

Advocates on behalf of Jews in Russia, Ukraine, the Baltic States & Eurasia

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#1 U.S. Puts Sanctions on 7 Foreign Companies Dealing With Iran By Helene Cooper and Steven Lee Myers New York Times, August 5, 2006

WASHINGTON, Aug. 4 — The United States has imposed sanctions on seven foreign companies, two of them Russian, for providing Iran with materials that could be used to make unconventional weapons or cruise or ballistic missile systems, it was announced Friday.

The sanctions, effective July 28, will be in place for two years. During that time, American government agencies are not allowed to buy goods or services from the seven companies or provide them with assistance. The sanctions also bar the sale of some military equipment, services or technologies to the companies or their subsidiaries.

The two Russian companies are Rosoboronexport, the state-owned arms trading monopoly, and Sukhoi, a large manufacturer of military and civilian aircraft.

Also affected by the sanctions are the Korean Mining and Industrial Development Corporation and Korea Pugang Trading Corporation, both of North Korea; one Cuban company, the Center for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology; and two Indian companies, Prachi Poly Products and Balaji Amines.

The sanctions were imposed by the State Department under the Iran Nonproliferation Act, passed by Congress in 2000. The announcement brings to 33 the number of foreign companies penalized under the law.

Russia's Foreign Ministry responded swiftly and harshly, calling the decision unacceptable and denying that the country's military trade with Iran had violated any international laws.

"In effect, it amounts to one more unjustifiable attempt to force foreign companies to base their activities on American domestic regulations," the ministry said in a statement released on Friday evening in Moscow. "Sanctions of this kind that the United States unilaterally applies to other countries and to organizations in them are an obvious political and legal anachronism, especially when such moves are made under farfetched pretexts."

On Monday, Russia joined the United States, Britain, France, China and other members of the United Nations Security Council in passing a resolution giving Iran until the end of this month to suspend its enrichment of uranium or face sanctions.

A senior Bush administration official, questioned about the timing of the sanctions announced Friday, given that the United States is trying to hold the Russians in a coalition to curb Iran's nuclear ambitions, said that "there's never a good time" to impose sanctions. "They know the law," he added.

The official asked that he not be identified because he was not authorized to speak publicly on the issue.

Late last year, Russia signed an agreement to ship \$1 billion in weaponry to Iran. The agreement includes the sale of Tor-M1 air defense missiles, but the deal has not yet been completed, according to Russian news reports.

An official at Sukhoi expressed puzzlement, saying the company had worked closely with American companies and had not sold anything to Iran in recent years. Sukhoi has been working with Boeing on a joint venture to develop a regional passenger airliner, but it is not clear whether that project will be affected.

"We have been on the U.S. market for a long time," Sukhoi's deputy director, Aleksandr N. Klementyev, said in a radio interview Friday evening on Ekho Moskvy. "We study the legislation very attentively, and we have never violated anything, nor are we going to." John Dern, a spokesman for Boeing, said his company was "reviewing the sanctions to assure that we'll be in full compliance with their requirements." Boeing serves in an advisory role in Sukhoi Civil Aircraft's plan to develop a regional jet called Superjet 100, he said.

The plane, which seats 100, is supposed to make its first flight in September 2007. It would compete with regional jets built by Embraer, a Brazilian company, and Bombardier, of Quebec.

The Russian Foreign Ministry's statement suggested that the sanctions could hurt American companies. "In effect, the United States punishes its own companies, depriving them of the opportunity to cooperate with advanced Russian enterprises," the statement said.

It did not address the debate over how to respond to Iran's nuclear programs, but it called the American step "shortsighted" and said it was "bound to affect the quality of our cooperation" with the United States.

Helene Cooper reported from Washington for this article, and Steven Lee Myers from Moscow. Matthew L. Wald contributed reporting from Washington.

#2 CIS: What Impact Will Ukraine's Political Shift Have On Colored Revolutions? By Robert Parsons RFE/RL, August 7, 2006

As the dust settles in Ukraine after last week's drama in parliament, what has been the reaction -- if any -- in the rest of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) to the outcome?

PRAGUE, August 7, 2006 (RFE/RL) -- There will be little talk of colored revolutions in Georgia this week. The euphoria that swept the young team of Georgian ministers when the Orange Revolution triumphed in Ukraine in January 2005 has all but dissipated.

For a few heady months, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili saw himself -- and Georgia's own Rose Revolution -- as the catalyst for change throughout the CIS. Ukraine was followed by Kyrgyzstan and perhaps Saakashvili could imagine a region ruled by presidents fashioned in his own image.

Now it's time for a reality check.

Instead of Yuliya Tymoshenko, Ukraine has Viktor Yanukovych.

Regional Alliances

But how serious a blow is this to the proponents of democratic change? Salome Zurabishvili was foreign minister of Georgia at the time of the Orange Revolution and responsible for forging a strong strategic alliance with the new democratic Ukraine.

"This is bad for Georgia from the point of view that Russia will conclude that these revolutions are not irreversible, and that with a little help it is possible to reverse the process," Zurabishvili said. "So all of Georgia's efforts at this time should be directed at assuring the Georgian people, Russia, and international society that this process in Georgia is irreversible."

But while Ukraine may no longer be so steadfast an ally of Georgia in the face of Russian pressure, some see here a triumph for Ukrainian democracy -- and, by association, the values that both the Orange and Rose revolutions are built on. Cory Welt, the deputy director of the Russia and Eurasia Program at the Center for International and Strategic Studies in Washington, said that what "we have seen in Ukraine is the most democratic outcome that we could have envisioned."

"So, in that regard it doesn't change anything. What it does change is the fact that they had linked the democracy agenda to this pro-Western agenda. And I think nobody had anticipated that in Ukraine those wouldn't necessarily go together," he said.

Erkin Alymbekov takes a similar view. The deputy speaker of the Kyrgyz parliament told RFE/RL's Radio Azattyk that last week's events in Ukraine had been a triumph of common sense.

"About half the population of Ukraine is supporting Yanukovych, and his political stance is very popular there. Yushchenko -- who did not play a game around the colored revolutions, and who put his personal, patriotic, and presidential duties higher than ordinary ambition in order to deal with the political crisis, who put forward Yanukovych as the prime minister of the coalition government -- this, I suppose, is the fair and right stance," Alymbekov said.

Indeed, as far as Kyrgyzstan is concerned, said Martha Brill Olcott -- a senior associate with the Russian and Eurasian Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, D.C. -- the reality is that little will change.

"I don't think it will affect Kyrgyzstan honestly except that it will make its foreign policy easier -- just because their foreign policy is closely oriented to Russia," Olcott said.

Problems In Central Asia

Indeed, there are few in Kyrgyzstan likely to mourn the fading of the Orange Revolution. Any hopes harbored by democratic reformers that the so-called Tulip Revolution would become a model for democratic change in Central Asia have so far proved premature.

In fact, if Olcott is correct, it is one of the more authoritarian regimes of the region that may have more cause for concern.

"Ironically, Kazakhstan may have more problems. I mean Kazakhstan is one of those places that did build very explicit bridges to the new regime and Ukraine, and with the new government of Ukraine," Olcott said. "Kazakh-Ukrainian economic cooperation was pretty good before and I think they saw this as strengthening the free market in Ukraine and in Kazakhstan's interests."

Yet, here too "business as usual" seems the more likely outcome. Kazakhstan and Ukraine have a mutual interest in seeing business relations develop.

Konstantine Gabashvili, the chairman of the Georgian Parliamentary Committee for Foreign Affairs, takes heart too from the fact that Yushchenko still controls Ukrainian foreign policy and Yanukovych's commitment to continue democratic reforms.

"As for [Ukraine's] main political course, the main thing for us is that according to the document they signed, it shouldn't really change. Yushchenko guaranteed that the course would remain unchanged, and if anything happens, Yushchenko will react on that," Gabashvili said. "I can't say that the situation is easy in Ukraine, but it's not tragic and it is not worth giving any reaction but support the main course of Ukraine."

No tragedy but, for the moment at least, the end of the colored revolutions. Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka said in 2005 there will be no rose, orange, or banana revolutions in his country. This week he must feel time is on his side.

(RFE/RL's Georgian and Kyrgyz services, and Washington correspondent Julie A. Corwin, contributed to this report.)

#3 A Coalition Worth Waiting For By Anders Aslund Moscow Times, August 7, 2006

On Friday, Viktor Yanukovych was confirmed as prime minister by the Ukrainian parliament, more than four months after elections to the body had been held. The process could have moved faster but, given the election outcome, the government is about as good as anybody could have hoped for.

This coalition represents a strategic realignment in four ways. First, it signifies that the Orange Revolution is really over, and its ultimate success has been the democratization of the Party of the Regions, which honestly attracted the most support in the elections. Second, it marks a departure from regionally divisive politics. Third, the new coalition is based on a common economic policy. And finally, the new government has adopted a unified foreign policy.

Yushchenko and Yanukovych have opted for a strategy of national unity. One of Yushchenko's advisers explained to me recently that Ukraine needed to satisfy western Ukrainians on questions of the state, culture and language, because that was what they cared about, while the easterners should be catered to on the economy, which was the most important issue for them. Otherwise, Ukraine would be divided by a western national vision leaning toward Europe in opposition to a Russian-oriented vision.

After the elections, three alternative coalitions were possible: one orange, one eastern and the third an ideological coalition between the Party of the Regions and Our Ukraine. The Orange coalition was tried, but it alienated the east and fell apart. An eastern coalition was attempted, which naturally alienated the east. The natural way out was a government based on a liberal/conservative economic policy hybrid uniting Our Ukraine and the Party of the Regions. The Socialist Party has also gone along, while the Communists are likely to remain outside the coalition.

