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The Limits of Exile

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Introduction: The Limits of Exile

David Kettler and Zvi Ben-Dor

In 1972 Paul Tabori (Pál Tábori, 1908–1974), a Hungarian émigré living in London, and "not an exile," as he was careful to write, conducted a unique experiment. Tabori, who set out to write a book on exile, was searching for a definition of the term that would serve as starting point for the project. Shortly after he began his search he realized that he was entering "an almost impenetrable jungle, a kind of super-maze". Facing this jungle, Tabori decided to present a "rough-and-ready version" of a definition of exile for comment by "several hundred exiles and international experts" (Tabori 1972: 26).

This experiment was, as far as our research can ascertain, the only attempt, "rough-and-ready" as it sounds, to define exile by surveying the views of a large number of individuals identifying themselves as exiles. Tabori, a prolific journalist, film critic, diplomatic correspondent, poet and novelist, was born in Budapest, and was educated in Switzerland, Hungary and Germany where he picked up Ph.D.s in economics and political science. Since the late 1930s he lived in London, but altogether, he lived in 17 different countries. Tabori was very familiar with the colorful world of émigrés and cosmopolitans, at least in London, Paris and New York. The definition of exile Tabori came up with after his survey ran as follows,

> An exile is a person compelled to leave or remain outside his country of origin on account of well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality or political opinion; a person who considers his exile temporary (even though it may last a life time), hoping to return to his fatherland when circumstances permit—but unable or unwilling to do so as the factors that made him an exile persist (Tabori 1972: 27).

Tabori himself was unhappy with this definition. In the introduction to the *The Anatomy of Exile*, the study of exile that he published in 1972, he wrote that his work "was not for the specialist or for the scholar, if it were, it would have to run to many thousands of pages and consist of a large series of monographs". Tabori was sure that "each exile community, national, geographical, or professional, will find various omissions" in his book which was going to show "only the very tip of the iceberg with thousand times the bulk left hidden". Tabori certainly felt the need to write a history of exile that will be at the same time an "anatomy" of it.

An attempt "find a synthesis for the immensely varied and controversial semantics of exile" (ibid.: 11).

We begin this introduction with Tabori's curious book because his work is still one of the only few attempts to historicize and understand the meaning of exile in recent decades, as opposed to individual reflecting on the term, which is the more common practice. We also share Tabori's sense of the necessity to define the meaning of exile and his unease with the definition with which he himself came up even after his experiment. More than three decades after this experiment we think that the time has long come for another, perhaps similarly "rough-and-ready" and even more modest in scope, but equally serious in its call for a rethinking of exile. Unlike Tabori, perhaps, we are sure that such this rethinking should be a collaborative effort right from the start. It must be done as a collaboration among scholars of exile coming from different disciplines, and dealing with different regions and historical periods.

At the beginning of the 21st century, the word 'exile' seems both very simple to understand and too complex to grapple with. A critical view of world-historical events, taking place during the past century and half, shows that many paradoxes and problems have become attached to the term exile. One set of paradoxes, perhaps the most acutely sensed during the twentieth centuries, is connected with nations. On the one hand, the collapse of empires and rise of nation-states all over the world created many new "homes" for collectivities now defining themselves as nations. On the other hand, however, the creation of these homelands was accompanied by wars, deportations, and attempts of "ethnic cleansings," that left many other peoples and collectivities displaced, or in other words – in exile. That is to say, the inclusionary act of creating a homeland was accompanied by the exclusionary process of sending others to exile. An important part of this set of paradoxes is the one stemming from colonial legacies, as decolonization and retreating colonial powers, either left behind or brought back with them people that we might/should call, at very least, displaced. Another important element of the various legacies of colonialism is large diasporas that were created in it is wake. To sum up, the redrawing of the world's inner boundaries as national boundaries, and redefinitions of spaces and territories left many peoples displaced, dislocated, and in exile even without moving from their original homes. These boundaries raise another serious question concerning the moment of when/where does exile occur. Does it happen only when that national boundary is crossed? At least one recent study reminds us that many migrations *within* national boundaries have been seriously overlooked (McKeoen 2004).

A second set of problems and paradoxes is connected with the rise of modern, strong states. Citizenship granted by the modern state has become the most

efficient way to ensure one's attachment to and rights concerning their home. But at the same time the modern state has infinitely more power to deny citizenship, expel, refuse entrance, and deny re-entrance and access to what was once one's home. Furthermore, since the beginning of the 19th century states have more powers and means to relocate (dislocate, exile) larger numbers of peoples.

It seems then, that exile, one of the most ancient recorded types of punishment and human suffering, is proliferating in modern times. Further, this proliferation in instances of exile, accompanied, as we stated above, by a culture of paradoxes and contradictions, has clearly produced an almost infinite trove of cases and kinds of exile. Exile, therefore, is highly relevant term in today's world, certainly more than in the early 1970s, when the cold war was still seen as the globally organizing, even stabilizing, principle.

However, the current age, the "age of globalization" as it is often labeled (cf. Stehr 2004), also presents us with phenomena that are thought to contradict these characterizations of exile in our times. Words, better yet, buzz words, such as transnationalism and transnationlity, globalization and global village, cosmopolitanism (in its contemporary guise) and cyberspace, seem to point in a direction different than the one sketched above. That is to say, the widely remarked supposed weakening of the state and the rise of a global age are thought to render meaningless concepts such a place and homeland. There are also the perceived homogenizing effects of globalization that seem to be rendering the political concept of exile irrelevant. How can one be in exile in such a world? Perhaps exile is no longer relevant? These considerations raise serious questions concerning the uses of the term exile, with the disputes often pivoting around the well-known views of Edward Said (Kettler 2004; Stephan 2005), which are especially challenging inasmuch as they do not simply ask questions about the present-day vicissitudes of the historical formation designated by the term, but about its conceptual core, about the aspects of experience that define the phenomenon around which a complex of ethical and epistemological expectations have clustered, notably in Jewish and Christian but also in civic republican discourses. Perhaps the historical obsolescence of exile in the sense circumscribed by Tabori's earnest researches is simply a prod to reconsider just what it is about "exile" that makes it such an elevated trope. Or, in other words, is exile only useful for a "Dante-esque" poetical writing, or reflecting, on the condition of displacement and dislocation? Or could it still be a potent analytical tool?

One significant emerging field of study, Diaspora Studies, shows both how pertinent the notion of exile remains and how it has been deprived of its familiar meaning. Diaspora studies emerged as a crucial tool in cultural studies and particularly in the study of the identity. The concept of diaspora is vital for the

critique of essentialist explanations in cultural studies, since it reveals, again and again, the importance of "positioning," rather then "essence," in the shaping of cultural identity (Hall 1990). For this important reason, argues an important scholar of diaspora, the concept "should be cherished" (Gilory 1993: x). Following this conceptualization of the term, *Theorizing Diaspora*, a recent collection of essays of the subject, promises to show how "diaspora forces to rethink the rubrics of nations and nationalism, while refiguring the relationship the relations of citizens and nation-states," and how "diaspora offers myriad, dislocated site of contestation to the hegemonic, homogenizing forces of globalization" (Braziel & Mannur 2003: 7). The compilers of this reader remind us in their introduction that the term 'diaspora' was "first used in the *Septuagint*, the Greek translation of the Hebrew Scriptures […] to describe the Jews living in exile from the homeland of Palestine […] the term "diaspora," then, has religious significance and pervaded medieval rabbinical writings on the Jewish diaspora …" (ibid.: 1). Exile, therefore, is the first point on a spectrum of factors that give rise to a range of "diasporic" instantiations, the other pole of that spectrum stands "nostalgia" for a homeland. And so, "once conceptualized as an exilic or a nostalgic dislocation from homeland, diaspora has attained new epistemological, political, and identitarian resonances" (ibid.: 4). While we share the reasoning that considers exile a keystone in diaspora studies, we are concerned with the ease with which it is invoked and then quickly deserted for the sake of another concept with which its relationship is not clear (weren't we told that "diaspora" means "exile"). More specifically, we are concerned that exile is presented as a term subsumed by diaspora. Standing alone, exile appears to be stripped of any political dimensions; it becomes "politicized" only when it is examined through the lenses of diaspora studies. That is to say, we are concerned with the politicization of exile only through the trajectory of cultural-studies-turned-politics. But it is important to remember that the first exile, the one that was translated as diaspora, was itself, at least in the way it was recorded, first and foremost a political event – the deportation of the Jews following the destruction of their polity in Judea. Furthermore, this understanding of exile is still very much politically alive.

Israel Yuval has recently demonstrated the centrality of the myth of the Jewish Exile from the land of Israel in contemporary western thought. More importantly, he argued that this 2000 year old notion of exile, shared by both Christians and Jews throughout this period of time, is a crucial factor in shaping the western positions and policies towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the conflict in the Middle East in general (Yuval 2006). Perhaps the best testimony to the political dimension of the term exile is the way in which it is used in contemporary Israeli discourse: while the Jews were exiled from the land

of Israel and left in exile, the Palestinians "left" Palestine and now live in the "diaspora." As Yuval points out, "the difference between leaving and being exiled is the difference between *denying the right to return* (to Palestinians) and granting *law of return* (to Jews)" (Yuval 2006: 18). This issue raises another point, while the study of diaspora is not always concerned with one's right to return to their homeland. The right of return, a quintessential political question, is always a key question in the study of exile, even if never realized.

The theme of return is consequently one of the recurrent motifs in the exploratory essays from various fields of specialization assembled in our collection. There are others. Although a common concern among the contributors is to illuminate the limits – and the powers – of exile as a concept, the studies are saturated with researched experiences, examined variously through the lenses of a number of disciplines. The contributors are drawn from different fields and generations, and the dialogue among them is at an early stage, requiring mediation by attentive readers. At a different level and in a different time, we are replicating Tabori's modest survey of conceptions and approaches, if also mostly at a remove from the testimony of exiles.

Rather than attempting to extract a common argument from the diverse experiments or to compete with the pieces being introduced – given especially that the co-editors are represented in the collection – we will simply say something about the background of the present effort and then lay out the rationale for the sequencing of papers, planned not as a systematic unfolding of a uniform argument or a "dialogue" in any stringent sense, but rather as an identification of issues placed on the table in a succession that permits productive negotiations at a later stage of the comparative study of exiles that we are introducing.

Limits of Exile arises out two earlier stages of a project initiated by David Kettler at Bard College to reconsider exile studies, *No Happy End* and *Contested Legacies*, beginning with the best-studied case, the intellectual emigration from Nazi Germany during the 1930s (Kettler 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006a,b; Kettler & Wheatland 2004; Kettler & Lauer 2005). Zvi Ben-Dor's work on this theme has touched on widely different cultural and historical settings, expressions of a sense of exile among Muslims in China, living outside "House of Islam," and the state of Iraqi Jews in Israel (Ben-Dor 2002/3; Ben-Dor Benite 2005). The selection of collaborators beyond the disciplinary domains familiar to the editors was largely guided by word of mouth and serendipity, with some weighting in favor of generational succession. The regrettable absence of contributions by women is the accidental product of the pattern of acceptances and refusals and must be corrected at later phases of the project, especially in view of the gender issues largely neglected in the present collection (cf. Hammel 2003, 2005; Heitlinger

1999). There is no shortage, however, of fresh light on old questions to be derived from the new contrasts (cf. Krohn et al. 2000).

If many of the exile studies focused on the German case deal with the interplay between individual exiles and their host environments, while the prime motif in the most expansive metaphorical use of the concept is an almost autopoietic self-enclosure of the distantiated individual to whom exile is imputed, several of the papers presented here emphasize the importance of the differences among these modes, with special attention to experience in diverse groupings. **Sebastiaan Faber** offers a comparison between two Republican Spanish writers from this standpoint, one negotiating his exile in a manner familiar from many German studies and the other oriented to the Republican collective, adding a brief analysis of Edward Said's self-explication for purposes of comparison. **Carlos Blanco Aguinaga** probes the unique qualities of the collective mode of exile in the Spanish Republican case, with special focus on its highly political character and strong sense of mission. As **Simon Lewis** shows in the instance of a South African poet, an exile governed by intense political commitments need not assume the collective form: the sense of mission can be individual, and it can become purified to the point where witness precludes return.

To add perspective to our understanding of these interpretive themes, **Alfons Soellner**, reviews the historically diversified waves of reception of the German exiles, highlighting the variations of political interest in successive periods of ***Exilforschung***. A theme of the most recent and perhaps least politicized period of such studies has been a recognition of the contributions made by exiles to the internationalization of science, as they encounter less restrictive intellectual settings, and the attendant dissipation of the status of exile of such contributors, whether or not they returned to their homeland. The studies of two academic Russian exile groups after the October Revolution of 1917 prepared by **Alexander Dmitriev** and **Igor Martynyuk**, however, illustrate the reverse trend. In both cases, the groups were strikingly internationalist in their intellectual orientations before their exile period, in conflict with advocates of inward-looking conceptions of Russian cultural possibilities, but became more national in their orientations and more inclined to ideological rather than scholarly types of communications in the course of their relations with the community of Russian exiles, especially in Germany – the very place where, as students and visitors, they had originally developed their internationalist perspectives.

Tibor Frank contributes a study that emphasizes the importance of the social characteristics of exiles prior to their departure, as well as the differences in degree of adaptability displayed by different exiles, individually or in groups. In the case in point, the exile is prepared by his background as an assimilated (and

converted) Jew in urban Hungary for the need to negotiate his position from the outside, but he is also closely bound to the settlement he achieves before his exile and he is consequently constrained in exile by this mix of considerations, so that he cannot become a credible "internationalist," in the sense of the Communist ideology to which he pledges allegiance. A very different complex of Jewish assimilation strategies and ideological dis/location in exile is the subject matter of **Zvi Ben-Dor's** study of Iraqi Jews in Israel, where their persistence in thinking of themselves as Iraqis in exile does violence to the ideological myth of Israel as the land of "ingathering of exiles," the place of return, where all exile ends.

The relation between ideology and exile is more closely examined in **Peyman Vahabzadeh's** study of the present-day exile from Iran. Challenging the attempts by a powerful political group among the exiled to define the exile's paradigmatic meaning and mission for everyone as comprehended by Leftist political ideology, he explores the subtle relations between the diversity of rationales and designs for exile among women, gays, and other diverse groups, on the one hand, and, on the other, the sense in which it is nevertheless appropriate to speak of exile as a common and fundamental mode of experience. **David Kettler** is similarly interested in the contrast between the paradigm of exile put forward by the Left and its negation by others, except that in his case, a Dutch returnee from a three-year stay in a German concentration camp, having been integrated into the Left perspective, is denied all recognition upon his return for just this reason, except insofar as it becomes possible to render the experiences he shares with his comrades meaningful through various levels of mediation, but only as subjection to a trauma that rendered them entitled to treatment, at the cost of their political self-understanding in exile and return.

Kettler's study deals not only with the problem of return but also with the politics of memory that decisively conditions those outcomes and with the various cultural instrumentalities that may play a part, notably film. **Jerry Zaslove** concentrates on still photography as a feature of such interpretive work, focusing on a writer who plays his prose off against stills in doing the work of memory.

Several studies, including those of Lewis and Kettler, take up the question, whether there is a contemporary historical basis for the theme of unending exile, which figures so prominently in the cultural theory approaches mentioned earlier. **Eduardo Subirats** shows that the concrete historical approach most common among the contributors is by no means the sole contributor to the discussion about the concept of exile and its present application. He displays the vigor of a world-historical statement of the issues, in terms of macro-level social theory, and he maps a new location for the conception of an exile without bounds. The limits of exile remain contested in the work we are putting before

you. But our principal aim is to place the contest on the agenda in a manner that is connected with human actions in past and present historical worlds.

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The Privilege of Pain: The Exile as Ethical Model in Max Aub, Francisco Ayala, and Edward Said

Sebastiaan Faber

ABSTRACT

Is there something so virtuous or beneficial about exile that those who suffer it can serve as an ethical example for all intellectuals, exiled or not? The work of Max Aub, Francisco Ayala, and Edward Said seems, in different ways, to suggest so. The main purpose of this paper is to point out the tensions, contradictions, and dangers of this figurative use of exile as an ethical model, arguing that it minimizes the concessions, negotiations and struggle for legitimacy that generally mark the exile's existence.

Introduction

Let me begin with a guilty confession: I love exile. This is an awful thing to say, because exile is an awful thing. I mean, of course, that I adore exile as a topic. I love to teach it and write about it. But even this sounds strange, almost unethical. If, as Edward Said states, exile is a terrible form of mutilation, then who am I to say I like it? It would be like saying I am fond of torture. I will come back to this dilemma of exile's guilty pleasures below. For now, let me stick to the uneasy notion that exile is a lovely subject to work on. Even though the exile *experience* is marked by expulsion and exclusion, exile studies as a scholarly field – the interdisciplinary domain that deals with the social, cultural, and political dynamics of forced displacement – is remarkably hospitable to people of all backgrounds and theoretical persuasions. The topic is rewarding, too. Exile evokes sympathy and appeals to the imagination. To many people exiles are fascinating, romantically heroic figures. Their lot, moreover, can be fruitfully cast in an epic, dramatic, or tragic mode, depending on one's particular need or preference. And exile lends itself to sweeping, melodramatic generalizations about the importance of home, the pain of loss, and the illusory consolations of nostalgia. As an object of scholarship it is especially inviting, of course, to those of us interested in comparative work: Isn't exile of all times and all places?

For literary studies in particular exile has long been a boon. Not only because writers tend to be susceptible to expulsion, but because displacement drives many non-writers to pick up the pen. The field includes many of the great

literary classics – Ovid, Dante, Conrad, Nabokov – but also an inexhaustible trove of unexplored, marginal authors and works. More concretely, exile studies offer all the elements that the Humanities and Social Sciences thrive on these days: marginality, border crossing, identity conflicts, hybridity, transnationalism, and a seemingly organic articulation of cultural production with politics (Buruma 2001: 33). It shouldn't surprise us, then, that the number of studies dealing with exile is astronomical. WorldCat gives 13,000 book titles, and the bibliography of the Modern Language Association, covering the past four decades, includes almost 5,000 entries on the topic, not including the 1,500 or so on "diaspora," the almost 1,000 on "migration," and the more than 500 on "displacement."

As a result, though, this potentially rich comparative field has become completely unmanageable. Its actual scholarly results, moreover, are quite uneven. Exile studies as such does not seem to have made very clear advances toward a better understanding of the exile experience. There are interesting case studies by the thousands, but when it comes to more general conclusions, rigor is hard to come by and shallowness abounds. Thinking about it, this, too, is no surprise. The field's apparent hospitality is deceptive; in reality it is rife with problems and pitfalls that make it difficult to do solid comparative scholarship.

Of these problems and pitfalls, I would highlight three. First, there is the issue of delimitation: What, really, is the field's scope? Should we attempt a careful definition of exile and, if so, what would that be? How do you determine who qualifies to be considered an exile and who doesn't? Do you exclude economic immigrants or refugees? And how about expatriates like Hemingway? Is the *cause* of the displacement – politics, economics, personal preference – what matters most, or its *effects*? Second, there is the danger of reductionism, that is, the temptation to explain everything exiles do and produce as a direct result of their displacement. Connected with this problem is the tendency to over-generalize, to loose track of the historical specificity of each exile experience. The concept of 'exile literature,' for instance, encourages both reductionism and overgeneralization, at least if one defines it as all literature written in exile. In reality, of course, the notion is much more slippery; one could just as easily say that it encompasses all literature *about* exile, regardless of the circumstances of its production.

In fact, it is entirely unclear whether an overarching concept like 'exile literature' has any legitimacy at all. To state that exile has an impact on an author's work is a truism, but that does not make exile literature into a category clearly distinguishable from non-exilic works. Many attempts have been made to define the 'exilic-ness' of texts written in situations of displacement, but the arguments proposed have been either too obvious or too stretched. Let me give

some examples from my field, twentieth-century Spanish literature. Paul Ilie, in a book about Spanish literature written after the Civil War, identifies in some of these texts an "exilic sensibility," defined as a "mental condition" characterized by "set of feelings or beliefs" separating one or more individuals from their community (1980: 2). Gareth Thomas's book on the Spanish Civil War novel detects a difference between texts written in Spain and those written in displacement: Some of the latter display "exilic symptoms," including characters' "feeling cut off from others, failing to communicate with others, … not knowing where to go or what to do" (1990: 156). For Michael Ugarte exile tends to foster a specific kind of metatextual awareness, as it "leads the writer … into a dialogue with him or herself on the very nature of writing and on the problems that arise from an attempt to record reality" (1989: 19–20). I myself have argued that, in the case of Max Aub, exile made it impossible to represent the Spanish Civil War in the shape of a neatly composed historical narrative. Instead, Aub wrote chaotic, all-inclusive war chronicles, examples of what I have called a "realism of aporia" (Faber 2002: 237–44).

The problem with identifying these kinds of specific formal and thematic traits is that they are not in any way defining of exile literature: It is true that they appear in some exile texts, but they also figure in texts by authors who were never forced to leave their home. Ilie realizes this, but instead of dropping the notion of exile literature he expands it to include texts by non-displaced authors. For this purpose he introduces the concept of "inner exile." Some of the Spanish authors writing in Franco Spain, he argues, were so isolated that their texts, too, manifest an exilic sensibility (1980: 2–4). There is some merit to the idea of inner exile, but it makes it even more difficult to reach any clear-cut definition. What use is defining exile if you don't even have to leave your home, let alone your country, to become one?

The concept of inner exile turns exile into a psychological condition – a first step down the slippery slope that ends up transforming exile into an existential metaphor. I would say that this 'temptation of the trope' is the third main pitfall for those of us working in exile studies: Once we allow ourselves to think of exile in existential or figurative terms, there is little that would automatically fall outside of the field's scope. Don't all writers, in some sense, live in exile? And why stop with writers? Who isn't an exile of sorts? Isn't life itself, especially modern or postmodern life, a quintessentially exilic experience?

This move to metaphor has a paradoxical effect. On the one hand, it grants the real, physically displaced exile a special status insofar as her state becomes a more literal and intense version of an ailment affecting all of humanity. On the other hand, though, it takes away from the specificity of exiles' experience, and thus *reduces* their status. For this and other reasons, some scholars have argued

strongly against any metaphoric or symbolic notion of exile, which in their eyes trivializes the terrible reality and the material circumstances of real displacement, as well as the political struggles connected to it (Kettler 2005; Buruma 2001; McClennen 2004; Naharro–Calderón 1991; Kaplan 1996).

The Exile as Ethical Model

Here I wish to focus on a particular figurative use of exile: the construction of the exile experience as a model for an intellectual ethics. In this case, the social, psychological, and political consequences of physical displacement are reconceived as desirable, even exemplary assets for *all* intellectuals, exiles or not. In what follows I will reflect on the problematic nature of this notion by analyzing its different manifestations in the work of three distinguished intellectual exiles: Max Aub, Francisco Ayala, and Edward Said.[1]

Said (1935–2003), as is well known, was an exiled Palestinian who lived and worked most of his life in the United States. Ayala and Aub left Spain after the defeat of the Republic in the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939). Aub (1903–1972) was an agnostic Jew who was born in Paris but moved to Spain when he was eleven and began publishing there in the 1920s. Following the proclamation of the Second Spanish Republic in 1931 he became increasingly politicized; he joined the Socialist Party, worked for the Republic during the Civil War, and felt compelled to leave the country when Franco won. After spending the first three years of World War II in prisons and concentration or forced-labor camps in France and North Africa he managed to make it to Mexico, where he lived until his death in 1972. Ayala, born in 1906 in Granada, was of the same literary generation as Aub. Although less politicized, he too thought it impossible to live under Franco. He first moved to Argentina, then to Puerto Rico and the United States. From the 1960s on he returned to Spain on a regular basis, moving back permanently after Franco's death.

