The 65th Anniversary of the Great Victory

The upcoming anniversary of Victory in the Great Patriotic War and the end of World War II is extremely important social and political event, whose importance to all nations of the world cannot be overstated. As President Medvedev has repeatedly emphasized, this date is sacred to us. 

The war provided examples of how low people can sink, but it also gave us unrivaled examples of the majesty of the human spirit and the willingness of people to lay down their lives for their friends. The Great Victory is a common spiritual heritage of all peoples of the former Soviet Union. Our fathers and grandfathers not only gave us our freedom and saved the Fatherland, they also made a decisive contribution to the liberation of Europe from fascist subjugation. 

The consequences of this dramatic historical drama have directly influenced the course of world history, including the development of international relations. The anti-Nazi coalition is rightly considered the major diplomatic breakthrough of its time. It was an unprecedented example of countries with different ideological and political systems joining together in the face of a mortal threat hanging over humanity. Its members were able to rise above their differences and reject secondary concerns for the sake of the main concern—destruction of the common enemy and achievement of Victory for all. The enemies of Nazism were united in their understanding that evil must be opposed by all means available in a spirit of solidarity and mutual trust. 

Elements of the postwar order remain crucial today. The most important of these is the United Nations, whose Charter is generally recognized as the fundamental code of modern international law, the basis for creation of an equitable 21st century world order . 

Unfortunately, there are frequent attempts to exploit World War II, and questions are raised regarding the causes of this global catastrophe for selfish purposes, including tailoring the accelerating transformation processes of international relations to suit oneself, or simply to stand in their way. In recent years, a variety of political forces, which, through elections or by a simple fraudulent approach to the events of the period, falsify history to suit political circumstances or revise the outcome of World War II as captured in the UN Charter and other international legal documents. Among other things, we clearly see trends toward "historical revisionism" aimed at discrediting the policies of the Soviet Union before, during and after World War II gathering momentum in some countries. 

It is difficult to interpret such attempts to politicize history as anything other than euphoria in the spirit of "winner takes all" (presumably in the Cold War), that is, the right to interpret history according to the well-known method so well described by George Orwell. This is also apparent in the attempt to draw new dividing lines on our continent. This line is pointed at Russia, the very existence of which seems to be a source of nervousness for those who are not in the mainstream of international life. 

In this regard, our task is not only to defend the historical truth about the war, but also to fix in the public mind an objective understanding of its lessons for modern world development. The experience of recent years, and especially the current world financial and economic crisis, has clearly shown that the ideology-inspired lessons learned from 20th century history encourages people to draw false conclusions and make policy based on them, which leads to disaster. And in the context of globalization, these kinds of national decisions threaten to disrupt the entire world community. Accordingly, it is more important than ever for us to reflect on our common history. And we need to begin by establishing the historical facts, which have received a variety of ideological interpretations, if only because the ideological confrontation resulting from World War I essentially left its imprint on both the Cold War and the between-war period. Just as it is impossible to explain the catastrophe of World War I without analyzing the permanent crisis in which European society found itself during the 19th century, it is also impossible to understand how Europe and the world slid into the tragedy of World War II without considering the ideological factor, which distorted the policies of European cabinets—to the extent of being irrational and self-destructive—beginning with Versailles and ending with the Phony War of September 1939-May 1940. 

In conversations about the origins of World War II there are too many blatant lies and situations and attempts to shift part of the responsibility for one's own past, solve one’s current problems at the expense of others by appealing to "civilized solidarity," as was done during the Cold War, and to the imperatives of "ideological struggle." The history of World War II has been rewritten many times. Elements of this approach, which was dictated by considerations of ideology and political expediency, were also present in the Soviet Union. At the same time, even during the Cold War nobody ever tried to equate the Nazi regime and the Stalinist dictatorship. It occurred to no one to compare the Nazi threat, which meant the enslavement and destruction of entire peoples, to the policies of the Soviet Union, which was the only force capable in the beginning of opposing the military machine of Nazi Germany and, in its final phase, of ensuring its defeat, which was accelerated by the opening, however late, of a second European front in 1944. The difference was well understood by those who awaited liberation from Nazism, those for whom the Red Army's rates of advance were a matter of life and death. Freedom came from the East. Its price was the heroism and willingness to die of the most unpretentious lads—the Vankas, Vaskas, Alyoshkas, and Grishkas that Anna Akhmatova wrote about ("To the Victors"). 

