

THE GROWTH OF WHITEHEAD'S THEISM

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Preface

Ordinarily we can only know what philosophers have produced without having much insight into how they arrived at their conclusions. If we can chart some progression, it is only with respect to the differences between successive dialogues or books. We rarely have the opportunity to observe the creative activity that goes into the construction of a complex system of thought that a book represents. The book as a whole is all we have. In the case of Whitehead's **Process and Reality**, however, we have the opportunity of determining its composition, and thereby gaining some insight into its creative development.

Earlier Whitehead had given a series of Lowell Lectures in February 1925. Before submitting the manuscript in June for publication, however, he had the idea of indivisible epochal occasions. This contrasted sharply with the Lowell Lectures just delivered, which conceived of events as infinitely divisible, in accordance with his earlier philosophy of nature. Rather than thoroughly revising the manuscript for **Science and the Modern World**, Whitehead elected to publish the lectures as presented "with some slight expansion"¹ and the addition of four chapters, including those which explored some implications of temporal atomicity: "Abstraction" and "God".

Though presented to the world as a single work, **Science and the Modern World** is really a composite of two essays, each with its own systematic integrity. Most read it, however, in terms of a single interpretive whole, for this is the way most books are designed to be read. Many of the difficulties it generates could be resolved by realizing that its compositional analysis reveals that it makes more sense on many issues to treat it as two units of interpretation.

Perhaps thinking he was successful in his first endeavor in producing a composite text, Whitehead tried it a second time in writing **Process and Reality**. It suited his own thinking admirably, for his philosophical system was very much in the making. Fresh unexpected insights calling for major conceptual revisions were frequent. Whitehead explored the implications of these insights with vigor, but he was not about to make full-scale textual revisions every time this happened, particularly as undertaking such revisions might lead to further insights, ad infinitum.

He resorted instead to the use of insertions expressing new insights placed within conceptually older material, often (though not always) with explanations designed to smooth over the gaps between these disparate materials. Moreover, he seems to have determined to keep all the material intended for publication, even when it had been superseded by other passages. It may be impossible very difficult to show that something had been left out, but some passages can apparently only be explained in this manner.²

Given these idiosyncrasies, it is possible to treat **Process and Reality** as a composite text. It is not composite in the sense in which the Bible is composite, where the book of Genesis may be seen as an interweaving of three different sources traditions. **Process and Reality** is all written by one author, but by that author in different stages in his philosophical development. By compositional analysis, that is, by attending to discrepancies, "ghost" references, shifts in conceptuality and terminology, arranging the texts in their probable sequence, it is possible to trace the stages of Whitehead's formulation of his metaphysics. Moreover, once these stages have been ascertained, it is usually possible to make very plausible conjectures as to why he modified his earlier position. In this wise we can obtain a more intensive picture of Whitehead's creativity than for almost any other major philosopher.

Many have observed that Whitehead as a philosopher is often deficient in giving arguments for his claims. It is not because no arguments could be given; his commentators have little difficulty in furnishing acceptable reasons and arguments. Perhaps the fact that Whitehead piled layer upon layer and yet tried to disguise the whole as a single unified treatise had something to do with this. Any justification of a revised point of view would be a criticism of its unrevised form, and call attention to the discrepancy between the two.

In this essay I shall explore the concepts for God Whitehead employs. As we shall see, there are three: God as nontemporal and nonconrescent, which is the notion of God employed in the first version of his work, before he worked intensively on the final chapter. The final chapter presents the concept most characteristic of him: God as temporal and conrescent. In between, however, there was another concept: God as nontemporal and conrescent, which is to found in some 26 insertions.

I have arranged those insertions in their probable genetic order, for they provide rich clues for the progression of Whitehead's thought.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Preface

A Note on Notation

Introduction

The Four Parts

Preliminary Considerations

1. Compositional Analysis
2. Two or Three Concepts?
3. Whitehead's Avoidance of 'Nontemporal Concrecence'
4. The Genetic Interpretation of Transforming Process Theism

A. God as Nontemporal and Nonconcrecent.

B. God as Nontemporal and Concrecent

C. God as Temporal and Concrecent: The Final Chapter

1. The First articulations: from 2.6 and 2.3
2. First recension: V.2.1-4
3. The Remaining sections: 2.5, 2.7
4. Revisions Making Use of the Two Natures

D. God as Temporal and Concrecent: The Insertions.

References

Notes

A Note on Notation

Studies of this sort require compact ways of referring to specific passages. Passages from **Process and Reality** can be indicated by e.g. PR 57, or by section (II.1.7). (The unit that Whitehead employed is usually the section.) Sometimes it is desirable to refer more precisely to the line number by decimal, e.g. PR 96.29-34.

The texts for each layer of composition exhibit a common doctrine which contrasts significantly with earlier or later layers. I counted some 13 layers in **The Emergence of Whitehead's Metaphysics**, labelled A through M.

Some examples will best illustrate the resulting complexity:

PR 39C p39 as belonging to layer C

II.1.1C Part II, chapter 1, section 1, layer C

PR 32e the fifth insertion on p32

[5] the fifth insertion to be examined, in probable genetic order

[1-2] the first two insertions

PR 257a: G in III.4.1E PR 257a is a G insertion in a section which is otherwise E.

PR 87.43d Sometimes it is necessary to indicate where on a line the insertion begins or ends. Small d indicates the fourth mark of punctuation on that line.

A+, C+ refer to sublayers after A but before B discerned since basic classification adopted.

Otherwise, e.g. D+ or I+, refer either to D or to subsequent layers.

Introduction

I have divided these essay into four parts, corresponding to the three concepts of God Whitehead successively entertained. (Parts **C** and **D** share the same concept.)

A. God as nontemporal and nonconrescent. This section includes all those mentions of 'God' which occur in the first version, which comprises the chapters written in draft form before he attempted the final chapter. Basically it is limited to the notion that God is **the** nontemporal actual entity, and one of three formative elements. This continues ideas presented in **Religion in the Making**, provided we bracket its fourth chapter. The fourth chapter is based on the personalistic theism as revealed in the Western religions. Whitehead means to restrict himself to natural theology (at least in the cosmological chapters), and thus to purely metaphysical concepts.

He proposes three formative elements: creativity, ideal entities, and God as "the actual but non-temporal entity whereby the indetermination of mere creativity is transmuted into a determinate freedom" (RM 90). These three formative elements are constitutive of every actual occasion. Creativity and the forms are not sufficient, for there must be some means whereby the occasion can actualize itself. This is the way God is a formative element. The means of actualization are articulated in terms of the various categories of explanation and obligation. God is that actuality providing reasons of the highest absoluteness for these categories (PR 19).

In this role God is immanent within each occasion. It is not necessary that God be prehended; at least God is never so described in the first version. On the other hand, God must be actual. If merely possible, God would be indistinguishable from the ideal entities.³ Most components, including creativity and the ideal entities, which are immanent in an occasion, are dependent for their existence upon that occasion. Not so God, who is actual independently of every occasion. As a formative element God does not exist, nor is located in spacetime, apart from occasions, but then this is not expected of a nontemporal actual entity.

God's status both as an independent actual entity and as a formative element allows God to be considered as one actuality, yet does not introduce the problems which prehension (and hybrid prehension) pose. As formative element God is immanent in occasions as the basis of their actuality. But since God's nature is unaffected by such ingression, God can be considered in abstraction from all such immanence.

There is as yet no hint of God as temporal or as conrescent. If the final chapter were to follow directly upon the first version, without any intervening ideas, the transition from this nonconrescent concept to the two natures of God, primordial and consequent, would be quite inexplicable. There is no bridge between the two ideas. Fortunately, however, we do possess a number of insertions mapping his progress from the first to the final concept by means of a bridging notion:

B. God as nontemporal and conrescent. The basic idea here is the application of conrescence to God. In a finite conrescence the multiplicity of past actualities comprising an occasion's world are prehended and integrated into a single unitary satisfaction. In a divine conrescence the eternal objects are conceived as a multiplicity to be ordered into a unified whole. Because that which is so unified are eternal, however, the divine conrescence is nontemporal. Eventually, when combined with the consequent nature, the nontemporal conrescence becomes the primordial nature.

The impetus for reconceiving God as conrescence came from Whitehead's decision to

regard the present concrescence as actual [1-2]. Heretofore only (past) concrete determinateness was considered to be actual (cf EWM 323f). Then God, to be actual, would also have to be concrescent. This in turn led to an augmentation to his account of the general Aristotelian principle [4], and a full-scale presentation [9-11].

The first mention of subjective aim, genetically considered, is found in an insertion within the account of the category of subjective intensity. Here, however, subjective aim is derived from reversion [12]. Further reflection, aligning this with his theory of God, quickly resulted in the current theory [14-15]. Subjective aim was appreciated as one grounds for the atomicity of occasions [16]. The study of living occasions [17] then prompted the introduction of hybrid physical prehension [18-20].

Since God as a formative element need not be prehended the use of hybrid prehension indicates that Whitehead already conceived of God as an individual subject, though this is not explicitly mentioned in any of these insertions. Later Whitehead comes to realize that the category of reversion is superfluous. The novelty reversion permits can be explained in terms of the novelty which initial subjective aims may have, particularly now that they can hybridly prehended. Therefore he inserts a paragraph abolishing reversion [26].

C. God as temporal and concrescent. C and D are devoted to those passages based upon the most familiar Whiteheadian concept of God, God as having both a primordial and a consequent nature.

Here I am using 'temporal' generically, as that which is other than nontemporal, for this contrasts with the nontemporal actuality of A and B. It does not mean that which is temporal in every sense, for Whitehead accords a primordial aspect to this concept. Nor does it mean 'temporal' in the narrower sense means that which comes into being and perishes. This sense of temporality can be contrasted with temporal as applied to God, by which Whitehead means the everlasting: that which is always coming into being and never perishing.

From a genetic perspective, the first articulation of God as temporal and concrescent is found in the second paragraph of V.2.6 (PR 349f). I trace the elaboration of this concept in the various compositional layers of the final chapter (V.2).

D. Editorial Additions based on God as temporal and concrescent. Here there is little advance in theory, but these adjustments were needed to correct possible misunderstandings based on earlier formulations. This part catalogues all known mentions of primordial or consequent nature, in order to show how they can be accounted for as passages written after the final chapter.

Some Preliminary Considerations

1. Compositional Analysis. We should situate this theological speculation with respect to the compositional layering of **Process and Reality** as a whole. The analysis of **The Emergence of Whitehead's Metaphysics** is still serviceable, although it needs to be modified in detail. For ease of ready reference I have retained its sigla:

- A. The Basic Theory of Extension (IV.2-3, 5)
- A+. Early passages in part II which still use SMW prehension.
- B. The original treatise on Perception (II.4,8)
- C. The Giffords draft, redefined not as the 9 1/2 chapters written the summer of 1927, but those which presuppose a unitary datum from which concrescence flows. This includes I.1, V.1, and the rest of part II.
- C+. Insertions in C which anticipate D (subjective form, negative prehension)
- D. "The Theory of Feeling" (III.1)
- E. The Revised Theory of Concrescence (III.2, 4)
- F. The Remaining Categorical Conditions (III.3)
- H. Intellectual Feelings (III.5)

Layers ABC DEFH, roughly parts II and III, constitute what I have termed 'the first version'. This comprises the material Whitehead wrote before seriously turning his attention to the problem of God in anticipation of writing the final chapter (V.2). It is characterized by the initial concept of God as nontemporal and nonconcretent.

G. Insertions in the first version anticipating the final chapter.

H precedes G if we retain the original designations. I had originally placed this before III.5, but I am now convinced that these insertions presupposed a completed first version. These insertions are characterized by the middle concept of God as nontemporal and concretent. But the train of thought developed in these insertions includes more, particularly subjective aim, hybrid prehension, and the abolition of reversion. All should be studied together to appreciate Whitehead's creative modification of his thought.

I. The Consequent Nature of God (V.2 and the insertions enumerated in part **D**) God as temporal and concretent.

J. The Gifford Lectures of June 1928 and subsequent additions

K. Strains (II.4.9, IV.4, 5.1)

L. [II.1.4; most of these materials have been reassigned to G.]

M. "Coordinate Division" (IV.1)

Aside from the casual mentions of God in the first version, the layers devoted to the theory of God are **G** (part B) and **I** (parts C and D).

By noting anomalies, ghost references,⁴ terminological shifts, and conceptual contrasts it has been possible to analyze the text into these differing layers. Then these layers can be ordered in terms of earlier and later, usually by the complexity of the ideas, and by its conformity with the received systematic interpretation. By and large the effort to interpret

Process and Reality as a single hermeutical unit has resulted in a theory which adopts Whitehead's resultant position (primarily parts III, IV.1, V.2), interpreting earlier material from this perspective.

For the purposes of genetic analysis, in which we attempt to reconstruct the stages of his system building, it is important to treat each layer as a separate unit of interpretation. Each layer must be understood by itself. Although earlier layers can be taken into account, later layers need not yet have been anticipated. We should divorce ourselves from assumptions derived from later layers, and consider the meaning which it would have had for Whitehead at that time. Thus I caution the reader not to read into the initial concept of God in the first version the notion of the envisagement of eternal objects, nor read into the passages in G on God as nontemporal and conrescent the final concept of God so characteristic of Whitehead's systematic position.

This essay introduces a dimension not present in **The Emergence of Whitehead's Metaphysics**, the analysis of insertions. Many insertions are introduced in order to explain earlier material from the standpoint of later conclusions. Thus Part D enumerates several passages mentioning the primordial and consequent natures in order prevent misunderstandings. But there are also insertions which are more like preliminary notes for chapters yet to be written.

It appears that before Whitehead felt ready to write his final chapter (V.2), he had a number of insights in anticipation of that task. His characteristic method for recording these insights, it seems, was to stick into the manuscript wherever it seemed to fit. Other authors might have held these notes separate to incorporate later in finished chapters, but that was not his style. He does best in articulating these insights while they are fresh in his mind. Frequently these notes are not rearticulated later.

We shall examine one set of notes, G, in anticipation of the final chapter (I). Paralleling this to some extent are the notes of C+ in anticipation of D. These have not been sufficiently isolated and studied, however, to know whether a comparative development of thought can be discerned.

There are two main methods for determining insertions: conceptual contrast and continuity of context. Conceptual and terminological contrast presupposes an acquaintance with compositional layering and the discipline of interpreting a passage solely in terms of its layer. Then the presence of concepts or terms which appear not to belong to that layer suggest the presence of an insertion. This method is not foolproof, for it may turn out that the concept in question really belongs to that layer, and our ideas about what constitutes the layer need to be revised. This must be resolved on a case by case basis.

The method of continuity of context is primarily important in determining the parameters of an insertion. In many cases the text reads more smoothly in the absence of the insertion. Then there is continuity of context, i.e. the text before and the text after read in a continuous fashion.

Whitehead's way of writing, however, often makes it difficult to show that it has any more continuity with or without the passage in question. Although it is often easy to recognize an insertion after the fact, this is not always true beforehand. There is no guarantee as to the length of the insertion, which may be just a few words (e.g. "the primordial nature of"), a few sentences, several paragraphs, or even a complete section (e.g. II.1.4L, III.3.1, 3.2). Each must be examined on its own terms. Getting it right in many cases is no guarantee that the next will be.

There are some minor clues that work in many instances. Sometimes Whitehead writes transitional phrases or sentences designed to achieve greater continuity between insertion and the following context, and sometimes this transition is patently obvious [12]. In many cases he prefaces an insertion with 'Again' [27]. Often he disguises an insertion by using a "run-on" paragraph, placing in a single paragraph two distinct topics (PR 347).

2. Two or Three Concepts? Many readers have assumed that **Process and Reality** has only one concept of God, God as primordial and consequent. They interpret **Process and Reality** as a single hermeutical unit, which is the way we naturally interpret a book. Since that is Whitehead's characteristic concept, it must be the one concept throughout the book. But there is a definite contrast between the nontemporal and temporal notions of God. Denis Hurtubise has thoroughly examined this contrast in **Relire Whitehead: Concepts de Dieu dans Process and Reality**.⁵ One reader questioned the importance of his endeavour, on the grounds that it was so obvious that Whitehead had these two concepts of God that it wasn't worth establishing. This may be obvious once it has been pointed out, but many readers assume that there was one consistent concept throughout. If we subtract the part of the final chapter that pertains to the consequent nature (PR 344-351) and the relevant insertions,⁶ that is, if we omit about eleven pages, we would scarcely know that Whitehead espoused any sort of process theism. His concept or concepts of God, in the other 340 pages, is strictly nontemporal.

Hurtubise shows that there are at least two concepts for God in **Process and Reality**, one nontemporal and one temporal (everlasting). But he does not make the further distinction I make between the nonconrescent and conrescent versions of God as nontemporal. The reason Hurtubise distinguishes only two concepts while I insist on three lies largely in the fact that we have different aims in mind.

He argues that the divine concepts are distinct if they are inconsistent with one another. Thus an everlasting conrescence cannot be wholly timeless, yet God previously was so conceived. The process theism of the final chapter is incompatible with the classical theism expressed earlier. Because my two versions of divine nontemporality are not inconsistent with each other, both can be construed together as constituting a single initial concept. Affirming God as nontemporally conrescent does not deny God as a nontemporal actual entity. The early expressions of divine nontemporality, moreover, could be construed as containing the notion of envisagement implicitly. Besides, the texts classified in terms of my first concept are silent as to whether they should be understood either as conrescent or nonconrescent. It is only retrospectively, in the light of temporal conrescence, that they can be classed as nonconrescent.

By contrast my overriding purpose is to further our understanding as to how Whitehead came to espouse process theism. Once God is conceived in terms of a nontemporal conrescence of conceptual feelings, it is but a short step to toy with idea of God's conrescence having both physical and conceptual feelings, particularly as all actual occasions have both kinds. This has momentous consequences for the history of thought, but the conceptual move is rather straightforward. What turns out to be much more complex is the move from the nontemporal actual entity to the primordial envisagement.

Concepts usually exclude only those alternatives they are aware of and take seriously. Although classical theism is increasingly defined in opposition to process theism, that was not initially the case. The notion of a nontemporal ordering of eternal objects, particularly if understood as the self-actualization of God, is sufficiently unusual and novel that any antecedent express denial is not to be expected.

The notion of a possible nontemporal conrescence is sufficiently rich and complex that we should carefully attend to its birth. The passages pertaining to this concept can be distinguished from earlier ones by this criterion: they must either express or be dependent upon the notion of a nontemporal conrescence. Earlier passages, while affirming divine nontemporality, are capable of being interpreted independently of any notion of conrescence.

Since the abstract early concept is usually compatible with the notion of nontemporal concrescence, we might suppose that Whitehead already implicitly accepted the idea, but was simply expressing himself in conventional terms, at least until he was ready to write the final chapter.⁷ Yet the fact that he enthusiastically affirmed the idea, exploring its ramifications, once the idea was introduced, strongly suggests that he had not considered it earlier. Its prior absence meant at least that he was not yet prepared to accept its consequences.

The criterion of strict consistency is appropriate for Hurtubise's purpose, which is to demonstrate with rigor, independently of theories of development, that there are at least two concepts of God in **Process and Reality**. Therefore the chief criterion for recognizing the difference between these concepts will be explicit conflict or contradiction. In contrast my purpose in using compositional analysis is to establish a basis for reconstructing Whitehead's development. If so, we need to attend not only to inconsistency but every indication of difference we can find: anomalies, discrepancies, evidence of insertion, absence of relevant ideas, etc.

Without the intermediate concept of nontemporal concrescence it will be difficult, if not impossible, to construct the full history of Whitehead's development. The ideal of pure, independent textual analysis has an important value. Certainly we should first develop all external clues before trying to fit our analysis into any preconceived idea of development. Compositional analysis is the basis upon which genetic reconstruction must rest, and needs to be initially investigated on its own. On the other hand, I have found in practice that conceptual differences have often played a major role in alerting us to the presence of compositional factors such as insertions.

The pattern of insertions offers independent evidence that there is an objective distinction between the two nontemporal concepts of God. If Whitehead began with a more traditional (nonconcretent) view of God, then the first version of **Process and Reality** would reflect that view, as it does. If his reconception of a nontemporal concrescence occurred after that draft was completed, any passages expressing this reconception could not be part of the original text but would be later interpolations. This appears to be the case: mentions of the nonconcretent concept appear to be part of the original text,⁸ while mentions of the concretent concept appear to be inserted. Some passages are obviously insertions, and all can be so interpreted. In some instances, the insertions constitute entire sections.

3. Whitehead's Avoidance of 'Nontemporal Concrescence'. Although I make ample use of the distinction between the nonconcretent and concretent versions of God as nontemporal, it is most noteworthy that Whitehead appears never to have ascribed the term 'concretence' to the nontemporal God, except in one late insertion (PR 87f: I+). He has a great variety of alternate designations: [primordial] togetherness (PR 32), conceptual valuation or realization (PR 31, 247), primordial valuation (PR 40), ideal realization (PR 40), transcendent decision (PR 164), divine ordering (PR 31), unconditional actuality of conceptual feeling (PR 344G). The term 'concretence' seems to have been deliberately avoided, for it connoted to him temporality, and above all, subjectivity. Subjectivity was incompatible with his (implicit) understanding of God as a formative element constitutive of actual occasions, an understanding he was not yet prepared to give up.

Despite its difficulties I shall retain the notion of nontemporal concrescence, recognizing that it is at best oxymoronic, and even possibly self-contradictory, for these reasons:

- 1) it provides a ready classification of his theories of God which needs only two differentia.

- 2) Nontemporal concrescence may be conceived as the limiting case of concrescence. It is the movement from the many to one with all the temporality drained out of it.
- 3) The notion of nontemporal concrescence lies behind Whitehead's reflection on conceptual realization. It may very well be the catalyst which leads him in this direction. He thinks of the divine activity in unifying the multiplicity of eternal objects as if it were a concrescence, only not temporal. [2, 4]. Possibly this should not be termed 'concrecence' if concrescence means (self-)creation, since the eternal objects are held to be uncreated [5].
- 4) Later, when Whitehead finds it appropriate to consider God as a whole to be subjective, because of the everlastingness of the consequent nature, he does ascribe concrescence to the primordial nature:

(i) the 'primordial nature' of God is the concrescence of a unity of conceptual feelings, including among their data all eternal objects. The concrescence is directed by the subjective aim, that the subjective forms of the feelings shall be such as to constitute the eternal objects into relevant lures of feeling severally appropriate for all realizable basic conditions (ii) The 'consequent nature' of God is . . . (PR 87f: I+).

This is carefully phrased to avoid all hint of temporal advance, yet at the same time to show how God's primordial activity could be conceived as an aspect of God's everlasting concrescence. Nontemporal concrescence was now possible because Whitehead was now prepared to affirm divine subjectivity.

4. The Genetic Interpretation of Transforming Process Theism

The analysis proposed in this monograph differs somewhat from the interpretation given in **Transforming Process Theism**.⁹ There I interpreted the transformation introduced by "the complete conceptual valuation of all eternal objects" (PR 32d) to signify the introduction of nontemporal concrescence, drawing upon the conceptuality of my essay on "The Non-Temporality of Whitehead's God."¹⁰ This account had to be heavily qualified, however, since Whitehead never refers to a divine concrescence as long as God was conceived as strictly nontemporal.

So I made the following account: **Religion in the Making** conceived of God metaphysically as a formative element only. This conception persisted up until conceptual valuation was introduced as a metaphysical doctrine (PR 32d). The earlier account of conceptual valuation (in RM 154) did not belong to the metaphysics (of RM, chapter three), but was a theistic projection based on the revelation of Western religions. It imagined God as subjectively contemplating the eternal forms. Whitehead, however, became disenchanted with this account, for it assumed that God was an instance of creativity, and this he found to conflict with the notion of God as a formative element. Now conceptual valuation was reintroduced, in terms of nontemporal concrescence, and that implied divine subjectivity. In order to avoid that unwelcome implication, Whitehead proceeded to qualify conceptual valuation, so that this form of the unification and ordering of eternal objects would not entail subjectivity.

This interpretation in **Transforming Process Theism** appeared to account for all the textual evidence, but it overlooked one passage, which comes from Whitehead's lectures at Harvard, Fall 1926: "God is a creature" (EWM 313, paragraph 21). This can only mean in context that God is a creature of creativity. Thus God is already conceived to be an instance of

creativity well before **Process and Reality** was written. It also means that Whitehead found no inconsistency between the notions of God as formative element and God as instance of creativity. It need not mean that God must be a concrescence of eternal objects in order to be an instance of creativity. The alleged conflict between formative element and instance of creativity was then re-examined and found to be absent. In that case there would be no reason for him to deny that God is an instance of creativity in the first version (of PR), only to introduce it later (PR 32d). Moreover, if both notions are consistent, they could be deemed consistent even in **Religion in the Making**. Thus this one text has some very far reaching implications.

Part A. God as Nontemporal and Nonconcretent.

This part considers all the mentions of 'God' in the first version of **Process and Reality**, excluding insertions and the final chapter. The conception of God they represent is best described negatively: God has no temporal features, and the notion of a primordial envisagement of eternal objects is also absent. While it has features of its own, it is much more traditional than Whitehead's final concept. God is purely nontemporal, for instance.

Many readers assume that there is only one divine concept throughout the book, which portrays God as both primordial and consequent. Because these mentions of God are often underdetermined, this is a possible reading. Yet if careful attention is given to Whitehead's development, and the compositional layers of the book, these early mentions can be isolated from later notions. When this is done, it turns out that the early concept requires nothing more than can be immediately inferred from the concept of a "nontemporal actual entity."

There appear to be at least three reasons why these early statements are so circumspect: (a) Whitehead's strategy in writing **Process and Reality** meant putting aside theological concerns until he had worked out the cosmology of actual occasions. It was the final chapter to be written after the cosmology was nearly complete. (b) The mentions of God are casual, often in passing, when Whitehead's primary concern was elsewhere. (c) He would be careful not to overstate his case, for that would limit how he could develop his theological speculations, especially if he was resolved not to go back and change what he had written earlier.

Most of these mentions are not particularly interesting from a genetic perspective.¹¹ They show no internal development. Many refer to the concepts of other philosophers, yet without detailed examination. Some of the more "interesting" passages are:

'Actual entities'--also termed 'actual occasions'--are the final real things of which the world is made up. There is no going behind actual entities to find anything more real. They differ among themselves: God is an actual entity, and so is the most trivial puff of existence in far-off empty space. (PR 18)

The reasons of things are always to be found in the composite nature of definite actual entities--in the nature of God for reasons of the highest absoluteness, and in the nature of definite temporal actual entities for reasons which refers to a particular environment. The ontological principle can be summarized as: no actual entity, then no reason. (PR 19)

The description of the generic character of an actual entity should include God, as well as the lowliest actual occasion, though there is a specific difference between the nature of God and that of any occasion. (PR 110)

The immanence of God gives reason for the belief that pure chaos is intrinsically impossible. (PR 111)

Yet these are not typical of the mentions of 'God' to be found in over two hundred pages in the first version. Few if any go beyond what is entailed by the notion of a nontemporal actuality. While I think the notion of a divine formative element lies in the background, and explains the absence of any prehension of God, it remains wholly implicit. It is likely that Whitehead was reserving its explication for the final chapter. By then, however, his thought took another turn.

One particular passage deserves comment:

In all philosophic theory there is an ultimate which is actual in virtue of its accidents. . . In the philosophy of organism, this ultimate is termed 'creativity'; and God is its primordial, non-temporal accident. (PR 7)

If by 'accident' Whitehead meant an instance of creativity, and the divine creative instance were the envisagement of eternal objects, then this passage might harbor an insertion. But as we saw from the introduction God was conceived as an instance of creativity apart from any later notion of envisagement. It is more likely, moreover, that by 'accident' Whitehead means something more like characterization, as he had considered the divine attribute of the underlying substantial activity (SMW 177).

B. God Conceived as Nontemporal and Concretent

Some of the passages to be considered show strong evidence of being later insertions into a tentatively complete text, and all 26 can be so construed. Since they present a different concept of God than that contained in the first version of **Process and Reality**, we may suppose that they are notes charting Whitehead's progress towards the view expressed in the final chapter (V.2). Alternatively, he may be tracing out implications of his new insight. Quite possibly both motives were at work.

Before we examine the individual insertions in context, an overview of Whitehead's development will be in order.

As we have seen, the concept of God in the original version is quite consonant with the earlier notion of a divine formative element (RM 90). God is actual, nontemporal, immanent and constitutive of the actuality of actual occasions. Most distinctively, God is not conceived as concretent, nor as the conceptual realization of all eternal objects, even though earlier God had been described as "the complete conceptual realization of the realm of ideal forms" (RM 154).

In these insertions, God is introduced as a conceptual realization [2], yet with a subtle difference. The earlier notion [of RM], avoided in the text of the first version [of PR], presupposed that a divine mind contemplated the eternal objects. In other words, it presupposed that divine conceptual realization would be subjective. The formulation now introduced is carefully crafted to avoid this implication.

Before this introduction of a qualified conceptual realization, however, there is an insertion which initiated the train of reflection leading to this revision of conceptual realization. In the original version Whitehead adopted a fairly traditional understanding of actuality as concrete determinateness. This is best seen in the formulation of the ontological principle which applied

throughout the first version. By that principle ultimate reasons are vested in actualities, so the principle must specify what counts as actual. Since this early formulation was superseded by other formulations, it is not found in the text [of PR] but it was presented to his students in October, 1927, when he was in the midst of writing **Process and Reality**: "That every condition to which the process of becoming conforms in any particular instance has its **reason** in the character of some actual entity whose objectification is one of the components entering into the particular instance in question (the ontological principle--or principle of extrinsic reference). Actual entities are the only **reasons**; to search for a reason is to search for an actual entity" (EWM 323f).

What's most significant is what is missing from this formulation: "in the character of the subject which is in process of concrescence" (PR 24). In other words, only past determinate actualities (and God) were regarded as actual, even though Whitehead had carefully analyzed the nature of present becoming.

Becoming was seen as that which gives rise to actual beings, but not as actual in its own right. Yet without its act of becoming, nothing was fully existent. Its being was derivative from becoming.

The realization expressed by the insertion on "togetherness in experience" [1] is that becoming was most fully actual, with being only derivative. The ontological principle was then reformulated: "All real togetherness is togetherness in the formal constitution of an actuality" (PR 32).¹²

In the original formulation God provided reasons of the highest absoluteness (PR 19), because God was regarded as a being. If, however, actuality primarily means becoming rather than being, some revisions have to be made. This was particularly urgent, since the only form of becoming Whitehead had analyzed was temporal concrescence which enjoyed subjectivity in all instances. Whitehead could have adopted his final conception of God as subjective and temporal, but he was apparently not yet ready for that step. Rather he sought to distinguish two species of (for want of a better term) prehensive unification, one nontemporal and nonsubjective for God, the other temporal and subjective, for all concrescences.

Now that conceptual realization has been developed in a form which Whitehead could find usable, it was applied to the explication of the general Aristotelian principle [4], which had hitherto been left in a very abstract form. Since God now grounds all eternal objects, God grounds those unrealized in the world in particular. Thus God serves as the ground for reverted eternal objects, provided they have "relevance to each stage of concrescence" (PR 164). Ordinarily we think of God as influencing only the initial stage, but as long as God is conceived to influence reversion directly, there must be some influence of interior phases. Since it would be arbitrary to affect only the third phase of reversion, all are stipulated at this time.

