Every Friday, The Diplomat’s Harry Kazianis looks out across the net to find the best articles and analysis involving defense, strategic affairs, and foreign policy. From America’s pivot to Asia, China’s growing military power, North Korea’s seemingly daily threats to the various territorial spats across the region, The Diplomat has you covered with what you need to know going into the weekend.

Here is our top five this Friday. Have we missed something you think should be included? Want to share an important article with other readers? Please submit your links in the comment box below! Happy Friday!

White House Says it Believes Syria Has Used Chemical Arms (New York Times) - "The assessment could test President Obama’s repeated warnings that the use of chemical weapons by President Bashar al-Assad might precipitate American intervention in Syria."

Shipbuilding Plan Portends a Navy in Decline (RealClearDefense) - "Listening to the Secretary of the Navy testify before Congress this week, one might be lulled into thinking all is well with U.S. Navy shipbuilding. But the president’s budget for 2014 shrinks and diminishes the Navy’s fleet. Again. Last year’s budget accelerated these same trends while permanently downsizing the Navy’s long-standing fleet goal from 313 to 298 ships."

Paper Tiger (Foreign Policy) - "Why isn't the rest of Asia afraid of China?"

Half of American's Can't Identify Syria on a Map (Washington Post) - "One in five respondents told Pew they thought it was Turkey."

China's Strategic Hedging (Orbis, paywall) - "China has sought to gain regional influence by utilizing a mix of energy investments and military modernization efforts. China's overall efforts aim to bring about three broad goals. First, China seeks to hedge its economic growth potential against the threat of energy source disruption. Second, it seeks to limit or deny access to areas of operations within the first island chain, effectively expanding their core strategic zone of interest within the South China Sea. Third, China wants to establish the Taiwan Strait as a ‘no-go’ zone preventing U.S. interference in the event of another Taiwan crisis. This type of hedging behavior can enhance a second-tier state's power without directly challenging the system leader. China has experienced some success in this approach but at a high cost. Its use of strategic hedging as an insurance policy carries a high financial and diplomatic premium."

How does coalition-building affect procurement?  To what extent do (or should) states anticipate operating in a multilateral environment, and choose their weapons accordingly? A recent FlightGlobal article examined Canadian military procurement policies, especially with regard to plans to replace the Royal Canadian Air Force’s CF-18 fleet with F-35 Joint Strike Fighters. The F-35 purchase has generated a great deal of controversy because of the heavy price tag and the contracting process. Much of the debate turns on how Canada expects to become involved in foreign conflicts, and consequently on what tasks are required from Canadian military forces.

The process sheds light on how Canada, a state which has long conceived of its security interests as being embedded with the United States and the United Kingdom, thinks about the design of its military institutions. The question of integration with foreign partners has long bedeviled aspects of Canadian defense policy; the disconnect between Canadian civilians and military commanders during the Cuban Missile Crisis played a role in the eventual decision to unify the Canadian armed forces. Because the services were intimately tied to their counterparts in the UK and the United States, Canada ran the risk of going to war without sufficient civilian deliberation.

Canada’s dilemma in this regard is hardly unique. The broader question involves the degree to which military procurement policies will be guided by expectations of integration into a multi-lateral military framework. Middle powers have a choice between procurement policies that maximize their unilateral security, and policies that maximize their ability to contribute to multilateral operations. For example, the United Kingdom faces a choice between preserving its nuclear deterrent (at this point a fundamentally unilateral project), and maintaining viable conventional forces capable of operating at the sharp point of NATO.

For what it’s worth, the choice the United Kingdom faces seems to be an easy one, with (nuclear armed) irrelevance on one hand and non-nuclear but conventionally potent forces on the other. Canada’s choice is obviously more complicated, but it is difficult to imagine a strategic situation demanding that the Royal Canadian Air Force spearhead a prolonged air campaign against a modern air defense system. Following the defeat of an enemy air defense system, RCAF CF-18s (or Typhoons, or Rafales) can make Canada’s contribution in a far more cost effective manner than Joint Strike Fighters, the F-35’s stealth notwithstanding. Given that the U.S. Navy may continue to purchase F-18s, it’s less than clear that Canada will be left behind by a decision to forego the F-35 purchase.