Historical revisionism has been used to attempt to link August 23 and September 1, 1939 – the conclusion of the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact and Germany's attack on Poland. These two events are taken completely out of historical context, ignoring the Munich Agreement of 1938, which led to the dismemberment and occupation of Czechoslovakia; the Anglo-German Declaration, which was signed at the same time and was essentially a non-aggression agreement between Great Britain and Nazi Germany (the so-called " peace in our time" agreement); and a whole series of other events that prepared the way for German aggression and directed it towards the East. As always, the sequence of events was critical. Were it not for the Munich Agreement, much of what followed would not have occurred. 

By denouncing the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact the Russian Parliament has admitted that the Soviet Union made a mistake. And we are justified in expecting that in other nations which dealt with the Nazis it was done not at the political leadership level but at the political decision-making level. The West, like Soviet Russia, was not blameless. Why is this difficult to admit now that the Cold War has seemingly ended? 

The "reflexive" reaction to the Soviet Union, which subordinates sound analysis and practical politics to ideological dogma, did a disservice to Europe in the 1930s. The same tendency is discernable in postwar developments. Serious historical studies have not confirmed the interpretation of the origin of the Cold War as the West's response to the USSR's rejection of cooperation with the Allies in opposing Nazism and its return to "communist expansion." It is difficult to understand that the Western nations were prevented for reasons other than ideological preferences from implementing in 1945-1946 the principles that later led to the lessening of tensions during the 1970s, that is, from choosing to "engage" the Soviet Union. This would have encouraged Stalin to follow a moderate policy in Europe, but this chance was lost—not just for Europe but for the Soviet Union itself. In any event, many of the decisive events that determined the shape of Eastern Europe took place in the context of the Cold War, which had already begun. The implication is that our Western partners have simply returned to the policy track that they followed with respect to Soviet Russia, and which was followed during the period between the two world wars—corrected, of course, for the significantly greater capability of the USSR. And the short lived illusion of a monopoly on nuclear weapons. 

World War II revealed the inadequacy of the policies of all of the European countries, regardless of their type of government, and the regimes in most countries were authoritarian or semi-authoritarian. The fact that this was no accident under the conditions of the "deglobalization" of the time is shown by the right-wing trends in the modern politics of those governments and attempts to rehabilitate fascist regimes and glorify Nazis and their collaborators in some countries who claim membership in the democratic community. 

Fascism—to varying degrees—became a common response to the contradictions of European society, which World War I could not resolve. A way out of the crisis was found in the militarization of the economies and international relations, which became a key factor in outbreak of World War II. Historians recognize that the perverse Versailles system, which Soviet Russia had nothing to do with, had already made a new war in Europe inevitable. 

I would not like to think that by rewriting history someone is trying to compensate for the presumed weakening of the West's ideological positions in the world. How else to interpret the celebration of the recent anniversary of the Allied landing in Normandy in which virtually none of the Western leaders other than Barack Obama made mention of the contribution of the Soviet Union to the victory over Fascism. Here we also see not sober analysis but haste associated with the consequences of the global crisis, the full extent of which has yet to be recognized. In any event, however, it is obvious that it was not the market economy and democracy as the foundations for development of society that suffered, but only a certain type of them—so-called liberal capitalism in its pure form as it was before the Great Depression, which could not stand the test of new conditions. 

All of the tragedies of the 19th and 20th centuries, including colonialism, the extremist products of European political thought, World Wars I and II, Nazism and Fascism and the Cold War took place while the West dominated world politics, economics and finances. More broadly, it was a crisis of European society, the traditional foundations of which were destroyed by the many revolutions in Europe. The establishment of a sustainable model of economic and social development—socially oriented with universal suffrage and supported by a significant middle class—was only possible during the Cold War and on the basis of new technology. 

Those who falsify history forget about what they gained as a result of the Red Army's liberation campaign, including territory. The victory over Fascism and the events preceding the war, like it or not, gave all countries of Central, Eastern and Southeast Europe, as well as the former Soviet Union, their modern boundaries, which most members of the Euro-Atlantic family have no objection to. Would we like to return to the past—to a Europe burdened by the territorial problem? 

