The USA’s GCV Infantry Fighting Vehicle: 3rd time the charm?

Bradley puts on wear

The US Army’s Heavy Brigade Combat Teams have relied on BAE’s 30+ ton Bradley family of M2/3/6/7 vehicles for a variety of combat functions, from armed infantry carrier and cavalry scout roles, to specialized tasks like calling artillery fire and even short-range air defense. The Bradley first entered US Army service in 1981, however, and the fleet has served through several wars. Even ongoing RESET, modernizations, and remanufacturing cannot keep them going indefinitely.

The Army’s problem is that replacing them has been a ton of trouble. Future Combat Systems’ MGV-IFV was terminated, along with the other MGV variants, by the 2010 budget. A proposal to replace it with a “Ground Combat Vehicle” (GCV) program raised concerns that the Army’s wish list would create an even less affordable solution. Now a revised GCV program is underway. Can it deliver a vehicle that will be effective on the battlefield? Just as important, can it deliver a vehicle that the US Army can afford to buy and maintain, in the midst of major national budgetary problems and swelling entitlement programs?

Aussie Anti-Air Umbrella: The Hobart Class Ships

F100 visits Sydney

Under the SEA 4000 Air Warfare Destroyer program, Australia plans to replace its retired air defense destroyers with a modern system that can provide significantly better protection from air attack, integrate with the US Navy and other Coalition partners, offer long-range air warfare defense for Royal Australian Navy task groups, and help provide a coordinated air picture for fighter and surveillance aircraft. Despite their name and focus, the ships are multi-role designs with a “sea control” mission that also includes advanced anti-submarine and surface warfare capabilities.

The Royal Australian Navy took a pair of giant steps in June 2007, when it selected winning designs for its keystone naval programs: Canberra Class LHD amphibious operations vessels, and Hobart Class “air warfare destroyers.” Spain’s Navantia made an A$ 11 billion clean sweep, winning both the A$ 3 billion Canberra Class LHD and the A$ 8 billion Hobart Class Air Warfare Destroyer contracts. The new AWD ships were scheduled to begin entering service with the Royal Australian Navy in 2013, but that date has now slipped to 2016 or so.

LCS: The USA’s Littoral Combat Ships

Austal Team
Trimaran LCS Design
(click to enlarge)

Exploit simplicity, numbers, the pace of technology development in electronics and robotics, and fast reconfiguration. That was the US Navy’s idea for the low-end backbone of its future surface combatant fleet. Inspired by successful experiments like Denmark’s Standard Flex ships, the US Navy’s $35+ billion “Littoral Combat Ship” program was intended to create a new generation of affordable surface combatants that could operate in dangerous shallow and near-shore environments, while remaining affordable and capable throughout their lifetimes.

It hasn’t worked that way. In practice, what the Navy wanted, the capabilities needed to perform primary naval missions, and what could be delivered for the sums available, have proven nearly irreconcilable. The LCS program has changed its fundamental acquisition plan 4 times since 2005, and canceled contracts with both competing teams during this period, without escaping any of its fundamental issues. This public-access FOCUS article offer a wealth of research material, alongside looks at the LCS program’s designs, industry teams procurement plans, military controversies, budgets and contracts.

US Navy Leaning on CANES to Integrate Shipboard Networks

Networking the Navy

The US Navy’s Consolidated Afloat Networks and Enterprise Services (CANES) program is designed to streamline and update shipboard networks to improve interoperability across the fleet. It will replace 5 shipboard legacy network programs to provide the common computing environment on board for command, control, intelligence and logistics. The primary goal of the CANES program is to build a secure shipboard network required for naval and joint operations, which is much easier when you consolidate and reduce the number of shipboard networks. That consolidation can also lower costs and maintenance requirements and reduce training needs, if good choices are made. The intent is to build it as an Infrastructure and Platform as a Service (IaaS / PaaS) and field it on a rolling 4-year hardware baseline and a 2-year software baseline.

In 2010, the US Navy awarded 2 contracts, with a potential value of $1.7 billion, for the design and development of the CANES common computing environment. Northrop Grumman and Lockheed Martin are competing, and a single prime contractor was expected to be picked in 2011. It took until early 2012, but Northrop Grumman won.

USN Ship Protection: From “Slick 32s” to SEWIP

“Slick 32″

The US Navy’s AN/SLQ-32 ECM (Electronic Countermeasures) system uses radar warning receivers, and in some cases active jamming, as the part of ships’ self-defense system. The “Slick 32s” provides warning of incoming attacks, and is integrated with the ships’ defenses to trigger Rapid Blooming Offboard Chaff (RBOC) and other decoys, which can fire either semi-automatically or on manual direction from a ship’s ECM operators.

The “Slick 32″ variants are based on modular building blocks, and each variant is suited to a different type of ship. Most of these systems were designed in the 1970s, however, and are based on 1960s-era technology. Unfortunately, the SLQ-32 was notable for its failure when the USS Stark was hit by Iraqi Exocet missiles in 1987. The systems have been modernized somewhat, but in an era that features more and more supersonic ship-killing missiles, with better radars and advanced electronics, SLQ-32′s fundamental electronic hardware architecture is inadequate. Hence the Surface Electronic Warfare Improvement Program (SEWIP).

