# Google Portable Native Client

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# Agenda



Motivation

Approach

**Developing Using PNaCl** 

Safe Translation

Status

Ongoing Work

#### Motivation

Thursday, April 7, 2011

#### **A NaCI-Enabled Web Application**



Your favorite language

Google

Screened for malicious instructions


System calls moderated by a virtualized OS

Performance within 5% of native code


# **Applications with NaCl**








Google




Google

### Where We Went Next










### What Developers Want




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#### Approach




# **Application Life Cycle**





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




LLVM bitcode is PNaCl's distribution format

#### **Client side**





#### **Developing Using PNaCl**

Thursday, April 7, 2011



Address space / data model ILP32 (sizeof(int) == sizeof(long) == sizeof(void\*)) sizeof(va\_list) == 24 1GB maximum total address space Stack pointer starts at the top of the address space

Data types



"natural" alignment

(e.g., double is aligned 0mod8)

Byte order

Little Endian

# **Target Model**



C++ Exception Handling x86-32 Linux model

varargs

sizeof(va\_list) == 24

Front end emits va\_arg instruction

setjmp

Consistent jmp\_buf size



**Calling conventions** 

- Bitcode file is calling convention neutral
- Actual target convention determined by translator


Concurrency and memory model

Assume a least common denominator Store ordering within a thread Explicit synchronization across threads

We expect people to use llvm atomic/barrier intrinsics where needed

# **Application Life Cycle**





gcc-like driver Ilvm-gcc front end LLVM's link-time optimization Produce smallest bitcode Expensive opts. off client

#### Safe Translation

# Translating in a Sandbox



The translator must run in the browser Malicious bitcode files are a potential attack vector




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> Translator phases are run as NaCl modules




#### today

Rapid code generation



### Translator





#### goal

Know the platform (uarch) Can collect/use profiling data Webpage-specific specialization Can translate at invocation time install time asynchronously

#### Status



One bitcode file translates, validates, and runs on three architectures

All of SPEC2000 int and the four C fp tests pass

The translator is self-built and sandboxed Ilc and Id run as NaCI modules on x86-32 and 64

#### ARM getting close

ARM ELF direct object generation passing most tests Still a bit of debugging on ARM self-build

# What's running?



Examples are running in Chromium (With a command-line flag for now)

#### Ongoing Work





LTO producing the smallest possible .bc files Improve gold plugin for marking symbols internal Gold/LTO as full linker without .bc to .o Collecting soname list for .so generation

### Translator



Direct .so generation Emission work for DT\_NEEDED

**Translation time** 



### <u>http://www.chromium.org</u>/nativeclient (Follow Portable Native Client link) <u>http://code.google.com/p/nativeclient</u>