In recent days, each tide seems to bring a new crew of activists to the shores of the Senkaku/islands while Dokdo/Diaoyutai Takeshima has been graced by South Korea’s president and a relay race of high-profile activists swimming from the South’s mainland. Equal numbers of “patriots” from each country have been actively discouraged from fanning the flames with their own visits.

Blame the high tide of activism on four factors. First, there is the fact that these disputes are inextricably linked -- to each other and to similar ones in the South China Sea. The attention given to any one controversy reminds publics in other countries of their own dispute and inspires them to assert their own claim or counter the actions of a rival. So for example, the scrutiny of South China Sea disputes prompted “patriots” elsewhere in the region to put down their own markers. They don’t feel threatened by those other claims, but they do feel obliged to make their own case. (Of course, these disputes are ever ready to be stoked, but recent flares suggest they shouldn’t be considered in isolation -- even when the same claimants are not involved.)

These disputes are also connected by a particular date in history: August 15. While each claim is rooted in a different set of circumstances, they are all legacies of the end of World War II, an anniversary marked this month. The August 15 commemorations focus on loss, and the territorial dispensations at the end of the conflict remain contested. An annual spike in civil action is to be expected when national sentiment is stoked in the name of remembrance, national humiliation, and defeat.

Those emotions flow even more abundantly this year. For two weeks, the world has been focused on the Olympics, where medal counts lead the nightly news and the media is awash with tales of individual accomplishment, national glory, or insult to the country at the hands of some long-despised nemesis. Patriotism has been stoked for weeks and some spillover is inevitable -- especially when each country from Northeast Asia saw each dispute played out in microcosm during the Olympics. For example, Japan squared off against South Korea in soccer (the ROK prevailed), Japan defeated China in women’s volleyball, and a Chinese swimmer bested his ROK rival in the 400 meter freestyle after the ROK participant was disqualified and then reinstated. The Olympics don’t create the deep-seated animosities that guide public (over)reaction, but we kid ourselves if we think that the emotions that are whipped up during two weeks of intense competition and chest thumping dissipate because of a Spice Girl reunion.

The final factor is the leadership transitions that are about to take place in each country. China is preparing for the handover of power to the fifth generation of leaders, likely headed by Xi Jinping. South Korea held National Assembly elections in the spring and the jockeying is intensifying for the December presidential ballot. Japan has leadership elections in each of its political parties in the coming weeks, and while a general election isn’t required to be held until next year, Prime Minister Noda Yoshihiko has already dodged one no-confidence vote and promised the opposition to hold an election “soon” -- with no date specified -- in exchange for its support for a tax increase.

As groups fight for influence during political transitions, no aspiring national leader can afford to act in ways that opponents can characterize as “soft” or insufficiently zealous in the protection of national sovereignty. While policymakers understand that nuance and compromise are essential elements of foreign and security policy, politics demand the full-throated, unyielding defense of national interests; and democracy demands that politicians pay some heed to that sentiment. There is no reward for being a statesman. The internet echo chamber amplifies nationalist complaints, providing a rallying point for like-minded provocateurs and often times dictating the agenda for the mainstream media. The “reasonable, sensible position” isn’t much of a rallying point.

Sadly, trends suggest that these cycles of provocations will persist and could intensify. Until a decade ago, there was the expectation -- the cornerstone of policy -- that as the memory of war fades and new generations mature, the intensity of those emotions would diminish and policymakers and publics would find the means and creativity to resolve enduring problems. In recent years, however, governments are instead institutionalizing such grievances. History curriculums use perceived injustices to create regime legitimacy, a step that ensures animosity persists and reduces the will to compromise. In these circumstances, protests will ebb and flow each year, especially around Aug. 15, but the overall level of the tide of discontent is almost certain to rise.

Brad Glosserman is executive director of Pacific Forum CSIS, a Honolulu-based think tank focusing on U.S. foreign policy and Asia. 

In the aftermath of the failed Russian re-set, much has been written about the Obama Administration's inability to convince Moscow to support Washington's diplomatic priorities. Nowhere is this more evident than Syria, where Russia's third veto at the United Nations' Security Council was widely portrayed as Moscow's support of Assad's reign of terror.

