Redistricting: Court Cases

Summaries

Bartlett v. Strickland

This case, pending before the U.S. Supreme Court, considers whether a racial minority group that constitutes less than 50% of a proposed legislative district's population can state a vote dilution claim under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA).  The standard for whether a minority group can state a claim under Section 2 is whether "its members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice."  In order to avoid a violation of Section 2, the State of North Carolina created a legislative district that-though its population is numerically less than 50% African American-nevertheless functions as a majority-minority district due to factors including high voter turn-out by African American voters and a small but reliable number of white "crossover" voters who typically support the African-American voters' candidate of choice.  The Supreme Court of North Carolina invalidated this district, holding that the VRA offers no protection to minority voters who comprise less than 50% of a jurisdiction's population. The Supreme Court granted the State of North Carolina's petition for certiorari in March of this year, and heard oral argument in this case on October 14, 2008.    

To read the Campaign Legal Center's amicus brief filed with the Supreme Court, click here.

Session v. Perry

Following the 2000 Census, Texas gained two additional congressional seats. Because the Texas State Legislature failed to adopt a redistricting plan, a three-judge federal court drew the state's congressional districts, which governed elections in 2002. In October of 2003, following a protracted partisan battle, the Texas legislature passed a new districting plan that strongly favored the Republican Party. In December 2003, Attorney General John Ashcroft pre-cleared this new district plan under the Voting Rights Act. Several groups brought suit against Texas government officials in federal court, claiming the new plan violated federal law in numerous respects, including: (1) Texas may not re-redistrict mid-decade; (2) the plan is a product of unconstitutional racial gerrymandering; (3) the plan is an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander; and (4) various districts in the plan dilute the voting strength of minorities in violation of the Voting Rights Act (VRA). A three-judge district court rejected these claims, and upheld the redrawn plan - clearing the way for the primary and general elections in 2004 which were held using the newly redrawn lines.  Session v. Perry, 298 F. Supp. 2d 451 (E.D. Tex. 2004).  Meanwhile, plaintiffs appealed the case to the Supreme Court.  In the fall of 2004, the Supreme Court vacated the three-judge court's decision and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of its decision in Vieth v. Jubelirer.  See Jackson v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 351 (2004).

The three judge court in Texas, on remand from the Supreme Court, again concluded that the 2003 Congressional redistricting plan did not violate the Constitution.  Henderson v. Perry, 399 F. Supp. 2d 756 (2005).  The plaintiffs again appealed to the Supreme Court.

In a splintered decision, styled LULAC v. Perry, the Supreme Court on June 28, 2006 upheld the district court's decision as to the constitutionality of the partisan gerrymander, but reversed in part the three-judge court's decision with respect to the vote dilution claims under the VRA.  The Supreme Court found that mid-decade redistricting was not an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander.  A majority of the Court reaffirmed that political gerrymandering cases were justiciable, but once again failed to articulate a constitutional standard for reviewing partisan gerrymandering.  The Court found that one district in South Texas from the 2003 map, District 23, violated the VRA because it diluted the voting strength of Latino voters, and would have to be redrawn. Elections were held under a revised remedial congressional map in 2006. 

Colorado General Assembly v. Salazar

As a result of the 2000 census, Colorado gained an additional congressional seat. Because the Colorado General Assembly failed to agree upon a congressional redistricting plan in time for the 2002 elections, a Colorado state court drew a map. In 2003, the Republican-controlled General Assembly pushed through a new districting map in the closing days of the legislative session. The map was challenged, and the Colorado Supreme Court held that the new plan was unconstitutional because under Colorado's constitution, congressional boundaries could only be drawn once in a decade -- immediately following the federal decennial census. People ex rel. Salazar v. Davidson , 79 P.3d 1221 ( Col. 2003). The Supreme Court denied the State application for certiorari. Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas dissented in the denial, arguing that under Article I, Section 4, Clause 1 of the Constitution, the state General Assembly has the ultimate authority to draw congressional district boundaries. Colo. Gen. Assembly v. Salazar , 124 S. Ct. 2228 (2004).