The new government is to be based on the principle of checks and balances. The Party of the Regions will get most of the economic posts, while Yushchenko will get to appoint the heads of the so-called "power ministries," consisting of defense, foreign affairs and interior, the chairman of the State Security Service and the Prosecutor General, as well as the first deputy prime minister and a number of minor ministers. Each ministerial appointment is supposed to be balanced by a committee chairman in the Parliament from another party.

Yulia Tymoshenko, meanwhile, has announced that she will move into opposition and will welcome anyone who wants to cross to join her faction. She will undoubtedly provide an effective critique of the government, which should prove good for democracy and the ultimate quality of governmental decisions. The concern that she could force new elections on flimsy constitutional grounds has, fortunately, subsided. These elections would have increased divisions between Ukraine's east and west and could have undermined Ukraine's newborn democracy.

Yushchenko has put great effort into elaborating the program for the new coalition, called the "Declaration of National Unity." This relatively brief document, consisting of six pages and containing 27 basic points, sets out the results of negotiations on four particularly difficult points: federalism, the status of the Russian language, private ownership of agricultural land, and Ukraine's foreign policy orientation. Compromises were made on all points, but Yushchenko appears to have emerged with the upper hand.

The first paragraph establishes that Ukraine is a unitary state, while another advocates decentralization, but without any mention of federalism.

The paragraph concerning language appears to have been put together carefully. Ukrainian remains the official state language, but "every Ukrainian citizen is guaranteed the right to use Russian or any other native language in all walks of life."

The private sale of agricultural land will be introduced no later than Jan. 1, 2008, a move that the Socialists have opposed.

Four paragraphs are devoted directly to foreign policy issues. Ukraine is to "take all necessary legislative steps to join the WTO before the end of 2006," which is a clear victory of Our Ukraine over both the Party of the Regions and the Socialists.

Ukraine is to maintain its course toward European integration with the eventual aim of joining the European Union, including the beginning negotiations on a free trade zone between Ukraine and the EU. Again, this looks like a victory for Our Ukraine.

The Party of the Regions insisted on adding a paragraph on the Common Economic Space, a proposed common market between Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine that has been pushed by Moscow. But the coalition addresses the Common Economic Space only as a free trade area and with certain reservations from Yushchenko that may make the deal much less attractive for the Russian side.

Our Ukraine was able to get a paragraph dealing with NATO in the declaration, calling for "mutually beneficial cooperation with NATO." The Party of the Regions made sure that a paragraph calling for a referendum on Ukraine's accession to NATO must be held, but Our Ukraine has attached the phrase that the referendum should be carried out only "after Ukraine has carried out all the necessary procedures," which seems somewhat diffusely to refer to NATO accession.

What it all comes down to is that Our Ukraine appears to have formed the foreign policy and security bloc in the government, while the Party of the Regions gets the economic bloc. Both parties appear to agree on the basic principles of economic policy. At the same time, significant progress has been made on resolving national tensions. The Party of the Regions appears to have accepted a Western-oriented foreign policy. Whether or not Ukraine gets a membership action plan for NATO at the organization's November summit in Riga is no longer a big issue.

That this was the outcome of the negotiations is impressive. Because of the complementary nature of the compromise, there is strong hope this alliance will hold. Therefore, we should not be too upset that it took four months to reach.

#4

Russia's Very Own Road From Serfdom Letter by Alexander I. Medvedev, Vice Chairman Gazprom OAO Moscow Wall Street Journal, August 5, 2006

Your July 15 editorial "Putin Village" presents a profile of Russia and the Russian economic experience that is very much at variance with reality. Russia is committed to democratic principles and free market processes. We are not, nor should we be, committed to adopt the governmental institutions and processes currently in place in the United States.

Your remarks fail to recognize the genetic core of democratic communities. Democratic communities around the world reflect the cultures and historic experiences of their respective peoples and their current conditions. They constantly seek the right balance between personal and economic freedom and government control of perceived excesses and inequities resulting from the unchecked "pursuit of happiness."

Recall the state of affairs inherited by the current Russian administration in 2000. The 1990s were a time of great hope and aspiration in the Russian Federation, but also a time of inequity and economic predation resulting in vast and unmerited wealth transfer. Think back to America's "robber barons" who thrived in the legal and regulatory vacuum of the 19th century. The appropriate response -- then in the U.S., now in Russia -- was and is direct government intervention to redress the common grievances of a democratic society: expropriation of ill-gotten gains and dissolution of the "trusts" that had distorted the principles of economic freedom and opportunity. The imposition of the rule of law and formal regulatory oversight is necessary to nurture the virtues of market competition while controlling the excesses that could compromise those virtues.

Forging a democracy is hard work, requiring constant re-evaluation and the accommodation of internal and external pressures. We welcome constructive criticism but we also feel strongly that an appreciation of our progress is warranted. The developments you characterize as "creeping authoritarianism" were not assaults on a pre-existing model democracy or model market economy but rather a rebalancing of rights and obligations in response to prevailing inequities and economic conditions. Russia's democratic and economic progress has been remarkable in scope and speed by any standard.

You are correct to note that the Russian economy still lacks the diversification we all seek. But there are many encouraging signs that the economy is diversifying and expanding. The number of small- and medium-size businesses has grown in recent years, with the retail and services sectors experiencing growth rates of 12% and 10%, respectively, in 2005. For the first time in Russian history, a middle class -- the traditional catalyst for the expansion of economic and political freedoms -- exists.

The Russian government owns 51% of my firm Gazprom, the nation's largest natural gas producer. This also means that 49% is owned by stockholders from around the globe, who, like those in U.S. firms, demand financial performance and transparency. Government ownership of key energy assets does not imply sinister economic intent, nor is it at odds with democracy. We need only look today to Mexico, Brazil, Canada, Norway and many other countries to find this model firmly rooted. Indeed, only a few years back British Petroleum was a state-owned enterprise too.

Russia seeks what every responsible nation seeks on the international stage: political integration with the international community, a meaningful role in the global economy and respect as an engaged partner with its own credible views and interests. We believe the respect we seek has been earned. We would appreciate a more balanced treatment of our challenges and our progress in the future.

#5 Ukraine in Uneasy Power Balance as Premier Is Approved By Steven Lee Myers New York Times, August 5, 2006

MOSCOW, Aug. 4 — Ukraine's Parliament approved Viktor F. Yanukovich as the new prime minister on Friday evening, creating an awkward balance of power between him and President Viktor A. Yushchenko, the man who defeated him in 2004 during what became known as the Orange Revolution.

Mr. Yanukovich's election ended more than four months of uncertainty and political turmoil following an indecisive parliamentary election in March. And though both Mr. Yanukovich and Mr. Yushchenko appealed for national unity, the new arrangement is almost certain to provoke tensions between the legislative and executive branches in a country that marked its independence and democracy only 15 years ago.

Mr. Yanukovich received the votes of 273 of 296 deputies who were present, a comfortable majority of the 450-member Parliament. Only 9 deputies voted against, while the rest abstained or did not vote. It was a measure of the lingering political divisions that 154 deputies boycotted Friday's meeting.

They included supporters of the former prime minister and erstwhile presidential ally, Yulia V. Tymoshenko, as well as many members of Mr. Yushchenko's own party, Our Ukraine, though an exact breakdown was not immediately available. Only 30 of 86 members of the president's party voted for Mr. Yanukovich, a sign of the profound internal dissension over Mr. Yushchenko's agreement on Thursday to ally himself with a new Yanukovich government.

For Mr. Yanukovich, 56, Friday's vote culminated an extraordinary comeback. As the chosen successor of the former president, Leonid D. Kuchma, he and his government were implicated in the electoral fraud in 2004 that prompted tens of thousands to pour into the streets of Kiev, where he was ridiculed as a criminal. The protests, along with international diplomatic pressure, forced a revote and left Mr. Yanukovich discredited and abandoned.

Addressing Parliament before the vote, Mr. Yanukovich pledged an "efficient, effective, professional and responsible" government — this time in tacit alliance with his rival, Mr. Yushchenko. He characterized the vote as an effort to unify a country that has remained deeply divided since the Orange Revolution.

"This hall is deciding on the actual unification of two teams, which have been standing on the opposite banks of the Dnieper in the past two years," he said, according to Interfax. He was referring to the river that, roughly, divides the country into Ukrainian- and Russian-speaking halves, echoing remarks made by Mr. Yushchenko the day before.

Even as the vote neared, there were last-minute snags that appeared to threaten the alliance that took shape earlier this week.

The Parliament first voted for new judges for the Constitutional Court, which has for months been unable to form a quorum and thus function. When a nominee proposed by Mr. Yushchenko was passed over in an initial vote, a presidential aide threatened to withdraw Mr. Yanukovich's nomination. That prompted a second vote for the judge, Petro Stetsyuk, this time in favor. At the same time, the Parliament passed a resolution asking the court not to revise the Constitution, as many suspect Mr. Yushchenko would like to do.

The composition of Mr. Yanukovich's government remained unclear. Under constitutional changes made in the midst of the Orange Revolution, and now supported only lukewarmly by Mr. Yushchenko, the prime minister and Parliament have considerably broader powers, especially over the budget and domestic policy.

The president, however, retains power over foreign and defense policy. And on Friday, Mr. Yushchenko renominated his two current appointees to the foreign and defense ministries, Boris I. Tarasyuk and Anatoly S. Hrytsenko.