Gradually the notion of 'subjective aim' emerges. Initially Whitehead spoke of the "satisfaction aimed at by the subject" (PR 255). By aiming at this ideal the subject could coordinate its many feelings into one satisfaction. Alternatively, by the many feelings sharing in a common aim they could be drawn into a final unity. The difficulty lay in trying to explain exactly how this aiming and coordinating could be accomplished, especially when, strictly speaking, the subject has not yet come into being.

According to an earlier theory the occasion adopts an 'ideal of itself' from the objective lure, which is the totality of values it inherits. Another theory develops physical purposes, which are initially the individual physical feelings combined with conceptual valuations directing them towards a common integration. Whitehead combines these two theories in terms of the first account of 'subjective aim' [12]. From the various conceptual valuations and reversions one

conceptual feeling is chosen to serve as a final form of the satisfaction. God is involved only in the reversions utilized, but the selecting is up to the concrescent occasion.

There is still the problem of how the subject selects, but the recognition that the aim is a single conceptual feeling (termed 'subjective aim') has momentous ramifications. This feeling, influencing the other feelings by mutual sensitivity, is able to coordinate the activity of the occasion in its final phases. Yet why should it be restricted to the final phases, requiring an antecedent process of selection? Whitehead proposes to place the subjective aim in the initial phase, so that it can influence the entire process of concrescence [14]. While the subject no longer aims or selects or integrates, the autonomy of the occasion is safeguarded by the (somewhat opaque) notion of modification.

By placing the initial subjective aim at the outset, it must be derived from some other actuality. But no one past actual occasion will do, since it is precisely the integration of these actual occasions that is sought. Since God is already conceived as influencing the occasion, and since God is the repository of all eternal objects, it makes sense to derive the aim from God.

'Subjective aim' was initially developed to explain the way an occasion achieves final unity, but it led to a theory of subjective agency (within the context of concrescence). Combined with the intrinsic creativity of the occasion, the subjective aim functioned as an embryonic self in the process of becoming a full being at satisfaction.

As long as God was conceived as purely nontemporal, it was possible for Whitehead to construe God's immanence in every actual occasion along the lines of a formative element. Thus the way God was in each occasion was the same. That changes once the consequent nature is adopted, for God's experience with respect to one occasion is different from that of another. As temporal God is individualized with a particular historical experience. In short, it now becomes necessary for God to be prehended to have any influence on the world. But the only way then available was (pure) physical prehension. The determinateness of its datum renders such a prehension unsuitable.

Thus Whitehead works out the theory of hybrid physical prehensions [18]. Hybrid prehension in turn provides an explanation for the provision of unrealized eternal objects, rendering reversion superfluous. So reversion is abolished [26].

This series of reflections, from nontemporal concrescence to subjective aim to hybrid prehension, may be based on an insertion which does not seem to raise any of these topics. First of all, we need to consider a somewhat obscure discussion of "togetherness in experience," rather oddly placed in the account of propositions, which appears to have initiated this whole course of creative thinking.

1. Experient Togetherness (PR 189a)

We may trace a deepening sense of the pervasiveness of mentality, subjectivity, and experience in Whitehead's writings. The philosophy of nature methodologically excluded mind; it was concerned with the perceived apart from the perceiver. Even when (in SMW) he sought to introduce mind into nature, most occasions were devoid of mentality. The original theory of prehension was a relationship between two events by virtue of a common sensum. It required no subject.¹³

The 1926 essay on "Time" does ascribe mentality to all occasions. "Each occasion is dipolar, and . . . one pole is the physical occasion and the other pole is the mental occasion" (EWM 303). I think this is a way Whitehead simplified his earlier theory of ground and ideal consequent (RM 113-15) by accounting for novelty in terms of mentality. We need not suppose, however, that mentality for Whitehead (at this time) meant subjectivity or anything

continuous with our inner sense of experience. This is formal panpsychism, not the panpsychism of degrees of experience, let alone of awareness, for all actualities. Physical occasions had been conceived as devoid of experience. Now they are ascribed mentality, but only for the sake of having some purchase upon novelty. Without mentality, universal emergent evolution would be impossible. But this mentality does not seem to presuppose subjectivity or experience.

The analysis of concrescence in the first version of part III does not appear to presuppose felt experience either. To be sure, its prehensions have a subject, which is the whole of the occasion. In that sense we have a sort of formal subjectivity. Subjectivistic language is employed for its analysis, but Whitehead may leave open the question whether all or merely some acts of concrescence have any inner sense of enjoyment. He may not have found any adequate criterion for distinguishing between the experient and the nonexperient, unlike with respect to consciousness. Some occasions having intellectual feelings are conscious, some are not. Likewise he may have left the question open concerning experience. While all occasions concresced and all enjoyed some degree of mentality, however minimal, some may lack the interiority of experience. They all must have mentality for any emergent novelty, but was interiority necessary?

Then he comes up with the idea of "experient togetherness," which he expands upon in the following passage:

[1]

There is a togetherness of the component elements in individual experience. This 'togetherness' has that special peculiar meaning of 'togetherness in experience.' It is a togetherness of its own kind, explicable by reference to nothing else. For the purpose of this discussion it is indifferent whether we speak of a 'stream' of experience, or of an 'occasion' of experience. With the former alternative there is togetherness in the stream, and with the latter alternative there is togetherness in the occasion. In either case, there is the unique 'experiential togetherness.'

The consideration of experiential togetherness raises the final metaphysical question: whether there is any other meaning of 'togetherness.' The denial of any alternative meaning, that is to say, of any meaning not abstracted from the experiential meaning, is the 'subjectivist' doctrine.

[The reformed version of the subjectivist doctrine is the doctrine of the philosophy of organism.]¹⁴

The contrary doctrine, that there is a 'togetherness' not derivative from experiential togetherness, leads to the disjunction of the components of subjective experience from the community of the external world. This disjunction creates the insurmountable difficulty for epistemology.

(PR 189.30-190.4: G in II.9.2C)

This insertion, which I have quoted only in part, starts in the middle of the first paragraph of this section (II.9.2). The paragraph begins with a discussion of propositions and judgments, a topic it resumes further on.¹⁵ The discussion of experiential togetherness is largely alien to propositions, and is best construed as an insertion extending through much of the next page (PR 189.30-190.40.)¹⁶

The larger insertion restates Whitehead's polemic against modern epistemology. He

charges that according to their substantialist assumptions the empiricists and Kant could only admit universals and not particulars within experience, since what is experienced was tacitly an attribute of the experient. Thus the universal could only represent the particular.

Whitehead's realism holds that the particulars can be experienced. The objectified occasion itself, and not some universal representative, was directly present to experience. Yet there was something inherently subjective about experience, which the former 'subjectivist principle' sought to protect in terms of universals. For Whitehead it is the 'togetherness' of the objectified occasions that is incurably subjective.

Togetherness is "a generic term covering the various special ways in which various sorts of entities are 'together' in any one actual occasion" (PR 21). Concrescence is one of these ways, in fact the major way. If occasions by themselves simply constitute a multiplicity without any organizing principle they cannot form even the loosest of unities. They cannot be even initially together except from some point of view, and they cannot be brought together in tighter unity except by concrescent activity. Whatever 'bringing together' is needed can only be accomplished by an experient subject.¹⁷

There may be derivative senses of togetherness, such as the togetherness of the various components of an actual occasion. But such actuality is dependent upon prior concrescence. It is the possibility of togetherness discontinuous from experient togetherness which is ruled out.

In this context epistemological considerations concerning the subjectivist principle predominate. Empiricist analyses had concentrated exclusively upon the objective components of experience. This is the element of past determinateness that is inherent in the present. By making present concrescence the primary locus of actuality, the derivative role of past determinateness is recognized.

In place of the empiricist subjectivist principle, which could only admit universals into experience, Whitehead proposes a reformed subjectivist principle placing primacy upon the subjective component, its experiential togetherness. In the light of these considerations he then sets forth to revise his discussion of the subjectivist principle.¹⁸

The import of experient togetherness can best be appreciated in terms of its ontological implications. Becoming is a kind of nonbeing. If being is regarded as primarily actual, then becoming is a kind of non-actuality, or at least only derivatively actual. For substantialist theory, this is no problem, for becoming is construed as an attribute of being. On the revised theory of concrescence, however, the occasion in becoming does not yet have any being. For the being first arises from the becoming. To be sure, a concrescence arises from the beings it prehends. But the being of others is not the being of the occasion; their being is a sheer multiplicity and lacks the unity a being requires. That unity first arises from the concrescence itself.

While Whitehead had analyzed the nature of concrescence in detail (in part III), he seems to have regarded actuality solely in terms of determinate actualities, as the early version of the ontological principle indicates. If so, the act of becoming acquires whatever actuality it has from the being it results in. After the completion of the first version of **Process and Reality**, he apparently concluded that the ontological primacy he assigned to being should be assigned to becoming. As we shall see in [2], the ontological principle must then be revised in order to ground reasons in the actuality of present actualization rather than in past determinateness.

If the past is now regarded as only derivatively actual, the empiricist analysis of experience which restricts itself to past objective elements is inadequate. The primary activity of present concrescence is also an essential element of experience. The togetherness of things in concrescence can only be experienced subjectively. Also our access to any other concrescence can only be in terms of our own, since no concrescence can be objectively prehended.

Since the being of other occasions is dependent upon their becoming, their becoming is primary and essential. Every occasion enjoys its subjective activity in order to become what it is. This means that subjective enjoyment is an essential feature for every occasion, and this subjectivity is continuous with our own. The togetherness we experience is not in principle different from the togetherness any actuality experiences.¹⁹

Previously Whitehead held to a formal panpsychism and a formal pansubjectivity. But these considerations about experiential togetherness lead him to ascribe the inner lived experience to all occasions. On the other hand, it is important to recognize that the meaning of experienced subjectivity has changed in the process. Subjectivity means nothing more, and nothing less than present immediacy. Experience has past, objective components ingredient in present immediacy. Only the present immediacy itself is subjective.

2. The "togetherness" Paragraph (32d)²⁰

The passage we are about to consider [2] sharpens Whitehead's appreciation for the newness of unrealized eternal objects considerably. We can see this best by considering their status previously. Eternal objects formed one of the formative elements constitutive of every occasion (RM 90). This suggested that all the eternal objects are somehow present to every occasion. In order to alleviate the obvious objection that we are only aware of some, hardly all, Whitehead introduced the distinction between the totality, most of which are inert, and the few which are active:

The gradation of eternal objects in respect to this germaneness ["to the basic data"] is the 'objective lure' for feeling; the concrescent process admits a selection from this 'objective lure' into subjective efficiency (PR 87C+).

Here we may distinguish three layers: an underlying layer of inert eternal objects, a middle layer of those admitted to 'subjective efficiency,' and an upper layer of those which are actualized. The subsequent theory of negative prehension clarified this theory.

When physical prehensions were introduced (at D),²¹ feelings and (positive) prehensions were identified. This required the distinction between positive and negative prehensions. The notion of negative prehensions was also used to effect perspectival elimination (PR 221). As applied to the theory of three layers, the inert eternal objects forming its bottom layer, those not admitted to 'subjective efficiency' could now be understood as those negatively prehended, "which are not therefore negligible" (PR 41).²²

As long as negative prehension is understood to hold these eternal objects in abeyance, they (or at least relevant cognate ones) may later be admitted to subjective efficiency by the process of reversion. This is akin to theories of creativity which argue that the new ideas we experience were already resident in our unconscious.

But if negative prehension comes to be understood as the definite exclusion of its data, then the ontological status of reverted eternal objects becomes quite problematic. Moreover, Whitehead comes to appreciate that the radical novelty of possibilities requires them to be "out of this world." Any derivation from past actuality becomes unacceptable, for it means that the new can only be a recombination of the old. To be really new in our world, unrealized eternal objects must first be resident in God.

What appears to be Whitehead's first expression of this idea turns up in a somewhat unlikely spot: in a paragraph in the extended statement about primordial relevance, which itself looks very much like material initially intended for the final chapter.²³

If it is an insertion, however, it raises special problems. Most insertions are placed within already existing texts. The text is usually there before insertions are made. In this case, however, [2] appears to be earlier than the text [11] into which it has been inserted. While Whitehead could have written short passages to insert later, we need not resort to that supposition if we can find an earlier place where it could have been attached originally, only to have been displaced by some subsequent insertion. If so, what is that place? What displaced it? Why was it displaced?

I propose that this paragraph on togetherness was initially attached to the end of the original account of conceptual valuation and reversion (at PR 249.41).²⁴ After all, it was the acceptance of Hume's principle for actual occasions embodied in these categories that posed the problem of unrealized eternal objects in the first place. When Whitehead sought to eliminate reversion, he found it was necessary to preempt that space, so that the category could be "abolished" immediately after it was introduced, alerting his readers to its provisional status.

Originally, however, the "togetherness paragraph" (PR 32d) sought to clarify the ontological status of reverted objects, and to use the category of reversion (implicitly) in the process. Unrealized eternal objects were now grounded in God, not in the first instance as inert objects already somehow within the occasion. Reversion, with its concern for relevance, and the partial similarity and difference of reverted objects from those conceptually derived from physical experience, could justify the ingression (from God) of the relevant reverted objects.

Whitehead did not doubt that some sort of ingression took place. After all, where do novel possibilities come from? Chance, or the random activity of the unconscious, simply mask our inability to give an adequate explanation. But the nature of ingression is still problematic. At this stage in his reflection, as we shall see [12], subjective aims require reversion as their source, whereas later he sees subjective aim as the source of reversion, and still later, that the hybrid prehension needed for subjective aim renders the notion of reversion superfluous.

One clue leading to the formulation of paragraph [2] may be found in the ontological principle. As we have seen, it had been previously formulated solely in terms of objectified occasions (EWM 323f). It was the determinateness of actuality (that it was 'this' rather than 'that') which enabled it to serve as a reason. God's generic definiteness as the principle of concretion serves for reasons of the highest absoluteness, and other actualities could be seen as providing more contingent, particular reasons (PR 19).

The ontological principle is an expression of a fundamental truth: the concrete cannot be derived from the abstract.²⁵ Therefore reasons, principles, explanatory factors must be derived from what is more concretely actual. The problem lies in trying to determine what is most fundamentally concrete, but in this context the concrete is ambiguous. Whitehead pioneered the distinction between concrescent becoming and its concrete outcome. Ontologically this renders becoming as more ontologically fundamental than being. Yet Whitehead continued throughout the first version of **Process and Reality** to think of being as what is most fully actual. This was continuous with the characterization of nature in the earlier philosophy of nature in terms of events and objects, and the notion that what is concretely determinate is what is actual, as the ontological principle as formulated in terms of the principle of extrinsic reference implies (EWM 323f).

Now, however, Whitehead comes to realize that the concrescent is really more truly 'concrete' than the 'concrete', i.e. than that which was formerly designated as concrete. It was conventionally held to be concrete because it was determinate. Since the 'concrete' as determinate turns out to be derivative and therefore somewhat abstract, our notion of what is most fully actual, and what should serve as reasons for the ontological principle, ought to

change. This has been first expressed obliquely, in epistemological terms [1]. From this perspective, concrescence was analyzed in terms of experiential togetherness. As we have seen:

The consideration of experiential togetherness raises the final metaphysical question: whether there is any other meaning of 'togetherness.' The denial of any alternative meaning, that is to say, of any meaning not abstracted from the experiential meaning, is the 'subjectivist' doctrine.
(PR 189)

"Experiential togetherness" is generalized in the present passage as "togetherness in formal constitution of an actuality" (PR 32a). This is the way the ontological principle ought now be expressed. (Later on past actualities will be reincorporated into the principle.)

If there can be no "'togetherness' which is not derivative from experiential togetherness" (PR 189), then the original interrelatedness of the eternal objects as a realm would have to be modified to show its derivation from an experiential togetherness "of the highest absoluteness." That inference is made in the following passage [2].

It seems like such a short step, explaining the relatedness of the eternal objects as the outcome of a nontemporal conceptual realization. Yet some of these inferences are difficult to see before they are made. For example, the ontological principle posits all reasons in actual entities, yet the reasons why any specific eternal object is what it is and not otherwise is not grounded in any actuality. Put another way: no reasons can be given for the nature of any eternal object, for if there were reasons, they would have to be vested in some actuality or other. There is a barrier preventing Whitehead from generalizing his ontological principle to apply to the nature of eternal objects, and that is his principle of their uncreatedness (PR 257a=[5]).

Another issue arose from Whitehead's adoption of Hume's principle.²⁶ Ontologically considered, it required him to derive eternal objects from actual entities.²⁷ This was no problem for realized ones, since the actualities they characterized would be the source from which they could be derived. The unrealized ones were a different matter. Even with the adoption of the general Aristotelian principle (PR 40C) Whitehead is often perceived to have Platonic leanings with respect to the forms. Yet he never claimed that eternal objects were somehow more real, or that actualities depended upon them for their existence, as Platonists are wont to claim. Rather, he seems to have held that all entities were equally existent. The Platonic flavour stems from his conviction that the eternal objects were uncreated.

[2]

In what sense can unrealized abstract form be relevant? What is its basis of relevance? 'Relevance' must express some real fact of togetherness among forms. the ontological principle can be expressed as: All real togetherness is togetherness in the formal constitution of an actuality. So if there be a relevance of what in the temporal world is unrealized, the relevance must express a fact of togetherness in the formal constitution of **a non-temporal actuality**. But by the principle of relativity there can only be one non-derivative actuality, unbounded by its prehensions of an actual world.²⁸ Such a primordial superject of creativity achieves, in its unity of satisfaction, the complete conceptual valuation of all eternal objects. This is the ultimate, basic adjustment of the togetherness of eternal objects on which creative order depends. It is the conceptual adjustment of all appetites in the form of aversions and adversions. It constitutes the meaning of relevance. . . (PR 32d: G in I.3.1G)²⁹

The conceptuality of a nontemporal concrescence clearly dominates this passage, with its contrast between a formal constitution and an objective concrete outcome. It is the activity of concrescing, an activity made possible by creativity, that effects the conceptual valuation.³⁰

Although this particular passage does not designate this nontemporal activity as God, it is a reappearance of an earlier idea: "Thus the nature of God is the complete conceptual realization of the realm of ideal forms" (RM 154). As we shall see, this idea is reconceived within a new context in ways which can overcome interim objections.

The ontological principle, in its various formulations, grounded fundamental reasons in actualities. Now we see that the meaning of 'actuality' has shifted. Previously, although all actual occasions were concrescent, the actuality of God was not, not even as the objective aspect of concrescence. Concrescence could not then define actuality generically. The nontemporal ordering of all eternal objects meant that concrescence could now properly apply to all actualities. Since the ontological principle grounded reasons in actualities, it could now be grounded in concrescence: "'Relevance' must express some real fact of togetherness among forms. The ontological principle can be expressed as: All real togetherness is togetherness in the formal constitution of an actuality" (PR 32d: [2]).³¹

His changing sensitivity towards what is concretely actual leads to very different formulations of the ontological principle. In any case, as finally formulated, the principle includes reference to both present and past actualities (PR 24).

Although every finite concrescence is by now conceived to be subjective, and every actuality is deemed to be experient, Whitehead does not formulate the ontological principle as "All real togetherness is togetherness in the experience of an actuality." He still resists ascribing subjectivity to God as incompatible with God's nontemporality. 'Formal constitution' is a way of referring to concrescence without the subjectivist connotations of experience.

In any case, while God may constitute only its objective aspect, this aspect partakes of the most ultimate instance of creativity: "Such a primordial superject of creativity achieves, in its unity of satisfaction, the complete conceptual valuation of all eternal objects. This is the ultimate, basic adjustment of the togetherness of eternal objects on which creative order depends" (PR 32). [Note that God is superject, not subject, even though elsewhere he treats these notions as interchangeable (PR 222).]

As primordial superject God continues to function as a formative element, but it is not clear how radical novelty can be accommodated in this way. Since a formative element is constitutive of every actuality, and the primordial actuality embraces all eternal objects, it would seem that all forms would be inherent in every occasion, as the theory of objective lure proposes. Genuine novelty means, I should think, that the novel form must be absent from the world, only to be introduced subsequently. To be absent, and yet exist, requires that it be hidden apart from the world. Since the primordial superject is already available to us, at least would be if God were a formative element, it can only be hidden within some transcendent subjectivity, i.e., within some divine concrescence. The logic of novelty should prompt Whitehead to abandon the notion of God as formative element, but it evidently does not, at least not yet.

3. General Potentiality must be Somewhere. (PR 46a)

Whitehead's thoughts about the locus of unrealized eternal objects may well have been first expressed in the following passage. These reflections are largely independent of each other, yet with the same conclusion. Since [2] follows from the more revolutionary concept of

"experiential togetherness," I am inclined to see this more as a restatement of the central idea in another context.

[3]

[The scope of the ontological principle is not exhausted by the corollary that 'decision' must be referable to an actual entity. Everything must be somewhere; and here 'somewhere' means 'some actual entity.']³² Accordingly the general potentiality of the universe must be somewhere; since it retains its proximate relevance to the actual entities for which it is unrealized. This 'proximate relevance' reappears in subsequent concrescence as final causation regulative of the emergence of novelty. This 'somewhere' is the non-temporal actual entity. [Thus 'proximate relevance' means 'relevance as in the primordial mind of God.']³³ (PR 46a: G in II.3.3C)

Language such as "final causation regulative of the emergence of novelty" powerfully suggests the provision of subjective aim. It certainly directs Whitehead's thinking in that direction. But here all that is meant is that reverted conceptual feelings must connect in some way with the divine conceptual realization of the eternal objects.

4. The General Aristotelian Principle Augmented (PR 40a)

Although it may be possible to analyze this passage as first establishing the general Aristotelian principle on the basis of the divine conceptual realization (G), there is a better analysis which sees the principle as having already been established (C), while a shorter insertion simply seeks to justify it in terms of conceptual realization.³⁴

[4]

In such a philosophy the actualities constituting the process of the world are conceived as exemplifying the ingression (or 'participation') of other things which constitute the potentialities of definiteness for any actual existence. The things which are temporal arise by their participation in the things which are eternal. The two sets are mediated by a thing which combines the actuality of what is temporal with the timelessness of what is potential. This final entity is the divine element in the world, by which the barren inefficient disjunction of abstract potentialities obtains primordially the efficient conjunction of ideal realization. This ideal realization of potentialities in a primordial actual entity constitutes the metaphysical stability whereby the actual process exemplifies general principles of metaphysics, and attains the ends proper to specific types of emergent order. By reason of the actuality of this primordial valuation of pure potentials, each eternal object has a definite effective relevance to each concrescent process. Apart from such orderings, there would be a complete disjunction of eternal objects unrealized in the temporal world. Novelty would be meaningless, and inconceivable. . . .[23]. . .

By this recognition of the divine element the general Aristotelian principle is maintained that, apart from things that are actual, there is nothing--nothing either in fact or in efficacy. . . .(PR 40a: G in II.1.1.C)

This way of construing the text permits the general Aristotelian principle to be placed much earlier in the composition (in C). It could well be an early implication of the ontological

principle. Yet notice how vaguely the original context describes God's role as mediating "the actuality of what is temporal with the timelessness of what is potential." He avoids the precision of an earlier formulation, that God holds "the ideal forms apart in equal, conceptual realization of knowledge. . . . in the synthesis of omniscience" (PR 153). He notes that "In one of its applications this principle issues in the doctrine of conceptualism" (PR 40.28c-29a), but he does not ally himself with conceptualism. At this juncture he avoids ascribing subjectivity to God, which conceptualism presupposes.

The excess of eternal objects. Now the problem becomes, what to do with the excess of eternal objects? As we have seen, Whitehead appears to postulate an underlying layer of inert ones, from some are admitted into 'subjective efficiency', and only a few of these are fully actualized (PR 87C). Later negative prehensions were used to dismiss eternal objects from subjective efficiency, but they are not therefore negligible. In this way Whitehead can argue that all eternal objects are located in some actual occasion or other, and even perhaps in all. Yet as long as God is conceived as a formative element constitutive of the actuality of occasions, it is difficult to see how God could be the locus of more than those which are metaphysically necessary.

Conceptual realization of all eternal objects resolves that difficulty. Moreover, he now recognizes that God's nontemporal ordering provides for the metaphysical stability of the world, all temporal variation being purely contingent. This synthesis or "efficient **conjunction** of ideal realization" is hardly indistinguishable from the notion of nontemporal concrescence. Yet he avoids the term 'concrecence' because it connotes to him temporality and subjectivity. Nontemporal concrescence lies behind Whitehead's conceptuality, but the term is not used.³⁵

The ontological principle. In line with the doctrine that "everything must be somewhere," however, the ontological principle is extended to apply to the existence of entities: "by the ontological principle every entity is felt by some actual entity" (PR 41D in II.1.1C.). Then unrealized eternal objects could only be housed in God, if negative prehension is interpreted as total exclusion.

Although the two appear to be identified, the ontological principle is a broader principle than the general Aristotelian principle, for there may be reasons for the nature of things as well as for their existence. The general Aristotelian principle is not the ontological principle so much as a specialized corollary thereof.³⁶

Divine relevance. We get a clue to the ordering of later passages from the passing statement, "each eternal object has a definite effective relevance to each concrecent process."³⁷ Is this "concrecent process" an occasion or a phase thereof? Our text does not fully determine this, although by past usage (in RM) the occasion would be indicated. Yet shortly he makes it clear that God's relevance is to "the concrecent phases of that derivate occasion" [11].

Later, when it becomes necessary to think about how God could be prehended, this doctrine will prove to be an embarrassment. Once the subjective aim was conceived as capable of its own autonomous modification, however, God's influence was limited to the initial phase, which suggested that the prehension of God was physical. Thus we can locate the passages permitting unrestricted divine relevance as prior the passages concerning the derivation of subjective aim [14, 15].

Unrestricted relevance was needed in order to account for reverted feelings. The novelty of a reversion was ultimately justified by its grounding in the divine conceptual realization. Yet in order for God to provide the reverted eternal object, Whitehead initially thought it would be necessary for God to influence the phase of reversion. Since this would appear very arbitrary if God influenced only this particular interior phase, he postulated that God

affect all phases of concrescence.

Since initially, as we shall see, Whitehead considered the subjective aim to be a conceptual feeling of novelty arising from reversion, God could only influence it by influencing all phases.

So far I have examined the pivotal paragraph introducing conceptual realization [2], its presupposition in experient togetherness [1], and its implications for the Aristotelian principle [4]. This does not exhaust Whitehead's adventure in exploring the ramifications of this novel idea. Subjective aim, for example, which originally 'subject' selects for itself, was seen to be necessary from the start, requiring an external source. Hence its derivation from God, thereby giving the means for divine persuasion. By pervading all phases the subjective aim also became the subject-in-the-making, a way to understand subjectivity within a process context.

First, however, one detail concerning nontemporal conceptual realization needed to be cleared up. God is the source of unrealized eternal objects; is God also their creator?

5. Uncreated Eternal Objects (257a)

The next probable insertion is to be found in Whitehead's introductory account of propositions (III.4.1E). The context contrasts propositions with eternal objects, demonstrating that "the endeavour to understand eternal objects in complete abstraction from the actual world results in reducing them to mere undifferentiated nonentities" (PR 257). Unlike eternal objects, propositions do not make such complete abstraction: "But a proposition, while preserving the indeterminateness of an eternal object, makes an incomplete abstraction from determinate actual entities" (PR 257).

This contrast between wholly abstract eternal objects and partially abstract propositions frames our insertion [5]. Note the continuity which is achieved by omitting the inserted paragraph:

Now an eternal object, in itself, abstracts from all determinate actual entities. . . .³⁸

But a proposition, while preserving the indeterminateness of an eternal object, makes an incomplete abstraction from determinate actual entities.

For our purposes we will only quote the second half of the inserted paragraph, which as a whole concerns the impossibility of totally abstracting eternal objects from the actual world:

[5]

Accordingly the differentiated relevance of eternal objects to each instance of the creative process requires their conceptual realization in [the primordial nature of] God.³⁹ He does not create eternal objects; for his nature requires them in the same degree that they require him. This is an exemplification of the coherence of the categorial types of existence. The general relationships of eternal objects to each other, relationships of diversity and of pattern, are their relationships in God's conceptual realization. Apart from this realization, there is mere isolation indistinguishable from nonentity. (PR 257a: G in III.4.1E)⁴⁰

The uncreatedness of the eternal objects seems to follow from their timelessness, and from what it means to create within the process theory. To bring anything into being requires concrescence, and this requires the togetherness of something. For temporal actualities there are

always past multiplicities, but how could there be any old eternal objects from which new ones might be created?

We might introduce the earlier distinction between individual and relational essences (SMW 159f). The individual essences could function as the initial multiplicity for God's nontemporal conceptual realization. Then the general "relationships of diversity and of pattern" resulting from the conceptual realization would be the relational essences.

Whitehead does not restrict uncreatedness to the individual essences, so the relational essences are implicitly assumed to be uncreated as well. If this is so, then it is difficult to see how the divine realization could contribute to their ordering. God becomes then a passive spectator to a finished order.⁴¹

Nevertheless, coherence is established on a purely nontemporal plane: God needs the eternal objects in order to have something to unify in the divine concrescent unification, while the eternal objects need God for their existence, particularly those unrealized in the world. The coherence could not have been expressed any other way at a time when any temporal relatedness of God with the world had not even been anticipated. This narrow coherence will mean, however, that the primordial nature is excluded from a wider coherence. (The consequent nature is dependent on the primordial nature, but not vice versa.)

6-8. God as Exception to Hume's Principle (164a, 247b, 87c)

The next three passages indicate Whitehead's recognition that God, unlike the actual occasions, does not derive conceptual feelings from physical feelings.

The first passage reflects a generalization of 'decision,' applying it not only to past conditions limiting possible alternatives but to the subjective determination of the occasion itself.⁴² In other words, what had been simply 'decision' [in a purely objective sense] (PR 43C, 150C) is now one type of decision, 'transcendent decision'. That is its meaning in the original context; in the insertion, however, Whitehead uses 'transcendent decision' to refer divine decision. In quoting the insertion, I set it off from the surrounding context by placing the context in italics:

[6]

The limitation whereby there is a perspective relegation of eternal objects to the background is the characteristic of decision. Transcendent decision includes God's decision. He is the actual entity in virtue of which the **entire** multiplicity of eternal objects obtains its graded relevance to each stage of concrescence. Apart from God, there could be no relevant novelty. Whatever arises in actual entities from God's decision, arises first conceptually, and is transmuted into the physical world (cf. Part III). **In 'transcendent decision' there is transition from the past to the immediacy of the present; and in 'immanent decision' there is the process of the acquisition of subjective form and the integration of feelings.** (PR 164a: G in II.7.4C+)

The context is directly continuous without the insertion, and makes no reference to divine decision. It understands 'transcendent decision' quite differently. The introduction of divine transcendent decision appears to be a later insertion, dependent on the notion of the divine ordering of eternal objects. By identifying divine decision as (an instance of) transcendent decision, Whitehead seems to be conceiving of God's nontemporal act as an (objective, or at least nonsubjective) decision which is not a concrescence, presumably because he takes all concrescence to be subjective, and he is not yet prepared to consider God to be subjective.⁴³

The last statement of the insertion, that "whatever arises in actual entities from God's decision, arises first conceptually, and is transmuted into the physical world," violates the category of conceptual derivation (Hume's principle) with respect to God. In the next passage we shall examine [7] Whitehead comes to recognize God's exceptional status (at least initially).

