Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel says the U.S. now believes with some confidence that the Bashar al-Assad regime used small amounts of chemical weapons against rebel forces. Earlier this week Israeli intelligence had also said it believed al-Assad’s forces used chemical weapons, and the United Kingdom and France have both said they had strong suspicions.

This is significant because President Barack Obama declared back in August that the U.S. had “communicated in no uncertain terms with every player in the region” that chemical weapons are “a red line for us and that there would be enormous consequences if we start seeing movement on the chemical weapons front or the use of chemical weapons.  That would change my calculations significantly.” He and his administration have repeated this message on numerous occasions in the months since.

These statements have led some to rightly bemoan the setting of red lines in general. Indeed, the casual setting of red lines should be concerning as it tries to impose a black and white solution on a very gray world. This was made painfully obvious a few weeks back when it briefly appeared that the rebels may have used chemical weapons against the Assad regime’s forces.

But the larger question that was never really asked was when did the use of chemical weapons become a red line for the United States, and should it be?

In fact, the initial criticism of Obama’s statement was almost solely that by making chemical weapons the red line the president was setting the bar for U.S. intervention too high, and implicitly telling al-Assad that any other coercive measures wouldn’t trigger U.S. action. Most people seemed to take it as a given that the U.S. could not stand back in the face of chemical weapons use, whatever other interests it might have in remaining aloof.

This seems extraordinary. After all, although the U.S. explicitly warned Saddam Hussein against using chemical weapons against U.S. and coalition troops in the two Gulf Wars, it has never intervened in a situation before simply because chemical weapons were used by one or both parties.

And chemical weapons have been used on a number of occasions, especially before but also after the Geneva Protocol prohibiting their use came into force in 1928. Right around the time the Protocol was being agreed upon, Spanish troops used them against rebels in Morocco in the Third Rif War. Despite being a party to the Protocol, Italy used them against Ethiopians during the 1935-1936 Second Italo-Abyssinian War. Japan also used them against Chinese forces during its brutal occupation of that country (the U.S. intervened but only because it had been attacked by Japan). The Nazis of course used them against Jewish and other populations inside its concentration camps.

Even after the WWII they were used on numerous occasions. Egypt used chemical weapons (phosgene, mustard gas) during its war in Yemen (1963-1967). It is widely suspected that South Africa gave Rhodesian (now Zimbabwe) troops anthrax, which the latter used to great effect against rebels in 1979. The U.S. and others like Thailand believed Vietnam was using chemical weapons in Cambodia and Laos during the early 1980s.

Perhaps most notably, Saddam Hussein used chemical agents extensively against Iranian troops and civilians during the bloody eight year Iran-Iraq war. Not only did the U.S. not intervene militarily to prevent Saddam’s sadistic use of the agents, it formed an alliance with him. Indeed, soon after Saddam’s forces began using mustard gas against Iran in 1983, Ronald Reagan sent Donald Rumsfeld to Baghdad to help cement ties with the Iraqi dictator. This alliance was maintained even when Saddam began using chemical weapons against his own Kurdish population later in the 1980s.

None of this is to say the U.S. shouldn’t necessarily intervene if Syrian forces have used chemical weapons. Among other things, doing so could set a powerful precedent against their use in the future, given that NATO’s intervention in Libya has appeared to make Assad cautious about using aircraft against the rebels, which certainly can’t be said of his father.

Rather, this history is just meant to highlight that the threshold for U.S. military intervention continues to drop, and for reasons that appear independent of the U.S. national interest. 

North Korea is usually not a place known for its interconnectivity, but that’s starting to change.

As North Korea Tech notes, the amount of North Korean subscribers to the state-sanctioned 3G network has doubled since February 2012, from one million to nearly two million.

North Korea Tech blog reports that the CEO of Kyotolink, the Cairo-based company that Pyongyang has commissioned to build its network, disclosed that the number of subscribers in a speech in Pyongyang. North Korea Tech then confirmed this with Kyotolink’s head office in Cairo.

Kyotolink first began operating in North Korea in 2008, after signing an agreement with the North Korean regime.

The phenomenal growth in the use of cell phones in the country is hard to fathom given the amount of censorship within the “Hermit Kingdom.” But, as North Korea Tech notes, the cell phone service in the country is not without its fault:

“Subscribers are offered voice, text message and web browsing service on their phones, but North Korean regulations prevent citizens from direct international communications or Internet service. Foreigners in the country have a different class of service that allows international connectivity, but shuts off access to most domestic phone lines.”