The Obama Administration was right to diplomatically confront Russia, however weak, for its support of an illegitimate regime willing to bomb its own people. The problem is that China, who also used its veto, has not been held to task for its unwillingness to denounce the Syrian regime. Why then the double standard?

In large part, the fault lies directly with the Obama Administration. They have demonized Russia in press conferences but held their tongue on China. One can only surmise that this reflects their strategic decision to passively accommodate rather than actively confront a rising China.

The South China Sea is a great example of the U.S.' timidity. When the U.S. closed its bases in the Philippines, America lost its hard power leverage in the region. A power vacuum was created and ASEAN could not match the strategic influence of the U.S. forward presence. China then responded by challenging the status quo and threatening its Southeast Asian neighbors with use of force by its growing navy.

The Obama Administration was caught flat-footed but nevertheless tried to pivot. Their late response was to wage a high-level diplomatic campaign against Chinese aggression in the region. They also announced a new basing agreement in Darwin, Australia for a small contingent of U.S. Marines.

The problem is that these small efforts fail to address the strategic root of the problem -- the U.S. lacks the sufficient forward presence in the Western Pacific to disincentive China from threatening use of force against its neighbors. And U.S. allies are concerned.

To be fair the new basing agreement in Darwin is a step in the right direction. But, a few thousand Marines are more of a symbolic nuisance than a strategic deterrent for the Chinese. This undermines the very rhetoric voiced by the Pentagon and State Department.

The Obama Administration must also rethink its overall defense strategy. Over the last four years, they have promoted the development of an agile, Special Forces-oriented military backed with top-secret strategic assets based far from the battlefield.

Such assets might be appropriate for killing terrorists or waging a nuclear war but they do little in the way of addressing Chinese aggression in Asia. Why? Because no one really believes that the U.S. is going to risk nuclear war over a conflict in the South China Sea unless American (or possibly its allies') forces are attacked.

If the U.S. wants to counter Chinese aggression in Asia, the Obama Administration needs to be more consistent in their approach against strategic adversaries and back-up its diplomatic rhetoric against China with hard power leverage. And, the first step should be to increase the American military's forward presence in Asia.

“Forget the past and lose an eye; dwell on the past and lose both eyes!”

This old Russian proverb comes to mind whenever I think of current Japan-South Korea relations.

The Japanese, it would appear, are eager to forget the past, while the Koreans can’t seem to see beyond it. Isn’t it time for America’s two key Northeast Asian allies to work toward a better future with both eyes open?

It some instances the flare-ups represent mere political opera with little of real substance at stake. But the latest cause for tension – the ROK government’s cancellation of both the June 29 signing of the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) and its plan to pursue an equally sensitive (but sensible) military Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) with Japan – has serious national security implications and also affects Washington’s relations with both nations. It also cost one of South Korea’s more forward thinking strategists, senior presidential secretary for national security strategy Kim Tae-Hyo, his job. His “sin”? He put Korea’s national interests ahead of public opinion.

GSOMIA is not some nefarious plot, as some critics in South Korea are making it out to be. It’s a fairly routine agreement outlining procedures which would help facilitate the sharing of classified defense-related threat information dealing with North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs and other potential common security challenges. It would also make trilateral defense cooperation with Washington easier for both. Seoul has similar agreements with some two dozen other countries and is talking about negotiating a similar agreement with Beijing (an effort that seems aimed more at generating political cover but would be useful nonetheless, but only after moving forward with the Japan agreement). An ACSA allows for logistical cooperation when both are engaged in humanitarian assistance/disaster relief and peacekeeping operations. Both pacts, long overdue, were scheduled to be signed in May. Unfortunately, that’s when public opinion and national emotions took over in South Korea, turning what Professor Jeffery Hornung described as “a practical, forward-looking effort to strengthen relations between two vibrant democracies facing shared security challenges” into “another casualty of the complexities of politics and history.”

The announcement of the impending signing provided opposition politicians – especially those who pander to citizens with lingering anti-Japanese feelings  – with a political windfall they have chosen to shamelessly exploit. Ruling party politicians have been equally shameful in their response – I guess it’s too much to expect political courage in an election year (a malady not unique to South Korea, I would hasten to add). The South Korean press has also seen fit to help inflame rather than help inform the public about the importance of such agreements.