In contrast to the Atlantic, the Asia-Pacific lacks this degree of military integration, although proposals for such joint ventures as ASEAN military exercises may point the direction toward greater integration in the future. As Andy Thomchick recently argued, the Philippines procurement policies may increasingly make military integration with the United States a given. But even between South Korea and Japan, tensions and strategic disagreements prevent coordination of security policy from reaching deep enough to touch procurement, although in some sense both Korean and Japanese procurement is complementary with that of the United States. Meanwhile AirSea Battle remains a tough sell even in states as friendly as Australia.

Thus, the United States can to some extent provide a focal point for procurement decisions across the Asia-Pacific, at least to the extent that states see their interests as aligning with those of the U.S.  But Washington shouldn’t expect that Japan, Australia, the Philippines or the RoK will ever become as embedded in a U.S. led security community as Canada currently is, even though all of them should nonetheless pay close attention to how their procurement policies can address gaps in U.S. capability. They should also identify areas in which their strategic interests do not coincide with that of the United States or other neighbors, and determine what assets are fundamentally unilateral in nature and which operate best in a multilateral context. 

Over the weekend Chinese President Xi Jinping issued an order requiring PLA and People’s Armed Police generals and senior officers to spend two weeks on front lines as enlisted, low-ranking soliders.

According to South China Morning Post, the order stipulates that, “Leaders of regiment- and brigade-level units have to serve on the front line once every three years. Division- and army-level commanders must serve once every four years. Top leaders from army headquarters and military districts will do so once every five years.”

The move is part of an ongoing effort by Xi to impose greater discipline on a military brass that many argue was allowed to grow intolerably corrupt under Xi’s two immediate predecessors. The fear is that the extravagance the military leadership indulges in is reducing the army’s professionalism and alienating officers from the men they command, ultimately curtailing combat-readiness.

Since taking office in November, Xi has taken a number of steps that aim to change this military culture, or at least tame its greatest excesses. Some of these measures have been rather small and symbolic, as when military officers attending the National People’s Congress last month were required to share hotel rooms. Other aspects have been more substantive such as banning expensive banquets and alcohol consumption, as well as prohibiting military officers from obtaining military license plates for their private vehicles.

The new directive imposes similar conditions on the military: “They need to provide for themselves and pay for their own food. They must not accept any banquet invitation, join any sight-seeing tours, accept gifts or interfere with local affairs." 

Unlike the restrictions cited above, however, the demotions here will only be temporary, assuming it is enforced on so many officers at all. 

But the order is more notable for its symbolism, given the parallels it has with Mao’s rule of China when senior Party and military leaders were often forced to perform humiliating feats ostensibly to retain their revolutionary fervor, but really to reinforce Mao’s ironclad rule. As SCMP points out, the military was not exempt from this in all occasions, and was the primary target in at least one campaign in 1958.

The senior CCP leadership’s relationship with the military brass has changed in fundamental ways since Mao and Deng Xiaoping’s time in power. Unlike Mao and Deng Xiaoping, who had both been battle-hardened guerrilla commanders before coming to power, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao hadn’t served in the military and were thus less certain of its leader’s personal loyalty.

From watching Mao and Deng’s reliance on the military, Jiang and Hu grasped the importance of winning this loyalty. Deng underscored this when handing power to Jiang, allegedly recommending that “Out of five working days, spend four with the top brass.”

According to Richard McGregor, Jiang took this message seriously by visiting 100 military installations in his first two years in power, and preparing for all military parades by practicing his moves in front of a mirror the night before.

Hu Jintao himself wasn’t above taking symbolic actions of his own when first coming to power.

As Scott Harold, associate political scientist at the US-based Rand Corporation, told The Diplomat via email:

“At the outset of Hu Jintao’s term he took the Politburo Standing Committee to Xibaipo, the last village the Red Army and the CCP leadership occupied before entering Beiping (now Beijing) as the victors in the Chinese civil war.  The intent was to remind the leadership that they had come from revolutionary origins and had to stay true to the ideals of the founders before they took power and developed the perverse vested interests that unchecked and unaccountable power produces.” 