Under the coalition agreement signed with Mr. Yanukovich and other party leaders on Thursday, though nonbinding, the new government pledged to pursue Mr. Yushchenko's main policy goals, including cooperation with NATO.

#6 Kiev Citizens Meet with Knesset Members FJC, August 7, 2006

KIEV, Ukraine – Jewish citizens of Kiev met with Israeli Knesset members who arrived in the Ukrainian capital as part of a joint program of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Euro-Asian Jewish Congress. Mikhail Nudelman representing the Kadima Party and Joseph Shagal of the party "Israel Our Home" spoke about the importance of the support of the Jewish Diaspora as they appeared before local Jewish residents in the Galitskaya Synagogue.

The Knesset members explained the current situation in Israel and the fight against terrorism. Afterwards, those who gathered in the synagogue, including many journalists, asked various questions concerning the current operation in the south Lebanon and the life of ordinary Israeli people during these difficult days. The main focus was on the future of the Middle East. In spite of difficulties, Israel will attain a victory, they said, while emphasizing the great need for support from Jews across the world.

#7 Is the CIS getting divorced? RIA Novosti, August 8, 2006

MOSCOW. (RIA Novosti political commentator Pyotr Goncharov) - The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) is undergoing several processes, but essentially they boil down to a regulated disintegration of a once enormous country. December 8, 1991 was not so much the CIS's date of birth as a prelude to its formal disappearance.

This conclusion may sound depressing to some people, but it is most probably true. Credit for this verdict goes to the president of the Kyrgyz Institute of Social Policy, Kyrgyz former Foreign Minister and member of the RIA Novosti Expert Council Muratbek Imanaliyev. There is little to add to it except for the fact that as an international entity, the CIS has devised a record number of paper projects. It has implemented only 10% of the 1,600 documents drawn up over the 15 years of its existence, 90% were "good intentions".

The CIS has all the formal attributes of an international organization: charter documents, executive bodies, etc., but its decisions are not binding on its members, and this is the main problem. It is understandable why Nursultan Nazarbayev, the president of the most dynamic CIS nation, made a "demarche" at the recent Commonwealth summit: "We should make decisions which meet everyone's interests and we should not make a decision if any country disagrees." He suggested five areas for resuscitating the CIS which would be good for all: migration policy, transportation, education, dealing with today's challenges, and the humanitarian problem. Now the only thing to do is to find common ground and secure a consensus among all members of the CIS club.

Migration and education are definitely the most important questions. All members have a stake in resolving this problem on CIS territory. The widespread opinion that guest workers are exclusively bound for Russia is wrong in many respects. It is true that more of them come to Russia than to any other CIS country. But in Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan the lack of proper conditions for the migration of workers is no less urgent than it is in Russia. The governments of the three republics should deal with this problem, which is sensitive in many respects. They should agree on how to resolve it. The situation in other parts of the CIS is much the same. To sum up, it is high time to adopt a law on migration in the CIS.

Education is a more appealing subject if it means the formation of unified standards for educational systems throughout the CIS. Resolution of this problem will streamline migration and even out the educational levels (at least on a regional scale in the beginning). It is indispensable for making the economies more equal, achieving EURASEC integration and developing cooperation in the framework of the Collective Security Treaty Organization.

The Kazakh president's other proposals are also topical. He spoke about a "united approach to international policy" and a "common defense space". But consensus on these questions will not be easy to reach. What is to be done? The CIS members should start working, and solutions may come in the process.

If the CIS implements the proposed reform on consensus and binding decisions, it will be making an effort to undo the divorce and restore cooperative relations. But is consensus always possible? There are some painful problems which can only be resolved with the passage of time. Is compromise possible at all in such cases?

Some CIS members are interested in the reform for geopolitical, economic, and historic reasons. But once it has been completed, the CIS may have fewer members, which is both predictable and natural.

As Imanaliyev pointes out, the CIS is not simply going through a divorce. It is also helping the former members of a once united country to develop two kinds of relations: between Russia and the rest and between newly independent states. All these processes are far from being completed; empires do not disappear overnight.

#8 Borderland Split By Mark Von Hagen Wall Street Journal, August 8, 2006

Mr. von Hagen is Boris Bakhmeteff professor of Russian and East European studies and chair of the history department at Columbia University.

Fifteen years after Ukraine's surprise birth, the struggle continues over its place in the world. The Orange Revolution of 2004 didn't settle it. Nor did this spring's parliamentary elections. Last week, following four months of political paralysis, brought the surprise return, as prime minister, of pro-Russian politician Viktor Yanukovych, whose attempt to steal the 2004 presidential elections sparked the Orange uprising.

The country was, and is, split along multiple registers -- regional and generational, linguistic and cultural, though not, as some mistakenly claim, ethnic. Perhaps the most serious divide is between Ukrainians who see their future with Russia and an economy dominated by the state and its oligarchs, and those who see it moving closer to the West. The first group finds powerful allies in Russia that want the two Slavic countries brought closer together again; this is Mr. Yanukovych's electoral base. The second sees a wholly sovereign Ukraine tied to Europe, and continues to back Orange Revolutionaries like President Viktor Yushchenko and former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko.

Slavophiles and Westernizers

A major battleground is history. The "reintegrationists" think that Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusans are fated again to live in a single Slavic Christian Orthodox state. This view of the past has its origins in imperial Russia, and insists that the medieval state of Kievan Rus in the 10th through 13th centuries was the birthplace of Russian civilization and Moscow its rightful heir. During the last century, communist ideologues in Moscow and Kiev recast this argument as "the great friendship of peoples"; Russians were "elder brothers" to all the other non-Russian peoples, above all the Ukrainians and Belarusans.

Much as the the current-day Slavophiles lay claim to history for political purposes, so do those in Ukraine -and the few Westernizers in Belarus -- who want to build democratic, sovereign nation-states and get close to modern Europe. Here the common past shared with Poland and Lithuania, now in the elite European clubs, is emphasized while the Russians are portrayed as invaders and illegitimate occupiers. For this project to succeed, the histories of Ukraine and Russia have to be disentangled in order to claim a separate existence for the Ukrainian nation even under Moscow's rule.

This "nationalization" of the past was well under way at the dawn of the 20th century. Myhailo Hrushevsky, the father of modern Ukrainian history, became the father of the modern Ukrainian state when he was elected head of the Central Rada, or parliament, in 1917. The Bolsheviks soon ended this brief experiment in self-rule. During an early wave of Stalin-era repressions, Hrushevsky was arrested and exiled to Moscow and died, in 1934, in mysterious circumstances. There was no place for such an advocate of Ukraine's independence or even autonomy. Stalin drove the "renationalization" project underground and into the Ukrainian diaspora. That's where it stayed until the second breakup of the Russian empire in 1991, the year an independent Ukrainian state resumed life with full force.

Today one of Kiev's central boulevards, on which sit the Ukrainian parliament and main government building, is named after Hrushevsky. A monument to him stands in front of the Pedagogical Museum that housed the 1917 Rada government and across the street from the Ukrainian National Academy of Science. Other figures from the Ukrainian past -- the Kievan Princes Volodymyr and Yaroslav, Cossack Hetmans Bohdan Khmelnytsky and Ivan Mazepa, the poet bard of the Ukrainian nation Taras Shevchenko and 20thcentury hetman Pavlo Skoropadsky -- are similarly honored in a not-so-subtle effort to retell the story of Ukraine's past.

Many Ukrainians dealing with their messy history today are tempted to claim that the nation was always so - characterized by primordial and unchanging traits. This idea, implied in Hrushevsky's work, originated with another 19th-century Ukrainian intellectual, Mykola Kostomarov. It tries to explain how "Ukraine" withstood world wars, occupations, terror, deportations, famine, nuclear contamination and other plagues and stayed purely Ukrainian.

Just as the Russian imperialists distorted Ukraine's past for their own political ends, the new nationalists are guilty of a similar sin. The major stumbling block in their attachment to the "primordial" Ukrainian theory is the fact of history. Nothing close to a "pure" genetic pool, rare enough in any place, could have possibly been preserved on such a large and diverse territory occupied by a host of invaders who intermingled with the local population. Mongols, Poles, Russians, Crimean Turks, Germans, Austrians, Hungarians and Romanians, to name a few, passed through contemporary Ukraine and left their mark, genetic included. Add to this violent history the collective biography of millions of Jews who lived there -- under Polish, Austrian and Russian rule -- and those who resettled in Ukraine after feeling serfdom in Russia. It's hard to imagine who or what this genuinely primordial Ukrainian might be. Reducing national identity to biology is an insult to millions of Ukrainians.

Throughout its history, Ukraine the place and the idea has been located at the frontiers of powerful Eurasian empires and states. Its "borderland" characteristic shaped such key social institutions as the Cossacks, who built a state in the 17th century that was distinct from both an ascendant Muscovite autocracy to the northeast and the declining constitutional monarchy of Poland-Lithuania to the west. The Greek Catholic, or

Uniate, Church also could have taken root only in a borderland, which is what the word Ukraine literally means. Since the Union of Brest in 1569, Greek Catholics practice the Byzantine rite (largely the same as the Orthodox Christians) but acknowledge the Roman Catholic pope as their spiritual leader. The religious communities of the Greek Catholic Church confronted frequent persecution by both Roman Catholic (mostly Polish) and Orthodox (mostly Russian) churches, but emerged in the 20th century as advocates for ecumenism and reconciliation of eastern and western Christianity.

