At the beginning of the 19th century Sakhalin and the Kurils first became an arena of armed conflict between Russia and Japan. The following events led up to that conflict. On 8 July 1799, the Russian Emperor Paul I signed an Imperial Charter forming the Russian-American Company, which was destined to play the important role in the acquisition and development of Russian colonies in the north Pacific. The high privileges of the Company allowed it to "utilize... all industries and institutions" on the Kuril Islands. A number of major expeditions were organized under the aegis of the Russian-American Company, the most famous being the first Russian circumnavigation of the globe. This was achieved by the sloops Nadezhda and Neva, which departed Kronstadt on 26 July 1803. On board the Nadezhda (under command of Ivan Kruzenshtem) was a diplomatic mission headed by Nikolay Rezanov, the plenipotentiary of the Russian-American Company to the colonies. Rezanov's mission was to "open trade relations with Japan," no simple task in light of the severe policy of isolationism Japan had followed since the beginning of the 17th century. In fact, contrary to widespread belief Japanese isolation was not absolute, though external trade was significantly limited. Only China, Korea, the Ryukyu islands, Holland and some countries of southeast Asia were permitted to send merchant ships to Japan. Rezanov had been ordered to persuade the Japanese to grant Russia the right of free trade as well, and to send several ships to Nagasaki each year. In case the Japanese would not permit direct trade, Rezanov was authorized to agree on indirect trade between Russia and Japan via the intermediary Ainu on Urup and Sakhalin. In addition, he was charged with collecting additional information about the mouth of the Amur and Sakhalin. The Nadezhda entered Nagasaki Bay on 26 September 1804. The Russian ambassador waited nearly half a year for the reply of the Japanese government to his call to the negotiating table. Finally, Rezanov was curtly informed that the Japanese government would not receive bis embassy and did not want to establish trade relations with Russia. The Russians were to leave Japan at once. On 6 April 1805 the Nadezhda departed Nagasaki and sailed on toward Sakhalin. On 1 May 1805 the crew of the Nadezhda caught sight of the Sakhalin coastline. The next day they dropped anchor in Aniva Bay opposite a small Japanese settlement, where two officers had taken up residence to "watch after trade between the Japanese and the Ainu." Their homes and household buildings (ambari) were brand new, which prompted Kruzenshtem to conclude that the Japanese had "settled there not long ago." On the morning of 3 May, Kruzenshtern and Rezanov paid call to a Japanese merchant ship which rode at anchor not far from the settlement. The captain informed them that he had arrived at Sakhalin from Osaka with a cargo of rice and salt, and intended to return with a load of furs and dried fish. Meanwhile, Russian sailors landed and began to explore the eastern part of Tomari-Aniva Bay; they also visited a nearby Ainu settlement. On 4 May the Nadezhda weighed anchor and, rounding Aniva Cape, headed north along the eastern coast of the island. Thick ice in the north half of Terpeniye Bay caused Kruzenshtern to call off the exploration of Sakhalin for the time being. On 25 May Nadezhda delivered Rezanov's embassy to Petropavlovsk harbor. Not long after, they resumed their study of Sakhalin. On 7 July 1805 the Nadezhda returned to the east coast of Sakhalin, and on 28 July the Russians found themselves in a bay near the northern tip of the island, where they spent three days. During the layover, the crew of the Nadezhda first caught sight of the Sakhalin Nivkhi when a small landing party attempted to visit a native settlement. But when the Nivkhi approached en masse armed with daggers and old sabers, the travelers hurried back to the safety of the ship. On 31 July the Nadezhda entered Sakhalin Bay, and the following day sighted the coast of the mainland from the ship. It seemed to Kruzenshtern at the time that the straits were no more than five miles wide at this point, the entry into the Amur estuary. Kruzenshtern was apprehensive of further navigation to the south because of the shallow waters and sent a small row-boat ahead to scout. It soon returned, and reported that the channel depth between the mainland and Sakhalin was constantly decreasing. The water in the estuary was absolutely fresh, proving that they were not far from the mouth of the Amur. Based on his