Many of the themes of the next passage [7] have already been anticipated, such as the general relatedness of conceptual realization (PR 257) which embraces the "entire multiplicity of eternal objects" (PR 164). The nontemporal act is unique, however, not simply because it is nontemporal, but because it cannot be affected by any other actuality. This could be inferred, as could the recognition (mentioned only here) that unrestricted conceptual valuation is Spinozistically infinite.

The insertion comes at the beginning of the section that introduces conceptual valuation and reversion (III.3.3F):

[7]

Conceptual feelings are primarily derivate from physical feelings, and secondarily from each other. In this statement, [the consideration of] God[']s intervention] is excluded. [When this intervention is taken into account, all conceptual feelings must be derived from physical feelings.] Unfettered conceptual valuation, 'infinite' in Spinoza's sense of that term, is only possible once in the universe; since that creative act is objectively immortal as an inescapable condition characterizing creative action.

But, unless otherwise stated, only the temporal entities of the actual world will be considered. **We have to discuss the categoreal conditions for such derivation . . .** (PR 247b: G in III.3.3F)

We should take note of the original text, here italicized. While Whitehead's formulation of Hume's principle, that all eternal objects are derived from actual entities, seems to have started the line of reasoning we have been following in this essay, the insertion comes much later. The initial sentence serves as Whitehead's ideal, to which the divine instance should conform, if at all possible. But now it appears that it cannot.

The insertion is complex, because the bracketed sentence seems to be a secondary insertion. Also the semantic context has shifted. Initially Whitehead is intent upon recognizing the problem conceptual valuation introduces. Since God at this stage has only conceptual feelings, no divine feelings can be derived from physical feeling.

Thus he writes, "In this statement [of conceptual derivation], God is excluded," and proceeds to justify that exclusion by pointing to the exceptional and unique unrestricted divine conceptual valuation.

Once hybrid prehension is introduced [18], he can add the bracketed account [22]. It is still the case (and remains so even after the incorporation of the consequent nature) that God's conceptual synthesis is unaffected by, and underived from any physical feeling. Now, however, his concern shifts. It's not God's own feelings, but rather the occasion's prehension of God that is not be exceptional.

The first two sentences of the insertion simply cancel each other out. Another author would simply have deleted both, but Whitehead tenaciously sought to retain what he had originally intended for publication.

Denis Hurbise has isolated another passage recognizing that God makes an exception

to Hume's principle:

[8]

Thus an actual entity has a threefold character: (i) it has the character 'given' for it by the past; (ii) it has the subjective character aimed at in its process of concrescence; (iii) it has the superjective character, which is the pragmatic value of its specific satisfaction qualifying the transcendent creativity.

In the case of the primordial actual entity, which is God, there is no past. Thus the ideal realization of conceptual feeling takes the precedence. God differs from the other actual entities in the fact that Hume's principle, of the derivate character of conceptual feelings, does not hold for him. . . . (PR 87.40-43d: G in II.3.1C)

This passage seeks to address the three-fold character of actuality as it applies to God as an actual entity, but not very successfully. It is at least prior to a later comment [18], in which hybrid prehension enables Whitehead to claim that God is not an exception to Hume's principle (PR 247a). Until he was able to make use of the distinction between the primordial and consequent natures, as in the rest of the paragraph, he could only admit that God differed in not having a past.⁴⁴

9-11. Primordial Relevance (343f + 349a + 31a)

Whitehead sought to draw together his various reflections on divine conceptual realization into a more sustained discussion. This was perhaps first made part of the chapter on God (V.1) he had written nearly a year before. Before he was done, however, this account was divided into three parts and scattered to widely separate places in the final text. As we shall see, the two sentences of part two (PR 349a) were appropriated to serve as an introduction to the original formulation of the final concept of God as concrescent and temporal. This severed the connection between the first and third parts. The third part was dropped from its original section (V.2.2), ultimately to end up on the scrap heap called "Some Derivative Notions" (I.3).⁴⁵ Its place was taken by an addition using the later notion of 'subjective aim' (PR 344.19-39).

Two parts (i.e. 343f + 31a) appear to have been subsequently edited, by the use of brief insertions, in order to render it compatible with the notion of a consequent nature. [[Double brackets, used in the second paragraph of 343f [9], indicate a short passage subsequently used at 345.]]

[9] [V.2.2]

. . . God is not to be treated as exception to all metaphysical principles, invoked to save their collapse. He is their chief exemplification. . . .⁴⁶ [[He is the beginning and the end. He is not the beginning in the sense of being in the past of all members. He is the presupposed actuality of conceptual operation, in unison of becoming with every other creative act. (PR 345).]]⁴⁷

[Thus, when we make a distinction of reason, and consider God in the abstraction of a primordial actuality, we must ascribe to him neither fullness of feeling, nor consciousness.]⁴⁸ He is the unconditioned actuality of conceptual feeling⁴⁹ at the base of things; so that, by reason of this primordial actuality, there is an order in the relevance of eternal objects to the process of creation. His unity of conceptual operations is a free

creative act, untrammelled by reference to any particular course of things. It is deflected neither by love, nor by hatred, for what in fact comes to pass. The **particularities** of the actual world presuppose **it**; while **it** merely presupposes the **general** metaphysical character of creative advance, of which it is the primordial exemplification. [The primordial nature of God is the acquirement by creativity of a primordial character.]

His conceptual actuality at once exemplifies and establishes the categorial conditions.⁵⁰ [The conceptual feelings, which compose his primordial nature, exemplify in their subjective forms their mutual sensitivity and their subjective unity of [[subjective]] aim. These subjective forms are valuations determining the relative relevance of eternal objects for each occasion of actuality.]⁵¹ (PR 343f: G)

[10] V.2.6

But God's conceptual realization is nonsense if thought of under the guise of a barren, eternal hypothesis. It is God's conceptual realization performing an efficacious role in the multiple unifications of the universe, which are free creations of actualities arising out of decided situations. (PR 349b: G)

[11] I.3.1

The primordial created fact is the unconditioned conceptual valuation of the entire multiplicity of eternal objects. [This is the 'primordial nature' of God.] By reason of this complete valuation, the objectification of God in each derivate actual entity results in a graduation of the relevance of eternal objects to the concrescent phases of that derivate occasion.⁵² There will be additional ground of relevance for select eternal objects by reason of their ingression into derivate actual entities belonging to the actual world of the concrescent occasion in question.⁵³ But whether or no this be the case, there is always the definite relevance derived from God. Apart from God, eternal objects unrealized in the actual world would be relatively non-existent for the concrescence in question. For effective relevance requires agency of comparison, and agency belongs exclusively to actual occasions.⁵⁴ This divine ordering is itself matter of fact, thereby conditioning creativity. Thus possibility which transcends realized temporal matter of fact has a real relevance to the creative advance. . . . (PR 31a: G)⁵⁵

By this time Whitehead had already explored many of the implications of the divine nontemporal concrescence, so he contented himself with repeating these thoughts in the first part [9]. The major novelty of the passage is to be found in the other parts, exploring just how God influences the world.

The middle part [10] now introduces the third paragraph of V.2.6, which is the first expression of what comes to be known as the consequent nature. "This final passage in God's nature [singular, unqualified] is ever enlarging itself" (PR 349). Here God can no longer be regarded as purely nontemporal.

How is "God's conceptual realization . . . nonsense if thought of under the guise of a barren, eternal hypothesis" (PR 349)? In its final context (as part of V.2.6) Whitehead obviously means that the primordial nature is nonsense apart from the consequent nature. But that could not be its meaning as it originally appeared in an account [10] of God as purely nontemporal. Here it refers to the influence which God's conceptual realization could have on the world. The primordial actuality, with no hint of any consequent nature, performs "an efficacious role in

multiple unifications of the universe, which are free creations of actualities arising out of decided situations" (PR 349).⁵⁶ Precisely how God influences each occasion is reserved for the next paragraph [11].

Even while the precise manner was still being worked out, he insisted on the fact of an influence of the conceptual realization all along. "By reason of the actuality of this primordial valuation of pure potentials, each eternal object has a definite, effective relevance to each concretescent process" (PR 40=[4]).

Thus the middle part was originally used as a rhetorical bridge from the analysis of God's conceptual realization within the divine life (the first part) to the analysis of its influence upon the world in terms of the created order of eternal objects (the third part). The ordering of the eternal objects makes them relevant "to every phase" of every actual occasion, and so applicable to reversion. (The eternal objects are not yet conceived as providing initial subjective aims.) This is the vision of a well-articulated order of forms, all derived from God and relevant to the world.

Later this primordial valuation may have meant that initial aims could be ranked in terms of better or worse alternatives, but that does not seem to be its present purpose. After the first two or three sentences mentioning valuation, the text switches to issues of relevance. The theory of valuation is here applied to the well-known problem of providing an ontological basis for reverted conceptual feelings.

I have omitted the last two sentences of the first paragraph (on PR 31), because I believe them to be an addition based on the notion of God's having two natures:

God is the primordial creature; but the description of his nature is not exhausted by this conceptual side of it. His 'consequent nature' results from his physical prehensions of the derivative actual entities (cf. Part V).

[12] The 'Balance' Insertion (278a)

In working out the notion of 'subjective aim', Whitehead makes use of his earlier notion of the 'ideal in itself': "The determinate unity of an actual entity is bound together by the final causation towards an ideal progressively defined by its progressive relation to the determinations and indeterminations of the datum" (PR 150C). This ideal is peculiar to each particular actual entity, "arising from the dominant components in its phase of 'givenness'" (PR 84C). As fashioned in terms of this ideal, the aim is derived from the past, emerging only in the latter stages of concretescence.

Initially, Whitehead treated reversion as an adequate explanation for any novelty in the subjective ideal, but the balance insertion relates it to the divine ordering [2]. The ideal aimed at, also termed the private ideal, could be formulated at the end of concretescence by means of the categories of conceptual valuation and reversion. He shifts from the ideal aimed at to the subject aiming, but does not yet propose to place any novelty in the initial phases.

I quote this text with its surrounding context in italics to indicate the probable scope of this insertion. Only the first sentence of the insertion explicitly mentions 'subjective aim'. This passage probably contains a secondary insertion, as indicated by single brackets.⁵⁷

[12]

For 'balance' here means that no realized eternal object shall eliminate potential contrasts between other realized eternal objects. Such eliminations attenuate the intensities of feeling derivable from the ingressions of the

various elements of the pattern. Thus . . .the origination of conceptual valuation . . . is devoted to such a disposition of emphasis as to maximize the integral intensity derivable from the most favorable balance. The subjective aim is the selection of the balance amid the given materials. But one element in the immediate feelings of the concrescent subject is comprised of the anticipatory feelings of the transcendent future in its relation to immediate fact. This is the feeling of the objective immortality inherent in the nature of actuality. Such anticipatory feelings involve realization of the relevance of eternal objects as decided in [the primordial nature of] God.⁵⁸ In so far as these feelings in the higher organisms rise to important intensities there are effective feelings of the more remote alternative possibilities. Such feelings are the conceptual feelings which arise in accordance with the Category of Reversion (Category V).

But there must be 'balance,' and **'balance' is the adjustment of identities and diversities for the introduction of contrast with the avoidance of inhibitions by incompatibilities.** (PR 278a: G in III.5.8H)

The last six words of the insertion, "But there must be balance, and" form a rather clumsy transition to the main text. If they are put to one side, continuity of the original context is easily established. Whitehead apparently chose this place to record his reflections on 'subjective aim' because he saw it as furthering the requirement of the eighth categoreal condition for intensity and balance of experience. But he saw no way to reintegrate the ending of his insertion with the original text except by this rather lame transitional phrase.

At this stage in his reflection, Whitehead conceived of subjective aim in terms of a selection which derives it from conceptual reproduction and reversion. But then who or what does the selecting? It is difficult to see how the subject could do the selecting, since the subject has not yet come into being until the completion of the concrescence. Nor does the subjective aim derive from God, even though the ideal realization of eternal objects in God is explicitly mentioned. At most the anticipatory feelings based on reversion could be grounded in God.

In light of Whitehead's later theory, this seems strange, but not if we take into account what was probably his earlier theory of unification (at F). How are the many physical feelings to be unified in concrescence? There was first a stage of conceptual valuation whereby some eternal object is derived from each physical feeling, and valued up or down with respect to its potential contribution to the final satisfaction. That conceptual valuation was then integrated with its physical feeling to form a 'physical purpose': "Such a feeling arises from the integration of a conceptual feeling with the basic physical feeling from which it is derived" (PR 266H). "In a physical purpose the subjective form has acquired a special appetition--adversion or aversion--in respect to that eternal object as a realized element of definiteness in that physical datum" (184H in II.9.1C). These physical purposes can be regarded as physical feelings which have been tailored to fit together in the satisfaction.

In generating the subjective aim as a selection from conceptual feeling, Whitehead is pursuing an alternative strategy of unification. Instead of first integrating the conceptual valuations with their respective physical feelings in physical purposes, which are then able to integrate themselves, he first experiments with the selection of one of these conceptual valuations to serve as the means for unifying all the initial physical feelings together in satisfaction.

The one conceptual valuation selected needed a distinctive term, so Whitehead designated it 'subjective aim.' This appears to be the first occasion he used the term, although

'aim' frequently earlier. If we have regard for the goal aimed at, the superject, it might have been termed the 'superjective aim' or the 'superjective ideal' or even the 'subjective ideal'. I suspect 'subjective aim' was derived from something like the subject's aim or a subject aiming.⁵⁹ Thinking of it as a single conceptual feeling clarified immensely what could be meant by a subject aiming (or selecting) within a context in which the subject is still coming into being.

To be sure, the surrounding pages (PR 277-79) are riddled with mentions of 'subjective aim', but they may be later additions, mostly by the simple device of placing 'subjective' before an earlier use of 'aim,' thereby making an earlier text consistent with his later insights. In his earlier conceptuality, the occasion as a whole, or the subject, had an 'aim'. It did not yet designate a specific feeling.

While the 'balance' insertion [12] may be the first to use the technical term, 'subjective aim,' it is not yet derived from God. Here it comes about by "the selection of balance amid the given materials." Such a selection requires the activity of the whole occasion.

Further reflection, however, may have led Whitehead to appreciate that the anticipatory feelings of ideals were not so much the materials to be selected from, but the means of making that selection itself. Moreover, these anticipatory feelings need be plural only if they are to be selected from, rather than being means of selection.

Then the aim might be conceived as a single feeling which did not have to be selected from a larger pool. Judged in terms of Whitehead's theory at this time, such a single conceptual feeling could be derived from past actualities by means of conceptual valuation. By itself this is insufficient, for Whitehead had a lively appreciation for the novelty and uniqueness of that towards which particular occasions aim. Hence the subjective aim would also require reversion, as many of the anticipatory feelings had required.

All this would contribute mightily toward the resolution of the problem he was wrestling with: how can a subject have unity during the course of concrescence, when it is still coming into being? This was no issue on substantialist principles, where the subject first exists, then experiences or acts. If subjectivity is the way something first comes into (objective) being, what is its unity of occasion at the outset, when it is simply a multiplicity of physical prehensions?

In the final sections!of the original version Whitehead came to recognize that the unity (at least in part) had to be conceived in superjective terms.⁶⁰ The aim of an occasion could be communicated to its various feelings, although just how this could be achieved was left to further examination. But if all the several feelings shared a common aim, then they could grow together into one determinate satisfaction.

This insertion takes the next step, laying the foundations by which the subjective aim could be conceived as a single conceptual feeling, Whitehead's distinctive doctrine. Because this subjective aim was derived by means of reversion, the subjective aim does not emerge until the later phases, and God must be conceived as effectively influencing the occasion only in its later phases.

13. "decision embodied in the subjective aim" (277a)

The next passage is perhaps the first of the insertions in these final sections bringing the theory of physical purpose in line with his new theory of subjective aim. Here the two theories are simply placed side by side:

[13]

In this way, the dipolar character of concrescent experience provides in the physical pole for the objective side of experience . . . and provides in the mental

pole for the subjective side of experience, derivative from the subjective conceptual valuations correlate to the physical feelings. The mental operations have a double office. They achieve, in the immediate subject, the subjective aim of that subject as to the satisfaction to be obtained from its own initial data. In this way the decision derived from the actual world, which is the efficient cause, is completed by the decision embodied in the subjective aim, which is the final cause. Secondly, **the physical purposes of a subject by their valuations determine the relative efficiency of the various feelings to enter into the objectifications of that subject in the creative advance beyond itself. (277a: G in III.3.7F)**

Let us attend first the context, taken from the original text prior the insertion was included. Whitehead first described the two components of the physical purpose, its objective and subjective aspects. Then these two are brought together in the physical purpose, whose function is to "determine the relative efficiency" of the physical feelings to contribute to the final satisfaction.

Whitehead is now prepared to supplement that account of physical purpose by an appeal to subjective aim. As in [12], this 'subjective aim' arises first in the satisfaction as the way "its own initial data" [the initial physical feelings] are to be unified. The mental operations of the concrescence achieve this aim. The fact that it does not arise in the initial phase, to be subsequently modified, indicates that it is prior to the next passage [14].

The contrast between efficient and final causation, and the specification of "the 'subjective aim' at 'satisfaction'" show affinities with what is discussed in this quotation:

The 'objectifications' of the actual entities in the actual world, relative to a definite actual entity, constitute the efficient causes out of which that actual entity arises; the [subjective] aim at 'satisfaction' constitutes the final cause, or lure, whereby there is determinate concrescence . . . (PR 87.27-34) (? in II.3.1C)

However, this passage is very difficult to date. If the bracketed word were added later, the original text (and the next paragraph) could belong to the original version.

14. The Derivation of Subjective Aim (224b).

The last two passages see the subjective aim as a selection from conceptual valuations and reversions, which can only arise in the final phases of concrescence. The next passage places it in the initial phase.

The notion of a subject selecting the aim was problematic if during concrescence there is only a multiplicity of feeling. The subject first has being in the satisfaction as that which can feel the totality of feelings in their ordered unity.

Now that a specific conceptual feeling replaces the imprecise notion of a subject aiming, it can take on a privileged status. If the aim could not be selected in the absence of any subjective agency, perhaps the aim itself could function as a subject, not as the final recipient of all feelings, but in the sense of being the means for selecting the course of action for an occasion. Such an aim could not emerge at the end as something selected by a non-existent concrescent subject, but must be present throughout concrescence. If so, the aim could guide all the feelings of the concrescence to their common final destination. To be present at the outset, however, it must derive from something antecedent. Yet in general the aim could not be derived from past occasions, for they constituted the very multiplicity it was intended to unify.

This could have left his theory at an impasse, had it not been for his prior reflection that all unrealized possibilities, including those needed for subjective aims, were already conceptually realized in God. To be sure, this would lead to a divine determinism were it not that he developed a theory of 'subjective ends' for every concrescent phase which permits the subjective aim to be successively modified in each genetic phase:

This basic conceptual feeling [of subjective aim] suffers simplification in the successive phases of the concrescence. It starts with conditioned alternatives, and by successive decisions is reduced to coherence. The doctrine of responsibility is entirely concerned with this modification. (PR 224G in III.1.5D)⁶¹

For purposes of incipient subjective unity, the aim appears fairly simple, but here it is quite complex. It may contain all the possibilities which a given occasion could actualize, and its inherent freedom lies in its selection of the final form to be actualized.

Though most, if not all of these possibilities are cognate to each other, reversion is not invoked. It is no longer needed. All the novel forms the occasion could possibly actualize are packed into its initial aim.

Whitehead had long before affirmed self-creation (RM 102); now he was able to devise an appropriate theory for its justification. To be sure, strict self-creation is self-contradictory: the self cannot create unless it first exists, and it cannot exist until it is created. The concept of 'self-creation' is merely oxymoronic if we allow 'self' slightly different meanings: 'Self' as subject can bring about itself as superject. That embryonic subject [with its creativity] is the subjective aim,⁶² and this aim must be given. The occasion must first receive itself in order to actualize itself. Sartre's claims to construct the self and its values out of nothing covertly presupposes a substantial self capable of making this construction.

The text I quote is probably part of a larger insertion beginning two paragraphs earlier, starting with the analysis of subjective ends (PR 224.5):

[14]

The ground, or origin, of the concrescent process is the multiplicity of data in the universe, actual entities and eternal objects and propositions and nexus. Each new phase in the concrescence means the retreat of mere propositional unity before the growing grasp of real unity of feeling. Each successive propositional phase is a lure to the creation of feelings which promote its realization. Each temporal entity, in one sense, originates from its mental pole, analogously to God himself. It derives from God its basic conceptual aim, relevant to its actual world. . . [25, 24]. . . In this sense, God can be termed the creator of each temporal actual entity. But the phrase is apt to be misleading by its suggestion that the ultimate creativity of the universe is to be ascribed to God's volition. The true metaphysical position is that God is the aboriginal instance of this creativity, and is therefore the aboriginal condition which qualifies its action. It is the function of actuality to characterize the creativity, and God is the eternal primordial character. But, of course, there is no meaning to 'creativity' apart from its 'creatures,' and no meaning to 'God' apart from the 'creativity' and the 'temporal creatures,' and no meaning to the 'temporal creatures' apart from 'creativity' and 'God.' (PR 224.32-39c + 225.11-21: G in III.1.5D)

Because God provides the initial aims God can be termed the (partial) creator of each

occasion. So the 'this' in the phrase "In this sense" (just after the ellipsis) must refer back some seventeen lines to "It derives from God its basic conceptual aim." This suggests that the intervening lines were penned after the original composition of this piece.

If in providing the initial aim God were to supply whatever novelty the occasion needed, reversion would be superfluous. Whitehead, however, was not prepared to abolish reversion [26] until he devised hybrid physical prehensions [18].

By placing subjective aim at the very outset of concrescence, it became possible, as Whitehead ultimately realized, to conceive it (as animated by creativity) as the very subject itself: "This subjective aim is this subject itself determining its own self-creation as one creature" (PR 69).

15. The Provision of Subjective Aim (III.3.1.)

The bare assertion that God provides initial aims [14] is here elaborated by means of a special section which was placed first in "The Transmission of Feeling" (III.3.1) as befits both the importance of subjective aim and its role throughout concrescence from its very outset.

This passage might have been considered the first of the 'subjective aim' insertions, since it expresses his theory rather intuitively and allusively, except that it is dependent on the fairly sophisticated notion of an initial subjective aim.

Here I shall quote only a portion of this section. This section as a whole was inserted into the chapter, inspired by his discovery of the subjective aim.

[15]

According to the ontological principle there is nothing which floats into the world from nowhere. Everything in the actual world is referable to some actual entity. [It is either transmitted from an actual entity in the past, or belongs to the subjective aim of the actual entity to whose concrescence it belongs.] This subjective aim is both an example and a limitation of the ontological principle. It is an example, in that the principle is here applied to the immediacy of concrescent fact. The subject completes itself during the process of concrescence by a self-criticism of its own incomplete phases. In another sense the subjective aim limits the ontological principle by its own autonomy. . . .

What is inexorable in God, is valuation as an aim towards 'order'; and 'order' means 'society permissive of actualities with patterned intensity of feeling arising from adjusted contrasts.'

In this sense God is the principle of concretion; namely, he is that actual entity from which each temporal concrescence receives that initial aim from which its self-causation starts. That aim determines the initial gradations of relevance of eternal objects for conceptual feeling . . . Thus the transition of the creativity from an actual world to the correlate novel concrescence is conditioned by the relevance of God's all-embracing conceptual valuations to the particular possibilities of transmission from the actual world . . . (PR 244 in III.3.1G).

This passage is important for our present purposes primarily in working out the immediate implications of the concept of 'subjective aim,' a concept which grows out of the divine influence on the occasion as conceived in [4] and [9].

Nothing "floats into the world from nowhere." Although it is not made explicit, could this

not be a principled rejection of ingression? Ingression goes back a long way, used as early as **The Concept of Nature** (e.g. 144). His early (SMW) concept of 'prehension' as the relation between two events by means of a common eternal object has close affinities with ingression.⁶³ If we abstract from the two events so related, only an ingression remains. Ingression may simply mean that an eternal object has ingreience in an actuality, but it carries the connotation of entering into an actuality from elsewhere.⁶⁴ But the truth of the matter is that if we abstract from the locus or loci involved, ingression could be either. While prehension took over the role of ingression with respect to occasions, ingression remained the vehicle for the ingreience and transmission of eternal objects. It was needed, above all, for the sake of novel possibilities.

Yet the transmission of that which is strictly atemporal (and aspatial) is somewhat queer. It makes no difference to the eternal object when or where it is. It makes no difference whether it is instantiated once or many times.⁶⁵ Thus it makes no difference whether each occasion has already within it all the eternal objects, albeit inertly, or whether all these exist in the divine formative element, having ingression wherever needed. The eternal object is the same in both cases, since it abstracts from location. Relevance, and partial similarity and dissimilarity are ways of specifying this need. But on the pure theory of ingression, any eternal object could be anywhere.

The conflicting demands of the ontological principle and novelty shape Whitehead's attempts to qualify ingression. The adoption of Hume's principle limits conception to prehension, yet with one exception, at least initially: unrealized eternal objects were still possible by reversion. Finally the adoption of initial aims derived from God closed this loophole. If it now can be asserted that "everything [including eternal objects?] must be somewhere, and here 'somewhere' means 'some actual entity'" (PR 46), then there can be no unrestricted ingression. Alternatively, we may say that all ingression of unrealized objects is communicated by means of the provision of initial aims. Any other ingression would violate the ontological principle.

However, which version does Whitehead have in mind in the present text? If we omit the third sentence, the one bracketed, the 'ontological principle' Whitehead refers to appears to be the earlier formulation limiting reasons to (past) actual entities only (EWM 323f). This earlier version explains how the concrescent occasion could be a limitation. It limits this earlier principle of extrinsic reference because the reason for the subject's own decision is to be found in the concrescent occasion, not in the past actualities it prehends. Later, instead of accepting this limitation, Whitehead extends the scope of the ontological principle to vest reasons also "in the character of the subject which is in process of concrescence" (PR 24) and modified this passage accordingly by inserting the bracketed sentence.

16. Subjective Aim as Indivisible (69f)

This passage depends on the last two, but it may have been introduced almost anytime thereafter, when Whitehead had occasion to revisit the question about indivisibility. I have placed it here mainly because it is independent of hybrid feelings [18] and the train of thought it will prompt.

[16]

In this section, the doctrine is enunciated that the creature is extensive, but that its act of becoming is not extensive. This topic is resumed in part IV. However, some anticipation of Parts III and IV is now required.

The **res vera**, in its character of concrete satisfaction, is divisible into prehensions which

concern its first temporal half and into prehensions which concern its second temporal half. This divisibility is what constitutes its extensiveness. . . . The concrescence is dominated by a subjective aim which essentially concerns the creature as a final superject. This subjective aim is this subject itself determining its own self-creation as one creature. Thus the subjective aim does not share in this divisibility. . . . [If it were,] the evolution of subjective form could not be referred to any actuality. The ontological principle has been violated. Something has floated into the world from nowhere.

The summary statement of this discussion is, that the mental pole [here, the subjective aim] determines the subjective forms and that this pole is inseparable from the total **res vera**. (PR 69.27-70.4: G in II.2.2C)

Whitehead discerns in the subjective aim an added justification for the way an actual occasion is indivisible, even though its prehensions are [coordinately] divisible. Each of these divisible prehensions has a subjective form, but that form is determined by its subjective aim, which cannot be abstracted from the occasion without losing its actuality. If it were absent, the ontological principle would be violated. He repeats the sentiment of the previous passage: something would have floated into the world from nowhere.

The subjective aim is now recognized as the subject-in-the-making, creating itself as one creature. In another conceptuality, we may regard the subjective aim as functioning as the essence of the actuality. But it is not an invariant essence that remains constant through out concrescence, requiring accidental features to explain its change. Rather as the concrescence becomes, this essence emerges to become the definite form of the occasion only at the satisfaction.

17. Living Occasions (II.3.5-11)

Stimulated by ideas of novelty in terms of subjective aim, he devises a theory of life. This is a digression from the theme of God's conceptuality, but it forms an integral part of the an analysis of Whitehead's creative development in this series of passages.

Unlike the previous passage on the indivisibility of the subjective aim, this passage can be fairly precisely located with respect to its genetic order. As we shall see in examining specific texts, the subjective aim here is operative throughout concrescence [17b], not merely in the final stages as in [12]. Its theory is at least as developed as [14], although it makes no mention of deriving the initial aim from God. But then there is no reason to. The derivation of aim is a universal feature of all actualities, whereas in this section the contingent features of some particular occasions are considered.

On the other hand, there is evidence that living occasions was written before hybrid prehension, because there is an insertion requiring hybrid prehension in the final section of living occasions (PR 107: [19-20]).

There is some external corroboration in the absence of this topic from "The Prospectus for the Gifford Lectures" (EWM 325-27). It appears that Whitehead lectured on everything he had prepared for **Process and Reality** up to that time, including such abstruse topics as flat loci and "external" [extensive?] connection. Only the themes taken up in **Symbolism** (published earlier that year) were omitted. We can therefore have some confidence that if a particular topic is not mentioned, it had not yet been adequately articulated. The Prospectus does not mention strains (IV.4), living occasions [17], hybrid prehensions [18], or the abolition of reversion [26]. Except for strains, which is a topic irrelevant to our present purposes, all these themes are later

by internal criteria. Thus there is good reason to suppose that the section on Living Occasions (PR 99-109) was worked out after Whitehead gave the Gifford Lectures in June 1928.

To be sure, the lectures do discuss the "Primordial and Consequent Natures of God" (EWM 327). However, the first explicit internal evidence that the consequent nature has influenced this series of texts comes in the account of hybrid prehension [18], which is after the lectures were given. This does not mean, however, that the consequent nature is as late as hybrid prehension, for the idea of hybrid prehension is dependent on the idea of the consequent nature (more particularly, on the notion that God is a subject and not a principle), not vice versa. Although it first makes its appearance here, the idea for the consequent nature could arise as soon as the initial subjective aim was derived from God [14].⁶⁶

Thus the sequence I propose: provision of subjective aim [14-15], the consequent nature of God, the Gifford Lectures, living occasions [17], hybrid prehension [18], the abolition of reversion [26]. !

The 'living occasions' insertion differs from all other insertions we have considered in its length. Most are a paragraph or less, but in this case it spans six sections (PR 99-109).⁶⁷ The problem is complex: how to develop the theory of societies so that it can do justice to 'life' and its novelties. We can well imagine that he had been working away at this problem for some time, while the introduction of 'subjective aim' may have been the catalyst for his thoughts.

We shall examine the three rather casual mentions of 'subjective aim' in this passage. These do not appear to be secondary insertions within the large insertion [17], so I am treating them as parts of this insertion rather than as individual insertions.

The problem facing structured societies is how to combine intensity with survival (PR 101f). The first way lies in ignoring the "diversity of detail" so that all influences are compatible with some dominant emphasis (PR 101).⁶⁸

[17a]

The second way of solving the problem is by an initiative in conceptual prehensions, i.e., in appetition. The purpose of this initiative is to receive the novel elements of the environment into explicit feelings with such subjective forms as to conciliate them with the complex experiences proper to members of the structured society. Thus in each concrescent occasion its subjective aim originates novelty to match the novelty of the environment. (PR 102)

"Each concrescent occasion" in context must mean each occasion using this second way, for those of the first way cannot introduce novelty. Also "novel elements of the environment" need not mean that there are any new forms appearing from the past, but only that there are circumstances out of the ordinary, which call for novel responses.