Vieth v. Jubelirer

Following the 2000 Census, Pennsylvania lost two congressional seats. The Republican-controlled state legislature passed a new districting plan strongly favoring Republicans. Several Democratic voters sued in federal court claiming that the plan was an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander and violated the "one-person, one-vote principle" of Article I, Section 2. The district court dismissed the plaintiffs' gerrymandering claim because plaintiffs had not alleged facts "indicating they had been shut out of the political process." The court, however, found in favor of the plaintiffs on the Article I, Section 2 claim (the one-person, one vote claim) because the defendants "failed to provide any legitimate justification for the population deviations contained in the bill," and because it was possible to draw a congressional district with zero population deviation. Vieth v. Pennsylvania, 241 F. Supp. 2d 478 (D. Pa. 2003). The state promptly corrected the deviation. On appeal of the partisan gerrymandering claim, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the three-judge district court. A plurality of the justices (Rehnquist, Scalia, O'Conner, and Thomas) concluded that political gerrymandering claims were non-justiciable. Because Justice Kennedy agreed that Pennsylvania's map was not an unconstitutional gerrymander, he concurred in the decision. However, Justice Kennedy's controlling concurrence stated that he did not agree that claims of partisan gerrymandering were non-justiciable. Although Justice Kennedy could not agree with the legal standards for assessing partisan gerrymandering claims under the Constitution that had been proposed by the four dissenting Justices, he did agree that it may be possible in future cases to devise a constitutional standard to adjudicate claims of extreme partisan gerrymandering. Vieth v. Jubelirer , 541 U.S. 267 (2004).

Cox v. Larios

A three-judge federal court struck down Georgia 's post-2000 legislative redistricting plans because it violated the "one-person, one-vote" principle of the Equal Protection Clause. The case was brought by Republicans who argued that their rights under the Fourteenth Amendment had been deprived by the state legislative maps created in 2001 and 2002 by a then Democratically-controlled Georgia General Assembly. Larios v. Cox, 300 F. Supp. 2d 1320 (N.D. Ga. 2004). The Supreme Court refused to grant a stay of the decision prior to the 2004 elections. Cox v. Larios , 124 S. Ct. 1503 (2004). In the 2004 elections, Republicans gained control of the Georgia Legislature. The Supreme Court summarily affirmed the decision of the three-judge court. Cox v. Larios , 124 S. Ct. 2806 (2004).

Davis v. Bandemer

In this landmark redistricting case, the Supreme Court held that political gerrymandering claims were justiciable under the Constitution if the injured party could prove a discriminatory purpose and effect against it. Indiana Democrats filed the case, claiming that a reapportionment plan constituted a political gerrymander that intentionally disadvantaged Democrats. An Indiana three-judge district court agreed and found the reapportionment unconstitutional. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court's decision, finding that although such claims were theoretically justiciable, this particular case did not meet the "threshold" standard required (which the Court did not articulate). According to the Court, intentional political gerrymandering constitutes unconstitutional discrimination when the electoral system effectively and continuously degrades a group's influence on the political process. Davis v. Bandemer , 478 U.S. 109 (1985).

Georgia v. Ashcroft

Following the 2000 Census, the Democratic-controlled Georgia legislature passed a state senate redistricting plan backed by all but one of Georgia 's black legislators. Georgia sought preclearance of its plan under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia . Georgia v. Ashcroft, 195 F. Supp. 2d 25 (D.D.C. 2002). A split, three-judge court invalidated the plan. On appeal, however, the Supreme Court held that the District Court failed to consider all the relevant factors when it examined whether Georgia 's state senate plan resulted in a retrogression of black voters' effective exercise of the electoral franchise. The Court sent the case back to the district court for further analysis. Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461 (2003). On remand, the federal court precleared the plan under the Voting Rights Act.

Click here to read the three-judge court decision in this case.