Still, the 2 million figure almost certainly grossly understates the amount of cell phone owners in the country as many North Koreans, particularly those along the border with China, actually own phones that have been smuggled in from China. These devices don’t suffer from the same restrictions.

Nor are cell phones the only technology that has proliferated in the country as technically illegal markets have come to make up a larger part of the country’s economy. DVD players have also become far more common, as have USB flash drives.

A colorful tradition has developed in U.S.-China relations in recent years, where each spring the State Department releases reports on the human rights records of 190 countries during the previous year, and Beijing responds by releasing its own report on human rights in the United States.

On Friday, the State Department began this process with the roll out of its annual human rights reports. The report on China was typical fare; it said human rights violations were increasing in China, but failed to specify what it was using as the baseline to make this judgment (certainly Maoist China had a worse human rights record than Xi’s China). The specific charges leveled against China were almost entirely what one would expect to see from a U.S. report on human rights in China.

In this sense, China’s report on human rights in the U.S. is far more interesting. One doesn’t normally think about what kinds of human rights issues might concern Beijing. The latest report features concerns that range from more or less justified to downright comical.

One of the more justifiable (if opportunist) concerns China has is gun violence in the United States. The report speaks at length about gun ownership and violence in America, and the refusal of the U.S. to take action against it. Some of the more notable quotes from that section include:

Americans are the most heavily armed people in the world per capita.

…In population-adjusted terms, civilians in some parts of the U.S. are more likely to become the victim of a firearms-related murder than their counterparts in war-torn regions like Iraq or Afghanistan.

…the violent crime rate went up 17 percent in 2011. Firearms-related violent crimes posed as one of the most serious threats to the lives and personal security of the U.S. citizens.

Of course, it’s arguable whether this is a human rights issue or not, especially given Americans support private gun ownership by overwhelming margins. Still, the report notes that the U.S. government has failed to pass legislation to reduce gun violence, a charge that seems justified in light recent events.

Many of the charges in the report were even more interesting, however, at least when one considers the accuser. These included:

The U.S. government continues to step up surveillance of ordinary Americans, restricting and reducing the free sphere of the American society to a considerable extent, and seriously violating the freedom of citizens. 

The U.S. election is like money wars, with trends of the country's policies deeply influenced by political donations.

The U.S. journalist community is worried about the continued toughening up of legislation on mass media. It is frequent that journalists in the U.S. lose their jobs because of "politically incorrect" opinions.

American citizens have never really enjoyed common and equal suffrage.

A huge number of people are homeless in the U.S.

Ethnic minorities do not enjoy equal political, economic and social rights.

Ethnic Americans' rights to vote are limited…. Racial discrimination is rampant in the field of law enforcement and justice.

Religious discrimination is rapidly on the rise.

Apartheid in fact still exists in the American society.

Many of these are justifiable in their own right and indeed are issues many Americans regularly raise themselves. Still, it seems odd that the PRC is concerned about them, given how it handles the same issues in its own country. This of course might have been China’s point, since it argues that the U.S. is a hypocrite for issuing reports on the human rights situation in other countries, but not one on the U.S. itself.

One subtle difference between the U.S. and Chinese reports is actually rather telling. Specifically, whereas the U.S. human rights reports focus on mainly political and social issues, China’s report on the United States focuses heavily on economic issues. For instance, the evidence China cites about ethnic discrimination in America points to minorities’ inferior economic opportunities in society. When criticizing China’s treatment of its ethnic populations, the U.S. report focuses on the level of surveillance and lack of civil and political rights that these groups enjoy.

In the one sense, this may just reflect the fact that each country is more vulnerable to charges of discrimination made on political or economic rights than the other. Still, it seems to me to point to a larger difference on how the Western world in general, but the United States in particular, views human rights, compared to the rest of the world conceives of them.

Specifically, the U.S. and the West seem to put political rights above all else, as seen from, among other things, the emphasis Washington placed on holding elections in Afghanistan and Iraq when it first invaded those countries. By contrast, it has placed far less importance on ensuring effective governance and economic opportunities for Afghans and Iraqis. The same is true with how it often views North Korean refugees as fleeing the country to pursue freedom in South Korea, when usually the refugees themselves report just wanting greater economic opportunities in China or elsewhere.