The borderlands were also, importantly, multiconfessional and multinational. So the history of Ukraine's people is shared with the history of Poland, Russia, Israel and other states. Certainly, this diversity contributed to very bloody interethnic conflict, above all in the last century. But this diversity also forced intellectuals to grapple with the dilemmas of intolerance and inequality. Some concluded that ethnic purity and violence were the solution; that included the Ukrainian Dmytro Dontsov and a Jewish counterpart from Odessa, Vladimir Zhabotinsky, one of the spiritual fathers of modern Israel. But the mainstream of Ukraine's intellectual life has more often embraced diversity and tried to work out models for peaceful and productive coexistence and even cooperation.

Empires' Children

To address the argument that Ukraine differs little from Russia, one must take a trip to Moscow and Kiev. The differences, which have emerged most clearly in the past 15 years, are not merely expressions of separate "national character." Compare the relatively pluralist religious situation in Ukraine with the hegemonic power of the Orthodox Church in Russia. In politics, Ukraine from the beginning of its independence embraced a parliamentary system that allowed a strong opposition to take root. Not so in Russia. As the previous and allegedly pro-Kremlin President Leonid Kuchma, who left in disgrace in 2004, pointed out, Ukraine is not Russia. It's also not Poland or Belarus.

Many of Ukraine's current divisions are legacies of the rival occupations that shaped its distinctive regions. Western Ukraine -- today's Galicia and Bukovyna -- is historically tied to Poland, Lithuania and Austria-Hungary, whereas the south and east of the country -- the homeland of the Cossacks -- for centuries have been in the Russian or Soviet, as well as the Ottoman empires.

Today's Ukraine lies at a new borderland between the European Union and NATO, which leave open the door for Ukraine's membership, and Russia and its allies in the former Soviet empire, which carry the powerful carrots (and sticks) of oil and gas. President Yushchenko tries to put Ukraine on the European track. The new Yanukovych government may want to veer the country back toward Moscow. Neither man will have an easy time of it. Ukraine's distinctive history, and the shadows it casts on the present and future, refuses to put the country firmly in the East or West, but somewhere in between.

#9 Political uncertainty in Ukraine persists RIA Novosti, August 8, 2006

MOSCOW. (Vyacheslav Igrunov for RIA Novosti) - The political crisis in Ukraine has been resolved, but uncertainty persists. The new government is still suffering from the painful compromise that brought about its establishment.

On the one hand, most key posts in the government have been given to people free of ideological intoxication and capable of constructive, pragmatic actions. They know why gas should be stored in underground depots in summer, why international commitments should be honored, and why their country should not clash with those on whom its development depends.

They are First Deputy Prime Minister Mykola Azarov and Naftogaz head Yury Boiko. They will be easy to work with, and may be the most suitable partners for Russia.

The duo of Foreign Minister Borys Tarasyuk and Defense Minister Anatoliy Hrytsenko, who had laid out the plan for an accelerated integration of Ukraine into NATO, which determined the policy underlying other decisions, has remained in place, just like the position of President Viktor Yushchenko, who pursued the line they had suggested and who remains the key politician in Ukraine.

Yushchenko's miraculous victory in the battle against the parliamentary majority showed that he still has something within him - a fighting spirit. Any other head of state would have acted in accordance with the law and nominated the majority's candidate. But Yushchenko said that the majority must accept his conditions or he would dissolve parliament because the creation of "a wrong coalition" distorted the will of the people.

Surprisingly for observers, parliament did not reject the ultimatum, which would have buried any other democratically elected president in a democratic country, but spent weeks discussing it and eventually signed it, although with compromise conditions.

The catastrophic inability of "orange" politicians to govern the country has reduced the president's approval rating to almost zero. (In his first and best 100 days, Yushchenko had the support of barely 50% of the people, which is logical in view of the illegitimate way he had come to power.)

The parliamentary victory of the "orange trio" - the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc, pro-presidential Our Ukraine and the Socialist Party - seemingly rehabilitated the revolutionary ideals. But subsequent developments showed that the winners were kept together by their striving for power, so that the "orange" government was deadlocked by their fear that one of the partners would gain the upper hand.

However, the ideological foundation of Our Ukraine proved to be sufficiently strong to prevent a seemingly unavoidable union with the pro-Russian Party of Regions, led by Viktor Yanukovych, the new prime minister of Ukraine. Its ideology prevented Yushchenko from implementing his agreements with the crisis coalition: only 30 of the 80 members of Our Ukraine in parliament voted for the new prime minister, leaving the party short of full participation in the new coalition.

This result will benefit Yanukovych, who did nothing to bring it about.

The talks on the formation of the government showed that Yanukovych is a weak politician, just like Yushchenko. The compromise was mostly reached through the surrender of his party's positions. Yanukovych's stance on the issue of the Russian language is a relevant example.

During the election campaign, the Party of Regions demanded that Russian should be granted the status of a second official language. But shortly before signing the agreement, Yanukovych said that Ukrainian should remain the only official language and that the Ukrainian Constitution, which protected all other languages, should be used to ensure this.

His statement sounded like a capitulation in view of President Yushchenko's stubborn refusal to implement the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages. Lawyers can talk all they want about how this refusal does not preclude support for decisions to grant Russian the status of a regional language, but the voters will not believe them.

Another example is Yanukovych's stance on joining NATO. A possible compromise might involve making a commitment to do everything necessary to become a member, with only the formal accession to be approved by referendum. That Tarasyuk and Hrytsenko have kept their posts in the government means that preparations for accession to NATO will continue alongside energetic brainwashing of the people.

But then, a brainwashing campaign might not be necessary, since the compromise agreement is not a binding document, and agreements survive in Ukraine only until one of the sides decides to change his/her stand. Moreover, the new government will be unable to speed up the country's movement towards NATO because of the growing civic awareness of the people. But the Euro-Atlantic factor will complicate economic talks with Russia.

Russia sympathized with the Party of Regions, above all because it hoped to stop Ukraine's slide towards NATO. Since Ukraine's stance on this issue remains vague, Moscow will most likely establish coldly pragmatic relations with Ukraine, and none of the new ministers, even though they suit the Kremlin, will be able to dampen its resolve. Russia will operate according to the "every man for himself" formula, although this may cost it some of Ukrainians' sympathy. But the Ukrainian government will also lose out unless it develops friendly relations with its main economic partner.

By succeeding in the coalition talks, Yushchenko has kept his post until the next elections but lost broad electoral support. By resisting the temptation to support the government and get seats in it, Our Ukraine may remain an opposition force alongside Tymoshenko's Bloc.

However, the "orange" time is over. The voters that may desert Yanukovych and his Party of Regions will not support the "orange" forces, but rather those who more consistently uphold the interests of the southern and eastern regions of the country. Unrestrained nationalism survived for as long as the eastern regions slept and maintained their paternalist Soviet mentality. They are becoming increasingly active today, as proved by the passing of laws on the status of the Russian language by regional assemblies.

This means that we may soon see the emergence of political parties that will fight for the interests of the majority of Ukrainians, who live in the southern and eastern regions. If the Party of Regions fails to get part of that vote, it will anyway not go to the "orange" forces.

Ukraine has started down the path of slow recovery after years of instability and civil discord. The formation of the new government was the first faltering step towards this goal. Ukraine's parliament has won the battle against the president, and its role will keep growing, together with that of the majority of voters.

Vyacheslav Igrunov is the director of the International Institute of Humanitarian and Political Studies.

#10 Moscow: A New Jewish Center Jewish Post of New York, August 8, 2006

A ceremony being held in Moscow marks the opening of the International Center for Russian & East European Jewish Studies. Members of Russian academic institutions and the cultural, scientific, educational and business communities will participate in the ceremony. Representatives of the Government of the Russian Federation, the Ambassador of Israel to Russia and diplomats from Eastern and Western European countries and the United States will also attend the event.

The International Center for Russian & East European Jewish Studies was established in Moscow with the support of Russian and international academic circles and philanthropic organizations. Dr. Oleg Budnitskii, a specialist in nineteenth- and twentieth-century Russian history, has been named Academic Director of the Center. He will also head the Centers Academic Council.

Over the past decade, Russia's Jewish community has increased its awareness of the vast learning, traditions and culture of the Jewish people that developed over thousands of years. Across Russia, and

most notably in Moscow, Jewish academic institutions have opened and literature on Jewish history, religion and traditions is being published. However, the vast majority of the academic community engaged in the study of Judaism has noted that as yet too little attention has been paid to the complex and diverse topic of the heritage and history of Jews residing in the territories that once made up Tsarist Russia.

The concept for establishing a Center in Moscow originated with Russian researchers engaged in studying this topic at foreign academic institutions and at centers of Slavic and Jewish studies. The goal of the International Center for Russian & East European Jewish Studies is to study and promote knowledge and understanding of the rich historical and cultural heritage of Russian and East European Jews. The Center will study their contribution to world culture and history, as well as their impact on the culture of peoples of Russia and other East European countries, and the development of a unique ethno-cultural phenomenon.

The Centers founders expect that the Center will contribute to self-identification by Russian and East European Jews through its dissemination of knowledge about the cultural heritage and historical traditions of the Jewish people. They also expect that the Center will contribute to the unification and development of Russia's Jewish community and strengthen its relations with compatriots living abroad.

#11 The Limits of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization RFE/RL, August 7, 2006

(Washington -- August 7, 2006) Any claim of an "active threat to Western interests" by the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is "exaggerated," two Central Asian experts told a RFE/RL audience last week. While they differed on the primary function of the SCO, which consists of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, Richard Weitz, Senior Fellow and Associate Director of the Center for Future Security Strategies at the Hudson Institute and Daniel Kimmage, Regional Analyst for Central Asia at RFE/RL agreed that the SCO represents "both a challenge and an opportunity" for Western decision-makers.

