


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# STRENGTHENING

# NATO:



**STATIONING  
OF THE 2D ARMORED  
DIVISION (FORWARD)  
IN NORTHERN GERMANY**

**HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE  
AND SEVENTH ARMY**

**22 May 1980**

**FOREWORD**

In the fall of 1978, for the first time since the end of World War II, a major U.S. combat formation took up station in the northern part of the Federal Republic of Germany.

This monograph attempts to outline the basic military and political thinking that led to the decision to deploy U.S. troops to the north German plain and to analyze the problems posed by such a major undertaking: the establishment of a major military installation with supporting facilities in an area where none had existed before.

That the task was no simple one may be readily imagined. That it was successfully accomplished is a tribute to the professionalism and dedication of all who were involved.

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## CHAPTER 1

### BACKGROUND

#### 1. Post-war Stationing

At the end of World War II, the victorious Allied nations consolidated their forces in the occupation zones assigned to them under the terms of formal agreements reached at the Yalta Conference in February 1945. U.S. Forces, the right flank of the Allied invasion force in 1944, were assigned the Rhine Valley from Duesseldorf south to the Swiss border. Since the stationing of units in Germany after the war was based on the availability and location of existing military installations, little regard was given to future defense requirements of central Europe at that time. With the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949 and the conversion of occupation forces to combat forces, the NATO chain of command divided the territory of West Germany between the Northern Army Group (NORTHAG) and the Central Army Group (CENTAG). The preponderance of U.S. combat forces was concentrated in the CENTAG area of responsibility.

Because of the defensive character of the NATO alliance, attacking Warsaw Pact forces would have tactical, geographic, and strategic initiative advantages. These forces could choose to move across the north German plain in the NORTHAG region, where NATO defenses were the weakest and where the terrain, relatively flat and open, favored the rapid advance of attacking armored forces and furnished a means to confound a NATO defense response. A successful Pact thrust across the north German plain into Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg could sever the transportation routes used to deliver supplies and ammunition to the U.S. and German Forces further south in the CENTAG region.

Four NATO nations -- the United Kingdom (UK), the Netherlands, Belgium, and Germany (MAP 1) -- were responsible for the military defense of the critical NORTHAG area, and it was expected that wartime coordination problems would affect adversely the region defense effort. These problems would be exacerbated by several factors. For example, the British, Dutch, and Belgian national forces were stationed well to the rear of their corps sectors in peacetime, and about half of their wartime manpower consisted of reserve components that would not be available until the completion of mobilization operations. The NORTHAG defenders did not have sufficient forces to form a reserve with which to counterattack Pact force insurgents, and they would be seriously outgunned by Warsaw Pact opponents.

A successful Warsaw Pact exploitation of a recognized NORTHAG weakness would jeopardize the NATO forward defense strategy. To improve NATO's forward defense posture, U.S. planners examined several strategies. One -- strengthening NORTHAG military capability -- had direct reference to establishing a U.S. military presence in the NORTHAG region.

#### 2. The Nunn Amendment

In the early 1970's, U.S. ground combat forces in Europe included two corps, each with two divisions, an armored cavalry regiment, and corresponding support forces. The Nunn Amendment to the FY 1975 Military Authorization Act, initiated in 1974, required the Commander in Chief, United States Army, Europe (CINCUSAREUR), to reduce his support forces in the forthcoming 1975 and 1976 fiscal years. At the same time, however, in a related but independent action, a Secretary of Defense program decision memorandum (PDM) called for the United States to deploy a combat brigade to Europe in each of those fiscal years. The 2d Armored Division was designated to

MAP 1

Corps Sectors of Military Responsibility in NATO's Central Region



SOURCE: P. Hillier, Background Paper, Strengthening NATO: Pomcus and other Approaches, Congress of the United States, Congressional Budget Office, p. 3.

deploy a brigade in March of 1975, and the 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) a brigade in 1976. The two units came to be known as Brigades 75 and 76, respectively.

### 3. Brigade 75 and Brigade 76

Brigade 75, consisting of the brigade headquarters and headquarters company and a support battalion, deployed as scheduled on a permanent change of station (PCS) basis. Deployed on a temporary change of station (TCS) basis and scheduled to rotate with like units from the United States every 179 days were a cavalry troop, an engineer company, an artillery battalion, a tank battalion, and two mechanized infantry battalions. Brigade 75 was initially housed at USAREUR's major training areas (MTA) pending the resolution of the stationing question.

Brigade 76, with an organization that was essentially the same, deployed in March 1976, moving directly into permanent facilities at Wiesbaden Air Force Base.

### 4. The NORTHAG Stationing Concept

Several factors combined to produce the concept for the stationing of U.S. Forces in the NORTHAG area. Brigade 75 deployed into the three major training areas in the CENTAG region--Grafenwoehr, Wildflecken, and Hohenfels. Brigade 76 was scheduled to deploy in the March - May 1976 period, and preliminary searches for permanent facilities had indicated that there would be difficulty in finding a suitable station for it in the CENTAG area.

The United States had often been criticized for accepting a situation in which its forces - both Army and Air Force - were concentrated in the southern part of the Federal Republic of Germany (F.R.G.); an area considered the least vulnerable and hence the least likely area of an opponent's approach. Strategically, the stationing of a U.S. brigade in the northern sector would not only strengthen the NORTHAG defense capability, but also contribute to offsetting criticism of alleged U.S. maldeployment.

Late in 1974 the Brigade 75 stationing question appeared resolved in principle as a result of a decision to exchange Army facilities at Kaiserslautern for Air Force facilities at Wiesbaden and to station the brigade at Wiesbaden. Pending the completion of the exchange operation, the brigade would be stationed at the major training areas.

At this point, however, a home for Brigade 76 was still lacking, and facilities in the CENTAG area simply were not available. At the suggestion of the Federal Republic of Germany Defense Ministry officials, in December 1974 a group of USAREUR staff officers visited the NORTHAG/BAOR (British Army on the Rhine) facilities in the Bergen-Hohne area to consider stationing the brigade there. U.K. General Harry C. Tuzo -- CINCBAOR and COMNORTHAG -- was not opposed to the concept, but he pointed out a number of associated problems. For one thing, the basic conceptual issues were totally unclear. The intentions of the Commander in Chief, Allied Forces Central Europe (CINCENT), were not known, and peacetime responsibilities for support and operational control issues would have to be clarified.

General Tuzo was also concerned about the problems that a permanently stationed brigade would cause at Bergen-Hohne. The permanent brigade would reduce the availability of troop housing for units of the Belgian, Netherlands, and U.K. forces using the areas for training. Since recreational and morale and welfare facilities were already insufficient, the U.S. brigade's soldiers would almost certainly have morale problems.

In two meetings with representatives of the F.R.G. Ministry of Defense in January, USAREUR staff officers explained the problems associated with Bergen-Hohne, discussed other alternatives, and received from the Germans a listing of F.R.G. facilities that might be made available in the NORTHAG area.

In the meantime, U.S. Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger forwarded to F.R.G. Minister of Defense Georg Leber a memorandum on stationing Brigade 76. Secretary Schlesinger proposed the study of three alternatives: stationing Brigade 76 in NORTHAG; deploying a German brigade from CENTAG to NORTHAG, Brigade 76 to be stationed at the vacated facilities in the CENTAG area; or stationing Brigade 76 in the CENTAG area, the brigade to conduct training in the NORTHAG area.

Late in February 1975, USAREUR representatives met with F.R.G. Defense Ministry officials to discuss these proposals. The German participants pointed out that FRG facilities in the NORTHAG area could not accommodate Brigade 76, and that the construction of needed facilities would require from 5 to 8 years to complete. Similarly, Bundeswehr facilities in the CENTAG area were already overcrowded. There were indications, however, that the Belgian army might withdraw some units from the NORTHAG area late in 1976. Two approaches were suggested -- contacting Belgian army officials to determine their intentions, and making a study through NATO channels of all facilities available to NATO nations.

The U.S. representatives held that any approach to Belgian authorities or NATO should be considered very carefully and at the highest levels. Both the U.S. and F.R.G. representatives agreed to make joint bilateral studies of the facilities available to their own forces in the hope of finding sufficient space to accommodate Brigade 76.

By the end of May it had become clear that the bilateral approach would not result in a solution. Adequate facilities were not available in the NORTHAG area to accommodate a brigade. The only USAREUR facilities in the area (i.e., at Bremerhaven) could accept but one or two battalions at the most. Accordingly, USAREUR concluded that the problem would have to be pursued through NATO channels.

On 30 May 1975, the U.S. National Military Representative (USNMR) to Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe (SHAPE), requested comments about the suitability of a new general concept that would completely revise current force planning. The proposal was to station Brigade 76 in the Bremerhaven area so that the brigade would serve as the advance element of a U.S. wartime augmentation force of three divisions that would be employed in the NORTHAG area. This augmentation would be considered as a regional reserve for the Commander in Chief, Allied Forces Central Europe.

Although the USAREUR staff supported the concept in principle, particularly because it would furnish a positive sign of the United States commitment to improve flexibility within NATO commands, a major rethinking of current wartime planning would be necessary. Moreover, the earlier search for a permanent station for Brigade 76 had so far failed, and the existing facilities at Bremerhaven could not accommodate a full brigade -- much less the nucleus for expansion into a wartime line of communications to support a 3-division augmentation force. Major construction, taking up to 3 years, would be necessary, and the question of funding would have to be resolved as well. A solution should be sought through NATO channels.

The United States Commander in Chief, Europe (USCINCEUR), took a similar view and urged that the U.S. willingness to commit an additional three divisions for a CINCENT reserve for possible employment in NORTHAG be used as leverage to escalate the Brigade stationing issue.



In June, General Alexander M. Haig, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), and USCINCEUR, directed the formation of a SHAPE working group under the chairmanship of U.K. General Sir John Mogg, the Deputy SACEUR. Comprised of representatives from NATO headquarters, the Federal Republic of Germany, and USAREUR, the working group met for the first time at SHAPE headquarters on 11 July 1975. After preliminary explorations, on 1 August General Mogg issued new instructions calling for the examination of two options. Option I would station part of the brigade at the existing U.S. facilities at Bremerhaven, and new facilities would be constructed at Garlstedt, 30 kilometers south, to accommodate the remainder of the brigade. Option II would rely on the use of existing U.S. facilities at Bremerhaven and Bundeswehr facilities at Neuenkirchen and Fuerstenau.

When it was determined that the Bundeswehr facilities would not be available before 1979 at the earliest, Option II was dropped. In the report submitted formally on 14 August, the study group recommended stationing the brigade at Bremerhaven and Garlstedt.

As these consultations and studies were proceeding, the USAREUR headquarters staff concluded that it would be better to exchange the planned permanent stations of Brigade 75 and Brigade 76. At the time, Brigade 75 had already arrived in Germany and was stationed temporarily at the MTA, pending completion of the Kaiserslautern-Wiesbaden trade, after which the brigade was to take its permanent station at Wiesbaden. Brigade 76 was scheduled to deploy to Europe in the spring of 1976.

In the interests of simplicity and cost effectiveness, to prevent multiple restationing actions, and to avoid the necessity of first placing Brigade 76 into temporary stations and then later into a permanent station or stations in NORTHAG, the USAREUR staff proposed designating Brigade 75 as the NORTHAG brigade. The deployment schedule of Brigade 76 could be adjusted to coincide with the completion of the Kaiserslautern-Wiesbaden exchange and necessary facility construction and rehabilitation at Wiesbaden. Brigade 75 would remain at its temporary stations in the training areas and would redeploy to permanent stations in NORTHAG when these became available.

Based on the findings of the Mogg study group and the above USAREUR proposal, in September the SACEUR and the CINCUSAREUR traveled to Washington, D.C. and briefed the DA staff, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), and members of the Department of Defense. Both commanders were committed to the concept that Brigade 75 should be stationed permanently in NORTHAG at Bremerhaven and Garlstedt. The brigade headquarters and headquarters company, the support battalion, the field artillery battalion, and the engineer company would go to Bremerhaven: one tank and two mechanized infantry battalions, the cavalry troop, and a support element would be at Garlstedt. The USAREUR staff estimated that the required construction at Garlstedt could be completed by October 1977. For the immediate future, two possibilities remained -- to station the NORTHAG brigade partially at Bremerhaven and partially at Bergen-Hohne on a temporary basis pending completion of facilities at Garlstedt; or to adopt the USAREUR proposal, leaving the brigade at the major training areas in the CENTAG area pending completion of the Garlstedt construction.

On 30 September, Secretary Schlesinger met with Minister Leber and discussed the NORTHAG stationing issue. He requested that the Federal Republic finance the costs for all rehabilitation and construction work at Bremerhaven and Garlstedt except those costs associated with facilities needed for community support activities. The German Defense Minister pointed out that the F.R.G. defense budget did not include funds that could be used for that purpose. A possible solution might be to use uncommitted funds that were part of the total specified in the U.S.-F.R.G. FY

1974-1975 "offset" agreement for the rehabilitation of U.S. troop facilities. This approach would facilitate an early start on the project, and the funds subsequently could be replaced to permit completion of the troop facilities rehabilitation program.

On the basis of that conversation, the Secretary of Defense directed the Joint Chiefs of Staff to provide him a definitive plan for the movement of Brigade 75 to the NORTHAG area. The plan should include time schedules and an examination of the financial implications.

The JCS memorandum to the Secretary of Defense again outlined the two temporary stationing options and indicated a preference for temporary stationing at Bergen-Hohne so as to speed the deployment of U.S. elements to NORTHAG. On 18 November, the Senate confirmed the appointment of Donald H. Rumsfeld as Secretary of Defense, and within a week the new Secretary had announced his support of his predecessor's decisions pertaining to brigade stationing in NORTHAG. Having reviewed the JCS memorandum of 30 October, he stated his preference for the early relocation of Brigade 75 (i.e., the option calling for temporary stationing at Bergen-Hohne). A final decision, however, would be made only after detailed U.S. discussions with the F.R.G. authorities. USCINCEUR was to initiate these discussions with the F.R.G. authorities to determine their preferences.