The Lee Myung-bak administration continues to pay lip service to the agreements, saying they have not been scrapped but merely shelved until a more propitious moment. No one sees that moment coming before the December ROK presidential elections, however, resulting in more precious time being wasted. Ironically, along the sidelines of the ASEAN Regional Forum in Phnom Penh, Cambodia earlier this month, ROK Foreign Minister Kim Sung-hwan joined U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Japanese Foreign Minister Koichiro Gemba in agreeing to form a trilateral consultative body to “promote peace and stability in Northeast Asia.” But will genuine consultation and real world cooperation be possible between Seoul and Tokyo without GSOMIA and an ACSA? It’s hard to imagine how.

In discussing the history issue, most Japanese and Korean interlocutors seem to agree on only one thing: the ball is in the other one’s court. Japanese claim, not without some merit, that Tokyo has both acknowledged and apologized numerous times for the crimes of World War Two; “how much longer,” they ask, “are we to be punished for the sins of our great-grandfathers.” But other Japanese can’t seem to resist keeping the flames alive, claiming the past never occurred or, more frequently, that it wasn’t as bad as critics claim (as if it’s somehow OK if “only” 80,000 Korean women were forced into sex slavery rather than the 200,000 that some Koreans claim). Official Japanese government protests against “comfort women” statues which are springing up in the U.S. as well as in South Korea further inflame the situation and prompt even more statues to be commissioned.

Note to Tokyo: it’s called “freedom of expression”; it’s what happens in democracies. Ditto to South Koreans who insist that the government of Japan issue a formal apology every time some private citizen or parliamentarian utters a preposterous statement denying what everyone knows is fact. Democracy 101: go back and read the rules! If President Obama had to apologize for every foolish remark made by a member of the U.S. Congress, he would never get off his knees.

I have long argued that the most sensible U.S. response to the history debate is to say and do as little as possible. When faced with a lose-lose situation between two allies, it is normally more sensible not to play the game. But, like it or not, U.S. territory has now become part of the extended battlefield, and U.S. security interests are being at least peripherally affected. Seldom has a situation seemed more appropriate for a preventive diplomacy intervention than the current “comfort women” dispute between Tokyo and Seoul. The history dispute goes beyond the forced sexual slavery of Korean (and Filipino, Indonesian, Chinese, and other, including even Japanese) women by the Japanese Army during World War Two, of course, and there are territorial issues to boot, but the “comfort women” issue has become the poster child and rallying point and must be dealt with first.

As an ally and trusted friend of both nations, Washington is well situated to play the mediator role, assuming both sides ask for the intervention -- the first rule of preventive diplomacy is that outside assistance is voluntarily sought and accepted. President Obama should privately offer to provide an impartial mediator to help craft a statement that both sides can accept in order to help finally settle or at least depoliticize this issue. Someone like former President Bill Clinton or former National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft comes quickly to mind.

President Lee, along with his Japanese counterpart, Prime Minister Noda Yoshihiko, has a golden opportunity to help Koreans and Japanese face the future with both eyes open by seeking and accepting outside mediation to put this cancerous issue behind for the sake of both nations. Or he, and the people of Korea (and Japan), can remain consumed and blinded by their tragic past.

I fully understand the importance of public sentiment in a democracy but am also reminded of comments attributed to a former U.S. President,  who when reportedly asked if he knew what the American people really thought about a particular issue, relied “I know what they damn well ought to think about it.” That’s called leadership, and that’s what’s really needed to get beyond the past.

Ralph A. Cossa is president of the Pacific Forum CSIS in Honolulu, HawaiiThis article was originally published by Pacific Forum CSIS PacNet here, and represents the views of the respective author.

The long-anticipated joint EU-U.S. statement that American and European officials have been talking about for months has finally emerged. Announced on the sidelines of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) on July 12, 2012, the statement puts an end to the political toing and froing that both sides of the Atlantic have been engaged in for the past several months. What should come next are concrete actions.