own observations, and those of La Perouse, Kruzenshtern was also "convinced..., absolutely, that there cannot be any passage to the south from the mouth of the Amur between Tatary and Sakhalin." The utter failure of Rezanov's mission would seem to bury all hopes of good trade relations between Russia and Japan. However, Rezanov himself considered that all was not lost. If they could not succeed by negotiations, they would use force to achieve the aims of his embassy. "I hope," wrote Rezanov, "that internal discord will soon force this proud Power to establish trade relations with us, when it sees for itself that it has no power to do us harm, but rather that it should always feel our displeasure, without having the least means to deflect it..." Thus was born the plan for a military expedition against the Japanese settlements on Sakhalin. Rezanov had no authority of any kind from the Russian government to make such a decision. Testifying to this are his apologetic letters to Alexander I ("Do as You will with me. Your Imperial Majesty, punish me, that I, not waiting for your permission, take action...") and to the Minister of Commerce Nikolay Rumyantsev ("I may be considered a criminal, in that I have set in motion this project of mine, but ready am I to bear punishment, and I shall here explain, that I was urged on to it for the greater glory of my Sovereign and by my love for the Fatherland, for the sake of which I will always sacrifice myself..."). Rezanov entrusted the execution of his plan to the naval officers Nikolay Khvostov (commander of the brig Juno) and Gavriil Davydov (commander of the tender Avos), who were then engaged in the service in the Russian-American Company. On 8 August 1806, Rezanov gave Khvostov secret instructions ordering him and Davydov to set sail for southern Sakhalin, as well as to Ump and Simushir islands. During this voyage, the Juno and Avos were to enter Aniva Bay, intercept all Japanese vessels found there and make prisoners of all able-bodied Japanese. ThoseJapanese unfit for work were to be allowed to remove to Hokkaido, "after being told that they were forbidden ever to dare visit Sakhalin except as a Russian possession, that is, traveling there for purposes of trade." In case of a shore landing the Russian sailors were to treat "with affection" the Sakhalin Ainu, to present them with gifts of cloth, clothing, etc., and to award medals to the Ainu elders. Japanese shops were ordered put to the torch, after removing all the wares. On 6 October 1806 the Juno dropped anchor in Aniva Bay. The next day a landing party went ashore and visited the Ainu settlement. On 8 October, Khvostov proclaimed Sakhalin a Russian possession. The commander of the Juno described the ceremony himself in this way: "At 8 A.M. I, Lt. Karpinskiy and ship apprentice Korekin set out in two boats for the settlement. Approaching the shore, we raised a military flag on the sloop and a merchant flag on the launch; friendly Ainu in large numbers had already come to meet the boat and fell to their knees when we landed and we tried to explain with the help of some kinds of words that we were Russians and their friends; I ordered a flagpole set on the shore, on which both our flags, military and commercial, were raised. Pointing to the ship, I gave them kerchiefs and different small things, the 'toen,' or village elder, I dressed in the finest housecoat and a silver medal on a St. Vladimir ribbon, during which a triple six-gun salute was rendered, with an answering shot upon each volley from the ship's cannon. I would like to mention that the Ainu were not in the least frightened by the shooting, but when they saw the fire and heard the sound of the cannon they were terrified and ducked their heads. To the elder with the medal I gave a sheet of paper on which the following was written: '(day) October, 1806 (sic). The Russian frigate Juno, under the leadership of Fleet Lieutenant Khvostov, this day has presented the elder of the settlement situated in die eastern part of Aniva Bay with a silver medal on the Vladimir ribbon in token of acceptance of Sakhalin and its inhabitants under the all-embracing patronage of the Russian Emperor Alexander I. We ask of all ships calling here, be they Russian or foreign, to acknowledge the elder as a Russian subject."' After that the Russian sailors destroyed all the Japanese shops and trading posts that they could find along the shores of Aniva Bay and took four Japanese prisoners. Some of the goods in die Japanese warehouses were seized (in all, about 1000 pood of rice was loaded