In addition, Secretary Rumsfeld requested that the U.S. Ambassador meet with Minister Leber to advise the F.R.G. Government that the new Secretary of Defense fully supported the position of his predecessor concerning the stationing of a U.S. brigade in NORTHAG. At the meeting held on 28 November, the Ambassador emphasized, among other things, that a final U.S. decision on the brigade stationing would depend upon assurances that F.R.G. financial support would be forthcoming, and, in particular, that any funds borrowed from the FY 1974-1975 offset rehabilitation program would be replaced.

Early in January 1976, F.R.G. negotiators advised that their Government no longer considered the temporary stationing at Bergen-Hohne a viable alternative. The only major advantage to that option had been one of timing (i.e., it would have permitted earlier deployment of the brigade to the NORTHAG area). Since that advantage was lost, SACEUR directed on 4 February that planning concentrate on the other option.

At that point, however, the advantage of using Bremerhaven to facilitate early deployment became outweighed by the disadvantages of having the brigade split at two locations. For example, the elements at Bremerhaven would not have ready access to training areas and there would be a degree of duplication of facilities such as hardstands, maintenance shops, and storage areas. In addition, command and control would be better when brigade elements were concentrated at a single location.

Accordingly, the USAREUR staff proposed a third option -- to leave the brigade at temporary stations in the CENTAG area pending construction of a complete consolidated brigade facility at Garlstedt. Construction costs would not be significantly greater than the combined costs of rehabilitation at Bremerhaven and new construction at Garlstedt as foreseen in the earlier option -- perhaps in the range of 3 percent.


Moreover, the new option would have a side benefit. The facilities at Bremerhaven were better suited for administrative use than for the stationing of combat elements in any case, and they could be made available to the U.S. Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) for the stationing of a tactical air control element that was to be deployed to the NORTHAG area.

At a meeting of USCINCEUR and the commanders in chief of the component commands on 27 February 1976, General Richard H. Ellis, CINCUSAFE, indicated his strong desire to station a TAC squadron in the Bremerhaven area. He and his command would support any USAREUR action that might facilitate such stationing. General Haig thereupon directed that the USAREUR and USAFE staffs prepare a joint proposal for U.S. utilization of facilities at Bremerhaven, which would serve as a basis for him to approach the F.R.G. Minister of Defense with a proposal to revise U.S. stationing plans.

After presenting informal briefings for officials of the U.S. Embassy, Bonn, and the F.R.G. Ministry of Defense, a team of representatives of the U.S. European Command (USEUCOM), USAREUR, and USAFE visited Washington DC. from 22 through 24 March to present briefings on the new stationing option that called for the entire brigade to go to newly constructed facilities at Garlstedt. (See MAP 2.) Briefings were presented to representatives of the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Office of the Secretary of State, the Departments of the Army and Air Force, and the Secretary of the Army. All supported the concept as outlined, and it appeared to the USAREUR staff as of early April that the only problem areas would center on funding (i.e., negotiating the shares of the costs to be borne by the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany, respectively, and determining a source of funds for the U.S. share).

Although the F.R.G. Ministry of Defense had accepted the shift to the Garlstedt option in principle by mid-April, and joint planning of the expanded facilities for Brigade 75 already had been undertaken, it was not until early May that the Federal Republic conveyed its decision on the revised concept to the state government of Land Niedersachsen, in which Garlstedt was located. The first public announcement of the U.S. intention to station a brigade in the NORTHAG area came through a press release issued by the Niedersachsen Government on 11 May 1976.

At a meeting in Washington in mid-July 1976, President Gerald R. Ford and F.R.G. Chancellor Helmut Schmidt reached agreement on a cost-sharing formula for the construction of Brigade 75 facilities at Garlstedt. Under the terms of the agreement, the Federal Republic would pay DM 171.2 million (\$68.48 million at the then-current rate of exchange), or approximately half the estimated total cost of the facilities, which included troop billets, dining facilities, bachelor officers' quarters, supply and maintenance facilities, administrative facilities, and utilities. U.S.-peculiar facilities (i.e., those which the Bundeswehr would not normally provide its own soldiers) were to be funded by the United States. These included an open mess, chapel, athletic and recreation facilities, and community service facilities. Dependent housing, 1,027 units, would be U.S.-funded. German civilian contracting firms would "build to lease" offpost housing. (See MAP 3.)



**GARLSTEDT**


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SOURCE: Incl 1, "NORTHAG Stationing," to DF, USAREUR (METRIC)  
 ODCSENGR to distr, 19 Jul 77, subj: NORTHAG Stationing  
 Brochure. AEAEN-IN. UNCLAS

## GARLSTEDT FACILITY INDEX

FACILITY	FUND SOURCE	FACILITY	FUND SOURCE
1. ENLISTED BARRACKS (200EM)	F.R.G.	23. OPEN STORAGE AREA	F.R.G.
2. ENLISTED BARRACKS (80EM)	F.R.G.	24. POL DISPENSING POINT	F.R.G.
3. BACHELOR OFFICERS QUARTERS	F.R.G.	25. GREASE RACK	F.R.G.
4. DINING FACILITY	F.R.G.	26. POL TANKER PARKING AREA	F.R.G.
5. HEADQUARTERS BUILDING	F.R.G.	27. NOT USED	
6. CLASSROOM BUILDING	F.R.G.	28. PACKAGED POL STORAGE BLDG	F.R.G.
7. INSTALLATION MAINT BLDG (STOV)	F.R.G.	29. OPEN MAINT SHEDS	F.R.G.
8. STORAGE & MAINT BLDG (STOV)	F.R.G.	30. TANK WASH RACK	F.R.G.
9. NOT USED		31. MINIATURE TANK RANGE	F.R.G.
10. GATE GUARD BUILDING	F.R.G.	32. OBSTACLE COURSE	OMA
11. POV PARKING AREA	F.R.G.	33. HELICOPTER PAD	F.R.G.
12. THEATER	AAFES	34. CENTRAL HEATING PT	F.R.G.
13. BOWLING CENTER	NAF	35. TRANSFORMER STATION	F.R.G.
14. COMMUNITY CENTER	MCA 78	36. SEWAGE LIFTING PLANT	F.R.G.
15. OPEN MESS FACILITY	F.R.G.	37. WATER STORAGE	F.R.G.
16. CHAPEL	MCA 78	38. RETAINING BASIN	F.R.G.
17. DISPENSARY	F.R.G.	39. DIAL CENTRAL BLDG	F.R.G.
18. BN MAINT SHOP	F.R.G.	40. GYMNASIUM	MCA 78
19. COMPANY MAINT SHOP	F.R.G.	41. INDOOR SWIMMING POOL	F.R.G.
20. DS MAINT SHOP	F.R.G.	42. NOT USED	
21. COMBAT TRAINING THEATER	F.R.G.	43. ATHLETIC AREA	MCA 78
22. WAREHOUSE BLDG	F.R.G.	44. MULTIPLE SPORTS COURT	MCA 78

MAP 3



MAP 3

CHAPTER 2

LAND ACQUISITION, PROJECT PLANNING, AND CONSTRUCTION

The decision to station an entire brigade at Garlstedt presented both U.S. and F.R.G. real estate, installation planning, and construction specialists a major challenge that made necessary an intensive binational management, cooperation, and coordination effort. MAP 3 shows the brigade areas at both Garlstedt and Osterholz-Scharmbeck. MAP 4 shows in more detail the brigade's schools and housing complex at Osterholz-Scharmbeck. Shown in figure 1 is a chronological presentation of planning and construction developments for both locations.

1. Construction Execution

That the Garlstedt construction effort resulted in having facilities ready for occupancy within 20 months after the start of actual construction represented a major German technical and management achievement. The same held true for the family housing quarters constructed at Osterholz-Scharmbeck, where German construction performance was all the more remarkable in that projects were expeditiously completed despite adverse weather conditions.




FIGURE 1

NORTHAG CONSTRUCTION MILESTONES

1975

- March Brigade 75 deploys to Germany.
- July SACEUR establishes working group to locate a home for the brigade in NORTHAG.
- September Engineers undertake development of facility and functional requirements.
- December Basic master plan developed for Garlstedt submitted to F.R.G. Federal Minister of Defense.

1976

- April U.S. and F.R.G. awaiting Garlstedt master plan approval by State of Lower Saxony.
- May USAREUR submits U.S.-funded construction program requirements to supplement initiatives undertaken for F.R.G. funding.
- July Chancellor Schmidt agrees to F.R.G. funding share of DM 171.2 million.
- August Dud ammunition removal begins at Garlstedt.
- November DA pledges support of U.S. share of NORTHAG construction for FY 78 appropriations.

1977

- February State of Lower Saxony approves Garlstedt master plan with stipulations; construction begins.
- May F.R.G. Defense Minister Leber and U.S. Secretary of the Army Alexander participate in ceremonial cornerstone laying at Garlstedt.

1978

- January Construction begins for 1,027 build-to-lease housing units at Osterholz-Scharmbeck.
- March Construction begins for Osterholz--Scharmbeck elementary and high school complex.
- September Beneficial occupancy of troop barracks and dining facilities.
- October U.S. Secretary of Defense and F.R.G. Defense Minister participate in transfer of Garlstedt; casern dedicated to General Lucius D. Clay. Families begin occupancy of Osterholz-Scharmbeck housing.
- November Heavy rains throughout late summer and early fall cause construction delay and interruption of dependent deployment until early 1979.




FIGURE 1 (cont)


1979

January

Classes begin at new Osterholz-Scharmbeck schools. Dependent deployment resumes at reduced pace because of severe winter in northern Germany.



Gymnasium Under Construction



Interior View of Barracks at Clay Kaserne in Osterholz-Scharmbeck, W. Germany

Although construction of the U.S. troop facilities at Garlstedt actually began in January 1977 -- and the largest single project, 14 enlisted barracks buildings, in April -- it was not until 3 May that the formal cornerstone laying ceremony was held. By the end of the year progress was such that USAREUR anticipated minimum troop facilities would be ready for occupancy by September 1978 -- to include barracks, dining facilities, and hardstands. (See MAP 2.)

Tentative plans called for unit relocations to be phased from September 1978 through February 1979. The brigade headquarters and headquarters company and the 498th Support Battalion (already in a PCS status in Germany) would start their moves from the MTAs to Garlstedt in September 1978. The remaining brigade units would convert from their current TCS status to PCS status in conjunction with their relocations to northern Germany.

The cornerstone laying ceremony for the build-to-lease family housing units at Osterholz-Scharmbeck was held on 5 December 1977 (the construction actually having begun in November). The housing, which was integrated into the existing German community at 6 different locations instead of being concentrated into a single American enclave, included 1 single house, 12 duplexes, 425 row houses, and 589 apartments -- 1,027 family units (see MAP 4).

The build-to-lease program also included an elementary and a high school, plus a community support center near the housing areas. Since fuller support services were available at the military installations at Bremerhaven and Garlstedt, the housing-area center provided only minimum essential U.S.-unique services not available from the German community. Included in the building were an Army Community Service (ACS) center, a child care facility, a dependent youth activities (DYA) center, a commissary annex, an Army and Air Force Exchange Service (AAFES) pickup point, limited beverage and merchandise sales facilities, and a Stars and Stripes bookstore. Four outdoor multipurpose (basketball and tennis) recreation facilities and a 50-car parking lot were included as part of the center,

An unusually wet summer caused slippage in the construction schedules of both military facilities and build-to-lease housing. Despite the delays, the military installation at Garlstedt was accepted for beneficial occupancy in September, and the formal transfer ceremony and dedication of the facility as Clay Kaserne (in honor of GEN Lucius D. Clay, US Military Governor at the time of the Berlin Airlift) occurred on 17 October. Underscoring the significance of this, the first U.S. permanent military installation constructed in northern Germany, the FRG Defense Minister, Hans Apel, made the formal transfer to the U.S. Secretary of Defense, Harold Brown.

At the time of the formal transfer ceremony, only an advance party of the 2d Armored Division (Forward), some 200 personnel, was actually present at the installation, although the troop and administrative facilities were essentially complete -- fourteen 200-man barracks buildings, headquarters and administrative buildings, bachelor officer and enlisted quarters, and maintenance shops.

By contrast, service facilities at the Garlstedt troop facility and the build-to-lease housing at Osterholz-Scharmbeck (including support facilities) were not complete. Nevertheless, the first dependent family moved into the newly built quarters on Monday, 16 October -- actually preceding the dedication ceremony by one day.

In a touching display of the desire of the local community to make their new American neighbors feel welcome, the mayor of Osterholz-Scharmbeck, Ernst Knuth,



Exterior View of Housing Area at Osterholz-Scharmbeck

personally greeted the family with a traditional German "bread and salt" ceremony at the doorway to their new home -- presenting a loaf of brown bread, a filled salt shaker, and a new 1-pfennig coin for luck.

By year's end, 410 family housing units had been formally accepted, and 281 of them were occupied. Interim facilities were in use at the Garlstedt facility for a post exchange, bank, barber shop, foodland (delicatessen), Army post office, and pickup point. The Army and Air Force Exchange Service, Europe, was providing mobile truck-mounted snackbar facilities. USAREUR officials anticipated that the construction of the permanent community center that would house all these activities would be completed in midsummer 1979.

Scheduled for completion by the end of September 1979 were the other support facilities at Garlstedt -- a chapel, recreation center, handball courts, swimming pool, combined club, bowling alley, and outdoor athletic facilities.

Similarly, for the dependent housing facilities at Osterholz-Scharmbeck, temporary facilities were employed for a commissary annex (the main commissary being at Bremerhaven), an Army Community Service installation, and a child care center. The permanent community center that would incorporate these facilities, together with a dependent youth activities office, pickup point, and Stars and Stripes bookstore, would be completed by early summer 1979.

Construction of the dependents' schools was completed in January 1979, the first elementary school classes beginning on Monday, 22 January, and the high school opening a week later.