Weitz rejected claims by some observers that the organization was "NATO's evil twin." In particular, Weitz said that, despite its "potential strengths... the SCO lacks the internal coherence and capacity of NATO or other strong multilateral security institutions." Weitz outlined three areas where SCO members "disagree over important issues," including "the desirability of the Western military presence in Central Asia," "the SCO's role in traditional defense matters," and "the extent to which member governments should assist one another to suppress future 'colored' revolutions and other domestic unrest."

Kimmage argued that the SCO represented a "hands-off alternative and institutionalized counterweight" to what a "like-minded elite of the SCO member countries have seen as the common strong-arm [tactics of the] schoolmarms of the West." The security officials of the SCO countries are increasingly cooperating to support each other as they "fight these threats to the local power structure," Kimmage said. "The SCO ruling elites have a shared understanding of stability as the status quo," he said, and "they see their self interest in the maintenance of that [status quo]."

The most recent meeting of the SCO included Iran as an observer. Addressing concerns that a potential Iranian membership could transform the SCO into an "OPEC with bombs," Kimmage and Weitz reiterated the above-mentioned weaknesses of the alliance and dismissed the possibility that Iran would join the organization in the near future. Kimmage noted that the alliance is hesitant of extending membership to a Middle Eastern state with its own collection of regional problems, including tense relations with the West; while Weitz said that a membership expansion could "just as easily weaken the SCO as strengthen it."

Weitz recommended that the "growing importance" of the SCO, as well as its "broad agenda" to combat terrorism and extremism, "warrants a NATO initiative to establish direct ties with it." "A formal dialogue would [help] avoid misunderstandings and dampen competitive pressures," Weitz said. Kimmage, on the other hand, felt that formal links may be less necessary than a reconsideration of policies towards the SCO. According to Kimmage, the SCO members have a "different understanding of terrorism [than the West]" which is "not global," and there are "natural limitations" among the SCO members. At the same time, Kimmage acknowledged that there are two tendencies that could pose a threat to western interests -- first, "the resistance of domestic elites to outside pressures that they perceive as a threat to their hold on power," and second, the desire of some nations "to turn [the SCO] into a platform for greater global influence."

#12

Ukraine ambassador says PM Yanukovych to visit Moscow next week RIA Novosti, August 9, 2006

MOSCOW, August 9 (RIA Novosti) - Ukraine's ambassador to Russia said Wednesday that the new prime minister, Viktor Yanukovych, will visit Moscow next week.

"He will focus on economic issues," Oleg Diomin told reporters.

A source in the Ukrainian government said Tuesday that Yanukovych could visit Russia as early as next week, but the foreign minister gave a more general timeframe and said the new prime minister would be expected in Russia in August.

"Our embassy in Russia has started preparations for the visit," Borys Tarasyuk said adding that Yanukovych would attend a session of the Russian-Ukrainian committee for economic cooperation.

President Viktor Yushchenko finally approved the nomination of Yanukovych, his 2004 presidential rival, as prime minister last Thursday, and parliament voted in his favor Friday, thereby ending a four-month political crisis in the former Soviet republic.

Yanukovych, who served as prime minister in 2002-2004 under President Leonid Kuchma, has strong support from the Russian-speaking eastern part of Ukraine, and is widely expected to seek closer economic ties with Russia.

The Ukrainian ambassador to Russia, however, said he had no information about a possible visit of Ukraine's fuel and energy minister to Moscow after some media reported Wednesday that Yuriy Boiko had departed for Moscow on a working visit.

"Unfortunately, I have no information about Boiko visiting Russia," Diomin said. "Perhaps, he is making a private trip."

#13 Ukraine FM comments on issue of Ukraine admission to NATO Itar-Tass, August 9, 2006

KIEV, August 9 (Itar-Tass) - Ukrainian Foreign Minister Boris Tarasyuk has commented on issues related to the country's admission to NATO.

Answering a question about the differences in the attitudes of the prime minister and foreign minister regarding Ukraine's entry in NATO Tarasyuk in a programme of 1+1 television urged "not to make hasty"

conclusions." According to Tarasyuk, "I've not noticed changes in the premier's attitude judging by his words. He only suggested extending the term to 2007, however it does not mean that it will be so," said the foreign minister. He recalled that amendments to legislation concerning the export of agricultural products, metal scrap, and adjusting Ukrainian legislation on television to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) norms have not been adopted.

Asked if Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovich's statement to the effect that Ukraine's admission to NATO should be coordinated by the prime minister, president and government means Yanukovich's refusal from a referendum on the issue Tarasyuk said, "The premier wanted to say that such issues cannot be decided without consent of the president and Verkhovna Rada (parliament)."

The Ukrainian foreign minister also noted that the referendum on the issue of admission to NATO has no binding effect, this measure is only of advisory nature. However, he did not rule out that the referendum will be held. Tarasyuk also said he "could not even imagine a hypothetical situation in which his views would differ from the views of the premier."

#14 City's Jewish Revival Comes in Many Forms By Ben Judah St. Petersburg Times, August 8, 2006

Early on a Friday evening deep in dacha season, a couple of dozen people slowly drift into a non-descript office block, tucked away between a Coffee House and a S'barro. You would never know the small Sha'rei Shalom synagogue was here.

Anya, 21, has recently decided to start coming here instead of the Choral synagogue.

"I am modern, a woman and my mother is Russian. I felt there was no place for me at a traditional synagogue. This synagogue is different," she says," this is a progressive synagogue."

The youthful and beardless Rabbi Michael Farbman of Sha'rei Shalom is keen to explain what is different about his community, compared to the long-established orthodox Choral synagogue. For him, "this is about offering a modern, progressive, alternative form of practising religious Judaism to the Jews of St. Petersburg other than the orthodox model."

At the Friday night service, that ushers in the Jewish sabbath, you can plainly see the difference between orthodox and progressive Judaism. Men and women sit together and the Rabbi strums on his guitar as he sings from the prayer book.

"I like to think of my service as interactive," he says smiling. Rabbi Farbman explains that the difference between orthodox and progressive Judaism lies in the matter of interpretation and application of Jewish religious law.

"For the same reason we no longer have slaves, or practice any of those other ancient practices, we believe in the complete parity of men and women. It's a question of form not essence."

Progressive Judaism, which predominates in the U.S. and has a large affiliation in most other Jewish communities has just begun to appear in the former Soviet Union.

"When we began three years ago, we started from scratch, but we found people who'd been waiting for progressive Judaism, people who'd been searching for progressive Judaism without really knowing what they'd been searching for, and then people who came, attracted by what we were doing."

Yet after only a few years, regular attendance every week is around forty, with youth groups and movements growing rapidly.

"Even though the community is ageing, we have more than enough committed young people here," insists Farbman.

Even though almost all of his congregation have only one or two Jewish grandparents, Rabbi Farbman stresses "we share, all of us, the Jewish feeling of not quite belonging, maybe belonging somewhere else."

For many the attraction of progressive Judaism lies in its ability to seemingly reconcile Jewish and Russian identities in a simple accessible form and could become popular among Russia's estimated Jewish population of 100,000, many of whom are secular.

Rabbi Peretz Peretz, of the orthodox Choral Synagogue disagrees, adding that "Russian Jews identify with a more traditional vision of orthodox Judaism — even if they are not practising it."

The relationship between Sha'rei Shalom and Choral has not reached the levels of bitter and vicious squabbles that other diaspora communities and and those in Israel have seen. But the theological differences between them are more than slight.

"For me religion is an institution that cannot be reformed according to one's likes and dislikes, then simplified to make it easier to digest," Peretz Peretz said.

Adjusting his skullcap and evidently choosing his words carefully on such a sensitive topic, Farbman describes his relationship with the Choral synagogue as "cordial."

He adds, "they snipe at us all the time, I am lucky never to have been attacked personally. But we're not in competition with each other."

The problem both Rabbis face is one of outreach. In a city with a Jewish population half the size of the Jewish population of Britain, there are only a dozen or so strictly observant families. Art, a twenty-something classical promoter is typical.

Art says "I am a Jew, so is my wife. And I won't leave for Israel, though many of my friends have. I live here, I work here, I drink here and I'm not religious."

But cultural events and secular activities organised by the Jewish community are often a great success.

The Yesod, the new Jewish Community Center, which opened earlier this year has been attracting crowds of hundreds of people to celebrate festivals such as Purim, the Jewish carnival, as well as to cinematic events and themed evenings.

Menachem Lepkivker, who is the Jewish American Joint Distribution Committee representative in the city, speaks enthusiastically about the impact he hopes it will have.

"The Yesod will be a bridge to either the orthodox or the progressive synagogues," said Lepkivker.

The JDC sponsors Jewish cultural life in the city.

#15 Ukraine: Gas Test Awaits New Government By Roman Kupchinsky RFE/RL, August 9, 2006

PRAGUE, August 9, 2006 (RFE/RL) -- One of the first items on the agenda of Ukraine's newly formed cabinet will be to address the unresolved question of future gas supplies from Russia.

The rise of Party of Regions head Viktor Yanukovych to the post of prime minister has led to speculation that the new Ukrainian political climate could result in Russian concessions when gas negotiations resume. The Party of Regions is widely considered to be pro-Russia, which in turn was seen as a Yanukovych supporter during his 2004 presidential run.

