Link to Leibniz's Monadology

SPINOZA: ETHICS

[45] 1. By cause of itself, I mean that of which its essence involves existence, or that of which its nature cannot be conceived except as existing.

2. A thing is said to be finite in its genus, if it can be limited by something else of the same nature. For example, a body is said to be finite, because we can always conceive of a larger one. Similarly, a thought is limited by another thought. But a body is not limited by a thought, nor a thought by a body.

3. By substance, I mean that which exists in itself, and is conceived through itself; in other words, that of which the concept does not need the concept of of any other thing, from which it must be formed.

4. By attribute, I mean that in a substance which the understanding perceives as constituting the essence of the substance.

5. By mode, I mean the affections of a substance; or that which exists in something else, and through which it is also conceived.

6. By God I mean absolutely infinite being; that is, a substance consisting of infinite attributes, of which each expresses eternal and infinite essence.

7. A thing is said to be free, if it exists through the necessity of its own nature alone, and if it is determined to action by itself alone. On the other hand, a necessary thing, or rather one which is compelled, is one which is determined by another to existence, and to acting in accordance with a fixed and determined law.

8. By eternity, I mean existence itself, in so far as it is conceived as following necessarily from nothing but the definition of the eternal thing.

1. Everything which exists, exists either in itself, or in something else.

2. Anything which cannot be conceived through something else, must be conceived through itself.

3. Given a determinate cause, the effect follows necessarily. Conversely, if there is no determinate cause, it is impossible for the effect to follow.

4. Knowledge of the effect depends on knowledge of the cause, and involves the cause.

5. Things which have nothing in common with each other, cannot be understood through each other either. In other words, the concept of the one does not involve the concept of the other.

6. [47] A true idea must agree with that of which it is the idea.

7. If anything can be conceived as not existing, its essence does not involve existence.

This is obvious from Definitions 3 and 5.

This is also obvious from Definition 3. Each of them must exist in itself, and be conceived through itself. In other words, the concept of the one does not involve the concept of the other.

If they have nothing in common between themselves, then (by Axiom 5) they cannot be understood through each other, and hence (by Axiom 4) the one cannot be the cause of the other. Q.E.D.

Everything which exists, exists either in itself or in something else (by Axiom 1). In other words (by Definitions 3 and 5), outside the understanding there exists nothing apart from substances and their affections. Therefore there exists nothing outside the understanding, through which different things can be distinguished from each other, apart from substances —or, what [48] comes to the same thing (by Definition 4), their attributes and their affections. Q.E.D.

In the universe, there cannot exist two or more substances which have the same nature or attribute.

If there are two or more distinct substances, they must be distinguished from each other, either by a difference in their attributes, or by a difference in their affections (by the previous Proposition). If they are distinguished only by a difference in their attributes, it is thereby conceded that there is only one per attribute. Suppose then that they are distinguished by a difference in their affections. Since substance is prior by nature to its affections (by Proposition 1), it follows that, if we set aside its affections and consider it as it is in itself — in other words (by Definition 3 and Axiom 6) as it truly is — the one cannot be conceived as distinct from the other. That is to say (by the previous Proposition), there cannot exist two or more substances, but only one. Q.E.D.

In the universe, there cannot exist two substances with the same attribute (by the previous Proposition), or in other words (by Proposition 2), which have anything in common with each other. Consequently (by Proposition 3), the one cannot be the cause of the other, i.e. it cannot be produced by the other. Q.E.D.

From this it follows that one substance cannot be produced by anything else whatever. In the universe there exists nothing but substances and their affections, as is obvious from Axiom 1, and Definitions 3 and 5. But a substance cannot be produced by another substance (by the above Proposition). Therefore it is impossible for a substance to be produced by anything else whatever. Q.E.D.

This is demonstrated even more easily from the absurdity of the contradictory. If a substance could be produced by something else, our knowledge of it would have to depend on our knowledge of its cause (by Axiom 4). Consequently (by Definition 3), it would not be a substance.

[49] It belongs to the nature of substance to exist.

One substance cannot be produced by another (by the Corollary to the previous Proposition); therefore it will be the cause of itself, that is (by Definition 1), its essence necessarily involves existence, or it belongs to its nature to exist. Q.E.D.

There exists only one substance per attribute (by Proposition 5), and it belongs to its nature to exist (by Proposition 7). It will therefore belong to its nature to exist either as a finite substance or as an infinite substance. But it cannot exist as a finite substance, since (by Definition 2) it would have to be limited by another substance of the same nature, which would necessarily also have to exist (by Proposition 7); and therefore there would be two substances with the same attribute, which is absurd (by Proposition 5). Therefore it exists as an infinite substance. Q.E.D.

Since to say that something is finite is in fact partly a negation, and to say that something is infinite is an absolute affirmation of the existence of some nature, it therefore follows directly from Proposition 7 that every substance must be infinite.

I am sure it will be difficult for anyone to understand the demonstration of Proposition 7, if they make confused judgments about things, and are not used to knowing things through their first causes. This is because they do not distinguish between the modifications of substances and substances themselves, and they do not know how things are produced. Consequently they attribute to substances the origins which they see everyday things as having. But people who do not know the true causes of things confuse everything. Without any sense of contradiction, they imagine trees as talking like humans, or humans as being formed out of stones rather than semen, or any form being changed into any other. In the same way too, people who confuse divine and human nature, readily attribute human affections to God, especially as long as they do not know how [50] affections are produced in the mind.

But if people attended to the nature of substance, they would have no doubt about the truth of Proposition 7. Indeed, everyone would consider this proposition to be an axiom, and it would be included among the common notions. For by ‘substance’ they would understand that which exists in itself and is conceived in itself, in other words, which can be known independently of the knowledge of any other thing. By ‘modifications’ they would understand that which is in something else, and the concept of which is formed from the concept of the thing in which they are. This is why we can have true ideas of modifications which do not exist, since, although they do not actually exist outside the understanding, their essence is contained in something else in such a way that they can be conceived through it. But outside the understanding, the truth of substances is only in the substances themselves, since they are conceived in themselves.

So if you were to say that you had a clear and distinct (i.e. true) idea of substance, but nevertheless were not certain whether such a substance existed — why, this would be the same as if you said you had a true idea, but nevertheless wondered whether it might not be false (this should be obvious to anyone who thinks about it carefully enough). Again, if you declare that substance is created, you are thereby declaring that a false idea has become a true idea — and it is obviously impossible to conceive anything more absurd than this. Consequently, it must necessarily be admitted that the existence of a substance, like its essence, is an eternal truth.

From this there is another way of proving that there can be only one substance of the same nature, and I think it is worthwhile presenting it here. But so that I can do it in the proper order, it is to be noted that:

1. The true definition of absolutely any thing neither involves nor expresses anything other than the nature of the thing defined. From this is follows that:
   
2. No definition involves or expresses any particular number of individuals, since it expresses nothing other than the nature of the thing defined. For example, the definition of a triangle expresses nothing other than the simple nature of a triangle, and not any particular number of triangles.
   
3. It is to be noted that every existing thing necessarily has some definite cause of its existence.
   
4. Finally, it is to be noted that this cause of something’s existing must either be contained in the nature and definition of the existing thing (namely because it belongs to its nature that it exists), or it must be external to it.

Given these four points, it follows that, if a definite number of individuals exists in the universe, there must necessarily be a cause why just those individuals exist, and not more or [51] fewer.