on the Juno, and about 100 pood of salt, as well as nets, dishes, etc.), and some looted by die Ainu, upon Khvostov's suggestion. Thereupon all Japanese buildings and timber yards were fired. On 16 October the Juno left Aniva Bay. In May of 1807 tile Juno and Avos appeared near the shores of Iturup island. On 18 May 1807, Khvostov and Davydov landed troops in Naibo harbor and burnt the litde Japanese setdement Uiere. Then they attacked Shana (present-day Kurilsk), die largest Japanese setdement on Iturup. Khvostov and Davydov's troops routed die formidable 300-man garrison in Shana widi surprising ease and set to plundering die shops of die Japanese merchants and trappers before firing die town. On 27 May, die Juno and Avos left Iturup. After paying call at Urup, Khvostov and Davydov's ships on 10 June entered Aniva Bay and put to die torch any Japanese structures remaining from die raid of die previous year. Sailing toward Hokkaido, diey came across four Japanese ships which they seized and burned near die litde island of Peak de Langle (off die northwest tip of Hokkaido), after capturing the cargo of rice, fish and salt. The willful actions of Lt. Khvostov and midshipman Davydov were not sanctioned by die Imperial government. As a result, die Japanese returned to Sakhalin in force and rebuilt Uieir fortifications on Iturup. In die end, Khvostov's and Davydov's "exploits" served only to significandy strengtiien die Japanese military presence on Iturup and Kunashir (1000 warriors were stationed diere by 1808), and to prompt die Japanese garrison of Kunashir to imprison die Russian mariner V.M. Golovnin when he chanced mere on 11 July 1811. Golovnin spent more dian two years inJapanese captivity (1811-1813), and was released only after die Japanese received assurances from die Russian administration mat die raids on Sakhalin and Iturup were die result of private initiatives, unaudiorized by me Russian government. StPetersburg was compelled to clearly define the soudiem boundary of its possessions in die Kuril islands. In die new charter, granted 13 September 1821 to die Russian-American Company by Tsar Alexander I, the southernmost cape of die island of Urup was declared the furthest possession of me Empire in die Kurds. Overall, Rezanov's venture was a total failure: Japan had strengdiened its position on Sakhalin and the Kuril islands; it would be anotiier half-century before the first Russo-Japanese trade treaty was to be concluded; and relations between Russia and Japan were darkened by die territorial problem from tile very outset. Anodier consequence of die conflict was mat Japan, expecting future Russian incursions, dispatched a new expedition to scout the territory in Sakhalin. In 1808, Matsuda Denjuro and Mamiya Rinzo set out from Shiranushi (die Japanese trade center on die soutiiwest coast of Sakhalin) on separate routes: Matsuda along die western coast and Mamiya along die eastern. Heading northward, Matsuda passed Cape Pogibi and reached die Sakhalin shore of die Amur estuary. Here he concluded diat, after all, Sakhalin must be an island. He diereupon retraced his steps and met up widi Mamiya near Cape Pogibi. Mamiya in his eastern march had gotten only as far as Terpeniye Bay, then crossed die island near die Poyasok istiimus and came out on die western side, turning north in order to catch up widi Matsuda. In 1808-1809 Mamiya again explored Sakhalin and visited tile Amur. In 1808 the Russian-American Company made an attempt to carry on Rezanov's undertakings. The board of directors of the Company had somehow wangled permission from the government to found its own settlements on Sakhalin. However, lacking ships capable of delivering colonists to Sakhalin, the company was unable at first to take advantage of this largesse. Then it was feared that an operation of this sort would have broken off all the delicate negotiations in progress for the return of Golovnin from Japanese captivity. After the first RussoJapanese armed conflict had been moderated, neither side attempted to enlarge its sphere of influence on Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands until the mid-1840's. The islands north of the Vries Straits (from Shumshu to Urup) remained in Russian possession, and the islands to the south (Iturup, Kuna-shir, Shikotan and the Habomai group) in Japanese possession. There was no Russian sphere of influence yet on Sakhalin. Japan controlled the southern part of the island (southwestern coast and Aniva Bay). Convinced that there was no further threat from Russia, the Japanese government