Professor
of Discourse Analysis
Discourse
and Rhetoric Group Email: J.A.Potter@lboro.ac.uk
Department
of Social Sciences Tel: 01509 223384
Loughborough
University Fax: 01509 223944
Loughborough
Leicestershire,
LE11 3TU
These three volumes will select from a tradition of
research that starts with psychology as something that is understood, expressed
and described in discourse. That is,
it is research that considers psychology as a practical object for people while
interacting with one another, either directly or through texts or other written
forms. It covers, for example,
research on how conversation can display a psychological state, and how such a
display can be treated as upset, say, or manipulative.. It surveys work on the way attitudes or
dispositions are invoked in arguments.
It describes studies that look at the way identity is related to
actions, to criticism and linked into to broader categories such as ethnic or
national groups.
What collects this tradition of work together is its
focus on psychology as something practical for individuals living their
lives in families, workplaces or in specialized environments such as
psychodynamic therapy, medical consultations or child protection
helplines. Indeed, it starts with life
as something practical and lived with others; that is, as something
relational. Memories, identities,
perceptions and all the other technical objects of traditional psychology are
studied for the way they enter peoples’ practices, they treated as something
inseparable from the practices in which they come alive. The interest is in the sense they have for
the texture of peoples’ lives. They are
things that are invoked, constructed, managed, and denied as people flirt, and
argue, or as they build up damning cases in courtrooms or as they develop
criticisms of social groups in political speeches. Indeed, some of these technical objects need to be understood
very differently than in traditional psychological work and some disappear
altogether. This tradition thus ends up
with a very different picture of psychology than is common in the mainstream
(social) cognitive tradition.
In this introduction to the Volume 1 I will perform
a number of tasks. First, I will give
some further account of the content of the volumes. This will involve exploring some of the traditions of work that
are not represented and explaining their absence. It will also involve trying to make explicit
the rationale for the specific articles that I have selected out of a much
broader and deeper pool of excellent possibilities. Second, I will discuss the origins of this tradition of work and
highlight the different intellectual threads that it weaves together. This will provide a frame for reading some
of the contributions and will therefore be the major part of the
introduction. Third, and finally, I
will discuss the methodological work that comprises the last section of Volume
1. I will try and show its development
and highlight some of the contemporary issues that it raises.
The scope of
Discourse and Psychology
The tradition of work represented here includes
discursive psychology, some areas of discourse analysis, some work inspired by
linguistic philosophy and constructionism, some work inspired by poststructural
thinking, and some ethnomethodology and conversation analysis. Before offering a more precise
characterization it is perhaps more straightforward to explain why some
traditions of work are not
represented here. As an
interdisciplinary field lying not just between psychology and discourse
studies, but bounded by linguistics, sociology, anthropology and communication
there is ample potential for confusion.
First, note that these are volumes on discourse and psychology. They are not collections of work on language and psychology; nor are they
focused on linguistics and
psychology. The term discourse picks
out the focus on language-in-use (conversation analysts write about
talk-in-interaction) rather than language-in-the-abstract as a set of words,
word meanings and rules for combination.
Discourse is talk and text embedded in social practices of one kind or
another (complaining about noisy neighbours, arguing about the royal family,
offering therapeutic advice). The topic
here is the activity and its role within the setting. It is also the way the discourse contributes to the structure of
the setting itself. Ethnomethodologists
have it that talk is both context sensitive and context reproducing (Heritage, 1984). The analysis that is offered in chapters
below is not linguistic analysis.
It starts with actions in settings and although the focus is on various
features of discourse it does not start with linguistic categories (sentences,
sub-clauses, etc.) to explicate that discourse. Such categories may or may not be relevant to what is going on
but as they are derived from an abstract analysis of linguistic structure it is
quite possible that they will not be.
Second, these are not volumes on the psychology of
language or psycholinguistics. There is
a large body of work that is concerned with a wide range of issues to do with
language learning, sentence production, speech perception and so on (see e.g.