For example, if 20 humans exist in the universe (and to make things clearer, I assume that they exist simultaneously, and that no other humans previously existed in the universe), it will not be enough to cite the cause of human nature in general (that is, in order to explain why 20 humans exist). In addition it will be necessary to cite the cause of there existing no more and no less than 20, since (by Note 3) there must necessarily be a cause of the existence of each and every thing. But this cause (by Notes 2 and 3) cannot be contained in human nature itself, since the true definition of ‘human’ does not involve the number twenty. Hence (by Note 4) the cause of the existence of these 20 humans, and hence the cause of the existence of each one of them, must necessarily be external to each of them.

Consequently, it must be concluded absolutely, that, whenever a nature is such that a number of existing individuals can have it, they must necessarily have an external cause of their existence. Now, since it belongs to the nature of substance to exist (by what has already been shown in this Scholium), its definition must involve necessary existence, and consequently its existence must follow from its definition alone. But the existence of a number of substances cannot follow from its definition (as I have already shown in Notes 2 and 3). Therefore it necessarily follows from this definition that only one substance of the same nature exists — which was the proposition to be demonstrated.

PROPOSITION 9

This is obvious from Definition 4.

An attribute is that which the understanding perceives of a substance as constituting its essence (by Definition 4). Hence (by Definition 3) it must be conceived through itself. Q.E.D.

[52] From this it is obvious that, although two attributes are conceived as really distinct (that is, the one is conceived without the help of the other), we cannot conclude that they constitute two beings, or two different substances. It is of the nature of substance that each of its attributes is conceived through itself. All the attributes it has were always in it together, and one could not have been produced by another. Each of them expresses the reality or being of substance.

Therefore it is far from absurd to attribute more than one attribute to a single substance. Quite the contrary. There is nothing in nature more obvious than that every being must be conceived under some attribute or other; and that, the more reality or being it has, the more attributes it has, which express its necessity (or eternity) and infinity. Consequently, there is also nothing more obvious than that an absolutely infinite being must necessarily be defined (as I said in Definition 6) as a being which consists of infinite attributes, each one of which expresses a particular eternal and infinite essence.

If anyone still wonders what criterion we can use for telling different substances apart, let them read the following Propositions, which prove that there exists only one substance in the universe, and that it is absolutely infinite. This is why they will look for such a criterion in vain.

If you deny it, conceive (if this can be done) that God does not exist. Then (by Axiom 7) his essence does not involve existence. But this (by Proposition 7) is absurd. Therefore God necessarily exists. Q.E.D.

Each thing must be assigned a cause or reason for its existence or non-existence. For example, if a triangle exists, a reason or cause must be given for its existence; but if it does not exist, again a reason or cause [53] must be given which prevents it from existing, or which removes its existence. But this reason or cause must either be contained in the nature of the thing, or be external to it. For example, the very nature of a square circle indicates the reason why it does not exist, namely because it involves a contradiction. By contrast, the reason why substance exists is because it follows from its nature alone, namely because it involves existence (see Proposition 7). But the reason why a circle or a triangle exists, or does not exist, does not follow from their nature, but from the order of universal corporeal nature. From this order it must follow, either that the triangle necessarily exists just now, or that it is impossible for it to exist just now.

These points are obvious in themselves; and it follows from them that something exists necessarily if there is no reason or cause preventing it from existing. So, if there can be no reason or cause preventing God from existing, or removing his existence, it must be concluded without reservation that he necessarily exists. But if there were such a reason or cause, it would have to be either in God’s nature itself, or external to it — that is, in another substance of a different nature. If it were of the same nature, it would thereby be conceded that God exists. But if it were a substance of a different nature, it would have nothing in common with God (from Proposition 2), and hence it could neither give him existence or take it away. So, since any reason or cause which might remove God’s existence cannot be external to the divine nature, it must necessarily (assuming he does not exist) be in his nature itself — and that would therefore involve a contradiction. But to assert a contradiction of the absolutely infinite and completely perfect Being is absurd. Therefore there is no cause or reason, whether in God or external to God, which could remove his existence. Consequently, God necessarily exists. Q.E.D.

To be able not to exist is lack of power, whereas to be able to exist is power (as is obvious in itself). So if what now necessarily exists is only finite beings, then finite beings are more powerful than the absolutely infinite Being. But (as is obvious in itself) this is absurd. Therefore either nothing exists, or the absolutely infinite Being also exists. But we exist either in ourselves or in another being which exists necessarily (by Axiom 1, and Proposition 7). Therefore an absolutely infinite Being, that is (by Definition 6) God, necessarily exists. Q.E.D.

[54] In this last demonstration, I wanted to show the existence of God aposteriori, so that the demonstration would be perceived more easily — not because the existence of God does not follow apriori from the same grounds. For since the ability to exist is a power, it follows that, the more reality that belongs to the nature of a thing, the more energy it has in itself for existing. Consequently, an absolutely infinite Being, or God, has absolutely infinite power in himself to exist, and therefore he exists absolutely.

However, perhaps many people will not be readily able to see the evidence of this demonstration, because they are only used to thinking about things which arise from external causes. Among these, they see that those which come into being quickly (i.e. exist easily) also go out of being easily; and conversely, they judge that things which they conceive as having more to them are more difficult to bring into being (i.e. do not exist so easily). However, in order to free them from these prejudices, I do not need to show here what truth there is to the saying ‘Easy come, easy go;’ nor even whether or not, as far as the whole universe is concerned, everything comes into being equally easily. It is enough to note just this one point, namely that here I am not talking about things which come into being from external causes, but only about substances — which (by Proposition 6) cannot be produced by any external cause. For things which come into being from external causes (whether they consist of many parts or only a few) owe whatever perfection (or reality) they have to the powers of the external cause. Consequently, their existence arises solely from the perfection of the external cause, and not from that of an inner cause.

By contrast, a substance does not owe whatever perfection it has to any external cause. So its existence too must follow from its nature alone, and hence its existence is not something other than its essence. Consequently, perfection does not detract from a thing’s existence, but adds to it; whereas it is imperfection which detracts from it. Therefore we cannot be more certain of the existence of any thing, than of the existence of the absolutely infinite or perfect Being, namely God. For the fact that his essence excludes all imperfection, and involves absolute perfection, removes all cause for doubting his existence, and provides the maximum certainty of it — which I believe will be obvious to anyone who pays the slightest attention.

[55] No attribute of substance can be conceived truly if it implies that substance can be divided.

If substance is conceived in this way, the parts into which it is divided will either retain the nature of substance, or they will not.

If the first, then (by Proposition 8), each part will have to be infinite, and (by Proposition 6) the cause of itself, and (by Proposition 5) it will have to consist of a different attribute, and hence it will be possible for a number of substances to be made out of one substance — which (by Proposition 6) is absurd.

Again, the parts (by Proposition 2) would have nothing in common with their whole, and it would be possible (by Definition 4 and Proposition 10) for the whole to exist and be conceived without its parts — and no-one could doubt that this is absurd.

But if the second is supposed (namely that the parts do not retain the nature of substance), then since substance as a whole would be divided into equal parts, it would lose the nature of substance, and cease to exist — which (by Proposition 7) is absurd.

If it were divisible, the parts into which it was divided will either retain the nature of absolutely infinite substance, or they will not. If the first, there will then be many substances of the same nature, which (by Proposition 5) is absurd. If the second is supposed, then (as above) absolutely infinite substance can cease to exist, which (by Proposition 11) is also absurd.

It follows from the above that no substance, and consequently no corporeal substance (in so far as it is substance) is divisible.

The fact that substance is indivisible can be understood more simply from the following alone. The nature of substance can only be conceived as infinite, and a part of substance can only be understood as [56] finite substance. But this (by Proposition 8) implies a manifest contradiction.

