

Chapter Title: Falling apart? The many meanings of individualization

Book Title: Sticking Together or Falling Apart?

Book Subtitle: Solidarity in an Era of Individualization and Globalization

Book Author(s): Paul de Beer and Ferry Koster

Published by: Amsterdam University Press

Stable URL: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt45kd13.6>

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at <https://about.jstor.org/terms>



This content is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0). To view a copy of this license, visit <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/>.



Amsterdam University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to *Sticking Together or Falling Apart?*

JSTOR

4 Falling apart?

The many meanings of individualization

The process of individualization is regarded by many as one of the most important social-cultural developments of the postwar period. For the most part, however, the growing literature on individualization lacks firm empirical underpinning. Most authors on individualization, among whom are renowned sociologists such as Beck, Giddens and Bauman, confine themselves to describing some broad, general trends that, in their opinion, should suffice to show that a process of individualization is taking place. This approach makes it rather difficult to judge the importance of the individualization process, and indeed, whether there really is a process of individualization taking place. In this chapter we will present the available evidence for a trend of individualization in a number of industrialized countries.

In order to test the phenomenon of individualization empirically, one must, of course, first define individualization. Because of the widely diverging interpretations of individualization, this is more than a cursory exercise. Hence, the first part of this chapter discusses different interpretations of individualization. We argue that individualization can be characterized by a combination of three trends, namely detraditionalization, emancipation and heterogenization. In the second part of this chapter we examine whether these three trends can be traced in reality. We find that, contrary to expectations, in the 25 developed countries that we analyze, there was no trend of individualization during the 1990s. Only in a quarter of these countries could we trace a trend of detraditionalization, in no country did we find evidence for heterogenization, and only in a third of the countries does a process of emancipation seem to have occurred.¹

4.1 What is individualization?

Far from being a recent development, as is sometimes suggested, individualization was in fact one of the main issues with which the founding fathers of social science were concerned. Émile Durkheim, Georg Simmel and Max Weber all studied the influence of the industrialization process on social cohesion and solidarity and the changes in the bond between individuals and community that took place in their era, i.e. around the turn of the twentieth century. For example, the gradual transformation from mechanic solidarity to organic solidarity, which Durkheim described in *The Division of Labour in Society* (1893), was in fact a process of individualization.

Recently, however, some authors claim that the present process of individualization differs in important aspects from the modernization process that took place a century ago. Authors like Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens and Scott Lash contend that modernity itself is undergoing profound changes. We are entering a new phase, which they call late modernity, reflexive modernity or second modernity (Giddens 1991; Beck, Giddens & Lash 1994; Beck & Beck-Gernsheim 2002). They claim that individualization is one of the defining characteristics of this new phase of modernity. According to Beck and Beck-Gernsheim (2002: xxii, emphasis in original), “individualization is becoming *the social structure of second modernity itself*”.

Although these authors stress the overriding importance of individualization for the present phase of modernity, it is not easy to derive a clear definition of individualization from their writings. For example, Beck and Beck-Gernsheim (2002: xxii) write: “So – to give a simple definition – ‘individualization’ means disembedding without re-embedding.” Bauman (2002: xv) states: “‘individualization’ consists in transforming human ‘identity’ from a ‘given’ into a ‘task’ – and charging the actors with the responsibility for performing that task and for the consequences (also the side-effects) of their performance.” These “definitions” are not easily converted into a formalization of individualization that lends itself to empirical testing. Hence, we will try to infer some concrete elements from the discussion of individualization by the authors mentioned.

For a start, individualization should clearly be distinguished from individualism. While individualism is commonly under-

stood as a personal attitude or preference, individualization refers to a macro-social phenomenon, which may – but just as well may not – reflect changes in the attitudes of individual persons. Beck, Bauman and Giddens emphasize that individualization is not a process that originates from a conscious choice or even a preference of the individual. To the contrary, Beck and Beck-Gernsheim point out: “individualization is a social condition which is not arrived at by a free decision of individuals. [...] people are condemned to individualization” (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim 2002: 4). Zygmunt Bauman states concisely: “individualization is a fate, not a choice” (Bauman 2002: xvi), and Giddens (1991: 81) says: “we have no choice but to choose.”