In late May, Aleksandr Medvedev, a member of Gazprom's management committee, was asked about possible increases in the price of gas Russia would charge Ukraine in the second half of 2006.

Medvedev replied that, "according to our signed contract, the price was agreed upon for the first half year. This deadline is not far off and both sides will soon discuss the future price," RIA Novosti reported on May 26.

Yet the July 1 deadline came and went without any negotiations and without a change in the price.

Ukraine's months-long political crisis may be one reason Russia opted to put the negotiations on hold.

As the Party of the Regions gradually improved its position as the crisis dragged on, Moscow may have felt that it would not be prudent to demand higher gas prices, lest it stymie its reputed ally's chances of taking over the government.

New Negotiating Team

The composition of the new government in Kyiv will be a major factor in the upcoming gas negotiations with Moscow.

Of Yanukovych's four deputies in his new cabinet, Andriy Kluyev will be the one overseeing Ukraine's fuel and energy sector. Kluyev is widely regarded as a competent specialist with vast experience in industry and government.

He will be assisted in his work by Fuel and Energy Minister Yuriy Boyko, who headed Naftohaz Ukrayina during Leonid Kuchma's presidency, and by Coal Industry Minister Serhiy Tulub.

Boyko was questioned in 2005 over his alleged role in creating RosUkrEnergo, the murky middleman company involved in delivering Turkmen gas to Ukraine. He is known as a professional in the gas industry and an experienced negotiator with Ukraine's Russian and Turkmen suppliers.

Tulub previously held the post of coal-industry minister in the government headed by then-Prime Minister Yushchenko during the second Kuchma administration. Tulub is not expected to play a role in the upcoming gas negotiations.

New Realities

The question of how much Ukraine will pay for future deliveries of Russian and Turkmen gas will hinge on a number of different factors: Russia's ability to export gas without harming domestic consumers. Russia is faced with rapidly rising domestic gas consumption and Gazprom has been considering the possibility of decreasing gas exports to European markets in the future; Gazprom is reportedly strapped for cash needed to increase production and for geological exploration, a situation that does not bode well for Ukrainian

consumers; The amount of gas Turkmenistan can export to Ukraine. Any decrease in volume that cannot be replaced by other sources could have a disastrous impact on the new government and on Yanukovych's pledge to raise the country's GDP; Ukraine's ability to implement energy-conservation projects, especially in the gas sector. The former head of Naftohaz Ukrayina during the Yuliya Tymoshenko government, Oleksandr Ivchenko, promised to diversify suppliers and called for the construction of a Liquid Natural Gas terminal on the Black Sea. It remains to be seen if the new energy team is willing to spend billions of dollars on such projects.

Common Misconception

Yanukovych's record in managing energy policies during his term as prime minister during the Kuchma administration is neither terrible nor brilliant.

The reason being that energy policy was decided by Naftohaz head Boyko and Kuchma, with Yanukovych apparently playing a peripheral role.

Coming from Donetsk, Yanukovych was more involved in domestic coking coal policy than in gas. The Donbas region of Ukraine has been far more dependent on its native coal for its wealth than on imported gas.

Moreover, during his former stint as prime minister Yanukovych was seen to be obedient to Kuchma, and never agreed to the gas-pipeline consortium the Russians so desperately sought.

For years Gazprom strove to get the Ukrainian government to agree to an "international" consortium (in which Russia would play a very significant role) to manage the main gas trunk line traveling to Europe via Ukraine. And for years the Ukrainians, even those thought to have "pro-Russian" leanings, managed to delay and obfuscate the issue.

Will the Yanukovych government continue the energy policies of the Kuchma government? This is not as absurd as it might seem, considering that neither the governments of Tymoshenko nor her successor Yuriy Yekhanurov remained in office long enough to formulate a gas policy. Thus, the only precedent is the old Kuchma-Boyko one.

The question thus remains: Will Moscow continue to tolerate the Kuchma strategy of Kyiv paying lip service to Moscow while doing what it deems in its own interests, or will Moscow demand a higher degree of subservience from Yanukovych in return for its past support and a possible discount on gas prices?

#16 Russia Sends Humanitarian Aid to War-Ravaged Lebanon MosNews, August 9, 2006

Russia will embark on a large-scale operation to deliver humanitarian aid to Lebanon on Thursday. According to the Russian Emergencies Ministry, four II-76 transporters are to deliver aid to the aerodrome of Larnaca (Cyprus) from August 9 to 15, RBC reports.

The planes are to deliver tents, blankets, mattresses and pillows, canned milk and meat products, cereals, meat, ten mobile power stations, baby food, medical equipment and medications. The cargo will be delivered to UN representatives in Larnaca, who will have it transferred to Lebanon.

Earlier this week, the United Nations said it was suspending attempts to send relief to southern Lebanon because of heavy shelling in the area, a spokeswoman said, though aid shipments were arriving elsewhere in the country, according to The Associated Press.

"The Israeli forces were warning today, saying that there shouldn't be any vehicles in the southern part of Lebanon," Christian Berthiaume of the World Food Program said Tuesday. "They had exempted humanitarian convoys (but) we decided not to go because there has been heavy shelling the last 24 hours."

The WFP and other UN relief agencies said they were frustrated over the difficulty of moving aid into Lebanon, and said what they had brought in so far was insufficient.

However, UNICEF managed on Monday to get 11 trucks — loaded with first aid kits, baby hygiene kits and essential drugs — from Syria into Lebanon through the Arida border crossing on the Mediterranean coast in the north, she said.

The UN High Commissioner for Refugees, which had held off truck convoys into Lebanon since last Thursday, said a convoy of six trucks was able to reach Beirut on Tuesday with its load of thousands of blankets, mattresses, tents and kitchen sets.

The relief agencies said they were looking for alternative ways to move supplies into the country because road transport was too dangerous and it has become increasingly difficult to find drivers willing to go to southern Lebanon.

#17 Terrorists Fight Israel With Russian Weapons — Internal Security Minister MosNews, August 9, 2006

Israeli Internal Security Minister Avi Dichter has said in an interview that "all the terrorists surrounding Israel" are using Russian weapons, AFP reports.

"All the terrorists surrounding Israel are using Russian and Soviet-made arms — Kalashnikov assault rifles and Katyusha rockets," Dichter told the Russian daily Vremya Novostei in an interview published Tuesday.

"We don't have information about direct contacts between Hezbollah combatants and Russia, but we know quite well about Hezbollah's direct contacts with Syria and Iran," Dichter said.

Russian sales of anti-aircraft missiles to Syria and Iran have been heavily criticized by the United States and Israel.

Last week, the U.S. government imposed sanctions on Russian jetmaker Sukhoi and arms export monopoly Rosoboronexport, citing their weapons sales to Iran.

President Vladimir Putin defended the sale of anti-aircraft missiles to Syria in 2004, saying they posed no threat to Israel.

#18 Russia Denies Supplying Hezbollah with Anti-Tank Armaments MosNews, August 7, 2006

Russia has not supplied modern anti-tank armaments to the Middle East, so Hezbollah militants cannot possibly be in possession of them, Deputy President of the Academy of Geopolitical Problems Col. Gen. Leonid Ivashov told Interfax-AVN.

"Had Hezbollah obtained modern close-combat weaponry, including grenade launchers, I think that Israeli army casualties would be incomparable to the current figures," he said.

Ivashov previously headed the Russian Defense Ministry's Main Department of International Military Cooperation.

Ivashov's statement came as a response to a Monday article in the Israeli Haaretz daily claiming Hezbollah had obtained Russian RPG-29s from Syria.

Hezbollah has rather primitive missile launchers for use in guerrilla warfare, items which Russia has never produced. Such weapons may be manufactured in the Middle East, Ivashov said.

Meanwhile, head of the Military Forecasting Center Anatoly Tsyganok ruled out the possibility of deliveries of modern anti-tank weapons to Hezbollah from Russia or Syria.

"Any accusations alleging Russian or Syrian deliveries of anti-tank weapons to any forces in Lebanon are unfounded. The Israeli side has not presented any evidence of this, and it is unlikely that it will," he told Interfax-AVN on Monday.

RPG-29 weapons have been supplied to India, China and some other countries. "Most probably, such weapons, should Hezbollah militants really have any, might have been brought to Lebanon through third countries," Tsyganok said.

Police Disperse Anti-Israel Protest in Azerbaijan 08.08.2006 MosNews

Police in the former Soviet republic of Azerbaijan forced a crowd of about a hundred Muslims to leave an area near the Israeli mission in Baku where they had planned to hold a picket in support of Lebanon, the Russian news agency Interfax reported.

The crowd shouted angry anti-Israel slogans, demanding that Tel Aviv withdraw troops from Lebanon. About 25 protesters were detained as they tried to get nearer to the embassy cordoned off by the police.

Rallies in support of Lebanon were held in many Muslim states across the globe in the past weeks.

#19 Chief Rabbi rebuilding Jewish community By Lena Plekhanova Kyiv Post, August 10, 2006

Ukraine's chief Rabbi, Yaakov Dov Bleich, says that during his 17 years in Ukarine, the Jewish community has undergone vigorous growth and development. A lot less Jews are emigrating from Ukraine these days, but efforts to rebuild the country's Jewish community and Jews' cultural identity continue, Ukraine's chief Rabbi, Yaakov Dov Bleich, has said. In an Aug. 7 interview with The Post in Kyiv, Bleich referred to "a healthy competition" between various groups in Ukraine that represent its Jews. But, he added, certain Ukrainian publications, like the newspaper Silski Visti, which is associated with the country's Socialist Party, continue to print anti-Semitic material. Regarding Israel's recent military campaign in Lebanon, Bleich said Ukrainians need to understand that it's a fight against terrorism, which affects the lives of Jews and Gentiles in Ukraine and elsewhere.