No substance apart from God can exist or be conceived.

God is an absolutely infinite being, who cannot be denied any attribute which expresses the essence of substance (by Definition 6), and who necessarily exists (by Proposition 11). So, if there were some other substance apart from God, it would have to be explained through some attribute of God, and hence there would exist two substances with the same attribute, which (by Proposition 5) is absurd. Hence no substance other than God can exist, or (consequently) even be conceived. For if it could be conceived, it would necessarily have to be conceived as existing; but this (by the first part of this Demonstration) is absurd. Therefore no substance apart from God can exist or be conceived. Q.E.D.

From this it clearly follows, first, that God is unique — in other words, (by Definition 6) that there is only one substance in the universe, and that it is absolutely infinite, as I have already hinted in the Scholium to Proposition 10.

Second, it follows that extended thing and thinking thing are either attributes of God, or (by Axiom 1) affections of attributes of God.

Whatever exists, exists in God, and nothing can exist or be conceived without God.

Apart from God, no substance can exist or be conceived (by Proposition 14), that is (by Definition 3), no thing which exists in itself and is conceived through itself. But modes (by Definition 5) can neither exist nor be conceived without substance. Therefore modes can only exist in the divine nature, and can only be conceived through it. But nothing exists apart from substances and modes [57] (by Axiom 1). Therefore nothing can exist or be conceived without God. Q.E.D.

{1} There are people who imagine God as like a human being, consisting of body and mind, and liable to passions. But it is clear enough from what has already been demonstrated, how far they fall short of a true knowledge of God. But leaving them aside, everyone who has given some consideration to the divine nature denies that God is corporeal. Their best argument is that what we mean by ‘body’, is every quantity which has length, breadth, and depth, bounded by some particular shape or other; and nothing could be more absurd than to say this of God, since he is absolutely infinite being.

{2} However, in attempting to turn this into a demonstration, they adduce other reasons, which clearly show that they completely remove corporeal or extended substance itself from the divine nature, and they maintain that it was created by God. But they have no idea at all what divine power could create it — which clearly shows that they do not understand what they themselves are saying.

{3} I, on the other hand, have demonstrated, clearly enough in my opinion (see the Corollary to Proposition 6, and Scholium 2 to Proposition 8), that no substance can be produced or created by another substance. Further, in Proposition 14, I showed that no substance apart from God can be produced or created; and from this I concluded that extended substance is one of the infinite attributes of God.

{4} But in order to explain things more fully, I shall refute the arguments of my opponents, which boil down to the following.

{5} Their first argument is that corporeal substance, in so far as it is substance, consists of parts (or so they think). This is why they deny that it can be infinite, and consequently capable of belonging to God. They explain their position by means of many examples, of which I shall mention just a few:

• {6} They say that, if corporeal substance is infinite, it can be conceived as being divided into two parts. Therefore each part will be either finite or infinite. If the former, the infinite will be composed of two finite parts, which is absurd. If the latter, there will be one infinity which is twice as large as another infinity — which is also absurd.

• {7} Next, if an infinite quantity is measured in terms of parts equal to a foot, it must consist of infinitely many such parts. The same is true if it is measured in terms of parts equal to an inch. Consequently, one infinity will be twelve times larger than another infinity.
• {8} Finally, suppose that from one point of any infinite [58] quantity, two lines such as AB and AC, which initially have a specific and determinate distance from each other, are extended to infinity. It is certain that the distance between B and C will continuously increase, and ultimately the determinate will become indeterminable.

{10} The second argument also turns on the supreme perfection of God. They say that, since God is an absolutely perfect being, he cannot be acted upon; but corporeal substance can be acted upon, since it is divisible; it therefore follows that corporeal substance does not belong to God’s essence.

{11} These are the arguments I have found in various authors, by which they try to show that corporeal substance is unworthy of the divine nature, and that it cannot belong to that nature. However, anyone who has paid proper attention will find that I have already refuted them. These arguments rest entirely on their supposition that corporeal substance is composed of parts; but I have already shown this to be absurd (Proposition 12, together with the Corollary to Proposition 13).

{12} Furthermore, anyone who is willing to weigh the matter properly, will see that none of the absurdities (assuming they are all absurd — but I am not arguing about that here) from which they want to prove that extended substance is finite, in any way follows from the supposition of an infinite quantity. Rather they follow from their assumption that it is a measurable infinite quantity, and that it is made up of finite parts. So the only conclusion they are able to draw from the absurdities which follow from this is that an infinite quantity is not measurable, and that it cannot be made up of finite parts. And this is precisely what I have demonstrated above (Proposition 12, etc.).

{13} So their argument backfires on them. If they want to draw from their own absurdity the conclusion that extended substance must be finite — why, they are doing exactly the same as someone who imagines that a circle has the properties of a square, and infers that a circle does not have a centre, such that all lines drawn from it to the circumference are equal. Corporeal substance can only be conceived as infinite, unique, and [59] indivisible (see Propositions 8, 5, and 12); but in order to conclude that this same substance is finite, they conceive it as consisting of finite parts, and as being multiplex and divisible. In the same way, others, once they have imagined that a line is composed of points, know how to find many arguments to show that a line cannot be infinitely divided. Certainly, it is no less absurd to maintain that corporeal substance is composed of bodies or parts, than to maintain that body is composed of surfaces, that surfaces are composed of lines, and, finally, that lines are composed of points.

{14} And this is what must be said by anyone who knows that clear reasoning is infallible, and especially those who deny that there is a vacuum. For if corporeal substance could be divided in such a way that its parts were really distinct, then why should it not be possible for one part to be annihilated, leaving the rest connected to each other as before? And why should all the others adjust themselves, so as to avoid a vacuum? Obviously, if things are really distinct from one another, one can exist without the other, and remain in its own state. So since there is no vacuum in the real world (I shall discuss this later), but all parts must be harmonised so that there is no vacuum, it also follows from this that they cannot be really distinct — in other words, corporeal substance, in so far as it is substance, cannot be divided.

{15} However, if someone now asks: why are we so naturally disposed to dividing quantity? I reply that quantity is conceived by us in two ways: abstractly (or superficially), just as we imagine it; and as a substance, which is done by the understanding alone. So if we consider quantity as it is in our imagination (which we do often and more easily), it will be found to be finite, divisible, and made up of parts. But if we consider it as it is in the understanding, and conceive it in so far as it is substance (which is very difficult to do), then, as I have already sufficiently demonstrated, it will be found to be infinite, unique, and indivisible. This will be obvious enough to all those who know how to distinguish between the imagination and the understanding.

{16} This is especially so, if it is also considered that matter is the same everywhere, and that there is no distinction of parts in it, except in so far as we conceive matter to be affected in different ways. Consequently, its parts are only modally distinct, and not really distinct. For example, we conceive water, [60] in so far as it is water, as being divided, and its parts as separate from each other; but not in so far as it is corporeal substance, since in that respect it is neither separated nor divided. Further, water, in so far as it is water, comes into and goes out of being; but in so far as it is substance, it neither comes into being nor goes out of being.

{17} With what I have said, I think I have also answered the second argument, since it too rests on the assumption that matter is divisible and made up of parts in so far as it is substance. And even if this were not the case, I do not see that it would be unworthy of the divine nature, since (by Proposition 14) there can be no other substance apart from God by which it could be acted upon. As I say, everything is in God, and everything which happens, happens only through the laws of the infinite nature of God, and follows from the necessity of his essence (as I shall show shortly). Consequently, there is no basis on which it can be said that God is acted upon by anything else, or that extended substance is unworthy of the divine nature. Even if it were supposed to be divisible, it would still have to be admitted that it is eternal and infinite. But enough of this for now.