The joint statement touches upon several important issues for the region’s stability: North Korea’s denuclearization, democratization in Burma, territorial claims in the South China Sea, and human rights. What stands out from the peace and security section of the statement is the EU’s pledge to support cooperative solutions for resolving territorial disputes in the South China Sea.  Given Europe’s vested interests in maritime security and the freedom of navigation, Brussels decision to adopt the United States’ procedural approach –we do not take sides but we want this dispute resolved peacefully- vis-à-vis the South China Sea was a wise choice. The transatlantic partners managed to keep the security part of the statement quite balanced. However, striking the right tone in the trade and economics section appeared to be a more daunting task. Behind phrases such as working together ”to improve reciprocal market access for goods and services including government procurement…and to protect intellectual property rights” one can only read China.

This being said, the joint EU-U.S. statement is an excellent starting point for closer transatlantic cooperation in the Asia-Pacific. It breathes new life into the transatlantic partnership’s efforts to coordinate their Asia policies and reaffirms the EU’s willingness to increase its involvement in the Asia-Pacific region. Far more important and complicated than the pledges laid out in the statement, however, is deciding what actions the two sides can take to move from words to deeds. The EU still faces an assortment of obstacles to formulating a clear, coherent strategy for the region that, in contrast to all Council papers so far, puts some actual meat on the bone. Unlike in the U.S., where the rebalancing to Asia policy has bipartisan support, in the EU the Asia-Pacific region is a divisive issue.

Jonathan Holslag, for instance, argues that European leaders should abstain from taking on a new Asian mission. According to Holslag, it is better for Europe to know its limitations and interests than to make itself look ridiculous posing as a would-be power in Asia. And it looks like some experts from the Asia Pacific would agree with him. Hugh White, one of the most prominent Australian experts, has argued “there is simply too much power in Asia itself for faraway Europe to have any impact.”

On the other hand, Jonas Parello-Plesner, another high-profile European Asia analyst, contends that Europeans should “engage much more in Asian security” and goes on to say that the ”EU’s next mission, beyond the Euro Crisis, is to become a global player.”  The results of the survey of more than a hundred European and American experts released recently by the EU Institute for Security Studies in Paris suggest that the level of satisfaction with the EU’s current performance in the Asia Pacific is low and that the EU is expected to assume a more active role in the region. But the question remains: how to achieve this?

It is no mystery by now that the EU’s recent activity in the Asia-Pacific is mostly due to pressure from the United States. When the European External Action Service – the diplomatic service of the EU - received the invitation from the State Department to work towards a common agenda in the region, European officials struggled to find a response. Should the EU go to Asia taking the transatlantic path or perhaps focus on its own objectives first? While internal EU competition for Asian markets makes it difficult to define a joint European vision in the region, the long-standing mistrust between the Europeans and Americans contradicts the rhetoric of “old partners sharing the same values.”

Holslag, in his recent article for the European Voice, observes that any European engagement is Asia “would be sheer adventurism if it did not flow from a strategic vision shared by all members.” In fact one could go further than that. For the EU to go to Asia without a crystallised vision of its own strategic objectives would be tantamount to blindly following the U.S. Most importantly, an overt EU-U.S. alignment in the Asia-Pacific would harm Europe’s image in the region. With China being the EU’s second trading partner, creating the impression that Europeans are joining the Americans in an effort to “contain” China would be disastrous for the EU’s Asia policy.

It becomes obvious that the EU first has a number of questions to answer before moving up to the next level. The good news is that the EU-U.S. dialogue on Asia has been ongoing for the last several months and is kept alive by a group of professional and committed officials. This recent political declaration will hopefully strengthen their mandate to create a more detailed roadmap for cooperation in the Asia-Pacific. A number of actions could help to facilitate this process, including:

     ●      In the short term, the EU and U.S. should create a list of their shared interests and capabilities in the region. The process of doing so would help the two sides identify potential issues where their interests diverge and help them design responses to prevent these from imperilling the larger effort, or at least mitigating their consequences. At the same time, this exercise would help avoid duplication of efforts and allow them to allocate resources more efficiently;

     ●      In the medium term, Europeans and Americans need to have a serious discussion about their partnership and its goals. The New Transatlantic Agenda of 1995 will soon celebrate its 20th anniversary and could probably be updated. A focus on Asia cannot be an afterthought or a passing thought but instead must be a part of a broader strategic vision. This exercise should be supported by a transatlantic community of experts whose interactions are currently substantially limited;

     ●      In the long term, both sides of the Atlantic need to make sure that Asia remains stable and secure. To that end, they need to find a way to constructively engage with not just with China but also India and Russia. Given the level of interconnectedness between Asia, Europe, and the United States, any disaster in the region would have major implications for the rest of the world. In that sense, even seemingly soft security issues like crisis management (natural or man-made disasters, pandemics, etc.)  or cooperation on law enforcement could bring much desired results over the next decade.