I do not think that everyone would like to publicly rake up the past; where there are a number of pages that many people would like to forget. What about the Phony War, which points to the unsavory plans of the Western Allies toward the Soviet Union in connection with Nazi Germany's attack on Poland? What about the collaborationism that was present everywhere? In some countries approximately equal numbers of citizens took part in the Resistance and served in the SS, including on the Eastern Front. Some still defend the struggle for independence in SS uniform. Who thwarted all intents to secure peace in Europe by guaranteeing the borders of Germany's eastern neighbors, including the idea of signing the Eastern Pact or the "Eastern Locarno Pact?" 

This list could go on. As for the Soviet Union, its actions were not unusual for the diplomacy of the time. The war was not won by Stalin but by the people of the USSR, who paid for the bankruptcy of all prewar European politics. And was it not the Soviet Union with its extensive territory, towns and villages that absorbed the brunt of the Nazi invasion? Three-quarters of Germany's armed forces were defeated on the Eastern Front. These were its most combat-capable, battle-seasoned units.

Attempts to sweep these facts under the rug are difficult to explain except as a reluctance to recognize the moral greatness and superiority of the peoples of the Soviet Union, who through enormous sacrifice and at the cost of the destruction of their cities preserved much of the material heritage of European civilization. And if this is not a "ticket" to Europe for Russia and the former republics of the Soviet Union—and here we raise the issue of the Europe-wide visa-free regime, not only for itself but for all—then it is difficult to say what more—in addition to the events at the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s—could have led our partners in the European Union to understand the significance of complete freedom of movement as confirming the unity of our continent once and for all. Let me remind you that the obligations for freedom of movement are recorded in various documents adopted by consensus within the OSCE framework—the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, the Vienna Document of 1989, the Paris Charter of 1990 and the Budapest Document of 1994. 

Finally, during World War II Russia—once again—fulfilled its historic mission of saving Europe from forced unification and its own folly. Suffice it to recall August 1914, when the outcome of World War I was a foregone conclusion thanks to the self-sacrifice of Russian forces in East Prussia. It is cynical and blasphemous to compare the events that occurred in Central and Eastern Europe following the war with the Nazi occupation, although tragedies did occur. 

Was not the German invasion, like Napoleon's invasion in 1812, an "invitation" for Russia and its army to enter Europe? The ways of the historical process are inscrutable. It was in response to the "challenge of the Soviet Union and socialism" that Western Europe's economic development model became socialist. And did not the postwar experience, including the experience of the German Democratic Republic, contribute to reconciliation in Europe, including between Russia and Germany and between Russia and Germany's former Allies? 

Erroneous conclusions were eventually drawn from the end of the Cold War. Some thought that in the absence of the "Soviet threat" it was no longer necessary to restrain market forces by government regulation, so that it now became possible to engage in "financial alchemy," including the financial pyramids from which liberal capitalism began at the start of the 18th century. The devastating consequences of such shortsightedness and the unwillingness to understand the historical pattern that Europe followed in the "hothouse" conditions of the Cold War are all too obvious to ignore and continue along the same path. Moreover, this mistake should not be repeated in the sphere of "strict security," which is no less important in terms of its consequences for the future of Europe. 

The fall of the Berlin Wall marked the end of the Cold War. At that time there was an opportunity to take decisive steps to overcome the ideological, military-political and other divisions on the European continent. The problem of European unity, which Europe had not known throughout virtually the entire 20th century, could have been solved easily in the early 1990s—and not necessarily by dissolving NATO after the Warsaw Pact fell apart. It would have been enough to implement a phased institutionalization of OSCE and transform it into a fully fledged regional organization to address the entire range of problems in the Euro-Atlantic region, primarily to provide an open system of equal and collective security for all through a comprehensive approach. 

Unfortunately, our partners took a different route—that of NATO expansion, which according to George Kennan was "the West's biggest mistake in the past 50 years." The end of the Cold War was not formalized in international law; we have not been able to abandon block approaches to security, which are essentially confrontational. It is hoped that the Corfu Process, if it is approached honestly, will to some extent allow the hopes associated with OSCE during the initial stage of the end of the Cold War to be realized. 