Infinitely many things must follow in infinitely many modes from the necessity of the divine nature, namely everything which can be subject to the divine understanding.

This Proposition must be obvious to everyone, provided they pay attention to the following. From a given definition of any thing, the understanding infers a range of properties which really necessarily follow from that definition (that is, from the essence of the thing); and the more the reality expressed by the definition of the thing (that is, the more the reality involved in the essence of the thing defined) the more the properties that follow from it. But since the divine nature has absolutely infinite attributes (by Definition 6), and since each of them expresses infinite essence in its genus, it follows that infinitely many things must necessarily follow in infinitely many modes from the necessity of the divine nature (namely everything which can be subject to an infinite understanding). Q.E.D.

From this it follows that God is the efficient cause of all things which can be subject to an infinite understanding.

[61] Secondly, it follows that God is their cause through himself, and not accidentally.

Thirdly, it follows that God is absolutely the first cause.

God acts from the laws of his nature alone, and without being compelled by anyone.

I have just shown (Proposition 16) that infinitely many things follow absolutely from the necessity of the divine nature alone, or (which comes to the same thing) from the laws of the divine nature alone. I have also demonstrated (Proposition 15) that nothing exists or can be conceived without God, but that everything is in God. Therefore there can exist nothing outside him which could determine or compel him to action, and hence God acts from the laws of his nature alone, and without being compelled by anyone. Q.E.D.

From this it follows, first, that there is no cause, other than the perfection of his own nature, which can incite God to action, whether intrinsically or extrinsically.

Secondly, it follows that only God is a free cause. For only God exists solely from the necessity of his own nature (by Proposition 11, and Corollary 1 to Proposition 14), and acts only from the necessity of his own nature (by the preceding Proposition). Hence (by Definition 7) he is the only free cause. Q.E.D.

{1} Others think that God is a free cause because he can (or so they think) bring it about that the things which I have said follow from his nature (i.e. which are in his power) do not come into being, or are not produced by him. But this is the same as to say that God can bring it about that it does not follow from the nature of a triangle that its three angles are equal to two right angles; or that an effect does not follow from a given cause [62] — which is absurd.

{2} Further, I shall show below, without the help of this Proposition, that neither understanding nor will belong to the nature of God. I am well aware that there are many people who think that they can demonstrate that the highest degree of understanding and free will belong to the nature of God, since (they say) they know nothing more perfect to attribute to God than what is the greatest perfection in ourselves.

{3} Again, even though they conceive God as actually supremely intelligent, they do not believe that he can bring into existence everything that he actually understands, since they think that this would destroy his omnipotence. They say that, if he had created everything which is in his understanding, he would then be unable to create anything more. They believe that this is inconsistent with God’s omnipotence, so they have claimed instead that God is indifferent to everything, and created only what he decided to create through his supposed absolute will.

{4} However, I think I have shown clearly enough (see Proposition 16) that infinitely many things in infinitely many modes (i.e. everything) have flowed necessarily from God’s supreme power or infinite nature — in other words, that they continuously follow from it with the same necessity, and in the same way, as it follows from the nature of a triangle, from eternity and to eternity, that its three angles are equal to two right angles. This is how God’s omnipotence has actually existed from eternity, and will remain in the same actuality to eternity. In my opinion, this makes God’s omnipotence far more perfect.

{5} In fact (to be frank), it is my opponents who seem to deny God’s omnipotence, since they are compelled to admit that God understands infinitely many things which could be created, but which he will never be able to create. Otherwise (that is, if he were to create everything which he understands), according to them, he would use up all his omnipotence, and render himself imperfect. So, in order to maintain God’s perfection, they are forced to claim at the same time that he cannot bring about everything which lies within his power — and I do not see how anything can be imagined which is more absurd, or more inconsistent with the omnipotence of God.

{6} Here I shall also say something about the understanding and will which we commonly attribute to God. If understanding and will belong to the eternal essence of God, we must obviously mean something different by both of these attributes from what people usually mean. For the understanding and will which would constitute God’s essence would have to be utterly different from our understanding and will, [63] and could not have anything in common, apart from the name — in other words, they would have nothing more in common than the dog which is a constellation, and the dog which barks.

{7} I shall demonstrate this as follows. If understanding belongs to the divine nature, it will be unlike our understanding in that it could not be posterior to (as most people hold) or simultaneous in nature with the things understood, since God is prior in nature to everything as their cause (by Corollary 1 to Proposition 16). On the contrary, the truth and the formal essence of things is as it is, because it exists as such objectively in God’s understanding. So God’s understanding, in so far as it is conceived as constituting God’s essence, is actually the cause of things — as much of their essence as of their existence. This also seems to have been noticed by those who have asserted that God’s understanding, will, and power are one and the same thing.

{8} Therefore since God’s understanding is the sole cause of things (namely, as I have shown, as much of their essence as of their existence), it must necessarily differ from them as much in respect of essence as in respect of existence. For something which is caused differs from its cause precisely in that which it has from its cause. For example, one human is the cause of the existence of another human, but not of their essence, since their essence is an eternal truth. Consequently, they can correspond to each other completely in respect of their essence, but they must differ in their existing. Hence, if the existence of one of them ceases to be, this doesn’t mean that the existence of the other will cease to be; but if the essence of one of them could be destroyed and become false, the essence of the other would also be destroyed. Consequently, a thing which is the cause of both the essence and the existence of some effect, must differ from such an effect in respect of its essence as well as of its existence. But God’s understanding is the cause of the essence and existence of our understanding; therefore God’s understanding, in so far as it is conceived as constituting the divine essence, differs from our understanding, as much in respect of its essence as in respect of its existence, and can have nothing in common with it apart from the name — which is what I set out to prove.

{9} The same goes for God’s will, as anyone can readily see.

[64] Everything which exists is in God, and must be conceived through God (by Proposition 15); and hence (by Corollary 1 to Proposition 16) God is the cause of all the things which are in him. This is the first part. Then there cannot be any substance outside God (by Proposition 14), or in other words (by Definition 3), a thing outside God which is in itself. That is the second part. Therefore God is the immanent, but not the transient cause of all things. Q.E.D.

God (by Definition 6) is substance, which (by Proposition 11) necessarily exists; in other words (by Proposition 7), it belongs to his nature to exist, or (which comes to the same thing) his existence follows from his definition, and hence (by Definition 8) he is eternal. Then by the ‘attributes’ of God is to be understood that which (by Definition 4) expresses the essence of the Divine substance; in other words, that which belongs to substance. So I am saying that these attributes must involve precisely that which belongs to substance. But (as I have already demonstrated from Proposition 7) eternity belongs to the nature of substance. Therefore each of his attributes must involve eternity, and hence they are all eternal. Q.E.D.

It is as clear as could be that this Proposition is also obvious from the way in which I demonstrated the existence of God (Proposition 11) — I mean that this demonstration establishes that God’s existence is as much an eternal truth as his essence. Besides, I have also demonstrated God’s eternity in another way (Proposition 19 of Descartes’ Principles), and there is no need to repeat it here.

God (by the preceding Proposition) and all his attributes are eternal, that is (by Definition 8), each of his attributes expresses existence. Therefore these same attributes of God, which (by Definition 4) reveal the eternal essence God, at the same time reveal his eternal existence. In other words, the very thing which constitutes the essence of God, at the same time constitutes [65] his existence; and hence his existence and his essence are one and the same. Q.E.D.

From this it follows, first, that God’s existence, just like his essence, is an eternal truth.