This is not to say that people worldwide don't seek political freedoms as well; it just suggests people place economic security before political freedom if forced to choose.  

A quick update on China's new aircraft carrier the Liaoning courtesy of the People's Daily:

"China's first aircraft carrier "Liaoning Ship" has been carrying out various tests and training as scheduled since it berthed at a naval port in Qingdao in east China's Shandong province on February 27, 2013. The "Liaoning Ship" will make an oceangoing voyage at a golden opportunity in 2013.

Currently, the naval port for aircraft carrier is able to provide in-port support for the "Liaoning Ship," and is still being streamlined. The naval port is adjacent to mountains and the Yellow Sea, and the "Liaoning Ship" can sail directly into the sea from the dock that is at a right angle to the coastline. The enormous "Liaoning Ship" berths at one side of the dock, firmly fixed to the dock by 16 ham-like cables. The dock adopts a jetty-type structure, without much visual difference from other naval ports."

The above report seems to show that China's first carrier is pressing ahead in its development. While the vessel is clearly making strides towards becoming a regular oceangoing carrier, it still has a long way to go.

Carriers don't operate in a bubble or go to sea on their own. Before we even begin to talk about the complexity of landing advanced fighters on the flight deck routinely without incident or the logistics of running a modern carrier, there are the support ships that are needed to defend and supply the carrier.

As our own Naval Diplomat noted, several months back:

"Carriers steam in company with a coterie of escorts and support vessels. The PLA Navy, however, has not yet filled out the remainder of a carrier task force. The navy’s newest guided-missile destroyers appear adequate for air-defense purposes, but anti-submarine warfare remains a puzzling shortfall—particularly since China’s likely adversaries, the United States and Japan, excel at undersea operations. Combat logistics—oilers, ammunition ships, refrigerated stores ships—remains another glaring shortcoming for the PLA Navy. These unglamorous but crucial vessels can replenish men-of-war, allowing them to stay at sea for long intervals without returning to port. Chinese task forces will remain vulnerable and tethered to shore logistical support until shipbuilders plug these gaps in the inventory."

So while China's new carrier has certainly made huge strides in its development from being a partially completed dream of the Soviet Navy to the Liaoning, the ship must be considered part of the development of a larger goal -- the creation of a Chinese carrier strike group. The development of such a potent and complex asset takes time. Flight crews need countless hours of training to start. Kinks in carrier operations need to be sorted out. The list could go on and on.

For now, China's carrier serves as a symbol of Beijing's evolving maritime power -- and its potential in the years to come.

Growing economic prosperity in the Asia-Pacific contributed to a sizeable decline in the percentage of the developing world that lives in extreme poverty over the last three decades, according to a new World Bank note.

According to the organization, “In 1981, more than half of citizens in the developing world lived on less than $1.25 a day. This rate has dropped dramatically to 21 percent in 2010.”

The World Bank also notes that the developing world’s population grew 59 percent over the same time period. Therefore, in absolute terms, the number of people in the developing world living in extreme poverty only dropped from 1.9 billion in 1981 to a still painfully high 1.2 billion in 2010.

Still, an encouraging number of Asians were lifted out of extreme poverty over the last three decades. This was particularly true in East Asia, where China not surprisingly led the way. In 1981 an astonishing 84 percent of Chinese citizens— 835 million people— met the World Bank’s criteria for extreme poverty. In 2010 only 12 percent of China’s population, or 156 million individuals, fell into that category. Thus there were nearly 700 million less Chinese living in extreme poverty in 2010 than in 1981.

Furthermore, China’s poverty eradication appeared to accelerate over time. From 1981 to 1990 China’s poverty rate declined from 84 percent (835 million Chinese) to 60 percent (683 million). Over the next decade ending in 1999 it fell to 36 percent or 446 million people. Just a third of that percentage, 12 percent (156 individuals) were still living in poverty in China in 2010. Indeed, although many Chinese consider the Hu-Wen administration to have been a “lost decade,” the number of extremely poor Chinese fell from 363 million to 156 million in the first eight years of their time in power.