Hartley, 2001). This is a very
different enterprise from that of the work in the current collection. One fundamental difference is that
psycholinguistics works with a cognitivist and information processing view of
the human actor and attempts to explicate the cognitive machinery that is taken
to underlie and generate talk. The
studies collected here avoid this kind of technical decomposition of psychology
into a set of modules and processes; instead it starts with the practical
situation of the actor embedded in interaction. Issues such as what the speaker intends, hears or mishears, what
is confused or clear are therefore treated
as practical and local issues to be worked out interactionally.
Third, these are not volumes on the social
psychology of language. Although
discursive psychology as is exemplified by the papers in Volume 3 has been
treated as a perspective within the social psychology of language (see Robinson
& Giles, 2001) much of the social psychology of language is concerned with
topics addressed in a more traditionally cognitivist manner.
Fourth, these are not volumes on discourse
processes. Much of the discourse
processes work grew up through the cross fertilization of work in pragmatics
and speech act theory with more traditional psycholinguistics. There are a range of different approaches
here. Mostly, as the name implies, they
are concerned with cognitive processes associated with discourse – story
comprehension, the perception of discourse cohesion and so on. Discourse processes is a less clearly
defined area than psycholinguistics (see contributions to van Dijk, 1996) and
some of the contributions this volume could be seen as part of discourse
processes or the more general discourse studies tradition. But its centre of gravity is outside the
pull of this volume.
Sixth, these volumes do not collect together
research in critical discourse analysis (CDA).
Again, the contrast is not so clear cut, as CDA covers a broad set of
approaches (see Fairclough and Wodak, 1997, for a review) and there is a strong
critical strand in the work collected in the current volumes, particularly in
the contributions to social psychological debates about racism, nationalism and
ideology in Volume 2. Indeed, in their
influential overview Phillips and Jørgensen (2002) suggest that discursive
psychology (the main theme of Volume 3) satisfies many of the defining features
of CDA but does not use the title.
Nevertheless, CDA work tends to start with linguistic analysis, often
the functional grammar associated with Michael Halliday (Halliday, 1985). Often CDA work attempts to connect textual
structures to social structures rather than focus more directly at the
activities done through talk as is characteristic of much of the work discussed
here. Moreover, this leads to
differences in the way ‘discourse’ itself is conceptualized.
As I have noted, in the work collected in this
volume discourse is treated in terms of language in use, a focus on talk and
texts being parts of practices. In CDA
it is more typical to treat discourses as objects of some kind that can be
counted. This is often inspired by
Foucaultian thinking, although there is considerable debate as to the precise
conceptualization of discourse in Foucault’s work (see Hepburn, 2003). The Potter et al. Chapter 13 of the current
volume explores the different conceptions of discourse and offers some reasons
for caution about CDA constructions such as ‘the discourse of medicine’ or ‘the
discourse of science’. The work in
these volumes is more likely to see such discourse organizations as a
by-product of the way activities are done within settings rather than a
consequence of the internal logic of discourse structures.
Finally, these are not volumes of conversation
analysis (CA). There is a degree of
overlap between the work collected here and work in CA. However, most CA is not focused on
psychological issues. It is only
recently that there has been a sustained engagement with questions of cognition
and interaction in CA, and there is by no means an agreed approach to the topic
(see te Molder & Potter, 2005 for examples). Nevertheless, CA exerts a strong influence on the studies here,
particularly in Volume 3, and there are a range of contributions by researchers
who would probably describe themselves as conversation analysts. There is a full collection of CA work to
parallel this one (Drew & Heritage, 2006); I have chosen here a selection
of pieces that have been particularly influential or have highlighted, often
implicitly, issues about the relation of discourse and psychology. Contributions by Watson, Drew, Pomerantz,
Suchman & Jordan and Houtkoop-Steenstra & Antaki in this volume,
combine with the contribution of Wooffitt to Volume 2 and the pieces by Goodwin
and Wooffitt in Volume 3 illustrate the important contribution of CA to this
tradition of work.
The selection of papers for these volumes is
inevitably a personal choice (although I canvassed a range of opinions of
others). The aim has been to give a
selection of the best and most influential work. I checked citations and where there are a range of choices to
capture a particular topic of strand of argument I typically chose the paper
that citations suggested had been most influential. A particularly important criterion has also been clarity – the
selections are designed to offer a narrative that covers the different strands
and the development of this tradition of work.