Unlike Jiang and Hu, though, Xi Jinping is a princeling whose father was a commander in the Red Army during the wars that brought the Communist Party to power. This gives Xi a certain amount of respect with the military brass, many of whom he has known for years. Notably, Xi also differs from his two immediate predecessors in that he inherited the chairmanship of the Central Military Commission, the country’s top military decision-making body, at the same time that he became head of the Party in November.

All of these factors better position Xi to bring change to the military than were Hu and Jiang. Still, the order Xi issued over the weekend is unlikely to have much impact, the Rand Corporation’s Harold predicts.

“I don’t see much reason to think that 15 days out of 365 spent cleaning latrines or eating grunt rations will systematically reshape the thinking of military leaders whose perquisites are almost certainly beyond the imaginings of most enlistees,” Harold says.

“And moreover the nature of Chinese political culture, as well as the mere practical realities of how hierarchically-structured organizations like the armed forces [operate], will make it extremely difficult for the common soldier to treat the generals as genuine colleagues given that they will shortly thereafter go back to being their superior officers.”  

So, maybe after all of North Korea's recent bluster we may now know a possible motivation for the recent standoff:  Pyongyang might simply be in need of food.

The Wall Street Journal's Korea Real Time blog reported this week that "at a courtesy call on the Mongolian president last week, Pyongyang’s new ambassador made a request for food aid, according to the official website for the head of state."

Mongolia's Presidential website has released a statement that confirms this report:

"At the meeting, both sides exchanged opinion on enhancing partnership in sport and cultural sector and discussed possibilities to bring North Korean basketball, football team and judokas to Mongolia to prepare for the international competitions. Mr. Hong Gyu said ‘North Korea may face severe food shortage. Therefore, we ask Mongolia to learn possibilities of delivering food aid to North Korea.’"

As has been discussed on The Diplomat, and by many academics and regional experts, there is a historical pattern of North Korean belligerence being followed by attempts to get aid. This process begins with North Korea making wild, outlandish threats or otherwise provoking a crisis. Many times South Korea, the United States and Japan have provided aid after some sort of agreement is reached. North Korea then later breaks the agreement, again making wild and threatening statements, and once again receiving again. This pattern has repeated over and over.

For its part, the Obama Administration has adopted a policy of "Strategic Patience," which basically vows to not reward North Korean belligerence with negotiations for aid.

The United States, some would argue, has been backing off this approach recently -- if only slightly.  Over the past several weeks the U.S. has stated North Korea must show progress towards denuclearization before talks can resume.

While current tensions have eased somewhat over the past week, North Korea has rejected the United States’ preconditions for talks, stating, "If the DPRK sits at a table with the U.S. it has to be a dialogue between nuclear weapons states, not one side forcing the other to dismantle nuclear weapons." 

The U.S. has also rejected what could be called North Korea’s preconditions for talks as well.

So, how does the current crisis end? Stay tuned...

On Monday, the military chiefs from China and the U.S., Gen. Fang Fenghui and Gen. Martin Dempsey, gave a joint press conference after holding meetings throughout the day. As expected, cybersecurity was a major topic of discussion in these meetings, as the Obama administration is ramping up pressure on China to curb its alleged cyber attacks on U.S. companies.

In a Wall Street Journal report that (not coincidentally) appeared on the same day of Fang and Dempsey’s meetings, numerous unnamed U.S. officials were quoted as saying that there has been a sharp increase in the number of American corporations who have approached the administration in recent months, to ask them to do more to curb China’s cyber attacks.

In response the administration held a meeting with Chinese officials in January where a U.S. intelligence official gave a two hour long presentation laying out the evidence of Chinese military involvement in these attacks. At the same time, since then the administration has continued to try to increase engagement with China on this issue, including during Secretary of State John Kerry’s trip to the country earlier this month, when the two sides agreed to begin holding a dialogue on cybersecurity.

Gen. Fang’s remarks at the press conference yesterday have been widely depicted by international media report as another sign that China will work with the U.S. on cybersecurity. According to Bloomberg News, Fang said at the press conference:“If Internet security cannot be controlled, it’s not an exaggeration to say the effects could be no less than a nuclear bomb.”

This may not be as placating as it sounds, however, or at the very least was not taken to be the Pentagon, who summarized Fang’s remarks on its site as having said “if Internet is not managed well,” without attributing that direct quote to Fang.