Thus, although some of the permanent support facilities remained to be completed, by the end of January 1979 the 2d Armored Division (Forward) had a new home -- a fully functioning military installation, together with a good portion of the required dependent housing and operating community support structure.

## **2. Lessons Learned**

**a. Real Estate.** Although the Garlstedt base was a German Forces (Bundeswehr) facility, this identity did not exclude it from the influence brought to bear by the expression of local- and national-level political concerns. The same was true for Osterholz-Scharmbeck. Early in the real estate acquisition process, it became apparent that land acquisition for the benefit of U.S. stationing in the NORTHAG area imposed the need for U.S. representatives to have the opportunity to address local resident opposition to deviations from specific zoning law specifications firmly expressed in the terms of both Federal and Land (State) laws. Although the procedures established for the U.S. acquisition process served well the U.S. interest, the Garlstedt experience indicated that the application of so-called expeditious (i.e., short cut) actions would not provide a means for circumventing or modifying German law to favor the attainment of U.S. objectives. In the future, U.S. real estate specialists would have to recognize the vagaries of host nation statutory processes for real estate acquisition, and they would have to consider the constraints imposed by the application of these processes when developing project planning and progress schedules.

**b. Planning and Design.** The development of the Garlstedt master plan was based on occupancy by U.S. troops without provision for the presence of their dependents in that area. Community support services for dependents were to be established near Bremerhaven. However, a major condition for the concurrence of Lower Saxony state officials with the Garlstedt plan was that brigade families would be housed closer to the Garlstedt area. For this reason, many of the originally established plans



Interior View of a Dining Room in the Housing Area at Osterholz-Scharmbeck

for troop-oriented community facilities became invalid. The reorganization of the brigade to a 2d Armored Division (Forward) configuration was another factor causing a delay in the realization of programmed construction. Although planning and actual construction could not readily be modified to satisfy changing requirements, the application of the build-to-lease and direct-lease arrangement as a part of the USAREUR accommodations program lessened the impact of many temporary and permanent facility shortfalls.



**Garteler Weg Housing Area**

From this experience, USAREUR staff members learned that since the completion of construction programming and construction represented a 1- to 2-year process, force planning modifications would have to be anticipated, coordinated, and sequentially ordered so as to avoid -- or at least diminish to a minimum -- the incidence of construction interruption and/or delay.

For that which concerned the relationship between troop and family member deployments, USAREUR staff specialists learned that the planning effort should include sufficient detail to permit the early identification of those construction project elements allowing for a degree of execution flexibility.



Exterior View of Dining Facility



## CHAPTER 3

### SUPPORT FOR THE 2D ARMORED DIVISION (FORWARD)

The restationing of the 3d Brigade, 2d Armored Division, from Fort Hood, Texas, to Garlstedt, Germany, represented not only a new U.S. troop deployment but also a new troop support concept. As approved by CINCUSAREUR in November 1977, the brigade was structured as a division forward commanded by a brigadier general. The brigade commander also commanded the Norddeutschland military community with two subcommanders: Garlstedt and Bremerhaven. The Norddeutschland Support Group (NDSG) commander functioned as the deputy commander of the Bremerhaven military subcommunity.

#### 1. Base Support

The Bundeswehr did not provide base support from military resources. Instead, this kind of service was provided by a civilian agency of the Federal Ministry of Defense known as the Standortverwaltung (StOV) -- translated approximately as Garrison Administration. When USAREUR had acquired the German installation at Giebelstadt in 1972, arrangements were made to continue the maintenance and operation of the installation by StOV on a reimbursable basis so as to preserve and protect the job rights of German StOV employees. This system proved entirely satisfactory.

As early as September 1975, in discussions with FRG Ministry of Defense officials about the stationing of the U.S. brigade in northern Germany, USAREUR representatives had proposed using the StOV arrangement to provide base operations and maintenance support for the U.S. facilities to be built at Garlstedt. In July 1976, the Minister of Defense confirmed formally that StOV would provide such services on a reimbursable basis.

A complicating factor, however, was the requirement for U.S. Forces -- and specifically USAREUR -- to adhere to U.S. statutory regulatory provisions for the procurement of goods and services. For example, the Armed Services Procurement Act and the implementing Department of Defense Armed Services Procurement Regulation (ASPR) established certain formal requirements that had to be observed for the establishment of purchase agreements, regardless of whether the supplier was an agency of a foreign government or a commercial enterprise. The ASPR applied to all purchases except land, and prescribed in detail more than 30 clauses that had to be included in any purchase contract.

The German Government, however, refused to enter into "contracts" under the ASPR terms and insisted instead on "agreements" to cover the procurement of logistic support, such as that required at Garlstedt. Representatives of the F.R.G. Ministry of Defense, however, did agree in principle to accept a negotiated "agreement" that incorporated the mandatory statutory and ASPR clauses. Accordingly, in November 1977, USAREUR requested that the Departments of Defense and the Army authorize the conclusion of an agreement for StOV support at Garlstedt that would deviate from the provisions of ASPR except for those clauses required by law. (There were only three -- one concerning gratuities, one prohibiting contingent fees, and one prohibiting U.S. officials from deriving benefit.) (See Chapter 4.)

#### 2. Logistic Support

From a conceptual point of view, the primary logistic concern was to ensure timely and responsive support in the functions of supply, maintenance, transportation, and field services. Within the European theater, inherent in that

logistic responsibility was the requirement to provide a peacetime structure that would facilitate a smooth and flexible transition to a wartime support posture. For the 2d Armored Division (Forward), complicating factors were an unprecedented long line of communications (LOC) from the major U.S. support facilities in central Germany to the Garlstedt area in northern Germany and associated high peacetime costs.

To discharge its logistic responsibility, the USAREUR staff adopted an overall support concept that provided for maximized direct support (DS)/minimized general support (GS); increased component stockage; contractor/StOV support, where appropriate; and the use of the air line of communication (ALOC) direct support system (DSS).

To maximize direct support, the 498th Support Battalion (organic to the 2d Armored Division (Forward)) functioned in its traditional DS mission role. To facilitate and enhance the battalion's capability, the unit's table of organization and equipment (TOE) was modified to provide for increased support in specified functional areas so as to accommodate the extended LOC. The 21st Support Command, through its subordinate, the Norddeutschland Support Group, provided the brigade backup direct support.

Although NDSG was restructured to provide personnel spaces to support a limited GS capability, that capability was minimized in terms of onlocation manpower in favor of stocking higher levels of major components and assemblies and direct exchange (DX) items. This increased stockage was intended to ensure timely and responsive support to the tactical commander during the early stages of a transition to a wartime posture.

StOV represented a significant part of the overall brigade support, especially for facility and maintenance services and selected morale and welfare support systems. Contractor support was employed where appropriate (e.g., aviation maintenance). Host nation support agreements also were employed, the most striking example being that for the storage and security of ammunition stocks.

The overall concept included the use of the air line of communications direct support system, through which selected supply class II, IV, and IX repair parts and class II maintenance-related items were provided directly from the U.S. wholesale supply system to the 498th Support Battalion.

Class I (subsistence) items were issued by the Troop Issue Subsistence Activity (TISA), Bremerhaven. Clothing, individual equipment, tentage, organizational tools and tool kits, hand tools, administrative and housekeeping supplies and equipment (class II items) not provided through the ALOC/DSS were furnished through the NDSG self-service supply center and clothing sales outlet. Class III supplies (petroleum, oils, and lubricants--POL) were delivered by commercial trucks from the Oldenburg NATO depot to the 498th Support Battalion. NDSG provided packaged POL, and class IV (construction/barrier) supplies were provided through DSS. Class V (ammunition) storage and security were provided under the terms of a U.S.-F.R.G. host nation support agreement calling for the storage of U.S. unit basic load, training, and reserve stocks at several Bundeswehr depots. An NDSG ammunition detachment furnished such class V services as stock record accounting, maintenance, surveillance, and issue/receipt. Class VI supplies (personal demand items) were made available through the Bremerhaven community structure (i.e., the Army and Air Force Exchange System (AAFES) outlets) and class VII support (major end items) was provided through 498th Support Battalion direct requisitioning to the Theater Army Materiel Management Center (TAMMC). Class VIII supplies (medical), as well as all other medical services (including aeromedical evacuation), were furnished through

the Medical Department Activity (MEDDAC) of the Bremerhaven community. Class IX supplies (repair parts) were made available through the ALOC/DSS systems, but theater-managed items were furnished through TAMMC.

For the provision of services, several capabilities had to be developed or expanded to support the increase in the U.S. military and dependent population. Three dining facilities were constructed as part of the **casern** at Garlstedt. Scheduled was the establishment of a commissary store annex for the Osterholz-Scharmbeck housing area, as well as the expansion of the existing Bremerhaven commissary. Laundry and drycleaning services were available through StOV and AAFES outlets. In addition, soldiers had access to the clothing washers and dryers installed and operating in troop barracks. Through the use of a mobile van, an extension of the Bremerhaven store, clothing sales store services were available. Normal transportation services, personal property shipment, and administrative-use-vehicle (AUV) support were made available by the Bremerhaven community's installation transportation officer (ITO). Under the terms of an ITO-commercial vendor contract, shuttle bus services were available for transportation between Bremerhaven, Garlstedt, and Osterholz-Scharmbeck.

For maintenance support, the 498th Support Battalion, as a part of its formal mission, furnished repair and return-to-user support. NDSG furnished backup direct support to the 498th Support Battalion; NDSG also furnished a limited GS repair capability, either performing onsite contact team services or evacuating items to the NDSG site for the conduct of component repair operations. The 21st Support Command's rear base facility specialists furnished a wider range of GS maintenance capability for the performance of more traditional GS repair and item return to the supply system.

The operation of the community support concept called for employing the existing and expanded facilities in the Bremerhaven area; the use of Garlstedt as the major cantonment area for the provision of troop billeting, support, and garrison military operations; and the use of the dependent housing complex area in Osterholz-Scharmbeck for the provision of a full range of family support facilities and services.

### **3. Communications Support**

Construction of new facilities and installations for the brigade at its permanent Garlstedt/Osterholz-Scharmbeck location made necessary a major communications-electronics (CE) support program. The Army Communications Command (ACC) staff was responsible for establishing base communications and for providing access to the Defense Communications System from the new facilities. The program consisted of engineering, procuring, and installing a total communications package. Since the permanent communications building was not scheduled for completion until October 1978, and because of the long procurement lead time required to equip the facility, a two-phase program came into being. The first phase -- an interim phase intended to meet the immediate brigade requirements on arrival at its new European location -- provided the brigade essential voice and record communications pending the completion of the permanent communications facility. Where and when possible, permanent requirements (e.g., the 40-meter concrete tower) were incorporated in this phase. The second phase would continue into 1980 and, when completed, would provide the permanent facilities needed to satisfy full-capacity brigade communication requirements.

Completed in July 1978 was a concrete-block hardstand adjacent to the communications-electronics building. This hardstand was used to support the transportable equipment currently furnishing the brigade's interim communications

needs. In the future, the brigade's tactical communications equipment can be parked on the hardstand during the course of exercises and will be facilitated by the tactical antenna mounts built into the concrete tower. The construction of the 40-meter concrete tower -- designed to permit a future expansion to a height of 90 meters -- started in April and was complete by the end of June 1978. The microwave link between the brigade casern at Garlstedt and the casern at Bremerhaven was established in August 1978, and by early September it was in an operational status. In the same month, the Armed Forces Network Television (AFNTV) microwave to the Bremerhaven studio made use of the tower for program retransmissions.

In keeping with the progressive completion of new buildings, personnel of the 581st Signal Company installed internal telephone wiring, the outside cable plan being sufficiently installed by the end of September 1978 to satisfy the requirements of the brigade's advance party on its arrival.

The equipment supporting the AFNTV ultrahigh-frequency (UHF) transmitter was the first permanent equipment installed in the C-E building. An early occupancy date for the building was necessary to ensure operational television by 1 October 1978. Actual onpost rebroadcasting of the signal received from Bremerhaven began on 15 September 1978, thereby providing UHFTV to Clay Kaserne, as well as to the Osterholz-Scharmbeck housing area.

Additional automatic voice network (AUTOVON) circuits were made available to the brigade on its arrival for connection with the parent unit at Fort Hood, Texas. Also available to arriving brigade personnel were ring-down circuits for dedicated use between the advance party at Garlstedt and the main brigade contingent temporarily stationed at the Grafenwoehr training area.

Direct distance dialing (DDD) into and out of the new dial exchange at Garlstedt was provided in early August 1978. The locally procured transportable dial central office (DCO) had been specifically designed to permit future DCO upgrades.

The 5th Signal Command (a non-USAREUR agency), in conjunction with its headquarters, the U.S. Army Communications Command (USACC) and USAREUR, furnished the necessary communications before the brigade's arrival. It also provided for uninterrupted service during the transition from temporary to permanent facilities.

#### **4. Intelligence Support**

**a. The Planning Stage.** In November 1977, members of the USAREUR headquarters intelligence staff participated in a series of inprogress reviews conducted by the staff of the USAREUR Office of Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations (ODCSOPS). Items of intelligence staff interest were those issues later described in a letter, dated 14 December 1977, from the Commander, 3d Brigade, 2d Armored Division. The general thrust of the letter was a proposal for granting approval to establish a direct interface between the brigade and USAREUR headquarters intelligence staffs. Since the brigade would be stationed in the NORTHAG area without a divisional or corps headquarters to provide the unit intelligence support, the brigade commander considered that direct interface was essential to ensure his compliance with USAREUR policies, directives, and regulations.

The 1st Armored Division and VII Corps commanders concurred with the proposed concept, and USAREUR headquarters intelligence specialists agreed that direct interface and direct personal contact with the brigade's intelligence personnel would be crucial for the success of the restationing operation.