KP: How long have you been in Ukraine?

RB: I've been here for 17 years, since the summer of 1989, when I came to Kyiv to check out the situation.

KP: What was your reason for coming?

RB: I came because I had gotten a job. I came to be the rabbi of the [Jewish] community in Kyiv, and once I came here – also as the chief rabbi of Ukraine.

KP: What are you proud of having accomplished so far?

RB: My mission here has not been a constant one. In the beginning, when I came here, most of the work and most of the people whom I came in contact with were prepared emigrants to Israel and the United States. And over the years, of course, we've been able to develop a local community, which today is a very good and thriving model community, throughout Ukraine. And we've been able to build the trappings of a community, which means infrastructure like schools, and we had an old-age home opened recently – the first non-governmental home in Ukraine. We have orphanages and we have synagogues. We built, renovated, renewed, restored... I think we have accomplished great things.

KP: What are you now planning to do?

RB: To continue developing. Here in Kyiv, we built a community center ... This is what we're doing throughout Ukraine, upon the ashes of the Holocaust, the ice of the Gulags, we're building a Jewish community in places where many, many people were sure that there would never be Jewish life again.

KP: After the fall of the Soviet Union, the flow of Jewish emigration out of Ukraine was large. Has this trend continued? Has there been a flow back?

RB: ... Very few people have come back ... I think what we see is an expression of what we call today globalization ... People do not have any problems living in Israel, Europe or the U.S. with their families and having a business in Ukraine.

KP: Are Ukrainian Jews still leaving Ukraine, still emigrating?

RB: Some are emigrating but a lot, lot less ... It is definitely not as much as 10 years ago, probably not even as much as five years ago. I think that it has a lot to do with the economy in Ukraine, its growth, the potential, the vision for the future of Ukraine. The people see that Ukraine's developing into a European country. I think there's a lot of optimism.

KP: What is the extent of Jewish business activity, investment in Ukraine?

RB: There is a natural market and there is a natural affinity between the people who grew up in Ukraine and who live today in Israel and the U.S.: they can speak the language [Russian, Ukrainian], they come back, they have contacts, and they can use these contacts ... We have a lot of people coming over and making investments.

KP: Can you name some of those who have come to invest in Ukraine, to do business here?

RB: ... I'm not sure they are interested in promoting themselves.

KP: How has the current conflict in Lebanon been reflected in Kyiv and Ukraine's Jewish community?

RB: Let me speak about two issues here. Issue number one: this is a conflict that Israel has today with Hezbollah and maybe even with Hamas. What does it mean for the Jewish Diaspora in general and of course what does it mean for Jews living in Ukraine. The second issue is what the Diaspora community living in Ukraine should do to support them in a time like this...

...Issue number one: it's no secret that the Jewish Diaspora throughout the world identifies itself with Israel ... Jewish people see Israel as our spiritual homeland ... The largest concentration of Jews in the world lives in Israel today. So there's definitely no possibility for Jews living throughout the world to say: I'm living in Ukraine, it doesn't bother me. At the same time, if you look at Ukrainian society ... I think that one of the biggest problems that Ukraine's having today as a society is that Ukraine is not interested in world politics. They [Ukrainians] are interested in what is happening in Russia, Europe, the near-abroad countries and Ukraine itself, because it affects them. But picking up any Ukrainian newspaper you can see what percentage of the coverage covers world and international affairs – and you're going to get close to zero...

It is important to explain to Ukrainians – even those who are not Jewish – why such conflicts like Israel-Hezbollah affect their lives ... Because terror today has no borders, and that's a fact: the Americans have seen it, the British have seen it, the Russians feel it, and the Ukrainians have to know it ...

I think that for people living under a democratic society for the last 15 years and trying to develop this democracy to be even more perfect, it's important to understand that the fight Israel is fighting today against Hezbollah is not Israel's fight but it's the world's fight. It's a fight of the free, democratic world, of the people who love freedom against the people who want to take it away from them ...

As a Jewish community, we have a very important obligation to stand up and explain to people living in the West that wherever we live the Jewish community's obligation is to make sure that people in Ukraine get objective coverage and objective news about Israel.

KP: Recently, there were protests near the Israeli Embassy in Kyiv both in support and against Israel's actions in Lebanon. What's your attitude to these demonstrations?

RB: Last week, there was a pretty nasty protest. Nasty because when politicians are looking to attract attention they do anything. Such as we witnessed last week when [Radical leftist politician Natalia] Vitrenko organized a demonstration outside the Israeli Embassy and said some very disgusting things about Israelis and Jews. This is something we've got to be aware of. I think that the Jewish community's showing of support for Israel two weeks ago gathered close to 8,000 people – this is a lot more telling and effective. It brought up Jews from all over Ukraine looking to identify with what's happening in Israel today...

KP: In 2004, Silski Visty, a newspaper closely associated with the Socialist Party, published anti-Semitic material that caused a negative reaction from the Jewish community. Does any tension remain between the Jewish community and the Socialist Party today?

RB: First of all, our main issue was not with Silski Visty so much as with those giving Silski Visty all of those anti-Semitic ideas and articles: that is, MAUP [Interregional Academy of Personnel Management]. MAUP

still exists; it still is publishing different anti-Semitic articles throughout many different journals and newspapers, such as Print and Personal Plus. It's hard to say that we had an issue with the Socialist Party. Silski Visty belongs to the Socialist Party, but the Socialists Party is hundreds of thousands of people and they don't all print newspapers. There's somebody who's responsible for this newspaper – that's the editor of the newspaper. The editor of this newspaper is responsible for the content of this newspaper. Silski Visty, as far as I'm concerned, has not turned the corner yet. It still has a long way to go. They still occasionally will print anti-Semitic articles ... I don't believe that [Socialist leader Oleksandr] Moroz is an anti-Semite ... I don't believe that [Interior Minister Yuriy] Lutsenko is either – he's no longer a member of the Socialist Party. I don't believe that the leadership of the Socialist Party are anti-Semites. What I do think is that the editor of Silski Visty, who is also a prominent member of the Socialist Party – I think that he has a problem with anti-Semitism.

And I don't think that this is only the problem of Jews. I think that it's a problem of Ukrainian society. A problem when people such as these do irresponsible things, print irresponsible articles and get away with it. I believe in freedom of speech, I believe in freedom of the press. But I also believe that people have got to be responsible for how they use that freedom...

KP: The desecration of Jewish cemeteries has raised concerns of increasing anti-Semitism. Is anti-Semitism really rising in Ukraine?

RB: There have been more acts of violence and anti-Semitism in Ukraine over the past number of years. It's hard to analyze something like this in hundred percents: blame it on Silski Visti or MAUP or Personal Plus – it's very hard. At the same time, it's hard to ignore the connection between dozens of kiosks that sell anti-Semitic literature throughout Kyiv. And they supposedly are breaking Ukrainian law, because they're selling literature that is being used to incite against national minorities, ethnic minorities such as Jews. And to say that there is no connection to those anti-Semitic attacks would be like a little child's reaction when it closes its eyes and says: you don't see me. You cannot totally detach these issues...

I think that lawmakers in Ukraine and law-enforcement agencies have to do their job better to rule out these things that cause crime, because you don't need to deal with the results if you deal with the cause...

KP: Has Ukraine's Jewish community been able to return Synagogues lost during the Soviet period?

RB: In Kyiv, Brodsky Synagogue [in the center of town, which was turned into a puppet theater by the Soviet authorities but given back to the Jewish community in 1997] has been renovated. It's been 10 years already. Galytsky Synagogue, which is behind the Ukrayina department store on Victory Square, has been returned and renovated. And now they are active in the main – the central Synagogue as well. These are the synagogues we have returned in Kyiv. This synagogue [the Kyiv Choral Synagogue] has been active since 1945. It's been obviously active for all these years. But it also has been renovated.

KP: What are relations like between the various Jewish organizations in Ukraine?

RB: There are a lot of Jewish organizations in Ukraine, and everybody works within the Jewish community. And at times when it's needed for the community, we'll come together. There is a healthy competition...

KP: Many of Ukraine's richest and powerful tycoons have close ties to Ukraine's Jewish community to which they donate money. Do you feel that this furthers negative stereotypes or do you welcome their sponsorship?

RB: These are not stereotypes. It's a fact that these are Jewish businessmen who are part of the Jewish community and donate money to the Jewish community. They identify with the community and they support the community. They do something they are very proud of and we're very proud that they don't forget the social needs of Ukrainians – be they Jewish or not...

KP: Do you support in any way relations between Israel and Ukraine, or are your activities limited to religion and culture?

RB: I keep very close contacts with two schools in Israel that I founded for Jewish children from the former Soviet Union... We have educational programs, but we don't have business programs.

KP: It's been said that the Jewish community in the former Soviet Union has been weakened through intermarriage with gentiles, which is damaging to Jewish identity. How do you feel about intermarriage of Jews today?

RB: Basically we're trying to encourage as much as we can for Jews to marry Jews. We're trying to encourage this for many reasons. One of the reasons is self-preservation. It's important for Jewish life for Jews to marry Jews and build Jewish homes and educate their children as Jews. It's important for Jewish continuity for children and grandchildren to continue being Jews ... In Jewish religion, intermarriage is frowned upon. It's imperative for Jews to marry Jews, people that believe as them – I'm talking about religion, not talking about ethnicity and national identity. And we try to educate the children to marry Jews. This is one of our goals. This doesn't stop them from being good citizens of whatever country they live in...