The fact that the story on the Pentagon’s website used the words “not managed well” seems significant. After all, China and other countries often use words like “management” and “supervision” of the internet to describe actions that Western governments would call censorship.

Indeed, Fang and Dempsey’s meeting takes place in the context of a larger battle for control over the internet that is being waged by a bloc of countries led by Russia and China, which believe that national and international organizations should have greater control over cyberspace, and the mostly Western states who argue that non-governmental organizations and the private sector should continue to regulate the internet.

This battle was on full display at a December UN conference in Dubai that was held to update the treaty that created the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), a UN Agency, when it was first signed in the late 1980’s. What should have been a relatively uncontroversial matter became quite heated when countries led by Russia, China, and Iran proposed language that would expand the ITU’s mission to include cyberspace. Western nations balked at this proposal arguing these new provisions would give the ITU—and by extension, national governments— greater authority to regulate and censor the internet. No common ground could be found between the two camps during the two week conference, prompting the Western nations to storm out in the final days.

In this context, one interpretation of Gen. Fang’s remarks is that China is responding to U.S. concerns over the cyber attacks by saying that it absolutely agrees that cyber activities pose a huge threat (comparable to nuclear weapons), and that the proper response to counter this threat is to give governments’ greater control over the internet.

Other comments Fang made at the press conference seem to support this interpretation. For example, Fang reportedly said, “The Internet is open to everyone and attacks can be launched from anywhere.” More government control over cyberspace could allow them to prevent the Internet from being open to everybody across all borders.

Fang also reportedly spoke at length about the difficulty of attribution when it comes to cyber attacks, something China has been emphasizing since the allegations of its cyber attacks on American companies began. On the one hand, this is done to dispute that the U.S. intelligence actually proves the PLA is directly responsible for the attacks. On the other hand, some of the ways countries might strengthen their capabilities for pinpointing cyber attacks could include forcing users to provide their real identities when purchasing internet service or registering with social media sites, both of which China is doing.

This interpertation also just makes sense from a policy standpoint. China to respond in this way to U.S. allegations that it conducts cyber attacks on American companies. On the one hand, China would be able to present itself as quite willing to cooperate with the U.S. on cybersecurity. On the other hand, its approach to addressing the issue is one America is almost certain to reject. Thus, the status-quo persists but it is America, not China, that is seen as unwilling to play ball in the cyber world.

The armed forces of the United States and the Philippines conducted the 29th annual Balikatan joint military exercises April 5 through April 17. These military exercises are the largest and most significant joint military operations between the U.S. and Filipino militaries.

The exercises are “a signature element” of the “two nations’ robust treaty alliance relationship.” The war games help the U.S. military and Filipino military operate more effectively together—especially when it comes to humanitarian disaster relief missions.

But the militaries also conduct joint field exercises and try to come up with more effective ways to work together on the battlefield amid the chaos of combat. An estimated 8,000 U.S. and Filipino troops took part in the exercises. The U.S. Marine Corps brought in heavy-hitting military hardware—F/A-18 fighters, MV-22 Osprey aircraft, and amphibious assault vehicles (AAVs)—to make the field exercises as realistic as possible.

One of the major challenges for the U.S. in the region is the weakness of Filipino naval and air forces. As one member of the Academy of Military Sciences of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army commented, “In this joint exercise, the U.S. side mobilized a large amount of advanced navy and air force equipment, while the Philippines had but little to show in contrast.” The U.S. therefore acts as a “bodyguard” for the Philippines.

It’s not quite that simple. These exercises build on the interoperability of U.S. and Filipino forces. Such cooperation also sets an example for military-to-military cooperation with other countries in the region at a time when U.S. leadership is critical. The territorial disputes in the South China Sea, particularly between the Philippines and China, demand that the U.S. take a strong stance to guarantee the security of our treaty allies and to maintain the freedom of navigation in the South China Sea.

The U.S.–Philippines alliance needs a better equipped, more “ready” Filipino element. As Filipino scholar Renato de Castro and Heritage’s Walter Lohman explain:

"The Philippines has the weakest navy in the region, and its air force is unable to patrol and monitor its vast maritime territory. It resorts to the futile filing of diplomatic protests whenever an aggressive China encroaches on its [exclusive economic zone]."