Secondly, it follows that God is immutable, or in other words that all his attributes are immutable. For if they changed with respect to existence, they would also (by the preceding Proposition) have to change with respect to essence; that is (as is obvious), the true would give rise to the false — which is absurd.

If you deny it, conceive (if it is possible) something in some attribute of God as following from his absolute nature, and which is finite and has a determinate existence or duration — for example, the idea of God in thought. But thought, since it is presupposed as an attribute of God, is necessarily (by Proposition 11) infinite in its nature. But, in so far as it has the idea of God, it is presupposed as being finite. But (by Definition 3) it cannot be conceived as finite unless it is made determinate through thought itself. But it cannot be made determinate by thought itself, in so far as it constitutes the idea of God, since to that extent it is presupposed as being finite. Therefore it must be made determinate through thought in so far as it does not constitute the idea of God; and this (by Proposition 11) must necessarily exist. Therefore there is a thought which does not constitute the idea of God, and hence the idea of God does not follow necessarily from his nature, in so far as it is absolute thought (for what is conceived both does and does not constitute the idea of God). But this is contrary to the hypothesis. So if the idea of God in thought (or something in some other attribute of God — it doesn’t matter what is taken as an example, since the demonstration is universal) follows from the necessity of the absolute nature of the attribute, it must necessarily be infinite. And this was the first part to be proved.

Next, that which follows from the necessity of the nature of some attribute in this way [66] cannot have a determinate existence or duration. For, if you deny this, suppose that there is a thing which follows from the necessity of the nature of some attribute, and is in some attribute of God (for example, the idea of God in thought), and suppose there was a time when it did not exist, or that there will be a time when it will not exist. Since thought is presupposed as being an attribute of God, it must exist necessarily and immutably (by Proposition 11, and Corollary 2 to Proposition 20). Therefore beyond the limits of the duration of the idea of God (since it is supposed that there was a time when it did not exist, or that there will be a time when it will not exist), there will have to exist thought without the idea of God. But this is against the hypothesis, since it is supposed that the idea of God necessarily follows from a given thought. Therefore the idea of God in thought (or anything else which necessarily follows from the absolute nature of some attribute of God) cannot have a determinate duration; but is eternal through that same attribute. And this was the second part to be proved.

Note that the same is to be affirmed of any thing which is in some attribute of God, and necessarily follows from the absolute nature of God.

The demonstration of this Proposition proceeds in the same way as the preceding demonstration.

A mode exists in something else, through which it must be conceived (by Definition 5); that is, (by Proposition 15) it is in God alone, and can be conceived through God alone. [67] Therefore if a mode is conceived as existing necessarily and as being infinite, then both of these must necessarily be inferred (or perceived) through some attribute of God, in so far as this attribute is conceived as expressing infinity and necessity of existence, or (which is the same, by Definition 8) eternity — in other words (by Definition 6 and Proposition 19), in so far as it is considered absolutely. Therefore a mode which exists both necessarily and as infinite, must have followed necessarily from the absolute nature of some attribute of God. This can be either immediately (see Proposition 21), or mediated by some modification which follows from its absolute nature, that is (by the preceding Proposition), which exists both necessarily and as infinite. Q.E.D.

This is obvious from Definition 1, since that of which the nature (that is, considered in itself) involves existence is the cause of itself, and exists solely from the necessity of its own nature.

From this it follows that God is not only the cause of things’ beginning to exist, but also of their continuing to exist, or (to use a scholastic term) God is the cause of the being of things. For whether things exist or do not exist, whenever we consider their essence, we understand that it does not involve existence or duration. Therefore their essence cannot be the cause of their existence or of their duration. Only God can be their cause, since it belongs only to his nature to exist (by Corollary 1 to Proposition 14).

If you deny this, then God is not the cause of the essence of things. Consequently (by Axiom 4) the essence of things can be conceived without God; but this [68] (by Proposition 15) is absurd. Therefore God is also the cause of the essence of things. Q.E.D.

This Proposition follows more obviously from Proposition 16. From the latter proposition it follows that, given the divine nature, the essence of things as much as their existence must necessarily be inferred from it. In a word, God is to be called the cause of all things in the same sense as he is called the cause of himself. This will be established even more obviously from the following Corollary.

Individual things are nothing other than affections or modes of the attributes of God, through which the attributes of God are expressed in a definite and determinate way. The demonstration is obvious from Proposition 15, and Definition 5.

That by which things are said to be determined to action is necessarily something positive (this is obvious). Consequently, God is, from the necessity of his nature, the efficient cause both of its essence and of its existence (by Propositions 25 and 16). This was the first part to be proved. From this the second part of the proposition very clearly follows. For if a thing which has not been determined by God could determine itself, the first part of this proposition would be false — which is absurd, as I have shown.

This Proposition is obvious from the third Axiom.

[69] Every individual, or thing, which is finite and has a determinate existence, cannot exist or be determined to action unless it is determined to existence and action by another cause, which is also finite, and has a determinate existence. Again, this other cause also cannot exist or be determined to action, unless it is determined to existence and action by another cause, which is also finite, and has a determinate existence; and so on to infinity.

Everything which is determined to existence and action is so determined by God (by Proposition 26 and the Corollary to Proposition 24). But that which is finite and has a determinate existence could not be produced by the absolute nature of some attribute of God, since whatever follows from the absolute nature of some attribute of God is infinite and eternal (by Proposition 21). Therefore it must have followed from God or one of his attributes in so far as it is considered as affected in some way; for nothing exists apart from substance and modes (by Axiom 1 and Definitions 3 and 5), and modes (by the Corollary to Proposition 25) are nothing other than affections of the attributes of God. But it also could not have followed from God or one of his attributes in so far as it is affected by a modification which is eternal and infinite (by Proposition 22). Therefore it had to follow, or be determined to existence and action, by God or one of his attributes, in so far as it is modified by a modification which is finite and has a determinate existence. This was the first part to be proved.

Next, in its turn this cause or mode (by the same reasoning as we have already used to demonstrate the first part of this proposition) must have been determined by another cause, which is also finite and has a determinate existence; and again this last one (by the same reasoning) by another; and so on (by the same reasoning) to infinity. Q.E.D.

[70] Some things must have been produced immediately by God, namely those which follow necessarily from his absolute nature; and others through the mediation of these primary ones, although they too cannot exist or be conceived without God. It follows from this:

First, that God is the absolutely proximate cause of the things produced immediately by him, and not just ‘in his genus,’ as they say. For the effects of God cannot exist or be conceived without their cause (by Proposition 15, and the Corollary to Proposition 24).

Secondly, it follows that God cannot properly be called the ‘remote’ cause of individual things, except perhaps for the purpose of distinguishing the latter from the things he produced immediately, or rather which follow from his absolute nature. For what we mean by a ‘remote cause’ is one which is in no way joined to its effect. But everything which exists is in God, and depends on God in such a way that it can neither exist nor be conceived without him.

Whatever exists is in God (by Proposition 15); but God cannot be called a contingent thing, since (by Proposition 11) he exists necessarily, and not contingently. Next, the modes of the divine nature have also followed from that nature necessarily, and not contingently (by Proposition 16); and this is true whether the divine nature is considered absolutely (by Proposition 21), or as determined to acting in a particular way (by Proposition 27). Further, God is not the cause of these modes merely in so far as they simply exist (by the Corollary to Proposition 24), but also (by Proposition 26) in so far as they are considered as determined to some particular action. But if they are not determined by God (by the same Proposition), it is not contingent, but impossible for them to determine themselves. If, on the other hand (by Proposition 27) they are determined by God, it is not contingent, but impossible for them to render themselves undetermined. Therefore [71] everything is determined from the necessity of the divine nature, not merely to existence, but also to existing and acting in a particular way, and nothing is contingent. Q.E.D.