With Volume 1 the choices are most open ended as for this early work
there is no easy start point or canon to work with. Often there are a range of roughly equivalent possibilities and I
have attempted to choose pieces that are most accessible to a wider
audience. Inevitably not everyone would
agree with these choices. And there are
plenty of high quality and influential pieces that lost out purely for space
considerations. For example, I thought
about reproducing Mills’ (1940) seminal piece on vocabularies of motive,
although this would probably need to be complemented by something illustrating
Wittgenstein’s take on psychological language, and Austin’s (1961) work on
accounts and excuses, and then further pieces locating some of the
post-structural strands in early discourse work. This would inevitably have diluted the collection. Some readers might be surprised by the
omission of work from the short lived journal Ideology & Consciousness or something of the Foucault inspired
work represented in Henriques et al. (1984).
However, I have judged that it is hard to do justice that that strand of
work in a brief selection and it is anyway somewhat marginal to the tradition
documented here. Again, I have opted
for focus and clarity.
Themes in Discourse and Psychology
There is no neat history of the earliest phase of
discourse and psychology work. Indeed,
work in the sociology of scientific knowledge (see Chapter 12 by Mulkay &
Gilbert) tells us that reconstructions of research fields this kind are always
partial and work to simplify events and reinterpret them in terms of
contemporary categories. Academic
history making is bound by a range of textual conventions and pushes a range of
different agendas as Stringer shows in Chapter 3. I have chosen to break things up into a series of themes but
readers should hold in mind that these are post hoc reconstructions designed to
make intellectual contributions clearer in contemporary terms.
Linguistic
philosophy and practices of mind
One of the central figures that inspired the
rethinking of psychology illustrated here was the philosopher Ludwig
Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein’s work was
notoriously difficult and fragmented and there has been much debate over its
implications. Coulter’s contribution in
Chapter 1 offers a reading of Wittgensteinian philosophy that brings out its
implications for academic psychology in its various cognitive forms. He takes the terms ‘understanding’ and
‘intending’ as his central examples and illustrates problems with
interpretations of these words that treat them as referring to private events
within the person. In contrast, he
develops the practical interpretation that has these words as being counters to
be drawn on in different kinds of language games which people engage in. For example, ‘understanding’ is often used
to mark a claim to success. However,
such a claim is not warrantable by reference to an inner event or experience
(whatever such a thing would be) but is dependent on practical, public and
social criteria (maybe a person tries out the ‘understanding’ and finds it
flawed, or other people my doubt its veracity – the criteria for
‘understanding’ are social rather than individual).
Wittgenstein develops a picture of all language,
including the language of psychology, as a toolbox:
Think
of the tools in a tool-box: there is a hammer, pliers, a saw, a screw-driver, a
rule, a glue-pot, glue, nails and screws.—The functions of words are as diverse
as the functions of these objects… Of
course, what confuses us is the uniform appearance of words when we hear them
spoken or meet them in script and print.
For their application is not
presented to us so clearly.
(Wittgenstein, 1953: #11)
One
of the ways of understanding the development of the tradition of discourse
research laid out in these three volumes is as a programme of making that
application more present so it can be more clearly understood. For Wittgenstein (and Coulter, 1983) this
largely involves conceptual analysis – for the work here it increasingly
involves the audio recorder and transcript.
We can see Wittgensteinian themes developed in different ways, with a
particular focus on the self and its coherence, in Harré’s Chapter 4 and
Shotter’s Chapter 6. The public and
conventional nature of language use emphasised by Wittgenstein is a key feature
of a wide range of discourse work including studies in ethnomethodology,
rhetoric, conversation analysis and discursive psychology.
Ethnomethodology
and the production of factuality
A further central problematic in work at the
boundary of discourse and psychology brings together issues of epistemics,
constructionism, description and psychology.
Smith’s study in Chapter 2 was influential in showing how factual
descriptions and they way they operate can be studied. It picks up from Garfinkel’s
ethnomethodology which highlights the everyday methods that people use to
produce descriptions of the social world that are treated as rational,
appropriate and justifiable (Garfinkel, 1967).