lost interest for a long time in Sakhalin and the Kurils. In 1814 Japan withdrew its troops and for many years Japanese activity to the north of Hokkaido was restricted to private trade and trapping. In the absence of a real threat from the north, the Japanese government begrudged the large sums which would be needed to colonize Sakhalin and the Kurils. In the 1820's, the Russian-American Company increased its activity on those islands in Russian possession. It already operated trading posts on Shumshu, Simushir and Urup. Recognizing that the flight of the native population from these islands had a negative influence on its economic activities, the Company organized a resettlement of the Kurils by Russians, Aleuts and Kamchadals. The new settlers engaged in hunting fur-bearing animals (primarily sea otter), trade, fishing, handicrafts and agriculture. A combination of events in the late 1840's in the Far East brought Sakhalin again to mind in Russia. The decay of China, and the expansion of Great Britain, France and the United States into the power vacuum thus created, generated a completely new geopolitical situation in East Asia and the Pacific Ocean, which inevitably forced Russia to revise the Treaty of Nerchinsk and re-examine its boundaries with China, in light of the changing alignment of forces. At the behest of the Russian government, the Russian-American Company sent the brig Konstantin to the mouth of the Amur river in 1846, under command of Lt. Alexander Gavrilov. According to his instructions from the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he was to explore the mouth of the Amur, "of which there exists the opinion that, due to heavy silting, it is not only difficult but in fact impossible for even shallow-draft ships to pass." The expedition was kept a secret in order not to complicate relations with China. "Our language, clothes, type of ship, gifts.... nothing showed that we were Russians... I myself gave orders in Swedish, the flag was also unknown," wrote Gavrilov afterwards. On 29 July 1846 the Konstantin entered the Amur estuary. Work continued until 14 August on exploring the estuary, the mouth of the Amur (as far as 12 miles upstream), and the Sakhalin channel. Based on the results of the exploration, Lt. Gavrilov concluded that ships of moderate draft could enter the northern part of the estuary, although entry into Amur itself was fraught with great difficulties and danger. The expedition 'was unable to explore the southern part of the Amur estuary. Ferdinand Wrangel, an experienced mariner and geographer, read Gavrilov's report but drew his own conclusions: the Amur was unnavi-gable. In December 1846, the Russian Foreign Minister Karl Nesselrode presented Wrangel's report to Tsar Nicholas I. The Tsar wrote in the margin, "Extremely sorry to hear this. Must give up on the Amur as a useless river." However, already in 1847 a new proposal for exploration of the Amur appeared, authored by A.P. Bala-soglo and G.I. Nevelskoy. The proposal laid out the organization of this Amur expedition: one detachment to voyage along the Amur itself, the other to explore the mouth of the Amur and its estuary. In late 1847, Nevelskoy was appointed commander of the transport Baikal, which was slated to sail the next year from Kronstadt to Petropavlovsk and Okhotsk with a cargo for the Russian-American Company. Additional to the scheduled voyage to the Far East, Nevelskoy also received the permission he sought to explore the southwestern coast of the Sea of Okhotsk, the estuary and mouth of the Amur, and Sakhalin. In this, Nevelskoy enjoyed the support of the Chief of Naval Staff A.S. Menshikov and the Governor-General of Eastern Siberia N.N. Muravyev. On 21 August 1848 the Baikal departed Kronstadt and by 12 May 1849 was anchored in Petropavlovsk harbor. After handing over his cargo, Nevelskoy left for Sakhalin, reaching its northeastern shores on 12 June. Following the Sakhalin coastline, the Russians entered the northern part of the Amur estuary on 27 June. Here the Baikal stood at anchor while further exploration was conducted by boats and canoes. By 26 July, after nearly a month of surveys, the Russian mariners had found a southern entrance to the Amur estuary — the straits between Sakhalin and the mainland. (That these straits existed was a secret only to European geographers up to this time; the Chinese and Japanese already knew very well that Sakhalin was an island.) In addition, they found channels by which seagoing ships could enter the mouth of the Amur from both the north and south. |