Here, before I go any further, I want to explain (or rather issue a warning about) what I mean by ‘Nature naturing’ and ‘Nature natured’. From what has gone before, I think it is obvious that by ‘Nature naturing’, I mean that which exists in itself and is conceived through itself, or such attributes of substance which express eternal and infinite essence, that is (by Corollary 1 to Proposition 14, and Corollary 2 to Proposition 17), God, in so far as he is considered as a free cause. By ‘Nature natured’, on the other hand, I mean everything which follows from the necessity of the nature of God or of each of the attributes of God, that is, all the modes of the attributes of God, in so far as they are considered as things which are in God, and which cannot either exist or be conceived without God.

A true idea must agree with that of which it is the idea (by Axiom 6), in other words (as is obvious), that which is contained objectively in the understanding must necessarily exist in Nature; but in Nature (by Corollary 1 to Proposition 14) there exists only one substance, namely God. Nor are there any affections (by Proposition 15) other than those which are in God, and which (by the same Proposition) cannot exist or be conceived without God. Therefore an understanding which is actually finite, or which is actually infinite, must comprehend the attributes of God and the affections of God, and nothing else. Q.E.D.

[72] By ‘understanding’ (as is obvious) I do not mean absolute thought, but only a particular mode of thinking. This mode differs from others, namely desire, love, etc., and hence (by Definition 5) must be conceived through absolute thought. In other words (by Proposition 15 and Definition 6), it must be conceived through some attribute of God which expresses the eternal and infinite essence of thought, in such a way that it can neither exist nor be conceived without it. Hence (by the Scholium to Proposition 29) it must be referred to Nature natured and not to Nature naturing — as also the other modes of thinking. Q.E.D.

The reason why I talk here about an ‘actual’ understanding is not because I accept that there is any such thing as a potential understanding, but because, in my desire to avoid any confusion, I did not want to talk about anything other than what we most clearly perceive — that is, the act of understanding itself, than which we perceive nothing more clearly. For we cannot understand anything which does not lead to a more perfect knowledge of understanding.

Willing is only a particular mode of thinking, just like understanding. Hence (by Proposition 28) no volition can exist or be determined to acting unless it is determined by another cause, and that cause by another one, and so on to infinity. But if the will is supposed to be infinite, it must still be determined to existence and acting by God — not in so far as he is absolutely infinite substance, but in so far as he has an attribute which expresses the eternal essence of thought (by Proposition 23). Therefore however it is conceived (as finite or as infinite), it requires a cause by which it is determined to existence and action. Hence (by Definition 7) it cannot be called a free cause, but only a necessary or compelled one. Q.E.D.

[73] From this it follows, first, that God does not act from free will.

Secondly, it follows that will and understanding have the same relation to the nature of God, as do motion, and rest, and absolutely generally, everything in Nature, which (by Proposition 29) must be determined by God to existence and action in a particular way. For the will, like all the rest, needs a cause by which it is determined to existence and acting in a particular way. And even if infinitely many things follow from a given act of God’s will or understanding, this does not mean that God can any more be said to act from free will, than he can be said to act from freedom of motion or rest, because of what follows from motion or rest (for infinitely many things follow from them too). Therefore will belongs to God’s nature no more than anything else in Nature. It is related to it in the same way as motion and rest, and as everything else which we have shown to follow from the necessity of the Divine nature, and to be determined by that same nature to existence and acting in a particular way.

All things have followed necessarily from the given nature of God (by Proposition 16), and have been determined from the necessity of the nature of God to existing and acting in a particular way (by Proposition 29). Therefore if things could have been of a different nature, or determined to acting in a different way, so that the order of nature was different, then the nature of God could also have been different from what it now is. So (by Proposition 11) it too would have had to exist, and consequently there could be two or more Gods — which (by Corollary 1 to Proposition 14) is absurd. Therefore things could not have been produced by God in any other way or with any other order, etc. Q.E.D.

[74] By these propositions, I have shown more clearly than by the light of the midday sun, that there is absolutely nothing in things on account of which they can be called contingent. I now want to explain briefly what we should mean by the word ‘contingent’ — but first I shall explain ‘necessary’ and ‘impossible’.

A thing is called ‘necessary’, either by reference to its essence, or by reference to its cause. For the existence of a thing follows necessarily, either from its essence and definition, or from a given efficient cause. Next, a thing is called ‘impossible’ for the same reasons — namely either because its essence or definition involves a contradiction, or because there is no external cause determined in such a way as to produce such a thing.

But the only reason why a thing is called ‘contingent’ is by reference to our lack of knowledge. For we might not know whether or not the essence of a thing involves a contradiction, or we might know correctly that it does not involve any contradiction; but we may still be unable to make any positive assertion about its existence, because we are ignorant of the order of causes. So since such a thing can never appear to us to be either necessary or impossible, we call it ‘contingent’, or ‘possible’.

{1} From what has gone before, it clearly follows that things were produced by God with complete perfection, since they followed necessarily from a given most perfect nature. This does not give any grounds for attributing any imperfection to God, since it was his very perfection which compelled us to assert it. Indeed, if the contrary were asserted, it would clearly follow (as I have just shown) that God was not completely perfect. The reason is that, if things had been produced in any other way, a different nature would have to be attributed to God, and it would be different from the nature we were compelled to attribute to him when considering the nature of the most perfect Being.

{2} I am sure that many people will reject this position as absurd, without bothering to put their minds to it. The sole reason for this is that they are used to attributing to God a very different kind of freedom from the one I have propounded (Definition 7), namely absolute will. But I am also sure that, if they were prepared to contemplate the matter, and to think through the sequence of my demonstrations in the right way, they would eventually completely reject the sort of freedom [75] which they now attribute to God, not only as worthless, but as a great obstacle to knowledge.

{3} There is no need for me to repeat here what I said in the Scholium to Proposition 17. However, for their benefit, I shall also show that, even if it is conceded that will belongs to God’s essence, it nevertheless follows from his perfection, that things could not have been created by God in any other way, or with any other order. This will be easy to show, if we first consider that (as they themselves admit) it depends solely on God’s decree and will that each thing is what it is, otherwise God would not be the cause of all things. Next we should consider that all God’s decrees were sanctioned by God himself from eternity, otherwise there would be grounds for attributing to him imperfection and changes of mind. But since there is no when, or before, or after in the eternal, it follows from God’s perfection alone, that God can never decree anything different, nor ever could have — in other words, that God did not exist before his decrees, and cannot exist without them.

{4} But, they will say, even if it were supposed that God had created a different universe, or that from eternity he had decreed differently about Nature and its order, this would not give rise to any imperfection in God. However, if they say this, they will thereby concede that God can change his decrees. For if God had decreed something different from what he actually decreed for Nature and its order (that is, so that he willed and conceived something different for Nature), then necessarily he would have had a different understanding from the one he now has, and a different will from the one he now has. And if it is legitimate to attribute a different understanding and a different will to God, but without any alteration to his essence and his perfection, is there any reason why he should not now be able to change his decrees about created things, and yet remain equally perfect? For his understanding and will about created things and their order is exactly the same in respect of his essence and perfection, however it is conceived.

{5} Further, all philosophers I know of agree that there is no potential understanding in God, but only actual. But since neither his understanding nor his will is distinct from his essence (as everyone also agrees), it therefore also follows from this that, if God had a different actual understanding and a different will, his essence would also necessarily be different. Consequently (as I concluded right from the beginning), [76] if things had been produced by God otherwise than they now are, God’s understanding and will, that is (as is admitted) his essence, would have to be different — which is absurd.