Now that the process for cooperating in Asia has been initiated, it is of great importance that the EU and the U.S. identify those steps that will take further this cooperation. To be sure, the transatlantic partners have long way to go. At the same time, the Asia-Pacific seems destined to remain on the transatlantic agenda in the foreseeable future. Most probably, it will not be an easy journey, but past diplomatic experiences and challenges have equipped the transatlantic partners quite well to deal with the issue.

Patryk Pawlak and Eleni Ekmektsioglou work for the EU Institute for Security Studies in Paris. They are currently coordinating a research project, “Look East, Act East: Transatlantic Strategies in the Asia Pacific.

Discussions about America’s “rebalancing” to the Asia-Pacific region to this point have focused on the rhetoric and resources surrounding the effort. But after more than a decade of America’s aspiring foreign policy practitioners choosing and being directed to language training and graduate programs focused on terrorism and the Middle East, we will also need a successful rebalancing of our human capital to the Asia-Pacific region to posture the United States for success. Kurt Campbell, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, said as much last month at the annual CNAS conference: “We have now built an unbelievable cadre of people that can tell you every aspect about how to do post-conflict reconstruction… What I am hoping for and what I believe will be necessary [...] is to build a similar cohort of people that are deeply, profoundly knowledgeable about Asia.”

While it is difficult to quantify the challenge the U.S. faces after a decade of focusing on the Middle East, I can attest that amongst my cohorts in Washington D.C. there exists a stark imbalance of Asia-focused experts age 25-35. This is true across the foreign policy spectrum: in think tanks, non-governmental organizations, graduate programs, at the State and Defense Departments, and on Capitol Hill. Part of this can be attributed to a decade of intense focus on the Middle East by the U.S. government and other international organizations, creating droves of career paths focused on the region. This in turn prompted graduate programs to align themselves to meet this demand, creating a new generation of terrorism, post-conflict reconstruction, and Middle East experts; NGOs that focused on the region to gain new notoriety; and think tank centers and fellowship positions to support the intellectual thrust.

As one small example of this shift, at a recent gathering I attended of 30 young foreign policy experts from around town we began the meeting by going around the room and saying our name, affiliation, and the last country we visited. To no one's surprise, only one other person and myself an Asian country as their most recent foreign destination, while almost everyone else cited a Middle East or North African state.

Consistent with Secretary Campbell’s advice, if the United States wants to continue to shape a more peaceful, prosperous, and democratic Asia-Pacific, it will need to cultivate a new generation of knowledgeable Asia experts that have spent considerable time in the region learning its political, economic, cultural, historical, and geographic contours, building language skills, and expanding personal relationships.

How can we begin to build and invest in future Asia Hands? Just like the last decade, if our government and intellectual institutions continue to shift their focus to the region, a demand for Asia experts will follow. The better question for my generation and those just beginning to chart their career path, then, is how young, talented individuals with an interest in foreign policy can chart an Asia-focused career path for themselves.

A few suggestions from a junior Asia Hand:

Learn a language. The most obvious, but critical, decision to be made. Although I have focused on defense policy in the region and am guilty of not taking my own advice, committing to an Asian language in University (and even High School, if possible) is a big hammer in the career toolbox. And while Mandarin speakers will be essential, we must also focus on Korean, Japanese, and a host of other languages from across South East Asia. One intensive way to study language that friends have chosen is the Middlebury Language School in Vermont. Another is the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center (DLIFLC) in Monterey California.

“Asia” doesn’t just mean “China.” The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is of course a focal point for discussing the region’s economic and strategic future. But we cannot forget that the “Asia-Pacific” contains some of the most exciting states in the world, from India in the west to states like Singapore, Malaysia, Vietnam, and Indonesia in the south. The ongoing political transformation in Burma over the last two years rivals the Arab Spring. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) continues to pose challenges to security on the Korean Peninsula. Finally, the United States maintains a host of alliances (with Japan, Republic of Korea, Philippines, Thailand, and Australia) that will help it play a major role in shaping the future of the region.