The other countries of East Asia were also relatively effective at eradicating extreme poverty in their countries. Whereas 61 percent of them lived in this condition in 1981, only 13 percent did in 2010. This latter number still meant 90 million individuals were living in extreme poverty, but this was dramatically better than the 261 million in 1981. Furthermore, like China, other parts of East Asia saw the number of their citizens suffering in extreme poverty decline by a faster rate over time. Whereas between 1981 and 1999, the number of poor individuals in East Asia countries excluding China dropped from 261 million to 209 million, the number of poor individuals declined from 209 million to 90 million from 1999 to 2010.

Although not as dramatic as in China, India also made considerable progress in lifting its citizens out of extreme poverty over the last three decades. The World Bank estimates that in 1981, 60 percent of Indians lived in extreme poverty. By 2010 that figure had declined to 33 percent. Furthermore, despite its steadily growing population India now has 29 million less citizens living in extreme poverty than it did in 1981, when 429 million Indians were considered extremely poor by the World Bank.

Other South Asian countries have also witnessed dramatic declines in the size of their extremely poor population, at least when considered as a whole. Whereas 66 percent of all South Asians excluding Indians were extremely impoverished in 1981, the number had fallen to 26 percent in 2010. This means that an Indian citizen is more likely to live in extreme poverty than are citizens of other South Asian nations considered as a whole.

Because other parts of the world fortunately made great strides in fighting poverty during this time period, the Indo-Pacific region’s success was decidedly more mixed when viewed in relative terms. On the one hand, with 20 percent of the world’s poor in 2010, China and East Asia accounted for a dramatically lower percentage of the world’s poor than they did in 1981, when China alone was home to 43 percent of the people living in extreme poverty and the rest of East Asia boasted13 percent of the global poor.

On the other hand, South Asia saw its share of the world’s poor increase considerably during this time period, from 29 to 42 percent. Much of this increase came from India; whereas 22 percent of the world’s extreme poor called India home in 1981, 33 percent did by 2010.

The World Bank considers the poverty line to be US$1.25 per day in 2005 Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) dollars. The global average extremely poor citizen lived on just 87 cents per day in 2010.

Over the last several years, research into China’s Anti-Access/Area-Denial (A2/AD) strategy in the Pacific Commons has swelled here in the United States and around the world. While such a strategy is certainly not new, interest in its development and evolution has skyrocketed as China and other nations deploy various weapons systems designed to negate the ability of a technologically advanced power to gain access to a conflict zone or contested geographic area during a time of open hostilities.

Just yesterday, in a statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee, U.S. Army Lieutenant General Michael Flynn, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) director noted that:

“They (China) are also augmenting the over 1,200 conventional short-range ballistic missiles deployed opposite Taiwan with a limited but growing number of conventional  armed, medium-range ballistic missiles, including the DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile.”

Mention of the DF-21D, what many feel is the world’s most advanced anti-ship missile, or “carrier-killer,” is important. The weapon is fired from a mobile truck-mounted launcher into the atmosphere, with over-the-horizon (OTH) radar, satellite tracking and possibly unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVS); each likely providing guidance. The weapon also incorporates a maneuverable warhead. Such weapons systems would be crucial in any A2/AD strategy.

Many nations have invested in anti-ship weapons, but the DF-21D is quite possibly the most advanced system of its kind and has a range that “exceeds 1,500 km .” An August 2011 report by Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense declared: “A small quantity of the missiles [was] produced and deployed in 2010, increasing the difficulty of military maneuvers in the region for the U.S. Army.”

On the flipside, there are a wide range of opinions, ideas and theories as to the motivations, technologies and capabilities concerning China’s A2/AD strategy. Below are my top five articles published on the subject over the last decade. While by no means even close to comprehensive, there is a great deal of information on this subject and this is serves merely as a starting point. Please drop a line in the comment section on what articles, books, or monographs you would put on this list.

International Security – Is China a Status Quo Power? By Alastair Iain Johnston– (2003, PDF) – “Many commentators wonder whether China is a status quo power that will continue to comply with regional and international norms or whether it is a revisionist power increasingly willing to challenge U.S. hegemony. Iain Johnston of Harvard University responds to the growing chorus of skeptics who contend that China is becoming a greater source of instability and offers evidence of Chinese behavior that, in some cases, suggests more status quo orientation. Johnston bases this conclusion on a set of indicators he uses to assess recent trends in China’s foreign policy.”