{6} Therefore since things could not have been produced by God in any other way or order, and since the truth of this follows from the supreme perfection of God, certainly no valid reason can persuade us to believe that God did not wish to create everything which is in his understanding with the same perfection as he understands in them.

{7} But, they will say, there is no perfection or imperfection in things. What there is in them by virtue of which they are perfect or imperfect, and called good or evil, depends only on God’s will. Consequently, if God had willed it, he could have brought it about that what is now a perfection was the height of imperfection, and vice versa. I reply that this would be nothing other than to assert explicitly that God, who necessarily understands what he wills, can bring it about by his will, that he understands things differently from how he understands them — which (as I have just shown) is a great absurdity.

{8} So I can turn the argument back against them in the following way. Everything depends on God’s power. So for it to be possible for things to be different, God’s will would also necessarily have to be different. But God’s will cannot be different (as I have just most clearly shown from God’s perfection). Therefore things cannot be different either.

{9} I admit that this opinion, which makes everything subject to God’s supposed indifference of will, and claims that everything depends on his arbitrary choice, is less far from the truth than the opinion of those who claim that God does everything in accordance with the good. The latter seem to suppose that there is something outside God, which does not depend on God, and which God has regard to as a model for acting, or which God (as it were) has in the corner of his eye as a specific target. But this is certainly nothing other than to make God subject to fate. Nothing more absurd can be asserted of God, since I have shown that he is the first and unique free cause, both of the essence of all things, and of their existence. Therefore there is no point in wasting any more time refuting this absurdity.

God’s power is itself his essence.

[77] Simply from the necessity of God’s essence, it follows that God is the cause of himself (by Proposition 11), and (by Proposition 16 and its Corollaries) of all things. Therefore God’s power, by which he himself and everything else exists and acts, is itself his essence. Q.E.D.

Whatever we conceive as being in God’s power necessarily exists.

Whatever is in God’s power must (by the preceding proposition) be comprehended in his essence in such a way that it necessarily follows from it, and hence necessarily exists. Q.E.D.

Nothing exists without some effect following from its nature.

Whatever exists expresses God’s nature or essence in a particular and determined way (by the Corollary to Proposition to 25), that is (by Proposition 34), whatever exists expresses God’s power, which is the cause of all things, in a particular and determined way. Hence (by Proposition 16) some effect must follow from it. Q.E.D.

{1} In the foregoing propositions, I have explained the nature of God and his properties: that he exists necessarily; that he is unique; that he exists and acts solely from the necessity of his nature; that and how he is the free cause of all things; that everything is in God, and depends on him in such a way that it cannot exist or be conceived without him; and finally that everything was predetermined by God, not from the freedom of his will or an absolutely arbitrary decree, but from the absolute nature or infinite power of God.

{2} In addition, wherever I have had the opportunity, I have taken care to remove any prejudices which could have prevented the force of my demonstrations from being perceived. However, quite a few prejudices still remain, which could (and can) also make it very difficult for people to accept the interconnectedness of things in the way I have explained it. Therefore I considered it worth the trouble to subject them to the test of reason at this point.

{3} [78] All the prejudices I have undertaken to point out here depend on just this one prejudice: namely that people usually suppose that all things in Nature act purposefully, just as they themselves do. Indeed, they hold it for certain that even God directs everything towards some specific goal. For example, they say that God made everything for the sake of humans, and humans so that they would worship him.

{4} I shall therefore begin by tackling this prejudice. I shall first consider what causes most people to acquiesce in this prejudice, and everyone to be naturally disposed to embrace it; secondly, I shall show that it is false; and thirdly I shall show how it gives rise to prejudices about good and evil, virtue and sin, praise and blame, order and confusion, beauty and ugliness, and others of the same kind. This is not the right place to deduce these from the nature of the human mind. Here it will be enough for me to rest what I have to say on something which no-one can disagree with, namely that all humans are born ignorant of the causes of things, and that they all have an appetite towards seeking what is good for them, and are conscious of this fact.

{5} From these, it follows, first, that people think they are free, since they are conscious of their volitions and appetite, but they can’t even dream of the causes which dispose them to appetite and volition, because they are ignorant of them. Secondly, it follows that humans do everything for a purpose, namely the good which they have an appetite for. This is why they are always interested in knowing only the final causes of things past, and are satisfied when they are told, because they have no reason to wonder any more. But if they can’t learn them from someone else, they have no other recourse than to introspect, and to project back the purposes by which they themselves are usually determined to similar actions. This is why they necessarily judge the characters of others on the basis of their own character.

{6} Next, they discover that many things, both within themselves and outside themselves, are very useful means for pursuing their own good — for example, eyes for seeing, teeth for chewing, vegetables and animals for food, the sun for illumination, and the sea for sustaining fish. So it comes about that they consider everything in Nature as a means for their own good. And since they know that they discovered these means, but did not supply them, they had grounds for believing that there was someone else who had supplied these means for their use. For once they had [79] considered things as means, they could not believe that the things had made themselves. Instead, they were forced to infer from the means which they themselves were used to supplying for themselves, that there were one or more governors of Nature, endowed with human freedom, who looked after everything for them, and made everything for their use.

{7} And since they had never had any information about these governors, they also had to judge their characters on the basis of their own. This is why they decided that the Gods governed everything for human use, so that humans would be obliged to them, and would hold them in the highest honour. And so it came about that each person worked out, by their own wits, different ways of worshipping God, so that God would choose them above the rest, and govern the whole of Nature for the benefit of their blind greed and insatiable avarice. Thus this prejudice turned into superstition, and became deeply rooted in people’s minds; and it is why everyone put so much effort into understanding and explaining the final causes of all things.

{8} But while they have sought to show that Nature does nothing in vain (i.e. nothing which has no use for humans), they seem to have shown nothing more than that God and Nature are as mad as humans. I ask you, just consider the eventual outcome of all this! Among all the good things of Nature, they couldn’t fail to come across quite a few bad ones — storms, earthquakes, diseases, etc. — and they claimed that these happened because the Gods were angry about wrongs done to them by humans, or about mistakes made in religious rituals. Although everyday experience contradicted this, and showed by infinitely many examples that good and bad things happen equally and without discrimination to the religious and the irreligious, this was not enough to make them abandon their ingrained prejudice. It was easier for them to consign it to the category of unknown things whose purpose they couldn’t understand, and thus to continue in their present and congenital state of ignorance, rather than to tear down the whole structure and think up a new one.

{9} So they held it for certain that the Gods had a power of judgment which far exceeded human understanding. If this had been the only factor, truth would obviously have remained hidden from humanity for ever. But mathematics, which is concerned not with purposes, but only with the essences and properties of figures, has shown humans a different standard of truth. And in addition to mathematics, one could identify other means (it would be superfluous to enumerate them here) for getting people to become aware of these common prejudices, [80] and be guided to a true knowledge of things.

• by my showing the grounds and causes from which the prejudice drew its origin;
  
  
• by Proposition 16, and the Corollaries to Proposition 32;
  
  
• and also by all the Propositions by which I have shown that everything happens with a certain eternal necessity of Nature, and with supreme perfection.