The occasion needs novel form in order to organize a new situation. We are not told how the subjective aim originates novelty, but it can be divinely provided [14-15].

The first kind of structured societies requires neither novelty nor reversion. Thus as Whitehead contemplates the difference between material bodies and living occasions, he realizes that the subjective aim is needed in order to explain life.

The theory of two types of occasions may follow from some distinctions made in an early insertion in the chapter on "Propositions" (II.9.1C)⁶⁹ which details three alternatives for

physical beings. The first and third apply to stability and decay, the second to living organisms, where

there is a zest for the enhancement of some dominant element of feeling, received from the data, enhanced by decision admitting non-conformation of conceptual feeling to other elements in the data, and culminating in a satisfaction transmitting enhancement of the dominant element by reason of novel contrasts and inhibitions. Such a life-history involves growth dominated by a single final end. (PR 188)

The technical language of reversion was unnecessary in this context, but the need to do justice to novelty is there, and this leads not only to reversion but also to subjective aim.

Whitehead recognizes that life requires freedom and novelty, not primarily permanence. He complains that the usual theory of an enduring soul cannot explain originality: "the soul need be no more original than a stone" (PR 104). It needs to be explained by final causation instead of tradition:

[17b]

Thus a single occasion⁷⁰ is alive when the subjective aim which determines⁷¹ its process of concrescence has introduced a novelty of definiteness not to be found in the inherited data of its primary phase. (PR 104)

(If the subjective aim directs "its process of concrescence," then we are beyond formulations which situate the aim solely in the final phases of concrescence. Whitehead contemplates that the aim is present and effective throughout the entire concrescence, although he would have phrased this sentence differently if hybrid physical prehension were available to him.)

This suggests the problem that had confronted him. Material societies endure because each occasion inherits and propagates the defining characteristic of its society. As part of societies, living occasions could merely repeat the past. But where do they get the novelty they need to stay alive? Subjective aim provides the answer.

Although 'subjective aim' arises in the first instance to explain the originality of living occasions, Whitehead generalizes it to apply to other occasions as well. In his summary:

[17c]

Thus the two ways in which dominant members of structured societies secure stability amid environmental novelties are (i) elimination of diversities of detail, and (ii) origination of novelties of conceptual reaction. As a result, there is withdrawal or addition of those details of emphasis whereby the subjective aim directs the integration of prehensions in the concrescent phases of dominant members. (PR 102)

In last two lines we see the subjective aim as operative "in the concrescent phases," not just the final phases, as in [17b]. As noted, there is no reason to regard any of these passages as being insertions, although another mention appears to be a later insertion (PR 105).⁷²

Another way in which living occasions could be receptive to novelty is by being non-social, outside of societies:

life is a characteristic of 'empty space' and not of space 'occupied' by any corpuscular society. . . . Life lurks in the interstices of each living cell, and in the interstices of the brain. (PR 106)

This theory is applied to the mind:

There is also an enduring object⁷³ formed by the inheritance from presiding occasion to presiding occasion. . . . This route of presiding occasions probably wanders from part to part of the brain, dissociated from the physical material atoms. (PR 109)

The relation of mind to body is an apt illustration of Whitehead's theme of order and novelty, and of order entering upon novelty. Thus it prompts an addition to the section developing this issue:

The lesson of the transmutation of causal efficacy into presentational immediacy is that great ends are reached by life in the present; life novel and immediate, but deriving its richness by its full inheritance from the rightly organized animal body.⁷⁴ It is by reason of the body, with its miracle of order, that the treasures of the past environment are poured into the living occasion. The final percipient route of occasions is perhaps some thread of happenings wandering in 'empty' space amid the interstices of the brain. It toils not, neither does it spin. It receives from the past; it lives in the present. It is shaken by its intensities of private feeling, aversion or aversion. In its turn, this culmination of bodily life transmits itself as an element of novelty throughout the avenues of the body. Its sole use to the body is its vivid originality: it is the organ of novelty. (PR 339G in V.I.3C)

18-20. Hybrid Physical Prehension (III.3.2.)

From the way in which the first two sections are placed in "The Transmission of Feelings," it looks like hybrid prehensions were already anticipated as the explanation for origination of subjective aims. The first section (III.3.1) presents God as the source of these aims, while the second (III.3.2) is the chief text for hybrid prehension. On the other hand, 'hybrid prehensions' are not mentioned in the Prospectus for the Gifford Lectures (EWM 325-27), nor in the first section. This suggests that 'hybrid prehension' arose later, after the distinction between the two natures of God, which is mentioned in the Prospectus.

The question of the provision of subjective aim may have led to the notion of hybrid prehension, or it may have been the problem of influence from one occasion to another within a living person. More likely both considerations were operative.

Yet, why are hybrid prehensions introduced so late? One might think that the notion of vesting all unrealized eternal objects in God [2] would already prompt speculation as to how they might be prehended. I suspect that Whitehead saw no problem here--as long as he felt it was still possible to conceive God as at least a formative element. After all, he had already recognized that the whole process "requires a definite entity, already actual among the formative elements, as an antecedent ground for the entry of the ideal forms into the definite process of the temporal world" (RM 152). Here the notion of 'gformative element' is crucial. God could also be conceived as an individual, provided this was also compatible with God's immanent role as a formative element. Then God could be the generic actual entity constitutive of all actual

occasions.

Insofar as God was conceived solely as primordial, Whitehead could continue to regard God as a formative element purely immanent within occasions. If so, there need be no prehensions of God. But this would all be changed by the introduction of the consequent nature. Once God is conceived as having particular experiences of particular things, God must be an individual. God's contingent experience has a determinate content which is different from that of any of the occasions.

Moreover, in discriminating and responding to successive contingent occasions, God would have to be both conscious and personal. As an individual instantiation of creativity, God could no longer be a formative element. A divine formative element constitutive of every actual occasion would have to be the abstractly the same in all instances, whereas God's responses would be different.

If God is to be an individual, it is time to admit that God is a concrescence. The contrast between the two natures of God now allows for the familiar distinction between physical and conceptual feelings. Before this point it does not appear that even conceptual feelings were ascribed to God.⁷⁵ Of course, it was powerfully anticipated by such notions as "conceptual valuation". But the ascription of any feelings to God would be a tacit admission of divine subjectivity.

Previously the terms 'actual entity' and 'actual occasion' were interchangeable (PR 211), since God as the constitutive formative element could function as a generic actual occasion. The individual God, however, differed from all actual occasions. Hence Whitehead now introduced the distinctions whereby God could be henceforth regarded as an actual entity but not an actual occasion (PR 88).⁷⁶

How, then, could a divine individual affect the world? Traditionally, this is resolved by claiming that God creates the world, but this option is not open to Whitehead. Nor can he argue that God has ingression. The only possible alternative he could see was prehension.

It was by no means clear, short of blatant **ad hoc** formulations, how we could be affected by God in terms of prehensions as these had been conceived up to this point. Conceptual prehensions could only treat God as a possibility. Physical prehensions would not do much better. An occasion was prehended as a whole, in terms of the way it is objectified for other actual entities. This means that it would be prehended in terms of its satisfaction, which was the determinate ordering of all of its physical prehensions. Moreover, the conceptual feelings were means by which the final integration was effected, and evaporate in its achievement. This is true even for the subjective aim. It becomes, through its successive modifications, the form of the final synthesis. This final form is fully actualized in the satisfaction, and loses its conceptual status as possibility.

Thus there is no simple transition from the recognition that initial aims must be derived from God (PR 244f: [14]) to the conclusion that these are derived by means of a special kind of physical prehension. On the other hand, the restriction of God's influence to the initial phase suggests that the prehension of God could be construed as physical. The fact that the same type of prehension also explains how members of a living person were connected would encourage Whitehead in his search. At least whatever solution he came up with should not treat God as exceptional.

The innovative step lies in the claim that an actual entity can be prehended by means of one of its own feelings. Since the members of a living person depended on "originalities in the mental poles of the antecedent members" (PR 107), their conceptual feelings had to be prehended in some way or another.

Heretofore Whitehead seems to have assumed that a satisfaction is fully determinate, actualizing its form completely. But if there are "originalities" still waiting for actualization, the satisfactions of living occasions must also include possibilities in the form of conceptual feeling. There is a determinate unity, but not every feeling it contains is equally determinate. Some may have unrealized possibilities.

If occasions were prehended as a whole, hybrid prehension of conceptual elements would still be impossible. But the notion of perspectival elimination (PR 221D) already permitted the coordinate division of the occasion, allowing the occasion to be felt in terms of a portion of its feelings. Granted, hybrid prehension is vastly different. Perspectival elimination was concerned with rendering causal influences compatible. Hybrid prehension is about the transmission of relevant novelty.

Also there seems to be a different kind of abstraction involved in hybrid prehension. Perspectival elimination retains the locatedness of actualities within a web of prior actualities. Conceptual and hybrid prehension abstract from all locatedness. In what sense does a hybrid prehension apprehend an actual occasion if that locatedness is lost? Whitehead takes that locatedness to be an essential part of the determinateness of an actual entity: see category of explanation 20. How does a hybrid prehension differ from a simple conceptual one, except in name? It seems to be like the smile of the Cheshire cat.

Nevertheless both theories, abstractly considered, hold that an actuality can be prehended in terms of one or more of its feelings. Moreover, adequacy requires possibility to be part of antecedent feeling, else we could not derive possibilities from prior states of ourselves. That seems to mean that the conceptual feeling of possibility must somehow be part of objectifiable satisfactions.

While I quote only the part germane to our discussion, the whole section (III.3.2) belongs to this passage. Note that Whitehead leaves undetermined whether the conceptual feeling in question is part of the final satisfaction, or whether it is prehended somehow **en passant**, in the concrescence itself.

For the satisfaction leaves no room for indeterminacy: "The actual entity terminates its becoming in one complex feeling involving a completely **determinate** bond with every item in the universe" (PR 44; cf 41, 238). (There may be a completely definite nontemporal "satisfaction," but that would be indeterminate with respect to the process of the world.)

[18]

There are evidently two sub-species of hybrid feelings: (i) those which feel the conceptual feelings of temporal actual entities, and (ii) those which feel the conceptual feelings of God.

The objectification of God in a temporal subject is effected by the hybrid feelings with God's conceptual feelings as data. Those of God's feelings which are positively prehended are those with some compatibility of contrast, or of identity, with physical feelings transmitted from the temporal world. [21]. . . Apart from the intervention of God, there could be nothing new in the world, and no order in the world. The course of creation would be a dead level of ineffectiveness, with all balance and intensity progressively excluded by the cross currents of incompatibility. The novel hybrid feelings derived from God, with the derivative sympathetic conceptual valuations, are the foundations of progress. (PR 246.42-247.15, from III.3.2 G)

Armed with the conceptual means which 'hybrid feeling' provides, Whitehead now has a suitable way of justifying how occasions can derive their subjective aims from God. But it also invites Whitehead to reconsider his theory of reversion. Reversion depended on the interconnectedness of eternal objects, by means of which the occasion was thought to be able toprehend cognates. But if it is now possible to prehend some eternal objects in God directly, why not also others? We will return to these questions later. Meanwhile he sees how 'hybrid feeling' means that the occasions' prehension of God need no longer be regarded as an exception to Hume's principle.

Although the idea of hybrid prehension was probably occasioned by reflection as to how novelties could be communicated within a living person, the theory was worked out in general with two species, one for actual occasions and the other for God. That section was placed next to the section on the provision of subjective aim (III.3.1) as that where it was most needed with respect to God. The generality of the theory was required in order to show that its application to God was not **ad hoc**.

On re-examination of living occasions, Whitehead found that the text needed surprising little adjustment by insertion of one paragraph and one sentence. The paragraph merely rehearses the theory with its application to 'canalization':

[19]

The defining characteristic of a living person is some definite type of hybrid prehensions transmitted from occasion to occasion of its existence. The term 'hybrid' is defined more particularly in Part III. It is sufficient to state here that a 'hybrid' prehension is the prehension by one subject of a conceptual prehension, or of an 'impure' prehension, belonging to the mentality of another subject. By this transmission the mental originality of the living occasions receives a character and a depth. In this way original is both 'canalized'--to use Bergson's word--and intensified. . . . Thus life turns back into society: it binds originality within bounds, and gains the massiveness due to reiterated character. (PR 107G in G)

On other insertion is called for, in this case a single sentence:

[20]

We may conjecture, though without much evidence, that even in the lowest form of life the entirely living nexus is canalized into some faint form of mutual conformity.

Such conformity amounts to social order depending on [hybrid prehensions of] originalities in the mental poles of the antecedent members of the nexus. **The survival power, arising from adaptation and regeneration, is thus explained.** (PR 107G in G)

Alternatively, if only the bracketed words were inserted, the sentence could remain as part of the original account. Another nearby sentence may or may not be an insertion:

It must also be noted that the pure mental originality works by the canalization of relevance arising from the primordial nature of God. (PR 108)

It all depends on whether Whitehead, prompted by [14], had already worked out the theory of primordial and consequent natures. If so, this is the earliest textual evidence for it.

In the initial context Whitehead confines himself to an "entirely living nexus" because his earlier theory of personal societies inheriting an invariant order, thus functioning as enduring objects, was too rigid to accommodate the dynamics of life. Hybrid prehension now permits both dynamism and the continuity of a living person.

21. God not an Exception to Hume's Principle (247a)

As we have seen, the notion of hybrid prehension presupposes the recognition of both divine physical and conceptual feelings. Thus it could belong to Part C examining the consequent nature. I place it and its implications, however, within Part B, since it is only God as primordial that is prehended hybridly.

[21]

Those of God's feelings which are positively prehended are those with some compatibility of contrast, or of identity, with physical feelings transmitted from the temporal world.

But when we take God into account, then we can assert without any qualification Hume's principle, that all conceptual feelings are derived from physical feelings. [The limitation of Hume's principle introduced by the consideration of the Category of Conceptual Reversion (cf. Sect. III of this chapter) is to be construed as referring merely to the transmission from the temporal world, leaving God out of account.] **Apart from the intervention of God, there could be nothing new in the world, and no order in the world.** (PR 247.4-9: G in III.3.2G.)

The bracketed sentence might possibly be an additional afterthought. As the context indicates, there would still be good continuity of meaning if this were omitted. The main insertion begins with the telling phrase, "But when we take God into account". This phrase would not usually be used in an on-going discussion, but suggests the introduction of a parenthetical thought. There is little conceptual contrast, however, to determine whether this is really an insertion. The recognition that God need not violate Hume's principle is simply an implication of previous reflection about hybrid physical prehension.

At this point Whitehead may think that while some novelties must be derived from God, such as the subjective aim, other novelties can be accounted for in terms of reversion. The category is not yet deemed inadequate for this limited purpose. On the other hand, he may have already found the category to be superfluous. Why derive unrealized eternal objects from cognate ones when they could all be derived from God? If so, he had not yet found a way to eliminate reversion without sacrificing prior texts. While he may not yet be prepared to take the bold step of simply "abolishing" the category, he could at least provisionally restrict its application to the temporal world.

22. Secondary Insertion based on Hybrid Prehension (247c)

Further along on the same page Whitehead finds another passage to be modified. In order to make this insertion more intelligible, let me quote from the text as it would have existed after the initial insertion [7] discussed above.

[7]

Conceptual feelings are primarily derivate from physical feelings, and secondarily from each other. In this statement, God is excluded. Unfettered conceptual valuation, 'infinite' in Spinoza's sense of that term, is only possible once in the universe; (247b: G in III.3.3F)

Now with its final modifications:

[22]

Conceptual feelings are primarily derivate from physical feelings, and secondarily from each other. [In this statement,] the consideration of [God]'s intervention [is excluded.] When this intervention is taken into account, all conceptual feelings must be derived from physical feelings.

Unfettered conceptual valuation, 'infinite' in Spinoza's sense of that term, is only possible once in the universe; (PR 247.19f G+ in G in F)

Originally (PR 88) Whitehead considered that God would have to be an exception to the category of conceptual valuation, since God's conceptual feelings were underived. Hence the concession in [7]: "In this statement, God is excluded." Later, armed with the notion of hybrid prehension, he revised this text, but now it applies to the way in which actual occasions prehend God. Since God can be hybridly prehend, the way in which God influences occasions is not categorically different from the way actual occasions prehend other actual entities.

Since it is still the case that God is an exception to the derivation of conceptual feelings from physical feelings, the second sentence is modified in terms of intervention. It longer refers to underivative nature of God's conceptual feelings but to the way God affects the occasions. Then all **non-divine** conceptual feelings are derived from physical feelings.

Another writer could have achieved the same purpose by simply omitting the second sentence, and rephrasing the last. As we have seen, however, that is not Whitehead's way of doing things.

23. Another Application of Hume's Principle (40b)

The widening of the scope of Hume's principle also enables Whitehead to emend one of the earliest texts in this section, [4]:

[23]

We are here extending and rigidly applying Hume's principle, that ideas of reflection are derived from actual facts. (PR 40.15d-17G in II.1.1C)

The original text [4] speaks of an ideal realization of potentialities, whereby eternal objects could have "effective relevance to each concrecent process. Apart from such orderings, there would be a complete disjunction of [unrealized] eternal objects. . ." (PR 40). There is no mention of physical prehension, so little cause to mention Hume's principle. Since then, however, he has solved the question of prehendng God as primordial by means of hybrid prehension, and feels justified in inserting this comment. He is "extending and rigidly applying Hume's principle" to God, which has hitherto resisted such generalization.

24-25. Amplifications in terms of Hybrid Prehension (224cd)

Though there is no explicit reference to Hume's principle, the purpose of these passages is to derive all finite conceptual feeling from physical feeling, using hybrid physical feeling when necessary. These are complex secondary insertions into a passage already discussed: [14].

[24]

Each temporal entity, in one sense, originates from its mental pole, analogously to God himself. It derives from God its basic conceptual aim [14]. . .

But this statement in its turn requires amplification. With this amplification the doctrine, that the primary phase of a temporal actual entity is physical, is recovered. A 'physical feeling' is here defined to be the feeling of another actuality. If the other actuality be objectified by its conceptual feelings, the physical feeling of the subject in question is termed 'hybrid.' Thus the primary phase is a hybrid physical feeling of God, in respect to God's conceptual feeling which is immediately relevant to the universe 'given' for that concrescence. There is then, according to the Category of Conceptual Valuation, i.e., Categorical Obligation IV, a derived conceptual feeling which reproduces for the subject the data and valuation of God's conceptual feeling. This conceptual feeling is the initial conceptual aim referred to in the preceding statement. **In this sense, God can be termed the creator of each temporal actual entity. . . .** (PR 224.44b-225.11d G in III.1.5D)

The first sentence of the insertion refers back to an earlier sentence, but not to either of the two immediately preceding it: "But this statement," with which this passage begins [25], refers to the statement, "It derives from God its basic conceptual aim." From this Whitehead concludes: "Each temporal entity, in one sense, originates from its mental pole, analogously to God himself." In other words, the occasion originates from conceptual feelings, and it obtains these by its conceptual feelings of God. Hybrid prehension now enables Whitehead to refine this, for he can reaffirm that conceptual feelings are only for eternal objects only, also adhere to Hume's principle insofar as it requires that actual occasions originate only from physical feeling. Hence the introduction of this insertion to set things right by an appeal to hybrid feelings.

By the use of hybrid prehension, Whitehead discovered that the derivation of subjective aim only required an appeal to conceptual valuation. Heretofore, appreciating that the subjective aim could often be novel, he had been careful to invoke not only conceptual valuation but also reversion. Yet since it was possible to hybridly apprehend any relevant eternal object, whether realized or not, no appeal to reversion was necessary. This may have led Whitehead to abolish reversion. Alternatively, if the "abolition" passage is earlier, it would be sufficient to eliminate reversion in this context.

There is another insertion within these two insertions:

[25]

It derives from God its basic conceptual aim, relevant to its actual world, yet with indeterminations awaiting its own decisions. This subjective aim, in its successive modifications, remains the unifying factor governing the successive phases of interplay between physical and conceptual feelings. These decisions are impossible for the

nascent creature antecedently to the novelties in the phases of its concrecence. **But this statement in its turn requires amplification.** (PR 224.39c-44b: G in [24]G in [14]G in III.1.5D)

The original insertion [14] followed the sentence "It derives from God its basic conceptual aim" with "In this sense, God can be termed the creator of each temporal actual entity" (PR 225.11), an inference which causes him some embarrassment. In both cases [24] and [14] refer back to the same sentence, indicating that the intervening sentences [25] were not there when those passages were drafted.

These sentences ensure that the subjective aim undergoes the same process of successive modification that Whitehead proposed for all concrecent feelings on that same page (PR 224). In order to hook it into the preceding text, Whitehead modified a sentence into a clause, so he could attach his own afterthought: "yet with indeterminations . . ." Yet the idea of modification, simplification, and successive decisions with respect to the subjective aim is not new to this insertion, appearing earlier on that page (PR 224), in the text pertinent to the derivation of subjective aim [14].

26. The Abolition of reversion (249a)

If we did not allow for insertion as a basic means for Whitehead's revising, it would be very difficult to account for this paragraph. For the two preceding paragraphs on Category V formally introduce and justify the very categoreal condition which is then said to be "abolished" (PR 249). This, the fifth categoreal condition, is no minor point. It is only one of nine categoreal conditions governing all concrecence, deemed (at least at one point) essential for the achievement of any novelty. On the other hand, if Whitehead is bent on retaining whatever he had written for publication, and later became persuaded that some categoreal condition had to be dropped, this is one way he could do it emphatically.⁷⁷

[26]

The question, how, and in what sense, one unrealized eternal object can be more, or less, proximate to an eternal object in realized ingression--that is to say, in comparison with any other unfelt eternal object--is left unanswered by this Category of Reversion. In conformity with the ontological principle, this question can be answered only by reference to some actual entity. Every eternal object has entered into the conceptual feelings of God. Thus, a more fundamental account must ascribe the reverted conceptual feeling in a temporal subject to its conceptual feeling derived[, according to Category IV,] from [the hybrid physical feeling of] the relevancies conceptually ordered in God's experience. In this way, by the recognition of God's characterization of the creative act, a more complete rational explanation is attained. The Category of Reversion is then abolished; and Hume's principle of the derivation of conceptual experience from physical experience remains without any exception. (PR 249f: G in III.3.3F)⁷⁸

The category of reversion was introduced in order to respond to a shift in Whitehead's assumptions. By the weak interpretation of negative prehension, the unrealized eternal objects could reside inertly in each occasion, although not admitted into subjective efficiency (PR 87).⁷⁹ Once negative prehension, however, is understood to exclude data entirely, some other ontological justification was needed.

In introducing reversion, moreover, Whitehead appears to have been content to rely on the relatedness of eternal objects that the realm of eternal objects with their relational essences provided (SMW, ch 10).⁸⁰ Some sort of relatedness is essential, since reversion is essentially a method for eliciting eternal objects other than those which can be abstracted from immediate physical feeling.

Yet if negative prehension excluded unrealized objects, then the earlier account (in SMW) only explained the ways in which the eternal objects were related. It could not explain how reverted objects could be present for appropriation. Their ontological justification was lacking, and by the ontological principle such explanation could only be grounded in some actuality. If the eternal objects by themselves only constituted a multiplicity (PR 43, 46), then they could only be grounded in the one nontemporal actual entity, God.

If God now brings about the relatedness of the eternal objects by conceptual concrescence, then the more remote eternal objects could be obtained directly from God. This would make reversion superfluous, provided some means for prehending unrealized objects could be found. With the refinement of the hybrid physical feeling each occasion could apprehend directly the eternal objects found in God.

Would the fourth categoreal condition, the category of conceptual valuation, also be superfluous? Why derive eternal objects from ordinary physical feelings if they can be obtained directly from God? The purpose of conceptual valuation, to provide the conceptual means whereby the multiplicity of initial physical feelings could be unified, may well dictate that the eternal objects come from those feelings themselves. Here the same end might be achieved either by conceptual valuation or by the direct prehension of God. Conceptual reversion, however, needs novelty, and has no satisfactory way of attaining it. It could only be obtained from God or from the originalities of prior occasions. It needed cognate objects, but had no access to their mode of relatedness. Novelty in the end required hybrid prehension, but the reason for it had shown reversion to be inadequate.

If this paragraph were not an insertion, we would have to imagine Whitehead both formulating and abolishing the category in one sitting. Moreover, the passages in the text using 'reversion' are most numerous just after it has been declared abolished. In the absence of the abolition paragraph the text would read more smoothly. We would expect Whitehead to employ his principle most heavily just after he had introduced it, which he does.⁸¹ This constitutes the original version for part III, which would be prior to the insertions we have been considering in this essay.

The simple declaration abolishing reversion is a bold and rather unexpected stroke, since we naturally expect our authors to "correct" their treatises in the light of fresh insight, and to remove all traces of earlier positions. By this time Whitehead was a practiced hand at preserving what he had already written by the use of repeated insertion. Yet no amount of insertion could persuade his readers to disregard something they regarded as basic as the category of reversion. Unless Whitehead were to yield by excising this one doctrine, he had no other option than to simply declare it abolished. This paragraph is mute evidence to the tenacity of Whitehead's determination to retain everything intended for publication, even though superseded.

27. Concluding Reflections

We have now examined those passages articulating Whitehead's intermediate concept of God as concrescent but nontemporal, arranged in genetic order as much as this can be ascertained. They show a course of reflections that leads in unexpected directions. The nature of

"experient togetherness" introduces a revision of the ontological principle. This allows him to account for unrealized eternal objects in terms of divine conceptual realization patterned after concrescence. This leads to the discovery of the subjective aim, the innovation of hybrid prehension, and the realization of the superfluity of reversion. Along the way, the consequent nature was also introduced; at least it is already presupposed by the account of the hybrid physical prehension [18]. This speculative adventure clearly required insights, but also a context in which these insights could be articulated. But the context could not be so rigid as to prevent the new insights from coming to fruition. The surrounding theory raised new problems to be resolved, and also permitted its own modification.

The conception of God as a nontemporal concrescence was the first great insight, which required Whitehead to revise his position, if not his text. At first he contented himself with inserting brief passages into a relatively finished manuscript, eventually adding some sections. Even these sections can be considered insertions in their way: (a) The passage on primordial relevance [9-11] may have once been intended as a separate section to the original chapter on God (perhaps as V.1.5). (b) The Provision of Subjective Aim constitutes a section (III.3.1), inserted to preface the "Transmission of Feelings" chapter (III.3.3-5) based on the later categorial obligations. When it was developed, the section on hybrid prehension (III.3.2) was sandwiched in between.

This tells us much about Whitehead's method of composition, and its relation to his quest for creative insight. Because he was so tenacious in retaining what he had intended for publication (such as 'reversion'), we can discern where his previous reflection has been interrupted by fresh insight. By the discipline of compositional analysis we can often indicate those passages which may show Whitehead's early articulations of a given insight. In some cases what appears to be unexpectedly new can be explained in terms of a fairly straightforward inference, but in other cases there is a genuine leap of the imagination.

While the intermediate concept of God enables Whitehead to champion a purely nontemporal and impersonal God, it made the transition to process theism quite easy. All that Whitehead needed was to entertain the possibility that a divine concrescence of conceptual feelings could also have physical feelings (as all other actual entities did). Seen from that vantage point, this line of reasoning provided the conceptual means or formal cause. While process theism may have more far reaching implications, the conception of a nontemporal concrescence may have been the major breakthrough. Without it, the discovery of process theism may not have been possible.

The transition from a divine primordial actuality to primordial nature should pose no problems, although we need to sensitize ourselves to this shift in terminology. An actuality is capable of existing by itself in some sense, despite the fact that it is constituted out of its prehensions of many other entities. A 'primordial actuality,' or 'non-temporal actual entity' is capable of such existence even more so, since it is not dependent on temporal actualities. This aspect, no doubt, was an embarrassment to Whitehead's notions of solidarity, but he did stress how God and eternal objects were mutually dependent. With the notion of two natures what had been the total actuality of God was reconceived as simply an aspect or 'nature' of a greater actuality. Nothing was lost or altered; but the primordial was relativized.

Put another way, an actuality is concrete. A 'nature' is an abstraction from something more concrete than itself. Without a consequent nature, the primordial actuality is the nontemporal actual entity, fully concrete. But when the consequent nature is added, it becomes merely the primordial nature, an aspect of the total reality, "deficiently actual" (PR 343). Thus in very short order the primordial actuality was reconceived as a nature within a larger divine

reality.

Working out the intermediate theory of God as concrecent but nontemporal, from 'experient togetherness' to the abolition of reversion, may have been very brief, a matter of days or weeks. Except for the Primordial Relevance material [9-11], it consists of insertions, whether brief paragraphs [2, 5] or sections [15, 18] to the tentatively completed first version of **Process and Reality**.⁸² The prior conception of God as a nonconcrecent principle appears to be presupposed by that version, since apart from the insertions analyzed in this essay its mentions of God all conform to that idea.

It appears that all of the intellectual activity concerning the notion of a divine nontemporal concrecence came after Whitehead had substantially completed the revised theory of concrecence, as informed by Hume's principle (DEFH). This seems also to be true of his breakthrough concerning 'subjective aim.' Although there are intimations of the subject aiming already in the first version with respect to the seventh and eighth categorial obligation (PR 254f, 277; PS 21:14f), the key passages [12, 14, 15] are later insertions.

As we have seen, the divine conceptual ordering of the eternal objects [2] is introduced before 'subjective aim' is worked out. It may be wondered whether the theory of subjective aim, especially its derivation from God, would have been possible unless God were conceived to have ordered (and evaluated) all the eternal objects.⁸³

While the divine consequent nature requires the world for the enrichment of its experience, the primordial nature needs neither the world nor the consequent nature (PR 44).⁸⁴ Thus, strictly applying Whitehead's own criterion, there is incoherence involving the arbitrary disjunction of the primordial nature and the world. Moreover, the primordial nature taken by itself reflects the immutable God of classical theism. Since the multiplicity sufficient for the primordial concrecence consists only of eternal objects, it does not need the world of actual occasions. The nontemporal concrecence of eternal objects forms a very tight coherent stability, but because it is impervious towards any further integration, it breeds incoherence beyond itself.

Moreover, while Whitehead had overcome an earlier double unification theory of actual occasions, he has not overcome it with respect to God. In the Giffords draft, there was first the unification of the original datum by means of transition, then a subsequent unification of concrecence derived from this original datum. This was replaced (in PR, pt. III) by a single concrecent unification of the many actualities in the occasion's world (EWM 189-217). But in God the double concrecence remains. There is first a primordial unification of all eternal objects, then a temporal unification of all actual occasions. The aesthetic perfection of theory would suggest that there ought to be one single divine concrecence.

In conversation with A. H. Johnson, Whitehead stressed that "only the union of the primordial and consequent natures forms a distinct actuality. [He] admitted that he 'wobbled' on that point. In one passage in **Process and Reality** he almost suggests that God as primordial might be a separate kind of actual entity" (EWP 5f).⁸⁵ The impression that the primordial and consequent natures are distinct actualities arises in large part because of the idiosyncracies in Whitehead's way of putting the book together. Although he reconceived the earlier primordial actuality as simply the primordial aspect or nature of God, he was unwilling to sacrifice his earlier language. The purpose of almost all of the insertions concerning the primordial nature (c.f. e.g. I.3.1) is to prevent readers from treating the primordial reality as a separate actuality. He failed to make the necessary insertion in a few instances. The device of the two natures of God also enabled him to wed together several lines of thought.