These remarks underline the fact that individualization is not closely connected to individual attitudes or preferences with respect to freedom of choice. According to these authors, individualization is in fact imposed on individual citizens by modern institutions. The welfare state, in particular, has replaced many traditional institutions, like the family, the local community, church and class, as the defining collectivity of people’s identity. Hence, a *first* interpretation of individualization is that it refers to a process of “detraditionalization”: the gradual loss of adherence of individuals to traditional institutions. Beck and Beck-Gernsheim argue that “the post-war development of the welfare state brought with it a social impetus toward individualization of unprecedented scale and dynamism. [...] a break in historical continuity released people from traditional class ties and family supports and increasingly threw them onto their own resources and their individual fate” (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim 2002: 30). This does not mean that the traditional institutions vanish into thin air, but they lose their strong hold on the individual. They still live on, but more or less like “zombie categories” (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim 2002: 27). About the nuclear family, Beck contends: “To be sure, families are still to be found, but the nuclear family has become an ever more rare institution” (Beck, Giddens & Lash 1994: 8).

A second implication of individualization that can be derived from the writings of these authors is *emancipation*, i.e. a declining influence of social groups and institutions on individual attitudes and behavior, resulting in a greater *freedom of choice*. Beck and Beck-Gernsheim state this quite clearly: “traditional guidelines often contained severe restrictions or even prohibitions on action

[...]. By contrast, the institutional pressures in modern Western society tend rather to be offers of services or incentives to action” (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim 2002: 2, 3). Further on they say: “Individualization liberates people from traditional roles and constraints” (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim 2002: 203). Giddens argues: “The self is not a passive entity, determined by external influences; in forging their self-identities [...] individuals contribute to and directly promote social influences that are global in their consequences and implications” (Giddens 1991: 2).

A third implication of individualization is *heterogenization*, i.e. increasing heterogeneity. If people no longer appeal to traditional institutions for guidelines for their conduct and increasingly make their own choices, they will most likely make *different* choices. In Beck’s words, “standard biographies become elective biographies, ‘do-it-yourself biographies’, risk biographies, broken or broken-down biographies” (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim 2002: 24). This means “the end of fixed, predefined images of man. The human being becomes [...] a choice among possibilities, *homo optio-nis*” (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim 2002: 5). If the standard biography is replaced by an elective biography, as Beck puts it, then one would hardly expect these biographies to become more alike.

The account of individualization by Beck, Giddens and Bauman is certainly not the only conceivable one. There are, for instance, interesting similarities and contrasts between the approach of these authors and the discussion of the succession of social characters by David Riesman in his 1950 book, *The Lonely Crowd*. The individualized person of Beck and Giddens shares some characteristics with Riesman’s “other-directed” person, who is free to make his own decisions, independent of his family or social background. As Riesman stated: “The family is no longer a closely knit unit to which he belongs but merely a part of a wider social environment to which he early becomes attentive” (Riesman 1950: 26). However, the other-directed person is acutely aware of the need of consent by others. They conform strictly to the expectations and preferences of their peer-group. So, although Riesman would probably agree with the first interpretation of individualization, namely detraditionalization, he would have more doubts about emancipation and heterogenization. Freedom of choice will not necessarily result in people making different choices. It is therefore not self-evident that people’s behavior will become more heterogeneous and less predictable.

4.2 Methodology: how to test for individualization?

In order to determine whether there is a process of individualization going on, we have to look for empirical evidence for the three implications of individualization discussed in the preceding section. In this section, we present the indicators that we constructed to perform this empirical test.

Since detraditionalization means that people's ties with traditional institutions are loosening or even disappearing, an obvious indicator is the membership of traditional institutions. Naturally, we have to confine ourselves to the membership of institutions for which data are available. Consequently, we focus on the membership of the nuclear family, of churches, of trade unions and of political parties. Although these institutions only constitute part of the numerous traditional institutions that might be subject to a process of detraditionalization, they are perhaps the most typical examples of these institutions and are often mentioned in discussions of individualization.

It is harder to find a suitable indicator for emancipation. Although it may seem clear what increasing freedom of choice means, it is far from evident how it should be measured. Simply counting the number of options available to people does not seem to be a feasible option, so we follow a different course. We do not look at the input of freedom of choice but at the outcome, by measuring to what extent the attitudes of individual people are determined by their objective characteristics. To be more precise, increasing freedom of choice or emancipation is supposed to mean that people's attitudes will be progressively *less* predictable by objective personal characteristics like gender, age, and educational attainment. Hence, as our measure of freedom of choice we use the proportion of explained variance (R^2 for short) of regression analyses of various attitudes. The smaller the explained variance in a particular country is, i.e. the less predictable the attitudes of the population are, the more its people are emancipated. If the proportion of explained variance shows a downward trend, this indicates that freedom of choice is growing and people are becoming more emancipated over time.

