For the first time since a diplomatic clash erupted late last year the whole UNSC, including the five permanent members, endorsed a statement on the situation in Syria and measures which should be taken for normalization in the country.

Russia expressed its satisfaction that the document is balanced and moderate unlike previous proposals, which Moscow felt compelled to veto.

Western reaction on this move is that Russia understood that its position before had no prospects and gradually moved back to common sense. Is this interpretation correct?

Of course, Moscow’s approach to Bashar Assad and assessment of his future has changed. There are no naïve people in Russia who believe that business as usual will be possible with the current regime in Damascus when the dust has settled. But business motivations played a significant role in the Russian stance initially.

Moscow’s stubbornness in recent weeks was not about commercial interest, but about principles.

The general principle can be formulated as following: the international community has no right to intervene in a civil war on one of the sides. If the responsibility to protect were to be interpreted as it was in Libya, where the UNSC sanction was abused for a regime-change operation, really responsible countries should block such behavior.

That’s why Russia was especially careful looking for hints, which potentially could be used to justify another invasion.

Another reason for Russia’s position was the willingness to prove to Western and Arab countries that Russia matters, and nothing in world affairs can be done without agreement from Moscow.

The first reaction to that was stormy. Russia was accused for being immoral, mercantile and reckless. Many commentators began to talk about isolation in which Russia had put itself. Some less emotional analysts were puzzled about why Russia was so short-sighted and didn’t diversify its policy – after the fall of Assad, they argued, Russia would lose everything in Syria.

But Moscow stood unusually firm, and finally won this round of the big Syrian game. After a tsunami of criticism, Western powers and Arab states understood that it was impossible to bypass Russia. Otherwise the only course of action would be the Iraqi scenario of 2003 – without the authorization of the UNSC.

Ten years ago, the US considered this option as highly applicable, but since then much has changed, and even most powerful states care about formal procedure. So usual diplomatic work re-commenced, Western and Arab diplomats suddenly “recalled” old good methods to address such a crisis, like sending missions and special envoys. When the whole process went back to normality, Russia found it possible to support those efforts.

There is a third reason why Russian and Western positions got closer to each other. While Moscow’s confidence for Assad is declining, the same is happening gradually to the Western attitude towards Syrian rebels. Forces which struggle against official Damascus are not fully identified. Doubts are rising about their goals and ideas.

All regime crashes during the Arab Spring led to the replacement of secular dictatorships by Islamic rule. The future of Egypt, Libya, Yemen is vague. Even Tunisia can seriously change its nature.

To help another Islamist group to prevail in one of the most important Arab states is hopefully not what critics of Assad in the West aspire to. And in such situation it seems to be quite useful to cooperate with Russia, which can contribute a more nuanced and balanced approach.

Unfortunately, interesting diplomatic games have little to do with the situation in Syria, where violence continues. It seems the confrontation has gone too far, and no international participation can stop it. Maybe coordinated work will be able at least to reduce the scope of the battle.

­Fyodor Lukyanov, for RT

­The statements, views and opinions expressed in this column are those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of RT.