In the last analysis, however, the primordial nature is only externally related to the

consequent nature. There can be no fully satisfactory unity unless both natures require each other. This is perhaps one reason why the 'Divine Eros' (=primordial nature) and 'The Adventure of the Universe as One' (= consequent nature) are given separate treatments in **Adventures of Ideas**.

Part C. God as Temporal and Consequent: The Final Chapter

Here we shall examine the emergence of the final concept most characteristic of Whitehead's mature philosophy, God as primordial and consequent. We can study its formation insofar as it can be determined from the stages in the composition of final chapter on "God and the World" (V.2).

Because the formation of Whitehead's final concept is largely identical with the composition of the final chapter (V.2), I shall designate its successive passages simply by chapter and section number. Two passages will be treated as insertions. The initial passage [27] is only a portion of 2.6. The other passage [28] is an insertion in a prior chapter (V.1.4) on the basis of ideas developed in this material.

1. The First Articulations: from 2.6 and 2.3

These first two passages show us how Whitehead initially expressed his discovery that God could be everlasting as well as nontemporal before making the familiar distinction between the 'primordial' and 'consequent natures.'

(a) from 2.6 [27]

The first passage, as I have reconstructed it, is taken from the third paragraph of 2.6, apart from the surrounding paragraphs which come from a later time. It is prefaced by two (italicized) sentences [10] which were probably originally attached to 2.2, before the discovery of the final concept. The earlier version of r.2 probably did not contain the last two paragraphs concerning subjective aim it now has, nor later editorial modifications, based on the contrast between the primordial and consequent natures.⁸⁶ Yet most likely 2.2 did contain paragraph [11], which has since been relegated to the first paragraph of "Some Derivative Notions" (I.3.1).

As we have already seen (at [9-11]), this relegation was probably caused by shifting the rhetorical [10] from 2.2 to 2.6.⁸⁷ In its original setting, it was intended to protest against the notion of God as having no impact on the world. This protest is most emphatic, rejecting it as "nonsense" if taken absolutely. Transposed to 2.6, the notion rejected as "nonsense" now becomes the primordial nature by itself, apart from the consequent nature. But these two sentences (here italicized since not part of [27]), taken by themselves, merely refer to the earlier conceptual realization as influential in the world. They need not presuppose the rest of the paragraph.

[27] = from 2.6

But God's conceptual realization is nonsense if thought of under the guise of a barren, eternal hypothesis. It is God's conceptual realization performing an efficacious role in the multiple unifications of the universe, which are free creations of actualities arising out of decided situations.

Again, this⁸⁸ discordant multiplicity of actual things, requiring each other and neglecting each other, utilizing and discarding, perishing and yet claiming life as obstinate matter of fact, requires an enlargement of the understanding to the comprehension of another

phase in the nature of things. In this later phase, the many actualities are one actuality, and the one actuality is many actualities. Each actuality has its present life and its immediate passage into novelty; but its passage is not its death. This final phase of passage in God's nature is ever enlarging itself. In the complete adjustment of the immediacy of joy and suffering reaches the final end of creation. This end is existence in the perfect unity of adjustment as means, and in the perfect multiplicity of the attainment of individual types of self-existence. . . . The sense of worth beyond itself is immediately enjoyed as an overpowering element in the individual self-attainment. It is in this way that the immediacy of sorrow and pain is transformed into an element of triumph. This is the notion of redemption through suffering which haunts the world. It is the generalization of its very minor exemplification as the aesthetic value of discords in art." (PR 349.29-350.7)⁸⁹

This passage introduces a transformed conception of God, and traces out the requirements of solidarity: God must have an impact on the world and the world must have an impact on God. It articulates the ideal, but we are not yet told how it is conceptually feasible. God affects the world as "performing an efficacious role in [actual occasions,] the multiple unifications of the universe" (PR 349). Elsewhere this is specified as God providing nascent occasions with their initial subjective aims.

The reaction of the world upon God calls for "another phase in the nature of things" (PR 349). Although this phase is identical with the third phase mentioned three pages before (PR 346), and with the third phase of the well-known four phases two pages later (PR 350f), it is not so specified here, suggesting that the numbering of the phases had not yet taken place. There is only "another phase," which is also the "final phase" (PR 349). (The fourth phase, by which God's experience of the world affects the world, does not seem yet to have been contemplated.)

The way the world affects God calls for the "passage in God's nature [as] ever enlarging itself" (PR 349). This is the key step in the transformation of Whitehead's theism. This is not possible if God is eternal and unchanging. Here Whitehead decisively breaks with any concept of God as complete nontemporality, a concept which had been overwhelmingly traditional since classical times and which he had personally championed since **Science and the Modern World**. Solidarity requires a real reaction of the world upon God. Since the world is a succession of occasions ever coming into being, each generation affects God anew, such that God's experience is "ever enlarging itself".

Classical theism insists upon the perfect completion of God apart from the world. God is independent of the world. Solidarity with the world is sacrificed on the altar of divine perfection conceived as complete self-sufficiency. This is the perfection of being, not the perfection of becoming which Whitehead comes to champion.⁹⁰ He relativizes the independence of nontemporal concrescence in terms of an abstract (actually deficient) primordial nature, in order to make room for divine physical feelings of the world.

Classical theism also evades the requirement of solidarity by its interpretation of omniscience. Divine knowledge may be the outcome of real relatedness to the world, yet apart from any temporal involvement. God is conceived as having timelessly that knowledge God would acquire over time if God were to know the way all other knowers know. Yet it is difficult to see how the creatures are not in some sense dependent upon divine knowledge, if God infallibly knows what will happen.

Whitehead never discusses classical omniscience, though this is a basic theme of much

process theology.⁹¹ The deterministic view of future contingents implied by classical theism would have repelled him, particularly after he had worked out a revised theory of concrescence whereby being only exists as the outcome of becoming, and cannot be known apart from that becoming. He may also have seen classical omniscience as the necessary implication of nontemporal divine subjectivity, a notion he rejected.⁹²

He implicitly champions process omniscience, but in this initial passage we are not told how this is possible. We are not yet told how any enlargement of the nontemporal concrescence could possibly take place.⁹³ The way Whitehead might have come to his new convictions, thereby gaining the confidence to assert the real impact of the world on God, may have been through pure theoretical play. He may have simply experimented with what would result if physical feelings were introduced into the concrescence of conceptual feeling, and found the idea to be enormously exciting and transformative.

While not telling us precisely how it would be possible, Whitehead was willing to speculate on some of the implications. If every occasion has a real, definite impact upon divine experience, the perfection of divine experience guarantees its perfect objective preservation forever. While this is not subjective immortality, it does mean that each life has a "sense of worth beyond itself" (PR 350). This is the doctrine of "everlastingness," which Whitehead describes but does not yet name. (In the next section we shall consider [PR 345], it is named, but not described.) Whitehead had already used the term 'objective immortality' to describe the way in which present subjectivity perishes in becoming past objectivity. This is an early concept (C), making no reference to God, let alone to the consequent nature. Now it was necessary for him devise another name, 'everlastingness,' if he was to retain 'objective immortality' for the original meaning he had given it.

Since each occasion is perfectly experienced by God, it forms part of the multiplicity taken into the divine unity. Thus "the many actualities are one actuality, and the one actuality is many actualities" (PR 349). This truth finds later expression in the second antithesis: "It is as true to say that God is one and the World many, as that the World is one and God many" (PR 348).

The claim that "God's nature is ever enlarging itself" is so audacious in the face of classical theism that we must suppose that Whitehead had considerable confidence in his ability to justify this claim. He must have already worked out some of the ideas of God as everlasting, although he had not yet formulated them for publication.

A major step would be his willingness to entertain the idea that God is subjective. For many this is no step at all, since they have always regarded God as personal, and it is certainly an idea rooted in western theism. As we have seen, however, Whitehead had resisted this. The divine was nontemporal, and as such nonsubjective. He had been careful to avoid specifying the nontemporal conceptual realization as a concrescence. But if God is subjective, by his own principles God would be a temporal concrescence of feeling. In order for God to be the most perfect concrescence possible, physical feeling as well as conceptual feeling would have to be ascribed to divinity.

Thus the conceptual background for [27] is his theory of concrescence, while its rhetorical basis is given by [10]. The immediate situation which led to God as consequent seems to be his acceptance of divine subjectivity. What led to that shift? Let me propose a very tentative conjecture. In the nature of things we can have no evidence, except that the idea of deriving initial aims from God [14-15] is just prior to the first use (by implication) of God as a individual subject which could be (hybridly) prehended [17].

There is a significant change in the conception of subjective aim from the 'Balance' insertion [12] to the derivation of subjective aim [14]. In the first, the subjective aim is selected

by the occasion from among "the conceptual feelings which arise in accordance with the Category of Reversion" (PR 278), in the second, the aim is "selected" by God. Reverted feelings can easily be conceived as general principles housed in the primordial actuality. They are realized and unrealized eternal objects found in its nontemporal conceptual realization. This need not involve any divine subjectivity.

However, some sense of divine subjectivity is called for if God selects the aim appropriate for each occasion. It seems to require the sort of dynamic responsiveness we associate with subjects. In particular, physical feeling would appear to be necessary in order to know the particular situations in order to match the relevant aims. The selection of aim was the impetus for conceptual transformation. A subject-in-the-making could not select, so the task of selection was passed on to God, who could not select unless subjective.

Yet Whitehead was never able to work out the way in which divine subjectivity in the form of the consequent nature could be prehended. Hybrid prehension only prehends conceptual feeling. If it were possible for occasions to prehend divine propositional feeling, then divine physical feelings would be included. This, however, is too **ad hoc** to propose, particularly as no counterparts with actual occasions could be found. Thus what may have been the guiding inspiration of Whitehead's turn to temporal theism leaves no trace. Divine temporal response to particular circumstances seems to have defied conceptual articulation.

(b) 2.3

Again, we need to remind ourselves that what distinguishes these first passages about God's temporal response is that they do not yet use the particular terms Whitehead fashions for this discussion: the contrast between the primordial and consequent natures, and its correlation with conceptual and physical feelings. This next passage naturally leads into the distinction between the two natures of God, or more accurately, to the distinction between the two sides of the nature of God, in terms of the phrases I have emphasized:

from 2.3

There is **another side**⁹⁴ **to the nature of God** which cannot be omitted. Through this exposition of the philosophy of organism we have been considering the primary action of God on the world. From this point of view, he is the principle of concretion--the principle whereby there is initiated a definite outcome from a situation otherwise riddled with ambiguity. Thus, so far, **the primordial side of the nature of God** has alone been relevant.

But God, as well as being **primordial**, is also **consequent**. [He is the beginning and the end. He is not the beginning in the sense of being in the past of all members. He is **the presupposed actuality of conceptual operation**, in unison of becoming with every other creative act.]⁹⁵ Thus, by reason of the relativity of all things, there is a reaction of the world on God. The completion of God's nature into a fullness of physical feeling is derived from the objectification of the world in God. He shares with every new creation its actual world; and the crescent creature is objectified in God as a novel element in God's objectification of that actual world. This prehension into God of each creature is directed with the subjective aim, and clothed with the subjective form, wholly derivative from his all-inclusive primordial valuation. God's **conceptual nature** is unchanged, by reason of its final completeness. But his **derivative nature** is consequent upon the creative advance of the world. . .

One side of God's nature is constituted by his conceptual experience. This experience is the primordial fact in the world, limited by no actuality which it presupposes. It is therefore infinite, devoid of all negative prehensions. **This side of his nature** is free, complete, primordial, eternal, actually deficient, and unconscious. **The other side** originates with physical experience derived from the temporal world, and then acquires integration with the primordial side. It is determined, incomplete, consequent, 'everlasting,' fully actual, and conscious. [His necessary goodness expresses the determination of his **consequent nature**.]⁹⁶ (PR 344.41-345.19, 25-34, emphasis added)

The words and phrases I have emphasized indicate certain features which are significant for compositional analysis. From the standpoint of purely textual considerations, what marks these paragraphs as early is the repeated use of "side of God's nature". God has one nature which has two sides. Even when it is shortened to the "consequent nature," Whitehead may really intend 'the consequent side of God's nature'.

Using this criterion of early and later terminology we can discern the parameters of the original version. Except for the third paragraph (and possibly the last), this section seems to be early. The third paragraph speaks directly of a primordial and a consequent nature, while the next reverts to the earlier manner of referring to the two sides of God's nature. In mentioning that the consequent nature is conscious it partially repeats the next (fourth) paragraph, while the third alone explicitly mentions "God's physical feelings".

The second paragraph starts out by using the standard contrast between 'primordial' and 'consequent,' although not here correlated with the nature or natures of God. Although Christianity has traditionally accepted Christ as being one person in two natures, the strong unity of God has required that there be but one nature to God. Whitehead evidently hesitated to ascribe two natures to God, one summing up his prior understanding of God as primordial, the other expressing the new understanding of God's experience of the temporal world. He is provisionally more comfortable with the language of two aspects of one nature, and even his terms for the two aspects is fluid, for in the penultimate sentence of the second paragraph is between a 'conceptual nature' and a 'derivative nature'.

This passage (2.3) in its original recension differs from the previous one (2.6) in that it comes closer to assigning physical feeling to God, although it appears somewhat reticent to say this directly. At first Whitehead contents himself with: "The completion of God's nature into a fullness of physical feeling is derived from the objectification of the world in God" (PR 345). In the last two paragraphs he speaks of "physical experience." It is never as direct as the later insertion (paragraph three): "the consequent nature is the weaving of God's physical feelings upon his primordial concepts" (PR 345).⁹⁷

The contrast in the fourth paragraph is remarkable for its cryptic use of unexplained terms. One side of God's nature is described as "actually deficient, and unconscious." Both are shocking terms applied to God, but they are not yet explained.⁹⁸ The other side of God's nature is 'everlasting.' Here Whitehead's special word (always in single quotation marks) is introduced, but it is not explained. Nor is it connected with the previous discussion (in 2.6) of the way finite actualities acquire ultimate value by their being incorporated within the life of God.

As already mentioned, the last paragraph may belong to the later recension, but if it did, we should expect to mention the dipolarity pertinent to all occasions, and to use the terminology of the two divine natures. It clearly states that while actual occasions originate from physical

experience, God originated from conceptual experience, but not yet in the customary terms. This recognition forms the basis for the later reflection that all actual entities are dipolar, and for the reversal of the poles, systematically explored in 2.5 (PR 348).

2. First Recension: 2.1-4.

After the initial breakthrough, abandoning the concept of an absolutely nontemporal God for one "ever enlarging itself" (PR 349), and chronicled in V.2.6, Whitehead sought to express his newly won position more systematically. He revised two sections (2.1-2) so that they would contrast the two natures, and added two more to express his new ideas about the consequent nature (2.3-4). The other sections (2.5-7) appear to have been added later as the occasion demanded.

a.) 2.1

To preface his contrast between the primordial and the consequent aspects, and to introduce the chapter devoted to the positive description of God, Whitehead appropriated five paragraphs which seem to have originally belonged to a much longer account (V.1.2, as expanded).⁹⁹ These paragraphs concern three ancient conceptions of God, which can be associated with: the divine Caesars, the Hebrew Prophets, and Aristotle. A closing paragraph briefly sketched the Galilean origin of Christianity.

The initial paragraph of 2.1 is not part of the poetic excerpt, but an editorial insertion designed to introduce the entire second chapter. It only has a tenuous relevance to the five paragraphs which immediately follow.

The same Biblical verse, "For so he giveth his beloved--sleep" (Ps. 127.6) is quoted twice on successive pages (PR 341f). This is additional evidence that Part V's two chapters were not written at the same time.¹⁰⁰ According to our compositional analysis, the first quotation was included in the half-chapter written during the summer of 1927 (C), while the second quotation was not used until the revisions of the following spring (I). By that time Whitehead may not have realized that he had used the quotation before, let alone on opposite pages.

b.) 2.2

As Denis Hurtubise has argued, the 'creativity' paragraph (PR 31.22-32.3) may well have been intended to open this section. But the poetic and deeply religious character of 2.1 effectively excluded any abrupt transition to the crass topic of metaphysics. So the 'creativity' paragraph was replaced by a smooth transitional paragraph which speaks about adding another speaker to Hume's **Dialogues**.

The original part of 2.2 (beginning with the second paragraph) was an initial systematic description of God based on the concept of a nontemporal concrescence, before the notion of a second, consequent aspect was even anticipated [9]. At that time he sought to contrast God's inner conceptual activity with its effect in ordering eternal objects with respect to their relevance towards the world [11]. Now, however, the original presentation of the nontemporal actual entity, fully actual in itself, can with very slight modification serve quite well as the account of the primordial aspect of a more complex actuality. The original contrast [11] concerning eternal objects and their relevance to the world now only gets in the way, and so was relegated to its present location (I.3.1).

Besides a slight transitional phrase, "In the first place," prefacing the second paragraph, all the recension needed for the contrast was part of the third paragraph and two sentences

framing the fourth paragraph. I have placed the reconstructed original text in italics, so we can determine the extent of the recension:

from 2.2

Viewed as primordial, **he is the unlimited conceptual realization of the absolute wealth of potentiality.** In this aspect, **he is not before all creation, but with all creation.**¹⁰¹ But, as primordial, so far is he from 'eminent reality,' that in this abstraction he is 'deficiently actual' --and this in two ways. His feelings are only conceptual and so lack the fullness of actuality. Secondly, conceptual feelings, apart from complex integration with physical feelings, are devoid of consciousness in their subjective forms.

Thus, when we make a distinction of reason, and consider God in the abstraction of a primordial actuality, we must ascribe to him neither fullness of feeling, nor consciousness. **He is the unconditioned actuality of conceptual feeling at the base of things; so that, by reason of this primordial actuality, there is an order in the relevance of eternal objects to the process of creation. . . . The particularities of the actual world presuppose it; while merely presupposes the general metaphysical character of creative advance, of which it is the primordial exemplification.** [The primordial nature of God is the acquirement by creativity of a primordial character.] (PR 343.38-344.3, 344.11-12)

If we attend initially to the reconstructed context, we can appreciate its continuity (even if we also include the additional material from 2.3). It begins with a series of basic categorical statements in the form: "He is," with no hint that this refers only to an aspect of God. The editorial additions are quick to remedy that defect; in fact, that seems to be their only purpose.

Except for the last sentence, placed in brackets, none of the statements in 2.2 use the technical terms contrasting the primordial and consequent natures. This is an additional indication that the contrast between 2.2 and 2.2-4 was made before Whitehead had stabilized his terms, and that such sentences as the bracketed one above indicate a later, secondary recension of these sections made in terms of these technical terms. Let us focus here upon the primary recension.

The first two sentences of older material now need to be qualified by the concept of a second aspect. The next sentences repeat and amplify what Whitehead had already written (in 2.3), particularly spelling out what was meant by the primordial nature being 'deficiently actual' and 'unconscious.' 'Deficiently actual' can be misleading, suggesting that there are degrees of actuality with some things less actual than others. Elsewhere Whitehead shows no sympathy with the theory of degrees of being. The difficulty is compounded in the next paragraph: "the abstraction of a primordial actuality." Actuality is that which is fully concrete. It is that from which abstraction is made. How can **any** actuality be an abstraction?

It is highly unlikely that Whitehead would have written either expression were it not for his own self-imposed determination to retain what he had written for publication, no matter what. He had once written that the pure divine nontemporal concrescence was fully actual. Now he sought to retain those words while at the same time relativizing their meaning. Thus he had written of God: "He is the unconditioned actuality of conceptual feeling at the base of things; so that, by reason of this primordial actuality . . ." (PR 344). Now, in order to make room for a consequent nature, he redescribes "this primordial actuality" as "the abstraction of a primordial actuality". Otherwise we appear to have two divine actualities, a primordial actuality and a

consequent actuality.¹⁰²

If we follow the dictionary definition of 'deficient,' however, there should be no trouble in understanding Whitehead's meaning. Something is 'deficient' if it is lacking in some quality necessary for its completeness. Actuality is completeness. While primordial conceptuality had hitherto been deemed complete in itself, it now needed physical feeling for its completion. The primordial nature in itself was considered insufficient for complete actuality. Note that this is a deficiency with respect to actuality; the primordial nature could still be perfect in its basic character.

That God, simply as the union of all pure divine conceptual feeling, is unconscious, follows from Whitehead's mature theory of consciousness. The subjective form of an intellectual feeling is conscious. That is, the way in which such a feeling is felt involves consciousness. An intellectual feeling, in turn, is an integration of a physical and propositional feeling (PR 266f). This is a very complex theory, one that Whitehead struggled to attain (EWM 224-27), but once he had attained it, he was willing to apply it even to God.

In times past I have been inclined to see the realization that any divine primordial actuality would be unconscious to be the primary motivating factor in Whitehead's search for the consequent nature (EWM 227-29), but that presupposes that he already conceived of God as subjective. Surely a perfect subjectivity would be conscious, but things are different if subjectivity itself is deemed to be absent from, or irrelevant to, the divine.

The final paragraph of 2.2 (not quoted here) was probably added very late in the composition of the book. It appears that during the fall of 1928 one of his Harvard students, Mr. F. J. Carson, saw the aptness of a quotation from Aristotle (quoted PR 344) to Whitehead's teaching of God as the source of subjective aim, and so it was incorporated here.

c.) 2.3

Although he had initially charged that God's conceptual nature was merely "a barren, eternal hypothesis" (PR 349), here he makes a simple contrast: "there is another side to the nature of God which cannot be omitted" (PR 344). Now he can oppose "the primary action of God on the world" (PR 345) with the world's effect on God.

d.) 2.4

In the two previous sections (2.2 and 2.3), Whitehead had prior materials to draw upon, but none for this section. The first paragraph is a later insertion, to judge from its mention of both 'primordial nature' and 'consequent nature.'

The first sentence of the second paragraph, the opening sentence of the original section, is very peculiarly phrased: "The wisdom of subjective aim prehends every actuality for what it can be in such a perfected system" (PR 346). It may reflect a fluidity surrounding the concept of subjective aim when this was first introduced, traces of which we find in 2.2 "The conceptual feelings [which compose his primordial nature,] exemplify in their subjective forms their mutual sensitivity and their subjective unity of subjective aim." (PR 344). If we omit the bracketed phrase as a later insertion, both see no need to identify the subjective aim as specifically God's. Could it be that at one point Whitehead conceived of the subjective aim as belonging peculiarly to God so that this identification need not be made explicit?

Another example of this fluid use is given in 2.3: "This prehension into God of each creature is directed with the subjective aim, and clothed with the subjective form, wholly derivative from his all-inclusive primordial valuation" (PR 345). If this is so, Whitehead may have understood "the wisdom of subjective aim" to be a way of speaking of God's activity in

prehending the world.

Later, when the term 'subjective aim' was applied to finite actualities as well, this sentence became opaque. True to his policy of not altering what had already been written, he sought by parallelism in the added first paragraph to illuminate that sentence. So we now have "the perfection of God's subjective aim" (PR 345) paralleling "the wisdom of subjective aim" (PR 346). This introduces a false note, for it is not God's subjective aim, but the entire divine activity, that prehends the world.

The final paragraph enlarges upon his earlier talk of "another phase" (2.6: PR 349) by sketching our three phases for the "universe" (1) the divine conceptual realization, (2) the world of actual occasions, and (3) the divine experience of the world. No mention is made of the provision of initial aims (III.3.1G), which connects the first two phases, for Whitehead may have been uncertain how to understand the connection in the light of God's consequent experience. Although it was probably by way of ascribing physical feelings to God that he discovered the third phase, he is apparently very reticent about describing God in terms of 'physical feelings'. Nor is there any mention of the fourth phase (see 2.7). Presumably he had not yet thought of it.

If at one time 2.4 was intended to close the chapter on "God and the World," it may have been followed by two other sections, the six antitheses (347.45-348.16), and the final paragraph of 2.6, which I shall term the 'coda' (350.8-13).

Taken by themselves, as forming "the final summary" (PR 347f), the antitheses were probably meant to stand at the end of the book. As they stand now, they form part of 2.5, when 2.5 was intended to be the final chapter. It may have stopped with the six antitheses, with the subsequent discussion being added later.

The 'coda' presently forms the concluding paragraph of the penultimate section (2.6), but it makes much better sense as following a series of opposites: "All the 'opposites' are elements in the nature of things, and are incorrigibly there. The concept of 'God' is the way in which we understand this incredible fact--that what cannot be, yet is" (PR 350). This striking oxymoron makes a most appropriate conclusion to **Process and Reality**.

These opposites could well be the antitheses. But the paragraph is phrased in such an open-ended fashion that the opposites could refer to the "Ideal Opposites" (V.1). Originally it could have concluded this chapter, or it could have crowned 2.4 when that was the intended end. It finally was placed at the end of 2.6, almost, but not quite, making it to the very end of the book.

3. The Remaining Sections of V.2

There does not seem to have been any attempt to order the entire chapter in a way which would parallel the recension of 2.1-4. The final three sections seem to have been appended in a somewhat piecemeal fashion.

a.) 2.5

This section has a complex compositional history. There seem to be at least two stages: (a) The antitheses evidently attracted further commentary (PR 348f), thereby diminishing the rhetorical lustre of the coda, which was displaced for another occasion. (b) The opening material, down to the last line of the page (PR 346f) was probably added in the revisions.

The second part of the sixth paragraph (PR 347f) announces itself as "the final summary" in terms of six antitheses. We need to take seriously these words, even the fact that it has been disguised for us by being made part of a "run-on" paragraph with two disparate topics. (Whitehead occasionally uses this device to join two very different passages on hand, perhaps

assuming that their disparity will be less apparent if buried in the same paragraph.)

The antitheses themselves may well have been formulated independently of the other texts. The fifth antithesis, for example, could have been formulated as early as the Giffords draft. Whitehead had already recognized that "The transcendence of God is not peculiar to him. Every actual entity, in virtue of its novelty, transcends its universe, God included" (PR 93fC). Also the second antithesis makes sense in terms of God conceived as simply a nontemporal concrescence, if for the 'World' we substitute the multiplicity of eternal objects. But the other four (and even the second in terms of the 'World' of actuality) are only possible in terms of the consequent nature, and there would have been no occasion for just one or two antitheses. If the list of antitheses, like the categories, had any prehistory, it does not seem to be recoverable.

In the sixth antithesis "God creates the World" (PR 348), while just two pages earlier we are told that "He does not create the world, he saves it" (PR 346). This discrepancy cannot easily be explained by any compositional analysis. If anything, these antitheses could have belonged to the same section (2.4), and then be separated only by a longish paragraph.

It seems to me that the antitheses should be reversed. Consider their form: "It is as true to say A as that B." In that form B should be something most persons would accept as true. Then A, the more striking, even shocking claim, would be as true as B. Following this pattern, the second antithesis should read: "It is as true to say that the World is one and God many, as that God is one and the World many." That God is one is practically a truism.

In these antitheses, what Whitehead has put down for the first clause is conventionally accepted. Although Whitehead usually affirms the theses, I submit that he does not in the every instance. He avoids elsewhere claiming that God is creator (cf PR 225), because he understands it generally to entail divine determinism. Because he wishes to claim that the World (partially) creates God, it was rhetorically necessary for him to embrace the opposite claim that God creates the World. Even so, he could construe the claim to be a statement about most persons' beliefs rather than his own. Just as most believe that God creates the World, they should believe that the World creates God.

In the attached commentary Whitehead takes the opportunity to develop the interaction between God and the World. The polarity within God and its parallel within actual occasions, as well as the polarity between God and the world, which had been adumbrated in the fourth and fifth paragraphs of 2.3, are here fully developed. "In God's nature, permanence is primordial and flux is derivative from the World; in the World's nature, flux is primordial and permanence is derivative from God" (PR 348).

d.) 2.7 as 2.5B.

This section is famous for its account of the fourth phase, yet its original version may not have contained the third paragraph which introduces the fourth phase. Note the contrast between "God's nature," repeated four times in the second paragraph and the casual mention of "the consequent nature of God" in the opening sentence of the third paragraph.¹⁰³ Also the continuity of thought in the absence of the third paragraph should be noted:

from 2.7

Thus in the sense in which the present occasion is the person **now**, and yet with his own past, so the counterpart in God is that person in God. . . . (PR 350)

We find here the final application of the doctrine of objective immortality. Throughout the perishing occasions in the life of each temporal Creature, the inward source of

distaste or of refreshment . . . is the transformation of Itself, everlasting in the Being of God. (PR 351)

'Creature' is here capitalized to indicate that it refers not to every occasion but to a personally ordered society having perishing occasions. It is a further explication of what is meant by "that person in God." I take that "inward source of distaste," etc. to be our own sense of "immortality" as being taken up into the everlasting life of God.

All this has to do with the third phase, the way in which we are experienced in the consequent life of God. I see no hint of how this divine experience is returned to the world, and suspect that the fourth phase was not yet clearly anticipated when the first version of 2.7 was written.

If it was not written to house the fourth phase, why was it originally written? Not to present the other three phases. That task had already been done in 2.4. Besides, Whitehead had no way of knowing then that the phases would be the central point of 2.7.

There seems to be considerable continuity of thought between the tenth paragraph of 2.5 and the second paragraph of 2.7. I quote a portion of each:

from 2.5 and 2.7

In God's nature, permanence is primordial and flux is derivative from the world: in the World's nature, flux is primordial and permanence is derivative from God . . . Creation achieves the reconciliation of permanence and flux when it has reached its final term which is everlastingness--the Apotheosis of the World. (PR 348) . . .

Each actuality in the temporal world has its reception into God's nature. The corresponding element in God's nature is not temporal actuality, but is the transmutation of that temporal actuality into a living, ever-present fact. (PR 350)

The first paragraph from 2.5 elaborates on the first antithesis, "It is true to say that God is permanent and the World fluent, as that the World is permanent and God is fluent" (PR 348). The second paragraph from 2.7 builds upon this by showing how each individual actuality contributes to the fluency of God, thereby developing the theme of 'everlastingness' for the temporal Creatures and the theme of how God constitutes "the Apotheosis of the world."

Possibly the original version of 2.7 was part of an earlier 2.5 which stopped with the tenth paragraph (PR 348.41). As the text now stands, there are two more paragraphs, which do not develop the tenth paragraph any further but do elaborate the second antithesis, "It is as true to say that God is one and the World many, as that the World is one and God many" (PR 348).

These paragraphs sever any continuity that might have existed between 2.5 and the paragraphs of 2.7, yet it is instructive to note how well the present first paragraph of 2.7 is carefully fashioned to integrate a discussion of God as many, the theme of the last two paragraphs of 2.5, with the reception of persons into the divine life, the theme of 2.7. If the first sentence of 2.7 originally read, "Thus the . . . nature of God is composed of a multiplicity of elements with individual self-realization" (PR 350), the three original paragraphs may have been first attached to 2.5.

4. Revisions making Use of the Two Natures

Once Whitehead revised his terminology to recognize a primordial and a consequent

nature, he revised 2.3-4 and added several remaining sections.

(a) 2.3-4

After writing the first draft of V.2, Whitehead stabilized his terminology and determined on two natures for God, one primordial and the other consequent. In the first draft he had spoken of two sides of the one nature of God, or of contrasting the conceptual with the derivative nature. Without using the word 'nature' he had referred to the second as the consequent aspect. The primary decision required for the stabilization of terms concerned the two natures. Despite whatever theological misgivings this formulation gives rise to, he evidently felt the two natures doctrine would be most expedient.