Aub, Ayala, and Said were all singularly productive in exile; and all three dedicated an important part of their work to reflections on exile as a particular state of being. All three recognized the many difficulties that come with forced displacement; but they also construed the exile experience as an opportunity for the intellectual to reach a new level of ethical awareness and virtue. As a result, they ended up constructing an ethics of exile that not only formulated a code of conduct for life in displacement, but aspired to a more general validity for all

[1] For some of the arguments and examples of this essay I am partly drawing on previous work, notably my book *Exile and Cultural Hegemony* (2002), and my articles "Max Aub, conciencia del exilio" (2003–2004) and "The exile's dilemma: writing the Civil War from elsewhere" (forthcoming).

intellectuals. My main purpose here is to point out the tensions and contradictions in this particular symbolic use of displacement – specifically, the ways in which it minimizes or masks the extent to which exile involves concessions, contaminations, complicities, negotiations and, in general, institutional dependency. Intellectual life, from a Darwinian standpoint, is less a struggle for survival than a struggle for legitimacy within a set of given institutional structures. This struggle is all the more obvious – and difficult – for intellectuals in exile.

It is important to note from the outset that although Aub, Ayala, and Said all end up deriving an ethics from exile, they do not go about it in the same way. Aub's exiled intellectual derives his strength and legitimacy from his unwavering affiliation with a political collective. For him the exile faces three main ethical imperatives: commitment to the political cause, loyalty to the exile community that embodies that commitment, and fidelity to his friends. For Ayala, by contrast, the ethics of exile forbid any lasting affiliation with collectives or political causes. In Ayala's model, the displaced intellectual cherishes his exilic rootlessness, striving to be detached, independent, and strictly cosmopolitan. Said occupies an ambivalent position in between these two extremes. On the one hand, he, too, advocates radical intellectual independence. On the other, he rejects the idea that the intellectual can or should stay out of politics. Still, for Said the intellectual's affiliations to particular collectives are always provisional and can never impose on his fundamental duty of dissent – a dissent that, in the end, is always strictly individual. If Aub grounds his ethics in the political *motivation* of displacement conceived in collective terms, then, one could say that Ayala and Said emphasize its salutary, liberating *effects* on the intellectual as individual thinker.

Max Aub: An Ethics of Aporia

Aub started writing about the Civil War even before he left Spain; and the centerpiece of his extensive production in exile – which spans narrative fiction, drama, essay, memoir, and poetry – is *El laberinto mágico*, a literary tapestry of the war consisting of five novels, one film script, and some forty short stories. Although Aub was raised, literarily speaking, in the 'dehumanized,' anti-realist art of the Spanish avant-garde, his gradual politicization in the 1930s and especially his experience of war and exile convinced him of the need for literary realism. Given what was happening in the world, Aub felt that the writer's first duty was to report on the times in as faithful a manner as possible. This also implied an explicitly political art – though Aub never subscribed to Zhdanov-style socialist realism and was always careful to emphasize his independence from party lines. Intellectuals, for Aub, should be interested in politics, address it, and take positions; but what distinguishes them from politicians is that they

see political issues primarily in *moral* terms (Aub 2000: 169; Villacañas Berlanga 2004: 27). For Aub, life in exile is the lived expression of an explicit commitment to the political struggle that motivated him to leave his country – in this case, the antifascist cause of the Spanish Republic. The exile's sole raison d'être is to honor this commitment, regardless of the immediate viability of the political project in question. Aub's ethics of exile, therefore, imply a full acceptance of exilic fate as a collective, potentially tragic condition.

Aub realizes that not all exiles are able to live up to this commitment. In his diaries, he regularly complains about the concessions made by his fellow Spaniards in Mexico, their small and larger acts of betrayal. Some give in to the lure of money and middle-class comfort: "Alardo Prats's wife, and he himself, have changed so much. He makes money now, owns a car, doesn't plan to return to Spain, is going to send his eldest daughter to school with the nuns … The Alardo Prats of his youth. God!" (Aub 2000: 197).[2] Others, especially the Stalinists, let Party loyalty trump their commitment to Spain and their fidelity to their friends. As soon as Aub publicly disagrees with Communist policy, his Party acquaintances stop talking to him. "Apparently," he complains, "there is a Communist concept of friendship that does not allow for differences of opinion" (Aub 2000: 213). Against the lack of steadfastness and loyalty he observes in his fellow countrymen, Aub obsessively reassures himself of his own moral constancy. "I am sticking to my own position," he writes in his diary in 1952; "I am who I was and plan on continue being the same"; "I still am in the place where I was before" (Aub 2000: 211, 216, 226). And fifteen years later: "It's not that I haven't changed – I'm not made of stone, and there are plenty of mirrors around – but I don't think that my transformations go beyond the ripeness of life and the grey hairs of experience" (1967: 9). Aub is aware of the possible, even likely, uselessness of his moral constancy; but to him it is a matter of honor. His ethics of exile is one of stubborn persistence in the face of adverse circumstances – an ethics of aporia.

Aub's obstinate dwelling in the impossible also drives almost his entire literary production in exile. On the one hand, he sees his writings as the clearest expression of his political commitment ("I left Spain in order not to remain silent," he writes in 1952, "because that is my way of fighting, because I am a writer by profession – and I will not stop speaking my truth" [2000: 216]). At the same time, his work is also a never-ending reflection on the problematic nature of that commitment. What does it mean to declare oneself bound to a set of values that everything indicates have long gone out of fashion? What virtue is there in defending the legitimacy of a government that disappeared thirty years

[2] All translations are mine.

ago? When do changed circumstances – or the simple passage of time – exonerate someone from an obligation contracted decades earlier? At what point does moral perseverance turn into pigheadedness? To what extent do the circumstances of displacement force an exile to betray his loyalties? Aub's characters – men and women, intellectuals and workers – never cease wondering and disagreeing; but they never hit on a clear answer, either.

Aub is well aware that loyalty and commitment constitute an exile's strongest claim to moral superiority but also her greatest vulnerability. Exiles might see their leaving their country as a major sacrifice and a supreme moral act, but it is easy for those left behind to turn this logic around and brand the exile's departure as a form of betrayal or cowardice. Especially if existence in exile is relatively comfortable in comparison with life back home, the exile can become haunted by feelings of doubt and guilt. Sure, exile can be harsh – but it also dissolves many of the bothersome obligations and limitations that are part and parcel of a normal life back home.

Aub's play *Tránsito* (1944) is about this sense of guilt produced by the inevitable fact that exiles contract new loyalties, betraying their old ones. The main character, Emilio, has left his wife and children behind in Spain, and struck up a relationship with another woman, Tránsito ('transit'). As his wife, Cruz ('cross'), visits him in his dreams, he begins to doubt the ethical soundness of his leaving his homeland. When Cruz's dream figure assures him that his children still love him in spite of it all, he retorts that they surely must resent his departure: "They blame me for having to flee, for having to abandon you all, as if I were a thief. As if I were a foreigner." "You are just imagining all that," his wife replies. "Then why," Emilio retorts, "don't they write me more often?" (Aub 1968: 834). It is also in his dreamed dialogue with his wife that Emilio confesses to have lost faith in his political convictions: "Faced with the past I am overcome with vertigo and dizziness. Was it worth it, so much death, so much distance?" (ibid.: 835). The play's symbolism is obvious: Emilio's doubts and the guilt toward his abandoned family are the 'cross' the exile gets to bear.

Many Spanish Civil War exiles were quick to claim moral supremacy (Faber 2002: 125); but most of Aub's stories about his comrades in Mexico show that these claims are largely based on self-delusion. "La verdadera historia de la muerte de Francisco Franco" (The True Story of the Death of Francisco Franco, 1960), for instance, casts the Spaniards' fate in a sharply ironic mode, making clear that what the exiles themselves see as moral constancy and courage is in reality sheer stubbornness and stagnation. Incapable of doing much more than to sit in a café, fight with each other, and dwell on the past, the Spaniards drive their poor Mexican waiter to a desperate act of murder: Just to get rid of the exiles, he decides to travel to Spain and kill Franco (Aub 1994: 407–28). Similarly,

in the short story "La Merced" (The Merced, 1960) the main character, a Communist, is convinced that he has remained loyal to his political beliefs until one day, fifteen years into his exile, he realizes with a pang that he has become his own political enemy: a *patrón*, or boss (Aub 1994: 401–405). As I have argued elsewhere (Faber 2003–2004), even Aub's texts that do not explicitly deal with situations of exile can be read as an expression of exilic dilemmas. The last two novels of Aub's magnus opus on the Spanish Civil War, especially, obsessively reflect on the relative nature of loyalty and the ultimate inevitability of betrayal. In this way, then, Aub's narrative fiction and drama not only end up undermining the steadfast position that he stakes out for himself in his diaries, but in more general terms raise fundamental questions about the notion of exile as a situation of ethical privilege.

Even in the rare cases that exiles really do manage to remain faithful to their principles, Aub shows their ethical probity to be both suspiciously facile and tragically unproductive, especially when compared to the much more fraught moral trajectory of those who did not leave their country and were forced to find a way to survive under political repression. Aub brings this out very clearly in three plays he wrote in 1947, 1960, and 1964, each entitled *La vuelta* (The Return). All three texts, set in the time they were written, feature protagonists who return to Francoist society after long years in prison or exile. They pride themselves on their purity of political purpose, which they nursed with desperate care throughout their time away, and thus believe they are coming back with their previous hopes and ideals intact. At first they are shocked to find that everyone else's ideas have changed, and they feel outraged by the concessions their friends and family have made to make do with their lives under Francoism. Soon, though, the returnees are forced to acknowledge that their jealously guarded moral purity – the only thing that sustained them in prison or exile – has become gratuitous and anachronistic.

For Aub, the three *Vueltas* turned out to be fictional dress rehearsals for his first trip to Spain after thirty years of exile, in 1969. The disillusioned diary of that journey, *La gallina ciega* (Blindman's Buff, 1971), stages the same tragic confrontation between the exile's claim to moral constancy and the much more complex position of those left behind. At one point Aub is even forced to admit that his own suffering in exile has been relatively minor compared to the fate of those who were forced to live and write in a dictatorial Spain (1996: 227). So while Aub himself, in his diaries and daily life, adheres to a notion of exile as a model of intellectual ethics, his work ends up indicating that the relative freedom of exile might allow for an extraordinarily faithful adherence to one's principles, but that such moral constancy, nursed as it is in isolation, is likely to prove sterile.

Francisco Ayala: An Ethics of Detachment

Francisco Ayala's take is different. For him the exile's freedom is both positive and productive, and contrary to Aub's, his vision of exile is pretty much free of conflict, tragedy, and guilt. For Ayala, the inconveniences of exile are outweighed by the advantages and opportunities it provides; and he concluded early on that he and his fellow exiles were far better off than the poor intellectuals who found themselves struggling for survival in the stifling, rancid cultural climate of Francoist Spain. Ayala, therefore, has little patience for exiles who wallow in their misery, and he feels no particular solidarity with them.

Having earned his law degree in 1932, Ayala spent most of his long exile in academic positions, first in Argentina and then in Puerto Rico and the United States. An active publicist from the early 1920s, he also made a name for himself as a literary writer associated with the avant-garde group promoted by José Ortega y Gasset and his *Revista de Occidente*. Like Aub, Ayala supported the Spanish Republic and opposed Franco; in 1937 he became the Republic's ambassador in Czechoslovakia. Unlike Aub, however, Ayala did not break with Ortega's "dehumanized" aesthetics. He also believed in a clear separation between politics and literature. His production in exile is wide and varied, ranging from sociology textbooks and philosophical essays to novels and short stories. Here we will focus on three texts that specifically deal with exile and intellectual ethics: *Razón del mundo* (Reason of the World, 1944), "Para quién escribimos nosotros" (For Whom Do We Write, 1949), and "La cuestionable literatura del exilio" (The Questionable Literature of Exile, 1981).

From the moment he left Spain, Ayala emphatically kept his distance from the rest of the exile community. A liberal in the traditional European sense, he refused out of principle to contract any significant group commitments. In fact, Ayala welcomed his exile insofar as it allowed him to sever his ties to any kind of organic collective. In *Razón del mundo*, his first significant book published abroad, he argued that the intellectual's sole imperative is to remain true to himself, "on a disinterested level, without governmental commitments or duties, without the ties of any temporal interests whatsoever" (1962: 121). He maintained this stance throughout his life: Even when, during his yearly trips to Spain, he would be asked by friends and acquaintances to sign manifestoes against the Franco regime, he always refused. "I have stubbornly resisted [this kind of] 'moral blackmail,'" he writes in his memoir, "with the unfailing response that, given that I'm quite capable of publicly expressing what I think, it is a principle of mine not to subscribe to other people's texts." "I knew," Ayala adds,

> that – unfailingly – those who I snubbed would interpret that response as a cowardly excuse, when in reality one needs more courage to face the irritated disapproval of one's peers and friends than to run the possible risks of a punitive reaction from the challenged authorities. However, my response was no subterfuge, but a logical and very congruent consequence of the notion I hold of my duties as an intellectual and of intellectuals' rightful role in public life. (2001: 472)

From this individualist position, Ayala manifested himself early on as a critical observer of the exile community. In "Para quién escribimos nosotros" he scolds his fellow exiles for obsessing too much over Spain: They should get their act together, stop whining, and begin facing the reality of their life abroad. Nor should they any longer write solely for a Spanish audience. True, Ayala admits, exiles face important hurdles, including nationalistic attitudes in their host countries that curb their freedom of expression and access to resources. But nationalism is an evil that stifles intellectuals everywhere, exiled or not. The Spanish Republicans have therefore no particular reason to mourn their fate. In a world that, as Ayala writes, "seems to have eliminated once and for all the moral aspect of all issues" (1971: 150), one could say that, from an intellectual point of view, all writers now live in exile.

Given the way things are in the world, Ayala believes that the only option open to true intellectuals wanting to preserve their moral integrity is to live an isolated existence, seeking solace in each other's company and conversation. Intellectual life must limit itself for the time being to a dialogue among like-minded recluses, "a tacit understanding among the most sophisticated minds" bound by "a solidarity based on shared values." Ayala thus ends up advancing a notion the intelligentsia as a cosmopolitan community of detached anchorites – a "conspiracy of solitary souls, of obstinate and extremely secretive hermits, hidden among the crowds and withdrawn within the middle of the city, waiting to be discovered" – who are engaged in a "spiritual rescue operation" to save the world from impending disaster. This operation will only work, however, if the intellectuals shun "any concern … unconnected to the proper interests of the mind, of thought, of letters" (1971: 162–64). Politics, in other words, have no place in the intellectual dialogue. For Ayala, then, exile provides an ethical model because the intellectual *should* be a loner with a strictly cosmopolitan position in the world. Ayala's is an ethics of stern detachment.

There is an interesting twist to Ayala's story, though. Paradoxically, his celebration of a de-institutionalized, de-politicized cosmopolitanism ended up facilitating his own individual *reintegration* into his homeland at a moment when most of his fellow exiles, including Aub, scrupulously maintained that a return to Francoist Spain was out of the question. Ayala first went back to Spain in 1960,

and bought an apartment in Madrid three years later. In a letter to Aub, he defended his decision as a purely financial one:

> That's what happens with the supercapitalism in which we live. If one has a bit of money left over, there is nowhere in this country [the United States] to invest it, and one has to find a place for it in some underdeveloped country, and what better country to do so than ours? If some time in the future things improve, and it's time to retire, we'll at least have a corner there. (Aub & Ayala 2001: 105)

It is much more likely, though, that buying the apartment was part of a conscious strategy on Ayala's part to gradually reestablish his contact with, and prestige in, his native country. As Villacañas Berlanga writes, Ayala's self-imposed isolation "gave him an ample margin of movement when it came to normalizing his relations with Spain" (2004: 2). From 1963 on he would spend every summer in Madrid; and in 1980, five years after Franco's death and three after Spain's first democratic elections, he moved back permanently.

Ayala's individualist, apolitical stance, and the care he had taken not to be politically associated with the Republic, significantly helped bolster his status in post-Franco Spain as well. In the first decades after Franco's death and the transition to democracy, there existed an overwhelming desire to break with the past, on the part of the political elite as well as a large section of the population. As a result, there were few attempts made to reincorporate the cultural legacy of Republican exile, let alone recognize the exiles' political struggle. It also meant that someone like Aub, who had never ceased to identify himself with the Republic, was too politically marked to receive much posthumous attention. Ayala – who incidentally is still alive as of this writing, and about to turn 100 – was a much more acceptable figure. The extent to which Ayala's meticulously independent trajectory paid off is illustrated by the fact that in 1992, the year of the Quincentenary, he received the prestigious Cervantes prize, awarded by the Spanish Crown to authors from Spain or Latin America. Especially striking was the rhetoric employed on that occasion by the King and Ayala himself. As it turned out, Ayala's carefully crafted self-image allowed King Juan Carlos to smooth over two gigantic, uncomfortable rifts in one single sweep: the postcolonial conflict between Spain and its former overseas possessions, and the still very much unsettled tension between the two warring camps in the Spanish Civil War.

Ayala proved himself to be a welcome and powerful symbol of reconciliation. The King, in a cautiously worded speech that managed never once to mention Franco or Francoism, characterized Ayala as "a man radically linked with his time," a time in which "Spanish social and political life underwent decisive changes" (an indirect reference to the Civil War and the dictatorship). Ayala's move to the Americas, however, was a blessing in disguise because it allowed

him to develop his talents "on both shores of the language," turning him into a truly pan-Hispanic author. The King emphasized that Ayala "never considered his exile as a cultural uprooting":

> For him, his literature written in those years belongs to the whole of Spanish culture, and has in common with the literature that continued to be written within our borders the unifying trait of the shared use of the Spanish language. Ayala has thus emphasized a notion of culture not differentiated by historical events, but enriched by them. The Crown, which by vocation draws together all the ways of feeling Spanish, finds in personalities like that of Francisco Ayala, the clearest example of a Spain that is finally reunited. (de Borbón 1992)

Ayala, in turn, used his acceptance speech to lament the fact that some people still confuse "the literary with the political." Speaking about his life, he indicated that in the Civil War he did indeed take the Republic's side, but also emphasized that he did so "as a citizen (but certainly not as a writer)." After twenty years of exile, he went on, "I had the opportunity to reintegrate (strictly speaking, *almost* reintegrate) into Spain" (Ayala 1992).

Although in his speech Ayala referred to his stay in the Americas as an *exilio*, in reality he never fully accepted the label of *exiliado*, and even less that of "exile writer." Similarly, he always insisted that his displacement should never be used to judge, evaluate, or classify his literary production. He thought the same was true for his fellow Republicans who had spent the better part of their life abroad. In a 1981 essay entitled "La cuestionable literatura del exilio" (The Questionable Literature of Exile), he formulated a detailed argument along these lines that is worth summarizing at some length.

What, Ayala asks, is the so-called 'exile novel'? Do Spanish novels written in exile have enough traits in common for us to group them together in one single category? No, Ayala says, they don't. In reality the only characteristics that can be invoked to speak in generic terms of the Spanish exile novel are based on "sheer external circumstances, without a serious repercussion on the content – and even less on the form – of the literary work" (1981: 63). Exile is a life experience, not a literary one. To be sure, the work of writers like Aub, Ramón Sender, or Ayala himself changed after the Civil War, but these changes were more due to general historical circumstances than to their displacement per se. After all, the work of writers who remained in Spain changed, too. This leads Ayala to his most important point:

> What is called the 'exile novel' is a literary category formed by virtue of socio-political circumstances that only affect the external aspects of literature. Paradoxically, it could be said that this category refers only indirectly to the novelists who were exiled; what it refers to more directly is, rather, the

> conditions under which narrative literature was written in the Pensinsula since the Civil War. (1981: 65)

For Ayala, it was the writers who *remained* in Spain that were most severely affected by Franco's victory. They suffered at least as much as their exiled counterparts: Given that prewar Spain had disappeared, they, too, had to live with the nagging nostalgia for their absent homeland. More importantly, Francoism, "which accomplished the incredible feat of culturally submitting to catholic integrism a country isolated from the rest of the world," created a highly anomalous situation as far as literary development was concerned. Hence, the work of those writers who went into exile developed much more naturally – more freely, more in touch with the world and their time – than that of those who stayed in Spain (1981: 65).

Ayala's arguments are, in themselves, worthy of serious consideration and point out some of the same pitfalls of exile studies that I identified at the beginning of this essay. Yet in the end his repeated insistence on a clear separation between the political, historical, or sociological, on the one hand, and the strictly literary on the other is self-serving. It allows him to have his cake and eat it too. In the 1960s and 1970s it permitted him to be a liberal while softening the consequences of Francoist cultural politics (the exclusion, persecution, and censorship most other exile writers suffered). Later, it helped him rise to fame in a post-Franco Spain that was not ready to face the conflicts of the past.

Edward Said: An Ethics of Renunciation

Said occupies a precarious, ambivalent position in between Aub's unwavering commitment and Ayala's attitude of strict detachment. Like Aub, Said believes that it is not possible or desirable for the intellectual to shun politics. At the same time, though, he shares Ayala's fundamental suspicion of any kind of collective affiliation. The notion that exile can serve as a model for an intellectual ethics occupies a central position in Said's work during the last twenty years of his life. The key texts here are a 1984 essay, "Reflections on Exile," and a series of radio lectures given in 1993 and published as *Representations of the Intellectual* (1994).[3]

"Reflections on exile" is founded on a contradiction. Said begins by warning against any attempt to elevate exile to a figurative level and turn it into a "redemptive motif," but ends up doing exactly that. Exile, for Said, symbolizes intellectual freedom; it provides, he says, "an alternative to the mass institutions that dominate modern life" (2000: 184). Although the exile experience is terrible, there are "things to be learned" from it. Concretely, Said suggests that the

[3] My reading of Said's "Reflections" is partly inspired by David Kettler's opening comments in his essay on "Symbolic uses of exile" (Kettler 2005).

suffering and losses of exile can produce a radical form of intellectual enlightenment – an emancipation from the ideology and mystification that come with being and feeling at home somewhere. In *Representations of the Intellectual*, Said goes one step further, associating an intellectual's being at home with forms of accommodation, materialism, co-optation, and self-interest – a corruption and betrayal, in short, of the intellectual's true vocation (1994: 53). In the face of these threats to the intellectual's integrity, exile "is a model for the intellectual who is tempted, and even beset and overwhelmed, by the rewards of accommodation, yea-saying, settling in" (1994: 63).

Exile, then, comes with great advantages. In "Reflections" Said lists five. In the first place, it can provide a more truthful vision of the self, fostering as it does "self-awareness" and a "scrupulous … subjectivity" (2000: 184). Second, exile promotes a radically secular vision of the world, insofar as it makes one face the fact that history is thoroughly man-made. Third, since exile breaks up habits of thought and perception, it helps provide immunity against "dogma and orthodoxy" (ibid.: 185). Fourth, the exile's multiple frames of reference can foster a "contrapuntal" awareness (ibid.: 186). Finally, exile has specific epistemological advantages as well. Since it turns the familiar strange and the strange familiar, exile makes one see "the whole world as a foreign land" (ibid.: 185). Following Erich Auerbach, Said argues that this is an indispensable disposition for the practice of a truly rigorous, disinterested form of humanistic scholarship. "Only by embracing this attitude," he writes, "can a historian begin to grasp human experience and its written records in their diversity and particularity; otherwise he or she will remain committed more to the exclusions and reactions of prejudice than to the freedom that accompanies knowledge" (ibid.: 185). After repeating many of these same themes in *Representations*, Said argues that the main ethical imperative for all intellectuals, whether they are exiled or not, is to behave and think *as if they were*. And he approvingly quotes Adorno: "It is part of morality not to be at home in one's home" (1994: 57).

As said, this reading of exile as an exemplary state of mind is one of the cornerstones of Said's later work. It is not without problems, though; and it is to Said's merit that in "Reflections" he brings up a couple of important caveats. First, he makes clear that what he identifies as the potentially liberating gains of exile by no means come automatically with displacement or dislocation. To the contrary, exile is just as likely – or even more so – to foster a *closing* of the mind. In order to make his argument work anyway, Said is forced to establish a relatively clear-cut division between "good" and "bad" exiles. Bad exiles are the ones who fall prey to exile's temptations: They engage in "less attractive forms of self-assertion," "sit on the sidelines nursing a wound," tend to be "indulgent," "sulky," and "jealous." By contrast, those whose attitude serves as an ethical

model for the rest of us are the ones who manage to work through these initial, childish stages and finally manage to go without the ideological and psychological consolations of nationalism, dogmatism, exceptionalism, and narcissistic self-pity. Said's intellectual ethics of exile, then, are ultimately an ethics of *renunciation*. His thinking in these matters, much like Adorno's, has a puritan, even ascetic streak.

Said's second caveat has to do with his metaphoric mobilization of exile in the service of an intellectual ethics. Said is well aware that his instrumental use of exile in this way is suspect, precisely from an ethical point of view, because it sublimates, even celebrates, a condition of terrible suffering and pain. In "Reflections" Said is so uncomfortably conscious of this problem that he spends almost half the essay explaining why it is wrong and dangerous to make exile "serve notions of humanism." However, the temptation to go this route anyway is clearly too strong. As if to compensate for ignoring his own warnings, Said resorts to describing exile's terrors in melodramatic hyperbole. Exile, he states, is "like death but without death's ultimate mercy"; "it has torn millions of people from the nourishment of tradition, family, and geography" (2000: 174); it is "the unhealable rift forced between a human being and a native place, between the self and its true home: its essential sadness can never be surmounted. The achievements of exile are permanently undermined by the loss of something left behind forever" (ibid.: 173).

What is really at stake here, however, is not so much the tension between the literal and the figurative meaning of exile or between a prescriptive "metaphysical" exile and the reality of political banishment. The tension that remains unresolved in Said's text is the contrast between the relative comfort of exiled intellectuals – including perhaps the essayist himself – and the large-scale suffering of large, anonymous refugee populations.

To be sure, Said tries to accommodate the refugees into his argument as a kind of moral reality check. It is true, he writes, that the didactic or cathartic effects of exile can also benefit onlookers and bystanders: "exiles … do leaven their environment"; "naturally 'we' concentrate on that enlightening aspect of 'their' presence among us, not their misery or their demands." At the same time, he realizes the parasitical nature of this tendency to celebrate the figure of the exile as a moral example and source of inspiration. But when he tries to point out the dangers of a too complacent consumption of exilic lessons, his normal lucidity eludes him, and he gets lost in empty rhetoric: "looked at from the bleak political perspective of modern mass dislocations, individual exiles force us to recognize the tragic fate of homelessness in a necessarily heartless world" (ibid.: 183).

Said ends up in a similar rhetorical dead end when he attempts to signal the dangers of studying exile from a purely literary perspective, without taking into account the large-scale havoc of mass dislocation:

> it is apparent that to concentrate on exile as a contemporary political punishment, you must … map territories of experience beyond those mapped by the literature of exile itself. You must first set aside Joyce and Nabokov and think instead of the uncountable masses for whom UN agencies have been created…. To reflect on [exiles] … means that you must leave the modest refuge provided by subjectivity and resort instead to the abstractions of mass politics. Negotiations, wars of national liberation, people bundled out of their homes and prodded, bussed or walked to enclaves in other regions: what do these experiences add up to? Are they not manifestly and almost by design irrecoverable? (Said 2000: 175–6)

What strikes one in these passages is not so much the meaninglessness of Said's phrases – "necessarily heartless," "by design irrecoverable" – as the fact that these insistent, repetitive statements about refugee collectives are curiously unconnected to the rest of the text, and remarkably unproductive for Said's general argument. In this sense, I would argue, they are symptomatic of the fact that Said, in his effort to invoke exile in the service of an intellectual ethics, *cannot find a place* for the anonymous masses of refugees. The refugees are obviously there, but he does not know what to do with them. This is why it is not his own troping of exile in the service of ethics that feels abstract to him; rather, it is those very concrete groups of people scattered in camps across the world whom he associates with "the abstractions of mass politics."

A second unresolved tension in the "Reflections" essay has to do with Said's ambivalent attitude to what one could call the ideology of home, the romantic discourse of belonging. Said, liberal, secular humanist that he is, does not like nationalism and patriotism. He is suspicious of any discourse that exalts collective identity, especially if it is linked to a particular geographical space. The problem is that his outrage about exile as a terrible fate derives its moral force from notions of home and belonging. You can't decry uprooting unless you attach a value to rootedness. Indeed, he approvingly quotes Simone Weil's phrase that "[t]o be rooted is perhaps the most important and least recognized need of the human soul." This sits uncomfortably with Said's rejection of what he calls the "thumping language of national pride, collective sentiments, group passions" (2000: 177). Said's problem, I would argue, is that he doesn't feel he can deny the anonymous masses of displaced peoples the right to an ideology of rootedness, even though he does demand that exiled *intellectuals* deny themselves that right.

This prescriptive asceticism comes more explicitly to the fore in *Representations of the Intellectual*. If "Reflections" is about the exile as intellectual, *Representations* is about the intellectual as exile. Over the course of his six lectures, Said identifies the true intellectual as a "nay-sayer," a rigorously independent, secular thinker who follows his own "universal and single standard" in criticizing the status quo, fights injustice, speaks "truth to power," sides with the "the weak and unrepresented" – and finds pleasure in this dauntingly lonely task. Exile, for Said, is the condition that most clearly represents this kind of attitude. He admits that not all exiles are nonconformist dissidents – he mentions people like Kissinger, who quickly managed to join the establishment and serve their host authorities – but Said is more interested in "the intellectual who because of exile cannot, or, more to the point, will not make the adjustment, preferring instead to remain outside the mainstream, unaccommodated, unco-opted, resistant …" (ibid.: 52).

Representations rehearses many of the same points of the "Reflections" essay written ten years before; but it is telling that the refugees have disappeared, and that Said seems to have lost his earlier hesitations about turning exile into a redemptive trope: "while it is an *actual* condition, exile is also for my purposes a *metaphorical* condition. By that I mean that my diagnosis of the intellectual in exile derives from the social and political history of dislocation and migration … but is not limited to it" (1994: 52). Metaphorical or "metaphysical" exiles are outsiders within their own community. Whereas some intellectuals, who "belong fully to the society as it is, who flourish in it without an overwhelming sense of dissonance or dissent" can be called "yea-sayers," Said's figurative exiles are "nay-sayers," "at odds with their society and therefore outsiders and exiles so far as privileges, power, and honors are concerned." The nay-sayers are like exiles in that they are never "fully adjusted, always feeling outside the chatty, familiar world inhabited by natives" and tend to "avoid and even dislike the trappings of accommodation and national well-being": "Exile for the intellectual in this metaphysical sense is restlessness, movement, constantly being unsettled, and unsettling others" (1994: 52–3).

As Williams points out, the image of the ideal intellectual proposed by Said – a dissenter, amateur, and rigorous individualist – relies heavily on "an essentially literary myth, fashioning the intellectual as a kind of existential hero who stands by her- or himself, alone, warding off power, without any social ties but simply drawn on by truth" (1997: 55). The principal redeeming feature of Said's intellectual, Williams concludes, is a Kantian kind of *disinterestedness*. The exile's position is perceived as clean and pure, free of the messiness of institutional interests, struggles for prominence and power, or personal ambition and self-

promotion. Curiously, then, "Said's definition of political engagement and the intellectual's purchase on politics is finally based on *aesthetic* criteria" (ibid.: 57).

The same is true for Ayala. In fact, his rhetoric is at times uncannily similar to Said's. In *Razón del mundo*, Ayala describes the intellectual's ideal attitude as one of abnegation, sacrifice, and selfishness: the intellectual "will have to preserve his faculties, isolated and intact, like a little island of vigilant reason" (1962: 125). This, Ayala writes, is a difficult task – "there is no heroism comparable to that of implacable solitude" – and one that requires a kind of courage not likely to garner much public recognition: "Who will recognize in that irritating, obstinate, inveterate lack of solidarity the self-sacrificing dedication to a mission ...?" (1962: 125).

Although Said and Ayala differ with respect to the intellectual's involvement in politics – anathema for Ayala, imperative for Said – their exile-based intellectual ethics shares one main problem: It is hopelessly idealist. Their construction of life in exile as well as their conception of the intellectual's existence almost completely ignores the material circumstances of both. They do not address issues of employment, legal status, housing, or access to the means of intellectual production (publishers, media outlets, and the like).[4] This oversight is problematic: If these crucial preconditions for intellectual work are never a given, they are even less so in situations of displacement. Intellectuals always find themselves struggling for survival and prominence in a particular public and economic sphere. For exiles, that struggle is all the more necessary, all the more difficult, and all the more likely to require complex negotiations in which an intellectual is forced to make concessions. Not the kind of personal sacrifices for the sake of ethical principles that Said and Ayala call for, but sacrifices *of* ethical principles for the sake of survival. As Kettler points out, there is a "fundamental falsity in Said's evocation of the exile as a post-modern or post-colonial hero"; it fails to "attend to the conjunctions between exile and phenomena of power and legitimacy" (2005: 271).

Said's depiction of the intellectual's ethical position as a matter of a "set of concrete choices" (1994: xv) – insider or outsider, yea-sayer or nay-sayer – is therefore misleading. So is the opposition he sets up between co-optation, accommodation, and self-interest on the one hand, and exile, autonomy, and disinterestedness on the other. In fact, if we have to stick to binarisms, it would make much more sense to turn Said's model around: Real-life intellectual exiles, having lost their normal economic support network, including their audiences

[4] "Said," Williams observes, "ascribes a free-floating quality to an intellectual who by his definition speaks to a public sphere, but he fails to account for the channels through which one might gain access to that public sphere" (1997: 56).

and media access, are much more vulnerable to co-optation and institutional dependency.[5]

It is entirely unclear how Ayala's and Said's intellectual, exiled or not, is supposed to put bread on the table, or get his voice heard. This lacuna is all the more poignant given the clear, though largely unacknowledged, autobiographical dimension of their texts. If, as Williams argues, *Representations* can be read as a form of self-legitimation, "an apologia, offering an explanation for Said's career" (1997: 57–58), the same can be said of Ayala's prescriptions. Both, however, fail to indicate how their calls for discipline, renunciation, and self-imposed marginality relate to their own institutional positions as well-paid, tenured, prestigious academics with ready access to the media. If intellectual exile is about a struggle for legitimacy, for symbolic capital, both Said and Ayala can said to have been extremely successful. As Williams writes of Said, "his career has been marked by all the signposts of prominence and recognized by plethora of elite 'legitimating bodies,'" signalling the "consecration of his position within the academic-intellectual field" (1997: 50). Said does purport to talk about intellectuals' relation to institutions and authorities, but the rhetorical register of his texts exonerates him from having to go into the nitty-gritty details of daily life.

Max Aub does go into those details. From a material and institutional point of view, he is in fact the only truly marginalized intellectual of the three, and therefore the most clearly exilic in Said's sense. Interestingly, this position allows him to be both more principled *and* realistic than Said and Ayala. Unlike Said, for instance, Aub has no trouble squaring the fate of the anonymous masses of refugees with his own, for the simple reason that, as a former concentration camp inmate and forced laborer, he has been one of them. And if Said can find no place for the refugees in his reflections on exile, they find a meaningful home, as characters, in Aub's literary work.[6] Aub was also more truly exilic than Said and Ayala in that he could not afford to be picky about the kind of work he accepted, including government assignments: He had a family to feed. Moreover, he was forced to come up with the printing costs for many of his own works, which were written for a Spanish audience (that had no access to them) and did not easily appeal to Mexican readers.

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[5] My book *Exile and Cultural Hegemony* argues that this was indeed the case for some of the Spanish Republicans who were exiled to Mexico after the Spanish Civil War.

[6] Political refugees are prominently featured in *Campo francés* (1965), a screenplay about repression and concentration camps in prewar France; *San Juan*, a tragedy set on a boat with Jewish refugees; and *No*, a play about refugees on the East/West German border in the early postwar period.

Given these experiences, Aub's view of life in exile is rather disenchanted. Even though he likes to think of himself as an example of moral constancy and rectitude, he knows that exile does not automatically imply an exemplary ethical life, free of compromising attachments – to the contrary. Aub also knows that there is something sadly facile about the exile's claim to ethical purity, much in the same way that, for Orwell, Gandhi's asceticism smacked of vanity and laziness (Orwell 2002: 1353–4).

As we have seen, for Ayala and Said intellectual independence precludes any visceral sense of group solidarity. Ayala prefers never to align himself with any collective at all; Said only does so with much caution and reservation, guided by the motto "Never solidarity before criticism" (1994: 32). Aub, by contrast, advocates – and lives – a conscious affiliation with a political collective, whose identity is based on a shared trauma – banishment – and a shared ideal: a return to a Spain free of Franco. For Aub, then, the relationship of exiled intellectual to the larger community of the displaced is one of solidarity and representation.

Correspondingly, Aub, Ayala and Said also differ fundamentally in their ethical vision of exile. For Said and Ayala exile provides a refuge of subjectivity, and they conceive of exile as a condition of almost utopian freedom and enlightenment. Ayala's repeated comparison of the exiled intellectual to a hermit is appropriate: His ideal intellectual is a saintly figure, detached from the world. Curiously, something similar is true for Said, despite his repeated calls for "worldliness." In the end, Said's mobilization of exile for an ascetic intellectual ethics of renunciation also turns the intellectual into an unworldly hermit of sorts, someone who is able to go without the ideological consolations that the displaced masses need to survive. Said and Ayala associate collective commitments with corruption, self-interest and subservience, but it is legitimate to wonder whether the individualism they promote is really free of those negative aspects. Looking at Ayala's career path, the self-interest and ambition – not to say opportunism – are pretty obvious. In Said´s case, there is a similar dissonance, bordering on bad faith, between his insistence on the need to resist the temptation of public recognition and the large amounts of it that he garnered in the course of his career. Speaking of the rhetorical excesses that characterize some types of exile writing, Ugarte mentions "the linguistic overcompensation of the exile who has not only an ax to grind but a life to vindicate." Indeed, if there is any overarching neuroticism to exile writing, it might well be the pervasive need for self-justification. In that sense, Ayala's and Said's texts *can* be called exilic.

Max Aub's political position, as said, was steadfast. At the same time, most of his literary work is about the impossibility of true steadfastness. It shows that exile is never pure, irremediably worldly, always a matter of negotiation and

therefore, inevitably, some form of betrayal.[7] The ethics of exile as formulated by Said and Ayala, enamored as they are by notions of asceticism, autonomy, and disinterestedness, prefer to ignore this messy reality. Said's ethics of dissent is admirable and necessary; but, in the end, I don't think one need invoke exile in order to formulate it. In fact, I would strongly caution against any effort to derive an ethical example from any type of suffering. Exile destroys much more than it enables, and one should think twice before celebrating or romanticizing it in any way.

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[7] Sophia McClennen, in her analysis of the exile writers Juan Goytisolo, Ariel Dorfman, and Cristina Peri Rossi, reaches a similar conclusion: "At a time when the exile was often heralded as a metaphor for a free-floating, deterritorialized, unfettered existence, these exiles wrote texts that challenged the notion that writers working on the margins can ever be free of social constraints, exposing such critical positions as naïve and untenable…. For these writers, free-floating transnational existence is illusory, because the exile, by definition, is grounded in a historical, political world that caused the conditions of his or her exile" (2004: 223).

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On the Specificity of the Spanish Exile of 1939

Carlos Blanco Aguinaga

ABSTRACT

In the Spanish case, with minor exceptions, all of the exiles left together because they had been together in a struggle and a defeat clearly delimited in time. That is, one of the characteristics of the Spanish exile of 1939 is to be found in the fact that in the course of three to four weeks most of the country's prominent intellectuals went into exile along with half a million other Spaniards. Once in Mexico, thanks to the Mexican government and to the Republican Spanish organizations set up in late 1938 or early 1939, the exiles continued behaving (and being seen) as a collective. As I think of the various massive exiles of the modern world I find that the political Spanish exodus that began in early 1939 is the only one in which a people and its government left the homeland together; and, furthermore, that the government took charge, at various fundamental levels, of the collective well-being of all.

Exile teaches how to live and to be self-sufficient.
– Democritus

The tendency to use the terms *diaspora*, *exile* and *migration* interchangeably has become common practice in the past few years, possibly because all three terms refer to the immemorial and very often tragic fact that, given diverse circumstances, people abandon their homelands to establish (or try to establish) themselves somewhere else, either because they displace themselves voluntarily or because they are obliged to do so (*desterrarse*, in Spanish: to be torn away from one's land or "place"). But it is important not to confuse the three terms, if we are properly to remember and understand the fact that 500,000 Spaniards – men, women and children; politicians, Loyalists soldiers, intellectuals and workers of the middle and lower class – left Spain *together* near the end of a civil war that for almost three years (July 1936-March/April 1939) had been at the world's center of the fight against Fascism.

The concept of 'migration' offers no difficulty in most languages. In Spanish, according to the very basic definition given by the *Diccionario de Autoridades* (1732), it simply means "moving from one location or place to another"; the definition is justly enlarged in all Spanish dictionaries from the early 19th

century to the present to mean "the abandonement of their country by a family, people or nation in order to establish themselves in another." And to '(e)migrate' indicates that "a person leaves his/her own country to establish himself/herself in another country." In our time – that time which for all of us begins, at least, with our grandparents – the most significant population displacements are those in which, individually, or in family groups, people leave the lands in which they were born in order to try to survive in other lands. Before our days of massive and horrifying displacements of Third World peoples, this phenomenon characterizes the arrival in the Americas of Irish, Polish, German, Jewish, Italians Spaniards and others to the USA, Canada, Mexico, Cuba, Central America, Argentina, Uruguay, Chile and so on and so forth.

These migrations are often justly defined as "economic," which does not exclude the possibility that the economic needs of the emigrants/immigrants may have been the result of difficult, even unbearable, socio-political conditions in their lands of origin. Nor does it exclude the fact that often these migrations are forced by politico-military problems, such as in the case of the Eastern European pogroms or, more recently the case of the thousands of Salvadorans who left their country in the 1970's and 80's as a consequence of a revolution that had become a civil war that made life very difficult for them regardless of their political ideas.[8]

If, for whatever reason, many prefer to define these demographic movements as 'diaspora(s),'[9] we must understand that this is done by a metaphorical association with the use of the term in the history and myths of the Jews who – as everyone seems to agree – are characterized since the VIII Century B.C. by the preservation of their religion, of their (original) culture, of their food and, supposedly, of their original language. So, for example, Basque nationalists, love to talk and write about, for example, the "Basque diaspora" in Chile or Argentina, even when many of the Basques living there arrived as exiles after the Civil War, and even when the other factors (religion, culture, food, language) are absent. Thus, the use and abuse of the term "diaspora" promotes historical, sociological, cultural and political confusion.

The confusion is particularly problematic because it overlooks the basic fact that the Jewish diaspora begins with the so-called "Babylonian exile," which was

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[8] A somewhat similar case would be that of present day Colombia, where the number of emigrants continues growing because the daily violence has made life intolerable for them.

[9] Thus, for example, we hear of the African "diaspora" towards Europe, of the Rumanian "diaspora" all over Europe, as well, of course, as of the Irish "diaspora," the Basque "diaspora," etc., all of them preceded by the neolithic "diaspora."

unquestionably an *exile*; i.e., a dis-placement forced by military and political conditions. The dictionary of the Spanish Academy (1970) is very clear on the meaning of 'exile': It is "the expulsion by which someone is obliged to leave his land […] or his home, for a period of time or permanently, for political reasons."[10]

As Claudio Guillén (1995) has explained, in the Greek and Latin world exiles were, generally speaking, very specific persons who, for whatever reason were bothersome to the established powers: a philosopher here, a poet there, a much too famous warrior…. This, for example, would be the case of Thucydides' banishment or, in the Spain of the 1920's, of Unamuno's banishment by order of the then dictator Primo de Rivera.

To be sure, there have always been 'voluntary' so-called 'exiles' but, beside the fact that, here and there, some people have always felt 'exiled' from the World (as in the case, for example, of the '*poètes maudits*' of the 19th Century, very notably Rimbaud), quite a few 'voluntary' exiles have resulted from the need of individuals to escape politically intolerable conditions in their homeland.

No wonder, then, as Guillén explains, that the concept of exile is not altogether clear in our time:

> The referential variety of the word exile, the diversity of realities it denotes and, what is more significant, the different degrees of reality implicit in the term [whose meaning vacillates] between the pure metaphor and direct experience is characteristic of our time. Is it exile when a person's relationship with the world is one of estrangement, rupture and solitude? Isn't it superficial to refuse to distinguish that feeling from the conditions that are imposed on an individual who is expelled to another society […]? (Guillen 1995: 145)

A distinction to which I would add something that I consider essential: we must also differentiate between the expulsion or banishment of one individual and the banishment or flight of thousands or hundreds of thousands of people.

Were this to be a valid difference, we could distinguish not only between the "metaphorical" exile and the forced (or real) exile of individual intellectuals, but also between the exile of one particular intellectual and the simultaneous banishment or flight of many intellectuals, who not only leave their homeland but also their people behind, as happened in Chile, Argentina and Uruguay during their dictatorships of the 1970s or, years before, in the 1920s, and 1930s and 1940s, in El Salvador, Nicaragua or Guatemala. And these cases would, in turn, be different from those in which intellectuals flee more or less together with

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[10] This definition completes that of *destierro* as offered by the *Diccionario de Autoridades* in 1732 and 1780, in which the term "exile" does not appear.

thousands of their compatriots, as is the case, for example of the exiles of Thomas Mann or a Bertolt Brecht, who left Nazi Germany just like thousands of other Germans. Or as in the case of anti-Franco Spanish intellectuals who were exiled simultaneously with almost half a million Spaniards.

There have been, of course, various important and tragic massive exiles in the XXth. century (that of the Armenians fleeing the Turkish genocide; the exiles resulting from the Russian revolution; the Vietnamese exile as of 1975), but the two most clearly political and massive exiles of the century were those of the Germans, Jewish or not, who were fortunate enough to leave Germany between 1933 and 1939 (or even 1942), and that of the Spanish in 1939.

Characteristically, these two massive exiles took their intellectuals with them. Or, to put it conversely, the intellectuals who left Germany and Spain in the 1930's went into exile together with a very large number of their people. This was not the case of the Chilean, Argentinean or Uruguayan intellectuals who, by going into exile, left behind not only their respective lands but their people, who did not go into exile massively.

To be sure, the Uruguayan Mario Benedetti, the Argentinean David Viñas, or the Paraguayan Roa Bastos, just like the Spanish intellectuals exiled in 1939, undoubtedly represented the ideas and feelings of many, probably most, of their fellow citizens. And all of them assumed the responsibilities of such a representation. But the commitment to that representation can be perceived, if not necessarily more clearly certainly more extensively, in the case of those intellectuals who, like the Germans and the Spanish found themselves in exile among thousands of Germans and Spaniards.[11]

Because for the millions of Spaniards who brought the Second Republic into being in 1931, and who, in February 1936, were even more united in the electoral vote for the Popular Front, the Spanish culture that went into exile was *their* culture, whether represented in the liberal texts of Manuel Azaña, the communist poems of Rafael Alberti, or the progressively more religious music of Manuel de Falla. Correspondingly, that exile was not for the Spanish intellectuals an individual (and/or elitist) problem, but rather the result of decisions taken many years beforehand and through the Civil War in profound agreement with the thinking and feeling of the people to which they belonged.[12] This fact allows us to advance one more step in trying to understand the specificity of the Spanish

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[11] Which is why – parenthetically – I was quite surprised to read that the Swedish Royal Academy presented the Nobel price in literature to the Chinese exile Kao Hsing-Chien (Gao Xingjian) because, in his works, "literature is reborn in the struggle of the individual to survive beyond the history of the masses."

[12] With what, I suppose, the Swedish Academy would call their 'masses'.

exile of 1939. The German exile, like the Spanish one, is clearly political, massive and "takes" with it writers like Mann or Brecht, composers like Kurt Weill, actors like Peter Lorre, philosophers like Arendt and Marcuse, etc.; but neither these intellectuals nor the rest of the Germans exiles left their country simultaneously, whereas in the Spanish case, with minor exceptions, all of the exiles left together because they had been together in a struggle and a defeat clearly delimited in time: from July 18, 1936 to February-March, 1936.[13] That is, one of the characteristics of the Spanish exile of 1939 is to be found in the fact that in the course of three to four weeks most of the country's prominent intellectuals went into exile along with half a million other Spaniards. This, of course, implies many and very special things.

Let us think, for example, about the "Sinaia," the first of the ships that took a large number of Spanish refugees from France to Mexico in May–June of 1939. There were 1599 passengers on board with an average age – excluding children – of somewhat more than 34 years, many of whom had directly participated in the Civil War. 35% of them were (industrial) workers, 19% were peasants, 27% were so-called "professionals," 13.5% "employees" and slightly more than 5% were teachers. These percentages correspond very well to the percentages, ages and jobs held by those who voted for the Republic in 1931 and in 1936.

We do not know in which of the categories the intellectuals on board (people like Andújar, Garfias, Iglesias, Jarnés, Rejano, and several important scientists) were inscribed, but it is useful to remember that they (poets, novelists, journalists, historians, biologists, teachers) published a daily newspaper on board in which selected world-news were offered as well as articles on the history of Mexico, meant to educate the passengers on the history of the country for which they were bound. The newspaper also contained daily articles about the good behaviour (respect for others, punctuality, etc.) required for the lengthy twenty-day trip. And all of this was underlined daily with articles about the need to continue and reinforce the unity of the exiles against fascism. As one of the articles put it: "We must take with us to Mexico our anti-fascist unity." In short, the "Sinaia" intellectuals, just like most of the Spanish intellectuals of the 1930's and through the War, devoted their best efforts on board ship to educate and to maintain the ideological unity of the exiles as a collective.[14]

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[13] The fact that the exceptions were 'minor' does not mean that they were not important. From the middle of 1938, approximately, people as significant as Díez Canedo, Moreno Villa, Isaac Costero, José Gaos, León Felipe Millares Carlo, and others, began arriving in Mexico. And the poets Juan Ramón Jiménez, Pedro Salinas and Jorge Guillén were in the United States also before 1939.

[14] For these and other relevant facts and opinions about that voyage, see *Palabras* 1982.

Once in Mexico, thanks to the immeasurable good will of the Mexican government and to the Republican Spanish organizations set up in late 1938 or early 1939,[15] the exiles continued behaving (and being seen) as a collective for which clinics were founded; whose individuals could receive individual loans (and even "pensions"); who were helped in their search for jobs; and for whose children four different schools were established. The intellectual "professionals" – whether historians or biologists, poets or philosophers – most of whom had found jobs in universities or in "El Colegio de México," also benefitted from the help of the SERE and/or JARE which funded magazines (where Spanish and Mexican writers worked together and wrote mostly about things Spanish) and publishing houses, such as the justly famous "Editorial Séneca." "Séneca's" publications ran the gamut from a two volume edition of the Presocratics to an excellent anthology of Spanish and Latin American poetry, and texts by Unamuno, García Lorca (no less than *Poeta en Nueva York*), Antonio Machado; etc. And as Alberti (in Argentina) or Rejano (in Mexico) wrote "political" poetry, so Aub or Andújar wrote plays and fiction grounded in the Spanish reality of the 1930's and the Civil War. Thus, even though early during the exile the different political tendencies became as contentious as they had been during the Civil War, the solidarity between the exiles was always evident: in how – for instance – the children and adolescents were taught at the "Instituto Luis Vives" and the "Academia Hispano-Mexicana," where no distinctions in class, politics, or place of origin in Spain were ever made; or in how a Catalan doctor would treat an Andalusian patient free of charge. The approximately twenty thousand Spanish refugees that arrived in Mexico during the first three or four years of the exile were always part of a collective.[16]

None of this, of course, eliminated the pain and sorrow of nostalgia, which tends to represent itself individually, subjectively: people remember their home towns, their landscapes, their family histories, and that cannot be easily shared with others. Even so, the poets, the essayists and the novelists in exile represented their own nostalgias in manners meaningful for all of the refugees. Furthermore, for many years all the refugees believed – and this was a collective political belief – that when the Allied victory came in World War II, as was hoped for, <u>all</u> of them would return to Spain. Not this person or that one, but <u>all</u>

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[15] First the SERE, founded in France in order to organize the departure of the refugees towards Mexico and a couple of other Latin American countries, then the JARE, founded in Mexico.

[16] And, by the way, it must be remembered that no one, officially or not, ever referred to them as 'exiles': we were '*refugiados*,' refugees, and the term 'exiles' was not applied to us until much, much later.

the antifascists regardless of political affiliation. And after the beginning of the Cold War, when the USA and Franco signed their military and economic agreements (1950, 1953), very few of the exiles returned to Spain. Instead, because most of the exiles already had steady jobs and their children and grandchildren had been and were being born in Mexico, all of them, the young, the middle aged and the, by then, old had to accept that their lives would indefinitely continue in Mexico.[17] By then, and even though the affinities and mutual forms of support continued, especially among those who came from the same regions of Spain (Basques, Catalans, Asturians, etc.), and even though they were all anti-Franco, the original sense of collectivity slowly waned and became another form of nostalgia.

As I think of the various massive exiles of the modern world I find that the political Spanish exodus that began in early 1939 is the only one in which a people and its government left the homeland together (as against, for instance, the exile of the French or Polish governments at the beginning of World War II, who left most of the French and Polish people behind them); and, furthermore, that the government took charge, at various fundamental levels, of the collective well-being of all. That was so especially in Mexico,[18] whose succeeding governments continued recognizing the Republic as the only legitimate government of Spain into the 1970's. This is a unique and extraordinary case, some aspects of which must be remembered.

The institutional relationship between Mexico and the official political structure of the Spanish Republic concerning exiles, or "refugees," began with the agreements, reached through the Mexican embassy in Paris, by which the government of Lázaro Cárdenas (1934–1940) declared its willingness to receive as many "refugees" as needed in order to escape the approaching war in Europe, specially since – perhaps – over 250,000 of them were in concentration camps in France.[19] And by the time the first Spanish exiles arrived in Mexico the organizations that would later become part of the Republican Government in

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[17] The same was the case with those that had remained in France or the Soviet Union.

[18] But it must be noted that the exiles in Venezuela also had various forms of support, although this applied mostly to the Basques who were helped along by the PNV (the Basque Nationalist Party) led from New York by the then President of the Basque Autonomy, José Antonio Aguirre.

[19] It is perfectly clear from the agreements that Mexico was willing to accept *all kinds* of Spanish refugees; but, given that Mexico was then in a process of "nationalist" development, President Cárdenas did express some preferences: industrial workers, people used to toil the land, so-called "professionals" (meaning teachers, engineers, etc.), scientists and other intellectuals.

Exile were already set up. With the continued support of the Mexican government these organizations processed the refugees' documents upon arrival in Veracruz, fed and housed them there for a few days, organized their transportation to Mexico City or other cities, and in most cases rented apartments to house them. All the individual exiles, or heads of family, had to do was to present their particular cases to one of several offices and their requests were attended to. And they did present themselves and even demanded support, for no one thought that their demands were absurd or unique in the history of modern exiles. The general feeling was that they were all in the Mexican refuge because of their having been faithful to the Republic and having defended it. Anything could have happened had they stayed in France, but they had come to Mexico at their government's suggestion and thanks to it. Therefore, it was felt, the Spanish Republican government had to carry the main responsibility for their survival, at least at the beginning of this new life which was considered as transitory, anyway, since everyone thought they would – rather sooner than later – return to Spain.

The thinking of those who had governed the Republic during the Civil War ran along the same lines, and thus they founded two agencies, the SERE (Spanish acronym for Service for the Evacuation of Republican Spaniards) and the JARE (Committee for the Help of Spanish Refugees) which, although in different and opposite leftist political camps, made possible the survival of the exiles during the first few years of their exile in Mexico. For these agencies would lend (or give) money to the grown-ups and helped them find jobs; they created medical groups whose services were free; they created a few enterprises such as the "Vulcano" factory, a large agricultural farm in Santa Clara (Chihuahua), a financial institution, a couple of publishing houses and four excellent schools (two of which, the "Colegio Madrid" and the "Instituto Luis Vives," still exist) which the exiled children and adolescents could attend for free.

In order to imagine how extra-ordinary that situation was it may be enough to ask how could the representatives of a defeated government act in a foreign country as those directly responsible for their own people; that is to say, with the apparent autonomy with which representatives of the Spanish Republican government behaved towards their own, thanks to the good (political) will of the Mexican government. Can we imagine – for instance – representatives of Chile's Unidad Popular government behaving similarly in the USA as of September 1973? Or in France. Or even in the México of the 1970's.

It has been 60 to 65 years since the days when the Spanish exiles began arriving in Mexico between – let us say – 1939 and 1942 and one cannot but think that in the institutional tolerance and the help the situation required in order to navigate

through Mexican law without violating the Constitution[20] probably lies what makes the Spanish exile in Mexico so unique; what distinguishes it from the other (few) massive political exiles of the 20th Century.

I will finish these pages by trying to situate the Spanish exile of 1939 in the context of a widely accepted theory of other modern political exiles. My point of departure is the chapter "*Derechos de asilo, derechos del hombre y del ciudadano*" ("The rights of asylum, the rights of man and of the citizen") in *Puertas que se cierran* (*Doors That Close*), by Javier de Lucas who, in turn, owes his principal inspiration to Hannah Arendt (and, in part, to Simone Weil) (de Lucas 1996: 45–60). Like de Lucas and Arendt I will accept the word "refugee(s)" as equivalent to "exile(s)" because the Spaniards who arrived in Mexico between 1939 and, let us say, 1942, were never known, officially or otherwise, as "exiles" but as "refugees."

Javier de Lucas' point of departure is that "a people without national rights are deprived of human rights" because "it is the political community that guarantees for individuals their basic right, which is *the right to have rights* […] The refugee is denied that right." (de Lucas 1996: 47). Which is why, in referring to the period between the two world wars, Arendt writes that "the struggle of refugees is the struggle of men without a State" (de Lucas 1996: 53–4). From which de Lucas derives what he calls the three "losses" or "wounds" characteristic of political exile.

The first loss would be that of the "political community, and of politics itself," from which derives the refugee's impossibility of finding another "home" (in the sense of his right to have rights) (de Lucas 1996: 55). The second loss is "the imposed obligation to renounce to one's own identity because it is mandatory to renounce memory; forgetting is imposed as a condition for coming out of transitoriness." Thus, "the refugees' problem does not end when he is given a refuge; on the contrary, that is the beginning of a very hard period, that of the struggle to integrate socially, which is even harder to do if one tries to maintain one's own identity." (de Lucas 1996: 57) The third wound is the refugee's "loss of protection from his or her government, since this loss brings with it the disappearance of his/her legal status, not only in his/her own country, but in all countries." (de Lucas 1996: 54). Which explains the importance Hannah Arendt gives to "the passport," for it "grants the identity of citizenship"; or, as Brecht,

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[20] Doctor José Puche, who was the head of the SERE in Mexico, once said that "the Mexican authorities facilitate things immensely, but they also had to observe their own constitutional laws. [That] made it necessary [for us] to obtain the help of Mexican juridical experts"; interview in *Palabras del exilio-1*, Instituto Nacional de Antropología e Historia, México D.F., 1980; p. 62.

characteristically put it in *Refugee's Dialogues*: "the passport is the noblest part of man." (de Lucas 1996: 55). An idea which we can only understand if we remember that in the 1920's and 30's the Western world was full of people without a passport, people who moved about with the help of some old and dirty and priceless pieces of paper, the "laisser passer," in which it was explained that the person carrying such papers was a "refugee." Which perhaps also explains, again according to Arendt, why the refugee wishes "to be considered as just one more among the emigrants who move for economic reasons in order to remake their lives." (de Lucas 1996: 57).

It seems evident that, although in general terms the Spanish exile in Mexico might be made to conform to the Arendt-de Lucas model, the differences are fundamental. There is no question that the second "loss," that which tries to force forgetting as a necessity for coming out of a transitory situation affected all Spanish refugees profoundly; but it is doubtful that those refugees tried in the first twelve or fifteen years to "integrate socially" in Mexican (or Venezuelan, or Chilean, or Soviet) life. Instead, they insisted on "maintaining their own identity" as Spanish refugees, or *political* exiles. And they always refused to be considered as "economic" immigrants.[21]

As for the second "loss," that of the "political community and of politics itself," it does not seem to apply to the Spanish case for during many years the Spanish refugees lived in their own "political community," thinking politically about Spain (and not, for instance, about Mexican politics, the participation in which was forbidden to them), and even *doing* Spanish politics: through the Communist Party, through the leaders of the Socialist Party, through anarchist organizations, and – at a different level – through the "nationalist" Catalan and Basque organizations.

And, of course, there is a radical difference between the "third wound" of the Arendt-de Lucas model and the reality of the Spanish exile in Mexico: for many years the Spanish refugees did not lose "the protection," economic and political, "of their government," aided by the Mexican government. As a consequence of this collaboration, if those refugees could not move about in the world with passports of Franco's Spain, they either had documents that established the fact of their legal residence in Mexico or, as of 1940, they could travel with Mexican passports.

All of which does not mean that those refugees did not live in a daily contradiction with the country that, having given them so much, denied them "the right to have rights" inasmuch as the Mexican "political community" to

[21] Among other things this was, again, a political necessity for them, since the previous Spanish immigrants were overwhelmingly reactionary and pro-Franco.

which, in fact, they belonged, while it allowed them –for instance – to vote in presidential elections, did not allow them the "fundamental and inalienable right" (Arendt) of participating in the political life of the nation. This was an ambiguity that persisted in the life of their descendants, some of whom – for example – participated in the Movement of 1968 and, although Mexican by birth, were accused (and persecuted) as "undesirable foreigners."

Yet, because time was passing – 15, 30, 40 years… – the specificity of the Spanish exile in Mexico became blurred as the refugees, and especially their children and grandchildren, installed themselves in Mexican life. Those of us who have studied that exile tend to see it as "frozen" in its first fifteen years or so when, in fact, there is an evolution in the lives of the exiles that, in the end, allows us to associate it with many of the massive migrations, political or not, that have characterized the XXth Century. To be sure, one could not pin-point the time when the exiles became immigrants; but even when we observe the lives, habits and speech of the descendants of those who were – let us say – younger than 16 years of age in 1939, the many thousands who are and feel to be Mexicans, we can sense the embers, the political embers of exile, of politics still burning. Yet, the opposite is also true: it might be impossible to detect today whether there is a difference between the descendents of Spanish immigrants, whether pre-1939 or post 1960, and the descendents of the exiles.

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Dennis Brutus and the Stations of Exile

Simon Lewis

ABSTRACT

The poetry of veteran South African poet and activist Dennis Brutus provides an excellent case-study in which to explore the often paradoxical effects of the various forms of exile symptomatic of recent African writing: enforced physical removal from one's country, exile within one's own society, and the sense of "internal alienation which produces literature." This essay uses exemplary poems from four periods in Brutus's life to identify four "stations of exile" in his career: an early period up until about 1963 when Brutus was effectively exiled from his own country by apartheid laws; a period of formal internal exile when Brutus was banned and imprisoned (1963–66); a period of formal external exile when Brutus lived mainly in the United Kingdom and United States while still hankering after South Africa (c. 1966–86); and a late period as a Pittsburgh-based global citizen whose poetry and activism transcends both home and exile.

Give me a place to stand and I will move the earth.
– Archimedes

In his introduction to the collection *Exile and African Literature*, Eldred Jones (2000: vii) remarks that of the numerous cases of mass displacement caused by "the internal wars which have plagued the African continent" and of the correspondingly numerous cases of individual "exiles of conscience who have fled various forms of tyranny and misrule," South African apartheid was "the most spectacular," driving "significant sections of the intelligentsia … into disorientating but sometimes mentally productive state of exile." Jones also remarks (ibid.: viii) that even without physical exile from their country many Africans across the continent "are as much exiles within their societies as if they had been thousands of miles away." Furthermore, Jones suggests (ibid.: viii) that we should not be surprised by the prevalence of the theme of exile in literature worldwide "because it is the internal distancing of the individual from the environment that produces art." The poetry of veteran South African poet and activist Dennis Brutus provides an excellent case-study in which we can explore the often paradoxical effects of the various forms of exile identified by Jones (ibid.: viii) as symptomatic of recent African writing: enforced physical removal

from one's country, exile within one's own society, and the sense of "internal alienation which produces literature."

Born in 1924 in what was then Rhodesia, but living from the age of six months old in the Port Elizabeth area of the eastern Cape Province in South Africa, Brutus came of age almost exactly at the same time as the National Party acceded to power (1948), thereby ushering in the period of racial domination known as apartheid, a period that grew increasingly totalitarian and brutal over the forty-odd years before its formal capitulation in 1994. According to the racial categorization of apartheid Brutus was classified as a Coloured person, a rather nebulous race-classification that comprised people of "mixed" race, the descendants of the enslaved "Malay" population of the Western Cape, and the descendants of the original Khoe inhabitants of the Western Cape. Historically, Coloureds, particularly in the Western Cape, had had certain legal rights not granted to black South Africans, and consequently experienced a kind of in-between racial status, neither white, nor black.[22]

By the time Brutus was a young man and teaching in Port Elizabeth the restrictions on all South Africans not classified as white had tightened – the last vestiges of voting rights had been stripped away and communities where whites, blacks and Coloureds had lived together were demolished to make way for racially exclusive communities. In the 50s and early 60s, therefore, when Brutus's career as a poet and activist began, Brutus included himself as among the racially dispossessed of South Africa. Neither skin color, nor official government classification were particularly relevant to him; he based his opposition to apartheid on the proposition that what mattered was that a racially-defined minority was oppressing the overwhelming majority of South Africans.

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[22] Colouredness is a vexed and contested category in South Africa with an extensive bibliography. For a very interesting recent discussion, see Farred 2000. Farred (2000: 6) writes that "South African colouredness is, arguably, best understood as a quasi-ethnic identity: a racially indistinct ... community bound together by cultural practices, mores, values, and traditions, all of which have evolved in the face of racist white hostility. In the absence of an autochthonous black culture or an imported (and amended) white European culture, coloureds have had to forge a set of cultural practices out of disparate racial experiences – East Asian slaves, indigenous African communities, European influences." For a political history of Colouredness, see Lewis 1987. For a classic account of Colouredness in South African literature, see February 1981. For coverage of more recent developments in Coloured history, see James et al. 1996. Wicomb 1998 also responds to the resurgence of interest in Colouredness after the 1994 elections, while Driver 2000 gives a superb summary of the history of some of the fragmentations within Colouredness. Kozain 2002 gives a caustic response to the notion of Coloured nationalism, and the continuation of racism in postapartheid society.

A keen athlete himself and aware of the degree to which sport mattered in white South African culture, Brutus's earliest successful campaign against apartheid took the form of a movement to have South Africa expelled from the Olympic Games.[23] This campaign was successful and all-white South African teams were barred from the Olympics from 1964 until their readmission in the Barcelona games of 1992. The success of the campaign, however, led to increased harassment of Brutus by the apartheid authorities. He was banned, attempted to escape to Mozambique, captured by the Mozambican secret police, shipped back to South Africa, shot in the back while attempting another escape, and jailed on Robben Island for 18 months. On his release from jail in 1965 it was apparent that the future in South Africa held more of the same, so Brutus went into exile in 1966 leaving the country on a one-way exit permit on the understanding that any return would be deemed unlawful and grounds for his immediate imprisonment. He was 41.

Now just turned 80, Brutus has lived the bulk of his adult life outside South Africa and hence, ironically, has built his career as a South African poet outside the country. His long exile from South Africa has lowered his profile there, and, to his great disappointment, no South African publisher has yet put out a collection of his poems. As Bernth Lindfors (1998: 491) remarks, "he is a lyricist whose singular achievements have yet to be adequately recognized and duly recorded in that still unwritten chapter in the revised literary history of his country that will bring to light what was once suppressed and thereby expunged from the national collective memory." *Outside* South Africa, however, Dennis Brutus remains one of the most widely-known of South African poets, featuring in almost all significant anthologies of African and South African poetry since the mid-60s[24] and being taken as the quintessential South African resistance poet in Barbara Harlow's influential 1987 book *Resistance Literature*.

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[23] See Brutus 1971. Brutus describes South Africa (1971: 150) as "by general agreement, the most sports-mad country in the world" and goes on (ibid.: 151), "For someone not familiar with the South African scene, it's not easy to grasp the extent to which sport dominates the thinking of most South Africans." Owing to white South Africans' obsession with sport, Brutus argued (ibid.: 160) that protests directed specifically at apartheid in sport might be effective in bringing about more general change "because South Africa is the odd kind of country it is – a country in which sport is an integral element in the fabric of the entire society."

[24] Brutus's poems appear, for instance, in early anthologies of African writing in English (e.g., Beier & Moore 1963; Mphahlele 1967); in apartheid-era anthologies of South African resistance poetry (e.g., Pieterse 1971; Feinberg 1980; and Couzens & Patel 1982); and in post-apartheid anthologies (e.g., De Kock & Tromp 1996; Hirson 1997; and Chapman 2002).

This ironic achievement is all the more interesting because it is absolutely *not* typical**.** In numerous other cases the apartheid authorities' efforts to silence voices opposed to the regime proved devastatingly effective. Amongst Coloured writers in exile, for instance, Brutus's former pupil, the poet Arthur Nortje died of an overdose of barbiturates in Oxford; the playwright Alfred Hutchinson drank himself to death in Ghana; the novelist Bessie Head managed to complete a sizeable oeuvre against the background of mental illness, grinding poverty and local ostracism in rural Botswana before dying of hepatitis at the age of 49. Alex La Guma, almost an exact contemporary of Brutus, coped slightly better, dying aged 60 in Havana where he was the representative of the African National Congress; he produced relatively little new work in his nearly 20-year-long exile, however, publishing his last completed novel in 1979, six years before his death.[25]

The experiences of other black South African writers of Brutus's generation similarly indicate the potentially lethal psychological damage that exile can cause. Nat Nakasa killed himself in 1965 by throwing himself from a New York skyscraper; Can Themba drank himself to death in his early 40s; and Bloke Modisane's 20-year-exile in London and Germany seemed merely to prolong the "tragedy of cultural displacement … conveyed harrowingly in [his] *Blame Me on History* (1963)" (Chapman 1996: 244).[26] Zeke Mphahlele whose longevity matches Brutus's, found himself unable to stay outside South Africa and returned amidst political controversy in 1977 (Barnett 1993: 104). The list of exiles – nearly all damaged or thwarted in one way or another – goes on and on, in fact, and one of the great tragedies of contemporary South Africa lies in the possibility that without apartheid every single one of these writers might still be alive today. It is mind-boggling to imagine how this community of writers might have expanded international understanding of what it means to live in a multiracial

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[25] Farred (2000: 75), writing about the effect of political pressure and subsequent exile on Nortje, comments as follows: "1966 saw the proscription of the works of Brutus, Ezekiel Mphahlele, Peter Abrahams, and the entire *Drum* magazine school; frustrated by and powerless at their banning, most of the writers – [Richard] Rive and James Matthews were among the few who remained in South Africa – went into an exile from which none of them, Brutus and Mphahlele excepted, returned."

[26] For further information on the writers of this generation, see also Ntongela Masilela's web-site on the "Sophiatown Renaissance (1952–60)" at http://pzadmin.pitzer.edu/masilela/sophia/sr.htm, and Chapman 1989. Good short biographical essays on Head, La Guma, Mphahlele, Nkosi, Nortje, and Rive can be found in *Dictionary of Literary Biography* 225; Mphahlele, Nortje, and Rive are also covered in *Dictionary of Literary Biography* 125. Essays on Brutus by Abdul JanMohamed and Ken Goodwin, respectively, appear in *Dictionary of Literary Biography* 117 and 225.

society. In addition to the physical destruction and political violence of apartheid, it is surely one of the great crimes of apartheid to have snuffed out what might have been a truly amazing cultural flowering in which the likes of South Africa's internationally renowned white writers such as Alan Paton, Nadine Gordimer, J.M. Coetzee, and Breyten Breytenbach might have appeared as simply one of many blooms.

Given this litany of the detrimental effects of exile in general, Brutus's achievements in exile and as an exile are all the more notable. While much of his poetry has been marked by the undertones of personal melancholy, longing, and nostalgia typical of the experience of exile and its literature, Dennis Brutus has been able to make remarkably effective use of his exiled state and to maintain a sense of his being a public spokesperson for groups of people (variously defined, as we shall see) even when physically separated from them. What is it about Brutus that allowed him to take his experience of exile and turn it to such effective and productive use? Is there perhaps a particular kind of personality that copes better with exile than most? If, as Jones and others suggest, some kind of alienation from the world around you is essential for a writer, why has Brutus apparently found physical exile from South Africa less debilitating than many of his peers did?

In order to address these questions I have divided Brutus's long career into four periods, each of which can be characterized by the term exile, although only the latter two come from the period of his physical exile from South Africa from 1966 on. In periodizing his career in this way I think it becomes apparent that Brutus's sense of internal exile within South Africa in some ways prepared him for his physical exile outside the country. More speculatively, I would suggest that Brutus's awareness of the gap between his idealistic vision of the way the world *could* be and his steely consciousness of the way the world *is* gives him a predilection for exile in the sense that he has never been able to inhabit the world of his choice. In identifying particular poems as marking these "stations" of Brutus's exile I am deliberately playing on what I see as a spiritual foundation to Brutus's work as well as the obvious realistic image of him as someone almost constantly on the move from one stopping place to another. It is important to stress this spiritual side because Brutus's political action has never been of the professional variety, affiliated to a particular party apparatus; rather than seeking political office, Brutus has consistently directed his conscience-driven campaigning against specific targets – South Africa's inclusion in the Olympics, for instance, the 1970 Springbok rugby tour of Great Britain, US investment in South Africa, and so on. Brutus's independence from party politics and his uncompromising idealism become especially significant, as I argue later in this essay, when it comes to analyzing his resistance to postapartheid deal-making.

These four "stations of exile" can be laid out in a loose schema as follows:

Station 1 (till c. 1963): Port Elizabeth/South Africa at large: the exile effect of apartheid laws

Station 2 (c.1963–1966): Banning and Robben Island: prison as internal exile

Station 3 (c.1966–1986): In transit (UK/US, etc.): in exile but occupying a South African homeland of the mind

Station 4 (c.1986 on): Pittsburgh-based global citizen: transcending home and exile

In the first period, comes the familiar "Nightsong: City" (1973: 18), an Audenesque blessing to "my land, my love" in which Brutus's enforced separation from his lover as a result of the Group Areas Act, the Immorality and Mixed Marriages Act, and the Population Classification Act becomes a metaphor for his self-figuration as "troubadour" roaming a land from which he has been effectively exiled by apartheid policy.

> Sleep well, my love, sleep well:
> the harbour lights glaze over restless docks,
> police cars cockroach through the tunnel streets;
>
> from the shanties creaking iron-sheets
> violence like a bug-infested rag is tossed
> and fear is immanent as sound in the wind-swung bell;
>
> the long day's anger pants from sand and rocks;
> but for this breathing night at least,
> my land, my love, sleep well.

In this short lyric, simultaneously personal and political, Colin Gardner (quoted in Lindfors 1998: 491) recognizes a note that should resonate with all South Africans, that they are "all, black and white ... to some extent exiles within the borders of this alien or alienated land." Writing after the break-up of a forbidden affair (his lover was white and the two had therefore risked jail simply by being together), Brutus is able to connect with all South Africans, reminding them that the whole land needs respite from violence, fear, and anger. Brutus himself (quoted in Lindfors 1998: 484) thinks of the poem as a watershed in his writing: "It was in the process of writing it that I discovered one could do the simultaneous statement, which I've done ever since ... a private as well as a public statement." (Although he has acknowledged a direct debt in the poem to Auden's "Lullaby" (which begins, "Lay your sleeping head, my love, / Human on my faithless arm …"), the traces of John Donne, a poet whom Brutus has acknowledged as a general influence on his work, are also significant. A direct verbal allusion is discernible to the later John Donne, the incomparable composer

of some of the most memorable sermons in the English language, in the reference (line 6) to "fear … immanent as sound in the wind-swung bell"; in South Africa, opponents of apartheid and black people generally did not need to ask for whom the bell tolled – they knew it tolled for them. At the same time, the barely repressed erotic tension and general sensuality of the poem indicate Brutus's debt to John Donne the love-poet who, in T.S. Eliot's formulation "knew no substitute for sense." The combination in Brutus of Donne's prophetic voice and his erotic voice grounds the public/private "simultaneous statement" in a spiritual or metaphysical foundation. Without this foundation the conflation of lover and land common in Brutus's poems of this period would be merely hyperbolic flights of wit, as in Donne's "The Sunne Rising," instead of allowing Brutus the moral conviction to transform individual "passion into militant protest" (Lindfors 1998: 484). Whereas with Donne, the sensuality of the earlier erotic poems seems at odds with the sensuality of the later Holy Sonnets, Brutus's sensual response to lover and to land provides Brutus with a method he could use consistently throughout his career to transform the Audenesque personal lyric into resistance poetry.

As the web of apartheid restrictions tightened around him, Brutus was first banned, then shot while trying to escape detention, then imprisoned. Out of this apparently desperate situation and the spectacularly violent attempts to silence him came the celebrated sequence of "Letters to Martha," a series of poems that poignantly capture the way in which apartheid operated a kind of gulag system.[27] Robben Island, the ultimate emblem of the state's ability to remove individuals from society, becomes Brutus's second station of exile. Again, however, as with "Nightsong" the poems in "Letters to Martha" transform violent separation into resistant solidarity. After all, while Robben Island may indeed have been the symbol of the apartheid regime's efforts to make unpeople of its opponents, at the same time, over the years it became "Mandela U," its "graduates" sharing an enhanced sense of common purpose and an enhanced aura of moral authority. As Noel Solani (2005) pithily puts it in his review of

[27] I use the term *gulag* advisedly to draw attention to the irony that apartheid South Africa, which declared itself to be a bastion of Western values holding out against Communism, in addition to a range of imprisonment, torture, judicial execution, and assassination, also used banishment and banning in order to quell dissent in ways very similar to those used by the Soviet Union. The so-called homelands were frequently used as sites of internal exile, for example, as in the case of Winnie Mandela, who was banished to her "home" magistrate's district of Brandfort in the Orange Free State in 1977. See *Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report*, 1999: Volume 2, Chapter 3 "The State inside South Africa between 1960 and 1990" for a succinct summary of apartheid's gulag system.

Fran Buntman's *Robben Island and Prisoner Resistance to Apartheid*, "Men went to Robben Island with a limited understanding of politics, except for their hatred of the apartheid system, and came out of Robben Island sophisticated politicians."[28] In Brutus, imprisoned on the island for 18 months in the mid-sixties, the common sense of purpose has extended way beyond South Africa, giving him a profound sympathy with political prisoners and a commitment to end racial injustice worldwide.

Hal Wylie (quoted in Ezenwa-Ohaeto 2000: 29) has said of Brutus's political and literary style in "Letters to Martha" that its "almost superhuman austerity and control, and … tight non-violent self-discipline remind one of Gandhi." Exemplifying that style, the sixteenth poem (1968: 17) in the sequence opens with Brutus's quiet admission that "quite early one reaches a stage/ where one resolves to embrace/ the status of prisoner." The poem in full runs as follows:

> Quite early one reaches a stage
> where one resolves to embrace
> the status of prisoner
> with all it entails,
> savouring to the full its bitterness
> and seeking to escape nothing:
>
> "Mister,
> this is prison;
> just get used to the idea"
>
> "You're a convict now."
>
> Later one changes,
> tries the dodges,
> seeks the easy outs.
>
> But the acceptance
> once made
> deep down
> remains.

This apparently simple statement belies the considerable emotional, psychological and intellectual processes involved. First, the use of the impersonal "one" suggests both the depersonalizing effect that prison can have (and which it

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[28] In addition to Buntman, see, for instance, Mandela 1996 in which he describes (489–511) conditions of formal study and the continuous political debating among the prisoners. In postapartheid South Africa, Robben Island's reputation as South Africa's Alcatraz has been transvaluated into a symbol of the moral triumph over apartheid brutality and denial of human rights. See, for example, Deacon 1998, and Coombes 2003, esp. the chapter "Robben Island: Site of Memory/Site of Nation" (54–115).

frequently seeks to impose – to break the prisoner, break him or her in, break him or her down), and simultaneously Brutus's ability to transcend himself and to use his own experience and his recollection as an empathetic emblem for all prisoners.[29] In an interview conducted via e-mail in 2000, Brutus commented that his use of the impersonal pronoun "one" in this poem was "a way of downplaying the ego and choosing to be 'one' of many." Secondly, and conversely, there is a tension between the prison's attempt at enforcing a particular kind of depersonalization, and Brutus's defiant "resolve" to embrace his new role as one of, and ultimately spokesman for, many others. Third, the trio of words "resolves," "embrace," and "status" with their overtones of pride and even desire effectively transvaluate the word "prisoner" – in the South African context in the middle 60s the status of prisoner is something one can wear, quite quietly but defiantly, as a badge of pride. Brutus and other political prisoners do not "resign" themselves to the role of prisoner, they resolve to embrace its status.[30] What's more, the poem continues (lines 14–17), "the acceptance/ once made/ deep down/ remains."

Similarly, in the poem "Cold," Brutus (1968: 48–9) writes quite quietly of his transportation from Johannesburg to Robben Island and a brief stop in the middle of the night at the town of Colesberg. The poem bluntly depicts Brutus and his fellow prisoners – barefoot, cold, and hungry – at their most abject, abused by a warder who says, "they are worse than rats;/ you can only shoot them," and forsaken of God, represented by their distance from the "large frosty glitter of the stars" above them and "the Southern Cross flowering low." After their brief stop to eat their "sugarless pap," they "labour erect;/ / form lines" and finally "begin to move/ awkwardly." In a 1972 interview Brutus commented (1972: 31) that he intended the word "awkwardly" to convey the men's lack not just of physical grace but of spiritual grace – their "absolute depth of desolation." At the same time, however, the chains on their ankles and wrists "pair" the men together, and "jangle" and "glitter," reflecting the starlight. The men's moving at all, and their moving forward *together* suggests that the prisoners' "acceptance" of their situation should not be understood as resignation but involves a

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[29] In his essay "Constellations of Exile" in Burness, Brutus (1993) explains that the stars, particularly the constellation Orion, came to have special significance for him from his experience on Robben Island. Consequently, he writes (1993: 26), "whether I write about Orion in Pittsburgh, or in Dubrovnik, London, or Athens, the strands all pull together and the focal points are Port Elizabeth and Robben Island."

[30] In the same 2000 interview, Brutus asserts, "It was not submission to imprisonment by an unjust system – as some critics seem to have thought!" He also, half-jokingly, suggests that "Perhaps it helps, too, to recall that there was at least one other Brutus who found strength in adopting Stoicism as a philosophy!"

transvaluation of grace and gracelessness. Indeed, in an interview in April 2005, while confirming the religious reference and reiterating the importance of the men's apparent gracelessness, Brutus (2005a) commented that he also wanted to convey the sense that "the guilty ones are the guards and the innocent ones are the prisoners, so you have a reversal which is almost a kind of Christ-like acceptance in the concept of the scapegoat, where the innocent are accepting the guilt of the guilty ones. We are the innocent ones even though we're being treated as if we're guilty."

Over and over again in the last forty years since his incarceration, Brutus's subsequent work has confirmed that his "resolve" to "embrace" the "status" of prisoner is anything but passive, as he has written, campaigned and lobbied for the release of political prisoners worldwide (e.g., in his work for Amnesty International, in the sequence of poems for Mumia Abu-Jamal in *Leafdrift*, etc.), even going so far as to get himself arrested in February 2000 while campaigning for the release of Mumia Abu-Jamal.[31] In short, Brutus's experience in his second station of exile as the prisoner of the South African state demonstrates the validity of Jones's argument that even though South African apartheid was the "most spectacular" of oppressive systems across Africa and prompted widespread "disorientation," it also produced some extraordinary creative responses. In Brutus the attack on the individual man appears to have facilitated an inner reconfiguration as a spokesperson. As he put it in the 2000 interview already cited, "When apartheid South Africa affirmed that I was less than human – only humans could vote – I had to assert I was not part of that society; I became a citizen of the world. I think it is possible to be sufficiently in a community not to need to assert an individual identity."

Brutus's physical exile from South Africa began in 1966 (so he has lived a higher proportion of his adult life *outside* South Africa). Released from jail but unable to live in South Africa under the conditions of apartheid, he left the country on an exit permit, and found himself at large in the world but without a passport. For the next 20 years he was in fairly constant motion around the world as the taglines on his poems from this period indicate. During these years the only station or fixed point is internal – or as Brutus (1973: 121) has it: "only in myself, occasionally, am I familiar."

The poems of this period are most typical of what one would expect from a poet in exile, displaying a keen sense of national loss and longing. Even when a poem such as "And I am driftwood" (1973: 141–43) lists its places of composition

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[31] Brutus was arrested for obstructing traffic at the Supreme Court on February 28th, 2000 while participating in the protest demanding a new trial for Mumia. His case was later dismissed.

as "Club des Pins/ Algiers/ en route to Paris," the heart of the poem is drawn back inexorably to South Africa and Brutus's sense of shared suffering with his oppressed countrymen. Wherever he may physically be – from Tehran to Texas, Paris to Peking – in all of these poems Brutus (1973: 121) shows himself chiefly to be inhabiting the homeland of the mind, which gives him an irredeemably, impossibly South African vantage point from which to observe French arrogance, Teutonic superiority, or English humbug.

> I am alien in Africa and everywhere:
>
> In Europe, outside Europe I stand and assess them
> – find French racial arrogance and Teuton
> superiority,
> mouldering English humbug:
>
> and in Africa one finds
> chafing, through bumbling
> at the restraints of restraint,
> brushing impatiently through varied cultures
> in fruitless search of depths:
> only in myself, occasionally, am I familiar.
>
> [Paris – Algiers]

Nothing daunted, however, by the double blow that afflicts all exiles – separation from one's own people at home, and from the people among whom one finds oneself living – Brutus again uses this experience transformatively to become a spokesman for a yet wider public. In a poem which typifies the cost to exiles' families of having the head of the family living in one place but focusing intently not just on somewhere else but on somewhere else where enemies have deemed it illegal for him/her to focus, Brutus turns an apology to his sons and daughters into a new kind of manifesto, no longer driven just by his *South* African nationalism but by what he calls his "continental sense of sorrow" (Maja-Pearce 1990: 8),[32] and his ever-sharpening consciousness of the ravages of racism worldwide.

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[32] The conflict between family loyalty and commitment to the political struggle is a common theme among anti-apartheid activists. Even Nelson Mandela (1996: 506) in his autobiography expresses "regret that I had not been able to be with her [his mother] when she died, remorse that I had not been able to look after her properly during her life, and a longing for what might have been had I chosen to live my life differently." In her autobiography Gillian Slovo (1997: 210), daughter of South African Communist Party exiles Joe Slovo and Ruth First, laments her lack of a family life as a child and contrasts her bitterness toward her largely absent parents with the warmth and admiration in

The fourth station of exile for Brutus is the University of Pittsburgh where he has been on the faculty since 1986. In any normal academic such an appointment might have represented the pinnacle of success and the desired endpoint of an impressive twenty-year career. Not only had Brutus gained a professional appointment on a par with his preeminence as a poet, he had successfully fought off efforts by the Reagan administration to deport him.[33] At this point, already in his 60s and physically exiled from South Africa for the last 20 years, one might have forgiven Brutus if he had at that point chosen to rest on some laurels. Far from it. Pittsburgh just gives him a place to stand.

Four years after Brutus's arrival at Pitt, Nelson Mandela walked free from jail, the ANC was unbanned, and South Africa embarked on four bloody years to its first and amazing fully democratic election. This was the moment of victory, surely, the moment of celebration for having brought down the bull as Tatamkhulu Afrika (1998) has it, the moment of return. Ingrid De Kock's poem "Transfer" (1997: 14) from this period ends with twinned images of change and cyclical permanence – urban and peri-urban development, balanced against the song of highveld birds and seasonal blossom – "And the exiles are returning," as if their politically driven departure and return were comparable to the passage of migratory birds.

But for Brutus, return was not so straightforward – the end of apartheid did not mean the end of exile. On his first visit back to South Africa in 1991 he put it quite bluntly (2005b: 97): "though the laws of apartheid may have been repealed, the structures and culture of apartheid have not been abolished." In a collection of tributes to Brutus in honor of his 80th birthday, Grant Farred (2005) recalls an appearance made by Brutus in Lansdowne Civic Center on the Cape Flats in August 1991 at which Brutus argued passionately against the over-hasty "normalization" of South African sport (Brutus clashed with Nelson Mandela over the readmission of South Africa to the Olympics in 1992). In Farred's reading (2005: 39) of the event, Brutus's position is already an "anachronism … 'out of joint' with the incipiently post-apartheid times," his talk "the ultimate act of political rhetoric: he was announcing the immanence of postapartheid society as a betrayal of the black working class … so that it could be struggled against, perhaps even before it was fully born" (ibid.: 40–41). Farred argues that Brutus's stubborn idealism, which will not compromise with "ANC real politik" (ibid.: 39) even in the moment of apparent victory, lifts Brutus out of a specifically

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which they were publicly held. At one point she writes, "all my life I had wanted him [her father] to value me as much as he valued South Africa."

[33] For a partial transcript of the deportation proceedings, see Bunn and Taylor 1987: 368–73.

South African political history and allows him to make "common cause with his African contemporaries [Farred mentions Ngugi, Achebe, and Soyinka] and their dis-ease with postcoloniality" (ibid.: 41) as well as with a new generation of black diaspora writers including Ben Okri, Moses Isegawa, and Patrick Chamoiseau.

Farred's reading is, I think, correct. Despite the progress in South Africa since 1991 in terms of electoral politics, Brutus has remained in exile in Pittsburgh, and I would argue that in the same way that he wrote of the psychological need to embrace the status of prisoner on Robben Island, so since 1991 Brutus has resolved to embrace the status of exile; not that he hadn't embraced it before, but I believe he has embraced it in a different way now, moving beyond the expectation of one day going home and instead thinking in transcendent terms and on a global scale.

Already over 60 when he arrived at Pitt and turning 70 the year of those first South African elections, it would have been extremely difficult practically and personally for Brutus to have relocated back to South Africa and to have attempted to re-establish a life there at that stage. Associated as he had been with pressure groups and individual campaigns[34] rather than with a particular political party, he was not part of the ANC political party apparatus; he was a political exile, to be sure, but not a politician in exile.[35] As an academic there were similarly no ready-made opportunities for him: while he has enjoyed some temporary visiting positions (as, for example, at the University of Durban-Westville in 1991), permanent professorial positions in South African universities were thin on the ground. Brutus's inability to return, however, involves issues more significant than the practical difficulties: as he observed the too-rapid normalization of South Africa into the global "community" and saw that the new ANC government in South Africa was inexorably bound up in global networks of power and financial control that he himself was unwilling to accept,[36] I think

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[34] E.g., the South African Non-Racial Olympic Committee, the Stop the Seventy Tour campaign, campus disinvestment campaigns, and Amnesty International.

[35] For work on the history of the ANC leadership in exile see Ellis & Sechaba (1992), Davis (1987), and Meli (1989). A third category of political exile, whose experience would be significantly different from that of writers and of political leaders, would be the rank-and-file members of the liberation struggle who fled South Africa to join Umkhonto we Sizwe (the armed wing of the ANC). Although more attention has been paid to the leadership and intelligentsia, recent work has been dedicated to Somafco, the school for exiles set up in Morogoro, Tanzania (Morrow et al. 2005), and to the organization, training and living conditions of Umkhonto we Sizwe soldiers (Shubin 1999; Frankel 2000).

[36] Notable here is Brutus's recent poem "Memory" (2005b: 93) in which he describes a 2004 protest against slum conditions in Alexandra township which recalls similar protests

he finally embraced the status of exile – the one who can never be an insider; and at this point, he's frying bigger fish. As Farred recognized (2005: 40) as early as in that 1991 meeting, "He was already, joined long ago in Kenya and Nigeria by Ngugi, Soyinka, Achebe, and their literary heirs, on the march to new territory, not seduced by the rhetoric of enfranchisement or democracy or the pull of old alliances."

This new embrace of exile is not just a question of recognizing his incorrigible outsider-ness; it's a question of transcending inside and outside. Thus, ever the contrarian, Brutus greets the advent of ANC rule and its shift of gear into neo-liberal economic policies[37] with a new strain of exilic melancholy but with a new resolve of globalized commitment, in John Berger's formulation, to resist "the great defeat of the world" (1999: 4). With a kind of arrogance and hyperbole worthy of John Donne, "Flying, after Seattle" (2005b: 72) figures Brutus heading back east after the demonstrations against the WTO in Seattle in December 1999. Because it is sunset the plane is heading into "encroaching gloom," but Brutus's airborne spirit is buoyant, convinced that "our searchlight glare disrobes their putrescences," and that a new generation, "billions" strong is beginning to assert its will and "construct a better world."

> Eastward, with wings sun-silvered
> at sunset, flying after Seattle
> we dip into encroaching gloom
> a surge of joy irradiating darkness
> as a new youthful song proclaims hope:
> at a crux in time we made our choice
> beat back predatory ghouls
> who would devour our inheritance:
> big-shouldered we thrust through dusk,
> strong-voiced with deep throated snore
> buoyant on wings borne on sweet air

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from "earlier apartheid-burdened days." The similarity of responses from the apartheid and postapartheid authorities causes Brutus to experience a sense of "betrayal ... stone-heavy on our hearts" which makes him "wince/ at familiar oft-repeated lies."

[37] The phrase "shift of gear" plays on the ANC's movement away from the more socialist economic policies of Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) (1994–96) to the neo-liberal Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) policies in 1996. More recently still, the ANC has formulated a new set of policies encapsulated in the acronym NEPAD [New Partnership for Africa's Development], which Brutus scornfully pronounces "kneepad," suggesting that South Africa is going down on its knees to Western financial institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. For a detailed, critical account of South Africa's postapartheid shifts in economic policy see Bond 2000).

after acrid stench, boots and concussions
our searchlight glare disrobes their putrescences
crouched under miasmas of confused lies.
Arise, you billions to assert our will:
We begin to construct a better world.

[December 15, 1999]

Comparisons with John Donne in this poem, however, are not limited to Brutus's Donne-like hyperbole. Like the great metaphysical poet before him Brutus's work generally is remarkable for its yoking together, often with violence, the intellectual and the physical – ideas become things (in the demonstrators' "glare" that becomes a "searchlight," in corporate "putrescences" that are able to be disrobed), and things become other unlike things that evoke physical, emotional, and intellectual reactions (as we saw earlier in the police cars which "cockroach" through the streets in "Nightsong"). As we have also seen already, like Donne, Brutus's work, particularly the early work, links the intellectual and the erotic – like Donne he's downright cocky, writing in Lindfors's pun "lays of the land" (1998: 482). But if the ability to see the entire world turning beneath him reminds one of the young John Donne's injunction to the "Busie old foole, unruly Sunne" to shine on him and his lover in bed because in so doing he is lighting the entire world (1971: 10), as in "Nightsong: City" it should also put us in mind of the later John Donne the moralist, who as Dean of St Paul's produced some of the greatest religious poetry in the history of English literature. In particular, in putting us in mind of the poem Donne wrote on "Goodfriday, 1613. Riding Westward" (1971: 306–08), "Flying, after Seattle" alerts us again to the deep-seated spiritual basis of Brutus's poetry and the unwaveringly idealistic principles of equity and justice that underlie his writing and activism. Although never overt, certainly never doctrinal or party-line in any way, transcending all the secular stations of Brutus's exile ultimately I sense an all-encompassing embrace of the concept that in the words of the gospel hymn he "ain't been nothing but a stranger in this world. Got a home on high." And when he gets there (after another 40 years or so, insha'allah) he will be able to say that the earthly stations of his exile, far from cutting him off from the world, provided him with new places to stand from which he, like Archimedes, could move the world.

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"Exilforschung" as Mirror of the Changing Political Culture in Post-War-Germany

Alfons Söllner

ABSTRACT

In the following short paper I will ask, in what way political emigration became part of the historical consciousness in post-war-Germany, how its status changed over half a century and not least what this change indicates for the development of political culture.

It is certainly no exaggeration to say that the Hitler dictatorship left lasting damage on the collective memory of the Germans. While the Holocaust has emerged more and more clearly as the traumatic centre of historical consciousness, the political expulsions could be consigned to the periphery, though they maintained an underground relationship with this centre. But in certain respects one can also reverse the picture: Since emigration, however much it was a humiliating and violent experience, was an escape from physical destruction, the survivors represented the moral accusation against the nation of murderers almost more directly than the dead, who were condemned to silence. It was Nietzsche who said that historical knowledge always results from a secret equilibrium between remembering and forgetting – exile and emigration offer a highly favourable opportunity to explore this secret.

In the following short remarks I will ask, in what way political emigration became part of the historical consciousness in post-war-Germany, how its status changed over half a century and not least what this change indicates for the development of political culture. To be sure, "Exilforschung", as professional historiography, was and is a particularly refined and artificial form of remembering, but it also remained part of the general, the collective memory. Insofar it was both object and subject of the cultural and political development, the image of emigration consequently became both reflex and reflection of the changing political culture. And this ambiguity in turn may serve as a tentative re-definition of the title of my paper: Not only what émigrés thought, argued or published on their country of origin, functioned as a very well known critical instance of historical consciousness, but also the research on emigration. The

scientific "re-presentation" of emigration can be seen as a peculiar kind of mirroring reality in post-war-Germany.

When sketching the changing image of emigration, I will restrict myself on the one hand to the Western part of the divided nation; on the other hand I will concentrate on a particularly sensitive sector out of the wide and disparate range of emigration. It was especially the émigré social and political scientists, who had formed as a critical group already in the Thirties and in the Fourties tried to become, in the context of the Western allied politics, an agent for the future development in Germany and Europe. Although their practical influence finally proved limited, it was their intellectual and scholarly legacy which in the long run became an influential and powerful factor. Four different stages can roughly be distinguished:

1. the years of silence –
2. the period of politicisation – the late '60s and '70s
3. the professionalisation of research – the '80s
4. the years since German re-unification

1. The Adenauer era

The '50s and '60s in West-Germany are often described as the "*bleierne Zeit*" (leaden time) of the Federal Republic – Otto Kirchheimer, for instance, spoke of a "*politische Käseglocke*" (bell jar) and Karl Löwenstein of a "Demokratur"(democtatorship); both were referring to the semi-authoritarian Adenauer regime in internal politics and the freezing period of the Cold War in foreign politics. In fact metaphors like these are useful for characterising the hybrid relationship of continuity and renewal which distinguished the political culture of this era more than anything else. But such characterisations are only really telling when formulated in politico-psychological categories, as Adorno and later Alexander Mitscherlich did: the post-war years were a time when the horrors of the recent past were imminently present on the one hand, and reinterpreted or denied on the other. In any case, they were overlaid with a strong taboo. What is obvious in the way the Holocaust was dealt with also applies in a weaker, yet analogous form to exile and emigration: "Emigrant" was a denunciatory insult in a political arena that enabled prominent armchair criminals from the Hitler era to regain official positions.[38]

This ambivalent constellation had sub-institutional consequences and was demonstrated, for example, by the strange shadow existence of emigre social and political scientists. On the one hand there was a thoroughly impressive presence

[38] For the general interplay between culture and politics in post-war-Germany see Müller 2003.

of emigrants which was not confined to vague lines of reception or appeals to guilty conscience, but had taken the concrete form of a limited remigration of social scientists – their quota is between 25 and 30 per cent, significantly higher than the general average and especially Jewish remigration, but also higher than that of natural scientists. The early return of the so-called Frankfurt School was definitely initiated as an act of political reparation, even though half their former colleagues chose to remain in the USA; returned emigres were also active in other centres of sociology in the Federal Republic, such as Rene König and Alphons Silbermann in Cologne, who managed to some extent to create a counterweight to the continuity of conservative sociology. Relatively, the greatest influence of the returned emigrants (and remaining emigres) was probably on the founding and establishment of West German political science – especially at Berlin's Free University. But after a time returned emigres also managed to gain founding or leading positions in Freiburg, Munich and Hamburg, thus contributing substantially to the establishment of political science – on the Anglo-Saxon model – as an autonomous discipline in opposition to the tradition of German "Staatswissenschaft".

Yet this is only one side of a culture that was in essence deeply contradictory – in this case academic culture. The other side remained under the spell of a political and social taboo which was even more hermetic because the returned émigrés themselves helped to maintain it. One could say with some emphasis that the returned émigrés only had the right to be present to the extent that they virtually neutralised, relativised or even deliberately ignored their own political and personal pre-history in the inter-war period, although it was often formative for their academic work. It is well known how anxious Horkheimer was, despite his post as the celebrated rector of Frankfurt University, not to be stigmatised again as a "Jewish Marxist" in the anti-communist milieu of the 1950s. And if we look at the leading figures in political science in Berlin who were close to social democracy – Ernst Fraenkel, Ossip K. Flechtheim and later Richard Löwenthal – we cannot fail to notice their silence about their own biographies of theoretical adherence. Their militant anti-fascism would have been sufficient provocation for the practice of what Hermann Lübbe called the communicative hushing-up of the Nazi-past ("kommunikative Beschweigen") (Lübbe 1983: 329). Other leading emigre academics, such as Eric Voegelin or Arnold Bergsträsser, had not really freed themselves from the tradition of German cultural conservatism even in exile, and were now able to emerge as particularly strong pillars of continuity of this tradition because they had no guilty past. But all in all, there is a remarkable common factor among this first generation of emigre social scientists, whether they returned or not. With the sole exception of Hannah Arendt, they kept the Holocaust, the darkest background to the emigration, out of the arena of public debate.

We can only glance here in passing at the different, yet in some ways similar development in the German Democratic Republic.[39] Of course there was a fundamental difference, in that emigration and exile were not only a constantly topical element of political consciousness but also, on a par with the communist resistance, actually became a core feature of "anti-fascism" and was thus incorporated into the official ideology of the communist-ruled state. But this boiled down to the emigration being instrumentalised for the legitimation problems of a party dictatorship primarily based on external support – with all the consequences that are bound to follow in a society with notorious deficits of legitimation. The communist exile was normatively overplayed and the dark sides of the Stalinist era were blended out, so that the returned émigrés from the West easily came under suspicion of political disloyalty. It is hardly coincidence that it was former exiles from the West – including Ernst Bloch and Hans Mayer – who made the spectacular departures from the GDR before and after the building of the Berlin Wall. But there were also partial dissidents, such as Jürgen Kuczynski, Stefan Heym and Alfred Kantorowicz, who could hold out inside the country, not least because the collective commitment to the memory of political exile gave them a kind of protection.

2. The late '60s and the '70s

There is no clearer indication that the peculiar blackout of the emigration led to its depoliticisation than the leap into a new phase for the culture of the West German "Wirtschaftswunder" initiated by the student movement in 1967/68. In fact the student movement, though it had precedents in the anti-nuclear movement of the late '50s, acted as a political beacon primarily because its provocative stance tore through the veil of political consciousness. The powerful effect of this provocation can be seen not least in the deeply defensive reactions that students in Berlin and Frankfurt got from their academic teachers – Adorno, Ernst Fraenkel and Richard Löwenthal took their distance in troubled formulations. The most pointed and well-known was Habermas' ambiguous term "Linksfaschismus" (left-wing fascism). The student movement was both a complex and international phenomenon, but in West Germany it was articulated more than elsewhere as a generational conflict between the silent fathers and their sons and daughters insistently demanding explanations. Behind the conflicts was the deep-seated question of the Nazi past (Kraushaar 2000).

We have to look for cultural-psychological connections like these to understand the changed, more direct political status the emigration took on in German historical consciousness after 1968. Because the émigrés seemed to be

[39] For the role of intellectuals in East-Germany see now Mittenzwei 2001.

the "better", anti-fascist fathers, the exile represented not only the "other" but the "better" Germany (Krohn 1995). In terms of the history of ideas this means the forced rediscovery of the politico-economic theory of fascism, which replaced the theory of totalitarianism that had been "unmasked" as anti-communist. The newly-awakened interest in the emigration was an integral, if not functional part of a political project. This is shown not least in a change in terminology: the non-political term "emigration" was replaced by the political one, "exile". And in this same context it becomes clear why it was more or less exclusively the left-wing exponents of exile or the leftist groupings and aspects of the emigration culture that attracted the most attention, while the wide variations of the spectrum as a whole remained unnoticed. This biased perspective lasted until well into the 1970s, when the student movement had long since collapsed without achieving its aims, and still left clear traces in the sphere of the prima facie "value-free" academic research.

A good example of this is the turn the reception of the Frankfurt School took in the '70s: whereas its image in the '60s had still been marked by esoteric-philosophical self-interpretation, as clearly represented in Adorno's late works, this varnish virtually cracked under the students' attacks – and the renounced early phase of the Institute for Social Research came to the fore: the rhetoric of revolutionary theory, its camouflage in the terminology of "critical theory" and the economistic foundation of social psychology and cultural criticism. The representative position previously held by Adorno was taken over in Germany too by Marcuse, because he seemed to embody this political tradition more convincingly. The historical reception, which made an intense impact in the 1970s, was still in the slipstream of the "Cultural Revolution" on the one hand, but on the other it was already ebbing away into academic industry – it submitted to epistemological interests in the sociology of knowledge (Dubiel 1978) or the history of ideas (Söllner 1979) and believed this methodological refraction was the best way to salvage the legacy of the Frankfurt School. But it is interesting that a broad historical account such as Martin Jay presented in the USA was first published in Germany only in the mid-'80s (Wiggershaus [1988] 1994).

Another development must at least be mentioned because it displays certain thematic parallels, and is also a notable methodical contrast to the 1980s. When people in Germany today talk of "Exilforschung", in the first place they mean the rapidly growing number of studies and publications devoted since the beginning of the '70s mainly to two partly overlapping thematic fields: on the one hand, the political exiles with their groups, strategies and aims – and on the other, the artistic, especially the literary exiles (Walter 1972; Spalek & Strelka 1976–1989). Even where the political connotations were underplayed in accounts by

contemporary historians and literary scholars, a certain bias remained in force which a telling title called "with their face turned towards Germany" ("*Mit dem Gesicht nach Deutschland*", Matthias 1968). In the foreground was the interest in Germany's fate under National Socialism and correspondingly the anti-fascist commitment, which was indeed typical of broad sections of the political and literary exile community; in turn, this political orientation was best illustrated by the focus on those celebrities who had most vividly portrayed the "experience of exile", i.e. also the suffering of exile.

I don't know if it's a malicious accusation to see these epistemological interests in exile research not just as the belated correction of an one-sided historical picture, but also as something like a "need to bring things back home", a reclamation of the cultural "losses of emigration", as it were. If this were the case, then the legitimate desire to finally take on fully the legacy of emigration would have been superseded in the very moment of its fulfillment by a nationalistic idea of cultural property – in clear contradiction to the cosmopolitan spirit of prominent figures like Thomas Mann, Albert Einstein and others. Whatever the case, it was no coincidence that it was the 1970s when an émigré, Willy Brandt, was the head of the government, and when academic research began to open up to the whole breadth and depth of the political, literary and scientific emigration: the German Research Foundation (DFG) set up its own focus on exile research, and at the Munich Institute of Contemporary History (Institut für Zeitgeschichte) the systematic work of collection was begun which would bear fruit ten years later in the "International Biographical Dictionary of Central European Émigrés".

This is the appropriate point to add an ironic footnote to the inner-German rivalry about the legacy of the emigration; in the GDR, at the same time as the late awakening of West German research, there appeared an early – and premature – general depiction of exile, as pretentious as it was one-sided, because it was totally bound by the communist party conception of "Erbe" [Legacy] (*Kunst und Literatur im antifaschistischen Exil 1933–1945*, 1981).

3. The 1980s

It should not be regarded as misplaced arrogance in relation to important impulses, particularly in US-American research, to state that truly professional research on the emigration got underway in Germany only in the 1980s. As indicators one might discern the emergence of three major trends, and above all their dynamic pairing:

a. the research started on the path towards specialisation;
b. the reflection on theories and methods came to the fore;
c. the research evolved its own form of organisation.

To start with the last point: the *Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft*, the official research organisation in the Federal Republic, extended its scope to cover research on the emigration, and the Volkswagen Foundation developed a new focus – which meant specialised selection committees and generously-funded programmes. The "*Gesellschaft für Exilforschung*" was established as an interdisciplinary organisation that held regular conferences and, since 1983, has published their results in its own annual review, the "*Jahrbuch für Exilforschung*". Along with a large number of individual initiatives in the research and publishing, the "*Zentrum für Antisemitismusforschung*" was founded in Berlin. Its first director, Herbert A. Strauss, maintained a programmatic and continuous involvement in emigration research. The other two points mentioned above are useful for making at least a rough sketch of the direction of development in more recent West German research on emigration:

The most important thematic area in the '80s emerged first from an obvious gap in research and rapidly became the subject of both fundamental and specialised investigations. I am referring to the "*Wissenschaftsemigration*", i.e. the emigration of scientists and scholars (Strauss et al. 1991). The research strategy was aimed towards intensive and extensive expansion. Not only could the whole spectrum and previously unknown quantity of the "exodus of culture" be revealed, but also the specific quality of the émigré scientists could be explored in detail: their differentiation within individual disciplines, the constellation of the various academic faculties (natural and social sciences and the humanities), as well as the consequences of the expulsion for the underlying structure of entire cultures of knowledge. The shift in the focus of research – and this connection is especially important – meant not only a characteristic shift of epistemological interest: from political and literary "exile" to the rather more neutral subject areas and the social milieus of "emigration". Almost more important were the resulting changes in the apparatus of cognition, the concepts and methods that have to be specially suited for examining the scholarly emigration. In any case, that it could now come to an alternative and momentous discussion of methods was also linked with fact that the archival and empirical preconditions have significantly improved. In the first place we should point to the publication of the *International Biographical Dictionary of Central European Emigres*, a collective work by German, American and Jewish researchers whose weighty volumes documented around 9,000 biographies, making available a wealth of data and information.

Finally, concerning the methodological innovations again three tendencies seem to be of major significance:

a. The move from individual to collective biographies: It was now possible, not least because of the aggregated data of the *International Biographical*

Dictionary, to locate the fate of émigrés, which had always been individual, within wider contexts, whether scientific disciplines like physics, psychology, political sciences etc., or institutional contexts like the New York School for Social Research or the Manhattan Project, or finally, cultural émigré milieus like those in New York and Los Angeles.

b. The move from history of ideas of exiles to the social history and the real impact of immigrants: While the older research on exiles remained fixated on the country of origin and was thus a "discourse of loss", the research into the emigration of scholars had to concentrate on the countries where they settled. The paths they took to get there, the forms of integration, e.g. social obstacles or political chances for émigrés, and the long-term impact in specific contexts of practice, e.g. their success or failure in one or another scientific discipline – all this now came to the fore. The concept of "acculturation" became a decisive key category, to be carefully distinguished from other concepts like "assimilation" or "nationalisation" (e.g. "Americanisation") (Institut für Zeitgeschichte and Research Foundation for Jewish Immigration. 1980–1983).

c. Research on emigration became in large measure part of a general history of culture and simultaneously of the history of migration in the 20th century. This created chances, but also brought dangers: On the one hand, a factual and temporal broadening of perspective emerged – the effect of the scholarly emigration in particular may have remained bound to the national context, but from the start it had a special international reverberation; the history of the émigrés' impact meant placing it in longer-term contexts whose boundaries no longer coincided with the boundaries of the exile – 1933 and 1945. On the other hand, this new "contextualisation" of the emigration threatened to cause the disappearance of the particular features of the "forced migration", its very specific cultural and political connotations.

Did this multiplex turn in emigration research run parallel with the tendencies towards "normalisation", i.e. the leveling out of National Socialism in the German historical consciousness? You know that these were the catchphrases with which the so-called "Historians' Quarrel" towards the end of the 1980s was fought (Ash & Söllner 1996: Preface). Although this debate evoked by Jürgen Habermas was started by Ernst Nolte's assertion of a causal nexus between Gulag and Holocaust, which was almost unanimously denied by the community of professional historians, in a wider sense it was also about the legitimacy of adopting a more general historical perspective. The first thing one notices is that in this debate there was no direct reference at all to the emigration research

currently being done. Was this an indication of the marginality of the emigration compared with the Holocaust I mentioned at the beginning – or was it now objectively justified and politically safe to situate the emigration in larger cultural and international contexts, in the whole course of a century whose continual eruptions of violence were impossible to deny and are obviously still not at an end?

For answering this question let me turn to the changed image of the group of political scientists. The fact that it is possible today to bring together such widely divergent political and scientific figures such as Franz L. Neumann, Arnold Brecht, Hans J. Morgenthau and Leo Strauss under one and the same "historical umbrella" – with good methodological reason, I assume – is already a demonstration of the epistemological progress in understanding the emigration. What we could call the "disciplinary fencing-in" of émigré culture, which was not at all unified, was both a result of a cognitive abstraction and of the research into multifarious contexts of praxis, the discovery of their political connections and the interpretation of recalcitrant intellectual biographies to achieve an internally coherent picture. And only from the synthesis of all this could the evolutionary idea finally emerge that the emigre political scientists have contributed *as a group* to build something like a viable bridge between the "German" tradition of juristic "*Staatswissenschaft*" on the one hand and the "Anglo-Saxon" tradition of political science on the other (Söllner 1996). It is also immediately evident that telling the story of the emigration like this is only possible if you look at the internationalization of knowledge as the real dynamic factor of modern history of science. In the case of the émigré political scientists there is also the fact that this bridge-building – more than in fields like biochemistry or history of art – had direct political consequences, because it was intentionally designed to integrate the Federal Republic of Germany into the cultural system of the Western democracies.

4. The Years since Re-unification

A few remarks must suffice to sketch the change in the scene since 1989. And of course, since nobody can have the confidence to formulate a reliable diagnosis on a political culture in rapid progress, the big question mark will remain: Has German re-unification really contributed to a tangible and lasting "renationalisation" of political consciousness? – Or is it only a result of short-term frictions arising from the enormous – and unexpected – social, economic and cultural problems of bringing together two very different states? I would like to mention two indicators from my personal field of work; one speaks for the first alternative, the other more for the second: a) the growth of obvious hostility to foreigners in relation to the so-called "asylum crisis" – this is, of course, an expression of a "new nationalism", but tends rather to fit in with a general

European reaction against the growing movements of migrants and refugees; b) the increasing scepticism about the capacity of democracy to deal with the crisis of the welfare state – in East Germany it may be an expression of a authoritarian cultural tradition and in West Germany the result of current political listlessness, of what we call the danger of "weariness with politics". But in present Germany these two factors have not (yet?) combined to a strong political party movement comparable, for instance, to the "Front National" in France.

Looking at the emigration as part of current historical consciousness, two tendencies seem clear to me; they occur on different levels but could nonetheless combine into a problematic perspective: thematically, since the beginning of the '90s research has concentrated primarily on the remigration (Krohn & Mühlen 1997) – however, this turn has nothing to do with re-nationalisation, insofar as the complexity that historiography has attained is not pushed into the background – and there is no sign of this; this concentration is more likely to result in getting an even clearer picture of the international networking of the emigration. On the other hand, it is disquieting that the great wish of many committed researchers on the emigration remains unfulfilled, that the emigration research should be institutionalised. The *Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft* has stopped making this its focal issue and there has been no success in establishing an institute or even a chair at any German university which would be exclusively dedicated to teaching and research in this field. There are also no discernible new impulses to investigate the emigration to the east, though they could have been stimulated by the opening of East European archives. Among other reasons, this is because GDR historical scholarship has been almost completely liquidated ("*abgewickelt*"). If you look at which new publications or new collected editions are attracting attention, it tends to be those by conservative figures from the spectrum of the Western emigration, such as Leo Strauss or Eric Voegelin. But anyway, this publicity remains restricted to the academic public, if you compare it with the waves caused by the debate on the book of Daniel Goldhagen.

So as a cautious summary conclusion we could say: The future, at least of organised research, is uncertain. The emigration has returned to where it was: to the periphery of public consciousness. Is this result, intermediate as it is, an alarming one? Does it indicate, that the difficult equilibrium of historical shame and actual self-confidence, which was and remains to be crucial for the national identity of the Germans, is waning away? If the co-existence of remembering and forgetting is a mysterious criterion indeed when evaluating the actual state of a pluralist democratic culture, this is all the more true for a relatively young democracy like post-war-Germany. Especially after the epochal break of 1989, it seems to me legitimate to give the term "historicization" its innocence back and thereby to return to the historian his professional pride – provided, of course,

that the violent experiences of this century, which without doubt include the expulsion of scholars and artists, are neither politically whitewashed nor nostalgically misinterpreted.

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European Exile for Russian Westernizers: The *Logos* Circle

Alexander Dmitriev

ABSTRACT

The present study deals with some significant changes imputable to the status of exile in the work of a group of Russian academic scholars, who had earlier negotiated a brilliant connection with exceptionally prominent German humanists and social scientists during their pre-war academic residence in German universities. Briefly stated, the case study of the *Logos* group shows that the shift from a nationally localized to a cosmopolitan (or at least "Westernized") scientific mode that students of the 1930s intellectual exile from Germany have increasingly emphasized (Ash & Söllner 1996) can by no means be generalized to other situations. If anything, the Russian example under review shows the opposite trend. This suggests the need for analytical models in the comparative study of exiles, which possess sufficient subtlety to identify complex historical constellations, rather than generalizations derived from grand theories of system change.

The lessons of inter-war Russian emigration are very important, not only for contemporary Russian intellectual history but also for the comparative study of exiles, and they are especially so in our case: how and why can exile and the context of intense political and ideological conflict transform the pro-European or indeed almost cosmopolitan attitudes originally held by a certain group of scholars in the humanities? From the 18th century, Russian social thought had modelled itself on, and developed against the background of, European science and thought in the humanities. What was special about the evolution of intellectual life in Russia during the first decades of the 20th century was that philosophical tendencies and world views – Ernst Mach's 'second positivism', the philosophical and religious heritage of Vladimir Soloviev and neo-Kantianism – were superimposed upon, and complexly combined with, the main political ideologies: Marxism, populism, liberalism and conservatism (which was of a relatively moderate variety in intellectual circles). On the whole, the Russian scholarly community tended towards left liberalism. Like the Russian *intelligentsi*, a distinct if not precisely delimited social formation, with porous boundaries – academic scholars, however oriented to their respective disciplines,

espoused an ethics of social responsibility and were convinced that they had to work for the good of their people (McClelland 1979).

The enlightenment ideology implicitly espoused by a majority of Russian academics at the time was closer to the radical world-view of French Republican intellectuals than to the 'Mandarin' ideal of the state as a guarantor of cultural values prevalent in the German universities (Ringer 1969).[40] Despite their status as civil servants employed by one of the departments of the imperial administration, the Russian academic intellectuals perceived their scholarly activities at the universities or in the system of the Academy of Sciences as aiming to serve the people and assist society's progress. The majority of Russian scientists supported the political ideals of Western constitutional democracy.

The intellectual contacts between Russia and the West were facilitated before 1917, most importantly, by Russian students enrolled at foreign universities and by post-graduates preparing for professorships at Russian universities and sent abroad on state scholarships. Apart from rather formalized contacts on the level of the Academies of Sciences and international congresses, in the early 20th century the 'Republic of Scholars' existed as a relatively unified academic market, especially for East Europeans and Russians who for some reason were excluded from higher education in their home countries (Karady 1998, 2002). From the beginning of the century the Russian student diaspora at German universities grew constantly, including large proportions of those groups who had limited access to universities in the Russian Empire due to conscious Tsarist policy: women, Jews, Poles and members of radical parties (Peter 2001).

The next level (and segment) of this mostly West European academic market was the system of post-graduate training and defending doctoral theses (mostly in subjects and fields of research that were less developed in students' home universities); this also includes Russian professorial bursars sent abroad. Of the 10–15% of university graduates 'retained' at the universities to prepare for a professorship who were sent abroad before 1914, most went to Germany. German also remained the main language of scientific communication in Russia at the time. Until 1917, émigré revolutionaries or liberals acted as a kind of laboratory of political thought (as in Herzen's case) in the domain of *intelligentsi*, while philosophy and especially the social sciences were tightly linked with the

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[40] The distinction between *intelligentsi* and academic scholars is worked out in German debates arising not only out of the situation described by Ringer but also out of the dispute between proponents of *Bildung* and *Wissenschaft* as the goal of higher education, with the question of *Weltanschauung* as a synecdoche of the differences. Cf. Loader & Kettler 2001 and Kettler & Lauer 2005. The concept of *intelligentsi*, however, was imported from Russia, notably by Masaryk (1919).

European (French and above all German) academic community. The mingling of *intelligentsi* and academic scholars – and their characteristic habits of mind was fairly promiscuous among the Russians in Western Europe, especially among the students. Yet the scientific prestige of those universities and the inner integrity of the sciences in those sites, including especially the humanities, were of utmost importance, especially as viewed from the Russian academic scene.

It would be entirely wrong, however, to perceive pre-war Russian science as entirely dependent on German science or being clearly situated on its margins. It was the *relatively* peripheral status of the Russian scientific community that made Russian scholars perceive the 'Western' system of universities and academies in the first third of the 20th century as a unified whole; the national peculiarities of the British, French and German scholarly communities were of secondary importance to them. Thus Russian scholars viewed the European 'Republic of knowledge' as more international than it was, which explains their surprise and dismay at the hostility between German and French colleagues, for example, which marked the scene when they returned to Western Europe in the 1920s, but now as èmigrès. The shift in status and perspective had other consequences as well.

The present study deals with some significant changes imputable to the status of exile in the work of a group of Russian academic scholars, who had earlier negotiated a brilliant connection with exceptionally prominent German humanists and social scientists during their pre-war academic residence in German universities. Briefly stated, the case study of the *Logos* group shows that the shift from a nationally localized to a cosmopolitan (or at least "Westernized") scientific mode that students of the 1930s intellectual exile from Germany have increasingly emphasized (Ash & Söllner 1996) can by no means be generalized to other situations. If anything, the Russian example under review shows the opposite trend. This suggests the need for analytical models in the comparative study of exiles, which possess sufficient subtlety to identify complex historical constellations, rather than generalizations derived from grand theories of system change.

Logos in pre-war Germany and Russia

Of special significance for the contacts between Russian and German scholars in the humanities on the eve of the First World War, was the international philosophical journal *Logos* published in Tübingen and Saint-Petersburg from 1910 by the Germans, Richard Kroner and Georg Mehlis, as well as by the Russians, Fedor Stepun (1884–1965), Sergey Hessen (1887–1950) and Boris Jakovenko (1884–1948), arising out of an earlier joint philosophical circle in Heidelberg (Kramme 1995). The three Russian editors, recently graduated from

German universities, were fairly representative of the transitory Russian intellectual diaspora. Jakovenko's father belonged to the modest Ukrainian gentry and was not only a former revolutionary activist but also the author of popular biographies; Stepun was born in the family of a land agent of German origin, and Hessen's father, Joseph Hessen was well-known Jewish lawyer and editor, as well being among the founders of the reformist Kadet party. The first product of this Russian-German philosophical co-operation, even before *Logos*, was a joint collection of articles published by the young scholars, entitled *Vom Messias* (1909) (Treiber 1995). This neo-Romantic book, which resonated with the sense of cultural crisis pervasive in German writings of the time, included an article by Kroner entitled 'A Page from the Journal of Our Time' and monographic articles by Mehlis on Comte, by Hessen on Herzen and by Stepun on the noted Russian religious thinker, Vladimir Soloviev (Belkin 2000: 44–59). Before 1914, then, *Logos* appeared in two versions and languages: the German edition was published by J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck) and the Russian one by the Symbolist publishing house *Musaget*, then by M.O. Wolf's book-trading company. In total, eight issues of the journal appeared in Russian (including three double issues). Apart from occasional pieces by the editors, the Russian version carried key articles translated from the German one, as well as original contributions by Russian thinkers, with the result being the publication of such philosophical or cultural celebrities as Georg Simmel, Heinrich Rickert, Edmund Husserl, Karl Vossler, Nikolay Lossky, Petr Struve, Vyacheslav Ivanov and others (Bezrodny 1992).

The Russian co-founders of the journal were far from united in their philosophical loyalties: Stepun felt most attracted to the heritage of German Romanticism and the historico-philosophical approach of Windelband, Hessen and Jakovenko followed the leading neo-Kantian thinkers, Rickert at Heidelberg for the former and Hermann Cohen at Marburg, for the latter. Despite the prominence of Husserl in German philosophy at the time and his prominent appearance in the very first issue of *Logos*, none of the Russian editors were drawn to phenomenology. Having no institutional links with Russian universities or institutes of the Academy of Sciences, the Russian *Logos* in the 1910s stood out for the rigorous intellectual demands it made, which were also evident in the criteria applied to submissions, as well as for its pronounced penchant for Western (predominately German) scientific philosophy, with special emphasis on epistemology (Stepun 1947). In aspiration, it represented the very antithesis of the ideologized *intelligentsi* styles of thought, whether Marxist, populist, reformist liberal or religiously conservative.

Especially the attempt to build a critical philosophy that would be autonomous from the 'axioms of religious experience,' in keeping with the 'scientific'

[*wissenschaftlich*] objectives common to all the *Logos* editors, met with staunch resistance among the Moscow-based Religious-Philosophical Vladimir Soloviev Memorial Society, whose influential members had rallied around the *Put'* publishing house, subsidized by the arts patron, Margarita Morozova. The militant neo-Slavophile Vladimir Ern rejected the attempt to 'discipline' Russian thought through a 'meonic' rationalism that was alien to it, and presented the Eastern Christian Logos as the true moving force of culture ('A Few Words about *Logos* and the Pretensions to Scientificity in Russian Philosophy,' 1910). Expanding his thesis in an argument with Semen Frank, another follower of Soloviev, Ern clearly stressed the primacy of the religious source of culture, the Absolute, over its 'profane' objectivations, including cultural values (Ern 1991).[41] Ern's ideologized point of view, also shared by some of his companions-in-arms at *Put'*, was rather the exception in the scholarly humanities community. As noted, most university teachers supported universal academic standards and patterned their behaviour on the European scholarly community.

Although the German *Logos* continued to appear until the "coordination" of German philosophy after 1933, the Russian *Logos* was closed down at the outbreak of the First World War for being too closely linked to German thought. Overall, the war was an important milestone in the development of science, especially in terms of its institutional framework and international co-operation. It put the ideals of disinterested and neutral scientific research beyond all national, class and other borders – ideas originally at home in the positivist world-view of the *belle époque*, but adapted as well to the anti-positivist "internationalism" of the *Logos* group and others – to a cruel test. Above all, the war transformed the link between scientific research, on the one hand, and political and social development, on the other; and this also changed the role of the nation-state in the evolution of science as an institution.

More specifically, the First World War ideologized the competition among different schools and national tendencies (vom Brocke 1988; Dmitriev 2002). This is illustrated by Ern's programmatic article 'From Kant to Krupp', a paper given at a meeting of the Moscow Religious-Philosophical Society in 1915. In it Ern derived the emergence of German militarism from the rationalism of modern German philosophy, starting with Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*. While the 'Slavophiles' highlighted the rejection of rationalism in their attack on German humanities culture, the 'Westernizers' and liberals turned rather to the French

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[41] It should be noted that in personal relations and private correspondence, Ern and the thinkers of the *Put'* circle expressed their respect for the *Logos* editors' (especially Jakowenko's) consistency, honesty and disinterested search for truth (Gollerbakh 2000: 355–6).

and Anglo-Saxon tradition during the war, embracing a wide range of ideas from traditional positivism to Bergson's vitalistic 'spiritualism.' Thus Boris Jakovenko became keenly interested in contemporary American philosophy, especially pragmatism, as is evident in his letter at 1915 from Italy to Russian phenomenologist and Husserl's disciple Gustav Spet (Spet 1992: 250f). Hessen, in a work published in 1916 and entitled *The Idea of the Nation*, retains his scholarly and abstract manner as he contrasts a truly defensive patriotism for the sake of the victory of the creative spirit with both self-complacent chauvinism and escapist cosmopolitanism (Hessen 1999).[42]

One of the main outcomes of World War I was a change in the composition of the world's leading scientific powers and the end of the unique and practically leading position of German science, which had been the result of an impressive 'spurt' in the second half of the 19th century (Schroeder-Gudehus 1990). After the First World War the international aspects of scientific co-operation on the level of pure research came to depend more and more on *organized* systems of co-operation and their regulation by the state. The 'patriots' internationalism' of the university-based (and predominantly European) 'Republic of scholars' of the pre-war period gave way to a state-regulated interaction of researchers who were defined in the first place as representatives of their nations, disciplines and national scientific schools.

The Russian *Logos* Group in Exile

The striking thing is that while the Russian *Logos* group had tried to advance a secular philosophical and epistemologically stringent program before 1914, the members began to incline towards ethical idealism and Christian rationalism in exile. This appears to reverse the direction that Alfons Söllner and others have observed in the case of the German intellectual emigration after 1933. In the circumstances of the 1920s and 1930s, there seemed to be a need to constitute a coherent and accepted presence of the "Russian idea." Notwithstanding their indisputable ideological influence and consonance with main tendencies of Western thinking, this was achieved neither by the erstwhile 'legal Marxists,' such as Pyotr Struve, Semyon Frank, Sergei Bulgakov or Nikolai Berdyaev, as these writers themselves as well as many subsequent commentators have noted,

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[42] After February 1917, the political activities of the former editors of the Russian *Logos* manifest themselves mostly on the moderate left wing of the spectrum. Stepun was a official representative of Provisional government in the army, and Hessen took part in social-patriotic group around the journal, *Unity*, which was headed by the father of Russian Marxism Georgy Plekhanov. Jakowenko chose exile already in 1913 because of his closeness to the Socialist Revolutionary Party and its leader Savinkow, and he lived in Italy until 1924.

nor by the alternative variant of Russian thinking expressed by the alternative designedly European way of the *Logos*' admirers.

In this context, the Russian exile community in Germany was especially significant for the life of the Russian *Logos* editors, because German philosophy provided the main context for their activities. After the revolution and the civil war, however, the now émigré Russian scholars found their former modernist (liberal or socialist) attitudes to have been strongly shaken or even compromised. The émigré community's harsh and uncompromising anti-Bolshevism engendered a highly distanced and negative attitude towards the Russian revolution in all its phases and to the socialist tendencies, which were perceived to have contributed to the formation and survival of the hateful regime in Russia. The rightward evolution of figures like Struve, Novgorodtsev and, in many ways, Frank, who had been moderate liberals in their politics, bears an eloquent testimony to this fact.[43]

One would have thought that this popularity of 'unshakable' conservative and traditionalist values in the émigré community would draw this emerging frame of mind closer to the anti-Versaille and anti-republican attitudes prevalent in much of the German academic world during the Weimar Republic (Döring 1975; Jansen 1992).[44] But this similarity didn't become a basis for rebuilding stable intellectual ties on pre-war foundations (Koenen & Kopelev 1998). Now that they were no longer representing a whole country (as before 1914) but only its diaspora in Germany and Europe, the Russian thinkers developed a much greater awareness of their affiliation with the context of the Russian national tradition. In many ways, this was a result of the general context of the institutional development of the humanities in Europe in the 1920s, and its increasing orientation to state policies. The Germans were not interested in the émigrés. The political union of the 'pariahs of Versailles' – Soviet Russia and Weimar Germany – that began with the Treaty of Rapallo in 1922, was complemented by a close co-operation between scholarly circles who not long ago had whole-heartedly supported a policy of mutual war till final victory. Most German scholars were interested in being on good terms above all with Soviet colleagues, not with the small academic exile community and,

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[43] The evolution of Berdyaev, who had been close to the others named, was more complex in comparison, leading from the prophecy of the new 'middle ages' during the mid-1920s to the recognition of the immediate relevance of the social question for the modern world and the necessity for a positive rethinking of the social shock to philosophical-religious thinking during the 1930s–1940s (Boobbyer 1995).

[44] See the case of Iwan Iljin, philosopher of law and director of Russian Scientific Institute in Berlin: Tsygankow (2001).

correspondingly, few opportunities were provided for the intellectual segment of Russian emigration (Voigt 1995).

This circumstance defined the organisational framework of émigré scholars' work in Germany (Williams 1972: 272f). Giving a lecture about Russian history to émigré Russian students or a public talk – in German and for a German audience – on contemporary Russian political or economic issues, addressing a convention of Russian scholars abroad or participating in a seminar organised by 'one's own party' or religious group, writing an article for an émigré journal or reviewing yet another book on Russia (or discussing a work by Soviet colleagues in a German scholarly journal) – such were the main forms in which the Russian humanities existed and developed in German exile (Schlögel 1999: 305ff.). In consequence of this restrictive opportunity structure, they preserved and reproduced a knowledge that remained shut off from methodological (rather than thematic) innovation and, most importantly, from critical self-problematization. Such ad hoc reproduction and improvization is the characteristic hallmarks of intellectuals' work, as distinct from the critical scientific discipline adhering to their earlier scholarly project. There were, to be sure, other ways in which some émigrés could enter the European intellectual context, as by participating as equals in foreign circles or colloquia (Berdyaev in Jacques Maritain's or Gabriel Marcel's circle in Paris in the 1930s), by taking part in the multinational cultural life of inter-war Prague (the Prague Linguistic Circle around Mathesius and Jakobson), or teaching a general subject to non-Russian students (the sociologist Pitirim Sorokin at Harvard). Compared to the 'restrictive' German situation of the second half of the 1920s and early 1930s, these forms offered greater opportunities for a dialogue between the émigré Russian and local cognitive traditions. The question of what defined the specifically 'Russian' character of these other kinds of new intellectual projects, however, remained unsettled (Tioman 1995; Reichelt 1999). The question of national identity could not be laid to rest.

This represented a serious shift for the *Logos* group, for which "international" had been a decisive self-characterization. Jakovenko, it should be said, considered the national form to be only a contingent moment in the development of philosophical knowledge, and he remained highly critical of Russian philosophy for being insufficiently rigorous, professional and systematic – see his *Studies of Russian Philosophy* (Jakovenko 1922). But then, he was away from Germany and the Russian exile there. In his Italian years, Jakovenko took active part in the intellectual life of the country, worked as co-editor in Italian version of Logos, published a lot of articles in some periodicals as expert on Russian matters (Garzonio 1999; Renna 2004). He also translated Croce's book (*Estetica come scienza dell'espressione e linguistica generale*) for Russian publication (1920).

Jakovenko (after return from Mussolini's Italy in 1924) and Hessen (until his final Warsaw period from 1935) moved to in Prague, where they collaborated and taught at special higher-educational institutions for Russian exiled youth (Goněc 2000). These educational organizations was established in framework of so-called Russian action at the initiative of Tomas Masaryk, who was not only President of the Czechoslovak Republic but also author of a widely read book on the Russian intelligentsi (Masaryk 1919; Chinyaeva 2001; Andreyev 2004). Hessen's main subject became theoretical pedagogy (Styczynski 2004), while Jakovenko turned to the history of philosophy in Russia, especially the history of Hegelianism. With the publication of a summary statement of his own system of philosophy – "transcendental pluralism" (Jakovenko 1928), Jakovenko suggested that he had remained the same rationalist and even dogmatic thinker in the 1930s as in his earlier period in Russia (Magid 1999). The change in the *Logos* group was not unanimous or straightforward, and they did not abandon their earlier hopes without a struggle.

A Russian *Logos*-in-Exile Experiment

An important attempt by these émigré philosophers to resume their dialogue with the German intellectual tradition was made in 1925, when they published under exclusively Russian auspices a new issue of their *Logos*, revisiting the project launched by Russian and German doctoral students in Germany fifteen years earlier. In addition to work by the Russian *Logos* group, it included articles by two older Lithuanian philosophers (with similar Russian-German backgrounds) Vassily Sezeman [Wassili Sesemann] (1884–1963) and Nikolay Lossky, both of whom had already published earlier in Logos. There was a contribution as well by one of the founding German patrons, Heinrich Rickert.

The renewed *Logos* saw it as its objectives to make sense of the experience of the Russian revolution and to expand upon the dialogue/argument with the main religious-philosophical tradition of Russian pre-revolutionary and émigré thought. The distinctive proposal of the *Logos* group in 1925 was the need to base philosophy on the post-revolutionary situation. The initiators of the new *Logos* took a surprisingly positive view of the social upheaval they had experienced, rather than interpreting it in terms of retribution, disaster and 'an experience of collapse' (the point of view espoused by most émigré thinkers). The Berlin circle of religious philosophers accordingly took a negative view of Jakovenko's undertaking. Berdyaev told Struve as much in a letter written in late 1922 to dissuade the latter from contributing to the renewed *Logos*: 'As a matter of principle we cannot join them. The platform of Jakovenko's journal will be a mental acceptance of the revolution, as expressed in F.A. Stepun's recent lecture in Berlin. Moreover, the journal intends to be at odds with the traditions of Russian religious philosophy. Now that our journal has appeared, Jakovenko's

journal is becoming less relevant … Il'yin and Frank have already turned Jakovenko down. We need to concentrate our ideological forces' (Struve 2000: 174).

The introductory note to *Logos* concludes with a programmatic thesis:

> The Russian revolution is not only a tremendous destructive force, but also a source of new life and new creativity. As an event of an unprecedented scale it gives every one of us a novel sense of existence. And it is in the sense of existence, in an intense ontological sense of self that we see the foundations and guarantee of that flowering and deepening of all of Russian culture and Russian philosophical creativity which the renewed *Logos* intends to serve to the best of its ability (*Logos* 1925: 18).

In the same text the editors admit that the former Russian *Logos* had displayed 'school-boyish and apprentice-like traits' and that the 'hegemony of theoretical knowledge' that had been peculiar to it

> … narrowed down the problem of cognition to the reality that is immediately given, whereas the forms of knowledge remain but a segment, only the first part of that ideal domain … which also embraces ethical and aesthetic values, legal and economic substances, religious experience – in short, all those "ornaments of the Deity" which are also the authentic supra-individual content of the human soul and are constitutive of its individuality.[45]

In terms of contents, the articles published in that issue, on the whole, showed no significant theoretical advance over the earlier *Logos*. There are no discussion of social philosophy or essentially new approaches to epistemology. Moreover, the *Logos* editors had clearly drawn closer to their former adversaries among the religious philosophers. Thus Jakovenko's article 'The Might of Philosophy' vividly illustrates his turn from a fervent defence of the scientific nature of philosophy to an assertion of its function as *Weltanschauung*, its relations with a culture aiming to grasp the Existent (Jakovenko 2002: 265–80). The *Logos* authors' later position bore distinct marks of a turn from epistemology to ontology (Nikolay Lossky pointed this out in his *History of Russian Philosophy*), not in a Heideggerian spirit but in the sense of Lossky's religiously-coloured ideas of the

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[45] This volume of *Logos* also contained two book reviews by Ukrainian and Russian philosopher Dmitro Chizhevsky (one of them on Richard Kroner's book *Vom Kant bis Hegel. Bd l. Von der Vernunft Kritik zur Naturphilosophie Tubingen*, *1921*). Dmitro Chizhevsky (1894–1977) was moderate social-democrat activist in his youth in Kiev before 1920, then in exile he became the brilliant historian of Russian and Ukrainian philosophy and literature. He was collaborator of Roman Jakobson in Prague Linguistic circle and one of the founding fathers of Slavic studies in Germany after 1945 (Bojko-Blochyn 1998).

'concrete subject', overcoming abstraction etc (Lossky 1951: 412–3). For a variety of reasons, the Russian *Logos* publication experiment could not be sustained.

A symptomatic subsequent undertaking by Jakovenko was the 1929 launching, in Bonn, of an international German-language journal called *Der russische Gedanke* (*Russian Thought*) devoted to Russian philosophy, literary criticism and culture. Besides drawing on the circle of *Logos* authors, it carried articles by the Germans Hermann Glockner and Hans Prager, the Italian Ettore Lo Gatto, as well as Berdyaev, Frank, Nikolay Arsen'ev, the Eurasianists Leo Karsavin, Nikolay Alekseev, Dmitry Svyatopolk-Mirsky, Alexander Kozhevnikov (later famous as Alexandre Kojève) and others (in total, five volumes appeared in 1929–34). Despite the participation of German authors, this journal, unlike the pre-war *Logos*, never became an organ of interaction between Russian and German thinkers. *Der russische Gedanke* remained a secondary forum for the discussion of strictly Russian intellectual preoccupations and conflicts (Plotnikov 1999).

Logos and Generation

The generational clash between young emigrant scholars of the post-war and post-revolutionary age cohort, on the one hand, and the generations of their teachers, with their European-level education, systems of personal contacts and foreign language publications, on the other hand, inevitably acquired an ideological tinge. While in the victorious European countries, younger scholars in the mid-1920s were on the whole more internationalist than their war-veteran 'fathers', a significant part of the younger generation of Russian academic intellectuals in exile in the early 1930s, on the contrary, tended towards isolationism and right-wing radicalism – against the established and overly liberal elder academic generation.

Eurasianism was a paradigmatic current of émigré thought in this sense. Like the former Vekhi-group and the left liberals affiliated with *Logos*, the Eurasianists attempted to consider the lessons of the First World War and the October Revolution, but they reached quite different conclusions. The Eurasianists – the linguist prince Nikolay Trubetskoy, the geographer Peter Savitskiy, and the musicologist Peter Suvchinsky. concluded that the base for the ideal social system for Russia would be constituted by the principle of the (Russian-Orthodox) church. This 'ideocracy', as they called it, stood in stark contrast to the corrupted and selfish regimes of Western democracy that dominated their time. From the *Logos* standpoint, Stepun, who had been an opponent of Eurasianism from very beginning, conceived their doctrine as the manifestation of more general crisis of the liberal world-view.

While the philosophical position of the authors of *Logos* in the 1920s was not a disowning of their former credo, however modified by a turn to religious philosophy, their social and political evolution was much more intriguing and innovative. Between 1914 and 1929, the authoritative Paris-based émigré journal *Sovremennye Zapiski* (*Contemporary Notes*) published a number of articles by Sergey Hessen (who was then living in Prague) in which he tried to provide a new – legal – substantiation of socialism and to present a programme for genuinely overcoming capitalism rather than externally negating it, as in Communist etatism (Walicki 1992). Among contemporary social theoreticians he was especially interested in guild socialism and the works of Cole and de Man, and he was close to the German circle of right socialist linked to the journal *Neue Blätter für Sozialismus* (Paul Tillich, Adolf Löwe, Emil Lederer) (Hessen 1999: 147–542).

The *Logos* circle's best-known philosopher and political commentator was Fedor Stepun, whose exceptional integration into the German academic community was eased by his German origins, so that he taught sociology at the Dresden Polytechnic from 1926 until his politically-motivated dismissal in 1937 (Treiber 1999). Throughout the 1920s, he published – also in the *Contemporary Notes* – a series of articles entitled 'Thoughts about Russia', in which he presented his 'post-revolutionary', rather than restorationist, project of democratic and religious-socialist transformation and revival of the future Russia (Hufen 2001: 165–96). Stepun also wrote on German events in the Paris-based journal *Novy grad* (*The New City*), one of the most interesting ideological undertakings of the inter-war Russian emigration (Stepun 2000: 425–54, 865–919). Contributors to that journal included Berdyaev and Stepun, the former socialist revolutionary Fondaminsky and the talented historian Georgy Fedotov (Raeff 1985), and it was very significant for developing an interpretation of the new reality that arose in Russia during the revolution. Like the 1925 *Logos*, it attempted to respond to the socio-political challenges of modernity and to conceive Russian problems in broad European framework of "crisis of world spirit." Aside from Berdyaev, the historian and philosopher Georgij Fedotov played a crucial role as one of the journal's most important contributors. Wherever they published, the former *Logos* collaborators attempted to speak for and to Russia, while their social and philosophical thought was close to such diverse European thinkers of that period as José Ortega-y-Gasset, Karl Mannheim and Simone Weill, who saw themselves as mediating between the roles of intellectuals and academics, who were open to more or less unorthodox religious thought, and who defined their primary tasks as a diagnosis of the presumed crisis of their times.