Smith’s analysis is doubly interesting from a psychological
perspective. On the one hand, it
foregrounds the various practical, discursive methods that speakers use to make
versions seem literal and objective. On
the other, it shows how constructions of persons can be put together to be
parts of particular actions, in this extreme case to produce a critical account
of a person as mentally ill. Smith’s
analysis focused on particular words and constructions at a level of
specificity that was hitherto extremely unusual in analytic work.
Smith took seriously Harvey Sacks’ proposal – a
proposal central to the field of conversation analysis – that talk is organized
in its specifics and that any order of detail is potentially related to
interaction (see Sacks, 1992). We will
see this followed through increasingly in research studies as we progress
through the 3 volumes. Although Smith
did not characterise her work in this way, we can see in it a form of discourse
constructionism rather different from the social constructionism that became
commonplace in later social science.
Constructionism here involves particular discourse constructions being
organized in to establish a particular version as part of a particular
action. This focus on the organization
of description complements the approach taken by Mulkay & Gilbert in
Chapter 12.
Post-structuralism,
reflexivity and the sociology of scientific knowledge
One of the features of 1970s and 1980s social
science was the engagement with ideas from post-structuralist thinkers such as
Barthes, Derrida and Foucault, either directly or indirectly through work such
as Henriques et al. (1984). Research in
this tradition developed a very different notion of discourse that emphasised
its systemic and structural properties and connected issues of discourse and
ideology (for a review of the implications of post-structuralism for discourse
work more generally see Hepburn 2003).
This engagement is represented here by Stringer’s
Chapter 3. This draws on and explores
various post-structural problematics.
It merges these with concerns about sociology of scientific knowledge as
it considers the various representations of a psychological research field that
are variously available in textbooks, research papers and informal
conversation. Picking up from Derrida’s
work that explores issues of representation and figuration in language partly
through pushing the boundaries of language use to destruction, Stringer
displays his argument partly through the form of his article. This reflexive argument, using an
alternative literary form was an important feature of the early development of
this work – see for example Ashmore (1989) or for a more psychological case
Curt (1994). Such formal experiments
have generally remained part of the meta-theorizing in this area rather than
influencing how analytic studies were produced.
The crisis in social psychology
An important impetus to the development of an
interest in discourse work and its relation to psychology comes from the
upheavals in social psychology associated with the so called ‘crisis in social
psychology’ in the 1970s. Although in
the longer term this had relatively little impact in US social psychology,
elsewhere it was a stimulus to major transformation. The crisis had three broad strands. First was a critique of individualism that reacted against social
psychology’s increasing focus on individual cognitive explanations. Part of this critique was political, but
there were also major theoretical and analytic reasons for doubting
psychology’s individualism. The second
strand of the crisis was a critique of method.
This was centred on a feeling of dissatisfaction with the narrowness of
experimental work and its limitations for understanding human action. Third came a critique of theory, and
particularly the failure of social psychological theory to address issues of
social organization and social structure.
The work in discourse and psychology in the current volumes offers a general
response to this crisis with its reformulation of theory and method and its
move away from individual cognitive explanations.
Key figures in this crisis were Gergen, Harré and
Shotter who are all represented in this volume. The pieces reproduced here are indicative of a broader strand of
work and highlight particular discursive themes. Gergen has gone on to be a major figure in a broader
constructionist perspective (e.g. Gergen 1994). Harré is particularly associated with the analytic programme of
ethogenics and strongly Wittgenstein influenced analytic work (see Harré &
Gillett, 1994). Shotter too has gone on
to focus particularly on the implications of Wittgenstein for psychology(e.g.
Shotter, 1993). He has also been
important for engaging with the Russian literary theorist Bakhtin who has been
a key figure in the development of activity theory (see Wertsch, 1991).
