vs.



When Security is not a Developer's fault.

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AndroidXRef: One year ago…

- Online source code cross reference of the Android source code.
- All major Android versions available.
- Average 10K page views per day.

www.androidxref.com

SIDI: Samsung's Research Lab

- Main Mobile Research Lab in Latin America.
- Focused on Smartphone research.
- Strong research on Mobile Security.
  - Focus on offensive security.

Security Targets

- Kernel
- File System
- Android Platform
- Android Applications

Apps Analyzed

- Pre-Loaded Apps
  - Samsung Apps
  - Partner Apps
- Non Pre-Loaded Apps
  - Samsung Apps
  - Partner Apps
  - Popular “critical” apps.

Vulnerability Frequency Chart



- Open Broadcast Receiver
- Improper SSL Handling
- Open Service
- Hardcoded Crypto key
- Improper SMS Handling
- Unencrypted Data over Network
- Improper Filesystem Permissions
- Open Content Provider
- Unprotected Socket
- Information Leak in logcat
- Unprotected data in DB
- Unprotected Intent

Open Broadcast Receivers

- Occurs when the Broadcast Receiver does not check the source of the intent it received.
- Not usually the intended behavior during development
- Most common use case is to export the broadcast receiver only to a restricted context.
  - E.g. Another app from the same developer.

Default Behavior

- Restricted to the App only
  - Good design choice.
  - Covers the most common use case of Broadcast Receivers.
- When Exported:
  - Default behavior is to be open to everybody.
  - Not the most common use case.

Protection Mechanism

- Protect the Broadcast Receiver with a permission.

```
1   <permission android:name="com.receiver.PERMISSION"
2       android:protectionLevel="signature"
3           android:label="@string/receiver_perm_label"
4           android:description="@string/receiver_perm_desc">
5   </permission>
6
7   <receiver android:name=".MyReceiver"
8       android:permission="com.receiver.PERMISSION">
9       <intent-filter>
10          <action android:name="com.app.custom.ACTION" />
11      </intent-filter>
12  </receiver>
```

Implementation Flow

- Proper Implementation Flow

- Developer Implementation Flow

Implementation Flow

- Proper Implementation Flow

- Developer Implementation Flow

Implementation Flow

- Current Implementation Flow

- Healthy Implementation Flow

Implementation Flow

- Proper Implementation Flow

- Developer Implementation Flow

Other applications

- The concept can be applied to other scenarios:
  - Open Services
  - Open Content Providers
- In both scenarios the developer reaches the unprotected state before the protected state.

Improper SSL Handling

- Occurs when the developer validates a self-signed certificate with an empty TrustManager. E. g. :

```
1   TrustManager tm = new X509TrustManager() {
2       public void checkServerTrusted(X509Certificate[] chain,
3               String authType) throws CertificateException {
4       }
5   };
6
```

- Lack of proper documentation and confusing API.
- New version of Android (4.2) already address that issue, but still needs improvement.

The rest of the chart…

- Other security issues in the chart are developers faults!
- Very bad common habits:
  - Hardcode the crypto key in the application
  - Trust SMS data to perform critical operations

The hidden issue: Excessive Permissions

- Hard to measure with manual assessment.
- Does not introduce a security flaw, but potentialize the risk is one is present.
- The Pwn2Own case:
  - Platform signed application with INSTALL_PACKAGES permission.
  - INSTALL_PACKAGES permission was not required.
  - Enabled an attack to that app to install malicious app in the device.

Permission Declaration Flow

- Developer Implementation Flow

Proper Permission Declaration

- A mapping of API-Permission must exist.
- Automate permission declaration for know APIs at compile time.
- Allow for manually add custom permission for unknown APIs.

To Sum Up…

- Not every security issue is a developer's fault.
- It is possible to act directly on the platform to avoid common security problems.
- The developer should always go through the secure state before he is able to reach the insecure state.

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