{11} However, I shall add one more thing, namely that this doctrine of final causes turns Nature completely upside down. It considers as an effect, what is really a cause, and vice versa; it makes what is prior by nature posterior by nature; and it renders that which is supreme and most perfect utterly imperfect. I shall not say anything about the first two, since the point is obvious. As for the third, it is clear from Propositions 21, 22, and 23, that the most perfect effect is one which is produced immediately by God; and that the more intermediate causes something needs in order to be produced, the more imperfect the effect. But if things which have been produced immediately by God were created so that God could pursue his own ends, then necessarily the last things to be created (for the purpose of which the earlier things were created) would be the most supreme of all.

{12} Again, the doctrine of final causes is inconsistent with God’s perfection. If God acts because of some end, he necessarily strives for something which he lacks. Now, it is true that theologians and metaphysicians make a distinction between an ‘end of need’ and an ‘end of assimilation.’ Nevertheless, they admit that God did everything for his own sake, and not for the sake of the things to be created, since they cannot identify anything before the creation (apart from God) which God could do anything for. Consequently, it is obvious that they are necessarily compelled to admit that God lacked the things for the benefit of which he willed to provide means, and that he desired them.

{13} Another point worth noting is that the proponents of this doctrine (who have wanted to show off their cleverness in identifying the final causes of things) have introduced a novel method of argumentation in order to prove their doctrine. This is the argument from the reduction, not to the impossible, but to the unknown; and it shows that there was no other means of arguing for this doctrine. For example, suppose a rock falls from the top of a mountain onto someone’s head, and kills them. By their method of argumentation, they will demonstrate that the rock fell in order to kill the person. After all, if it did not fall for that purpose, [81] assuming that God willed it, how could so many circumstances (for often many coincide) coincide by chance? You may reply that it happened because the wind blew, and the man was going that way. But, they will insist, why did the wind blow at that time? And why was the man going that way at precisely the same time? Suppose you reply that the wind arose at that time because the day before, while the weather was still calm, the sea began to get rough; and that the man had been invited by a friend. They will again insist (since there is no end to the number of possible questions): why did the sea get rough? Why was the man invited at that time? And so on. They will not stop asking for the causes of causes until you appeal to the will of God — in other words, the last refuge of ignorance.

{14} In the same way too, they are dumbfounded when they see the structure of the human body; and since they do not know the causes of so great a technology, they come to the conclusion that it is constructed not mechanically, but divinely, or by supernatural technology, and so constituted that one part does not harm another.

{15} This is why those who research into the true causes of miracles, and who want to understand natural phenomena as scientists, rather than gawp at them like idiots, are everywhere regarded as heretics and enemies of religion, and denounced by those whom ordinary folk revere as interpreters of Nature and of the Gods. For the latter know that if ignorance is dispelled, it takes bewilderment away with it — and bewilderment is the only means they have of arguing and of preserving their authority.

{16} But enough of this. I shall now proceed to the third topic I undertook to discuss here.

{17} After people had persuaded themselves that everything which happens, happens for their benefit, they had to judge that the most distinctive aspect of each thing was what was most useful to them, and to value most highly all those things which had the most beneficial effects on them. This is why they had to frame notions for explaining the natures of things, such as good, bad, order, confusion, warm, cold, beauty, and ugliness. And their belief that they were free gave rise to notions such as praise and blame, and sin and virtue. I shall explain the latter below, after I have discussed human nature; but I shall briefly explain the former now.

{18} They called everything which is conducive to good health and to the worship of God ‘good’, and everything which is contrary to them ‘bad’. And those who do not understand the nature of things, but merely imagine things, assert nothing about things, and mistake imagination [82] for understanding. Consequently, they firmly believe that there is order in things, despite being ignorant of things and of their own nature. When things are disposed in such a way that, when they are represented to us through our senses, we can easily form images of them and hence easily remember them, we say they are well ordered; and if the opposite, we say they are badly ordered. And since things which we can easily form images of are the most pleasing to us, people prefer order to confusion — as if order were something in Nature over and above a relation to our imagination.

{19} They also say that God created everything in proper order; but in doing so, they unwittingly attribute imagination to God. The only way out would be to say that God made provision for human imagination, and disposed all things in such a way as to make them as easy as possible for humans to imagine. But they probably won’t notice that there are infinitely many things which are completely beyond our imagination, and very many things which it is too feeble to cope with.

{20} But that’s enough on this matter.

{21} Next, other notions too are merely modes of imagining, by which the imagination is affected in various ways. Yet ignorant people consider them as being the distinctive attributes of things. As I have already said, this is because they believe that all things were created for their benefit; and they call the nature of a thing ‘good’ or ‘bad’; and ‘healthy’ or ‘mouldy’ and ‘rotten’, depending on how we are affected by it.

{22} For example, if the motion which the nerves receive from objects which are represented by means of the eyes is conducive to health, the objects causing the motion are called ‘beautiful’; and those which give rise to the opposite kind of motion are called ‘ugly’. Objects which move our sensibility through the nostrils are called ‘sweet-scented’ or ‘smelly’; those which move it through the tongue, ‘sweet’ or ‘bitter’, ‘tasty’ or ‘tasteless’, etc.; those which move it through touch, ‘hard’ or ‘soft’, ‘rough’ or ‘smooth’, etc.; and finally, those which move it through the ears are said to produce ‘noise’, ‘sound’, or ‘harmony’. The last of these has made people crazy enough to think that even God takes pleasure in harmony. And there is no lack of philosophers who have persuaded themselves that the motions of the heavens constitute a harmony.

{23} All this shows clearly enough that the judgments each individual makes about things depends on the state of their brain; or rather that they take affections of the imagination for real things. This is why it is not surprising (another incidental comment) that, among humans, every experience is controversial — hence the rise of scepticism. Although human bodies are similar in many respects, there are more differences than similarities. [83] Consequently, what seems good to one, seems bad to another; what seems orderly to one, seems chaotic to another; and what is pleasing to one, is displeasing to another —and so on for the rest, which I shall not say any more about here, both because this is not the right place to discuss them explicitly, and because everyone has had sufficient experience of them.

{24} This is why we have sayings like ‘So many heads, so many sensations,’ ‘Everyone has more than enough sensations for themselves,’ and ‘Brains are as different as tastes.’ These sayings show clearly enough that people’s judgments about things depend on the state of their brains, and that they rely on their imaginations rather than on their understanding. For if they had understood things, the example of mathematics shows that, even if they had found them off-putting, they would all at least have been convinced.

{24} So we see that all the notions through which ordinary folk are used to explaining Nature are only modes of imagining. They do not indicate the nature of any thing, but only the state of the imagination. They have names as if they were beings existing outside the imagination, and this is why I call them ‘beings of the imagination’ rather than ‘beings of reason’. Consequently, it is easy for me to refute any arguments which are raised against me from notions of this kind.

{26} Many habitually argue as follows. If everything has followed from the necessity of the most perfect nature of God, then what is the source of so many imperfections in Nature? To put it bluntly, why are things so rotten that they stink? Why are things so ugly that they make one want to puke? Why is there chaos, evil, sin, etc.? But, as I have just said, they are easily refuted. For the perfection of things is to be quantified solely on the basis of their nature and power; and consequently things are not more or less perfect because they delight or offend human sensibility, or because they support or obstruct human nature.

{27} As for those who ask why God did not create all people so that they would be governed solely by the guidance of reason, my response is just this: it is because he had no lack of material for creating everything, from the highest to the lowest degree of perfection — or, more strictly speaking, because the laws of his nature were so rich that they were sufficient for producing everything which can be conceived by an infinite understanding, as I demonstrated in Proposition 16.

{28} These are the prejudices which I undertook to note here. If there still remain any others of the same sort, they can be corrected by anyone with a modicum of thought.

END OF PART 1

Link to Leibniz's Monadology