All the areas of concern described in the 14 December 1977 letter could be removed quickly through direct coordination between the USAREUR and brigade staffs, except those associated with the establishment of a brigade special intelligence (SI) facility. The facility and a special security officer (SSO) organization had not been addressed in early planning for brigade relocation. Considering the brigade's role as a division forward headquarters, the USAREUR staff placed additional emphasis on the need for an SSO facility.

**b. The Establishment of a Special Intelligence Facility.** In early 1978, the USAREUR intelligence staff was called upon to develop informational data supporting a USAREUR request to the Department of the Army to establish a brigade SI facility and to provide the brigade SSO support. Primary considerations supporting the validity of the request were the isolation of the brigade's NORTHAG site and the need for backchannel communication support for the brigade's commander.

In early February 1978 the USAREUR Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence (DCSI), forwarded to the Department of the Army an SI facility concept with justification for its implementation. Because of time and resource constraints, he recommended establishing the facility in two phases. Phase I called for conducting SI operations in a one-room area, using construction already programed and receiving communication support from the 39th Signal Battalion, 2d Signal Group, 5th Signal Command. In Phase II, the facility would be expanded after the 1-year construction moratorium so as to permit the location of an expanded all-source intelligence center (ASIC).

On 10 February 1978, the DA intelligence chief approved the concept; as a result, the USAREUR intelligence staff was directed to coordinate its implementation. A few days later, on 15 February, the USAREUR DCSOPS sponsored a meeting to discuss brigade personnel and equipment authorizations. Participants agreed to request a brigade authorization revision calling for six additional enlisted personnel spaces to support the unit's SSO requirement.

In March, USAREUR intelligence specialists attended another brigade inprocess review, at which it was determined that the brigade's fixed station communications equipment to support its SSO might not arrive in time to coincide with the expected October arrival of unit personnel at the Garlstedt location. An interim solution to this problem called for obtaining from the 5th Signal Command the loan of a Mode V communications system until the brigade's fixed equipment had arrived, was installed, and was operating at the brigade site. The SSO staff at USAREUR headquarters obtained Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) approval for the facility and outlined a plan to staff the brigade SSO until the six newly authorized personnel spaces had been filled. Implementation of the SSO staffing plan made necessary a search for properly cleared brigade personnel, assigning them to the SSO activity, and providing them on-the-job training.

By mid-May SSO planners had made significant progress. The DA and DIA staffs had expedited the USAREUR request, and national-level authorities had approved the project. The 5th Signal Command staff had agreed to provide at Garlstedt required equipment and maintenance support. To counter the effects of a short-term delay in the arrival of the brigade's equipment, planning called for the SSO staff at USAREUR headquarters to arrange for establishing a point-to-point dedicated teletype circuit from the SSO site at USAREUR headquarters (Heidelberg) to Garlstedt. The equipment at the brigade location would be furnished by the 5th Signal Command. Should a long term delay be unavoidable, the 5th Signal Command staff agreed to furnish the brigade a mobile Mode V communications system until the unit's fixed station equipment was on hand and functioning.

In late July, the 5th Signal Command forwarded to the brigade a project coordination letter calling for establishing the Garlstedt SSO facility in the basement of the brigade's command building. Recommended was an initial period of intensive coordination to accord the construction modification effort with the arrival of equipment so as to permit completion of the facility before the scheduled arrival of the main body of brigade personnel.

Additional surveys of the Garlstedt site and examinations of brigade requisitions for equipment, accomplished by the SSO staff at USAREUR headquarters and the staff of the 5th Signal Command, resulted in developing a requirement for a number of additional brigade equipment authorization items.

In late August, it became apparent that the brigade's Mode V communications system equipment items would not be available in time for installation before the arrival of the first brigade units in October. The brigade commander expressed concern that he would have troops on the ground without the critical SSO link with USAREUR headquarters. At an inprocess review taking place on 12 September, participants agreed to support an interim SSO arrangement at Garlstedt until the fixed station equipment had arrived and was operating. USAREUR headquarters logistic and communications-electronic specialists started a search for a suitable communications van (an MSC-29 or AN/MSC 32) to be made available from either USAREUR or 5th Signal Command resources. The van would be furnished on loan and was to serve as the Garlstedt SSO terminal. Toward the end of September, USAREUR SSO and engineer representatives visited Garlstedt, where they surveyed the onsite situation, conducted an initial facility inspection of the sensitive compartmented information facility (SCIF), and furnished their advice and assistance for locating a suitable site for a temporary van-configured SSO facility.

In October, the need for the SSO link to the brigade came sharply into focus as a result of a series of public demonstrations protesting the stationing of the brigade in the Garlstedt area. The expressed interest of GEN Blanchard in the SSO project and in the furtherance of the van location effort provided a special impetus toward project completion. One major deterrent, however, was that the critical items of SSO facility equipment were then committed to important military exercise (i.e., REFORGER 79) operations. Even a temporary loan of one of the available vans could upset the delicate balance of communication support services already planned for the conduct of exercise play.

Late in October, USAREUR headquarters communications-electronics and 5th Signal Command specialists agreed on a solution. An AN/MSC-29 communications van would be made available to the brigade until the unit's fixed station equipment was installed and functioning. The van, furnished on 16 November, made possible the start of limited schedule SSO operations at Garlstedt from 27 November.

As of 1 March 1979, the major part of the brigade's Mode V communications system equipment items were in place and being prepared for operations. Should there be a substantial delay in the arrival of brigade equipment, the 5th Signal Command would provide backup Mode V communications system items.

## 5. Community Support

Except for the U.S.-unique facilities (e.g., community center, gymnasium), the casern at Garlstedt was funded by the Federal Republic. Dependent housing was constructed at Osterholz-Scharmbeck under a build-to-lease contract arrangement. Units (1,027) were row-type houses and apartments integrated into, and similar to, German housing units in the area. Housing area planning reflected the CINCUSAREUR philosophy calling for maximum integration of U.S. families into the German community. The community center at Osterholz-Scharmbeck had been designed to provide minimum essential and U.S.-unique services, expanded services being available at the community center on the casern at Garlstedt and at Bremerhaven. Initial planning meetings of USAREUR engineer and personnel specialists to develop the kind of facilities that would support the brigade both at Garlstedt and at Osterholz-Scharmbeck brought about in early 1977 the formulation of a plan to establish community support facilities that would include at Osterholz-Scharmbeck an elementary and a high school. Planned for Garlstedt were a bowling alley; a chapel; a community center that would include an AAFES retail store, a food sales outlet (foodland), a theater, a barber shop, a beauty shop, and a bank; a recreation center that would include a crafts shop, a music center, and a library; a gymnasium; handball/racquetball courts; a swimming pool; a combined club; and outdoor athletic facilities. (See paragraph 6.)



**Vossberg Housing Area, Osterholz-Scharmbeck**

a. **Housing.** The original community support concept for the brigade's dependent population envisioned Bremerhaven providing overall support, the dependent housing to be located somewhere between Garlstedt and Bremerhaven. However, since the land

made available by the F.R.G. authorities for housing construction was located farther from Bremerhaven than from Garlstedt (a total distance of 35 kilometers (21.7 miles)), it became necessary to establish within the Osterholz-Scharmbeck dependent housing area a community support center that would offer minimum essential U.S.-unique services. USAREUR engineer and personnel specialists had already identified these services, and in early December 1977, the USAREUR Chief of Staff approved a concept for the Osterholz-Scharmbeck Community Support Center. The center, established to blend with the surrounding German community, would include in its operations the provision of such services as an Army Community Service office, a child care facility, a dependent youth activities (DYA) center, a Stars and Stripes bookstore, a commissary annex, and an AAFES pickup point that would offer a narrow selection of merchandise and beverage items.



Schuetzenhof I Housing Area





Schuetzenhof II Housing Area



Garteler Weg Housing Area

**b. Dependent Schools.** In early 1978 the USAREUR staff increased coordination with the Department of Defense Dependents Schools, Europe (DODDSEUR), and at the request of the USAREUR staff, the DODDSEUR director appointed, on 11 April, the Supervising Principal, Bremerhaven Schools, as the DODDSEUR representative for the conduct of the inprocess reviews (IPR) that took place in April of that year. Later this authority was extended to include DODDSEUR representation for all school matters associated with the schools at both locations, Bremerhaven and Osterholz-Scharmbeck.

The Bremerhaven schools opened on 28 August 1978, and since the Osterholz-Scharmbeck elementary and high school complex would not be ready for the conduct of a complete school program until sometime after the end of the calendar year, high school level dependents of brigade personnel enrolled temporarily in the Bremerhaven high school. For elementary level dependents of brigade sponsors, elementary school classes started on 25 September at Osterholz-Scharmbeck in 11 classrooms made available through a leasing arrangement with a local German school.

An energetic furniture and other school equipment movement and installation program took place throughout December, and on 1 January 1979 the collocated elementary and high school complex (six buildings) officially opened for school attendance. The brigade's high school students at Bremerhaven and elementary students attending classes in the leased German school area were transferred to the new Osterholz-Scharmbeck facilities, which were officially named the Osterholz American High School and the Osterholz-Scharmbeck American Elementary School.

Planned for the newly established schools was a limited special-education program. Initially, one learning disabilities teacher cared for the educational needs of children with mild learning disabilities. Planning called for a later expansion of the program to meet the specific needs of the community.

**c. Driving Licenses.** Late in 1977 the USAREUR staff developed a plan to give European driving tests to brigade personnel while they were in the United States and to issue USAREUR driving licenses to those personnel who satisfied test requirements for eligibility to drive in Europe. To this end, two USAREUR testing teams traveled to the brigade's U.S. site -- one team in June and one team in November 1978. A total of 1,087 licenses were issued.

## **6. Morale Support**

**a. Sports and Recreation Programs.** In March 1978, the USAREUR Recreation Services Support Center (USARSSC) designated \$300,000 for the reimbursement of sport-associated items made available from NORTHAG stocks and other supply sources. By the end of 1978 the cost of USARSSC-issued items totaled \$110,000. In November 1978, a gymnasium at Garlstedt was made available for troop use; however, still under construction were six handball/racquetball courts. In addition, numerous repairs were required before the facility could be accepted as a completed project. It was estimated that outdoor recreational facilities would be completed sometime in the spring of 1979 and that other recreational facilities (e.g., recreation centers, arts and crafts shops, libraries) would be completed sometime in the fall of the same year.

**b. Libraries.** Initial estimates for personnel, furniture, equipment and special materials for a library at Garlstedt were prepared in September 1975, and detailed engineering specifications were completed by May 1976. Additional requirements data and a building requirement statement were completed by the end of 1976. However, when it was determined that a separate library installation would

exceed the dollar amounts specified for library establishment, it was decided to collocate the library with other recreational facilities in a single structure, the library to be established in such a way as to avoid noise intrusion. A construction contract was awarded in early 1979, and 31 October 1979 was established as the project completed date. In the interim, a temporary library facility was established in the Garlstedt gymnasium. Ordered for the permanent library were books, furniture, and equipment representing a total cost of \$75,000. Planning called for the permanent employment of two full-time U.S. civilian personnel -- one library technician and one professional librarian.

#### **7. Health Service.**

Early in 1976 the USAREUR Chief Surgeon's staff initiated plans to develop health service support for the brigade personnel to be permanently stationed in the NORTHAG area, as well as for their dependents. Medical milestones were established for renovating and upgrading the Bremerhaven hospital facility, designing and constructing an outpatient facility at Garlstedt, and stationing an air ambulance detachment to support the U.S. military communities in Norddeutschland. (See figure 2.)




**Osterholz-Scharmbeck Elementary School**



**Garteler Weg Housing Area**

FIGURE 2  
HEALTH SERVICE MILESTONES



Plans for the Bremerhaven hospital called for increasing the staff at the facility and expanding the operating bed capacity from 25 to a total of 75 beds. The dental clinic, located in the hospital, was increased from a 9- to an 11-chair facility. An urgent minor MCA project (approximately \$400,000) was initiated to further expand the dental facility to an 18-chair clinic, which would be operated by a professional staff of 11 dentists.

The planned upgrade of the hospital called for the renovation and alteration of the general facility, the previously identified substandard area receiving priority attention. MCA renovation/alteration for the U.S. Army Hospital, Bremerhaven, facility was programed at \$8 million for FY 1981.

Plans also called for designing and constructing a consolidated medical and dental clinic building, including the procurement and installation of medical equipment, at Garlstedt. The facility was constructed at a cost of DM 1.4 million. Equipment procurement and installation costs for the consolidated clinic totaled \$367,943. The troop medical/dental clinic building was scheduled to be completed by 1 September 1978; however, because of unforeseen construction shortfalls, the facility did not become available for beneficial occupancy until 21 March 1979. The health clinic -- which included an emergency treatment room, a small laboratory, and a minimal optical and X-ray capability -- functioned under the technical supervision of the Bremerhaven MEDDAC. It was managed and staffed by the Brigade Surgeon, 3d Brigade, 2d Armored Division (Forward), and medical personnel of the brigade's medical company (separate) of the 498th Support Battalion. The facility was designed primarily for troop use. Military personnel could receive more definitive medical support, including inpatient treatment, at Bremerhaven hospital. Dependents received the full range of outpatient and dental care at the Bremerhaven facility, whereas limited outpatient medical care (i.e., sick call referral service) was offered at the U.S. Army Health Clinic, Garlstedt. The Bremerhaven hospital was considered the preferred facility for outpatient care.

The eight-chair Garlstedt dental facility could accommodate the staffing of four dentists and one hygienist; it was staffed and operated by the Bremerhaven Dental Activity (DENTAC) and was primarily oriented to troop support.

In March 1978, the USAREUR staff recognized a requirement to station an air ambulance detachment (minus) in Norddeutschland to provide areawide aeromedical evacuation services for the U.S. military communities supported by the U.S. Army Medical Activity, Bremerhaven. In November 1978, the 159th Medical Detachment (Helicopter Ambulance) was moved from Fuerth (near the site of the Nuernberg MEDDAC) to Lemwerdter Airfield (near Bremen). The unit (minus two helicopters) employed four UH-1 helicopters and provided 24-hour coverage for the region supported. The 159th Medical Detachment was under the command and control of the 421st Air Ambulance Company, 7th Medical Command.