The symbol of the Philippines’s need for assistance is the fact that it does not have a single fighter aircraft in service today.

In light of the current situation, the U.S. should:

- Help the Filipino military build up its forces, particularly its naval and air forces, so that they can contribute more to the alliance;

- Reaffirm our commitment to the 1951 U.S–Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty (MDF) and make it clear that an attack on either U.S. or Filipino “armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific” will result in a U.S. response in accordance with the MDF treaty; and

- Maintain a strong forward-deployed presence in the Western Pacific. As Lohman argues, a strong America in Asia will lead to a “stable and secure” region and will lend credibility to our commitment to our allies.

Maintaining a strong relationship with the Philippines and helping them build up their military forces is an absolutely critical factor in the U.S. strategic “pivot” to Asia.

Andy Thomchick is currently a member of the Young Leaders Program at The Heritage Foundation. The following post was republished with permission.

When China's military modernization hit its stride over the last decade, America’s Asian allies and partners began to wonder how the U.S. plans to respond to the PLA’s growing ‘anti-access/ area-denial’ (A2/AD) capabilities.

‘Air-Sea Battle’ (ASB) has become a much discussed potential Pentagon response at the level of U.S. warfighting doctrine. While US officials refrain from naming names, everyone in Asia knows that this is about China. In short, ASB is about planning for a potential U.S.-Sino military confrontation in the Asia-Pacific, raising the stakes for allies given that they are expected to play a major role in implementing the concept.

According to some U.S. think tank, alongside Japan Australia is to play a central role. For the most part, the Australian debate – to the extent that there has been one - has either fully embraced or dismissed ASB. However, as I argue here in much more detail, a middle position which identifies both strengths and weaknesses is more fruitful.

Let’s start with the positives. The ASB initiative should be welcomed as an attempt by the U.S. to strengthen its conventional deterrence posture, thus balancing China's increasing hard power by signalling both the intention and the capability to operate in maritime zones increasingly contested by the PLA. Some analysts have argued that ASB is only a military-technological concept which enables a new degree of joint operations between U.S. air and naval forces in an A2/AD environment. But while the concept has certainly a technological dimension to it, it's the political message that matters most. Any Chinese leader would need to calculate the possibility and nature of a U.S. reaction in response to a major military action designed to change the status quo in the Western Pacific.

This deterrence dynamic is particularly important in East Asia, where Taiwan and Japan in particular are deeply concerned about China’s increased military pressure. Not surprisingly, these two countries are the most welcoming when it comes to ASB, given that they are ‘front line’ states in the emerging U.S.-Sino strategic competition.

The concept plays to the strength of the U.S. military when it comes to high-intensity warfare. Indeed, the U.S. Navy and Air Force are likely working on counter-measures against much-hyped PLA capability developments such as its ‘carrier killer’ DF-21 anti-ship ballistic missile. ASB could thus make a critical contribution to regional stability by promoting deterrence in Sino-US strategic affairs.

However, the concept appears optimized for deterring a high‐intensity conventional war between China and the U.S. and its allies—extreme cases such as PLA attacks on Taiwan, Japan or forward deployed US forces. Because it's a 'big stick,' it will probably be far less effective against small scale Chinese aggression, like coercive military actions in maritime territorial disputes where the stakes are small enough to (probably) avoid high levels of escalation. The U.S. is thus still in search for a credible deterrence strategy for such cases, especially in the South China Sea. That's why Southeast Asian allies and partners are much more ambivalent when it comes to ASB, and the U.S. would be ill advised to take their participation for granted.

Moreover, it isn’t clear how AirSea Battle fits within a broader U.S. grand strategic framework to deal with China’s military rise. Some analysts have called for the development of a grand strategic framework to guide American Asia‐Pacific defense strategy. Left unaddressed, ASB will continue to suffer from an image problem, and be seen as being designed to militarily 'contain' China. The U.S. thus needs to do more to explain the concept’s rationale to its allies. And it needs to explain it to China as well—the emergence of a military strategy designed to counter China's growing strength hasn't gone unnoticed in Beijing.