In constructing an indicator for heterogeneity of attitudes, we start from the logical assumption that maximum homogeneity – or minimum heterogeneity – would mean that all members of a population share the same opinion. An obvious indicator for het-

erogeneity then is the dispersal of opinions, as measured by a conventional statistic. We will use the coefficient of variation – i.e. the standard deviation divided by the mean – as an indicator for the heterogeneity of opinions among the population.

We use the second and fourth wave of the European Values Study (EVS) and the World Values Study (WVS) to assess the extent of individualization in a number of countries at two points in time. The fourth wave is the most recent one and covers the years 1999-2004. The second wave covers the years 1989-1993. Thus, on average, we can trace the evolution of individualization over a period of ten years. Unfortunately, this is rather short to find clear signs of a long-term trend of individualization, which may take decades to evolve fully. However, the first wave of the EVS and WVS, which dates from 1981-1984, includes too few variables that are identical to those in the consecutive waves to make a useful comparison.

To measure detraditionalization we use the questions in EVS/WVS regarding the marital status of the respondent and whether they have children, and whether they belong to a religious organization, a labor union or a professional organization, and a political party. Being married and having children or being a child that is living with its parent(s) is interpreted as belonging to a traditional nuclear family. If one is married but has no children, this is only counted as “half” a membership. The total number of memberships is subtracted from four to get an overall indicator for detraditionalization, which thus ranges from zero (minimum detraditionalization) to four (maximum detraditionalization). The detraditionalization score for a particular country is calculated as the average of this indicator for all respondents in that country.

To construct an indicator for heterogenization, the standard deviation of fourteen attitudes is calculated. These attitudes refer to:

- Self positioning on a political scale from left to right.²
- Preferences with respect to income equality, private versus state ownership of business, government versus individual responsibility, the obligation to accept a job for the unemployed, whether competition is good or harmful, and whether firms should have more or less freedom.³
- The rating one gives to the political system for governing the country and the rating for the political system as it was before.⁴
- The justifiability of cheating the government (by evading taxes or claiming benefits unjustly), of individual liberty rights (for

homosexuals, free abortion, divorce, and suicide) and of improper road behavior (joyriding, using alcohol while driving, throwing litter on the street, exceeding the maximum speed).⁵

Emancipation is measured as one minus the average explained variance (R^2) of a number of linear regression analyses with the above-mentioned questions as dependent variables and sex, age, marital status, family situation, educational level, income category, social class, labor market position and town size as independent variables. This indicator thus measures the average proportion of the variance of opinions of individuals that cannot be explained by their objective personal characteristics.

4.3 Is there a process of individualization going on?

Before analyzing the trends in individualization, we first describe the state of individualization in 25 industrialized countries around the year 2000. Table 4.1 shows the scores of these countries on the three indicators of individualization (see the Appendix for more detailed information). The higher the scores, the more individualized the people of a country are. The correlation coefficients at the bottom of the table show that the three dimensions of individualization are positively correlated, though the correlations are rather small. This confirms that the three interpretations of individualization are indeed separate dimensions, which are not simply interchangeable.

Although it is rather arbitrary to fix a threshold above which a country may be called individualized, the figures in Table 4.1 seem to point to quite a high degree of individualization. An average score of almost three on the indicator for detraditionalization means that on average a citizen of these countries is a member of only one of the four traditional institutions (family, religious organization, labor or professional union, and political party) that constitute this measure. Only Icelanders and Swedes belong, on average, to two institutions. The Britons, French and Portuguese have, on average, the smallest number of memberships.