Conversation
analysis and a discursive conception of psychology
Away from the debates within the discipline of
psychology, developments in ethnomethodology and conversation analysis were
offering new ways of conceptualizing psychology almost as a by-product of their
main interest. The chapters in this
volume by Bogen & Lynch, Watson, Drew and Pomerantz do not thematize the issue
of psychology. Nevertheless, they start
to show the potential for this kind of interaction research offering a very
different picture of psychology. Bogen
& Lynch focused on the role of constructions of memory appear in official
testimony, particularly as speakers manage the plausible deniability of their
positions. For example, they explore
the way Oliver North’s practices of claiming not to remember in his testimony
to the Iran-Contra investigation committee provide for avoiding troubling lines
of questioning. A key feature of this
approach is that instead of treating memory as an inner cognitive object to be
investigated using the methods of psychology it is treated as a practical move
in an interactional practice of managing guilt and innocence within a
particular institution. This line of
thinking is extended in chapters by Goodwin and Edwards in volume 3.
Watson and Drew both work with legal materials and
are focused on issues of description that have since become core in the sorts
of discourse analysis and discursive psychology collected in volumes 2 and
3. Watson draws on Sacks’ membership
categorization analysis to show the way murder suspects provide descriptions of
their victims that invoke various categories that manage issues of culpability
and mitigation. In contrast to the work
on categories and categorization in social psychology, which focuses on the
role of categories in relation to information processing, here categories are
studied as words and categorization as socially located practices of using
those words to perform particular actions.
Drew too studied the working of descriptive constructions, but this time
his focus was on the way descriptions work in the cross examination where a
witness to an alleged rape deals with cross examination. Drew highlights the role of contrasting
descriptions from the Counsel and the witness in constructing different
attitudes, motives and moral status of the parties involved. Fundamental psychological matters are played
out through these practices of description.
Pomerantz drew more directly on conversation
analysis in her study of the practice of indirectly ‘fishing’ for information
from an interactant. Fishing involves a
party telling something that they only have partial knowledge of to someone who
has, or is entitled to have, full knowledge of that thing. For example, ‘your line’s been busy’ is a
description from the point of view of caller, but the recipient has been on the
phone and is expected to know who they were talking to. Eliciting the information about who the
recipient was talking to by fishing in this way is less invasive than a direct
question. Pomerantz’s original focus
was purely on the nature of this interactional device, but we can read this
study as a contribution to discursive psychology. It shows how particular uses of description, invocations of
knowledge and experience and the person’s position related to those things, is
drawn on for practical tasks.
Epistemology is a live interactional issue here in a way that was startlingly
different from the psychology of knowledge and belief.
Rhetoric and
the disruption of cognitivism
Billig’s contribution to the area of discourse and
psychology comes from neither the ethnomethodological and conversation analytic
tradition, nor the post-structural tradition; instead he drew on classical
rhetoric to engage with and rework cognitivist thinking in psychology. Billig argued that attitudes and assertions
should be understood in their rhetorical context. Thus an attitude makes sense in the context of potential
alternatives where it can be understood as a potential argumentative counter to
those alternatives. Such an approach
moves the study of attitudes from an issue of individual cognition to an issue
of public assertions and their argumentative counters (see for example Billig’s
Chapter 28).
The piece reproduced in Chapter 11 is one of the
first articles to set out this perspective as well as one of the first pieces
of analysis of this kind published in a traditional social psychology
journal. In it Billig develops a
critique of social identity theory with a classical rhetorical inversion – he
shows the way that the processes of categorization that had been the main topic
of social identity theory must be understood in relation to equally important
processes of particularization when they are addressed in the context of
specific arguments. Shotter’s Chapter 6
offers an account of how Billig’s rhetorical perspective can be linked in to both
Bakhtinian thinking and the linguistic philosophy of Wittgenstein. In general, this strand of rhetorical work
provides another element in the move from an analysis of mental processes to an
analysis of practical actions.
