development purposes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>Taxation of emigrants</i></li> <li>• <i>Duties or levies on remittances transfers</i></li> <li>• <i>Voluntary check-off for charitable purposes (on transfer forms)</i></li> </ul>
Stimulating transfers through formal channels and/or stimulating capital availability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>Remittance bonds</i></li> <li>• <i>Foreign currency accounts</i></li> <li>• <i>Premium interest rate accounts</i></li> <li>• <i>Promoting/enabling transfers through microfinance institutions (MFIs)</i></li> <li>• <i>Promoting financial literacy / banking the unbanked</i></li> </ul>
Stimulating investment of remittances	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>Outreach through MFI infrastructure</i></li> <li>• <i>Outreach through migrants' service bureaus</i></li> <li>• <i>Tax breaks on imported capital goods</i></li> <li>• <i>Small to Medium Enterprise schemes (financial, infrastructural, or innovative)</i></li> <li>• <i>Training programs</i></li> </ul>
Outreach to diaspora associations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>Matched funding</i></li> <li>• <i>Public-private ventures</i></li> <li>• <i>Competitive bidding for development projects</i></li> </ul>
Influencing consumption patterns	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>Promoting consumption of local goods and services</i></li> <li>• <i>Enabling migrants to spend on their relatives' behalf</i></li> </ul>

Source: Carling, 2004: 6

The data from Figure 34 show that if the Serbian diaspora were interested in investing their remittances that they are likely to invest in something that may not have a high financial return, but a high humanitarian or social return in their local area of origin. However, if social investments in localities can be coupled with financial return for the diaspora investor, then the means of attracting investors may be less difficult. Promoting social investment amongst the diaspora may attract foreign investment and allocate risk more broadly and create an environment where investors pool their resources to contribute to social causes in Serbia while pursuing other investment opportunities at the same time. Thus, the diaspora can play the role of innovators in social causes and investment opportunities, setting the stage for further discovery.

Family and social ties often underlie investment decisions, meaning that money from the diaspora can flow back to communities of origin and involve motives other than pure profit.



However, some members of the diaspora may be interested solely in profits and returns, so programs should cater to their needs as well. Deep community ties mean that members of the diaspora may require less returns, as they are not interested in profit but the positive social consequences of their investment. Lower returns for the investor means that the money lent is less costly for the Serbian government. In other words, borrowed money from the diaspora may require little or no return or interest paid. However, the diaspora may not be so forgiving if the country mismanages the money, as evidenced in the survey by attitudes to uncertainty in the strength of markets in Serbia.

Since respondents were interested in an on-line remittance system, perhaps a small percent levied on each transfer could be used for community projects – with municipalities explaining well in advance which initiatives are being prioritized, so that the project is as transparent as possible. Matching funds for remittances could be an important tool for integrating diaspora resources with government initiatives. Matched funds could include 2 RSD from the government for every 1 RSD from the diaspora, or any other feasible combination which can be met under the government budget. If matching funds can be put to use in developmental or social programs, without representing narrow interest groups, these programs may be more successful.

Finally, there are three potential hypotheses regarding the way the diaspora will send remittances (HWWI, 2007):

1. The longer migrants are in the host country the relationship with Serbia declines and remittances decline in turn.
2. The duration of residence in the host country is not related to the relationship with country of origin, and remittances remain constant or non-existent.
3. Financial support for family increases in tandem as money is saved over time, and the more stable the migrant becomes, the more opportunity for productive assets to be transferred, leading to an increase in remittances over time.

The third hypothesis is the best option for Serbian policy makers, based on the data. Creating an environment where affluent members of the diaspora make investments in Serbia requires making Serbia a long-term focal point in the lives of the diaspora, which may not be possible. In parallel, remittances used to invest in property or in capital markets is typical of long-term migrants, as these migrants have more chances to save money and plan their finances accordingly, giving them a stronger potential for investment in the country of origin. Finally, the evidence indicates that the diaspora may hold financial assets outside of their income. Although not recorded in the survey, these assets may include savings, retirement accounts, property, equity or securities. How to mobilize these savings and channel them for productive investment in programs that the diaspora support is crucial. Finally, many respondents carry their remittances on their body when they transfer the money. Increasing public awareness about the ways to receive money from the diaspora, the best ways to send it and how to make investments

can increase the security of transfers. Being able to quantify what encourages and what discourages the diaspora from sending remittances formally can improve knowledge on the kinds of remittance services and products to make available for them (HWWI, 2007).

#### 4.4 Expected Challenges

It has become important for policy makers in Serbia to better quantify diaspora flows and understand the trends and impacts they have on employment and social services. In particular, developing policies that retain youth and help mainstream their employment opportunities, promoting the return of the diaspora for social causes, and circulating the skills of the diaspora so that skills are transferred from the highly educated diaspora back home. In general, it is important to design policies that encourage the Serbian diaspora to invest and contribute to economic growth in Serbia, through outreach and information dissemination programs. Migration policies of sending countries like Serbia are often contentious. Due to the complex social and economic environment that emigration occurs in, policies are often difficult to enact and rarely have simple effects.

A potential long-term side effect of the proposed programs in this paper is that investing in potential migrants, in an effort to stem or prevent their migration, may paradoxically lead to further migration. The skills that are invested in may become necessary in labor importing countries of the EU, leading to further outmigration of qualified youth from Serbia. Alternatively, failure of public offices to support migrants in an efficient manner will lead them to turn to private intermediaries or private institutions which outperform the state. Such policy conundrums may be unavoidable however, and with a paucity of research it is very difficult to determine accurately. The best policies may be those that do not target migrants directly, but those that benefit the population as whole, which give potential migrants an incentive to stay, and gives those who return more opportunity when they arrive.

An important question is the fiscal impact that the Serbian diaspora will have on government resources when they return and when attracting them back. Initially the impact may be more federal, but as more return the impact may be more local. Short term costs may come from attracting back the diaspora whereas long term costs include social programs that ensure people stay when they return. Finally, the challenge of mobilizing diaspora wealth is to ensure that sufficient resources are mobilized to create and support projects in Serbia and that these resources are stable so that the projects are sustainable over the long term. Another important question is whether returning emigrants will displace workers already in Serbia. It must be emphasized that the inability to properly predict further migration potentials leads to an inability to predict the costs of return as well as the required administrative capacities.

## 5 Suggestions for Further Research

It is important to determine how the survey data may be presented to national and international stakeholders to best take advantage of the results and determine how it may be improved. A crucial component includes which indicators are useful for policy makers and have relevance for effective migration policy. The survey does a good job of describing the benefits and negative effects of legal migration, and replicating the survey again may yield important insights over time.

First, long-term longitudinal survey of certain individuals or a group of individuals may be necessary for comparison over time and place, giving a more accurate picture of migration trends. This could also involve the creation of a migration database to observe trends and for future projections. This database could be coordinated from a third-party institution of higher learning in Serbia or the Ministry of Statistics, whichever is more capable, to continuously update information, both qualitative and quantitative of the Serbia diaspora. The Serbian Ministry for Diaspora is creating a database providing information and contacts for diaspora associations abroad (IOM, 2008: 26). This database is meant to contain information which will assist in analyzing the current and long-term issues of the Serbian diaspora. The UNDP also has the Transfer of Knowledge Through Expatriate Nationals databases which include data on skilled nationals and could also include data on youth volunteer programs. A parallel example of such a database is the African Experts database.<sup>11</sup> This can contribute to flexibility in coordinating temporary contracts and joint projects with the diaspora and assist in identifying long term trends in the diaspora. This database could also be used to support the understanding of diaspora needs over a longer time period than the current survey provides.

Second, previous suggestions by the stakeholders considered including sections on diaspora associations, transnational links with Serbia and knowledge of languages (ILO, 2010). Building on these suggestions could be a survey which is more qualitative and which can capture aspects of the motivations and reasons why people are moving are better to answer some of the questions of policy makers. A survey which captures migration history, integration measures and the potential for return may highlight the determinants and indicators of return. In other words, a series of questions related to the goals migrants are hoping to achieve when they go abroad will help determine the factors which promote return to the country of origin.

Third, maintaining that the current survey is comparable with the Labor Force Survey means that the section on labor history and status is important to retain, although data from this section are less relevant to migration measures. It was also suggested by previous reports that the length of survey may deter potential respondents, which implies shortening the sections on employment in

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<sup>11</sup> The African experts database can be found here: <http://www.uneca.org/itca/ariportal/db.htm>

order to increase the sections on migration parameters (ILO, 2010). Additionally, the survey should remain analogous to other surveys carried out for comparison.

Fourth, it may also be necessary to ask specific questions of those who are most likely to return. Sub-sections for potential return migrants could include questions on what they think the costs are to them if they migrate home. These kinds of questions could also be replicated to determine what people perceived the costs to be *before* they moved, and what the costs actually were *after* they moved. Questions about professional development opportunities and the state of working environments, such as access to technology, quality of facilities, burden of workloads, promotion, training, etc. can help pinpoint very specific reasons for leaving and potential incentives for return. Location of potential return is not included in the survey, and would be useful. Respondents agreeing to provide information voluntarily may shed light on the origin municipalities and regions, as well as potential return locations.

Fifth, it is important to expand the survey to include more detailed data on remittances. Knowing how the diaspora is participating in mainstream capital markets both in Serbia and in their country of residence will greatly enhance the knowledge of how the diaspora is investing its money. Including questions in further surveys as to why the diaspora would invest in Serbia is necessary. Tailoring the survey to identify how the diaspora participates in capital markets and how they would participate in investment in Serbia is essential. Further research using an updated survey specially designed in conjunction with an economist is necessary.

Sixth, nothing in the survey details potential obstacles to engaging the diaspora and gaining their trust. Lack of engagement or lack of trust, as noted in Section 4, is critical in allowing diaspora policies to fail. Success in building trust and bridges of engagement are critical, and including questions on how to harness the trust of the diaspora should be integrated into future surveys.

Finally, family and household level variables should be included in further surveys. Elderly family members residing with respondents, younger siblings, spouses which are Serbian citizens or not and other family connections can elaborate the needs of potential returnees. For example, having an elderly family member in the household may free up the labor of others in the household, which may impact the amount of remittances sent back to Serbia in a positive manner. Family connections within the host country may also benefit return migration through emotional support as well as broaden social networks. The broadening of social networks through family ties facilitates entrepreneurship within the country of origin as those in the home country may find support from their diaspora brethren. The ability of family members to lend capital and potentially cheap (or free) labor for starting up new businesses within the host country cannot be underestimated. Creating youth labor programs that work to facilitate the knowledge and family connections of the Serbian diaspora may yield promising results.

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