By use of 'the primordial nature' he could reconceive and thereby preserve what he had already written concerning God as the nontemporal actual entity or primordial actuality (parts A and B). It was not intended as a systematic distinction, somewhat on analogy with the trinitarian persons. Rather the 'primordial nature' or aspect was to be a convenient way to reconceptualize his older theory under the changed circumstances of a more complex view. Instead of being the total 'primordial actuality,' it was relativized as being merely an aspect.

The second or consequent nature became the vehicle for the ideas introduced by this new way of thinking. This was made possible by the fact that the primordial nature could signify God's mental pole taken in abstraction, while the consequent nature could designate God's physical pole. Because the whole is new if one aspect is, the 'consequent nature' also did double duty as the final synthesis of both physical and conceptual feeling: "The primordial nature is conceptual, the consequent nature is the weaving of God's physical feelings upon his primordial concepts" (PR 345).

The only insertion in 2.3 is the third paragraph. This is the only text in which God is described as 'dipolar', but the idea is already inherent in the original text of 2.5: "For God the conceptual is prior to the physical, for the World the physical poles are prior to the conceptual poles" (PR 348). It may also have the first mention of "God's physical feelings."

In 2.4 the first and third paragraphs are insertions. As mentioned above, the first paragraph may be fashioned in order to explain the enigmatic "wisdom of subjective aim" (PR 346) by "The perfection of God's subjective aim" (PR 245). It also seeks to explain 'everlasting,' which had been used in passing of the consequent side of God's nature: "It is determined, incomplete, consequent, 'everlasting,' fully actual, and conscious" (PR 345). 'Everlasting,' which becomes a crucial term of Whitehead in V.2 is defined as "the property of combining creative advance with the retention of mutual immediacy" (PR 346).

The third paragraph develops the consequent nature in terms of its judgment upon the world. "The judgment of a tenderness which loses nothing that can be saved" (PR 346) has often been interpreted to mean that evil, because it cannot be saved, must be discarded. That overlooks the next sentence, that this is "the judgment of a wisdom which uses what in the temporal world is mere wreckage" (PR 346). Evil results in destruction and wreckage, but it can be retained and restructured within the infinite resources of God's imagination. The gross evil of the world can be transformed by divine conceptual supplementation. God saves all being, it is the immediacy of becoming which perishes in the attainment of being which cannot be saved.¹⁰⁴

(b) from V.1.4

While most of "The Ideal Opposites" (V.1) was written the previous summer, it contains an important insertion which was made in conjunction with the composition of the final chapter.

It poses the question which an insertion to 2.5 seeks to answer. There is some gap between question and answer, however, for it is posed as a single problem, but answered in terms of a double problem.

[28]

But, just as physical feelings are haunted by the vague insistence of causality, so the higher intellectual feelings are haunted by the vague insistence of another order, where there is no unrest, no travel, no shipwreck: 'There shall be no more sea.' [Rev. 21:1]

This is the problem which gradually shapes itself as religion reaches its higher phases in civilized communities. The most general formulation of the religious problem is the question whether the process of the temporal world passes into the formation of other actualities, bound together in an order in which novelty does not mean loss.

The ultimate evil in the temporal world is deeper than any specific evil. It lies in the fact that the past fades, that time is a 'perpetual perishing.' Objectification involves elimination. The present fact has not the past with it in any full immediacy. The process of time veils the past below distinctive feeling. There is a unison of becoming among things in the present. Why should there not be novelty without loss of this direct unison of immediacy among things? In the temporal world, it is the empirical fact that process entails loss: the past is present under an abstraction. But there is no reason, of any ultimate metaphysical generality, why this should be the whole story. . . . (PR 340: I in V.1.4C)

The rest of this long paragraph considers selection as the way to eliminate evil. It does not mention the particular kind of evil time introduces. This cramming of two topics into the same paragraph is one clue alerting us to the presence of a possible insertion.

This section apart from the insertion does not even hint at God prehending the temporal world so as to achieve its 'everlastingness,' while the insertion sets up the problem 'everlastingness' is designed to overcome. In God's experience the novelty of the temporal world is not lost, but retained with full immediacy. It seems highly unlikely that Whitehead could have written these words without a rather clear anticipation of the consequent nature. Its inclusion in 1.4 would then be a rhetorical device to elaborate the problem to which 2.5 could supply the answer.

This insertion really presupposes the earlier discussion of evil which now follows it in the text. It would help to know at the outset of the paragraph that "the nature of evil is that the characters of things are mutually obstructive" (PR 340). Then the fact that present immediacy obstructs past achievement can be seen as a particular form of evil. Had the two parts of the paragraph been written together, it could have been so ordered.

In determining where this insertion begins, the criterion of the continuity of meaning of the original context is not very decisive. More to the point, certain technical terms were only introduced after the original text (V.1.4C) had been written. Thus Whitehead does not mention 'physical feelings' until the notion of concrescence had been fundamentally revised (at D). As a technical term, 'intellectual feeling' was not introduced until "The Higher Phases of Experience" (III.5H). Even its non-technical use referring to all mental feelings in contrast to physical feelings comes later.

Whether this consists of three separate additions or one mostly depends upon our sense

of what Whitehead could have written in the absence of any clear anticipation of divine consequent experience. The [rest of the] first paragraph continues the theme of the transiency of novelty, but that "vague insistence of another order" suggests the 'everlastingness' the consequent nature will introduce.

The middle paragraph comments on the religious response to the transiency of novelty, but what exactly is meant by how "the temporal world passes into the formation of other actualities?"

The original continuity of meaning for 1.4 may have moved directly from what was before the insertion to its last two paragraphs. The general theme remains the transiency of novelty, even if described in terms of evil. The problem that the discussion of the nature of evil in the second part of the second paragraph (PR 340.34-351.2) poses is that there is no transition from the account of transiency of novelty to the problem of evil. It is bridged only by the insertion.

One very tentative suggestion is that this passage on the nature of evil was originally attached to a section of "The Theory of Feelings" (III.1.4) affirming that "insistence on birth at the wrong season is the trick of evil" and describing the overcoming of evil in terms of a "barrier reef" (PR 223). Then the inserted reflection on temporal evil whereby the present obstructs the past could be the justification for bringing the passage up to be included in V.1.4.

(c) 2.5

The 'two natures' insertions for 2.5 consist in the fourth to the sixth paragraphs down to "The final summary" introducing the antitheses (PR 347f). They originate from Whitehead's recognition that there is a double problem concerning fluency and permanence: "actuality with permanence, requiring fluency as its completion; and actuality with fluency, requiring permanence as its completion" (PR 347).

Despite the claim that "civilized intuition has always, although obscurely, grasped the problem as double" (PR 347), it may be doubted whether anyone ever would have considered it as double unless already equipped with the notion of divine receptivity. Even when Whitehead was beginning to think in terms of the consequent nature, he continued to conceive of the problem as single: "the religious problem is the question whether the process of the temporal world passes into the formation of other actualities [i.e. actualities as 'everlasting' in the life of God], bound together in an order in which novelty does not mean loss" (PR 340).

Thus during the first recension (2.1-4) the problem was seen as a single problem: how the transient world could acquire some permanence from God. The double problem, Whitehead now realizes, additionally involves how the permanent God can acquire some transience from the world.

In order to give a rhetorical flourish to his argument, Whitehead drew upon what may have been an expanded version of V.1.2, which had already been exploited for other sections (II.10.1, V.2.1).¹⁰⁵ His attention may have been drawn to the last sentence of the third paragraph about "verbal expressions, which carry consequences at variance with the initial intuition of permanence in fluency and of fluency in permanence" (PR 347). This gave him an opportunity to clarify the problem in terms of its double aspect.

The first paragraph (of 2.5) follows immediately upon the first paragraph of V.1.2 in its present form, which concludes with the observation that "Those who would disjoin the two elements [of permanence and flux] can find no interpretation of patent facts" (PR 338). The later section (2.5) straightway applies this to the particular case of God and the world: "The vicious separation of the flux from the permanence leads to the concept of an entirely static God, with

eminent reality, in relation to an entirely fluent world, with deficient reality" (PR 346).

When Whitehead wrote these paragraphs as part of the half-chapter (V.1.2C, expanded), he held God to be quite static and nontemporal. Is he here questioning that view? While it may seem so, he is not objecting (as yet) to the notion of God as static; he probably assumed that any true notions of God would be entirely nontemporal. The objection is rather to "the vicious separation" of God and the world. This would be true of any model which supposes that God could exist and be entirely what God is apart from the world. This is certainly true of the Creator model, where God is free to create or not to create.

While both paragraphs discuss the static God and the fluent world, there is no adequate reference for "the intuitions of Greek, Hebrew, and Christian thought" mentioned in the second paragraph (PR 347). This suggests that there is a discontinuity between these two paragraphs, particularly when the second paragraph sums up all but the first paragraph of the discussion of Aristotle, the Hebrew prophets, and the Galilean vision (in 2.1). Accordingly the three paragraphs (of 2.1) may have originally belonged between the first and second paragraphs (of 2.5.), before those two paragraphs were placed in the latter section (2.5).¹⁰⁶

The third paragraph opens with "Such systems," referring back to the Greek, Hebrew and Christian systems discussed earlier (in 2.1), linking this to the theme of "permanence in fluency and of fluency in permanence" (PR 347), which had been both the original theme (in V.1.2) and the theme of this double problem.

The second half of the problem, whereby the permanent (God) acquires fluency from the world, leads Whitehead to coordinate the notions of 'objective immortality' (drawn from the earlier analyses (C) of objectivity [EWM 194-97]) and 'everlastingness' (first introduced in V.2). Whereas previously (in V.2) Whitehead had sharply distinguished the 'objective immortality' of the world from the 'everlastingness' of God, now he ventures the claim that: "The consequent nature of God is the fluent world become 'everlasting' by its objective immortality in God" (PR 347).

The rest of 2.5 has been considered above in the first version of 2.5. It is somewhat puzzling why Whitehead did not treat the two parts as separate sections. They seem to be artificially joined by a seam in the middle of the sixth paragraph, at the very end of the page: "The final summary can only be expressed in terms of a group of antitheses" (PR 347f). Thus he abruptly switches from the double problem of flux and permanence to the six antitheses. He may have felt that this was the dominant theme of the antitheses, and their commentary. This is certainly true of the first antithesis, its commentary, and the early material from 2.7 which may have then been attached to 2.5.

(d) 2.6

Although the core of 2.6, the third paragraph, was probably Whitehead's first articulation of his newly discovered position [27], the exigencies of his systematic contrast between the primordial (2.1-2) and consequent (2.3-4) aspects of God displaced it from its probable position at the end of 2.2.

While 2.5 may have originally been intended as the final section of the book, the inclusion of the commentary (extended with material from the original 2.7) frustrated that goal. I believe Whitehead intended to end the book with 2.6, using it to house [27] and the coda. But he did not get around to doing this until after he had adopted the two natures distinction.

Without the original context (supplied by 2.2) which made it possible to protest against the barrenness of the primordial actuality taken in isolation, this paragraph needed some sort of adjustment. Its opening sentence "**But** God's conceptual realization is nonsense. . ." (PR 349)

could hardly introduce the section. It needs something to protest against. To be sure, it could stand alone with only minor adjustment, such as: "**For** God's conceptual realization is nonsense. . ." Yet it is characteristic of Whitehead not to make such revisions, stubbornly clinging to every detail of what he had already written for publication, especially if it expressed a striking turn of phrase.

Rather than shaping the passage to fit a new context, the context was shaped for it. The immediately preceding paragraph (PR 349.24-28) seems to have been specially fashioned to be that which the core paragraph could challenge. Additionally it enables Whitehead to make a rather tangential point about the coherence of the basic categories of existence, an interconnectedness which could be illustrated by reference to God and the eternal objects, for by God's conceptual realization all the eternal objects are ordered. This had been Whitehead's own position.¹⁰⁷ Then it follows that "God's conceptual realization is nonsense" unless God is **also** really connected with the world. This administers a powerful self-critique of his own prior convictions.

The first paragraph seems designed to integrate this section with the final chapter as it is shaping up, drawing upon at least two concepts of the final recension (2.1-4): the 'consequent nature,' which is mentioned only here in this passage, and "the deficiency of his mere conceptual actuality" (PR 349), which echoes the earlier claim that the primordial nature was "deficiently actual" (PR 343).

Were there one or two editorial modifications of this material to fit its new home? If there were two insertions, the first paragraph looks later, because it uses the later terminology of 'the consequent nature of God.' All other language seems consistent with the first version. If so, then the second and third paragraphs originally stood as an independent section, to which the first paragraph was added, presumably to integrate it more with 2.3-5. On the other hand, both paragraphs could well have been written once 'consequent nature' came into use, the second being particularly fashioned to fit with the third which was already in existence.

The last paragraph of this section is the coda we have already mentioned in connection with other sections (2.4, 2.5). It is not written to summarize the section (2.6), but to be a fitting conclusion to the book. The ending needed a thought-provoking oxymoron: "The concept of 'God' is the way in which we understand this incredible fact--that what cannot be, yet is" (PR 350).

(e) 2.7

I believe that Whitehead fully intended to end the book with 2.6. The promise to discuss "the objective immortality of [God's] consequent nature" (PR 32) may have been met, in his eyes, by the objective immortality of actualities in the 'everlastingness' of God. The 'superjective' nature of God, which many have taken to refer to the fourth phase, probably refers to the objective immortality of the primordial nature (PR 88), particularly if then no fourth phase had been contemplated.

When Whitehead did receive this unanticipated insight, a new section was called for. It needed to come last, because 2.6 presupposed only three phases. He couldn't very well go from four to three phases, or even have the difference within the same section.

It only took one long paragraph (the third one) to express his new insight, which would look short for the final section. So he drew down the last three paragraphs of the expanded version of 2.5. That meant including its ending: "the ever-present, unfading importance of our immediate actions, which perish and yet live for evermore" (PR 351). The words Whitehead seems to have intended for his concluding paragraph, the coda (PR 350), couldn't be placed

here without seriously obscuring the rhetorical effect of its own closing words.

[29] from 2.7

But the principle of universal relativity is not to be stopped at the consequent nature of God. This nature itself passes into the temporal world according to its gradation of relevance to the various concrescent occasions. There are thus four creative phases in which the universe accomplishes its actuality. There is first the phase of conceptual origination, deficient in actuality, but infinite in its adjustment of valuation. Secondly, there is the temporal phase of physical origination, with its multiplicity of actualities. In this phase full actuality is attained; but there is deficiency in the solidarity of individuals with each other. This phase derives its determinate conditions from the first phase. Thirdly, there is the phase of perfected actuality, in which the many are one everlastingly, without the qualification of any loss either of individual identity or of completeness of unity. In everlastingness, immediacy is reconciled with objective immortality. This phase derives the conditions of its being from the two antecedent phases. In the fourth phase, the creative action completes itself. For the perfected actuality passes back into the temporal world, and qualifies this world so that each temporal actuality includes it as an immediate fact of relevant experience. For the kingdom of heaven is with us today. The action of the fourth phase is the love of God for the world. It is the particular providence for particular occasions. What is one in the world is transformed into a reality in heaven, and the reality in heaven passes back into the world. By reason of this reciprocal relation, the love in the world passes into the love in heaven, and floods back again into the world. In this sense, God is the great companion--the fellow sufferer who understands. (PR 350f)

It is just possible that the final section of the book (2.7) was written in the confidence that God provides initial aims, yet without any precise mechanism for this transfer having been worked out. To many this has seemed to address the promise to consider the objective immortality of God's consequent nature (PR 32). This might be worked out if the consequent nature had a hand in providing the initial aim. By responding to the particular situation confronting the occasion, God could provide an aim specific to its needs. Yet it is also possible that the fourth phase, as conceived here, does not concern the provision of aims at all.

In 2.6 implicitly, and in 2.4 explicitly, Whitehead had proposed three phases: the phase of divine conceptual origination (the primordial nature), the phase of temporal actual occasions, and the receptive phase of the consequent nature. To these a fourth phase could now be added: the divine response to the world. "In the fourth phase . . . the perfected actuality passes back into the temporal world, and qualifies this world so that each temporal actuality includes it as an immediate fact of relevant experience. . . . It is the particular providence for particular occasions" (PR 351).

Because of the poetic character of this passage we cannot be sure how to interpret it. There may well have been more that Whitehead hoped to be able to express in more precise, systematic terms. For many there are two basic problems: How can God's everlasting concrescence be prehended? How can God's aims be particularized? Both are deeply troubling, but the particularization of aims may not have been much of a problem for him.

Whitehead apparently had held that God as primordial alone was able to provide particularity. "Particular providence for particular occasions" may simply mean that "the transition of the creativity from an actual world to the correlate novel concrescence is

conditioned by relevance of God's all-embracing conceptual valuations to the particular possibilities of transmission from the actual world" (PR 244). Or, again, "His particular relevance to each creative act, as it arises from its own conditioned standpoint in the world, constitutes him the initial 'object of desire' establishing the initial phases of each subjective aim" (PR 344). Both passages appear to have been written before the discovery of the consequent nature. The second is found in the section (2.2) concerning the primordial nature as contrasted to the consequent nature.

If so, there might be an indirect influence on God's particularization of aim by what is presently experienced from the world, but the final result is that concrescent occasions prehend only initial aims from God, and these are purely conceptual. No direct prehensions of divine physical feelings need be contemplated.

Part D. God as Temporal and Concrescent: The Insertions.

Thus far our study of Whitehead's final concept of God as the everlasting concrescence has been confined to the last chapter. If this chapter alone mentioned the two natures of God, many thoughtful readers might be willing to regard Whitehead's completed view of God as an afterthought to a substantially completed treatise. But the fact remains that the 'consequent nature of God' has been mentioned several times before in anticipation of this final chapter, even in the first chapter. Also the term, 'primordial nature of God,' which derives its meaning from the contrast with the consequent nature, has appeared many times before in the rest of the book.

Most of these passages, however, can be explained as later insertions, made after he wrote the final chapter (V.2). If so, it would be most likely that Whitehead did not achieve this concept until just before he delivered the Gifford Lectures in June 1928.¹⁰⁸ Passages mentioning the consequent nature, or its contrasting primordial nature occurring within what he had already written (A-H) would have to be insertions. (A-H).

Since Whitehead also wrote material after the Giffords (J-M), whatever mentions of the final concept they contain could be part of the main draft.

Indeed none of these appear to be insertions, e.g. IV.1M (see **283**) and IV.4 (see **316**). To be sure, "the primordial nature" appearing at PR 47.32 is often an insertion elsewhere,¹⁰⁹ but there are other indications that this section (II.1.4L) is a late composition. It describes the 'ninth Categoreal obligation,' whereas earlier there were only eight categoreal conditions (PR 222D).¹¹⁰

Some passages (e.g., **283M**, **326K**) have been included even though they simply mention 'God' and does not explicitly refer to the final concept, simply because they have been reckoned to be later than, and therefore presumably based upon, the final concept.

This appendix records all known instances in which 'God' is mentioned in terms of Whitehead's final concept outside the final chapter. In the case of some insertions, the passage itself is given in regular form, with the surrounding context in bold. Here the continuity of the original context is a strong reason for taking the passage to be an insertion (e.g. **44**, **67a**). In other cases, the context is not so easy to determine, being neither clearly continuous or discontinuous. Yet there are usually other reasons for believing these could well be insertions.

For example, **12** and **31b** mention the 'consequent nature of God.' It is difficult to suppose that these passages belong to the original text, for Whitehead makes no attempt to inform his reader what the 'consequent nature' is. Even a single explanatory sentence or phrase would be in order. Yet as later insertions Whitehead was intent on making his point, and rather heedless of context.

On the other hand, we must reckon with the alternative that any one of these mentions in

texts prior to the final chapter (A-H) could be an integral part of the original text. In other words, should it turn out not to be an insertion, it would seriously undermine the genetic theory here proposed. For depending on the layer in question, it would mean that Whitehead already had the notion of the consequent nature in mind long before he expounded its theory.

It would not be necessary for these earlier texts to refer to the consequent nature by name, as long as the idea were present. But I am not aware of any passage referring to the consequent nature, or to the contrast between the natures, which does not use these terms, except for the introduction of the idea in the final chapter (PR 349f).

Showing that any reference to the final concept is integral to earlier texts, however, may not be so easy to determine. Whether or not there are insertions ultimately depends on the consensus of scholars. I see insertions everywhere, and it would be good to be challenged by other interpretations. Whether a passage is an insertion, and if so, what are its parameters, is subject to individual judgment on a case by case basis.

I need not argue, however, that any particular passage must be an insertion. It is enough to show that it might be. The cumulative presence of other passages which are most plausibly be insertions lends weight to the supposition that what here might be is in fact another insertion. The plausibility of insertions is strengthened by those for whom there are reasons why they are, such as the continuity of meaning interrupted by the insertion. It is sufficient to show, however, that all are possible insertions. I think the coherence of Whitehead's development, and his use of insertions elsewhere, would be a strong reason for their deployment. The presence of these anomalies as part of the original text would seriously disrupt that coherence. That consideration alone weights the issue towards an insertion, provided it is possible and can best explain the anomaly.

In many cases, the conceptual contrast between the original text and a given passage announces the presence of an insertion. For example, the discussion of living occasions and the living person (PR 99-109) would be considerably enhanced by reference to full final concept of God, yet it is only mentioned twice (**107, 108**). The first is a footnote, an easy device for entering an afterthought, the second five brief lines. Had the idea of the consequent nature been part of Whitehead's thinking at the time, we should expect a more developed use of idea here than we find.

Whitehead's discussion of the threefold character of an actual entity (**87b**) shows a lively play of ideas which shows itself most fully if this is a sequence of text, first insertion, then second insertion. The text simply generalizes that all actual entities have a character given by the past, a subjective character, and a superjective character. In making this generalization, Whitehead clearly had actual occasions in mind. (At this point actual entities and actual occasions are not clearly differentiated, as they would be later (**88a**)). But he comes to wonder how God as an actual entity could exemplify these principles, and finds God cannot: God has no past [8].

In other words, using the concept of God as nontemporal but concrecent, he had to admit defeat. Later, however, armed with the final concept, he makes another attempt to show how God exemplifies this three-fold character. The primordial (at least as it is in itself) and consequent natures fit the first two natures, but something more must be found for the superjective character (which I take to be the objective role of the primordial nature).

There is another alternative that we should consider: All the passages examined in parts B and D are insertions, perhaps with somewhat different parameters, but they are arranged differently. Compositional analysis enables us to determine what might be inserted, but it gives us very few clues as to establishing their genetic order. I have arranged part B in what appears to me to be most plausible order illustrating Whitehead's growth of ideas. In many cases that

order is indeterminate, and the actual order may be somewhat different.

Could it be that some D insertions referring to the final concept actually appear among the earliest B insertions? That would confound our conclusions considerably, but I regard it as antecedently very improbable. By adding the notion of a consequent nature it is possible to go from primordial actuality to primordial nature, but the reverse order is highly implausible. If Whitehead ever championed a notion of God as temporal, it seems unlikely he would then refer to God in later compositions as the nontemporal actuality, especially without a word of explanation or justification for abandoning an earlier position.

Thus the nature of the passages enables us to classify as belonging to one or the other concepts, and determining the general order of the concepts. But one important qualification needs to be recognized. There is no reason why notions of the final concept may not arise before the entire series of the middle concept is exhausted. The role of divine conceptual feeling in [18] presupposes the final concept of God as having both conceptual and physical feelings. We may even conjecture that Whitehead was playing with the notion of the consequent nature to guide the provision of initial aims [14]. Aside from the notion of conceptual feeling, however, the final concept plays no explicit role in the further development of the intermediate insertions [19-26].

In short, if even one passage using the language of primordial and consequent natures were really an original part of an early text, it would throw this genetic theory into confusion. On the other hand, I need not show that any passage must be an insertion, only that all of them could be.

The insertions in D seem to be predominately editorial insertions, made when Whitehead was preparing his manuscript for publication. At any rate, no development in his understanding of God in two natures is discernible. He seems to have placed all the development of this notion in the final chapter (V.2). Since there is no way these passages can be ordered genetically, there is no reason to arrange them other than by their page number.

12

12.38-13.6=18.36-19.12. I+ insertion into I.1.5C.

It is, therefore, no valid criticism on one metaphysical school to point out that its doctrines do not follow from the verbal expression of the facts accepted by another school. The whole contention is that the doctrines in question supply a closer approach to fully expressed propositions.

The truth itself is nothing else than how the composite natures of the organic actualities of the world obtain adequate representation in the divine nature. Such representations compose the 'consequent nature' of God, which evolves in its relationship to the evolving world without derogation to the eternal completion of its primordial conceptual nature. In this way the 'ontological principle' is maintained--since there can be no determinate truth, correlating impartially the partial experiences of many actual entities, apart from one actual entity to which it can be referred. The reaction of the temporal world on the nature of God is considered subsequently in Part V; it is there termed 'the consequent nature of God.'

Whatever is found in 'practice' must lie within the scope of the metaphysical description.

This is one insertion that is more than an editorial correction, for it develops an insight based on the two natures. This is the first mention of the consequent nature in the book. If this passage were part of the original chapter, we should expect that the reader would be some preliminary explanation of this unfamiliar and somewhat strange term. The passage stands out as a bit of highly specialized speculation in a chapter otherwise devoted to introductory epistemological concerns. Excited by the ideas, Whitehead introduced it here rather heedlessly. For another example of this practice, see the impartial nexus of **231a**.

Reflections on I.3.1a (PR 31-32)

The first half of this section contains some of the most important articulations of Whitehead's intermediate concept of God as primordial concrescence [see 11]. These paragraphs were originally associated with the original systematic presentation of these ideas (V.2.2), but were apparently set aside in order to make room for the contrast between the primordial and consequent natures which now dominates that chapter (V.2.1-4).

Before doing so, however, Whitehead worked over the text in order to persuade the reader that the primordial concrescence was not the totality of God's actuality but rather one nature of a total everlasting concrescence. These "corrective" insertions include **31a**, **31b**, and **32e**.]

31a

31.5c-6a,20-21=46.6,25-27 I+ insertion into I.3.1

[First paragraph, second sentence:]

This is the 'primordial nature' of God.

[First paragraph, last sentence:]

God is the primordial creature; but the description of his nature is not exhausted by this conceptual side of it. His 'consequent nature' results from his physical prehensions of the derivative actual entities (cf. Part V.)

[11] presents the original text, as reconstructed, which had been composed in terms of God as nontemporal concrescence. (The first phrase, "God is the primordial creature," could either belong to the original text or to the addition.

31b

31.34d-36=47.12-15. I+ insertion in I.3.1.

The non-temporal act of all-inclusive unfettered valuation is at once a creature of creativity and a condition for creativity. It shares this double character with all creatures. By reason of its character as a creature, always in concrescence and never in the past, it receives a reaction from the world; this reaction is its consequent nature. It is here termed "God"; because the contemplation of our natures, as enjoying real feelings derived from the timeless source of all order, acquires that 'subjective form' of refreshment and companionship at which religions aim.

The surrounding context of [11] presents God as nontemporal and concrescent, while the

inserted second sentence supplements this in terms of the consequent nature. Note the continuity of context from the first to the third sentences.

Yet it also possible that the entire passage is an insertion based on the consequent nature.

32a

32.4-9=47.21-27. I+ insertion in I.3.1.

This function of creatures, that they constitute the shifting character of creativity, is here termed the 'objective immortality' of actual entities. Thus God has objective immortality in respect to his primordial nature and his consequent nature. The objective immortality of his consequent nature is considered later (cf. Part V); we are now concerned with the primordial nature.

This paragraph is inserted between **31b** and **32b**, which have rough continuity otherwise. This insertion was probably made in conjunction with the insertion of **31b**.

This is more than simply a corrective insertion; it announces that the objective immortality of the consequent nature will be considered later. From this statement alone we may not infer very much. It may be that he already had such a concept firmly in mind, or that he was confident that in time he would be able to develop such a concept, or simply that this was not the place to consider it. If he did have such a concept in mind, it would be expressed either in the superjective phase (PR 87f) or in the fourth phase (PR 350f). Both of these passages are problematic, however, and ultimately may not directly interpret "the objective immortality of the consequent nature". If so, it promises more than he could deliver.

Other than **12**, this is the first mention of 'the consequent nature.' We still await an orderly introduction of the term.

32b

32.10-11=47.28-30. I+ in I.3.1.

God's immanence in the world [in respect to his primordial nature] is an urge towards the future based upon an appetite in the present.

The insertion may be only the entire sentence or only the bracketed passage.

32e

32.40-41=48.31-33. I+ in I.3.1.

Its status as an actual efficient fact is recognized by terming it the 'primordial nature of God.'

Were this an integral part of [2], the last phrase would probably have been 'the non-temporal actual entity, God.'

Reflections on the rest of I.3.1 (PR 32f-34)

The rest of this section is largely given over to a discussion of 'appetition'. 'Appetition' is an early term, earlier than 'subjective aim' or its predecessors, such as 'private ideal' (PR 212).

Since there is a difference between datum and satisfaction in early concrescence, there must be some transformation. There must be some 'principle of unrest' (Alexander) (PR 28), and some desire or appetite for the achievement of that transformation. This appetite seems to be derived from the datum itself (cf PR 150).

This passage (PR 32f) seems to be less a single presentation than a series of notations. Thus the third and fourth paragraphs both introduce the notion of 'appetition' and both use the same example of 'thirst,' suggesting that they are two separate entries. (Judging by its comparative sophistication, the third paragraph may be the later, perhaps formulated together with **32b.**) Nothing in these paragraphs, however, would preclude their belonging to the Giffords draft.

The next two paragraphs (linked by the notion of "technical terms") must be later, for they introduce the contrast between conceptual and physical prehensions (D+), and particularly the concept of 'physical purpose'. That concept seems to have been first mentioned in conjunction with the fourth categorical condition of conceptual reproduction (PR 249F).¹¹¹

This long paragraph probably has several additions. The first (PR 33.31-38) **may** be simply transitional, but Whitehead may be repeating and elaborating a theme expressed elsewhere, namely, that appetite in its higher forms is vision. Thus he speaks of "a unity of aesthetic appreciation immediately felt as private. This is the incoming of 'appetition,' which in its higher exemplifications we term 'vision'" (PR 212).

What is most striking about this entire passage (PR 32.11d-26+32.42-33.38) is that there is no mention of God nor any hint of any theistic connection, even though this section is thought to be primarily about God. Nor is there any connection between 'appetition' and 'God' in any of Whitehead's writings prior to this passage.

33a

33.38-34.3. I+ in I.3.1.

If we say that God's primordial nature is a completeness of 'appetition,' we give due weight to the subjective form--at a cost. If we say that God's primordial nature is 'intuition,' we suggest mentality which is 'impure' by reason of synthesis with physical prehension. If we say that God's primordial nature is 'vision,' we suggest a maimed view of the subjective form, divesting it of yearning after concrete fact--no particular facts, but after **some** actuality. There is deficiency in God's primordial nature which the term 'vision' obscures. One advantage of the term 'vision' is that it connects this doctrine of God more closely with philosophical tradition. 'Envisagement' is perhaps a safer term than 'vision.'