Facts,
accounts and interpretative repertoires
A key strand in the early work on discourse and
psychology came out of the sociology of scientific knowledge. This was a research field that developed
careful empirical studies of the operation of scientific fields with the aim of
understanding processes in the development of knowledge, theory change and so
on (for a relevant review of the considerable and sometimes controversial
theoretical complexity in this field see Potter, 1996, ch. 1). The contribution of Mulkay and Gilbert in
Chapter 12 emphasised the centrality of scientific discourse and in particular
the organization of accounts for what is taken to be true and false. They introduced the idea of an
interpretative repertoire to help understand the operation of discourse, and in
particular to make sense of the huge variation that they found in the accounts
of the scientists they were studying when they looked at them closely. In effect, this is a semi-organized,
semi-preformed resource for action – it can be used for justifying, criticising,
and producing versions of the world which appear solid and objective. Contrasting versions of actions and events
are constructed out of constructing repertoires.
This analytic notion has become widely used – it is
drawn on in many of the chapters in Volume 2.
It is interesting to note that when it was introduced by Mulkay and
Gilbert it was related to the notion of linguistic register brought to
prominence by the linguist Halliday (1978).
However, the specific way repertoires were defined, and the subsequent
analytic use of the notion quickly departed from the notion of register. The concept of an interpretative repertoire
is developed further in Chapter 13 by Potter et al. who lay out some of the
benefits of the notion and compare it to some versions of the Foucaultian
notion of discourse. Debates about the
relative merits of repertoires, discourses and other possible notions such as
social representations have continued.
It is notable that although the notion of repertoires is a central
feature of many of the social psychological contributions seen in Volume 2 it
is largely absent from the discursive psychology collected together in Volume
3.
Methods in Practice and
Methods as Topic
One of the features of this tradition of work that
separates it out from other social psychological perspectives that emerged from
the crisis in social psychology, for example Harré’s ethogenics perspective
(1979) or the work on social representations associated with Moscovici (1984),
is its focus on method. This is partly
because of the early interest in the limitations of social psychological
methods such as experiments and surveys and partly because of the broader
interest in the way methods operate in science.
Following through the emphasis on language in use
had important implications for the way method is understood. Initially the idea that people’s
descriptions were parts of actions raised problems for any method that treated
people’s talk as merely descriptive of what they thought, of what had happened
to them, of their social environment and so on. The initial move was to use open ended interviews as a procedure
not for harvesting people’s views or information about their past or whatever,
but as an arena for revealing the different interpretative repertoires they
used to construct the world as part of specific actions. The Potter & Mulkay Chapter 14 is the
earliest full statement of this perspective on interviews, and this stance on
interviews has informed large amounts of discourse analytic work done since.
As discourse research became more refined and
subtle, and as it drew increasingly on conversation analytic understandings of
the activities done in talk, the earlier perspective on interviews seemed more
limited. Indeed, interviews started to
seem more complex and harder to analyse than had previously been thought. Potter & Hepburn’s Chapter 16 is an
exploration of some of the varied considerations that must be addressed when
conducting, analysing and presenting interviews. Antaki et al’s Chapter 17 highlights some of the analytic
shortcomings that have become widespread in the large body of interview work
done in the last two decades. Indeed,
it highlights just the considerations that have encouraged researchers to
increasingly move toward the study of naturalistic records – audio and video
recordings of people interacting in their institutional and everyday
settings. This move will become clear
from the pattern of contributions; while many of the contributions to Volume 2
depend on interview material most of the contributions to Volume 3 work with
naturalistic materials. Edwards Chapter
15 is an illustration of what is possible in applying the insights from
contemporary interaction analysis and discursive psychology to interview talk. Although the study highlights further limitations
in the use of interviews, it also reveals new analytic possibilities.
The final theme in this section of articles on
method is what is revealed by an application of interaction research and
discursive psychology to the study of methods in action. The Suchman and Jordan Chapter 18 was one of
the first pieces that took method as topic in this way. Their study of standardized surveys
highlighted the failure of survey researchers to conceptualize interaction
adequately, and showed up how this failure undermined the goal of
standardization. It made the
challenging claim that to achieve standardization for the recipients of survey
questions interviewers might need to respond flexibly to the contingencies of
natural conversation. Myers in Chapter
19 and Houtkoop-Steenstra & Antaki in Chapter 20 are both studies that
consider the way the classic objects of psychological research (‘opinions’,
‘quality of life’) are at least partly produced through interactions in the
research setting. These latter papers
raise profound questions for psychological research methods and their status
vis a vis the objects of psychological study.
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