While not a direct link to A2/AD, there are some obvious connections that serve a good primer before delving into the subject.

RAND - Entering The Dragon’s Lair: Chinese Anti-Access Strategies and Their Implications for the United States (2007, Book or PDF):  While dated being a few years old, this was one of the first and most comprehensive attempts at covering the subject from various vantage points. This is one of the best places to start for anyone who is interested in the subject.

U.S. Naval War College Review - Using the Land to Control the Sea?  By Andrew Erickson and David D. Yang (2009, PDF) – “For China, the ability to prevent a U.S. carrier strike group from intervening in the event of a Taiwan Strait crisis is critical. Beijing’s immediate strategic concerns have been defi ned with a high level of clarity. The Chinese are interested in achieving an antiship ballistic missile (ASBM) capability because it offers them the prospect of limiting the ability of other nations, particularly the United States, to exert military influence on China’s maritime periphery, which contains several disputed zones of core strategic importance to Beijing.”

Orbis - How the United States Lost the Naval War of 2015 (2010, PDF) By James Kraska – “Years of strategic missteps in oceans policy, naval strategy and a force structure in decline set the stage for U.S. defeat at sea in 2015. After decades of double-digit budget increases, the People’s Liberation Army (Navy) was operating some of the most impressive systems in the world, including a medium-range ballistic missile that could hit a moving aircraft carrier and a super-quiet diesel electric submarine that was stealthier than U.S. nuclear submarines. Coupling this new asymmetric naval force to visionary maritime strategy and oceans policy, China ensured that all elements of national power promoted its goal of dominating the East China Sea. The United States, in contrast, had a declining naval force structured around 10 aircraft carriers spread thinly throughout the globe. With a maritime strategy focused on lower- order partnerships, and a national oceans policy that devalued strategic interests in freedom of navigation, the stage was set for defeat at sea. This article recounts how China destroyed the USS George Washington in the East China Sea in 2015. The political fallout from the disaster ended 75 years of U.S. dominance in the Pacific Ocean and cemented China’s position as the Asian hegemon.”

The Journal of Strategic Studies - China’s Anti-Access Strategy in Historical and Theoretical Perspective By Thomas Mahnken (2011, Alas, paywall only) – “This article views China’s development of anti-access capabilities against the backdrop of the theory and history of military innovation. It begins with a discussion of the process of military innovation, as well as the indicators that may appear at different stages of that process. It then discusses the barriers to recognizing new ways of war and applies that framework to China’s development of advanced ballistic missiles, to include precision-guided conventional ballistic missiles and anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs). It concludes with several suggestions for how to improve the ability to recognize and understand foreign military innovation.”

Almost every weekend for the last several months, my family has found itself in Boston. Living just south of the city, we always find time to walk the streets, wander through the shops, and sample the fine local cuisine. From my beloved Boston Red Sox and Harvard, to the local venders selling various goods with that great Boston accent, it’s a town that has a soul I have grown to love.

Last Saturday we found ourselves near Faneuil Hall, an area we don’t normally get to as we tend to stay near Cambridge and Harvard Square. As we were about to cross the street to begin our walk to the “T” and eventually home, we noticed a plaque that commemorated the Boston Massacre. It was hard for me to believe that such a shocking event took place in a city like Boston, where such historical incidents seemed so divorced from present reality.

Needless to say, yesterday’s tragedy at the Boston Marathon was heart wrenching. My wife works in the Boston area. I immediately sprang to the phone to call her as well as local relatives and friends to see if all were OK. My phone would not stop ringing as friends and colleagues were checking to see if I was in the city that day. Thankfully, everyone I knew was accounted for. Sadly, many were not as fortunate and have been greatly impacted by the day’s events.

As various media outlets replayed the bombing over and over again, a sense of profound loss overwhelmed me, increasing in intensity every time I watched the bombs go off on television. I thought of those who were killed or suffered grave injuries—including losing limbs— whose lives will be forever changed. In the coming days and weeks ahead, we will know more about who committed this act of terror, what their motivations were, and whether this was a foreign or domestic plot.