It seems that the possible addition about 'vision' may have suggested the connection between vision and the primordial nature, once Whitehead admitted that God should be conceived as subjective. Then the material on 'appetition,' which might have first been attached to a section of the chapter on "The Subjectivist Principle" (II.7.3, at 163.39) or been an independent section, say of "The Theory of Feeling" (III.1), was brought forward and connected here (I.3.1) by means of **32a** and **33a**. The first (**32a**) seems written for the occasion, to effect a smooth transition. The second (**33a**) may have been written independently, but it is the primary justification for linking the two passages together.

As 'vision' suggests "a maimed view of the subjective form" (PR 33), Whitehead opts for the term 'envisagement', which presumably can be stipulated to mean 'vision' coupled with a

strong view of subjective form. 'Envisagement' is his most characteristic term for the primordial activity thereafter (see, e.g. 44). Though without such a precise meaning, 'envisagement' had been used in the additions to **Science and the Modern World** to indicate the three envisagements (basic characterizations, or synthesizing activities?) of the underlying activity: "first, the envisagement of eternal objects; secondly, the envisagement of possibilities of value in respect to the synthesis of eternal objects; and lastly, the envisagement of the actual matter of fact which must enter into the total situation which is achievable by the addition of the future" (SMW 105).¹¹²

Besides 'envisagement,' he made use of the notion of divine primordial appetitions. He speaks of "the graduated order of appetitions constituting the primordial nature of God" (PR 207I+) or of "God embodying a basic completeness of appetition" (PR 316K). "The primordial appetitions which jointly constitute God's purpose are seeking intensity, and not preservation." (PR 105G). This primordial appetition or desire is renamed 'the Divine Eros' in **The Adventure of Ideas**.

34a

34.3-7. I+ in I.3.1.

To sum up: God's primordial nature is abstracted from his commerce with 'particulars,' and is therefore devoid of those 'impure' intellectual cogitations which involve propositions (cf. Part III). It is God in abstraction, along with himself. As such it is a mere factor in God, deficient in actuality.

This addition purports to sum up the entire section, but says nothing about 'appetition.' It may have been part of the original editing of this passage to contrast it with the consequent nature (so 31a, 31b, 32d) and so be prior to the addition of the 'appetition' material as framed by 32b and 33a.

36

36.25-41. I.3.4.

Finally, in the cosmological scheme here outlined one implicit assumption of the philosophical tradition is repudiated. The assumption is that the basic elements of experience are to be described in terms of one, or all, of the three ingredients, consciousness, thought, sense-perception. The last term is used in the sense of 'conscious perception in the mode of presentational immediacy.' Also in practice sense-perception is narrowed down to visual perception. According to the philosophy of organism these three components are unessential elements in experience, either physical or mental. Any instance of experience is dipolar, whether that instance be God or an actual occasion of the world. The origination of God is from the mental pole, the origination of an actual occasion is from the physical pole; but in either case **these elements, consciousness, thought, sense-perception, belong to the derivative 'impure' phases of the concrescence, if in any effective sense they enter at all.** This repudiation is the reason why, in relation to the topic under discussion, the status of presentational immediacy is a recurrent theme throughout the subsequent Parts of these lectures.

The entire fragment, or simply the two sentences surrounded by strong continuity of context, belongs to the passages pertaining to the consequent nature.

In this short fragment Whitehead reflects on the derivative status of consciousness, thought, and sense-perception for both God and actual occasions, as an integration of both poles. The idea leading to the reversal of the poles, although not in those terms, is raised by V.2.3, last paragraph (PR 345). This is probably the first mention of dipolarity. It was probably crafted later as part of an independent concluding observation (changing last line from 'preceding' to 'subsequent' parts), only to be relegated to I.3.

This excerpt may be prior to, or dependent upon, V.2.5 which mentions the reversal of the poles just after the antitheses.

On the other hand, the first paragraph of 36 may have been excluded from IV.1.7M, originally belonging at 292.36.

44

44.24-27. I+ in II.1.3C

In this definition the 'conceptual recognition' must of course be an operation constituting a real feeling belonging to some actual entity. The point is that the actual subject which is merely conceiving the eternal object is not thereby in direct relationship to some other actual entity, apart from any other peculiarity in the composition of that conceiving subject. This doctrine applies also to the primordial nature of God, which is his complete envisagement of eternal objects; he is not thereby directly related to the given course of history. The given course of history presupposes his primordial nature, but his primordial nature does not presuppose it.

An eternal object is always a potentiality for actual entities; but in itself, as conceptually felt, it is neutral as to the fact of its physical ingression in any particular actual entity of the temporal world. . . .

Here there is strong continuity of context, which makes good sense without the intrusion of God. The insertion notes that the primordial nature, like eternal objects, is only externally related to the course of things.

46a

46.4-12. I+ or G in II.3.3C

[Immediately precedes 46b]

The scope of the ontological principle is not exhausted by the corollary that 'decision' must be referable to an actual entity. Everything must be somewhere; and here 'somewhere' means 'some actual entity.' Accordingly the general potentiality of the universe must be somewhere; since it retains its proximate relevance to actual entities for which it is unrealized. This 'proximate relevance' reappears in subsequent concrescence as final causation regulative of the emergence of novelty. This 'somewhere' is the non-temporal actual entity. Thus 'proximate relevance' means 'relevance as in the primordial mind of God.'

Almost all of the paragraph belongs to [3]. Only the final sentence must be late, not because it mentions 'primordial' but because it mentions 'mind': The idea that the forms exist in the mind of God is as old as Aristotle and middle Platonism, but Whitehead could not assert it until it was clear that God possessed subjectivity.

If the entire paragraph belongs to the final view, the penultimate sentence would have something other than "the non-temporal actual entity." This ill suits a God having any temporal features.

46b

46.13-19. I+ in II.3.3.C.

[Directly follows 46a]

It is a contradiction in terms to assume that some explanatory fact can float into the actual world out of nonentity. Nonentity is nothingness. Every explanatory fact refers to the decision and to the efficacy of an actual thing. The notion of 'subsistence' is merely the notion of how eternal objects can be components of the primordial nature of God. This is a question for subsequent discussion (cf. Part V). But eternal objects, as in God's primordial nature, constitute the Platonic world of ideas.

[This paragraph is concurrent with, or prompted, the next section (II.1.4L), which begins with a reference to it, "that every explanatory fact refers to the decision and to the efficacy of an actual thing" (PR 46). 'Efficacy' is used in the original Macmillan version, and may have a slightly different meaning than 'efficacy'. 'Efficacy' means the capacity to produce an effect; 'efficacy' may mean the activity by the prehending occasion actualizing that effect within concrecence.¹¹³

Since the eternal objects are again placed in the 'primordial mind,' here called the 'primordial nature,' 46a was probably a separate entry from this passage. The next section (II.1.4L), with which it may have been written, is obviously much later, introducing a 'ninth Categoreal Obligation' while the third part only lists eight categoreal obligations (PR 222).

The final paragraph probably belongs to the original material of this section (II.1.3C), which had consisted simply of the first two paragraphs, the rest being additions of one sort or another. It resumes the theme of a multiplicity of Platonic forms.¹¹⁴

67a

67.17-21 I+ in D+ in II.2.2C

In the mere extensive continuum there is no principle to determine what regional quanta shall be atomized, so as to form the real perspective standpoint for the primary data constituting the basic phase in the concrecence of an actual entity. The factors in the actual world whereby this determination is effected will be discussed at a later stage of this investigation. They constitute the initial phase of the 'subjective aim.' This initial phase is a direct derivate from God's primordial nature. In this function, as in every other, God is the organ of novelty, aiming at intensification.

In the mere continuum there are contrary potentialities . . .

[Alternatively, the insertion may include the next paragraph (67.22-32), concluding with the transitional sentence: "This conclusion can be stated otherwise." If not, it should be assigned to [16] above.

[See 283.]

87b

87.43d-88.19 = 134.26a-135.16. I+ in G in II.3.1C.

The 'objectifications' of the actual entities in the actual world, relative to a definite actual entity, constitute the efficient causes out of which that actual entity arises; the 'subjective aim' at 'satisfaction' constitutes the final cause, or lure, whereby there is determinate concrescence; and that attained 'satisfaction' remains as an element in the content of creative purpose. There is, in this way, transcendence of the creativity; and this transcendence effects determinate objectifications for the renewal of the process in the concrescence of actualities beyond that satisfied superject.

Thus an actual entity has a threefold character: (i) it has the character 'given' for it by the past; (ii) it has the subjective character aimed at in its process of concrescence; (iii) it has the superjective character, which is the pragmatic value of its specific satisfaction qualifying the transcendent creativity.

[In the case of the primordial actual entity, which is God, there is no past. Thus the ideal realization of conceptual feeling takes the precedence. God differs from the other actual entities in the fact that Hume's principle, of the derivative character of conceptual feelings, does not hold for him.] There is still, however, the same threefold character: (i) The 'primordial nature' of God is the concrescence of a unity of conceptual feelings, including among their data all eternal objects. The concrescence is directed by the subjective aim, that the subjective forms of the feelings shall be such as to constitute the eternal objects into relevant lures of feeling severally appropriate for all basic conditions. (ii) The 'consequent nature' of God is the physical prehension by God of the actualities of the evolving universe. His primordial nature directs such perspectives of objectification that each novel actuality in the temporal world contributes such elements as it can to a realization in God free from inhibitions of intensity by reason of discordance. (iii) The 'superjective' nature¹¹⁵ of God is the character of the pragmatic value of his specific satisfaction qualifying the transcendent creativity in the various temporal instances.

This is the conception of God, according to which he is considered as the outcome of creativity, as the foundation of order, and as the goal towards novelty. . .

This insertion appears to have been placed within an earlier insertion, the three bracketed sentences in the third paragraph [8], and the final paragraph], itself placed within an earlier insertion (G) which can be recognized by its use of 'subjective aim'. Since 'subjective aim' was first introduced after Whitehead had worked through the second revised view of concrescence,¹¹⁶ it would be most surprising to see it turn up in this early section of the Giffords draft, unless it were a later insertion. Besides including the material I have emphasized, the larger insertion probably extended to the previous paragraph as well.

The initial context sets forth a threefold character for an actual entity: "(1) it has the character 'given' for it by the past; (ii) it has the subjective character aimed at in its process of concrescence; (iii) it has the superjective character, which is the pragmatic value of its specific satisfaction qualifying the transcendent creativity" (PR 87). Thus an actual occasion prehends the past, unifies by its aim, and affects the future in terms of its determinate satisfaction.

It is not immediately obvious how God, conceived as an actual entity, could exemplify this threefold character. Whitehead first tried to meet this challenge in terms of his intermediate conception of God as primordial concrescence (see [8]), but he was then persuaded that his

final concept afforded a better conceptuality for that task.¹¹⁷

How does God exemplify this three-fold character? The first two can be easily handled, with some adjustment, by the primordial and the consequent natures. What about the third character? How does the divine satisfaction affect the world? At this point Whitehead may have been confident that the problems attaching to an unending everlasting satisfaction could be worked out. He seems to have had that confidence when he issued his promissory note concerning the objective immortality of the consequent nature (**32a**). Or he may have identified God's specific satisfaction with the nontemporal satisfaction of the primordial nature. In any case, he describes this third factor in exactly the same language used for the superjective character of actual occasions: "the character of the pragmatic value of his specific satisfaction qualifying the transcendent creativity in the various temporal instances" (PR 88).

We may like to suppose that by the superjective nature Whitehead intended the objectification of the consequent nature, but that is not specified by the text, either here or in the fourth phase, with which it is often identified. For it could equally well be the objectification of the primordial nature, and that we know is capable of objectification.

This is the **only** text in which the superjective nature of God is mentioned. There really is no room in the Whiteheadian economy for a third nature, since the primordial nature sums up the divine mental pole and the consequent nature the physical pole. That Whitehead intended no third nature on a par with the other two is indicated by his differentiating use of single quotation marks: 'Superjective' nature, with single marks around 'superjective' only, is contrasted with 'primordial nature' and 'consequent nature', with single marks also embracing 'nature'.¹¹⁸ Thus 'superjective' nature arises as a construct from using the original context about the superjective character of the actual occasion.¹¹⁹

The second half of the next paragraph discussing God as **causa sui** may belong to the final concept, provided "the first element of his character" signifies the primordial nature in contrast to the consequent. Here see [8].

88a

88.27-30

(Follows **87b** and [8])

In the subsequent discussion, 'actual entity' will be taken to mean a conditioned actual entity of the temporal world, unless God is expressly included in the discussion. The term 'actual occasion' will always exclude God from its scope.

[Initially Whitehead seems to have used 'actual occasion' and 'actual entity' interchangeably. "Actual entities"--also termed 'actual occasions'--are the final real things of which the world is made up. There is no going behind actual entities to find anything more real. They differ among themselves: God is an actual entity, and so is the most trivial puff of existence in far-off empty space" (PR 18; cf. 22). "An instance of concrescence is termed an 'actual entity'--or, equivalently, an 'actual occasion'" (PR 211; cf. 77, 141). "The description of the generic character of an actual entity should include God, as well as the lowliest actual occasion, though there is a specific difference between the nature of God and that of any occasion" (PR 110, cf 75). God is here an occasion contrasted with any other occasion.

Now Whitehead feels ready to make a systematic distinction. Armed with the notion of the reversal of the poles (see **36** above), occasions begin with physical feelings, supplemented by conceptual feelings, whereas God uniquely begins with underived conceptual feelings, supplemented by physical feelings. Thus Whitehead can stipulate that "in the subsequent discussion" [parts III and IV in particular] 'actual entity' will mean 'actual occasion' unless

otherwise noted. This excludes God from the analysis pertaining to the categorial obligations, particularly with respect to categories four (conceptual derivation), five (reversion), and six (transmutation).]

105a

105.21, 26-28. I in II.3.10G

The primordial appetitions which jointly constitute God's purpose are seeking intensity, and not preservation. . . He, in his primordial nature, is unmoved by love for this particular, or that particular. . . His aim for it is depth of satisfaction as an intermediate step towards the fulfillment of his own being. His tenderness is directed towards each actual occasion, as it arises.

Thus God's purpose in the creative advance is the evocation of intensities. . .

[See [17].]

107

107n17=164n14. I in II.3.11G

This account of a living personality requires completion by reference to its objectification in the consequent nature of God. Cf. Part V, Ch. II.

[A footnote could easily be a later insertion, made in the light of V.2.7 (PR 350f).]

108

108.1-3=164.26-28. I in II.3.11G

It must **also** be noted that the pure mental originality works by the canalization of relevance arising from the **primordial nature** of God. Thus an originality in the temporal world is conditioned, though not determined, by an **initial subjective aim** supplied by the ground of all order and all originality.

[The word 'also' signals that this comment may be added later. I have additionally italicized two phrases which belong to later strata than this composition on the living person (G). It has 'subjective aim' but not yet the idea of an 'initial subjective aim' derived from God.]

167

167.29-48=254.7-28. I insertion in II.7.5D+

Finally, the reformed subjectivist principle must be repeated: that apart from the experiences of subjects there is nothing, nothing, nothing, bare nothingness.

It is now evident that the final analogy to philosophies of the Hegelian school, noted in the Preface, is not accidental. The universe is at once the multiplicity of **res verae** and the solidarity of the **res verae**. The solidarity is itself the efficiency of the macroscopic **res vera**, embodying the principle of unbounded permanence through flux. The multiplicity is composed of microscopic **res verae**, each embodying the principle of bounded flux acquiring 'everlasting' permanence. On the one side, the one becomes many; and on the other side, the many become one. But **what** becomes is always a **res vera**, and the concrescence of a **res vera** is the development of a subjective aim. This development is nothing else than the Hegelian development of an idea. The elaboration of this aspect of the philosophy

of organism, with the purpose of obtaining an interpretation of the religious experience of mankind, is undertaken in Part V of these lectures.

Cosmological story, in every part and in every chapter, relates the interplay of the static vision and the dynamic history. But the whole story is comprised within the account of the subjective concrescence of **res verae**. **[End of chapter.]**

[This comment, perhaps written very late, after the Preface, is based upon the role of the consequent nature in providing permanence to the flux of actual occasions.]

189

189.4-17=287.21-33. I+ in II.9.1C.

In conclusion, there are four main types of entities in the universe, of which two are primary types and two are hybrid types. The primary types are actual entities and pure potentials (eternal objects); the hybrid types are feelings and propositions (theories). Feelings are the 'real' components of actual entities. Propositions are only realizable as one sort of 'objective' datum for feelings.

The primary element in the 'lure for feeling' is the subject's prehension of the primordial nature of God. Conceptual feelings are generated, and by integration with physical feelings a subsequent phase of propositional feelings supervenes. The lure for feeling develops with the concrescent phases of the subject in question. I have spoken of it elsewhere (cf. **Science and the Modern World**, Ch. XI).

It is this realized extension of eternal relatedness beyond the mutual relatedness of the actual occasions which prehends into each occasion the full sweep of eternal relatedness. I term this **abrupt** realization the 'graded envisagement' which each occasion prehends into its synthesis. This graded envisagement is how the actual includes what (in one sense) is not-being as a positive factor in its own achievement. It is the source of error, of truth, of art, of ethics, and of religion. By it, fact is confronted with alternatives.

[End of section.]

[This addition is only loosely associated with its immediate context. exploring only one kind of feeling. Its connection with SMW illustrates how Whitehead felt his later ideas were already foreshadowed in earlier writings.]

207

206.35-207.45 I in II.9.8 C+ or G.

But there is another factor from which, in combination with the four premises, a non-statistical judgment of probability can be derived. The principle of the graduated 'intensive relevance' of eternal objects to the primary physical data of experience expresses a real fact as to the preferential adaptation of selected eternal objects to novel occasions originating from an assigned environment.

This principle expresses the prehension by every creature of the graduated order of appetitions constituting the primordial nature of God. There can thus be an intuition of an intrinsic suitability of some definite outcome from a presupposed situation. There will be nothing statistical in this suitability. It depends upon the fundamental graduation of appetitions which lies at the base of things, and which solves all indeterminations of transition.

[In this case the insertion is the entire section (II.9.8), but whether it belongs with the intermediate or the final concept depends entirely upon the one italicized sentence. One might suppose that it belonged to the intermediate concept, and this sentence would be later insertion. But then we should expect some sort of expression appropriate to the middle concept expressing God's ordering of the eternal objects. We cannot simply excise "the primordial nature of" because "order of appetitions constituting . . . God" would make an awkward original sentence.

There are other possibilities. Since the passage has good continuity without that one sentence, it might be quite early (before G). Or the passage was constructed in the light of the intermediate concept, though Whitehead elected not to make that background explicit. In either case, when Whitehead re-examined this passage for final revision, the sentence was added.]

231

231.8-12a. I+ in III.1.9D+.

Thus, just as the 'feeling as one' cannot bear the abstraction from it of the subject, so the 'data as one' cannot bear the abstraction from it of every feeling which feels it as such. According to the ontological principle, the impartial nexus is an objective datum in the consequent nature of God; since it is **somewhere** and yet not by any necessity of its own nature implicated in the feelings of any determined actual entity of the actual world. **The nexus involves realization somewhere.**

[The context locates data and feelings relationality, while the insertion introduces the impartial nexus of the consequent nature. This is associated with the ontological status of truth: **12a.**]

257b

257.9 I+ in G in III.4.1E.

Accordingly the differentiated relevance of eternal objects to each instance of the creative process requires their conceptual realization in the primordial nature of God.

[For context, see [5]. All that need be added here is the phrase "the primordial nature of". Otherwise the passage makes best sense as part of the development of the intermediate concept.]

278b

278.27 I+ in G in III.5.8F

Such anticipatory feelings involve realization of the relevance of eternal objects as decided in the primordial nature of God.

[This requires the same adjustment as **257b**, this time in the 'Balance' Insertion [12].]

283

283.28. IV.1.1M:

The quantum is that standpoint in the extensive continuum which is consonant with the subjective aim in its original derivation from God. Here 'God' is that actuality in the world, in virtue of which there is physical 'law.'

[Since this chapter on "Coordinate Division" was written after the introduction of God as primordial and consequent, I take this reference to God to be to the final concept. [Its theory of standpoint is foreshadowed in **67a**.]

316

316.15-23 IV.4.2 K

The philosophy of organism provides for this relevance [the relevance of *sensa* to the world] by means of two doctrines, (i) the doctrine of God embodying a basic completeness of appetite, and (ii) the doctrine of each occasion effecting a concrescence of the universe, including God. Then, by the Category of Conceptual Reproduction, the vector prehensions of God's appetite, and of other occasions, issue in the mental pole of conceptual prehensions; and by the integration of this pole with the pure physical prehensions there arise the primitive physical feelings of *sensa*, with their subjective forms, emotional and purposive.

[This chapter on "Strains" was also written later, and it reflects the doctrine of the final concept that God effects an [everlasting] concrescence of the universe.]

REFERENCES

- EWM = Lewis S. Ford, **The Emergence of Whitehead's Metaphysics** (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1984). [This book indicates various strata (A-M) in the composition of PR. Capital letters after citations to PR refer to these strata.]
- EWP = Lewis S. Ford and George L. Kline, eds., **Explorations in Whitehead's Philosophy** (Fordham University Press, 1983).
- MF = Paul A. Bogaard and Gordon Treash, **Metaphysics as Foundation: Essays in Honor of Ivor Leclerc**. (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993).
- PR = A. N. Whitehead, **Process and Reality**. New York: Macmillan, 1929; the corrected edition, New York: The Free Press, 1978.
- PS 21 = Lewis S. Ford, "Subjectivity in the Making," **Process Studies** 21/1 (Spring 1992), 1-24.
- PS 22 = Lewis S. Ford, "The Riddle of Religion in the Making," **Process Studies** 22/1 (Spring 1993), 42-50.
- PS 22 = Denis Hurtubise, "The Original Version of **Process and Reality**, Part V," **Process Studies** 22/1 (Spring 1993), 1-12.
- RM = A. N. Whitehead, **Religion in the Making**. New York: Macmillan, 1926; Cleveland: The World Publishing Company (Meridian Books), 1967.
- SMW = A. N. Whitehead, **Science and the Modern World**. New York: Macmillan, 1925. New York: The Free Press, 1967.
- TPT = Lewis S. Ford, **Transforming Process Theism**. Albany: State University of New York Press, forthcoming.
- WM = Ivor Leclerc, **Whitehead's Metaphysics** (London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1958).

NOTES

1. Preface, SMW xiii. The slight expansion appears to be some twenty paragraphs, primarily at the end of chapter VII on "Relativity." These paragraphs present the epochal theory, which was not part of the original lectures. For details, see EWM, chapter one.
2. All of part I, chapter 3 (PR 31-36) appears to consist of passages originally excluded from their original homes by fresh material. Other authors would have discarded them. This may not be evident from section one, which may have received additional material after its initial displacement, but it is particularly evident from section four (PR 36). How else could we explain the presence of these two paragraphs?
3. The three formative elements and actual occasions form four mutually exclusive classes: actual and temporal (the occasions), actual and nontemporal (God), possible and nontemporal (ideal entities), and possible and temporal (creativity).
4. Some of the references in the original Macmillan 1929 edition do not match up with the completed text. But they are not simply errors, for it is possible in many instances to discover an earlier arrangement Whitehead had planned for the book.
5. Quebec: Les Presses de l'Universite Laval, forthcoming.
This is the revision of his prize dissertation: **Les Concepts de Dieu dans Process and Reality de Alfred North Whitehead** (Universite Saint-Paul, Ottawa, 1993).
Hurtubise participated in two informal summer seminars I led on the methodology of compositional analysis held at Helton, North Carolina. In order to test the objectivity of the method, we undertook our investigations into the concepts of God in **Process and Reality** independently of one another. There is considerable agreement between us on details, but not on the larger issue of interpretation discussed here.
Non-French readers can profit considerably from the book, as it quotes copiously from PR in English.
6. See part D.
7. Even the penultimate chapter on "The Ideal Opposites" (PR 337-341), with the exception of 340.21-34a, is based on the earlier concept of God.
8. With one possible exception. PR 65.29-39 (depicting God as nonconrescent) may or may not be an insertion. That depends primarily on whether the ensuing discussion on the significance of relativity physics for Whitehead's project follows most naturally from the initial paragraph on how the settled actual world conditions and limits potentiality beyond itself, or from this passage which distinguishes between general and particular potentiality. Either way this paragraph refers to "the primordial actual entity" and also to "the multiplicity of eternal objects," **without** any mention of any divine conceptual ordering. I suspect it is an early insertion, made without concern to issues of divine conceptuality. The mention of God is largely tangential to the main purpose of the insertion.

9. Although **Transforming Process Theism** may not yet have been published by the State University Press of New York, it was substantially completed in manuscript before a key text came to light. In his lectures at Harvard, Fall 1926, he asserted: "God is a creature" (EWM 313, paragraph 21). I will explain the significance of this claim shortly, in this section.

10. **International Philosophical Quarterly** 13/3 (September, 1973), 347-76.

11. 'God' is mentioned in this first layer of material at PR 7, 18, 19, 74, 75, 110, 111, 144, 190, 208, 222, 248, 256, 325.

12. Ultimately he held that both being and becoming should be regarded as fully actual (PR 24). These different versions are explored in my essay on "Perfecting the Ontological Principle," pp. 122-149 in **Metaphysics as Foundation: Essays in Honor of Ivor Leclerc**, ed. Paul A. Bogaard and Gordon Treash (New York: State University of New York Press, 1993).

13. See my essay on "Panpsychism and the Early History of Prehension," **Process Studies** 24 (1995), 15-33.

14. Once Whitehead realized that what was here described as 'subjectivist principle' was not the 'subjectivist principle' he had originally designated (PR 157), he moved to clarify the situation. Most authors would have simply changed what he had written to 'the revised [or reformed] subjectivist principle,' but Whitehead was committed to letting the original text remain uncorrected. This required him to supply an additional sentence: "The reformed version of the subjectivist doctrine is the doctrine of the philosophy of organism."

15. The total insertion probably spanned three pages, from 189.30a to 191.23. The first paragraph of the section is really a "run-on" paragraph, combining a discussion of truth concerning propositions and judgments with one of "experiential togetherness". Run-on paragraphs often disguise the presence of insertions in Whitehead's writing. If I am correct in determining the insertion, there is far more continuity in the original text:

. . . The former concerns propositions, the latter concerns judgments. (PR 189.29) . . .
A judgment is a feeling in the 'process' of the judging subject, and it is correct or incorrect respecting **that** subject. (PR 191.23)

(I regard 191.22 as a transitional sentence primarily designed to bring back the topic from the insertion to the original discussion about judgments.)

16. The reason this passage was inserted here seems to be Whitehead's conviction that "intuitive judgment is concerned with togetherness in experience" (PR 190.5).

17. This excludes transitional unification, basic to the early theory of concrescence (part II), which Whitehead had already excluded on other grounds: See "The Concept of 'Process': From 'Transition' to 'Concrescence'" in **Whitehead and the Idea of Process**, ed. H. Holz and E. Wolf-Gazo (Freiburg: Verlag Karl Alber, 1984), pp. 73-101.

18. See "The Reformed Subjectivist Principle Revisited," **Process Studies** 19/1 (Spring 1990), 28-48. Its analysis is largely sound, but its assignment of strata is somewhat implausible. It proposed that the theory of togetherness is part of the revised theory of concrescence (D), but our immediate passage was not inserted until after God was conceived as experient (I). While togetherness belongs to concrescence, it was not evident that experient togetherness was a feature of all concrescence, and Whitehead has other ways of evading the implications of experient togetherness for God. See [2]. Thus both this passage and those revisions of the subjectivist principle should be assigned to G.

19. In order to generalize his account, Whitehead treats consciousness as a particular feature of animal experience, not applicable to other actualities. Thus prehension applies to all actualities, only some of which are conscious (SMW). Now experience belongs to all. But our only access to others is in terms of our own conscious experience. Is that consciousness an essential feature of our experience? If it is, then there is a steady intensification from bare subjectivity to mentality to consciousness, and the analysis of consciousness as particular feature of only some experiences (PR III.5) needs to be revised.

20. Note that 32d follows 189a. Whitehead placed his insertions wherever he thought most appropriate, so there will be a bit of jumping from place to place. The order of the text bears no direct relationship to the order of composition.

21. See the end of the preface for an explanation of these symbols for various layers of composition.

22. The introduction of negative prehensions here seems to be part of a D insertion into II.1.1C. It probably begins with the first full paragraph on page 41, continuing to the end of the section (41.13-42.4).

23. We shall examine the reasons for considering 31f to be displaced from 344 at [10]. The paragraph [2] appears to be an insertion within this section for three reasons: (a) There is considerable continuity concerning 'appetition' between the paragraphs immediately preceding and following our paragraph. Nothing would be lost from their discussion by the absence of our paragraph. (b) The passage on 'primordial relevance' [10], as we shall see, shows signs of being heavily edited from the perspective of the introduction of the consequent nature. If this paragraph were integrally part of that discussion, it should also be modified, but it is not. (c) There is very little connection between the beginning of our paragraph, "In what sense can unrealized abstract form be relevant?" and the preceding discussion of appetite, illustrated by thirst. In order to argue that the "Togetherness" paragraph [2] is not an insertion, we would have to assume the previous five paragraphs have been inserted so that the sixth, the passage in question, originally followed directly after the first paragraph of this section (I.3.1). For only in this fashion would there be satisfactory continuity.

For the first paragraph concludes (if we exclude the last two sentences mentioning the "consequent nature"): "Thus possibility which transcends realized temporal matter of fact

has a real relevance to the creative advance" (PR 31). Such possibility would be unrealized form. The sixth paragraph picks up on this theme: "In what sense can unrealized abstract form be relevant?" (PR 32).

It may be possible to show that the intervening paragraphs could all be considered as insertions. This is particularly true of the second and third ones. But the "Togetherness" paragraph starts out very deliberately, as if the first did not (yet) exist. It provides the reasons for the first's rather dogmatic assertions. These reasons should be part of the first paragraph. In a later paragraph they simply sound somewhat repetitious.

24. The paragraph abolishing reversion [26] is partially patterned after the paragraph on togetherness [2]. It paraphrases the first sentence and expresses the basic theme of the second. Once the togetherness paragraph was replaced, Whitehead would be left with a fragment others might simply discard, but for which he found another home.
25. See my essay, "Nobo's Eternal Realities and the Primordial Decision," **Process Studies** 26/3-4 (1997), 38-51.

26. His reasons for adopting Hume's principle at **F**, after having previously resisted it, are given in EWM 219-21. By generalizing the notion behind Hume's missing shade of blue into the principle of reversion, Whitehead hoped to be able to account for novelty and still derive all conceptual feeling from physical feeling.

27. Thus Hume's principle functions as an epistemological version of the ontological principle, at least within Whitehead's context.

28. This does not presuppose the consequent nature. Any reference to "a non-temporal actuality" would not have been possible once God came to be conceived as having physical feeling. A nontemporal actuality is "unbounded by its prehensions of the actual world." At this juncture Whitehead evidently assumes that God would be limited by any physical prehensions which God were to have (as do many classical theists). His point is repeated at [7]: "Unfettered conceptual valuation, 'infinite' in Spinoza's sense of that term, is only possible once in the universe; since that creative act is objectively immortal as an inescapable condition characterizing creative action" (PR 247a) Here God functions as a formative element conditioning every actual occasion.

Later, after the introduction of the consequent nature, this could have been rephrased by arguing that while God is affected by the world, "the primordial nature by itself is unaffected by any divine physical prehensions." That some such phrase does not occur shows that he had not yet introduced the two natures, nor had he subjected this paragraph to later editorial scrutiny.