The Caucasus crisis in August 2008 more than demonstrated that the situation leaves no room for complacency. It became clear that irresponsible regimes are capable of the irresponsible use of force and military adventures that hold all Europe hostage to their selfish calculations and ambitions. Use was made of real possibilities associated with the fragmented structure of European security. 

Today hardly anyone can deny, even if only in his own soul, that serious problems remain with the issue of European security. At the level of consciousness and practical politics many have not put aside the old agenda with its roots in the 20th century. It is increasingly at odds with the problems posed by life itself—especially in overcoming the effects of the current financial and economic crisis, planning for post-crisis development and combating the major challenges and threats of today. The stereotypes and political and psychological attitudes that have accumulated over decades and centuries draw us into the past and hinder cooperation on the pressing problems affecting the vital interests of all European states. 

President Medvedev's initiative to conclude a European Security Agreement is a call to finally close the books on the politics of confrontation in the military-political sphere, at least. By restoring trust in this area, which comprises a large part of the old European political agenda, we will be able to concentrate at last on a positive option, which is dictated by the demands of our time. 

We propose nothing more than a solution to the problem of security in the Euro-Atlantic region on a universal basis—to provide all countries of the region with equal and indivisible security without discriminating against anyone based on membership or non-membership in any military-political alliance. This principle was solemnly declared by heads of state and governments in their political declarations during the 1990s. Now, it needs to be made legally binding; the "spoken word" needs to be backed up with the real thing. I am convinced that conclusion of this Agreement would allow us to come up with a positive agenda for relations with our partners in Europe and create an environment for effective resolution of our common problems. 

We hope that the draft Agreement that President Medvedev sent to the leaders of the countries in the Euro-Atlantic region and the executive heads of the organizations operating there—NATO, the European Union, CSTO, CIS and OSCE—will give a serious impetus to the practical implementation of our initiative and make it possible to begin substantive discussions without delay. In the 1930s, opportunities to establish a collective security system in Europe were lost. It is our duty to prevent these errors from recurring under the present circumstances and to finally carry out a plan for a united Greater Europe. 

We value the positive reversal occurring in the approach of the Western structures to Russia, part of which is a recognition of the counterproductive nature of keeping Russia-NATO relations frozen. We presume that it arises out of the properly understood interests of the NATO member nations and the alliance itself. Of course, differences remain. But during abrupt changes in history it is always necessary to choose between the past and the future. That is the question before us today. Needless to say, the European Union is also called upon to play a role in ensuring the unity of the Europe. We believe that the preparations for celebrating the 65th anniversary of the Victory themselves should form part of the unifying agenda in European and world affairs. In his speech to the 64th session of the UN General Assembly in New York during September of this year, Russia's President proposed a resolution on "The 65th Anniversary of the End of World War II" and suggested holding a special session of the General Assembly to honor all victims of that war. A corresponding Ministerial Declaration was adopted at the suggestion of Russia, Serbia and our CSTO allies during a meeting of the OSCE Ministerial Council in Athens on December 1-2. 

We attach particular importance to preparations for the anniversary of the Victory in the Commonwealth of Independent States. A resolution of the CIS Summit declared 2010 the Year of Veterans of the Great Patriotic War in the Commonwealth; it will be held under a slogan proposed by Russia—"We were victorious together." The Summit adopted an Appeal by the heads of the CIS states to the peoples of the member nations of the Commonwealth and the international community in connection with the 65th anniversary of Victory in the Great Patriotic War. 

The main goal of our foreign policy now is to help meet the challenges of the comprehensive modernization and innovative development of our country. We are capable of safeguarding our security. However, we do not need a fruitless confrontation which would hinder creative efforts and provoke a costly arms race. We do not need business-as-usual "zero sum games" that reproduce the old policies of competition to acquire and subjugate new territories in a new context. We are convinced that the Europeans will nevertheless succeed in leaving the past in the past and undertake to construct for themselves and the coming generations a safer and more economically stable future. Russia is ready for that. 

Sergei Lavrov - Russia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs. This article was published in the 2009 issue of "Diplomaticheskiy yezhegodnik [Diplomatic Annual]."