#### **8. Liaison Support**

Representing the command's interests and functioning as the USAREUR point of contact with officials of the several state governments and officials of F.R.G. agencies operating at the state level were U.S. Forces Liaison Officers (USFLO), each with a small staff. To the end of September 1977, a USFLO contingent functioned in each of the several states in which significant numbers of USAREUR military personnel were stationed (i.e., one each covering Baden-Wuerttemberg, Bayern, and Hessen, and one USFLO organization covering two states: Rheinland-Pfalz and Saarland).

In preparation for the scheduled 1978 deployment of the U.S. brigade to northern Germany, effective 1 October 1977, a new liaison element -- USFLO Norddeutschland -- was established in Bremerhaven with an authorized personnel strength of three U.S. civilian employees (an international liaison officer, a government relations specialist, and a translator-secretary). The newly established USFLO had responsibility for U.S. Forces representation and liaison with officials of the states of Niedersachsen, Nordrhein-Westfalen, and Schleswig-Holstein, as well as the city states of Hamburg and Bremen.

#### **9. Officer and Enlisted Personnel Support**

Beginning in February 1978, USAREUR officer and enlisted personnel managers began participating in discussions with representatives of the 2d Armored Division (Forward) and the 1st Armored Division, the division that exercised operational control of the brigade until 1 August 1978.

In May and June of 1978, personnel requisitions were submitted to the DA Military Personnel Center (MILPERCEN) for personnel to replace those TDY soldiers who had been deployed to Europe to fill brigade personnel spaces. Personnel specified for duties with the brigade were assigned directly to the Garlstedt/Osterholz-Scharmbeck area. Those personnel already assigned to the brigade's headquarters and headquarters company and the 498th Support Battalion at Grafenwoehr were either issued instructions for a permanent change of station move to the brigade's permanent site or, when they did not have sufficient time remaining for an in-theater reassignment, retained at Grafenwoehr to assist with brigade rear area support operations.

#### **10. Postal Services**

APO 09355 was transferred from Grafenwoehr to the brigade in mid-October 1978, the 11th Adjutant General Detachment (Postal) at Bremerhaven being assigned responsibility for furnishing the full range of postal services to the U.S. military community at Garlstedt. A bulk mail movement system provided for mail routing from Bremerhaven. Pending the completion of a permanent postal facility, DS postal service was conducted at a temporary location. To accommodate the postal detachment's expanded responsibilities, seven personnel spaces (one officer, six enlisted) were transferred from the brigade's postal section to the 11th Adjutant General Detachment (Postal). Planning called for the construction of a postal facility in the community complex, a facility that would be functionally responsive to the Garlstedt community's postal needs and comply with established postal service regulations. It was estimated that the facility would be completed in February 1980.

## CHAPTER 4

### LEGAL, FUNDING, AND COST ISSUES

#### 1. Legal Issues

##### a. Background.

(1) **Offshore Procurement Agreements.** In the mid-1950s, the United States concluded offshore procurement agreements (OPA) with the Federal Republic of Germany and 12 other nations. These OPA provided for U.S. direct procurement from commercial vendors and from the foreign government concerned, as well as indirect procurement through agencies of the foreign government. In all cases, a model contract was negotiated in compliance with the OPA, a contract that satisfied U.S. statutory and regulatory requirements. Before 1976 the model contract negotiated pursuant to the OPA was rarely used, because there was little reliance on obtaining logistic support from host nations. Almost all logistic support was obtained by direct procurement from commercial vendors. However, for many years before 1976, the USAREUR staff negotiated and executed a variety of logistic agreements with foreign governments, including the Federal Republic, that required USAREUR to reimburse those governments for the use of facilities. These agreements were not executed by contracting officers, and they were executed without reference to the Armed Services Procurement Act (ASPA) 10 U.S. Code (USC) Chapter 137, or to the Armed Services Procurement Regulation (ASPR)

(2) **A 1969 Opinion.** As early as 1969 the USAREUR Office of the Judge Advocate (OJA) staff became concerned about the legality of these agreements and expressed the opinion at that time that:

"The use and expenditure of U.S. appropriated funds is controlled by the Congress through statutory enactments and administrative regulations. 10 USC 2202 provides, for example, that an officer or agency of the Department of Defense may obligate funds for procuring supplies only under regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Defense. These regulations are found in the Armed Services Procurement Regulation which provides (ASPR 1-401) that the responsibility for the procurement of supplies and services in the DoD is assigned to Heads of Procuring Activity. Contracting officers appointed by such HPAs are authorized to enter into contracts for supplies and services on behalf of the Government and in the name of the United States. Thus, with certain exceptions ... any support agreement which incorporates the purchase of services or supplies from a source outside the U.S. Government will require signature by a properly appointed contracting officer."

The opinion further explained that there was no requirement for a contracting officer if the support agreement did not constitute a binding agreement for the payment of supplies and services, and that a support agreement might establish a procedure under which the actual requirement was later to be satisfied through a proper contract.

(3) **The 1969 Through 1976 Period.** Although the 1969 OJA opinion questioned the legality of the noncontractual agreements, they continued to be concluded. One school of thought in legal circles held that:

(a) Agreements other than ASPR contracts could be used to obligate U.S. funds without violating 10 USC 2202, because that statute was inapplicable.

(b) Even assuming that 10 USC 2202 applied, the ASPR was not the only DoD directive dealing with obligating funds under 10 USC 2202.

During this period, 1970 through 1976, there arose considerable concern throughout the U.S. Government that many violations of the Anti-Deficiency Act, Revised Statute 3679 (31 USC 665), were being committed and not reported. Many of these cases arose in USAREUR, among them, an incident where funds were expended under an agreement and no funds had been obligated. These Anti-Deficiency Act cases were one factor that increased the visibility of the legal issues surrounding the use of agreements not concluded under the OPA. In addition, the level, scope, and cost of obtaining logistic support from host nations escalated because of several factors. Some of the reasons for this escalation were:

(a) The REFORGER (Return of Forces to Germany) exercise became a part of larger NATO exercises, and there was a need to interoperate with forces of other nations and exchange logistic support.

(b) The requirements for F.R.G. logistic support at Garlstedt became a prominent matter.

(c) Other U.S. requirements (e.g., storage) were expanded.

(4) **A 1976 Opinion.** On 30 August 1976 the OJA staff responded to a request by the USAREUR Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics (DCSLOG), for policy guidance. The DCSLOG indicated that foreign governments and NATO organizations were refusing to enter into contracts under the OPA for the provision of supplies and services to the United States. The OJA staff responded to the DCSLOG, in part, as follows:

"This office is unaware of any ... properly implemented Government-to-Government Agreement which provides legal authority to acquire supplies or services from foreign governments or international organizations where U.S. funds are expended without compliance with the Armed Services Procurement Regulation."

**b. Garlstedt - General Legal Problems.**

(1) **General.** Legal problems relating to the acquisition of base support for Garlstedt from the Bundeswehr Garrison Administration (StOV) surfaced in the late summer and early fall of 1976. This effort coincided with U.S. initiatives to obtain various kinds of logistic support from the Federal Republic. It became evident that officials of the F.R.G. Ministry of Defense were opposed to using the model contract of the OPA as a documentary vehicle for support at Garlstedt. The USAREUR legal position was that the U.S. Congress had imposed certain statutory controls and limitations on the procurement of supplies and services by its military forces and on the expenditure of U.S. funds. Such procurement could be made only by a properly authorized contracting officer and only pursuant to a contract containing certain statutory clauses. Title 10, USC, Chapter 137, provided that the Act (Armed Services Procurement Act) applied to purchases, contracts to purchase, all services, and all property (except land), when payment was to be made from appropriated funds. The Armed Services Procurement Regulation (now called the Defense Acquisition Regulation) established procedures for procurement under the authority of the ASPA. The ASPA and ASPR (or DAR) applied worldwide to purchases from foreign governments, as well as from individuals and commercial enterprise (except transportation services procured under other specific regulations). The ASPR provided for certain



contracting procedures and prescribed clauses and forms. Certain clauses were based on statute (e.g., "Covenant Against Contingent Fees" (10 USC S 2306 b), "Gratutities" (10 USC 2207), "Officials Not to Benefit" (18 USC S 431)). All these statutory clauses were in the Offshore Procurement Agreement. It was the position of the USAREUR OJA staff that the two governments had recognized the OPA statutory requirements and the model contract adopted for use under that agreement. In a series of meetings and exchanges of correspondence in the first 3 months of 1977, the U.S. position was communicated to the Federal Ministry of Defense (FMOD). In letters of 7 April 1977 and 25 August 1977, the FMOD made it plain that support of the U.S. Forces by the German Armed Forces should be arranged by administrative agreements only and not by contracts as provided in the Offshore Procurement Agreement. The following reasons were advanced:

(a) The OPA and model contract did not apply to reimbursable support.

(b) The NATO Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) superseded those documents in regard to procurements from the Federal Republic, and the political-economic situation in the 1950s on which the documents were based had changed.

(c) A contract between two sovereign nations was not appropriate, especially a contract that treated one nation as if it were a commercial enterprise. It was apparent that the clauses required by U.S. statutes, as contained in the Offshore Procurement Agreement, were particularly offensive to the FMOD representatives. They considered the clauses inappropriate in a contract/agreement between sovereign nations.

**(2) Efforts to Resolve the Impasse.** In an effort to resolve the impasse which had been reached, in a June 1977 message to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations and Logistics, CINCUSAREUR stated that he intended to negotiate and conclude an administrative agreement with the Federal Ministry of Defense under the provisions of Article 47, F.R.G. Supplementary Agreement (SA), NATO SOFA. This implementing agreement would provide for the procurement of support requirements of the brigade to be stationed at Garlstedt in October 1978. USAREUR proposed that this agreement be a test for a subsequent Article 47 implementing agreement of a broader scope. The message also stated that a 21 July 1977 meeting had been arranged between USAREUR and FMOD representatives so as to begin the negotiation process. The reaction of both the United States European Command and Department of the Army was that USAREUR had no authority to negotiate and conclude such an implementing agreement. In a 6 July 1977 message, USCINCEUR stated that:

"...negotiation of an administrative agreement with F.R.G. under Art 7 of the SA for host nation support at Garlstedt may be contrary to U.S. law and would risk forfeiture of U.S. rights under the 1957 U.S.-F.R.G. OPA."

DA staff members provided their initial reaction in a July 1977 message in which they stated:

"...initial reaction is that Article 47 of the Supplementary Agreement to the NATO Status of Forces Agreement does not contain authority for CINCUSAREUR to negotiate and conclude a contract for procurement of supplies and services through the F.R.G., without complying with all ASPR and statutory requirements which have not been specifically waived by appropriate authority."

The message also included the following statement:

“Accordingly, negotiation scheduled to begin on 21 July 1977 should be conducted within the framework of existing Offshore Procurement Agreement which provides for such procurements within U.S. law.”

The DA staff never provided any final opinion in writing, but it became apparent from later communications that USAREUR was not to implement Article 47 as a solution to the impasse that had been reached.

(3) **Legislative Efforts.** It became apparent after the effort to secure approval to implement Article 47 had been disapproved that legislation was required to remove the statutory impediments to entering into logistic support arrangements with foreign governments. Part of the DoD legislative program for the 94th Congress was a proposal to amend Section 814 of Public Law 94-106 (89 Stat. 540). This legislation -- DoD legislative item 94-141 -- would have permitted the Secretary of Defense, with certain exceptions and notwithstanding any other provision of law, to negotiate and enter into standardization agreements that provided standard procedures and forms for purchases from other NATO countries. In the same session of Congress, a proposal was made to insert a separate title into the proposed Federal Acquisition Act of 1977, known as the Chiles Bill (Senate 1264). Neither of these proposals met with success. In 1978 the Department of Defense came up with DoD Legislative Proposal 95-86 (HR 11607). Adoption of this legislative proposal would have allowed the acquisition of equipment, materials, goods, other supplies and services (including the use of facilities) for the use of the Armed Forces of the United States deployed in Europe and its adjacent waters from the governments of other NATO countries and NATO subsidiary bodies, pursuant to agreements with those governments or subsidiary bodies in lieu of contracting, pursuant to Chapter 137, Title 10, USC (the Armed Services Procurement Act). Again, certain exceptions to such acquisition were provided in the proposed legislation. The need for such legislation became even more apparent after 17 March 1978. On that date, in an attempt to resolve the problem, a delegation of USAREUR representatives headed by the USAREUR Chief of Staff and including a U.S. Embassy representative, met with F.R.G. officials, headed by the Chief, Logistics Division, F.R.G. Armed Forces General Staff. Representatives for the F.R.G. Ministry of Finance, the Foreign Office, and Chancellery were also present. The objective of the USAREUR participants was to find a way to procure F.R.G. support in accordance with U.S. law. The F.R.G. official position was that representatives of F.R.G. agencies would not sign U.S. Forces contracts based on the OPA or the model contract. The F.R.G. representatives objected to the application of the OPA to F.R.G. governmental agencies and to the model contract in total. DoD legislative item 95-86 was changed at the beginning of the 96th Congress to DoD legislative item 96-4. This item, which proposed an act to be known as the "North Atlantic Treaty Organization Mutual Support Act of 1979," proposed essentially the same legislation as that in DoD legislative item 95-86.

(4) **Armed Service Procurement Regulation Deviation.**

As the time approached for the arrival of the 2d Armored Division (Foward) at the Garlstedt installation, projected for the first of October 1978, the urgency of removing the impasse on contracting for base support for that installation became greater. The F.R.G. authorities continued to maintain their opposition to an OPA contract. In response to a USAREUR staff request, the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Research, Development, and Acquisition) on 18 February 1978 granted the Deputy Commander in Chief, USAREUR, the authority to approve those ASPR deviations required to procure from the host nation the supplies and services needed to support Garlstedt. Proscribed, however, was any deviation from statutory provisions. This grant of DOD authority paved the way for serious U.S. - F.R.G. negotiations on the exact form of the document by which the Federal Republic would provide base operations support to the U.S. facility at Garlstedt. The primary conceptual

problem that remained was the manner in which the F.R.G. authorities would accept the required statutory clauses. The agreement was eventually reached that the F.R.G. officials would acknowledge those statutory requirements in a separate exchange of letters that would reference the principal agreement.