To minimize the risk of major power war, ASB should feature in the upcoming Sino-U.S. high-level military talks. This must include a debate on the relationship between ASB and nuclear deterrence. Advocates argue that escalation in an ASB context could be kept at the conventional level. That is a dangerous proposition given that the concept entails deep penetration of Chinese territory to destroy and disrupt PLA command and control nodes used for conventional operations. Beijing might well perceive such attacks as American attempts to disarm China’s nuclear deterrent and could thus be tempted to nuclear pre‐emption.

What is needed is a mutual understanding that as Chinese conventional and nuclear forces grow, a new concept of strategic stability in U.S.-Sino relations is required. While the US can no longer strike China conventionally with impunity, China should not assume that it can increase conventional brinkmanship under a (more) secure nuclear second-strike capability. In an emerging deterrence framework, the U.S. needs to persuade China that ASB is actually part of an ‘escalation ladder’designed to avoid acatastrophic nuclear exchange.

What then about Australia? Given what’s at stake we need to be an active participant in the future evolution of ASB. But that doesn’t mean that Canberra should sign up to a concept which is still in want for detailed explanation about allied participation. After all, Australia is not a ‘front line’ state in U.S.-Sino strategic competition and it could, if needed, provide vital military niche capabilities and ‘strategic depth’ independently of any public commitment. The Pentagon needs to do much more to persuade allies that ASB is the right response to China’s military challenge.

Ben Schreer is Senior Analyst Defence Strategy at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) in Canberra. He can be reached at benjaminschreer@aspi.org.au

There’s no doubt that China’s Dong Feng 21D (DF-21D) anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) is, in theory, a formidable anti-access weapon. Since its alleged deployment circa 2010, many defense analysts have argued that the so-called “carrier killer” would be a game changer in any armed conflict in Northeast Asia and prevent the participation of U.S. carrier groups in regional contingencies, such as war in the Taiwan Strait. But is the missile really that much of a threat, or is all the hype part of an asymmetrical campaign by China to defeat its enemies without a fight?

If last week’s statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee by Defense Intelligence Agency Director Michael T Flynn is any indication, the U.S. military is buying into the capabilities of the DF-21D. The unclassified version of Flynn’s annual threat assessment even states that China has augmented its 1,200 conventionally armed short-range ballistic missiles deployed opposite Taiwan with “a limited but growing number of conventionally armed, medium-range ballistic missiles, including the DF-21D.”

But ever since the People’s Liberation Army then chief of general staff General Chen Bingde gave the first official confirmation in July 2011 that the PLA was developing the DF-21D ASBM, specifics about the missile have been few and far between, with officials refraining from discussing the program in detail. For the most part, the hype has been the result of reports in Chinese media, which were subsequently picked up by Western outlets and analysts — including the missile’s alleged maximum range of 2,700 km, which, it was later found, had been an erroneous addition by editors at the China Daily. Later assessments by the U.S. Department of Defense set the missile’s range “in excess of 1,500 km.”

Although some analysis have posited that the lack of information given by Chinese officials about the DF-21D may stem from efforts to downplay the threat and thereby disincline U.S. and regional powers from developing effective countermeasures, the reverse could also be true. It is worth exploring the possibility that the DF-21D is an asymmetrical weapon whose utility is unrelated to whether the system has reached “initial operational capability.” In other words, the ASBM doesn’t have to be fully operational to meet China’s strategy of anti-access and area-denial within its sphere of influence.

As long as there is enough uncertainty, and as long as experts worldwide vaunt the missile’s threat to carrier battle groups and other surface vessels within the region, the DF-21D will remain the ultimate deterrent. As far as we know, the PLA has yet to conduct a test of the ASBM with a moving target in the middle of the ocean — a huge challenge for even the most technologically advanced military. To date, the only alleged test has involved “sinking” an immobile carrier mockup in the Gobi desert, which, even if successful, hardly replicated actual combat conditions. And yet, despite never having conducted proper tests, we are told that the PLA has deployed the DF-21D, and many accept that at face value.

The value of such deception is hard to overstate. The Chinese government may not have gone as far as to claim that it is producing DF-21Ds “like sausages,” as the former Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev once famously said of his country’s nuclear missile production, but its decision not to correct misrepresentations in the media nevertheless encourage paranoia. This certainly reflects Sun Tzu’s saying that the acme of skill is one’s ability to subdue the enemy without fighting. This also has echoes of Myamoto Musashi, who famously said in The Book of Fire Rings that: “In battle, if you make your opponent flinch, you have already won.”

