

Don't Play Dice With Random Numbers

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ANDROID FOR INTEL ARCHITECTURE INTEL LINUX WIRELESS GUPNP KVM POKY
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INTEL LINUX GRAPHICS SYNCEVOLUTION SIMPLE FIRMWARE INTERFACE (SFI) ENTERPRISE SECURITY IN

Random numbers

- **Random numbers are used in...**
 - Games
 - Monte Carlo simulations
 - Security protocols
- Computers are not very random
 - Lots of effort goes into *eliminating* random behavior...
- “Good enough” randomness depends on the application
 - Security protocols have very high demands
 - Games usually not so much...





Randomness is subtle

- **Improper use**
 - A random number is only random once
 - Only random until the outcome is known
- **There are no tests for randomness!**
 - There are tests for *some types* of nonrandomness
 - General testing for randomness might be intractable (**P = BPP** conjecture)
 - Need to understand the failure modes of the source




What could possibly go wrong?

- **Weak keys**
 - Several serious vulnerabilities in Linux distros already
- **Key disclosure**
 - Recent PS3 hack
- **Identifier collisions**
 - UUIDs are probabilistically unique
- ...



Pseudo-Random Number Generator



- **Statistical properties**
- **Cycle length**
- **Resistance to analysis (“security”)**



“God doesn't play dice.”

— Albert Einstein


“Wanna bet?”

— God



Hardware (true) Random Number Generator



Quantum events




- **Bandwidth**
- **Resistance to observation (“security”)**
- **Failure modes**




Intel Bull Mountain Technology (DRNG)






Linux Kernel Random Number Generator



Linux Kernel Random Number Generator Inputs



rngd

- Necessary to get full benefit from a hardware or virtio RNG
- *Should be started as early as possible*
- Versions < 4 had significant problems
 - Hopefully all fixed now
- TPM harvesting conflicts with TrouSerS unless **rng-tpm** is available
 - Upstream in 3.7, probably an easy backport
 - TPM may need to be “provisioned”
 - If you don't need TrouSerS, don't run **tcsd**





`rngd -r /dev/urandom`



HAVEGE

- **Claims to extract entropy from CPU indeterminism**
- Some people swear by it...
- Unclear to what extent it actually works
 - *“The source is so complex it is impossible to analyze”*
 - Self-tests pass even with the timer readout removed
- It probably does provide *some* entropy
 - Consider to what degree you are willing to trust it
- Can be run in parallel with **rngd**



Administrator recommendations

- **Make sure that rngd is running**
 - Version 4 or higher strongly recommended
 - If not by default, please complain to your distribution
 - Run as early as possible
 - Avoid zero-entropy situation on boot
- **Make sure TPM is available**
 - May have to be provisioned
 - If you don't need TrouSerS, don't run **tcsd**
- **haveged** can be a complement, but not an alternative
 - Consider how much you trust it...



Application writer recommendations

- **If you need *lots of randomness*:**
 - Use a cryptographic library (OpenSSL, etc.)
 - A simple **librandom** may be available in the future
- **If you need *a little randomness*:**
 - Use */dev/random* if you would rather fail than be insecure
 - Use */dev/urandom* if you need “good enough for most things”
- **Please conserve randomness**
 - Not everyone has a hardware random source yet...
 - Don't use buffered I/O unless you really need to!
- **Defer extraction as much as possible (especially daemons)**
 - Entropy may be scarce at boot



Future work

- **Policy interface**

- Allow rngd bypass and possibly direct use of architectural hwrng
- Discussed in principle at Kernel Summit 2012
- Still being architected

- **Finish virtio-rng**

- Kernel (guest) side complete since 2008
- Host (Qemu/KVM) side still in progress
 - Got stalled several times
 - Hopefully will get committed to Qemu git this week or next



Copyright acknowledgments

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- *Diagram of Intel DRNG Entropy Source*
 - © 2011 IEEE Spectrum





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