As the day’s events unfolded there was something else, something in the background – a memory of a past event that caused an even greater sense of anger and sadness, which seemed to compound the current tragedy in Boston into something even more horrific. The memory of that day’s events has never left my mind. And even though I was not there to witness that harrowing moment, it has had a profound impact on my life, who I am as a person, and the life I have led since.

That day was September 11, 2001.

While very different tragedies, for me there seems to be an obvious link – that of pain and loss caused by a senseless act of violence against innocent people.

Watching the sheer panic of people running for cover and the sense of shock immediately after the bombs went off brought me back to the dark times of that Tuesday morning.

On the morning of 9/11, my future wife and I were going out for an early morning breakfast date. As we arrived at the restaurant, a TV was setup right near the hostess stand.  On screen I saw what I presumed to be a movie depicting planes crashing into large skyscrapers in New York City. For the first few minutes, as I gazed at the screen, I thought what I was watching was Hollywood fiction, and certainly not reality. As the announcer came on  to update everyone on the latest developments, I quickly realized that a dark day had befallen New York, America, and indeed the world. We stayed for hours, glued to the TV, as we watched the second tower collapse.

To be honest, I have never been to the 9/11 memorial or the area where the Twin Towers once stood. I have always wanted to go, but my wife to this day still cries when she sees pictures or video of the towers collapsing. I could never go without her. I can’t say that I do much better when those images cross my eyes; my mind still struggles to understand the impact of that horrific day.

I like so many Americans live in the shadow of 9/11. Yesterday’s events for me hurt even more because I look at 4/15 through the prism of fallen towers, lost lives, and a tragedy that still hurts to this day. I am guessing for many Americans and people around the world who have fallen victim or witnessed even from afar other senseless acts of terror, they may share some of these emotions.

Keep Boston in your thoughts.

The recent crisis on the Korean Peninsula has once again brought to the fore China’s support for North Korea, which many deem vital for Pyongyang’s survival. In explaining this support analysts typically cite two factors: Beijing’s fear that the North Korean regime’s collapse will bring untold numbers of refugees across the border into China, and Beijing’s fear of a unified, democratic, and pro-American Korea under Seoul’s leadership with a large U.S. troop presence stationed on the Sino-Korean border.

These factors probably accurately reflect Beijing’s strategic calculus. However, although possible, it’s not at all clear that a unified Korea under Seoul’s tutelage would in fact be as pro-American as Western and (presumably) Chinese policymakers assume. A number of factors could undermine this assumption.

The first one being the process that unification takes. Even assuming the North Korean regime collapses and is quickly unified under Seoul’s leadership, there are a number of different ways this can unfold. One of the most plausible is that Chinese troops would rush across the Yalu River at the same time that ROK troops came across the DMZ in the south. In the process China would come to occupy a sizeable chunk of North Korea, which would also likely contain some of Pyongyang’s nuclear and other WMD programs. Beijing would therefore have powerful leverage in bargaining the terms of its withdrawal from Korea. This would almost certainly be used to extract concessions from Seoul and Washington on the U.S. presence north of the DMZ.

Even if Chinese troops did not play a role in the immediate aftermath of the North Korean regime’s collapse, Beijing would still hold important cards to extract concessions from the U.S. and South Korea. The most important of these would be to help develop the former North Korean state following unification. It’s difficult to understate the immensity of this challenge. Although German unification was difficult, the income disparity between the two Germanys at the time of unification was estimated at 3:1 or 2:1. Comparable figures for North and South Korea today are anywhere between 1:15 and 1:40 and are almost certain to continue growing.

Editors of the world rejoice!

Thanks to U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry we have another useful way to refer to America’s “pivot” towards Asia. We can now thankfully “pivot” away from the idea of a “rebalance” (sorry had to get that last pivot reference in there).

Truth be told, I never cared for the “rebalance” term anyway, it seemed too politically correct when anyone who has been following events in the Asia-Pacific already knows, America’s focus on Asia is all about China.

As part of his recent trip to Asia, Kerry delivered a speech that seemed to be a play on Xi Jinping’s “Chinese Dream” concept that has been widely reported in the media as well as in this publication.

“Now Beijing’s new leader has introduced what he calls a ‘China Dream.’ Today I’d like to speak with you about our opportunity in this increasingly global age to design and define our dream for the Pacific region, one in which nations and people forge a partnership that shapes our shared future.”