Get out of town! The best way to learn about Asia is to go there. It as simple as that. Too many in the foreign policy field make it to D.C. and then believe they’ve made it. Instead of becoming an “armchair” regional analyst, we need to be learning Asia by engaging with its people, culture, and politics. Even today, only 10% of students who chose to study abroad are choosing Asia (with well over 50% still heading to Europe). London, Paris, and Berlin are a fun time, but our generation should be seizing the opportunity to study a language in Tokyo or Beijing, economics in Singapore or Hong Kong, or history in Manila or Sydney. Other opportunities from Fulbright scholarships to the Japan Exchange and Teaching (JET) program also present themselves. Think tanks in the region also offer opportunities, including the Lowy Institute in Sydney and the Sasakawa Peace Foundation in Tokyo.

Get a degree...in Asia. Individuals in the foreign policy community who have not focused on Asia in their early career and are considering a Masters degree should consider studying in the region. Many American Universities have set up affiliate programs or dual degree programs with Asian affiliates in recent years. Columbia University, for instance, has a dual degree program (in English) with the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy in Singapore. Singapore also is home to the S. Rajaratnam School of International Affairs, which offers English Masters programmes in Strategic Studies, Asian Studies, International Relations, and International Political Economy, as well as a PhD program (I attended RSIS in 2009-2010 along with a handful of other American students). Other programs worth looking at are De La Salle University in Manila, Philippines, The Diplomatic Academy in Hanoi, Vietnam, and Australian National University in Canberra, Australia.

Connect to other 'Asia Hands'. A number of programs/networks exist that help to connect perspective young Asia scholars with one another. In DC, Young Professionals in Foreign Policy is a good way to meet others who focus on international relations, including Asia. The Young Leaders program at Pacific Forum CSIS in Honolulu is another great network. Pacific Forum organizes over a dozen conferences each year throughout the Asia-Pacific and invites individuals from its Young Leaders program to take part in Track 2 and Track 1.5 dialogues. The East-West Center in Honolulu also offers a range of scholarships, fellowships, and exchanges to bring Asia-focused individuals together. It also never hurts to be proactive and reach out to professors, think tank fellows, or government official working on Asia issues to ask them to share their experiences. When I was starting out I found this was an invaluable way to understand the broader community and learn how each individual and organization connected to one another.

Write on this blog! The Diplomat has its own “New Leaders Forum” page, a space just for young Asia watchers to offer their insights into the diplomatic, strategic, economic, or cultural events of the week. This online magazine has become one of the most widely-read discussion venues for Asia-specific issues. If you are in undergrad , working on a graduate degree, or further along in your career, contributing a piece to The Diplomat for publication is a great way to hone your writing skills and engage in the discussion with a global audience.

Whether we have an Obama II or Romney I Administration next January, the United States’ effort to refashion its time, energy, and resources to the Asia-Pacific region will continue. Resourcing this effort will not just require new diplomatic and military resources, but also a cadre of Asia Hands with deep knowledge of the region. The years ahead present a great opportunity for aspiring foreign policy thinkers to choose a career path focused on the Asia-Pacific region.

Eric Sayers is the Defense Policy Advisor to a U.S. Congressman on the House Armed Services Committee in Washington D.C.. He previously completed an M.Sc. degree in Strategic Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies and worked as a Sasakawa Peace Foundation fellow at the Pacific Forum CSIS in Honolulu, Hawaii. The views expressed here are his alone. He can be reached at EricSayers@gmail.com.

It is often argued that Iran’s ties with Eastern powers would make it almost impossible for the West to thwart Tehran’s nuclear ambitions.

However, recent years have displayed a very different picture: many emerging powers are beginning to distance themselves from Iran, forcing Tehran to re-examine its nuclear calculus. Emerging powers are more explicitly prioritizing their ties with the West at the expense of Tehran.

In early 2000s, Iran-West relations faced a renewed period of crisis. Despite Iran’s constructive role in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks – from assisting anti-Taliban Western operations in 2001 to acquiescence in the run-up to the Iraq invasion in 2003 – the discovery of purportedly ‘clandestine’ enrichment facilities in Natanz and Arak baffled Western powers.