**c. Special Legal Problems and Resolution.** The conceptual legal problems have been discussed in the paragraphs above. After the major decisions were made that the model contract of the OPA would not be utilized and that statutory clauses would be treated by an exchange of letters that made reference to the primary agreement, it was possible to proceed to specific provisions of the agreement. Several major legal problems on specific provisions confronted the negotiators.

(1) **The Consignment.** Initially, the FMOD legal spokesman advanced the proposition that the consignment of the Garlstedt facility would be part of the contract or agreement for services, and that such consignment would not be pursuant to Article 48, Supplementary Agreement to NATO SOFA. The U.S. position was that the only authorized means of consigning an accommodation was pursuant to Article 48, Supplementary Agreement. The means by which the U.S. Forces were granted use of F.R.G. real property in the Federal Republic was through accommodations consigned pursuant to Article 48, Supplementary Agreement, an executive agreement signed at state level and made pursuant to a treaty. The rights and obligations relating to the use of real property were governed by the various provisions of the supplementary agreement. U.S. representatives were concerned about altering any rights and obligations under the Supplementary Agreement. The F.R.G. authorities desired to have a definite tie-in between the consignment and the support agreement. They desired that the two terminate at the same time. This would ensure that the new showcase facility would be maintained by their governmental agency (StOV) in a manner they desired. This position, of course, was understandable because the major part of the facilities was F.R.G. funded. The matter was resolved when both sides agreed that the consignment would be included in the support document as the first part of the agreement, whereas the support provisions would be included in a Part II. Article 1 of Part I, pertaining to consignment, referenced Article 48 as the authority for making the Garlstedt cantonment area with all structures and facilities exclusively available to the U.S. Forces.

(2) **Noncompetitive Procurement.** The Armed Services Procurement Act required that purchases made by the US Government be on a competitive basis when practical and feasible. Since the proposed arrangement for StOV was to be negotiated without competition, it was necessary to justify this procedure. It was determined that there was adequate justification to negotiate solely with StOV for the support at Garlstedt. Article 28 of the final agreement stated that:

"In times of crises and in a state of defense, the Bundeswehr Administration will continue to perform the accepted task within the scope of existing capabilities, and in consideration of Bundeswehr requirements on the basis of the respective German laws and provisions in force as well as to NATO agreements and German-American arrangements."

This guarantee of support, which could not be given by a commercial firm in times of crises and in a state of defense, was considered necessary to ensure that the mission of the U.S. Forces at Garlstedt could be performed. Additional justification was the need to test the concept for obtaining base operations support from a host nation to determine the feasibility and practicality of this approach.

## 2. Funding Issues

Coming into prominence during the course of the U.S.-F.R.G. negotiations for the conclusion of the Carlstedt agreement were several funding issues that had their origin in the conflict of U.S. and F.R.G. interests. The Germans had well-founded reasons for wanting to obtain a U.S. commitment that extended over a period of several years. Recognizing that it would be necessary for them to hire additional personnel and to acquire other additional resources to satisfy the terms of the support agreement, the F.R.G. negotiators believed that their national interests constrained them from committing national resources for a short-term arrangement. This being so, it was important that they obtain as permanent an arrangement as possible. On the other hand, the U.S. representatives had to recognize and abide by the Congress-imposed funding limitations. Operation and maintenance (OMA) funds--appropriated annually by Congress to satisfy recognized needs and authorized for expenditure in the same year for which appropriated and no other--would be used for the U.S.-F.R.G. base support agreement. The funding problems brought into being by reason of conflicting national interests are discussed in the following paragraphs.

**a. One Year Versus Multi-Year.** The Germans wanted a negotiating team to make the support agreement for an indefinite period. This, as previously mentioned, conflicted with U.S. laws that required annual funding for this kind of contract. Although there was certain legal authority to enter into multi-year contracts, even in those authorized situations the acquisition of supplies or services after the initial year would have to be made subject to the availability of funds. The Germans expressed an unwillingness to accept a provision that made subsequent-year funding subject to the availability of appropriations by Congress. This was resolved by drafting Part II of the agreement as a basic ordering agreement. The services and supplies incidental thereto were to be furnished at written U.S. request. The Bundeswehr administration was to present not later than 1 February of each calendar year to the U.S. authorities a budget estimate for the coming U.S. fiscal year. Then, the responsible U.S. agency and the Bundeswehr Administration were to develop jointly a budget estimate. On the basis of this estimate, a plan of expenditures was to be developed. The requirements furnished by the U.S. authorities and the jointly signed plan of expenditures would then be consolidated and constitute an ordering document. The U.S. authorities considered the ordering document as the document that obligates funds, and this would be done on a fiscal-year-to-fiscal-year basis. The plan of expenditures set forth a funding ceiling, and under Article 17 of the agreement, the ceilings could be exceeded only with the prior written approval of the responsible U.S. agency. This arrangement was considered to satisfy U.S. legal requirements relating to the obligations and expenditures of annual appropriations.

**b. Administrative Charge.** In this agreement, as in all similar agreements, the Germans insisted on a U.S. payment of an administrative charge. They pointed out that this was similar to U.S. administrative charges levied on services provided to Bundeswehr units stationed in the United States and also on U.S. military sales to the Federal Republic. The U.S. legal concern here was the possibility of violating the prohibition on the cost-plus-percentage-of-cost contracting system. Article 18, paragraph 1, stated that the F.R.G. Federal Minister of Defense "will bill the cost price only, plus an administrative charge; he will not realize any profit." This repeats an OPA principal (i.e., that the Federal Republic would not realize a profit on direct contracting with the United States). It was determined that this arrangement did not violate the cost-plus-percentage-of-cost system prohibition, a prohibition intended to avoid the negative incentive that occurred when a contractor could increase his profit by increasing costs. In this situation, the administrative fee covers only actual administrative costs, and there will be no F.R.G. profit.

Thus, there would be no incentive to increase the cost, and the purpose of the statute would not be violated.

**c. Advance Payment for Personnel Costs.** The F.R.G. negotiating team proposed a provision in the contract that would state:

"Invoices on fixed costs, especially personnel costs, will be presented on the first business day of the month. The appropriate U.S. agency must be notified, in writing, one month in advance of these costs. The U.S. Finance and Accounting Office will immediately remit the amounts identified in the invoices."

Initially, it appeared that this requirement to pay for services in advance of receipt would be a violation of 31 USC Section 529. However, it was determined that advance payments were authorized by 31 USC Section 529 for those services the FMOD specifically identified as requiring payment in advance of receipt of services under F.R.G. law and regulation. The Comptroller of the Army was advised of this position and no objection was received.

**d. Termination Provisions.** Negotiation of termination provisions once again highlighted the conflict between the F.R.G. desire to obtain an arrangement for a number of years and the U.S. necessity to comply with funding limitation. An agreement was reached that the agreement should remain effective until 30 September 1979, and, unless notice of termination was submitted, the period of validity would extend for 1 year thereafter. It was also provided that Part I or Part II of the agreement could be terminated by either of the agreement parties in writing, the notice of termination becoming effective on 1 October, provided a period of notice of 1 year was given before that date. Although these provisions, taken out of context, could be legally objectionable as creating a U.S. obligation for more than a period of 1 year, it was determined that the arrangement was legally sufficient because:

(1) The U.S. authorities could control the length of the agreement by providing timely notice of termination.

(2) The U.S. authorities had additional control over the length of the agreement under the ordering provisions of the agreement. Although many attempts were made to obtain more favorable termination provisions, the U.S. authorities recognized that, in view of the F.R.G. need of assurance that the services of StOV would be used for a period beyond 1 year, the final form of the termination provisions was practical, reasonable, and met U.S. legal requirements.

### **3. Costs**

**a. Stationing Cost Comparisons.** The brigade's permanent stationing concept was based on two options: (1) stationing at NORTHAG area sites at an estimated cost of \$150.8 million; (2) stationing at a CENTAG major training area at a cost of \$130.4 million. TABLES 1 through 6 show detailed presentations of cost elements for both options.

**b. Stationing Costs.** TABLE 7 presents an extract of the DA January and June 1975 program budget guidance furnished USAREUR by fiscal year. Included were dollar sums associated with the stationing of both 3d Battalion, 2d Armored Division, and the 4th Brigade, 4th Infantry Division. DA guidance having specific reference to each brigade as a separate entity was not provided. USAREUR's program analysis and resource review (PARR) addressed resources associated with the stationing of both brigades. Although dollar sums were specified for the several programs, the major

part of the resources were specified for base operations funds for stationing support

As already mentioned, the permanent stationing of the 3d Brigade, 2d Armored Division, to the NORTHAG area started in FY 1978. TABLE 8 shows the status of brigade resources at the end of February 1979. The differences between DA guidance and actual resource allocations to the brigade were attributed to fund reprogramming to satisfy the command's high priority requirements. For example, in FY 1978 about \$5.5 million of base operations funds were applied to cover fund shortfalls caused by the progressively declining value of the U.S. dollar in relation to the Deutsche Mark.

**c. Other Related Issues.** To support the deployed brigade, USAREUR furnished an appropriate structure and associated procedures for funding, accounting, and disbursement. Effective 1 October 1978, responsibility for brigade base operations was assigned to the 21st Support Command; responsibility for P2 (mission) funding was assigned to the USAREUR Support Budget Agency.

U.S.-F.R.G. negotiations for the StOV arrangement started in the fall of 1976, and on 22 September 1978, both parties signed a formal agreement. Actually funded to defray FY 1979 StOV-associated costs was a total of \$3.1 million, which included the costs for engineer maintenance, repair, guard, and laundry/drycleaning services.



Temporary Building Used Dining Construction of General Lucius B. Clay Kaserne

TABLE 1

## STATIONING OPTION COST COMPARISON\*

(\$ Millions)

OPTION	ONE-TIME COSTS			RECURRING/TNG COSTS		TOTAL
	INTERIM	PERMANENT	TOTAL	FIRST YEAR	OUT-YEAR	
	COSTS	COSTS	COSTS	COSTS	COSTS	
#1 (NORTHAG)	20.07	110.5	130.57	20.24	21.01	150.81
#2 (CENTAG MTA)	.22	121.77	121.99	8.36	21.01	130.35
				OPTION COST DIFFERENTIAL		20.46

\*Made in 1975 @ DM 2.50/\$

TABLE 2

## OPTION 1 STATIONING COSTS\*

(\$ Millions)

INTERIM (NORTHAG)	ONE-TIME			RECURRING
	P.D & NEW CONST	OMA/FHMA	TOTAL	
Planning/Design**	.84		.84	
New Construction	14.90		14.90	
OMA/FHMA		4.25	4.25	21.01 (1st yr)
TOTAL	<u>15.74</u>	<u>4.25</u>	<u>19.99(a)</u>	<u>20.24(a)</u>
PERMANENT (NORTHAG)				
Planning/Design**	6.00		6.00	
New Construction	100.09		100.09	
OMA/FHMA		4.41	4.41	21.01 (out-yr)
TOTAL	<u>106.09</u>	<u>4.41</u>	<u>100.50(a)</u>	<u>21.01(out-yr)</u>
US NAT'L ADMIN EXP***	.08		.08	N/A
GRAND TOTAL	<u>121.91</u>	<u>8.66</u>	<u>130.57</u>	

(a)TOTAL \$150.81

\*Costs do not include US secondary move impacts from Bremerhaven.  
 \*\*F.R.G. agrees to prefinance planning/design as a host nation cost.  
 \*\*\*U.S. cost to supervise and administer F.R.G. design to U.S. specifications.  
 (a) 1975 estimate @ DM 2.50/\$



TABLE 3

## OPTION 2 STATIONING COSTS\*

(\$ Millions)

INTERIM (CENTAG MTA)	ONE-TIME			RECURRING
	P/D & NEW CONST	OMA/FHMA	TOTAL	
Planning/Design**	0		0	
New Construction	0		0	
OMA/FHMA		.14	.14	8.36 (1st yr)
<b>TOTAL</b>	<u>0</u>	<u>.14</u>	<u>.14(a)</u>	<u>8.36(a)</u>
<b>PERMANENT (NORTHAG)</b>				
Planning/Design**	6.58		6.58	
New Construction	109.73		109.73	
OMA/FHMA		5.46	5.46	21.01 (out-yr)
<b>TOTAL</b>	<u>116.31</u>	<u>5.46</u>	<u>121.77(a)</u>	<u>21.01</u>
US NAT'L ADMIN EXP***	.08		.08(a)	N/A
<b>GRAND TOTAL</b>	<u>116.39</u>	<u>5.60</u>	<u>121.99</u>	

(a) TOTAL \$130.35

\* Costs do not include U.S. secondary move impacts from Bremerhaven.  
 \*\*F.R.G. agrees to prefinance planning/design as a host nation cost.  
 \*\*\*U.S. cost to supervise and administer F.R.G. design to U.S. specifications.  
 (a) 1975 estimate @ DM 2.50/\$

TABLE 4

## OPTION 1 STATIONING COST RESOURCE ALLOCATION\*

(\$ Millions)

FUND	PERMANENT STATIONING				INTERIM STATIONING			TOTALS
	BREMERHAVEN		GARLSTEDT		BERGEN HOHNE			
SOURCES	BILLETS	MAINT	CMTY SPT	BILLETS & MAINT	CMTY SPT	VAR	REGTS	
Offset**	8.77							8.77
US Spec Prog		7.20					5.20	12.40
DOD Contingency								
Construction			0.91					17.73
One-Time OMA/FHMA				82.93	16.50	4.41	4.25	8.66
								82.93
TOTAL								130.49

\* Includes design cost but does not include U.S. costs (\$80,000) to supervise and administer F.R.G. design to U.S. specifications.