An average score of two on heterogenization means that the average coefficient of variation of the set of opinions used is rather large, pointing to a lot of disagreement among the population. The Polish, Turkish and Slovakian people disagree most with

Table 4.1 Scores on three interpretations of individualization, c. 2000

	Scores			Ranking			
	detraditionalization	heterogeneity	emancipation	detraditionalization	heterogeneity	emancipation	average
Austria	2.64	1.88	0.928	22	24	20	22.0
Belgium	2.94	2.02	0.935	12	12	16	13.3
Canada	2.82	1.96	0.948	16	15	8	13.0
Czech Republic	3.01	2.26	0.927	9	4	21	11.3
Denmark	2.67	1.94	0.941	19	19	13	17.0
Finland	2.65	1.95	0.922	21	17	25	21.0
France	3.25	2.09	0.953	2	5	3	3.3
Germany	3.15	2.04	0.935	4	11	17	10.7
Greece	2.91	2.09	0.952	13	6	4	7.7
Hungary	3.02	2.08	0.949	8	7	7	7.3
Iceland	1.83	1.90	0.934	25	21	18	21.3
Ireland	2.90	1.95	0.933	14	18	19	17.0
Italy	2.75	2.07	0.939	18	8	14	13.3
Japan	2.94	1.88	0.948	11	22	9	14.0
Republic of Korea	2.90	2.06	0.952	15	9	5	9.7
Luxembourg	3.00	1.96	0.954	10	16	2	9.3
Netherlands	2.66	1.65	0.927	20	25	23	22.7
Poland	3.08	2.37	0.927	7	1	22	10.0
Portugal	3.17	2.06	0.968	3	10	1	4.7
Slovakia	2.76	2.31	0.944	17	3	11	10.3
Spain	3.10	1.99	0.943	6	14	12	10.7
Sweden	2.02	1.91	0.944	24	20	10	18.0
Turkey	3.10	2.35	0.938	5	2	15	7.3
United Kingdom	3.30	1.88	0.926	1	23	24	16.0
United States of America	2.31	2.02	0.950	23	13	6	14.0
average	2.83	2.03	0.941				
Correlation coefficients:							
detraditionalization	1	0.35	0.13				
heterogeneity		1	0.11				

Source: EVS/WVS (1999-2004); calculations by the authors

each other. The Dutch, Austrians and Britons share the same views relatively often. However, the differences between the countries with respect to heterogeneity are rather small.

Finally, an average score of 0.94 on emancipation means that, on average, 94 percent of the variance of the opinions of individuals cannot be explained by their objective characteristics. This

points to a large freedom of choice with respect to one's opinion, independent of the social group one belongs to. The opinions of the people of Portugal, Luxembourg and France are the least predictable; the Finnish, British and Dutch people are somewhat more predictable.

If one looks at the ranking of the various countries on the three indicators of individualization in the right-hand panel of Table 4.1, there are only a few countries that score consistently high or low on all indicators. Somewhat unexpectedly, the French and the Portuguese turn out to be, on average, the most individualized, closely followed by the Greeks and the Turks. The Dutch, Austrians, Icelanders and Finns appear to be the least individualized.

Actually, the term individualization does not refer to a situation, but to a process. To determine whether there really is a process of individualization going on, one has to analyze the evolution of the scores on detraditionalization, heterogeneity and emancipation. If there is indeed a trend of individualization, the average scores should rise over time.

Table 4.2 shows the changes in the average scores between the second and the fourth wave of the EVS/WVS. Roughly, these changes represent the individualization trend during the 1990s. At the bottom of the table, the average of the changes of detraditionalization, heterogeneity and emancipation is shown. Contrary to expectations, both detraditionalization and heterogeneity have, on average, *decreased* during the 1990s. In only a quarter of the countries did the average number of memberships drop (i.e. the detraditionalization score rose), the most pronounced drop being in the United Kingdom. The strongest increase in membership rates occurred in Sweden, the United States and Finland. This was mainly due to an increase in the membership of religious organizations. Remarkably, in all 25 countries considered, the heterogeneity of opinions decreased, meaning that around the year 2000, people more often agreed on a number of opinions than around the year 1990. The strongest decrease in heterogeneity (or increase in homogeneity) occurred in Korea and Turkey.

The trend with respect to emancipation is less clear. Although the average unpredictability (i.e. unexplained variance) of people's opinions grew slightly, in only one in three countries was there an increasing trend of emancipation, most notably in Korea and Finland. In fact, in more than half of the countries, people's opinions became more predictable during the 1990s.