2006 Saudi Shopping Spree: $2.9B to Upgrade Their M1 Tank Fleet

Saudi M1A2

In July 2006 the US DSCA informed Congress [PDF] that the government of Saudi Arabia wished to purchase 58 M1A1 Abrams tanks, then upgrade these M1A1s, along with its existing 315 M1A2s, to create 373 M1A2S (Saudi) Abrams configuration main battle tanks. The sale will include kits, spare and repair parts, communications and support equipment, publications and technical data, personnel training and training equipment, contractor engineering and technical support services and other related elements of logistics support. The estimated cost is $2.9 billion.

This program also dovetails well with ongoing Cooperative Logistics Supply Support Agreement, which ensure support and spare parts for their American-made land equipment. This sale and upgrade program will be executed in 3 phases, and is well underway.

The USA’s DDG-1000 Zumwalt Class Program: Dead Aim, Or Dead End?

67% of the fleet

The prime missions of the new DDG-1000 Zumwalt Class destroyer are to provide naval gunfire support, and next-generation air defense, in near-shore areas where other large ships hesitate to tread. There has even been talk of using it as an anchor for action groups of stealthy Littoral Combat Ships and submarines, owing to its design for very low radar, infrared, and acoustic signatures. The estimated 14,500t (battlecruiser size) Zumwalt Class will be fully multi-role, however, with undersea warfare, anti-ship, and long-range attack roles.

True, or False?

That makes the DDG-1000 suitable for another role – as a “hidden ace card,” using its overall stealth to create uncertainty for enemy forces. At over $3 billion per ship for construction alone, however, the program faced significant obstacles if it wanted to avoid fulfilling former Secretary of the Navy Donald Winter’s fears for the fleet. From the outset, DID has noted that the Zumwalt Class might face the same fate as the ultra-sophisticated, ultra-expensive SSN-21 Seawolf Class submarines. That appears to have come true, with news of the program’s truncation to just 3 ships. Meanwhile, production continues. DID’s FOCUS Article for the DDG-1000 program covers the new ships’ capabilities and technologies, key controversies, associated contracts and costs, and related background resources.

South Beached: Fire and Fixes aboard USS Miami

USS Miami

The nuclear-powered Improved Los Angeles Class (SSN-688i) submarine USS Miami was ordered in 1983 and built by General Dynamics Electric Boat. She was commissioned in 1990, is homeported in Groton, CT, and was the focus of Tom Clancy’s 1993 non-fiction book Submarine: A Guided Tour Inside a Nuclear Warship. In May 2012, a civilian shipyard worker in Portsmouth Naval Shipyard caused a fire, which quickly spread through its forward compartments. It took the efforts of more than 100 firefighters at to save her, and the cost of the necessary facelifts and fixes was so extensive that there was serious talk about retiring the boat.

Navy panels have been conducting wide-ranging investigations trying to figure out why the fire spread so fast, how to reduce these kinds of hazards, and how to improve firefighting response in the future. In parallel, the Navy decided that they’d get more out of spending $400+ million to fix USS Miami to support her remaining 10 years of service life, than they would spending $2.5 billion to get a full 30-year lifetime of service from a more capable Virginia Class submarine. Now, work is underway – but budget cuts have the Navy re-considering their decision…

Saudi Shopping Spree: A Hardened, Networked National Guard

Latest updates[?]: Training infrastructure - will it make a difference?

LAV-25 in combat

The Saudi Arabian National Guard is seeing a lot of investment lately. In July 2006, the Saudis formally tabled a multi-billion dollar request to buy LAV wheeled APCs and related equipment for its National Guard. October 2010 added a slew of added requests, covering a wide range of transport, scout, and attack helicopters. Other contracts in between have involved missiles, communications, and training. It all adds up to a fairly comprehensive modernization.

Who is the SANG, and why are they a globally significant institution? A must-read article in the Tribune-Libanaise explains:

M1 Abrams Tanks for Iraq

US M1A1s, Tal Afar

Tanks decide battles, unless aircraft are around. Iraq had a lot of unfriendly visits by the USAF from 1991-2003, which left the largest armored force in the region looking to rebuild their armored corps from zero. Early donations and salvage fielded a small set of Soviet-era weapons, but after tangling with the Americans one too many times, the Iraqis knew what they really wanted. They wanted what their opponents had.

On July 31/08, the US Defense Security Cooperation Agency announced Iraq’s formal request to buy M1 Abrams tanks, well as the associated vehicles, equipment and services required to keep them in the field. The tanks will apparently be new-build, not transferred from American stocks. With this purchase, Iraq became the 4th M1 Abrams operator in the region, joining Egypt (M1A1s), Kuwait (M1A2), and Saudi Arabia (M1A2-SEP variant). A similar December 2008 request was confirmed to be additive, and deliveries have now finished on the initial order. So, what’s next?