\*\*Reprogramming/diversion of resources.

(a) 1975 estimate @ DM 2.50/\$

TABLE 5

## OPTION 2 STATIONING COST RESOURCE ALLOCATION\*

(\$ Millions)

FUND SOURCES	BREMERHAVEN			GARLSTEDT		TOTALS
	BILLETS	MAINT	CMTY SPT	BILLETS & MAINT	CMTY SPT	
Offset***	8.77					8.77
US Spec Prog		7.20				7.20
DOD Contingency						
Construction			0.91		16.50	17.41
One-Time OMA/FHMA					5.60	5.60
FRG (DM 200M)				82.93		82.93
TOTAL						121.91(a)

\* Includes design cost but does not include U.S. costs (\$80,000) to supervise and administer F.R.G. design to U.S. specifications.

\*\*Reprogramming/diversion of resources.

(a) 1975 estimate @ DM 2.50/\$

TABLE 6

## ESTIMATED OMA/FHMA COSTS\*

## BRIGADE 75

(\$ in Thousands)

OPTION 1	P-2	P-2 BO	P-3	P-72	P-73	P-84	P-87	P-9	FHMA	TOTAL
<b>INTERIM (FY 77 in NORTHAG)</b>										
Annual	4,500	11,306	2,121	76	1,222	120	123	4	768	20,240
One-Time	378	2,554	1,157	0	0	100	47	0	17	4,253
<b>PERMANENT (FY 78 in NORTHAG)</b>										
Annual	4,500	12,334	1,868	70	1,222	120	123	4	770	21,011
One-Time	100	2,880	970	189	0	250	1	0	17	4,407
<b>OPTION 2</b>										
<b>INTERIM (FY 77 in CENTAG MTA)</b>										
Annual	3,500	3,004	0	0	1,222	120	69	4	442	8,361
One-Time	135	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	135
<b>PERMANENT (FY 78 in NORTHAG)</b>										
Annual	4,500	12,334	1,868	70	1,222	120	123	4	770	21,011
One-Time	246	3,788	970	189	0	250	1	0	17	5,461

\*1975 estimate @ DM 2.50/\$

TABLE 7

PBG GUIDANCE\*

(\$ Millions)

FY	P2(MSN)	P2(BASOPS)	P72	P84	TOTAL	BDE 75**
76	14.2	19.6	4.1	2.9	40.8	N/A
7T	7.1	3.2	1.1	.5	11.9	N/A
77	15.1	40.6	9.3	4.3	69.3	24.5
78	15.1	40.6	9.3	4.3	69.3	25.4

\*Dollars associated with stationing of Bde 75, Bde 76 and non-Bde civilian conversion funding.

\*\*Bde 75 estimate developed in 1975.

TABLE 8

BRIGADE 75 DISTRIBUTED RESOURCES\*/MANPOWER

FY	P2 MSN	P2 BASOPS	P84	P87	P95	TOTAL OMA	FHMA	MCA	FRG
76	4.6	2.2	0	0	x	7.1	0	0	N/A
77	5.1****	2.2	0	0	x	8.3	25.2	0	68.48***
78	4.5****	6.9	0	.03	x	11.43	3.0	21.4**	-
79	6.9	12.4	1.3	.33	.01	20.94	3.2	0	-

\*Dollars in millions

\*\*Includes \$12.5M from DOD School Contingency Funding; USAREUR MCA was \$8.9M.

\*\*\*Federal Republic of Germany funding of DM 176.2M (DM 2.50/\$); funding to be applied 1977, 78, 79.

\*\*\*\*Includes rail cost from MTA to NORTHAG.

xData not available.

MANPOWER

MILITARY:	FY 78**	FY 79	SUPPORT:	P2 MSN	P2 BASOPS
OFF	77	232	FY 78/79 OFF	3	0
WO	13	21	WO	15	2
EN	772	3,829	EN	18	0
TOTAL	862	4,082	DH	20	26
			IDH	13	371

\*\*HHC and Support Battalion; remaining brigade strength in FORSCOM

**d. Lessons Learned.** The resources available to support brigade stationing in the NORTHAG area were effectively managed from the conception of the plan to the actual execution of the deployment operation. The success of this endeavor could be attributed to the application of a centralized resource management arrangement.

Available from the start of the plan development process was a central point of contact, a representative of the USAREUR Deputy Chief of Staff, Resource Management (DCSRM). The DCSRM cost estimate for permanent brigade stationing was carefully coordinated with other USAREUR staff representatives and completely documented. Although the Department of the Army did not furnish all the resources specified in the USAREUR estimate -- and despite fund reprogramming actions to satisfy requirements brought about by reason of the dollar's declining value in relation to the Deutsche Mark -- the funds actually provided were sufficient to permit the brigade to accomplish successfully its mission.

From the conception of the brigade stationing plan to its execution, the application of the centralized management of resources concept furnished valuable contributions to a successful operation. For one thing, it provided an appropriate structure and procedures for the prudent distribution and handling of the brigade's available resources. It also enabled the USAREUR staff to maintain an accountable track, thereby making it possible to accomplish a close control of these resources. In addition, it made it possible for the USAREUR staff to examine the brigade's funding status as it related to the command's overall resource requirements, thereby furnishing the USAREUR staff the flexibility to reprogram some of the brigade's funds to satisfy the command's other higher priority needs. In this regard, it was often possible to reprogram funds because total brigade support requirements had not yet been developed. Finally, it made possible an improved control of resource distribution and a more effective management of these resources.

The centralized management of resources continued until FY 1979, when the brigade's total funding guidance was distributed to the field in USAREUR's September 1978 Budget Manpower Guidance (BMG).

## CHAPTER 5

### PUBLIC AFFAIRS

#### 1. Background

The introduction of U.S. combat forces on a permanent basis into northern Germany after an absence of more than 30 years created uncommon challenges and opportunities for USAREUR's public affairs specialists. The primary challenge existed in the form of small vocal protest groups opposing the concept and possible consequences of stationing U.S. Forces in the NORTHAG areas. (Protest groups in the 1960s and 1970s had attracted considerable media attention.) At the same time, real doubts about the resulting impact on local communities existed in the minds of local government and civic leaders, and early on it was recognized that these doubts had to be addressed. In south and central Germany, where U.S. Forces had been stationed since the closing days of World War II, maintaining harmonious German-American relations against the background of World War II and the occupation era had long been a matter of continuing U.S. emphasis. Now, the opportunity existed to build a program on a near zero base. These, then, were the primary challenges and opportunities the public affairs officers (PAO) of USAREUR, 21st Support Command, and U.S. Army Norddeutschland Support Group faced in 1975.

#### 2. 1976 and 1977

Planning was the primary public affairs activity in 1976. The vast differences between stationing U.S. Forces in a totally new area of Germany and the comparatively routine exchange or restationing of units in the traditional U.S. regions of Germany were soon recognized. Not only would the challenges and opportunities previously mentioned have to be met, but a myriad of details to ensure the proper orientation and public affairs support of the soldiers and their families would have to be identified and problem solutions found. Several public affairs related actions were accomplished in 1976. On 13 May, a U.S. European Command public announcement declared that one of the two additional combat brigades that had been stationed in Germany on a rotational basis would be permanently stationed in the Garlstedt area "to further strengthen the NATO forces in the Northern Army Group." After that announcement, the Chief, Office of Public Affairs (OCPA), USAREUR, met with U.S. Embassy, Bonn, and F.R.G. Federal Ministry of Defense (FMOD) to discuss the public affairs aspects of the planned stationing. FMOD officials offered assistance to ensure the friendly reception of the U.S. Forces in the Garlstedt area. In September, representatives of the USAREUR OCPA Community Relations Division met with officials at Garlstedt and Osterholz-Scharmbeck. Discussions centered on the objections voiced by local interest groups, as well as the current climate of public opinion and future community relations plans. The meeting set the stage for further community relations's efforts by the Bremerhaven PAO staff. One immediate outgrowth of this meeting was the start of planning for the formation of a Community Relations Advisory Council (CRAC) in the Garlstedt area. A CRAC existed in each community where USAREUR forces were stationed and was the vehicle for both German and American officials to exchange views and seek solutions to common problems. This planning for a Garlstedt area CRAC was significant in that the CRAC proved to be an invaluable mechanism for many programs.

Another important initiative made known to the 21st Support Command commander was the establishment of a US Forces Liaison Office (USFLO) for Norddeutschland in Bremerhaven. (At this time the USFLO program was under the staff supervision of the Chief, Public Affairs, USAREUR.) The USFLO also soon would prove the wisdom of this decision through the officer's liaison with German local, state, and federal



officials. Plans in 1976 called for the USFLO staff to begin operations in the first 3 months of 1977. (See paragraph 8, chapter 3.)

This first year of active planning for the Garlstedt stationing program also saw extensive analysis to place into proper perspective the various protest groups. Many questions had to be answered. Key analysis factors appeared to have been their motivation, their political strength, and their potential impact not only on established plans but also on the relations of the U.S. Forces with local communities after the stationing was complete. It had to be recognized that the protest groups posed a problem for the national level staff in their efforts to convince local and state government officials to accommodate the U.S.-F.R.G. agreement. At the same time the United States and especially USAREUR had an inherent interest in the developments. Early on it became apparent that most of the so-called Citizen Action Groups opposed the Garlstedt stationing on widely diverse grounds. Protest themes ranged from an opposition to further stationing of U.S. troops in Germany to a defense of the local environment. As early as December 1975, the diversity of the groups' interests began to appear, and diverging opinions began to create opposing factions. For example, at a Bremen press conference the United Citizens Action Group disassociated itself from the newly formed Bremen Citizen Action Group Garlstedter Heide, the first group accusing the Bremen Group of combining expressions of justified citizen concern with ideological issues. The United Citizens Action Group had previously gone on record as "strictly opposed to the stationing of any further U.S. troops in Germany." The new Bremen group, as its name implied, was publicly opposed to U.S. stationing because it might create environmental damage to the Garlstedter Heide (heath), a favorite recreational site for Bremen and other regional residents. The group announced several planned protest measures, such as occupying the proposed construction site, conducting demonstrations, preparing petitions, and mobilizing protesting high school students. By June 30, the USFLO chief reported that local citizens were generally "pro-American and sophisticated enough to understand the benefits of American presence in Germany." In July the Minister of Interior, Niedersachsen, raised specific legitimate environmental issues that needed to be addressed. Some of the issues were the results of Land (State) hearings and combined individual and local government concerns, as well as those of the several protest groups.

By September, the leading protest organization appeared to be the Bremen Group that, notwithstanding its general opposition to a U.S. presence, included a "considerable minority" concerned primarily with environmental issues. A general consensus of both Germans and Americans close to the scene at this time was that public emotion had subsided from the high 1976 level.

U.S. and F.R.G. officials then received favorable news on 20 October -- the Lower Saxony legislature had given formal approval to the stationing of a U.S. brigade in legislation that would hold the State government responsible for insuring that "the legitimate rights of the population of the country (Osterholz) are safeguarded to the greatest extent possible." A Lower Saxony spokesman said the government accepted the lawmakers' mandate. He warned that "... the stationing is contingent on the fulfillment of certain conditions, specifically safeguarding the environment and insuring the continued utilization by the people of adjacent recreational areas." The legitimate concerns of the citizens had been heard and heeded by both the Lower Saxony legislature and government. For U.S. and F.R.G. officials the last formal and legal obstacle had been cleared, but the warning given by the Lower Saxony legislature was clear to the planners.

Although the Lower Saxony Legislature approved the Garlstedt project, 1977 began without a formal approval granted by the Osterholz-Scharmbeck city council. The council's explicit approval was not necessary, although a waiver of the right to object, as provided for in the Federal Construction Act, would be needed. Again the Garlstedter Heide was the prime concern. After the FMOD gave assurances that the recreation area (i.e., the Garlstedter Heide) would be preserved, the council in mid-January waived its right to object. According to a German wire service report, the delay in announcing the waiver had been caused by the city director's nonreceipt of adequate assurances from U.S. sources in response to his demands. Regional newspapers reported the council had announced its assent only after the FMOD had assured the council that the U.S. Forces would be a party to the agreements for the protection of the health and for other environmental concerns.

Other concerns of area citizens surfaced in February at a meeting of the Heilhnorn Citizens Association. The Osterholz Kurier reported citizens "feared racial strife and drug offenses and an increase in all crimes." At the same time, the proposed building of an American "enclave" in Osterholz-Scharmbeck for family housing and community support facilities began to create concern, especially about economic and long-range city planning issues. This concern diminished, however, after the announcement that primary shopping facilities would be in the existing post-exchange and commissary in Bremerhaven and that the Osterholz-Scharmbeck facilities would be built to American specifications but could be easily converted to German use if vacated.

Protests began to decrease, except for specific issues that would arise later and except by groups that appeared to be pacifist or anti-American. A key factor throughout this period was that U.S. Forces representatives did not normally deal directly with any of these protest groups. The U.S. agreement for Garlstedt was with the F.R.G. authorities, and these officials throughout the German Government down to the local city council in Osterholz-Scharmbeck dealt with the groups and their protests. As pointed out earlier, however, U.S. authorities found it imperative to be kept current because the concerns of the citizens could impact adversely on construction plans and future activities of the new brigade in Garlstedt. The close coordination between U.S. and German authorities at all levels consistently favored the U.S. interest, as will be described later.

Workmen and technicians began preparing the Garlstedt site for construction work in February, and the first official ceremony at Garlstedt, hosted by F.R.G. Minister of Defense Georg Leber, took place on 5 May. Representing the United States at this cornerstone laying ceremony was the U.S. Secretary of the Army, Clifford L. Alexander. Although no incidents were reported, about 200 members of the Garlstedter Heide Citizens Action Group demonstrated and demanded an immediate stop to construction activity. After stating, "I lay this cornerstone as a symbol of our Alliance," Leber commented that "...utmost consideration had been given to residents' concerns" in the planning process and that compromises had been made.