The most important point I took away from the speech was the idea of a "Pacific Dream."  Kerry laid out in the speech four principles “to ensure that Asia contributes to global peace and prosperity.” These included: “strong growth, fair growth, smart growth, and just growth.”

The focus on economics makes perfect sense. As America continues to advance the Trans-Pacific Partnership, linking the economies of Asia with America is one way to create stronger ties as well as economic bonds. But China’s absence in TPP has some questioning if America is seeking to contain China economically.

There have been some interesting reactions to the speech. One particularly from the Global Times is noteworthy:

“Kerry's speech has reinforced an impression: the core issue in the Asia Pacific is what kind of bilateral ties China and the U.S. can nurture. The U.S.' confidence in policies backed up by its military strength to contain China has been declining.

The U.S. will focus on maintaining economic dominance in the region to ensure its competitive advantage over China. The Trans-Pacific Partnership led by the U.S. will be a stage on which it will compete with China's economic influence.

Kerry didn't want to provoke China the same way his predecessor Hillary Clinton did, which is worth applause. China has maintained a consistent attitude toward the U.S., while the U.S.' stance toward China has always been the changing factor in bilateral relations.

If the US had not always calculated what geopolitical challenge China's development will pose but focus on how to improve its own economic vitality, the China-US competition would be seen differently. Most Chinese would see it as much better than the US using its military strength as leverage over China.

The economic competition between the two should be fair, or it will continue to be the source of tensions between the two.”

Although not the complete focus of the piece in the Global Times, the idea that the United States is trying to contain or was trying to contain China seems quite silly. The classic idea of containment died when the Soviet flag was lowered from the Kremlin for the last time. Using Cold War ideas to explain U.S – China competition is dated at best. In an age where the internet, social media, and global trade drive commerce around the world, how could the world’s second largest economy ever be contained? Containment as defined in the Cold War is dead.

Washington and China are certainly competing with one another for power and influence in the Pacific, and America is very clearly hedging its bets. In fact, a clear hedging strategy seems the appropriate and desired American course of action these days. Even as strategic issues grab headlines the two countries have strong reasons to cooperate, such as hundreds of billions of dollars in annual bilateral trade. Kerry's trade-centric strategy for the Asia-Pacific is a smart one. Washington gets an A in my book for its PR sense. It’s something China could certainly learn from.

As tensions seem to be thankfully dying down on the Korean peninsula, there is one party to the crisis that seems to always be forgotten, the actual people of North Korea.

Over the weekend, I came across a powerful article and video over at CNN. The piece comes courtesy of the TED speakers’ series.  The speaker, Hyeonseo Lee, shares her powerful story of escaping from North Korea then travelling thousands of miles, learning multiple languages, and then going back to the China-North Korea border to help her own family escape. It was certainly not lighthearted Sunday evening viewing in the Kazianis household, but an amazing story that shows the power of the human spirit.

Here is a brief excerpt from her piece at CNN that is adapted from her talk:

“When I was young, I thought my country was the best on the planet. I grew up singing a song called "Nothing to Envy." I felt very proud. I thought my life in North Korea was normal, even though when I was 7 years old, I saw my first public execution.

My family was not poor, and I had never experienced hunger. But after my mother read me a letter from a coworker's sister who said that her family was dying of hunger, I realized that something was very wrong in my country. A huge famine hit North Korea in the mid to late 1990s, and I began to see suffering, hunger and death around me.

I can't reveal the details of how I left North Korea, but I can say that during the dark years of the famine when I was a young girl, I went alone to China to live with distant relatives. I thought I would be separated from my family for a short time. I could never have imagined that it would take 14 years for my family to live together again.

Since North Korean refugees are considered illegal migrants in China, I lived in constant fear that my identity would be revealed and I would be repatriated to a horrible fate back in North Korea.

One day, my worst nightmare came true when I was caught by the Chinese police and brought to the police station for interrogation. Someone had accused me of being North Korean, so they tested my Chinese language abilities and asked me tons of questions. I thought my life was over, but I managed to control all the emotions inside of me and answered their questions. They let me go. It was a miracle!”

Hyeonseo Lee reminds us all that throughout the crisis of the last several weeks, we must remember those who have no voice, and suffer in near silence.

Please take a look at the talk she gave, it is truly powerful. Please note: some of the details and images presented in the talk are graphic. Viewer discretion is advised: