This monograph offers an assessment of the progress of the ANA to date. It draws on a variety of sources, including in-country interviews with U.S., NATO, and Afghan officials; data provided by the U.S. Army; open-source literature; and a series of public opinion surveys conducted in Afghanistan over the past three years.

Assessment of the Afghan National Army

Our assessments pertain to following areas:

• manpower, infrastructure, and equipment
• training
• operational proficiency
• public perceptions of the army.

Manpower, Infrastructure, and Equipment
Of these three areas, manpower shows the most progress. The ANA has recruited nearly 79,000 soldiers, and the goal of 122,000 personnel plus an additional 12,000 in training, transient, holding, and student (TTHS) status seems possible, if difficult. Reenlistment efforts have been relatively successful, with about 67 percent of noncommissioned officers and about 49 percent of soldiers opting for an additional enlistment. This success notwithstanding, important personnel issues remain, including an unacceptably high absent-withoutleave rate and a lack of ethnic balance across the force.

Progress has occurred in developing the infrastructure, but it lags behind in manpower recruitment. Only about 40 percent of infrastructur projects are completed or under way. Funding is available to complete many of them, but the time line of that completion extends longer than U.S. officials would like. The projected force increase, from 80,000 to 122,000, will require additional infrastructure, posing yet another set of challenges to a program that already lags behind the requirements.

Finding a source of funding to pay the salaries of an additional 40,000 soldiers and to build the necessary infrastructure has not been a bright spot thus far. Afghanistan’s GDP is only $11 billion, and the annual federal budget is $4 billion, much of which is foreign aid (O’Hanlon, 2008). Opium cultivation and trafficking constitute a large part of the country’s economic activity. Thus, the ability of the Afghans to provide the economic support and develop the infrastructure that the ANA requires remains an open question. It is likely that a continued international commitment will be necessary to ensure that the ANA and its infrastructure are sustained.

Equipment is also a problematic area. Some units, such as the commandos, are well equipped, but others are missing equipment or have old or obsolete materiel. The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports that Afghan combat units are short about 40 percent of the major necessary items. A recent U.S. decision to provide additional equipment to the ANA will help, but some units that do not currently have the assistance of coalition forces find themselves outgunned by their Taliban adversaries.

Training
After a somewhat rocky start, institutional training appears to have progressed well. The programs of instruction appear sound and attuned to the needs of the Afghan army. More problematic is the unit-level training, which depends in large part on the efforts of embedded training teams. Teams promised by NATO have been slow in coming, and two years after the program’s inception, only about half of the operational mentor and liaison teams (OMLT) have been staffed. Additionally, some of these teams have restrictions on what they can do. Furthermore, the schedules of the teams do not mesh well with the operational employment of the Afghan units they advise. Ensuring that enough teams are available to meet current demands and to support the increase will be important and, if recent history is any guide, difficult.

Operational Proficiency
The key to the success of the Afghan army is how well it performs in combat. The coalition claims that Afghan units participate in almost all operations and take the lead in about half of them. Publicly available data to support or refute this claim are hard to come by. Anecdotal information is mixed, but in general it seems that the army is steadily improving. Some units (commandos) essentially run their own operations with some advice from mentors. Others are considerably less adept. Still, many observers note real improvement, although the starting baseline was relatively low. A recent GAO assessment indicates about 40 percent of the ANA is capable of conducting operations with support of international forces (GAO, 2008). Accounts of several operations—for example, the one in Kandahar province in summer 2008 to reimpose security after a large number of Taliban broke out of prison in—show a capability to respond quickly and carry out a relatively sophisticated operation. Still, the increase in the number and quality of Taliban fighters is posing a serious threat to the stability of the country to the point that U.S. commanders have made requests for additional forces. Thus, in spite of the progress made in the development of the ANA, its operational effectiveness remains very much in the balance.

One area universally seen as needing major improvement is the ability of the ANA to support itself. Logistics remains a weakness, both in planning and in execution.

Public Perception
In a conflict that ultimately hinges on public support, it is noteworthy that survey data indicate that the people of Afghanistan view the army positively. While the overall perception of security has declined recently, the ANA is seen as a positive force in providing security. This positive perception helps coalition forces carry out operations, using the Afghan forces to interact with the civilian population while they focus on direct combat with the insurgents.

The Way Forward
The ANA remains a work in progress but is an indispensable part of the ultimate security of the country. Coalition forces cannot be the guarantors of national security. Only the Afghans themselves can do that. However, coalition forces, particularly those of the United States, will play a crucial role in Afghanistan for the foreseeable future, particularly in light of the increased threat from Taliban forces operating out of Pakistan and parts of Afghanistan. Even if the ANA reaches the stage where it can operate independently, the United States and other nations will need to keep a security presence in the country for a substantial period. Moreover, it is likely that an international commitment will be necessary to ensure that the ANA and its infrastructure are sustained for the foreseeable future.

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What has allowed North Korea to act in the way it does?

The accumulated mistakes of successive administrations to understand that the North Koreans really want to have a nuclear weapon and that they are not prepared to trade it away. There are honest disputes among many people about whether or not North Korea was at one time or another time willing to trade its nuclear weapons. But I think that now, since 1990 through 1994, despite agreements that Clinton had as well as the various agreements under president Bush, it is now very clear that North Korea wants a status very similar to India, where they obtain recognition of their right to retain nuclear weapons, but otherwise normalize relations with their neighbors and the United States.

So what is the solution to the problem: the six-party talks, or something else?

The six-party talks are probably the only mechanism that, if there was a desire by Pyongyang to reach a solution, could provide the means to solve it. However, the situation has deteriorated to the point now where the six-party talks have been rejected by the North and I think China would have a very hard time getting the North Koreans back to the six-party talks. And to answer your fundamental question, I think we need to see some kind of change in North Korea. They currently have a powerful domestic motivation for what they are doing and we need to see domestic motivations adjusted in order to get them to take seriously the concerns of their neighbors and the United States.

Would it be right to say that as long as Kim is in power nothing will change?

That appears to be the case. Because it is a one-man leadership he can change things anytime he wants to. Now, they appeared to be focused on the succession arrangements, they are rapidly promoting the young son, they are creating arrangements around that son to have a kind of regency, in case Kim dies. To back him up they need the support of the military…and to demonstrate their importance to the country’s survival. The nuclear missile capabilities appear to be at the heart of that.

Do you think North Korea poses a real threat or is it just a political game that they are playing?

I am a little different from some observers, because I think the threat is very small. North Korea lacks the industrial capacity to build large numbers of long-ranged missiles. They will not be able to build so many weapons as to become a strategic factor in the region. But I have to acknowledge that they do pose a threat to South Korea both through short-range missiles, and the possibility of using the nuclear weapons in the South, even though there are just a few, or artillery from the North to the South. That would be the end of the North regime if they were to attack the South, but they still have that capacity. Moreover, they may force the Japanese to reconsider their very modest defense program. The Japanese have the capacity to move to a nuclear weapon, I do not think they will, but they certainly can. Certainly, politically Japan will debate whether or not move to a nuclear weapon in the short term because of this development in North Korea. And they do feel threatened by the North Korean short-ranged missiles and nuclear weapon. But as I said, North Korea is an industrial midget and not really in a position to pose a large-scale threat to the neighborhood.

Summary

The Department of Defense (DoD) cannot long ignore the inadequacy of much of the current force for nontraditional challenges lurking on the strategic horizon. In the face of the next large-scale unconventional challenge when the President turns to the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) for options, the SecDef must have the right force available to respond effectively.

Senior landpower leaders in particular should reorient on a new unconventional balance point for force optimization. They should anticipate that there will be changes in the U.S. approach to defense-relevant and defense-specific challenges around the world. As a consequence, they should act proactively to help the SecDef identify and build capabilities for the new balance point during the upcoming Quadrennial Defense Review. Doing so will enable DoD to better account for contemporary strategic conditions with minimum future institutional disruption. This monograph arrives at the following conclusions.

• The contemporary strategic environment is marked by a new unconventional status quo. Four characteristics define this new normal. First, unconventional threats of "purpose" and "context" dominate the defense operating space. Second, internal and external threats to foreign interests will commingle in future land-centric contingencies. Third, hybrid combinations of purposeful and contextual threats will be commonplace. And, finally, fourth, traditional military power--employed in isolation--will be increasingly less useful. Combined, these indicate that "fighting and winning America's wars" will mean something quite different to senior land force leaders in the future.
• U.S. landpower fulfils two roles in this new unconventional operating space. It delivers decisive lethal and nonlethal military effects and enables effective employment of important nonmilitary capabilities and resources like aid, development assistance, consequence management, and preliminary reconstruction.
• Armed stabilization may be the next most common and most important major combat operation (MCO) for DoD land forces. More broadly among the many targets available for land force optimization in the coming years, the most prudent course is one that pursues an unconventional revolution in mission and capabilities. Shifting land force policy in this direction acknowledges that armed stabilization of nations and/or regions in crisis and the defeat of violent threats to a foreign internal order are likely more important organizing principles for future force planning than is preparation for future traditional MCOs.
• Here, U.S. land forces optimize for circumstances where: (1) vital interests are challenged by violent unconventional threats; (2) the degree of violence itself is quite high and the environment is nonpermissive; (3) physical threats demonstrate some organization and relative sophistication at various levels (but not that commonly associated with high-end MCO); and finally, (4) foreign partners suffer from substantial loss or complete failure of sovereign control over political and security outcomes.
• Four principles should govern future landpower employment in this new environment. These reflect the strategic experience and choices of the post-September 11, 2001 (9/11) era, and are sensitive to contemporary risk and cost tolerance. They are: (1) core interests first; (2) limited objectives; (3) risk management; and, finally, (4) early integration of joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational contributions. All four blend at critical points.
• Shaped by these four principles, unconventional land force optimization calls for the adoption of eight new or revised missions. This new mission set is not a threat to the warfighting culture of either the U.S. Army or Marine Corps. Instead, it represents a recalibration of landpower's focus consistent with history, the likeliest strategic futures, and, finally, the desire by senior defense leaders to shift DoD's weight decisively in the direction of unconventional threats.
• The new mission set includes: (1) active management of purposeful unconventional threats; (2) armed stabilization; (3) preemptive/ punitive campaigns; (4) security sector reform and assistance; (5) conventional deterrence and limited traditional war; (6) facilitation of whole of-government stabilization and reconstruction; (7) generation and sustainment of adequate land force capabilities; and finally, (8) homeland defense and security. All of these missions andtheir associated force pools are interdependent. When combined, they amount to a new 21st century land power force planning construct.

Pursuit of an unconventional land force revolution that accounts for these eight missions resets landpower for decisive intervention in future complex contingencies. General purpose land forces, in particular, must optimize for armed stabilization missions that demand rapid containment and defeat of nontraditional foreign hazards under conditions of general civil disorder in order to create secure operating space for the effective employment of essential nonmilitary agents (e.g., interagency, intergovernmental, international, and nongovernmental). This course recognizes that U.S. land forces are warfighting institutions first. However, it forces landpower leaders to build for a different kind of warfighting future.

Conclusion: Pursuing a New Balance

An unconventional revolution in land forces redefines the balance point for force optimization. As a hedge against lingering traditional uncertainty, full-spectrum balance remains a legitimate goal for parts of DoD. Nonetheless, the author concludes that uncompromising pursuit of full-spectrum balance in land forces is fraught with unwarranted strategic risk. Indeed, pursuit of full-spectrum balance is likely to result in renewed imbalance in favor of the missions landpower leaders are culturally most comfortable with as against those they are likeliest to undertake. In this regard, excessive investment in full-spectrum balance in land forces is an expensive strategic detour that can result in sub-optimizing for an unconventional future.

Pursuit of a wider unconventional revolution resets the balance point for land forces in a way that best positions them for decisive intervention against compelling unconventional threats. Landpower remains the most versatile and broadly employable DoD capability. General purpose land forces, in particular, must optimize for armed stabilization. This envisions a land force capable of containing and defeating nontraditional hazards to U.S. core interests under conditions of general civil disorder in complex foreign contingencies. Their purpose in doing so is to create secure operating space for the essential work of important nonmilitary agents (i.e., interagency, intergovernmental, international, and nongovernmental). This course recognizes that American land forces are warfighting institutions first. However, it pushes landpower leaders to recognize that they must anticipate and build for a different kind of warfighting environment.

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Authored by Mr. Nathan P. Freier

NOWRA, Australia: BAE Systems plans to establish a world class aviation maintenance facility in Nowra, NSW, if it secures the contract to support the Royal Australian Navy’s S-70B-2 Seahawk helicopter fleet.

Jim McDowell, Managing Director, BAE Systems Australia, said today the company remained committed to Nowra as the long term home of its naval helicopter support operations.

“BAE Systems has been providing deeper maintenance support for Navy helicopters based out of Nowra since 1993,” Mr McDowell said.

“If we are selected in response to a current tender process, we plan to establish a new helicopter support capability at the Albatross Aviation Technology Park, adjacent to HMAS Albatross.

“This proposal will enable cost effective investment in a long term facility solution at Nowra and support of a sustainable Nowra based industry capability for the Seahawk Mission System and broader Navy requirements,” he said.

The deeper maintenance facility at Albatross Aviation Technology Park, to be known as the Navy Helicopter Support Centre will incorporate the previous Seasprite facility and a purpose built maintenance facility.

The company is leading a defence helicopter industry alliance, known as the Seahawk Support Team, together with partners Raytheon Australia, Rosebank Engineering, and Asia Pacific Aerospace and Air Affairs, in its bid for the contract. Raytheon Australia is the leading provider of avionics maintenance and engineering services to the ADF across multiple aircraft platforms.

“The release of the RFT for an initial period of seven years, and lifting a restriction that mandated government furnished facilities at HMAS Albatross has allowed the Team to offer the Navy a much improved industry support model for the Seahawk helicopter,” Mr McDowell said.

BAE Systems is the premier global defence and aerospace company delivering a full range of products and services for air, land and naval forces, as well as advanced electronics, information technology solutions and customer support services. With approximately 105,000 employees worldwide, BAE Systems' sales exceeded £18.5 billion (US $34.4 billion) in 2008.

MOSCOW: After the breakup of the Soviet Union, many intellectuals in Russia and the West announced "the end of history." It seemed that the United States' complete domination of the world was not disputed by anyone.

The subsequent decade, during which Russia lost its foreign policy positions, and its former satellites and even provinces became U.S. and NATO allies, seemed to have buttressed this idea.

The first signal that the situation could change came on September 11, 2001, when it suddenly transpired that U.S. domination did not guarantee Washington absolute security. Moreover, for the first time since the Soviet Union's collapse, the United States had to bargain in order to guarantee the loyalty of its allies. With the start of the Iraqi conflict, U.S. domination was called into question even more openly, despite obvious successes in the post-Soviet space such as the admission of the Baltic nations into NATO and permission to use bases in Central Asia.

The second half of the first decade of the new century saw a new trend. Russia's consolidation, buoyed by a favorable economic situation and political stabilization, raised the issue of spheres of influence, at least in the post-Soviet space and Eastern Europe. Many analysts saw the series of colored revolutions that spread across the post-Soviet space as the final renunciation of peaceful settlement of disputes between Russia and the West; but this was not true - Russia did not give up attempts to come to terms with pro-American governments.

The issues of missile defense and the Kosovo problem proved the Rubicon of East-West relations. The West demonstratively ignored Russia's position, and this was bound to evoke response. Russia had to face military confrontation and settle disputes in the CIS to its own benefit, without looking to the West.

Almost as soon as Mikheil Saakashvili came to power, many observers began to see Georgia as the most probable arena of an armed conflict with Russia. All the prerequisites for this were in place - Georgia's conflicts with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the presence of many Russian citizens in these republics, and Tbilisi's open desire to subjugate the rebellious territories.

There is no need to describe the history of the five-day war again. Its main geopolitical result is not the recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia but the return of political confrontation between Russia and the West. What could it lead to?

Nobody wants a military solution to the conflict, which could be fatal for the whole world. Both sides will have to prove their cases by political and economic means. Russia's integration into the world economy over the last 15 years has led to a situation where the West cannot inflict serious damage on us without hurting itself as much, if not more.

As a result, Russia's main lobbyists to Western governments are the Western companies, for which a quarrel with the eastern neighbor could be financially ruinous.

Apart from oil and gas, I could recall agreements on the supply of titanium spare parts for the world's biggest aircraft-builders, the Russian market for cars and other hardware, and many other spheres where cessation of economic cooperation will deal substantial damage to Western interests.

And there are political, as well as financial, interests that would be damaged by confrontation with Russia. Space cooperation between Russia and the United States, the air corridor granted by Russia for NATO flights to Afghanistan and some other programs, not as obvious as oil and gas supplies, are too important to be jeopardized over Moscow's recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

What will global confrontation be like now? It is clear that the point of no return has already been passed. Russia is not prepared to renounce its positions as it did in the 1990s. The West may be indignant, but it will have to face reality - it has become too expensive to risk.

Revision of values is inevitable. The weight categories of the political players will be revised, and many countries which had been seen as subjects will come to be viewed as objects - bargaining chips in a big power game. Their elites will not welcome this change. This is why some East European and Baltic countries quickly expressed their unreserved support for Georgia.

Where will the next round of confrontation take place? It is hard to predict with certainty, but it is likely to be in Ukraine, where not only the destiny of the Black Sea Fleet but also Russia's influence in Eastern Europe is at stake. This round will be bloodless. At any rate, I would like to hope that Ukraine is not going to oust the Black Sea Fleet from the Crimea by force.

However, the propaganda confrontation will be much more intense than in Georgia. A world event is not the one in which 10,000 take part, but the one which is being filmed by 10 TV cameras.

RIA Novosti military correspondent Ilya Kramnik. The opinions expressed in this article are the author's and do not necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti.

MOSCOW. (RIA Novosti military commentator Ilya Kramnik): Analysts are actively debating the possible outcomes of an armed conflict between Georgia and self-proclaimed Abkhazia that seceded from Georgia in 1992.

Without looking into the most pessimistic scenarios envisioning a nuclear conflict between Russia and NATO, let's try and predict the possible outcomes of the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict.

In late 2007, the Georgian Armed Forces had about 33,000 officers and men, including a 22,000-strong army that comprised five brigades and eight detached battalions.

These units had over 200 tanks, including 40 T-55 and 165 T-72 main battle tanks that are currently being overhauled. The Georgian Army also had 180 infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers, as well as 20 other armored vehicles, 120 artillery pieces with a caliber of 122-152 mm, 40 multiple-launch rocket systems and 180 mortars, including 60 120-mm mortars and 120 mortars with an 82-mm caliber.

Although the Georgian Air Force has 10 to 12 Su-25 Frogfoot ground-attack jets, only 4-5 of them are operational. It also has 15 Czech-made L-29 and L-39 combat trainers that can be converted into light-weight attack planes and 30 helicopters, including 8 Mi-24 Hind helicopter gunships.

The Georgian Navy has 10 motor boats of different types, including two guided-missile boats. One of them is similar to the French-made Le Combatant and carries four Exocet anti-ship missiles. And the Soviet-made Project 206-MR boat has two P-15M missiles.

However, their combat readiness is in doubt.

The Georgian military faces a 10,000-strong Abkhazian Self Defense Force wielding 60 tanks, including 40 T-72s, and 85 artillery pieces and mortars, including several dozen with a 122-152-mm caliber and 116 armored vehicles of different types.

The Abkhazian Army also has numerous anti-tank weapons ranging from RPG-7 rocket launchers to Konkurs-M anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs).

Additionally, the break-away republic has one or two Su-24 Fencer tactical bombers, one MiG-23 fighter, five combat-ready Su-25 ground-attack jets, 3-4 L-39 combat trainers and 3-4 helicopters. Although some sources allege that Abkhazia has 1-2 Su-27 Flanker fighters, this seems unlikely.  

The Abkhazian Navy has over 20 motor boats armed with machine-guns and small-caliber cannons.

The experience of the 1992-1993 Georgian-Abkhazian conflict shows that even small units can resist superior enemy forces in mountainous areas for a long time. Consequently, the outcome of any hypothetical conflict would depend on the aggressors' level of military training and the influence of third parties, primarily Russian units from the Collective CIS Peacekeeping Force.

Analysts have long noted the inadequate combat readiness of Georgia's Armed Forces. Although the United States has trained several crack Georgian units in the last few years, the fighting effectiveness of all other elements is uncertain.

According to American instructors who helped train Georgian units, the country's officer corps is riddled with corruption. There are no trained sergeants, and troop morale is running low. Only about 50% of the military equipment is operational, and coordinated operations in adverse conditions are impossible.

The Abkhazian Armed Forces pack a more devastating punch because they would resist an aggressor that has already tried to deprive the republic of its independence.

Abkhazian units are commanded by officers trained at Russian military schools. Many of them fought in the early 1990s. Analysts agree that the combat-ready Abkhazian Army does not suffer from corruption.

Moscow has recently beefed up the local peace-keeping contingent. Neighboring Caucasian nations, including North Ossetia, are siding with Abkhazia and are ready to square accounts with Georgia.

Chechen volunteers, who had fought in Abkhazia in 1993, could also join a hypothetical conflict and minimize Tbilisi's chances still further.

The Georgian Army would be quickly defeated if Tbilisi tries to settle the conflict by force. The situation could change in case of foreign intervention. For instance, the United States could provide weapons, reconnaissance and other intelligence information to Georgia. New NATO members, such as Poland and the Baltic countries which are close U.S. allies, could even send their units to the conflict zone.

The possible outcome could be succession from Abkhazia of its eastern and southern parts. Although NATO peacekeepers would be stationed there, military involvement is highly unlikely because its unsuccessful outcome would undermine the alliance's reputation. Brussels and Washington realize this, and are in no mood to conduct another protracted counter-insurgency operation. 

Behind-the-scenes bargaining and saber-rattling also seem possible. However, a Balkans-style "divorce" is more likely because Georgia does not want to recognize Abkhazian independence, and Abkhazia flatly refuses to consider itself part of Georgia.

Although a de facto "divorce" has already taken place, both Moscow and Washington will have to recognize it de jure after bilateral talks. The Kremlin and the White House should search for troubleshooting options and find the required bargaining chips.

Still it is unpleasant to realize that human destinies, rather than missile sites or oil wells, are at stake. 

Hopefully, the Kremlin and the Russian Foreign Ministry will consider the human factor to be more important than even the most attractive missile-defense proposals or lucrative energy contracts.

The opinions expressed in this article are the author's and do not necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti.

WASHINGTON: A move to beef up US forces in Afghanistan with some 3,000 marines reflects growing concerns about rising insurgent violence and turmoil in neighboring Pakistan, analysts said Thursday.
 
But the proposed deployment is seen as a stop-gap measure at a time when some experts say a revamped, unified strategy is needed to halt a worrying two-year slide in public confidence in the government of President Hamid Karzai.

"It's not a radical change in strategy, it's a selective application of power," Michael O'Hanlon, a military expert at the Brookings Institution, said of the proposal to send more troops.

US Defense Secretary Robert Gates is slated to review the military's request for the deployment of a marine air-ground task force on Friday.

No final decision is expected immediately, but the proposal calls for sending the 3,000-man force to Afghanistan's Helmand province by April, in time to confront a "spring offensive" by Taliban insurgents.

Gates told reporters Thursday that he would weigh the impact on US forces, as well the implications of taking pressure off US allies to fulfill their commitments.

But he said, "I also am very concerned that we continue to be successful in Afghanistan and that we continue to keep the Taliban on their back foot and that we defeat their efforts to try and come back."

Pentagon officials stressed that the deployment would be a one-time only, seven month mission to help fill a shortfall in combat forces that had been promised by NATO but never materialized.

Analysts and some military officials believe that Islamic extremists are shifting their focus from Iraq to south Asia, and will do so increasingly as the war in Iraq winds down.

Currently, there are about 26,000 US troops in Afghanistan, most of them under a 40,000-strong NATO-led force that has assumed responsibility for security throughout the country over the past two years from US forces.

But the expanded NATO mission, which has more than doubled the number of foreign troops in Afghanistan, has coincided with the rise of a Taliban insurgency that has sent violence soaring.

"If you look at the last year, the increase of violence, particularly in the south, has been to the tune of 60 percent," said Ali Jalali, a former Afghan interior minister.

"At the same time, the situation across the border in Pakistan is deteriorating," he said.

Jalali said more US troops were welcome but the problems are deeper.

The United States and NATO lack an overarching strategic vision for Afghanistan and the region, he said.

Poor coordination among the collection of foreign military forces in Afghanistan and with the Afghan government and its forces have resulted, according to Jalali.

"They can win any battle, but there is no strategy," he said. "Since last year, NATO has won many battles but the strategic situation is worse than last year."

Jalali and others say a strategy for Afghanistan is incomplete unless it also encompasses nuclear armed Pakistan, whose tribal border areas have become safe havens for Taliban and al-Qaeda.

"What we need to do is look at the situation regionally," said retired Colonel David Lamm, a former chief of staff of the US military command in Afghanistan in 2004 and 2005.

"One of the things we really need to reassess is, particularly hedging our own strategic bets on what may be happening inside of Pakistan, what sort of military structure inside Afghanistan would give you the best advantage, and the best head start if something bad happened inside Afghanistan," Lamm said.

And yet, the commander of the NATO-led force in Afghanistan, General Dan McNeill, has no authority for military planning beyond Afghanistan.

Pakistani military leaders, meanwhile, bristle at any suggestion of US military operations inside Pakistan.

But Sam Brannen, a fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Affairs, said the assassination of former Pakistani prime minister Benazir Bhutto has pointed up "a clear need in the view of US policy makers to plan for a growing instability from Pakistan."

"Internally in Pakistan, turmoil has further distracted and distanced Musharraf from the problem of extremists fighting against external elements. It has given them a safer haven than ever before," he said.

HONG KONG: Should a conflict break out across the Taiwan Strait, Taiwanese forces would face a grave shortage of ammunition after just seven days of fighting. Even though China has a much greater stockpile of ammunition than Taiwan, it would also encounter similar problems in a sustained conflict.

The PLA Air Force fleet of third generation fighters comprises 281 Su-30s, Su-27 SKs, J-11A/Bs and 64 J-10As, whereas its bomber fleet includes approximately 48 JH-7As and 117 H-6s. In full-scale warfare across the Taiwan Strait, suppose there were a loss of 20-30 combat aircraft each day, the current fleet of 344 third generation fighters in effective service in the PLAAF could sustain combat operations for only 11-17 days.

Unlike the United States and Russia, China does not yet have the capability to independently manufacture third generation fighters. For instance, in order to produce J-11B fighters, China has to rely on imports from Russia for critical subsystems including engines and infra-red search and track systems.

Furthermore, the manufacturer of J-11 serial fighters, the Shenyang Aircraft Co., has had a production capacity limited to roughly 17 aircraft each year. As for the J-10, it is widely known that production of this fighter aircraft relies heavily on the outside world, as the J-10's AL-31FN engines are imported from Russia, and other large parts are forged following the designs of a certain Western country.

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SOUTHWEST ASIA: We all had many different reasons for joining the military, but since Sept. 11, I know we all joined or re-enlisted knowing that we are at war with the terrorists.

But, why are we still fighting in Iraq and putting our lives in jeopardy?

To shed some light on this question, I want to provide some of my personal thoughts and avoid the politics of the issue. I will not debate whether Saddam had weapons of mass destruction at the beginning of the Operation Iraqi Freedom, nor will I argue whether Saddam killed innocent men, women and children who were citizens of his own country. Those are all questions for the politicians, historians and senior leaders of our military and government to answer. I'd like to focus on the current situation and the people aspects of the issue.

Regardless of who was right or wrong, the fact remains that at 10:15 Eastern Standard Time on March 19, 2003, the United States and coalition forces began OIF and moved troops into Iraq. By April 7, the forces had captured Baghdad and Saddam's presidential palace. Iraqis were celebrating in the streets and overjoyed to be free and out from under Saddam's rule. Since this time, there have been many factors that have changed the environment in Iraq and caused a major rise in terrorist activities across the country. But, we cannot change the past. We can only try to change the future.

If you had an opportunity to meet some Iraqis, you would probably find them to be very much like you and me. Yes, they speak a different language and practice a different religion than most of us. But, if you look a little closer, you will find many of our words come from Arabic and some of our major religions have the same roots and similar beliefs.

You also may find some of their customs to be different from ours. But again, at the core of their customs you will find a belief in good values and taking care of family. They enjoy watching TV, playing sports and browsing the Internet, and parents want their children to grow up and have a good education, just like us. So, in the end, the majority of Iraqi people are just looking for a happy and peaceful life, and they are not terrorists.

Since the insurgents' activity has escalated in Iraq, daily life has become quite uncomfortable. The most obvious issue, of course, is the improvised explosive devices in the neighborhoods that are blowing up and killing innocent people.

Receiving consistent electrical power also has been a challenge because the insurgents often targeted the power and oil infrastructure. Imagine trying to sleep at night when it is 120 degrees outside and you have no air conditioning. Keeping food cold and fresh is also tough when you are only getting a few hours of electricity each day.

But, in the midst of all this chaos, the Iraqis still go about their business trying to improve their lives, complete their educations, get married and raise a family.

The members of the Iraqi military and police force make a huge sacrifice by just joining the service. As soon as they put on their uniforms, they are a target for the terrorists. Many Iraqi military members have sent their families into hiding or have developed "cover stories" to help keep their family safe. In some cases an Iraqi service member may not even know where his family is located and not communicate with them for many months, wondering if they are alive and safe. Numerous Iraqi servicemembers also have been killed after returning from training in the United States.

Yet Iraqis continue to join and serve. In fact, the Iraqi air force recently graduated their second class of officers from their newly established air force academy. These men and women continue to join and serve because they want to have peace in their country and want a better life for their children.

As the fight against the terrorists has continued, the Iraqis and coalition forces have been training and fighting, side by side. A large number of the coalition forces in Iraq are there as trainers and advisors. They have been working, eating, laughing and fighting along side one another.

There are many stories of Iraqis coming to rescue or protect their American counterparts. One Iraqi officer did not hesitate to place himself in harm's way to protect an American Airman when his aircraft was forced to land in a very dangerous area. This Iraqi was able to divert any hostile attentions towards himself and away from the American until they could get to safety.

And yes, Iraqis and Americans have even died together. Aug. 11, 2005, an Iraqi citizen was buried at Arlington Cemetery, a first in the history of Arlington. He was an Iraqi Air Force pilot who was killed with American Airmen. They died together fighting for the same cause -- peace and freedom -- and now they are buried together. This Iraqi is the same officer who protected the American Airman only a few months prior. The young Iraqi pilot was married and left behind two young children. Like most Americans, his family was sad for the loss, but very proud of what he was fighting for.

There are many other stories like this that you don't see on TV or read in the newspaper. Every day, Americans and Iraqis are working together, helping one another, helping the local civilians, building schools, providing medical support, etc. It is important that people understand there is more going on than just the terrorists' acts of violence and killing.

We constantly hear the stories of death and destruction, but rarely hear the stories of success and friendship. More and more, these successes are continuing to accumulate. The number of terrorist acts have dramatically decreased as more Iraqis are trained and as the responsibility for security transitions to their forces.

So, why are we in Iraq? I can't answer for you, but I know why I am honored to be here and away from my family, yet again. It is because we are fighting for good people who just want the same peace and happiness that we tend to easily take for granted. We've started this mission and I'd like to see us finish.

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