Unfortunately it's a very hard battle because the fact is that during Soviet times intermarriages were veryvery prevalent. Sometimes we have four generations of intermarriages... It's interesting how there was assimilation to such a great extent and today sometimes people are coming back to their roots after almost a hundred years.

#20 Duplicitous Russia Editorial Washington Times, August 11, 2006

Despite voting for a U.N. Security Council resolution calling on Iran to halt its nuclear program, Russia continues to assist the rogue state with the development of a laser isotope separation process that uses laser technology to enrich uranium -- and do so more efficiently than with gas centrifuges. That, at least, is the troubling report from a Russian nuclear engineer in the German newspaper Der Spiegel this week. Iran first tried to obtain the technology from Russia in 1999 or 2000, and in a 2003 letter to the International Atomic Energy Agency, Iran admitted it had pursued the technology but claimed that it no longer had such a program.

If accurate, the report reveals a disturbing contradiction between Russia's Security Council vote against the Iranian nuclear program and its secret willingness to aid that country's nuclear ambitions. What this story also highlights is a more obstinate Russian disregard for the West and for the United States in particular that Mr. Putin has used in recent years to fashion a more assertive foreign policy. As we wrote in July as Russian President Vladimir Putin played host at the G-8 meeting in St. Petersburg -- and, as host, managed to keep specific criticism of Syria and Iran out of a statement on the Middle East crisis -- Russia was moving in the direction of the odd man out in the club of industrialized democracies. The United States benefits from the best relationship possible with Mr. Putin's energy superpower, but that relationship cannot be founded on false pretenses.

The United States also announced last week that it put in place sanctions on two Russian companies -- one of which is state-owned -- for violating the Iran Nonproliferation Act and furnishing Iran with material that could be used to produce weapons of mass destruction. The Russian Foreign Ministry responded in a statement that the sanctions were "unlawful" because Russian companies "act in strict conformity with

international law and Russian legislation." The Russian news agency Itar-Tass quoted Russian officials who claimed that the sanctions were retribution for the \$3 billion arms deal that Mr. Putin reached, over strong U.S. opposition, with Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez. (That Mr. Putin treated Mr. Chavez to a somewhat cooler reception than some of the Venezuelan firebrand's other hosts on his recent tour, which included Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, reflects Mr. Putin's low regard for Mr. Chavez's anti-U.S. alliance, not his deference to United States.)

Like Mr. Putin's obstructionism at the G-8 Summit, Russia earlier this week Russia helped the Arab League campaign to weaken the draft resolution on Lebanon at the United Nations. If Iran has not suspended its nuclear program when the Aug. 31 deadline set down by the Security Council is reached, continued Russian unwillingness to impose sanctions would surely undermine the council's resolution. And providing Iran with technology for an advanced uranium enrichment process would undermine U.S. efforts entirely -- with disastrous effects. Even Mr. Putin should not think that this is a good way to assert his Russo-centric world view.

#21 Russians Divided It's all right when Russia does it, but not when Israel does it Kommersant August 11, 2006

[The proportion of respondents who like Israel has fallen from 30% when the conflict broke out a month ago to 21% now. The ranks of those who dislike Israel have swollen from 8% to 20%. Moreover, 17% of respondents blame Israel for the hostilities and only 5% blame Hezbollah.]

Every day of the war in Middle East reduces the number of Israel's supporters throughout the world - and in Russia. According to the latest opinion poll done by the Public Opinion Foundation (FOM), the proportion of respondents who like Israel has fallen from 30% when the conflict broke out a month ago to 21% now. The ranks of those who dislike Israel have swollen from 8% to 20%. Moreover, 17% of respondents blame Israel for the hostilities and only 5% blame Hezbollah. However, society is not exactly unanimous in is attitude because 55% do not really know what to say. Which is hardly surprising, for that matter.

Russia's official stand on the matter comes down to condemnations of the excess use of force by Israel. This is what Russian TV stations, nearly identical as all of them are, tell the country every day. According to the FOM, 60% of respondents disapprove of Israel's methods against terrorists and 9% approve. A third of respondents believe that the Israeli army's air-strikes on Lebanon are not justified, and 20% claim that they are. Forty-four percent of respondents say that Israel was wrong to launch a campaign against Hezbollah on the territory of Lebanon. Fourteen percent support the Israelis and say their actions are justified (42% do not know).

But when a Chechen gang entered Russia from the Pankisi Gorge in Georgia and retreated back to Georgia after several days of fighting, Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov said Russia might bomb the gang on the territory of Georgia. The FOM did a survey then and discovered that two-thirds of respondents supported the idea of preventive air-strikes of the territory of sovereign Georgia, and only 20% disapproved. Moreover, 37% of respondents supported the option of hostilities on the territory of Georgia - regardless of what the government of Georgia would say on the subject. In other words, Russians were then supporting the policy and the methods Israel is promoting and using now. According to the All-Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VTsIOM), strikes against terrorists and their bases abroad appealed to 82% of respondents in the wake of the Beslan school hostage siege.

Eighty-two percent of Israelis approached by pollsters in late July wholeheartedly supported the military operation in Lebanon.

Translated by A. Ignatkin

#22 Russian Jewish group protests Muslim comments JTA News Brief, August 11, 2006

Anti-Israel comments by some leaders of the Russian Muslim community are harming interfaith coexistence in Russia, the leading Russian Jewish group said. The Federation of Jewish Communities of Russia leveled the criticism after Muhammad Karachai, deputy head of the Union of Muftis of Russia, earlier this week said Israel's war on Hezbollah has revealed "the aggressive nature of the Zionist state that organized a real holocaust in Lebanon."

A federation spokesman said his group was going to call on the Interfaith Council of Russia, which promotes interreligious dialogue, to call on the Muslim group to disown its leader's statement, Interfax reported.

"Unbalanced statements undermine the Jewish-Muslim dialogue in Russia," Boruch Gorin said Thursday.

#23 Israel Solidarity Campaign Goes On In Russia EAJC Media Digest, August 2006

The Russian Jewish community held Israel solidarity rally 'We are against terror' on August 9 in Moscow Choral Synagogue. The Euro-Asian Jewish Congress (EAJC), the Vaad of Russia and the Congress of Jewish Religious Organizations and Communities in Russia (KEROOR) organized the event.

Rabbi-in-Chief of Russia Adolph Shaevich, in his speech, noted that nowadays the society lives with the sore heart for what is happening in the Middle East because many have relatives, acquaintances or friends in Israel. «Such a situation when innocent blood is flown, can last for ages, and that doesn't encourage», — Shaevich said. Recalling many slaughters us moments in the Jewish history, the rabbi pointed out that «we are opposed to war and stand for peace among nations».

Israeli Ambassador to Russia Arcadi Mil-Man in his statement stressed the issue of Lebanese conflict biased covering in the world media. «They often accuse Israel of excess violence saying it should be equal to the threat. But the danger emerging from Hezbollah now is a true threat to the State of Israel and to the Jewish community», — the diplomat pointed out.

He noted the militants' leader Sheikh Nasrallah words broadcasted live about the urge to «fight against Jews all over the world» and recalled that it was Hezbollah to carry out the acts of terror in Argentina in the early 90-s when Israeli embassy building and Jewish cultural center venue in Buenos Aires were blown up.

EAJC Secretary General, Vaad of Russia President, Michael Chlenov pointed out with regret the existence of double standards on the Russian TV. Covering the situation with Russian citizens in Lebanon and

Palestinian Autonomy in depth, TV channels never mention the fate of hundreds of thousands Russian citizens living in the Israeli regions under Hezbollah fire, he said.

Moreover, neither Hezbollah, which supporters had kidnapped a group of Soviet diplomatic officials and murdered one 20 years ago, no Hamas have ever been put on the terrorist organizations list published recently by the officials. Thereupon Chlenov has called Russian authorities to get rid of double standards in the case of Middle East conflict.

Chlenov finished his speech with the news about the fundraising for Israel organized by the EAJC. They have raised already more than US \$700,000 now. «This money will help the people who are stuck up for days in the bomb-shelters, those relocated to the children's campuses, etc.», — said he.

Israeli MKs, Zeev Elkin and Yosef Shagal, also took part in Moscow anti-terrorist rally. They arrived in Russia under the Jewish state solidarity campaign held by EAJC. Earlier Shagal and his colleague Michael Nudelman have visited Ukraine with the same mission.

The head of Verkhovna Rada (Parliament) of Ukraine Foreign relations committee Vitaliy Shybko greeted in Kiev the MKs, Israeli Ambassador to Ukraine Naomi Ben Ami and EAJC General Council Chairman, Vaad of Ukraine Chairman Jozef Zissels.

Apart from the meetings with the Jewish communities of Ukraine and Russia, the delegation held a press conference and was interviewed by the leading media. In its turn the EAJC is going to organize a tour to the destroyed Israeli regions for a group of CIS and Eastern Europe journalists in the nearest future, the EAJC President, Kazakhstan Jewish community leader, Alexander Machkevitch said.

«The Jewish state defends itself not only from Palestinian and Lebanese terrorists», — Machkevitch stated, — «A massive flow of falsehood and libel is being spread in the media. Our objective is to restore unbiased covering we expect from independent mass media».

EAJC President also mentioned that a special session of the EAJC General Council is soon to be held in Israel. Jewish leaders from the 3 continents are to arrive and show solidarity and support to the Jewish state.

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