29. I have not quoted the last sentence of this paragraph, for it appears to be added later (at I+) from the standpoint of the primordial/consequent distinction.

30. Conceptual valuation had been introduced with respect to the fourth category of conceptual derivation (F). "conceptual valuation introduces creative purpose. [This is F, before the introduction of subjective aim at G.] . . . The mental pole is the subject determining its own ideal

of itself by reference to eternal principles of valuation autonomously modified in their application to its own physical objective datum" (PR 248F).

Primordial valuation simply transfers this notion to the divine activity in ordering the eternal objects. At first this is primarily for the sake of relevance and coherence, but with the introduction of subjective aim primordial valuation becomes the grading of alternative possibilities.

31. This passage is fundamental to the ontological dimension of the revised subjectivist principle. See my essay on "The Reformed Subjectivist Principle Revisited," pp. 8, 13.

In that essay, however, I made a too easy transition from concrescence ("formal constitution") to divine subjectivity. At that time temporal concrescence did indeed mean subjectivity, but, as we shall see, God was carefully exempted from being a concrescence.

However, once Whitehead adopted divine temporality and hence divine subjectivity, the inference can be made that all togetherness must be based upon subjective experience.

32. These first two sentences may well have been part of the original, in which case Whitehead used the context they provided to restate his idea.

33. This last sentence appears to presuppose God's subjectivity, which is first introduced with the consequent nature (at I). It is then a later addition.

34. The former analysis assigns the last two and a half sentences of the upper context and the concluding sentence mentioning the Aristotelian principle to the insertion. The decisive objection against this analysis is the extreme difficulty in determining the ending to the insertion which would permit continuity of the surrounding context. The analysis we have adopted in the main text has a definite closure.

Though the two analyses vary in only a few sentences, they generate a rather different interpretation. According to the the former analysis, there would be a genetic contrast between Whitehead's Platonism (PR 39C) and subsequent Aristotelianism (PR 40aG). I adopted this interpretation in "Process and Eternity: Whitehead Contemplates Plotinus," ed. R. Baine Harris, **Neoplatonic and Contemporary Thought**, vol. 1. (Although written in 1995, this book has not yet been published by the State University of New York Press.)

If PR 32d [2] with 40a [4] were prior to the introduction of the general Aristotelian principle, then [2] by locating reasons in the formal constitution of an actuality would be the presupposition for affirming that principle. Otherwise it would be an additional justification for a principle originally enunciated in terms avoiding any ascription of divine subjectivity.

There is little evidence, however, that Whitehead was ever an extreme realist, holding that forms are ontologically prior to actualities. His interest in Plato was probably concentrated on the later dialogues, particularly the **Timaeus**, where issues concerning the Forms recede into the background. What gives the eternal objects a Platonic cast is their uncreated status, but Whitehead derives this from his classification of *sensa* rather than from Plato.

Future Activity also generally presupposes the earlier interpretation, and needs to be revised on this point.

35. The ideal realization of potentialities may be understood in terms of 'conceptualism,' as

Whitehead notes. This constitutes a "first step in the description of the universe as a solidarity."

36. See my essay on "Perfecting the Ontological Principle" exploring its different formulations, pp. 138-168 in **Metaphysics as Foundation: Essays in Honor of Ivor Leclerc**, ed. Paul A. Bogaard and Gordon Treash (New York: State University of New York Press, 1993).

The discerning reader will notice that further study of the texts in the light of the middle concept for God has led to a re-ordering of passages f1-f5 within section f of that essay. I now order it this way: f2, f5, f1, f3. F2 should be first because it presupposes the early concept of God, a consideration I did not take into account at the time of my study on the ontological principle. [4]=(f1) follows more naturally from [1] than vice versa.

[21]=(f3) is the passage abolishing reversion. When I assigned it to f3, however, I was assuming that the brief bracketed passages were secondary insertions dependent on hybrid physical prehension. Without that later concept, the rest of the passage could be as early as [4]=(f1), because the relevance of unrealized eternal objects in the divine concrescence makes reversion unnecessary. But [18] indicates that even after hybrid prehension was introduced, Whitehead was still resolved to limit the category of reversion rather than abolish it.

Of these passages, f4 turns out to be the most problematic. It may belong to the text of which it is a part (II.2.4C); it may be part of a very early insertion (C in C); or it may be an insertion based on nontemporal concrescence (G in C). It could be an insertion because the surrounding text is about motion without mentioning the ontological principle, while it is only about the ontological principle. "The an actual entity never moves: it is where it is and what it is. . . It is quite obvious that meanings have to be found for the notions of 'motion' and of 'moving bodies'" (PR 73).

The supposed insertion f4 reads: "Thus the actual world is built up of actual occasions; and by the ontological principle whatever things there are in any sense of 'existence,' are derived by abstraction from actual occasions" (PR 73).

I had initially regarded this as a late (G) insertion, based on the principle that unrealized eternal objects had to be derived from God, a doctrine not formulated by Whitehead until later. Yet what if he was not yet aware of any difficulty about the ontological status of unrealized eternal objects? After all, f4 may not be that much different from his position in **Religion in the Making**: "The actual temporal world can be analyzed into a multiplicity of occasions of actualization. These are the primary actual units of which the temporal world is composed" (RM 91).

On the other hand, if we free this passage from any necessary dependence upon divine conceptual realization, it could be Whitehead's first formulation of the ontological principle in **Process and Reality**. There had been an earlier formulation Whitehead gave in his Harvard Lectures (1926): "The character of creativity is derived from its own creatures and expressed by its own creatures" (EWM 313). (One Harvard student records Whitehead's informal comment: "Nothing behind the veil." This alludes to his attack on any causal nature behind apparent nature.) This formulation is rephrased from the standpoint of the creatures as "the actual world is built up of [a single species of] actual occasions."

If the world solely constituted by actualities, then only actualities can be the ultimate reasons for things (PR 19).

37. Whitehead used very similar language earlier with respect to another formative element

besides the eternal objects: "God is that non-temporal actuality which has to be taken account of in every creative phase" (RM 94). In this passage he surely means by a "creative phase" an occasion, or at least a physical or mental occasion. Thus God is also said to be "the antecedent ground conditioning every creative act" (RM 154).

38. While the three sentences completing this paragraph (PR 256f) may be part of the context, they are more likely transitional ideas leading to the theme of the inserted paragraph, and hence part of the insertion itself.

39. If the bracketted words, indicating a tertiary insertion, were part of the original insertion, then this passage should be assigned to material pertaining to the final concept of God (I+). Yet the use of earlier terminology ("conceptual realization") and earlier conceptuality (relevance to "to each instance of the creative process") show it to be the result of thinking through the implications of the middle concept.

40. The insertion in question may be just the passage quoted, or the entire paragraph to which it belongs. The continuity of the surrounding context may be found in the contrast between eternal objects given in complete abstraction from the actual world and propositions which make only an incomplete abstraction from determinate actual entities.

41. For a critique of the uncreatedness of eternal objects, see my essay on "The Creation of 'Eternal' Objects," **The Modern Schoolman** 71/3 (March 1994), 191-222.

42. This parallels the enlargement of the ontological principle. Initially only past determinate occasions were reasons (EWM 323f), but then also subjective decision (PR 24).

43. The comment that eternal objects have "relevance to each stage of concrescence" repeats [4], and indicates that initial subjective aims are not yet anticipated.

44. In taking up the challenge anew to describe God in the threefold character of an actual entity (PR 87f I), Whitehead introduces the notion of a 'superjective' nature, mentioned only here. Since the primordial nature is only described here with respect to itself alone, the 'superjective' nature may simply be the objectification of the primordial nature.

45. This chapter (I.3) seems to have become Whitehead's repository for materials that could not fit in otherwise.

This may well be suspected of I.3.4, which is a two paragraph excerpt not closely connected with the preceding section. I.3.3, apart from 35.21-30 (once at xiv.4?) may originally have belonged at 68.5 as Whitehead's original discussion of Zeno before being displaced by the present account.

At one point Whitehead remarks: "It is obvious that the simple classification (cf. Part I, Ch. III, Sect. II) of societies . . . requires amplification" (PR 99). This section, which no doubt originally stood at that location (II.3.5), was not eliminated because deficient; it was simply relegated to this introductory chapter (I.3.4).

46. This teaching is a firm part of Whitehead's teaching as far back as the fall of 1926, when he

says: "These [six metaphysical] principles are essential to actuality, and so apply equally well to God (pure act)" (EWM 313). Cf PR 75C: "God's existence is not generically different from that of other actual entities, except that he is 'primordial' in a sense to be gradually explained."

It could easily follow from his earlier declaration "that any summary conclusion jumping from our conviction of the existence of such an order of nature to the easy assumption that there is an ultimate reality which, in some unexplained way, is to be appealed to for the removal of perplexity, constitutes the great refusal of rationality to assert its rights" (SMW 92). Here he criticizes the traditional notion of God as Creator, especially insofar as God is taken to be an exception to the metaphysical principles characterizing the world.

47. In **Relire Whitehead**, Denis Hurtubise suggests that this passage, found in V.2.3, which otherwise belongs to a discussion of God as consequent (I), is really part of the earlier account of nontemporal concrescence. See the two sentences bracketing this passage in the printed text: "But God, as well as being primordial, is also consequent. . . . Thus, by reason of the relativity of all things, there is a reaction of the world on God" (PR 345 I). The "Thus" in the concluding sentence does not follow from the three sentences of the suggested insertion, but from the assertion in the initial sentence that God is consequent.

If it is an insertion from an earlier conceptuality, then it should have a place somewhere in earlier texts concerning nontemporal concrescence. Here PR 343.38 is most likely, being displaced by the final paragraph of this page which indicates how the 'primordial actuality' is 'deficiently actual' and therefore to be conceived as only an aspect of the divine. For before the consequent nature was envisioned, the primordial actuality was not considered to be less than fully actual.

To be sure, this insertion claims that God is both the beginning and the end, and 'end' naturally suggests the consequent nature. Although it says nothing about how God is the end in the insertion, we may expect that God is not literally the end anymore than God is the beginning as lying in the past of all things. God could still be conceived as the end or purpose for which the created order exists without it being necessary that God experience all things.

48. This criticism presupposes an enlargement of Whitehead's vision by the consequent nature. But the fact that it refers to the 'primordial actuality' (and not the 'primordial nature') suggests that it was made, like the original text of V.2.3 and V.2.6, before the distinction between the primordial and consequent natures were so designated.

49. This repeats "the unlimited conceptual realization of the absolute wealth of potentiality" (PR 343). Since an author would ordinarily attend to such things in a writing of one sitting, one of these passages seems to be a later addition.

50. This sentence may have originally been the concluding sentence of the previous paragraph.

51. The bracketed portion is probably a later insertion made in conjunction with V.2.4 (PR 345f I). Whitehead would have no reason to ascribe feelings to God as long as God was conceived as a principle (see [17], nor to distinguish divine conceptual feelings before the introduction of physical feelings.

If the double-bracketed 'subjective' were a secondary insertion, so that it originally read

"subjective unity of aim," it could be much earlier. Then upon adopting 'subjective aim' as a technical term, he could have revised his original 'aim'.

Certainly "subjective unity of subjective aim" sounds very redundant. But Whitehead's point is to claim that the subjective aim is precisely that which provides God's subjective unity.

52. In line with PR 40a [4], Whitehead does not yet consider that God primarily influences only the initial phase.

53. Thus it would be possible for many occasions to contribute to the concrescent occasion's aim. This corresponds to John B. Cobb's proposal that a new occasion may feel past occasions in terms of their aims for it. (**A Christian Natural Theology**, [Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1965], pp. 182f; see also his account of the role of the initial aim, pp. 204f.)

Once Whitehead came to identify the occasion's subjectivity with its subjective aim he stressed its exclusive unity, not its hospitality to diversity.

54. We should ordinarily expect 'actual entities' in order to include God within the scope of effective agents. Whitehead, however, had not yet introduced the distinction between 'actual entity' and 'actual occasion' which excludes God from being an actual occasion (PR 88). Here I agree with the editors of the corrected edition. This distinction belongs to a very late insertion (I) within II.3.1C.

55. I have quoted only from the first paragraph of I.3.1, but our passage [9-11] may well have also included elements of paragraphs four and five (PR 32.10-26). The second paragraph on creativity (except for the 'consequent nature' insertion of 31.34c-36) appears to have originally been the first paragraph of an independent section: see Denis Hurtubise, "The Original Version of **Process and Reality**, Part V," **Process Studies** 22/1 (Spring 1993), 1-12. The third paragraph (32.4-9 I) is most likely an insertion based on the notion of the consequent nature.

The original version of paragraphs four and five may be reconstructed as:

God's immanence in the world . . . is an urge towards the future based upon an appetite in the present. . . . Appetition is immediate matter of fact including in itself a principle of unrest, involving realization of what is not and may be. . . . [For example,] Thirst is an appetite towards a difference--towards something relevant, something largely identical, but something with a definite novelty. This is an example at a low level which shows the germ of a free imagination. (PR 32)

I have omitted later insertions mentioning the primordial or consequent natures. The rest of the second primordial insertion (32.11e-15) would apply to God only if there were divine physical feelings. It also makes use of thirst to illustrate appetition, which repeats, perhaps inadvertently, its use in the original text (PR 32.23).

The next insertion presupposes the consequent nature unless it were to apply only to finite actual occasions.

The sixth paragraph seems to have been relegated to that place after it was bumped from its probable original place by the "abolition of reversion" paragraph (PR 249f).

56. The idea of "multiple unifications of the universe" (PR 349) may have prompted speculation of some sort of divine integration of these multiple unifications. But if it did, there is little evidence of any consequent nature until later.

57. There appear to be several compositional overlays constituting this section (III.5.8)

(a) The original section, pertaining to a second species of physical purpose (based on reversions), which I reconstruct as: 277.34-38c (the first paragraph without the final sentence), 278.1-17c, 278.32c-280.7a.

(b) The final page (280.7b-37) seems to have been added at a time prior to the introduction of the eighth condition. The last two sections on physical purpose may have originally belonged to III.4 before Whitehead had devised intellectual feelings. For it was the structural similarity between propositional feelings and physical purposes that prompted the invention of intellectual feelings and the writing of III.5 (EWM 224-27). Whitehead may have taken the occasion of transferring those final sections to III.5 to write a paragraph comparing physical purposes with conscious purposes.

(c) The introduction of the eighth categoreal condition of Subjective Intensity.

(d) The passage to be quoted. PS 21:15 demarcates the insertion as 278.6-31, but the opening lines make better sense as part of the surrounding context. The insertion is probably only 278.17-31.

58. Some sort of secondary insertion seems needed, since 'primordial nature' only arises with the later contrast to 'consequent nature'. PS 21:24n24 treats all of 278.17-27 as this insertion, but this does not permit the best continuity with respect to the surrounding context. Denis Hurtubise argues that only four words, "the primordial nature of," need be the secondary insertion, which I am now inclined to agree with.

From the vantage point of Whitehead's final theory we are inclined to think that only the subjective aim is derived from God. At this point, however, Whitehead considers the possibility of multiple reverted feelings, from which the subjective aim is selected.

59. See his formulations in the seventh and eighth categoreal obligations (PR 254f and 277/424 1929 text: PS 21:14f).

60. See "Subjectivity in the Making," **Process Studies** 21/1 (Spring 1992), 1-24.

61. This passage belongs to a larger insertion that also includes what is quoted in [14]: 224.5-225.21.

62. "That aim . . . constitutes the autonomous subject in its primary phase of feelings" (PR 244).

63. Here see my "Panpsychism and the Early History of Prehension," **Process Studies** 24 (1995), 15-33.

64. See George L. Kline, "The Systematic Ambiguity of Some Key Whiteheadian Terms," MF 151-52, 162n9. The German translation has **das Eintreten** for ingression.

65. Although this does make a difference to the actualities which instantiate it.

66. See the final paragraphs for the discussion of [24].

67. It may include the first paragraph of II.3.4, at least when it was determined to insert these sections into chapter 3 (PR 96.29-34). Lecture 5 of the Prospectus (EWM 326) suggests that II.3.1-4 and II.4.1-4 were once conceived as a single chapter, then broken apart by the addition of the living occasions material.

68. Even though it involves no novelty, he ascribes mentality to this "first grade of ascent beyond the mere reproductive stage," for it employs transmutation (PR 101). I am inclined to think that mentality should require some measure of responsiveness to possibility. Thus the definition I once ascribed to subjectivity more properly applies to mentality: "the capacity to be affected by differing alternative possibilities with the power to decide between them". ("Subjectivity in the Making," p.1.) In my view subjectivity is broader than mentality as the capacity to be affected by various prehensions, whether conceptual or physical.

69. It is prior to the category of reversion, as the following quotation from PR 188 indicates, and it uses 'data', so it is at least D but before F. The insertion seems to be 187.25-188.14, with 187.25-29 as transition. It, in turn, has a later brief insertion mentioning 'subjective aim'. Thus 187.29b-32a:

In considering the life-history of occasions . . . there are three possibilities as to the subjective aims which dominate the internal concrescence of the separate occasions:
Either [etc.]

70. According to his definition in **Adventures of Ideas** (New York: Free Press, 1967), p. 207: "no single occasion can be called living. Life is the coordination of the mental spontaneities throughout the occasions of a society." (Austin Lewis recognized this shift and called it to my attention.)

71. This seems a bit strong. Why did Whitehead not write "partially determines" or "directs"?

72. Whitehead develops an interesting argument for the justification for eating food, which in one sense is robbery. It depends on God's purpose as "indifferent alike to preservation and to novelty" (PR 105).

This notion of God is appropriate for his early nontemporal conceptions of God. But with the introduction of the consequent nature, which reconceived God as personal and caring, and receptive to the world, this account becomes untenable without qualification. He had written that God "is unmoved by love for this particular, or that particular," but now restricts this to apply only to the primordial nature. Then the paragraph is qualified by a final sentence:

[God's] aim for it is depth of satisfaction as an intermediate step towards the fulfillment of his own being. (PR 105)

Thus we have both the primordial aim and the consequent fulfillment. To be sure, he

writes "aim" rather than "subjective aim," but this is not one of the pre-subjective aim uses of "aim".

73. Note the very broad use Whitehead gives 'object'; here anything enduring.

74. This sentence may be an afterthought, but it could be a fitting conclusion to this meditation on order and novelty. At any rate Whitehead had already worked up the contrast between causal efficacy and presentational immediacy (in B) before embarking on V.1.3 (C).

75. Unless 'conceptual feelings' at PR 344.14 belongs to an earlier insertion, which I consider unlikely.

76. There seem to be two insertions at PR 87f: (1) one based on the middle concept: [8]; (2) a later one based on the final concept: PR 87.43c-88.12, 88.27-30. In this instance, the first paragraph of the later insertion comes between the two paragraphs of the earlier one.

77. I have already noted that the insertion of the "abolition" paragraph may have displaced some other material. The "togetherness" paragraph [2] may have originally belonged here, but once displaced, ended up in the chapter for "Some Derivative Notions" (I.3.1: PR 32).

78. The bracketed phrases indicate hypothetical secondary additions, if it were the case that Whitehead had affirmed the abolition of reversion before hybrid prehension was anticipated. This is possible, though hardly very likely. He did amend texts by simple insertion of "the primordial nature of" or "the hybrid prehension of" (e.g. PR 107.39). The insertion of those words in this context required the other hypothetical insertions. As long as Whitehead still had confidence in the functioning of God as formative, hybrid prehension would be unnecessary.

The "abolition" paragraph, however, makes mention of God's conceptual feelings, which means that God is now conceived as having contrasting physical feelings, but even more importantly as a concrete contingent individual having feelings. In that case God cannot simply be conceived as an immanent formative factor; God must in some sense be prehended to be influential. Until that problem was resolved, Whitehead is unlikely to make the further step of abolishing reversion, which conceivably might be revised in some way to account for our sense of God.

79. See section two.

80. The language of "thing which combines the actuality of what is temporal with the timelessness of what is potential" (PR 40C) reflects the language of the actual but nontemporal entity (RM 90), which would be quite consistent with the realm of eternal objects. Quite possibly, however, Whitehead conceived of God as somehow ordering the eternal objects, though this is not yet clarified by using the model of concrescence. One indication of this is his use of "the multiplicity of Platonic forms" instead of the realm of eternal objects (PR 43-46C).

81. Except by way of anticipation (PR 246-47), Whitehead could not use reversion until it was introduced at PR 249G. Most mentions follow immediately after: 250-5F, 260-63F, 269H,

272H, 277-79H. (I retain the strata of EWM, but the G insertions are now seen to come after the initial recension of part III: DEFH.)

82. In only one instance an extended series of six sections is introduced: II.3.5-11: [17].

83. While we have traced out the basic passages concerning this transitional theism, there is a terminological shift we should consider, one which seems integral to its new naming as 'primordial nature.' I refer to "the primordial envisagement of eternal objects." While it is perhaps the most common way of referring to God as nontemporal, that term has not yet been used. Whitehead first describes the primordial nature as the "complete envisagement of eternal objects" which is independent of the course of history (PR 44 I).

The term, 'primordial envisagement,' is the outcome of an earlier reflection (in I.3.1). This discussion picks up on the matter of 'appetition,' an earlier term that Whitehead had used for God's conceptual striving (PR 32). He considers, besides appetition, intuition (Bergson), vision, discussing them in terms of his technical terms, 'conceptual prehension' and 'physical purpose'.

The final paragraph (PR 33f) seems to be a "run-on paragraph" having two different topics. In the first part Whitehead has satisfied himself that 'vision of good and evil' is the appropriate description of conceptual realization. It makes mention neither of 'God' nor 'envisagement'. In the second part, which I take to be a latter addition (PR 33.38d-34a), he argues that 'vision' suggests "a maimed view of the subjective form" by divesting it of yearning after concrete fact. "There is deficiency in God's primordial nature which the term 'vision' obscures" (PR 33/50). Only the final sentence (before the summary) introduces the favored term: "'Envisagement' is perhaps a safer term than 'vision.'"

[The final summary (34.3-7I) is not particularly germane to 33.38-34.3I, the addition just discussed. Its primary purpose seems to be the insistence that the primordial nature is but an aspect of God, and not the primordial actuality that Whitehead may have first assumed for this section. It is thus a piece with the other (I) insertions (except the one just discussed.) It appears that Whitehead had formulated this section (I.3.1) down to 33.38 before introducing the consequent nature.]

We are not given any positive reasons to prefer 'envisagement'. Perhaps it was chosen over 'vision' as less subjective. In 'vision,' or in 'imagination', the individual may produce that which is being contemplated, and that would be false to Whitehead's understanding of the uncreated eternal objects. As uncreated they have an objective status over against God, now clearly viewed as a subject for the first time. He does not allow the divine subjectivity to overpower the primal objectivity of the forms

Once formulated, the primordial envisagement of the eternal objects becomes a permanent feature of Whitehead's theory. It defines the primordial nature of God. The primordial nature is often identified with Hartshorne's objectively abstract nature, as it would be were it the defining characteristic of the society of divine occasions. Yet once Whitehead has accepted the subjectivity of God along with the consequent nature, we may interpret the primordial nature as a subjective concrescence, one which is a nontemporal activity. It abstracts from the temporality of the everlasting consequent concrescence, but it need not abstract from its subjectivity.

84. To be sure, God does not need this particular world, only some world. Minimally this need only be something other than God.

85. Probably more than one passage would lead the unwary to suppose that God as primordial was a distinct actuality. All those mentions of God as a 'primordial actuality' or as 'the non-temporal actual entity' could imply this. Some readers might conclude that there was a corresponding 'consequent actuality,' but Whitehead never asserts anything of the sort.

86. The final paragraph (344.19-39) most likely arose as a result of a discussion with F. J. Carson. Since Whitehead lectured on metaphysics during Fall terms, this is probably the fall of 1928.

87. More precisely, to [27], which later became the core of 2.6.

88. 'Again' is often used by Whitehead to introduce a fresh thought by insertion. The use of 'this' rather than a simple 'the' indicates that he was referring back to his context rather than, as sometimes is his wont (e.g. PR 189f [1]), freely composing a passage and then searching for a likely place to insert it.

89. Because [27] makes no mention of either the primordial or the consequent natures, I had originally classified it as continuous with the concept proposed in **Religion in the Making**. (At that time I did not appreciate any intermediate concept of God as nontemporal and concrecent.) Thus I then affirmed that "in **Religion in the Making** God is personal, conscious, dynamic, and **possibly even receptive to the temporal world**" (EWM 140). This text [27] was the sole warrant for the italicized clause. If, as I now realize, [27] is the first formulation of the consequent nature, the italicized clause cannot characterize the earlier concept.

David Ray Griffin seized upon that phrase as proof of my "inconsistency" and for his reconstruction of Whitehead's development: see his Critical Study of Lewis S. Ford, **The Emergence of Whitehead's Metaphysics, 1925-1929**. *Process Studies* 15/3 (Fall 1986), 194-207, at 119, 200.

Griffin's reconstruction builds on an apparently reasonable supposition: "It is indeed true that a viable hypothesis about the development of Whitehead's ideas would require that the doctrine of God with which Whitehead ended RM not be more advanced than the one which he began the lectures which became PR" (200). He proposes that God was conceived as "dynamically primordial, i.e., as a primordial actuality which knows and interacts with the world" (200). Then such a concept is later differentiated into the primordial and consequent nature.

Yet the earliest concept of God in **Process and Reality** is nontemporal, nonconcrecent, and nonsubjective, as I indicate in Part A. It is much less than what was affirmed in **Religion in the Making**. This is what I have termed "The Riddle of **Religion in the Making**" (PS 22:42-50).

90. See my essay on "Process and Thomist Views Concerning Divine Perfection," pp. 115-129 in **The Universe as Journey: Conversations with Norris Clarke, S.J.**, ed. Gerald A. McCool, S.J. (New York: Fordham University Press, 1988).

91. We may conjecture that his early (1898) rejection of an immutably omniscient God, like the notion of an omnipotent creator, may have been so great that he avoided the term 'omniscience' entirely. In a way, 'omniscience' has been reconceptualized in terms of 'everlastingness.' From the start, however, Whitehead is convinced that 'everlastingness' is really more than omniscience, for it means that by our decisions we can really contribute to the divine experience.

92. On his rejection of nontemporal subjectivity, see **TPT**, the end of chapter two and the beginning of chapter three.

93. There is a parallel in the passages presenting the divine provision of aim. The first section of "The Transmission of Feelings" (PR 244f) proclaims God to be the source of initial aims, but the way this is achieved by means of hybrid physical prehensions is not presented until the second section (PR 245-47).

94. Denis Hurtubise first noticed this distinction.

95. Denis Hurtubise has properly identified this fragment as a middle concept insertion within a final concept passage. According to the total passage, God's actuality has two sides, but the insertion speaks of the **actuality** of conceptual operation, one way of describing the primordial actuality of God as nontemporal and concrescent.

This particular insertion seems to have been replaced by most of the last paragraph of PR 343. 2.2, originally formulated in terms of God as nontemporal and concrescent, was later heavily revised in order to contrast with 2.3. In the course of that revision our bracketed passage seems to have been transposed from 2.2 to r.3. See [9-11].

96. This sentence may be an insertion, along with the third paragraph [here omitted], added once the standard terminology of the primordial and consequent natures had become stabilized.

97. The ambiguity of this phrase may be responsible for the double meaning of 'consequent nature'. Is it the physical feelings, or the integration of both?

98. The last paragraph on PR 343, the place where one usually first encounters the primordial nature as deficiently actual and as unconscious, is in all probability a later insertion.

99. See Denis Hurtubise, "The Original Version of **Process and Reality**, Part V" (PS 22:1-12. 2.1 contains section E of this reconstruction of V.1.2.

100. Moreover, the two quotations are not identical. With respect to Biblical allusions, Whitehead appears to quote from memory. See Frederic R. Crownfield, "Whitehead's References to the Bible," **Process Studies** 6/4 (Winter 1976), 270-78.

101. As noted in our discussion of 2.3 above, three sentences starting with "He is the beginning and the end" (PR 345.6-9) may have originally belonged here, only to be displaced by this editorial comment indicating the limitations of the primordial aspect.

102. While Whitehead originally affirmed a primordial divine actuality, he never speaks of a separate consequent actuality.
103. The first paragraph, or possibly only the four words "the consequent nature of God," could be a later insertion.
104. See my essay on "Divine Persuasion and the Triumph of Good," **The Christian Scholar** 50/3 (Fall, 1967), 235-250. Reprinted in **Process Philosophy and Christian Thought**, ed. Delwin Brown, Ralph E. James, Jr., and Gene Reeves (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1971), 287-304.
105. See Denis Hurtubise, "The Original Version of **Process and Reality**, Part V." 2.5 draws on D and F as isolated in his analysis.
106. In terms of Dr. Hurtubise' analysis (**Process Studies** 22/1), four paragraphs from the expanded version of V.1.2 (E) were appropriated for 2.1: 342.17-343.19. Whitehead probably regarded the surrounding paragraphs (DF) as sufficiently continuous to use as the first three paragraphs of 2.5.
107. While God and the eternal objects are systematically interconnected by the primordial actuality, what needs interconnection is the primordial and consequent natures, and the primordial nature with the world. Interdependence is lacking insofar as the divine primordial nature is only externally related to both.
108. While the two natures are absent from the first version of **PR**, they are mentioned in the Prospectus for the Gifford Lectures (EWM 327).
109. It may be an insertion at **207**, or part of a later section (II.9.8).
110. See editor's note to PR 222. A metaphysical obligation is a necessary subjective condition, so these transcendental conditions were renamed obligations.
111. It is not surprising that 'subjective aim' has not been named in conjunction with 'appetition' so far in this passage, since 'subjective aim' was first introduced somewhat later. But it is surprising that the two notions are not explicitly linked elsewhere.
112. 'Envisagement' is also used in the chapter on God (SMW 176f), quoted in part at PR 189.
113. See my essay on "Efficient Causation within Concrecence," **Process Studies** 19/3 (Fall 1990), 167-180, particularly pp. 169f.
114. It is possible that 44.28-33 and 45.35-46.3 belongs to the original stratum. The material inbetween is one insertion ending with a particularly clumsy transition "Returning to the correlation of 'givenness' and 'potentiality,' we that . . .; also we see that . . ." (PR 45)
115. Following the punctuation of the original 1929 edition. The corrected edition has

'superjective nature,' assimilating this instance to 'primordial nature' and 'consequent nature'. I suspect by punctuating it as "'superjective' nature" Whitehead was signaling that it was not on a par with the two basic natures.

116. See my essay on "Subjectivity in the Making," PS 21:1-24.

117. **87b** offers the only discussion of God in this section (II.3.1), which is otherwise about order and objective lure. In that sense these insertions interrupt the basic flow.

118. This is evident only in the original Macmillan 1929 edition (p. 134).

119. Besides the text promising the objective immortality of the consequent nature (PR 32) and this passage on the superjective nature (PR 88), the consequent nature is mentioned only twice outside part V.

"The truth itself is how actualities are represented within the consequent nature." The paragraph to which this belongs (PR 12.38-13.6 I) has been inserted with the initial chapter on "Speculative Philosophy" (I.1C), which otherwise knows nothing of God's two-fold nature.

"The impartial nexus, since it is not located in any particular occasion, needs to be located in the consequent nature of God." This claim is located in an apparent three paragraph insertion (PR 230.45-231.18 I) in a discussion of contrasts (III.1.9D).