Initially, the Iranians agreed to concrete confidence-building measures (i.e., implementing an Additional Protocol (AP) and imposing a temporary enrichment freeze) to contain the brewing crisis, but the situation dramatically escalated when hardliners (2005-present) took over the Iranian state.

The new leadership, under President Ahmadinejad, upped the nuclear ante by pushing the boundaries of Iran’s enrichment capabilities, reversing prior agreements with the West, and ignoring repeated U.N. Security Council Resolutions calling for greater transparency and cooperation from Iran. Gradually, Iran faced not only political isolation, but also economic pressure as European companies withdrew from the country’s key economic sectors such as manufacturing and energy.

In response, the Iranians sought greater support from traditional allies such as Russia and China, while offering increased access to companies from East Asia to South Africa, Turkey and Brazil to tap into Iran’s huge hydrocarbon reserves and burgeoning consumer market.

Iran’s explicit alignment with rising powers accomplished two objectives: (1) Allowing Tehran to dampen the impact of sanctions and growing isolation within the Western order; and (2) Increasing the stake of emerging economies in the stability and growth of Iran, thus, providing Tehran with more international support amidst intensifying external pressure over its nuclear program. 

This trend reached its peak in 2010, when the Brazilians and the Turks brokered a ‘nuclear swap’ deal with Tehran.  When the West turned down the deal, Turkey and Brazil expressed their dismay by opposing a new UNSC resolution against Iran’s nuclear program. Arguably, this was the last time that emerging powers firmly stood by Iran. 

The failure of the Turkish-Brazilian mediation was followed by vigorous, coordinated transatlantic efforts to force Iran into compromise. The West resorted to unprecedented measures targeting Iran’s economic lifeline: oil exports and the Iranian Central Bank.

Meanwhile, the emerging powers began to distance themselves from Iran. The change in the Brazilian leadership reversed President Lula’s embrace of Tehran, while differences over the Syrian crisis - coupled with growing American pressure on Ankara  – drove a wedge in Turkish-Iranian relations. On the other hand, the Chinese began (followed by the Indians) to exploit Iran’s growing economic isolation by pushing for barter trade, discounts and favorable credit terms in oil purchase, and lopsided investment deals in Iran’s infrastructure and energy sectors. The Russians – the world’s leading non-OPEC oil producer –joined the fray by benefiting from Iran’s declining output and rising global oil prices. For Moscow’s leadership, which is facing chronic budget-deficit and rising economic expectations, oil prices above $100 per barrel is a matter of fiscal survival.

In early 2012, as unilateral sanctions intensified, Tehran’s Eastern partners progressively downgraded their exposure to the Iranian impasse.  South Africa, Iran’s traditional trade partner, severely reduced oil imports from Iran. Later, South Korea, Japan, and Turkey followed suit by significantly reducing their Iranian oil import to gain American waivers of exemptions. Then came India’s gradual cut in Iran imports. Meanwhile, China paused increases to its overall intake of Iranian oil – compared to 2011 – and is set to further exploit its position as Iran’s sole major importer. In total, top Asian customers have reduced their Iranian imports by almost 18 percent., with Korea and Singapore set to completely halt Iranian oil imports. In exchange, the U.S. has granted waivers of exemption to all of Iran’s major oil customers.  

Iran’s economy is hurting. The World Bank and the IMF have markedly downgraded their forecast of Iran’s GDP growth for this year. From a relative high of 2.5-3 percent growth projection in mid-2011, the IMF is expecting only 0.36 percent growth, while the World Bank is projecting a 1 percent contraction for the year 2012.

In the past, Iran could afford to defy the West, because it benefited from improving ties with rising powers, trade with European economies, and record-high oil prices. Now, Iran is not only facing declining oil exports and political estrangement with Europe, but it is also coming under growing pressure by the Russians, Chinese, and the Indians to strike a compromise with the West.

Ahead of the recently-concluded nuclear talks in Moscow, leaders from Beijing, New Delhi, and Moscow have all called on Iran to cooperate with the IAEA and resolve outstanding questions to diffuse tensions over its nuclear program.

While India's acting Permanent Representative to the United Nations Manjeev Singh Puri stated, “Iran should fully cooperate with the IAEA to restore the confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear programme,” the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Liu Weimin urged Iran to show more “flexibility and pragmatism” in nuclear negotiations. For their part, the Russians sent Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov to Tehran to urge the Iranians to contribute to a fruitful resolution of the nuclear crisis.