Table 4.2 Change of scores on individualization between c. 1990 and c. 2000

	detraditionalization	heterogeneity	emancipation
Austria	-0.07	-0.13	-0.008
Belgium	0.00	-0.21	-0.004
Canada	0.07	-0.08	0.008
Czech Republic	-0.02	-0.06	0.021
Denmark	-0.07	-0.21	0.002
Finland	-0.31	-0.14	0.030
France	0.07	-0.09	0.011
Germany	0.12	-0.15	-0.001
Greece	0.00	-0.15	0.000
Hungary	-0.11	-0.15	0.002
Iceland	-0.23	-0.18	-0.001
Ireland	0.04	-0.24	-0.009
Italy	-0.19	-0.23	-0.006
Japan	-0.07	-0.08	-0.002
Republic of Korea	-0.23	-0.43	0.035
Luxembourg	0.00	-0.06	-0.008
Netherlands	-0.01	-0.17	-0.009
Poland	-0.08	-0.11	-0.007
Portugal	0.10	-0.19	-0.005
Slovakia	-0.16	-0.05	-0.003
Spain	0.04	-0.26	0.000
Sweden	-0.64	-0.19	0.015
Turkey	0.00	-0.37	-0.005
United Kingdom	0.20	-0.21	-0.013
United States of America	-0.33	-0.06	0.004
Average	-0.08	-0.17	0.002
% of increases	28	0	36
correlation coefficients:			
detraditionalization	1	0.03	-0.47
heterogeneity		1	-0.13

Source: EVS/WVS (1989-1993) and EVS/WVS (1999-2004); calculations by the authors

In short, there is hardly any evidence for a trend of individualization during the 1990s. Contrary to expectations, in most countries membership rates of traditional organizations went up, and the people became more united with respect to a number of opinions. There was, thus, no general trend of detradditionalization and heterogenization. Moreover, in over half of the countries, individual opinions became more predictable, contradicting the expectation

of an emancipation process, although on average, all countries considered, unpredictability increased slightly.

4.4 Conclusion

The empirical analysis of this chapter leaves us somewhat puzzled. Although, both in the popular media and in the scientific literature, individualization is often mentioned as one of the main social trends of the past decades, we did not succeed in establishing this claim empirically. First, we observed that the existing scholarly literature on individualization is rather vague and provides little basis for examining this phenomenon empirically. Second, after we constructed three indicators for individualization which, in our opinion, come as close as possible to the tenor of the theoretical literature, we did not find any proof of an individualization trend in 25 developed countries.

There are four possible explanations for this unexpected result. The first is that the indicators we constructed are not adequate to measure individualization. The obvious question is then, of course, what would be better indicators. Since the best-known authors on individualization did not provide us with a clue of how to measure it, we do not know what would be better measures of individualization.

Second, the time period we examined, *viz.* the 1990s, might be too short to be able to detect the individualization process. Although we agree that a period of ten years is rather short to measure a gradual process such as individualization, we nevertheless found considerable evidence for the opposite trend of individualization, which we might perhaps call collectivization. Elsewhere, we carried out a more detailed analysis for one particular country, the Netherlands, covering a much longer period of time (ranging from 20 to 50 years) and also found little evidence for an individualization trend, with the exception of detraditionalization (De Beer 2007).

Third, the data we analyzed might be unreliable.⁶ The fact that we, rather unexpectedly, found the highest levels of individualization for countries such as Turkey and Portugal might be caused by the unreliability of the data for these countries. If the data contain a lot of random noise, e.g. due to measurement error, this may inflate the heterogeneity of responses and reduce the explained

variance. The overall fall of heterogeneity during the 1990s might then be due to the fact that the fourth wave of the EVS and the WVS was conducted more accurately and meticulously than the second wave. Since we do not have independent information on the accuracy of the various country surveys, we are not able to judge the plausibility of this explanation.

Finally, our results might, of course, also be caused by the fact that there simply is no unambiguous trend of individualization. As mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, this conclusion would not rule out the possibility that most people consider themselves to be individualized or believe that they have more freedom of choice and are less influenced by social conditions than before. But as is well-known, people's perceptions of their own motives and behavior might substantially deviate from what scientists find if they examine their behavior more closely.

To conclude, the fact that we did not find evidence for a trend of individualization during the 1990s in our sample of 25 countries does not necessarily imply that the whole idea of an individualization trend is a concoction. Perhaps there would be clearer signs of individualization if we could survey a much longer time period, for example the whole twentieth century. Perhaps we are just at the beginning of a process of individualization which will manifest itself fully in the decades to come. And perhaps individualization reveals itself in other phenomena than those we were able to test empirically. So, our conclusion is not that individualization is a chimera, but we do want to stress that it is a much less understood and much more ambiguous phenomenon than is generally thought.

Notes

1. Sections 1 and 2 of this chapter are based on De Beer (2007).
2. The question runs as follows:
In political matters people talk of "the left" and "the right". How would you place your views on this scale, generally speaking? (1) Left ... (10) Right.
3. The following questions were used:
How would you place your views on this scale? 1 means you agree completely with the statement on the left; 10 means you agree completely with the statement on the right; and if your views fall somewhere in between, you can choose any number in between.
 - (1) Incomes should be made more equal ... (10) We need larger income differences as incentives for individual effort

- (1) Private ownership of business and industry should be increased ... (10) Government ownership of business and industry should be increased
 - (1) The state should give more freedom to firms ... (10) The state should control firms more effectively
 - (1) The government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for ... (10) People should take more responsibility to provide for themselves
 - (1) People who are unemployed should have to take any job available or lose their unemployment benefits ... (10) People who are unemployed should have the right to refuse a job they do not want
 - (1) Competition is good. It stimulates people to work hard and develop new ideas ... (10) Competition is harmful. It brings out the worst in people
4. The next two questions were used:
 People have different views about the system for governing this country. Here is a scale for rating how well things are going: 1 means very bad; 10 means very good.
 Where on this scale would you put the political system as it was [some specific moment in the past].
5. The following questions were used:
 Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you think it can always be justified (10), never be justified (1), or something in between:
- Claiming government benefits to which you are not entitled
 - Cheating on taxes if you have a chance
 - Someone accepting a bribe in the course of their duties
 - Homosexuality
 - Abortion
 - Divorce
 - Euthanasia - ending the life of the incurably sick
 - Suicide
 - Throwing away litter in a public place
 - Driving under the influence of alcohol
 - Taking away and driving a car belonging to someone else (joyriding)
 - Speeding over the limit in built-up areas
6. We would like to thank Mark Elchardus for drawing our attention to this explanation.

Appendix to Chapter 4

Table A1 Data for detraditionalization and emancipation

	Detraditionalization					score
	membership of					
	traditional family	religious organization	labor union	professional organization	political party	
Austria	0.75	0.25	0.19	0.08	0.12	2.64
Belgium	0.65	0.12	0.16	0.08	0.07	2.94
Canada	0.56	0.30	0.13	0.16	0.06	2.82
Czech Republic	0.72	0.07	0.10	0.06	0.04	3.01
Denmark	0.57	0.12	0.54	0.11	0.07	2.67
Finland	0.47	0.46	0.34	0.06	0.06	2.65
France	0.62	0.05	0.04	0.03	0.02	3.25
Germany	0.59	0.13	0.07	0.04	0.03	3.15
Greece	0.75	0.07	0.08	0.14	0.08	2.91
Hungary	0.73	0.13	0.07	0.04	0.02	3.02
Iceland	0.60	0.71	0.60	0.19	0.19	1.83
Ireland	0.72	0.19	0.10	0.08	0.04	2.90
Italy	0.79	0.10	0.06	0.07	0.04	2.94
Japan	0.86	0.11	0.06	0.05	0.03	2.90
Rep. of Korea	0.67	0.42	0.06	0.09	0.03	2.75
Luxembourg	0.71	0.09	0.12	0.06	0.05	3.00
Netherlands	0.55	0.34	0.24	0.17	0.09	2.66
Poland	0.74	0.05	0.10	0.04	0.01	3.08
Portugal	0.71	0.06	0.02	0.02	0.02	3.17
Slovakia	0.81	0.17	0.16	0.05	0.07	2.76
Spain	0.76	0.07	0.04	0.02	0.02	3.10
Sweden	0.51	0.71	0.62	0.15	0.10	2.02
Turkey	0.88	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.03	3.10
United Kingdom	0.55	0.05	0.07	0.02	0.03	3.30
United States	0.58	0.58	0.13	0.27	0.19	2.31

Source: EVS/WVS (1999-2004); calculations by the authors

Table A1 Data for detraditionalization and emancipation (continued)

	Emancipation							
	average R ² of regression analyses with as dependent variable:							
	Self positioning in political scale	Income equality	Private vs state ownership of business	Government responsibility	Job taking of the unemployed	Competition good or harmful	Firms and freedom	Rate political system for governing country
Austria	0.024	0.113	0.025	0.026	0.094	0.012	0.056	0.036
Belgium	0.047	0.031		0.060	0.064	0.036	0.049	0.065
Canada	0.038	0.028	0.041	0.036		0.036		
Czech Republic	0.063	0.109	0.093	0.077	0.043	0.028	0.074	0.020
Denmark	0.079			0.029	0.047	0.060	0.079	0.008
Finland	0.056	0.080	0.046	0.048	0.062	0.010	0.041	0.047
France	0.021	0.021	0.026	0.023	0.072	0.018	0.032	0.054
Germany	0.056		0.072	0.053	0.084	0.040	0.038	0.026
Greece	0.026			0.035	0.008	0.042	0.015	0.040
Hungary	0.015			0.040	0.072	0.013	0.048	0.040
Iceland	0.053	0.043	0.048	0.023	0.016	0.039	0.036	0.048
Ireland	0.027	0.053	0.051	0.080	0.112	0.032	0.007	0.035
Italy	0.027	0.050	0.038	0.045	0.053	0.020	0.046	0.020
Japan	0.035	0.061	0.043	0.050		0.022		
Rep. of Korea	0.064	0.022	0.040	0.010		0.002		
Luxembourg	0.020	0.020	0.000	0.021	0.034	0.040	0.022	0.021
Netherlands	0.080	0.059	0.062	0.023	0.061	0.028	0.033	0.045
Poland	0.008	0.127	0.097	0.039	0.042	0.013	0.057	0.067
Portugal	0.042		0.036	0.009	0.053	0.039	0.003	0.023
Slovakia	0.029		0.000	0.047	0.076	0.029	0.083	0.017
Spain	0.071	0.010	0.031	0.034	0.074	0.011	0.033	0.032
Sweden	0.089			0.023	0.047	0.035	0.057	0.039
Turkey	0.068	0.031	0.046	0.052		0.056	0.011	0.027
United Kingdom	0.054	0.041	0.040	0.057	0.074	0.031	0.014	0.065
United States	0.013	0.027	0.046	0.043		0.060		

Source: EVS/WVS (1999-2004); calculations by the authors

Table A1 Data for detraditionalization and emancipation
(continued)

	Emancipation			
	average R ² of regression analyses with as dependent variable:			
	justifiability of cheating government (taxes, benefits)	justifiability of individual liberties (homo, abortion, divorce, suicide)	justifiability of road behavior (joyriding, alcohol, litter, speed)	average
Austria	0.087	0.229	0.094	0.072
Belgium	0.083	0.136	0.090	0.065
Canada	0.055	0.147		0.052
Czech Republic	0.062	0.129	0.100	0.073
Denmark	0.030	0.149	0.063	0.059
Finland	0.097	0.189	0.184	0.078
France	0.087	0.093	0.070	0.047
Germany	0.078	0.166	0.051	0.065
Greece	0.043	0.156	0.059	0.048
Hungary	0.086	0.080	0.065	0.051
Iceland	0.073	0.150	0.196	0.066
Ireland	0.062	0.239	0.041	0.067
Italy	0.089	0.185	0.104	0.061
Japan	0.012	0.125		0.052
Rep. of Korea		0.121		0.048
Luxembourg	0.060	0.113	0.107	0.046
Netherlands	0.102	0.206	0.107	0.073
Poland	0.075	0.206	0.068	0.073
Portugal	0.032	0.035	0.033	0.032
Slovakia	0.054	0.119	0.063	0.056
Spain	0.055	0.218	0.057	0.057
Sweden	0.035	0.117	0.076	0.056
Turkey	0.021	0.285	0.023	0.062
United Kingdom	0.158	0.176	0.102	0.074
United States	0.072	0.066		0.050

Source: EVS/WVS (1999-2004); calculations by the authors

Table A2 Data for heterogenization

	standard deviation of opinions with respect to							
	Left-right	Socio-economic issues						
	Self positioning in political scale	Income equality	Private vs state ownership of business	Government responsibility	Job taking of the unemployed	Competition good or harmful	Firms and freedom	sub-average
Austria	1.65	2.57	2.10	2.57	2.62	2.01	2.56	2.41
Belgium	1.87	2.92		2.73	2.83	2.60	2.82	2.70
Canada	1.78	2.66	2.21	2.56		2.36		2.50
Czech Republic	2.34	2.78	2.54	2.57	2.68	2.20	2.69	2.58
Denmark	2.01			2.15	2.74	2.24	2.41	2.43
Finland	2.09	2.58	2.09	2.46	2.65	2.23	2.29	2.38
France	2.17	2.98	2.22	2.51	2.93	2.70	2.88	2.70
Germany	1.83		2.28	2.70	2.74	2.18	2.76	2.56
Greece	2.12			2.58	2.69	2.53	2.62	2.57
Hungary	1.74			2.84	2.90	2.55	2.81	2.69
Iceland	2.18	2.85	2.12	2.64	2.81	1.85	2.12	2.40
Ireland	1.67	2.75	2.28	2.54	2.67	2.29	2.48	2.50
Italy	2.20	2.73	2.21	2.67	2.43	2.49	2.78	2.55
Japan	1.89	2.20	1.85	2.59		2.07		2.32
Rep. of Korea	2.22	2.75	2.39	2.27		2.24		2.48
Luxembourg	1.76	2.61		2.47	2.63	2.48	2.49	2.54
Netherlands	1.74	2.03	1.86	2.11	2.25	2.04	2.04	2.06
Poland	2.29	3.18	2.83	2.62	2.94	2.76	3.01	2.89
Portugal	2.19		2.36	2.73	2.61	2.66	2.67	2.62
Slovakia	2.03			2.61	2.75	2.23	2.58	2.53
Spain	1.94	2.86	2.49	2.50	2.43	2.35	2.38	2.50
Sweden	2.09			2.22	2.38	1.92	2.11	2.28
Turkey	2.55	3.25	3.30	3.27		3.09	3.19	3.22
United Kingdom	1.65	2.55	2.19	2.39	2.62	2.15	2.21	2.35
United States	1.96	2.57	2.24	2.70		2.40		2.52

Source: EVS/WVS (1999-2004); calculations by the authors

Table A2 Data for heterogenization (continued)

	standard deviation of opinions with respect to							
	Political system			Justification of transgressions				total score
	Rate political system for governing country	Rate political system as it was before	sub-average	cheating government (taxes, benefits)	individual liberties (homo, abortion, divorce, suicide)	road behavior (joyriding, alcohol, litter, speed)	sub-average	average of sub averages
Austria	1.89	1.92	1.90	1.34	2.40	0.92	1.55	1.88
Belgium	1.94	1.94	1.94	1.64	2.16	0.92	1.57	2.02
Canada		2.05	1.96	1.49	2.20		1.60	1.96
Czech Republic	1.80	2.41	2.11	1.67	2.93	1.49	2.03	2.26
Denmark	2.02	2.10	2.06	0.86	2.24	0.72	1.27	1.94
Finland	1.79	1.89	1.84	1.36	2.09	1.03	1.49	1.95
France	1.82	1.75	1.79	1.79	2.10	1.17	1.69	2.09
Germany	2.05	2.38	2.22	1.44	2.21	0.98	1.54	2.04
Greece	2.00	2.01	2.00	1.61	2.05	1.27	1.64	2.09
Hungary	1.88	2.32	2.10	1.93	2.39	1.10	1.80	2.08
Iceland	1.72	1.63	1.68	1.08	1.81	1.11	1.33	1.90
Ireland	2.10	2.29	2.19	1.27	2.07	0.91	1.42	1.95
Italy	1.89	2.26	2.07	1.29	2.09	1.00	1.46	2.07
Japan		1.89	1.88	1.27	1.93		1.44	1.88
Rep. of Korea		1.94	1.91	1.26	2.56		1.65	2.06
Luxembourg	1.79	1.77	1.78	1.65	2.32	1.33	1.77	1.96
Netherlands	1.41	1.40	1.41	1.17	2.20	0.82	1.40	1.65
Poland	1.91	2.68	2.30	1.80	2.84	1.30	1.98	2.37
Portugal	1.75	1.87	1.81	1.54	1.90	1.43	1.62	2.06
Slovakia	1.85	2.53	2.19	2.18	3.00	2.25	2.48	2.31
Spain	1.90	1.85	1.88	1.41	2.46	1.05	1.64	1.99
Sweden	1.95	1.84	1.90	1.27	1.90	1.02	1.40	1.91
Turkey	2.03	2.82	2.43	0.82	2.17	0.60	1.20	2.35
United Kingdom	1.77	2.07	1.92	1.45	2.17	1.16	1.59	1.88
United States		2.12	2.00	1.50	2.13		1.59	2.02

Source: EVS/WVS (1999-2004); calculations by the authors