The next week the Garlstedter Heide group's spokesman presented to Bremen officials a collection of 45,000 signatures of citizens living throughout northern Germany who opposed the Garlstedt construction projects. Once again, the primary point of contention was an environmental concern. The group's spokesman warned that citizens' groups "will bring an increased watchfulness concerning the fulfillment of the Federal Defense Ministry's obligations."

In July some positive actions were reported in the Osterholzer Kreisblatt. Fences 3 meters high were erected to protect two prehistoric graves in the area of the new casern. In addition, open areas were to be restored at a cost of more than

DM 4 million. Another costly, but necessary, move was the planned removal of dud ammunition from the heath's sand. The German Forces' use of the area for a number of years had its effects. The dud removal project was estimated to cost as much as DM 16 million.

About 1 week later, the answer to the question of where the American families would live began to take form, but not without some opposition. The Hanover Finance Directorate, acting on the desires of representatives of the State of Lower Saxony and the city of Osterholz-Scharmbeck, announced plans to construct on a build-to-lease basis 1,027 housing units and a school. One citizens' group demanded a stop to project planning. A founder of the group was quoted in the Bremen Weser Kurier as stating, "We are not against the Americans; however, their massed settlement here is too much for Osterholz-Scharmbeck."

In late July Major General George S. Patton, then Commander, 2d Armored Division -- stationed at Fort Hood, Texas -- lead a group of senior U.S. officers on a tour of the new casern and family housing areas. After the tour, the group met with local senior officials. The general's visit had special significance because the brigade scheduled for stationing at Garlstedt was a part of the general's "Hell on Wheels" division. Included in the U.S. party were the 21st Support Command and the Bremerhaven Community commanders. However, the reception was not entirely favorable because a sign reading "US troops out" appeared on a factory stack. The local "Emergency Association" disclaimed any knowledge of the act. Appearing in the Osterholzer Kreisblatt, was the statement: "We do not agree with these primitive methods." Suspected of the act were members of a group the Emergency Association had expelled from meetings.

Planning continued throughout the summer of 1977. A U.S. community relations group (Kontakt) in Bremerhaven coordinated with Osterholz-Scharmbeck youth officials, and brigade officials received briefings. Plans for the CRAC continued as a German initiative. German officials also continued planning for a trip in August to the German cities hosting American garrisons. At the same time, U.S. authorities had allocated \$25,000 to pay for a trip by area officials to the United States to visit Washington, D.C., and Fort Hood, Texas. Obviously, community relations efforts by both Germans and Americans began to move into higher gear in anticipation of the brigade's move to Garlstedt in 1978.

From 23 through 25 August, a group of 50 officials from Osterholz-Scharmbeck visited Schweinfurt, Kitzingen, and Bad Kreuznach. Heading the group was the city director, who had initiated, planned, and sponsored the visit. Group members discussed U.S.-German relations with their German counterparts, and they were given briefings and tours of the U.S. garrisons, family housing areas, and community facilities. All reports indicated that the visits contributed to a better German understanding of U.S.-German relations and the American living conditions, and American lifestyles.

Also reported as most successful and helpful were the visits of the German Government civic and military leaders from the Osterholz-Scharmbeck area to Washington, D.C., and Fort Hood, Texas. The purposes of these visits were to give the group members a better understanding of the U.S. Army and to let them meet and talk with the soldiers who would be coming to Garlstedt. Escorted by the Bremerhaven community commander, the group arrived in Washington on 18 September. The next day's activities in the Washington area included a Pentagon tour, office calls with the Undersecretary of the Army and the Vice Chief of Staff, and a luncheon hosted by the Secretary of the Army. An afternoon tour of Washington preceded the group's departure for Fort Hood early in the evening of 19 September. For three days, the German guests visited billets, observed training activities, inspected community

support facilities, and talked with soldiers. The warmth of their reception by the citizens of Fort Hood and Killeen impressed the visitors. Among the social activities were a barbeque hosted by a Secretary of the Army representative and a farewell dinner hosted by 2d Armored Division officers. The German community leaders' obvious interest in making the Garlstedt effort successful was encouraging and set the stage for a smooth brigade integration into the German community.

The extent of this interest was made apparent in early November when the Osterholz-Scharmbeck Sports Club hosted a group of brigade officers and their wives for the traditional club ball. To honor the "future inhabitants," the U.S. flag was flown outside the August Schlueter Halle, where the social event took place. The mayor gave each American present a T-shirt inscribed "Friendship - Osterholz-Scharmbeck, Gartenstadt am Teufelsmoor." The momentum of U.S.-German understanding was increasing through active German leadership.

Construction news dominated the remainder of 1977. The Lower Saxony Minister of Traffic and Economy visited construction sites at the new casern. The occasion of his visit gave the Osterholzer Kreisblatt an opportunity to review the entire construction package, including financing. The minister stated that small-business construction firms in the area would benefit. The Kreisblatt pointed out that ecological benefits had been derived because more than 30 tons of dud ammunition had been removed from the heath's sand. Some ammunition remnants could be traced to World War I.

Marred only by a small group of protesters, a symbolic cornerstone laying ceremony for the housing units in Osterholz-Scharmbeck signified the beginning of an integrated American community in the county seat. The USAREUR Chief of Staff and the F.R.G. Federal Finance Minister headed the national delegations. A soldier scheduled to transfer to Garlstedt expressed the hope that the Germans and Americans "will respect and like each other and live together in friendship." He added that the intent was for the Americans not to create a "Little America" but to become fully integrated into the German community. In a remark, obviously directed to the few on-hand protesters, the soldier said that although everyone in a democracy had a right to work for their own interests, a good citizen should be willing to yield to the will of the majority.

Finally, in December the CRAC was formed, the Germans electing the public members. Now the organization was complete, and the first meeting was scheduled for late January 1978.

The year 1977 was a watershed year for the brigade restationing program. Protest activities subsided and solid, serious work for harmonious relations began to show positive results. The year 1978 promised to be exciting and challenging, for in this year the first soldiers and families would be coming to their new homes in Germany.

### 3. 1978

Construction continued at Garlstedt, and Major General Patton revisited the area on 1 March. He had an evident interest in the project: in July 1977 he had visited it as the Commander, 2d Armored Division; in September 1977 he was the host for the German visit to Fort Hood; and currently he was the Deputy Commander, U.S. VII Corps, the corps area where the brigade was then stationed. The modern casern in the making impressed him, and he expressed optimism about future relations between Americans and local citizens.

An indication of the Europe-wide importance of the area to the American community appeared in March when the Stars and Stripes (European edition) assigned a top military reporter to open a Bremerhaven news bureau. This bureau staff would help focus attention to the U.S. contribution to NORTHAG in the coming months.

On 4 March the first CRAC meeting convened. The measure of its success was that difficult issues were addressed by both U.S. and German participants. The primary issue concerned the proposed addition of a railroad spur into Garlstedt from Oldenbuettel to facilitate the movement of tracked vehicles. Ecological concerns were the prime reasons for the German rejection of the plan. The chief of the American delegation agreed in principle to the need for alternatives, but he cautioned that the availability of flatbed trailers suitable for hauling the vehicles could create a problem. At the same time, friendly discussions were held on a wide range of subjects including casern landscaping and helicopter noise abatement. The candid atmosphere of the meeting left few doubts that this CRAC would be a working group dedicated to resolving problems.

With the coming of spring the Garlstedter Heide Action Group returned to the limelight. The group announced in early May its plan to conduct demonstrations on 20 May. Various movements joined the group for this effort, including church groups, the local Communist Party, and other environmental groups. An earlier group information paper had attacked on ecological grounds the railroad spur-concept approved by the FRG Defense State Secretary.

To assist the new USFLO for Norddeutschland in defusing situations such as this, the USAREUR staff sent a message outlining in detail the composition of the brigade in terms of soldiers and equipment, the planned training areas, and the rationale for the stationing of a U.S. brigade in NORTHAG. The same information could be used as background for discussions with German officials. A unique program was well underway by June, according to a briefing presented at the June inprocess review. At the suggestion of General Blanchard, U.S. officials met with German officials. The result of this meeting was the establishment of the "New Neighbor" program, objective of which was to have Germans sponsor the new soldiers and families upon their arrival in the area. Initially, the Germans were limited to those from Osterholz-Scharmbeck, but the program was eventually expanded to include Dutch and German military units, as well as the German-American Association in Bremen. The mechanics of the program were refined as planning progressed. Initially, hometown news release forms were used at Fort Hood, but this complicated the matching process. A new form designed for computer matching was distributed to the Americans then in Germany and at Fort Hood, as well as to the European organizations previously mentioned.

Another stride forward in easing the way for brigade stationing occurred when 15 Osterholz-Scharmbeck and Bremen community leaders visited Heidelberg and Mannheim from 26 through 28 June. Accompanied by the USFLO for Norddeutschland, a brigade representative, and the Director of the Hanover 'Amerika-Haus, the group received briefings in Heidelberg on the Warsaw Pact threat and USAREUR. At Coleman Barracks in Mannheim the group was briefed on installation facilities and later observed training sessions and displays presented by members of the 3d Brigade, 8th Infantry Division. Many questions were asked about the Warsaw Pact and, of course, the ramifications of Garlstedt stationing. Of high interest were possibilities of an expanded labor market for local civilians and access by local civilians to the U.S. recreational facilities. In Mannheim several group members asked about U.S. crime rates and drug abuse problems. The brigade commander enlightened the officials about the training programs, soldier education and income levels, and offduty activities. Of particular interest was the rail spur that was the main topic of conversation at the first CRAC meeting. After seeing the alternative to the rail spur -- the heavy

equipment transport (HET) — several group members indicated that they would rather endure a rail spur operation than the use of the HET item. The group returned to Norddeutschland armed with facts, not rumors, about Americans, the U.S. Army, and the Warsaw Pact.

Concern with the "New Neighbor" program surfaced in July. The public affairs office staff in Bremerhaven, the "on-the-ground" U.S. coordinators for the program, posed two minor problems. First, a few Germans willing to participate in the program requested not to be put in contact with black Americans. They were tactfully informed that the United States could not support their sentiments. The second problem dealt with the requests of some Osterholz-Scharmbeck residents that German program participants be limited to residents of the city or the immediate area. They were informed that this desire would be accommodated to the extent possible, but no volunteers would be turned away. These minor "growing pains," however, would not impede the program functioning.

The brigade, commanded by a brigadier general, became known as the 2d Armored Division (Forward) in Grafenwoehr ceremonies on 25 July. This signified that the coming move of the unit to Garlstedt and the implementation of the NORTHAG corps concept were becoming realities. The redesignation also removed the unit from the temporary-duty status under which it had initially come to Germany in 1975.

Die Welt, the influential national newspaper in Hamburg, focused on "New Neighbor" in August and credited the program and its German sponsors with assisting in subduing protests. The Osterholz-Scharmbeck leader of "New Neighbor" reported a daily growing interest in the program, exemplified by a constantly ringing telephone. Die Welt reported no trace of the past strong resistance to the Americans. In fact, a member of the district legislature said, "Now we're feeling euphoric in anticipation of the American boys."

As planning began for the October 17th "turnover" ceremony, action came quickly for the selection of a name for the new casern. The brigade commander forwarded his recommendation with supporting letters from German military and civilian leaders in the area, and General Blanchard received a recommendation from the Bundeswehr's senior officer. The unanimous choice was to memorialize General Lucius D. Clay. The Germans praised General Clay's postwar efforts on behalf of the Germans, especially his role in the Berlin Airlift. All concerned concurred in the German recommendations, and planning surged ahead.

The October ceremony was different for USAREUR. First, it was a German affair, and the Germans would turn the facilities at Garlstedt over to the United States. USAREUR planners were charged with supporting German planners. As a result of a September meeting in Bonn, the USAREUR OCPA representative agreed to submit a list of U.S. press representatives for invitation consideration. A German point of contact for media activities was not given at that time. The Embassy in Bonn said that the German Government had invited the family of General Clay to the ceremony, as suggested by the USAREUR staff. The German Embassy in Washington soon afterward received acceptance of the invitations from Major General Frank B. Clay, a retired Army officer and a son of the American to be honored at the October ceremony, who would be accompanied by his wife.

More than 50 U.S., British, and German news agency representatives converged on the ceremony site under dark, rainy skies. The gathering of influential civilian and military figures presented unusual opportunities for photographers, and they took advantage of it. When the U.S. and F.R.G. Secretaries of Defense arrived and began shaking hands with the other dignitaries, the crush of photographers and television cameramen was controlled by the German police. The remarks of U.S. and F.R.G.

defense ministers were brief but meaningful. Both addressed the importance to NATO and the Federal Republic of an American presence in northern Germany. After a symbolic shaking of hands by the two defense chiefs, the sign proclaiming the new installation as "General Lucius D. Clay Kaserne" was unveiled by the brigade commander and Major General Clay. The casern was now officially the home of the 2d Armored Division (Forward). After the ceremonies, the two defense chiefs held a press conference at a new dining facility on the casern. The favorable press reports of the day's activities capped a successful public affairs effort.

#### 4. Lessons Learned

The uniqueness of the Garlstedt experience furnished dividends for the 2d Armored Division (Forward). The new successful CRAC, the New Neighbor Program, and the local newspaper's publication of a weekly English-language supplement were all manifestations of Americans and Germans plowing new ground together. Undoubtedly, new opportunities would present themselves in the future. At the same time, U.S. Forces representatives throughout the casern's growing pains period did not attempt to deal with citizens' groups; they deferred to the appropriate German authorities. The U.S. avoidance of the middleman's role furnished a valuable lesson learned.

Although significant public affairs challenges had been met successfully, many yet remained for the 2d Armored Division (Forward) and Bremerhaven PAO staffs. The New Neighbor Program would have to be fully implemented, community relations programs would have to gain momentum, and the viability and credibility of the CRAC would have to be maintained. The future was promising but the challenges remained.