Gradually, Tehran is beginning to realize that the BRICS are neither reliable nor are they capable of meeting Iran’s growing economic and security needs as the West tightens the noose around the Islamic regime.

Javad Heydarian is a Manila-based foreign affairs analyst focusing on international security and development issues. His articles have been featured or cited in Foreign Policy in Focus, Asia Times, UPI, the Transnational Institute and the Tehran Times, among other publications.

This week, legislation tied to Japan’s reform of social security and taxation systems, including a bill to raise the consumption tax rate from the current 5 percent to 8 percent in April 2014 and then to 10 percent in October 2015, passed the Lower House.

The proposal to increase the consumption tax rate has been highly contentious. Proponents see a fiscal and social need to reduce the national debt, which already exceeds 200 percent of GDP, and to make sacrifices for the future. Opponents voice concern over a possible blow to their household accounts and businesses, particularly if they are small- to mid-sized businesses.

According to the Dai-ichi Life Research Institute Inc., an average household with an annual income of 5,000,000~5,500,000JPY (with working parent and two children) will pay an additional 73,000JPY ($915) and 120,000JPY more annually under the increased rates of 8 percent and 10 percent, respectively. A Bloomberg article warns that Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda’s decision would “risk stalling the economy.”

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The Rio+20 United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development (UNCSD) in Rio de Janeiro last week brought together world leaders, government officials, and civil society and private sector representatives  seeking the best ways of working toward achieving a global “green economy,” poverty eradication and sustainable development. 

Long before the conference even began, however, there was considerable pessimism that Rio+20 would amount to anything more than another elite talking shop. And the outcome of this massive multilateral effort appears to have vindicated these gloomy forecasts.

So what did Rio+20 achieve? 

One Step Forward

There were several positive outcomes, the most notable of which was the decision to set up Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) next year. Unlike the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), the SDG topics are broader and will include all three aspects of sustainable development – economic, social and environmental. The SDGs also seek to continue momentum in international development work beyond the poverty eradicating mission of the MDGs, which will lapse in 2015.

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Many U.S. and South Korean analysts have become increasingly frustrated, indeed annoyed, by China’s policy toward North Korea. In their view, China’s policy not only jeopardizes the security of the United States and South Korea, but also undermines international norms in a way detrimental to China’s own national interests.

In an eloquent analysis on Pacific Forum CSIS, Ralph Cossa and Brad Glosserman argued that China’s  North Korea policy is “misguided, illogical and self-defeating” because it enables North Korean misbehavior, antagonizes China’s neighbors, contributes to the strengthening of U.S. alliances in the region and tarnishes China’s international image.

But the judgment on whether China’s North Korea policy is illogical or self-defeating very much depends on the perception of China’s goals. Despite all the criticism, most Chinese analysts would argue that China’s policy has its own internal logic, and that suggesting otherwise is to fail to see the issue through Chinese eyes.

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The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) derives much of its legitimacy from ensuring stellar economic growth. Such growth is, of course, resource intensive, and those who consider the CCP’s brand of stability a virtue would err in discounting the role secure energy supply lines have to play in keeping the political status quo. This is true now more than ever, as Beijing’s quest for oil, metal and minerals takes it far from its own shores.

As China develops complex economic and strategic interests in Africa and the Middle East, what hinders freedom of navigation through the Indian Ocean and much of the Pacific will concern Beijing mightily. However, the discomfort with sharing maritime security responsibilities closer to home is unsurprising. Considering the relative strength of those patrolling the waters (mainly Japan and the U.S.) the fear is that in times of crisis, access to critical Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) could be blocked. Or worse, Beijing might be forced to make a compromise not in keeping with its long held logic of sovereignty over a region that extends far beyond what international law would seem to permit.

In addition, the combined weight of 21 of the world’s biggest navies is, by some measures, 6.75 million tons. Remove the U.S. Navy and that leaves the global fleet 46 percent lighter at about 3.63 million tons, b some estimates. Though not the most accurate gauge of naval prowess, the skewered weight distribution, combined with the U.S. Navy’s pound for pound superiority, surely can’t bode well for a rising power wary of the status quo.

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