Click on any institution name below to see its IBC Minutes (pdf).
Status: 211 institutions added to date. Over 875 MB of IBC minutes.
Tips for exploration:
• Compare 3 years of "minutes" from the Southwest Foundation for Biomedical Research (a spook-filled BSL-4 lab) with those of the University of Virginia. Or Walter Reed Army Institute of Research against Vanderbilt University, among other contrasting possibilities.
• Spot abject failures apparent in replies such as that of the Illinois Institute of Technology, which has a lab specializing in aerosolization of bioweapons agents. And the University of South Carolina, whose President sits on the NSABB.
• Figure out what's missing from many minutes that cover recombinant DNA; but say nothing about pathogens (such as with the University of Pittsburgh's otherwise reasonably comprehensive reply), or accidents (many), or anything else. Some committee's minutes reveal that they are little if anything more than signature mills.
• Ponder meeting consistency. Why do some IBCs meet monthly and others barely meet? (Annually (or less)? It frequently does not relate the the size and scope of the research at the institution.
• Ponder format consistency. There is remarkable variability of the format and details of minutes between and even within institutions. Why such a lack of consistency and standardization?
• Identify trash minutes. Federal guidelines require keeping of minutes to which the public has access. Thus, the minutes obviously should be useful to the public by enabling understanding of the research and committee review. But some institutions keep minutes that reveal nothing - defeating the very purpose of the public access rules. Sometimes, this is a cynical policy deliberately designed to thwart public oversight. Examples of such retrograde institutions include the University of Hawaii and the University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center.
• Search for accidents (there are a couple dozen). Wonder why many IBCs don't consider accidents at all. Search for some widely-reported accidents, such as the Boston University tularemia incident (you won't find it), or the disappearing plague mice at the Public Health Research Institute (ditto) or the brucella infection at Texas A&M (ditto). Some institutions won't put the embarrassing parts in writing.
• Find references to select (bioweapons) agents. Some IBCs are reliably straightforward; but many black out references or use other tricks to pretend they aren't there. In almost every circumstance, there is no reason for IBCs to do this. Some IBCs don't consider select agent work at all - who, then, does?
• Find labs in unexpected places - like the BSL-3 select agent virus lab at the Connecticut Agricultural Experiment Station, which does not really have an IBC. Who would have suspected to find such a facility at the tiny state's experimental farm? Or the anthrax lab at the obscure University of Scranton.
• Fill in the Blank. Frequently, IBCs will inexplicably redact information that can easily be found elsewhere. In some cases, we have filled in the redactions with notes in the PDF file, for example, the University of New Mexico and University of Louisiana Lafayette.
• For laughs: Study the redactions made by the University of South Florida, read the cover letter from the University of New Hampshire, or view East Carolina University's reply (which accidentally included loads of material they intended to withhold).