What if our intelligence missed some crucial information, and China’s ASBM capabilities are far more advanced than we expected? Such questioning alone can be sufficient to deter intervention in second-tier (that is, of no existential value to the U.S.) conflicts where decision makers in Washington might not want to gamble an aircraft carrier over, say, Taiwan, or disputed islets in the South China Sea. Ironically, it also provides convenient ammunition to voices in the U.S. that have increasingly called on Washington to “abandon” Taiwan, which is far more important to China than it is to the U.S.

One of China’s top mid-term objectives is to push U.S. naval forces out of what it regards as its backyard. It will use every means at its disposal — diplomacy, sweeteners, threats — to achieve this goal. It would be a terrible mistake to ignore deception as another tool in China’s box.

Both China and U.S. officials will be crossing the Pacific over the next coming days to hold talks with their counterparts on how to move forward on North Korea. At this point it appears both countries hope to restart negotiations with Pyongyang possibly through the six-party talks format.

On Friday China’s Foreign Ministry announced that the country’s special envoy for North Korea, Wu Dawei, will travel to Washington, DC to hold consultations with his U.S. counterpart, Glyn T. Davies, the State Department’s special envoy on North Korea.

According to the New York Times, Wu has previous served as the chairman of the six party talks that include China, Russia, the U.S., Japan, South Korea, and North Korea. His trip to Washington comes at the invitation of Davies Chinese Foreign Ministry said on Friday, the New York Times reported.

At roughly the same time Wu is traveling to the United States for consultations, Deputy Secretary of State William Burns and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey will be in China meeting with their counterparts. Neither official is traveling to China alone and are almost certain to discuss issues other than North Korea while in China. Still, the Korea crisis is certain to be on the agenda as all parties seek to a path towards restarting negotiations.

General Dempsey leaves later today for the region with the first stop in South Korea. From there he will head to China for four days before moving on to Japan. The primary purpose of Dempsey’s time in China is to expand mil-to-mil ties with the PLA. To that end Foreign Policy’s National Security site reports that the general’s time will be spent mainly with General Fang Fenghui, chief of the PLA’s general staff.

Meanwhile, the State Department has announced that Deputy Secretary Burns will leave for a nearly weeklong visit to Asia on Tuesday that will include a stop in China on Wednesday and Thursday to “meet with senior Chinese officials to discuss bilateral, regional, and global issues of mutual concern.” Like Dempsey, Burns will also travel to Japan and South Korea during this trip and it therefore seems almost certain that North Korea and the six-party talks will figure front and center of these discussions.

Every Friday, The Diplomat’s Harry Kazianis looks out across the net to find the best articles and analysis involving defense, strategic affairs, and foreign policy. From America’s pivot to Asia, China’s growing military power, North Korea’s seemingly daily threats to the various territorial spats across the region, The Diplomat has you covered with what you need to know going into the weekend.

Here is our top five this Friday. Have we missed something you think should be included? Want to share an important article with other readers? Please submit your links in the comment box below! Happy Friday!

Is China Changing Its Position on Nuclear Weapons (New York Times) – “Interpreting any country’s pronouncements about its nuclear weapons can be a study in fine distinctions, but occasionally a state says — or fails to say — something in a clear break from the past. A Chinese white paper on defense, released on Tuesday, falls into this category and now demands our attention, because it omits a promise that China will never use nuclear weapons first.”

USS Freedom Arrives in Singapore (DefenseNews) – “USS Freedom, the U.S. Navy’s first littoral combat ship, arrived in Singapore on Thursday, just over six weeks after leaving San Diego for the type’s first major overseas deployment, the U.S. Navy announced.”

Off to a Bad Start (Foreign Policy) – “Why is the president letting America’s nukes rust?”

North Korea Hints at Openness to Talks, Despite Still-Venomous Rhetoric (Washington Post) – “Government officials and security analysts in the region say North Korea is scaling back its campaign of threats and showing signs it wants to ease tensions with South Korea and the United States.”

U.S. Could Be World’s Most Populous Country (Yale Global) – “The United States could aim to have largest population in the world before the end of the century, thus ensuring its power.”