Conclusion. The Distinctiveness of the Russian Intellectual Exile

It is, in part, the very abruptness of the Russian socio-cultural upheaval, which literally threw numerous leading intellectuals and university teachers out of the country, that accounts for their need to preserve their *group* identity as *Russian* scholars. By contrast, the fate of Hungarian scholars who found themselves abroad after the revolutionary events of 1918–9, provides an example of a national identity 'left in the past' for the sake of *individual* entry into a foreign national context (Congdon 1973, 1991). These émigrés' further careers turned out to be the more successful the less they were linked to specifically Hungarian problems, as can be seen by comparing the cases of Karl Mannheim (b. 1893) and Karl Polanyi (1886) with those of Oszkár Jászi (b. 1875) and Pál Szende (b. 1979), a contrast partly due no doubt to generational differences and to the respective positions of the two pairs before emigration.

More generally, however, the survival of the project of a 'diasporic,' outward-looking science (especially in the humanities) appears possible only when the exile is relatively short – about a decade and a half, as in the case of the German émigrés after 1933 (Raeff 1990). Historical realities did not grant such an opportunity to inter-war Russian thought. Under the conditions they encountered, even the most Europeanized philosophical programme begins to acquire national-particularist features. The former cultural or scientific and epistemological universalism gives way to idealist or openly religious universalism. On the other hand, the continuing aspiration for internationalism is now embodied on an ideological rather than an academic level. This was what made it possible for the political self-definition of the Westernizers to evolve leftwards in exile during the inter-war period, in contrast to most Russian émigré thinkers.

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Toward Understanding the Art of Modern Diasporic Ideology Making: The Eurasianist Mind-Mapping of the Imperial Homeland (1921–1934)

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ABSTRACT

Eurasianism arose in the 1920s as the cross-national brain-child of several prominent Russian intellectuals in exile. Notwithstanding the geo-political implications of the key concepts in Eurasianism, it focuses on the question of Russia's relation to 'Occident' and 'Orient' as first of all culturally conditioned, and as being the crucial component of imperial history of modern Russia and its 'hybrid' identity. While exploring the ways the Eurasianists conceptualized empire/homeland and thought about the future, new 'other' Russia coming after the Bolsheviks ("Russia No. 2"), one must be careful to pose the questions "when", "why" "for whom", apart from "what." In this article, I will try to address the symbolic geography of Eurasianism as surprisingly a project to be understood sociologically, as a historically localized exilic process of ideology-making, while I will also attempt to point out some new interdisciplinary directions for further research and analytical interpretations.

In the last two decades, classical Eurasianism, the Russian post-revolutionary émigré intellectual movement in interwar twentieth-century Europe, provides a steady focus for debates in Russian (and, to the lesser extent, in Western) scholarship: even the most complete bibliographical collections relating to the subject soon become obsolete as dozens of new references appear regularly every year.[46] Ironically, it is reminiscent of the situation in the early 1920s in France and Germany, when there was rarely a month in the local émigré periodicals without reports of some 'scandalous' political and cultural activities of the Eurasianists. Given the academic over-production of novelty in subsequent years, it may seem all the more paradoxical that historiographical assessments and research interests remain preoccupied with the political implications of the

[46] The number of academic publications boosted in the 1990s, and sharply declined after 2001. As a vivid example see the most complete bibliographical collection complied by A.V. Antoshchenko (Antoshchenko 1997).

phenomenon (Khachaturian 1992; Tsygankov 1998, 2003). And yet, it is no surprise. As long as 'Eurasionology,' a brand new sub-field in security studies and geopolitics, monopolized thinking about meta-geographical constructions such as 'civilizations', the intellectual and cultural reception of the *émigré* Eurasianism,[47] not to mention any attempts of its synthetic comprehension, was very reserved. Eurasianism, however, goes beyond a purely (geo)political platform, and the question of Russia's relation to 'Occident' and 'Orient' was first of all culturally conditioned, being the crucial component of imperial history of modern Russia and its 'hybrid' identity (Bassin 1991a,b; Hauner 1990).

Eurasianism arose in the 1920s as the cross-national brain-child of several prominent Russian intellectuals in exile. The circle of the leading Eurasianist ideologues (and co-founders) included the geographer Petr N. Savitskii (Prague), the linguist Nikolai S. Trubetskoi (Vienna), the musicologist Petr. N. Suvchinskii (Berlin and Paris), and the historian Georgii Vernadskii (Prague and Yale). Later in the decade, it expanded into political movement, with about one hundred participants in European countries of asylum, but this political manifestation dissipated, after several splits and mobilization failures, shortly before WW II.

One of the most visible factors that contributed to the revival of the intellectual legacy of the Eurasianist project in the newest historiography is the key problems of Eastern European modernity and ethnopolitics that the Eurasianist theorizers had addressed: conceptualizing heterogeneity of national cultures and their natural boundaries in space and thinking about commensurability (overlapping) of spatial identities of nation and state. In fact, it was the geography and history of the former Russian empire re-imagined and re-interpreted by the Eurasianist intellectuals that produced a range of paradigms articulating a new model of supra-national identity for Russia as a 'Eurasian' power, a model so popular in the milieu of contemporary political scientists.

Any form of nationalism inevitably presupposes a reinterpretation of space, with the idea of a national homeland lying at the core. However political delimitation of space is always the last stage in forging spatial identities, that is, in their maximization and expansion, whereas diversification of space at the environmental and cultural levels is always the first step (Herb & Kaplan 1999; Kaiser 2004; Sahlins 1991; Williams & Smith 1983). A sort of technique that I prefer to call 'structural mind-mapping of homeland,' developed by Petr Savitskii, Nikolai Trubetskoi, and Georgii Vernadskii, is no exception, but it is still the least researched and most problematical topic in the domain of studies in

[47] Eurasianism has also had certain reception in the western historiography: the most productive and brilliant interpretations, to my view, belong to Nicholas Riasanovsky (1967) and Patrick Sériot (1999).

symbolic geography. This is not necessarily due to the fact that there is neither a comprehensive geographical theory of nationalism nor an adequate analytical discourse. Quite the contrary, the recent rise of 'imagology' demonstrates quite a productive interaction of academic disciplines in explaining the ways landscapes and territories encapsulating long-term historical legacies form different types of 'socio-spatial consciousness' and affect nation- or region-building techniques (Paasi 1996; Todorova 1997; Zorin 2001). Recent interpretations of landscape aesthetics point at the role artistic imagination and painting have played both in shaping national identity and in sustaining what can be called "territorialized memory" (Daniels 1993; Ely 2002; Lavrenova 1998). Seeing in spatial metaphors "culturally encoded organizers of social experience" (Hellberg-Hirn 1999: 59) contributes not only to understanding of symbolic (mobilizing) meanings of the national, but also reveals the principles of 'colonizing' the nation's 'Others' and thus re-inventing the notion of homeland, 'Self.' As Bassin, Khalid, and Layton showed, in late imperial Russia, with quite porous cultural continental boundaries between her European metropolitan and oriental colonial territories, it was a complex multifaceted social process involving literary criticism, cultural anthropology, and ethnographical studies (Bassin 1991a; Khalid 2000; Knight 2000; Layton 1994; Ram 1995). Surprisingly, little attention has been given to ideological use of scholarly constructions of space, despite common claims that constructs of space, just like landscapes themselves, being in many respects, shaped by mental activities, are nothing other than systems of significations, like those which any ideology strives to create (Baker 1992).[48]

Notwithstanding the value of environmental and oriental discourses, a different side of the Eurasianist problem poses more serious problems. Since the debates on social and spatial settings of modern nationalist visions and 'nested' identities are framed and rooted, as a rule, (with)in institutionalized national historiographies and academic schools, the scholarly interpretations inevitably assume the form of contested paradigms viewed largely from so called 'homeland' perspectives. It is the latter that have homogenized and monopolized nationalism discourse, having ascribed the right of attributing national/imperial characteristics exclusively to 'parent' (metropolitan) states. Discursive challenges coming from the side of exilic interpretations had virtually no chances to be considered seriously till the rise of synthesizing approaches and comparative studies in the mid-1990s. This process itself enabled scholars to see in diasporic communities 'Others' for nation-states (Cohen 1996; Tölölyan 1991), if not the emblems of trans-nationalism and 'long-distance nationalism' (Anderson 1998)

[48] Alan Baker even argues that "a proper understanding of landscapes must rest upon the historical recovery of ideologies" (Baker 1992: 3).

that embody the questions of cultural borders, paradoxes of unevenness of modernization along the East-West axis, and trans-national communication in the epoch of postmodernity. Still the consequences of domination by an intra-national view are clearly visible, as the theoretical discourse on emigration (not to say modern *political* emigration) is virtually absent, with the field of *Exilforschung* mainly oscillating between the dominant metaphorical poetical tropes/perceptions of exile and sociological inquiries into 'intellectual migrations.'[49]

Indeed, there were reasons for deflating and marginalizing the role of political language of exile and its implications for nationalist vision. As Robert C. Williams once noted,

> Historians dislike lost causes. They seek to explain what happened, rather than what might have been, and have consequently neglected the story of political emigrations. Granted, the study of émigrés is full of methodological pitfalls of the unwary: biased accounts of past issues, outright forgeries of documentary evidence, personal recriminations that serve to distort political reality, and a pervasive mood of bitterness, acrimony, nostalgia, and endless hope (Williams 1970: 140).

In the specific case of Russian interwar émigré politics and nationalist imagery, several underlying reasons are worth mentioning. First, even the most positive émigré accounts of culture and historiography of 'Russia Abroad' (as Marc Raeff termed it) after 1917 seemed to have been compliant with a gloomy thesis of the "lost cause."[50] As long as the Bolshevik regime succeeded where the current émigrés failed, nothing except the actual problems of the grandiose project of the Stalinist modernization drive, together with the revolutionary shifts it caused in Soviet society and academia, were regarded as valid subjects of research. Eurasianism was by no means an exception. As a political movement it was short-lived, without any reliable evidence of its influencing the minds of the

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[49] See the most recent example: Friedrich (2002). Surprisingly, Edward Said's contributions rather comply with these tendencies, see his famous "Reflections on Exile," (Said 1990: 357–68); also Suleiman (1998). About the sociological dimension in *Exilforschung*: Coser (1984); Fermi (1968); for the most developed and well-research German case, refer to: Ash & Söllner (1996).

[50] Referring to the case of Russian post-1917 political emigration: the western European historiographical annals in the 1950–late 1970s had perhaps only several bibliographical records, a thin brochure-like book by George Fischer (1951) and R. Williams' reference book on cultural life in exile in a single country, Germany (Williams 1972).

Bolshevik elite and *apparatchiki* across the political borders.[51] Besides, the academic contributions made by two leading proponents of the movement, Savitskii and Vernadskii, were considered to be far from being worth taking seriously because of evident links to the discredited German *Geopolitik* and the apparent absence of reliable primary sources for their research and assumptions (Antoshchenko 2002; Hauner 1990). One more reason made any references to the ideological milieu and academic legacies of these exiles even more complicated. Émigrés themselves were far from been optimistic in generating reflective discourses. The harsh experience of the 'long twentieth century' (the civil strife in the 1920s, two world wars) could not but produce the psychological atmosphere of tiredness of 'history's burden' in the émigré society, which naturally only deepened the national-ethnic divisions among them. Much of the writing in exile, whether of academic, political or literary character, seemed to be affected by psychotherapeutic consequences of exile, due to the painful remembrance of the imperial past in new, often hostile, social conditions. In this sense, the supposed liaison with *Geopolitik* might signify psychological dissatisfaction with the status-quo of interwar emigration rather then indicating shifts in identity that might have seriously challenged political and cultural development in the homeland.[52] Inevitably, exilic reflections clustered around the crucial idea of "normalizing" the historical process and identifying the point where Russia supposedly diverted from "normal" path, be it universal or national. The answers proposed for the question of how things *might have gone* differently, according to the estimation of the most authoritative interpreter of the interwar émigré historiography, Marc Raeff, were far from being genuine and creative. In his view, these answers revolved, with slighter modifications across the political spectrums in exile, around two basic trends of conceptualization: on the one hand, the liberal positivist tradition, with its universal European model and teleology of stages and repetition of liberal clichés of the nineteenth century –

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[51] Though the Soviet security services (GPU-NKVD) infiltrated into the Eurasianist movement in the mid-1920s, the upper party echelons confronted the Eurasianist ideology and actors only at the latest stage of the movement, as the correspondence between Maksim Gor'kii and Stalin in 1929 demonstrates. See: Dubinskaia-Dzhalilova & Chernev (1997).

[52] As interesting and stimulating as this episode might be for comparative identity studies, such a short-term transformation of émigré mentality still remains unresearched on its own, being simply attached to quite a standard explanation of psychological *ressentiment* of the exiled. As an example, see Daniel Rancour-Laferriere's approach toward nationalist imagery in his recent book "Russian Nationalism from an Interdisciplinary Perspective: Imagining Russia" (2000), especially Chapter 1 ("Russian 'Self' and Illusion of Russia").

thesis about Russia's temporary social discrepancy with Europe due to specific environmental factors, and, on the other, around the Eurasianist alternative which sanctioned another type of environmental determinism and an implicit teleology that "implied … the Soviet's regime's 'legitimate' and lasting character" (Raeff 1990: 167). Eurasianist imagery deprived, according to Raeff, history of its "singularity and individuality" and turned it into "a tool for ongoing critique against autocracy, which in the twentieth and thirties was automatically redirected against the Bolshevik regime" (ibid.: 186). Whatever the real understanding of the historical legacies of the Russian emigration may be, he insists, it has nothing to do, with the "eclectic, muddled, and rather shallow nature of émigré political discourse and thinking" (Raeff 2005: 327).

Paradoxically, in 1990, the very year in which Raeff's pioneering book appeared, the Soviet political collapse seriously challenged his assessment. After the break-up of the communist regime, Russia was left with a controversial legacy in its domestic ethnic policies. Numerous voices within political elites claimed that neither the predominant European model of rigid mono-ethnicity "one nation, one state", nor the American model of a "melting pot" (replacement of ethnic sentiments by a civic identity) would work in Russia, due to its internal elemental heterogeneity and large areas with multicultural communities and mixed populations. To many scholars and political think-tanks, the Eurasianist concept of national-cultural autonomy represented an alternative emerging together with the "natural rise of Eurasian Union" (Chinyaeva 1996: 34–5). In addition, the intra-state political controversies over acceptable standards in ethnopolitics were substantially aggravated by external factors, since even the changed geographical setting of the Russian state posed problems of self-identification. On the twentieth century metageographical charts, Russia had no other choice but to become "a source of balance and a buffer between the two competing, economic, and … political, models at either end of the continent" in the long-term civilizational East-West clash (Kerr 1995: 983). In the 1990s, both neo-liberal and neo-conservative political circles in Russia surprisingly found themselves using a lexicon very much reminiscent of the speech-style of the Eurasianist émigré intellectuals who instrumentalized the symbolic power of geographical destinies. Such was the effect of the "geopolitical reflex" (Dijkink 1996) that produced well-coordinated reactions in the *politicum* of 'Weimar Russia' in the 1990s.

Yet the political success of what had been previously exiled did not go beyond the old historiographical assessments, notwithstanding all the efforts of the virtual industry aimed at resurrecting the Eurasianist intellectual and political tradition. The reason was that the historical message of émigré Eurasianism was not fully (and accurately) decoded. It could not be done without acknowledging

its double-sided connections both with exile and homeland and, particularly, with the process of two successive types of nation-building recently interpreted as "affirmative action empire" and "national Bolshevism" (Martin 2001; Brandenberger 2002). More importantly, what was left on the margins of discussions is the paradox of constructing a supra-national Eurasianist identity by overtly nationalist means, with an unresolved contradiction between re-imagining and implicitly preserving the *imperial* ("Pan-Eurasian," as Trubetskoi called it) social-cultural space and, at the same time, denying its actual existence in the form of empire (Riasanovsky 1964). In this, Eurasianism resonates in both the Stalinist practice of ethnopolitics and in the ideological shifts in the late 1930s.[53] Yet if one assumes that this sort of imagination relied on such a sophisticated nationalist justification, what were its key principles? In other words, how did politics in exile, on the one hand, and intellectual constructions, on the other, interact/intersect in producing the image of Russia as 'neither nation-state nor empire'? Why did the Eurasianist ideologues, in theorizing commensurability of the concepts of empire and nation in terms of ethnic, territorial and cultural constituents, resort to a scholarly vocabulary that justified the existence of such a hybrid superstructure as Russia-Eurasia?

In this article, I will try to address the symbolic geography of Eurasianism as surprisingly a project to be understood sociologically, as a historically localized exilic process of ideology-making, while I will also attempt to point out some new interdisciplinary directions for further research and analytical interpretations. In answering the questions posed above, the basic problem confronting a researcher seems to be as much in the multiple levels of Eurasianism as in the historical phenomenon itself. I suggest that the Eurasianist intellectuals performed a double function. First, they served as the 'legislators,' establishing an epistemological authority and creating a unique world-view, a structurally complex *Weltanschauung* that cut across the academic fields of history, philosophy, legal studies, geography, literature, and linguistics. Second, they also served as the 'interpreters,' universalizing their scholarly visions by converting (translating) them into the language of politics, that is, into a modern action-oriented political ideology.[54] One of the paradoxes of this multi-

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[53] Neither the parallel doctrinal nor the broader rhetorical developments in Stalin's Russia and émigré politics have not yet been adequately studied. The recent innovative work of David Branderberger disregarded the exilic ideological representations (Brandenberger 2002; Brandenberger and Dubrovsky 1998). For the most recent framework discussion, see Hoffmann (2004).

[54] Of course, thinking in terms of moral values always stimulated the political engagement of Russian *intelligentsi*, and exile only exacerbated it. The Eurasianists were no exception as far as the motivational side is concerned. Though religiously coloured human values

layeredness was that the Eurasianist ideology (and the political aspirations that stood behind it) chose the humanistic disciplines, instead of the 'rigorous' social sciences, to legitimize itself. The other one is that these academic disciplines strove to 'ontologize' themselves, that is, to become an effective organizational force in social terms.

If students of intellectual history address the problem of accounting for Eurasianism by immersing the subject into the broad context of the emergence of structuralist and postcolonial discourse in Eastern and Central Europe (Sériot 1999, Glebov 2003, Moore 1997), students of nationalism and identity have largely left the relationship between the Eurasianist intellectual constructions and changes in social context a historiographical void because of the absence of detailed narrative research in the political history of the Eurasianist movement.[55] It is much easier to treat one particular layer in Eurasianism, either the historical or the linguistic, outside of such contexts, whose value cannot be restored simply by referring to the ideological nature of the phenomenon. While exploring the ways the Eurasianists conceptualized empire/homeland and thought about the future, new 'other' Russia coming after the Bolsheviks ("Russia No. 2"), one must be careful to pose the questions "when", "why" "for whom", apart from "what." In following them, I shall concentrate on the views of three leading émigré theorists, Savitskii, Vernadskii and Trubetskoi, retaining the integrity of academic (cultural) and political (ideological) layers, without ascribing priority to either of them.

The pillars of the epistemological Eurasianist world-view have been subtly interpreted in a recent monograph by Patrick Sériot, who uncovered in Eurasianist scientific thinking several basic premises of the structuralist approach of the Prague linguistic school as well as, neo-Platonic obsession with harmony, structural regularities, order, geometrical symmetry of overlapping cultural structures. This system represents an epistemological project, a fundamental cognitive framework encompassing scientific statements, moral and aesthetic values, or normative beliefs. It sets up (and shapes) the parameters of a group's identity, and proceeds from the initial cultural *preconscious* of individuals, I would argue, that is, from the implicit cumulative social/professional experience and unarticulated assumptions attached to it. Both individual and collective

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played a significant role in the Eurasianist ideology, the former were subjects of negotiation in the dialogical communication between scholarship and politics, that is, between scholarly approaches and strategic goals of the organized political movement.

[55] However, there were some endeavors to follow this combined perspective, particularly, in identifying the chronological concurrence of the transformation of the 'Mongol component' in Vernadskii's historical writings and changes in his social status of émigré scholar (Halperin 1982).

(groupist) *Weltanschauungen* are internalized, for their main functional task is to keep status quo of an identity. The collective world-views are 'locked' within the boundaries of a group.

The explication of what became the public manifesto of Eurasianism was given in N. Trubetskoi's brochure (1920) titled "Europe and Mankind." Not the least, it claimed that "European culture is not the culture of all humanity; it is a product of specific ethnic group" (Trubetskoi 1920/1991: 6); that the view of "world-spanning-Eurocentrism" and its cultural imperialism has to be replaced with a new principle of the equal worth and qualitative incommensurability of the cultures and nations. "To declare that those who are like us are higher and those unlike us lower is arbitrary, unscholarly ... simply ignorant. The element of elevation should be banished once and for all from ethnology, the history of culture, and from all the evolutionary sciences, because evaluation is inevitably based on egocentricity" (Trubetskoi 1920/1991: 34–5). One of the cultural implications, which may be drawn from this cultural vision, is that "traditionalism is a necessary prerequisite of normal development of culture, otherwise the cultural fund, without which further development of culture is unthinkable, would be irretrievably lost" (Tchoubarian 1993: 107).

One step further in affirming the uniqueness of particular cultural phenomena was made by Savitskii, who postulated the concept of the Russian Empire as a unified geographical world unto itself, belonging neither to Europe, nor to Asia due to the cohesiveness of its biogeographical zones and the rhythmic nature of historical interaction of two cultural types: the forest (settled civilization) and the steppe (nomadism), within the imperial geopolitical boundaries as they were on the eve of WW I. Savitskii defined Eurasia as that part of the continental block, land-locked geomassif, where the normal succession from north to south of climatic zones is least disturbed by non-longitudinal factors (seas or mountains). The structure of Eurasia could be called "flaglike": the zones (biomes) of tundra, forest, steppe and desert follow each other from top to bottom of the map, like the stripes of a flag (Savitskii 1927: 39). Such a quatro-partite entity emphasized, in his view, compactness and cohesiveness of these boigeographical regions:

> Eurasia is indivisible. And therefore there is no "European or Asiatic Russia," since the lands that are usually so designated are equally Eurasian lands.... The preservation of the terms "European" and "Asiatic" Russia is incompatible with the understanding of Russia as a special and integral ... world…. In accordance with the geographical indications, within the main massif of the Old World's lands *a special geographical world – the Eurasian world – and within the boundaries roughly corresponded to Russia's political ones, is to be identified....* (Savitskii 1927: 1).

One important observation made by Larry Wolff, who pioneered the field of symbolic geographies, helps to clarify the role of 'geographical' mind-mapping in exilic imagery. The Enlightenment's pattern of spatial thinking, as it is known, did not rely upon the notions of 'states' and 'systems of states,' though the parameters of inclusion or exclusion, applied by Voltaire and Rousseau, presupposed the rudimentary vision inherent in Cartesian geopolitical perspectivalism (Ó'Tuathail 1996). More importantly, behind the "possessive partition of continent" by the philosophers, according to Wolff's observation, stood thinking in terms of a public that was not equivalent to the nation. National consciousness required some mythological foundations and "implicitly depended upon structural alignments and opposition … or the presumption of civilization with respect to some excluded domain" (Wolff 1995: 942). Insisting upon a contrast between 'us' and 'them,' the philosophers of the Enlightenment tried to imagine their national community, addressing an association of fellow-readers who "formed in their … visible invisibility the embryo of the nationally imagined community [B. Anderson]" (Wolff 1995: 934). Obviously, the construction of Eastern Europe, Wolff concluded, was supported so vigorously because the eighteenth-century construction of Western Europe's 'Self' was unstable and amorphous.

In the interwar 'Russia Abroad,' the persistently shifting and eroding social identity of émigrés required a similar tool for exclusion/inclusion of identifications. In addition to the public of *Russie fantôme* (Gorboff 1995), the 'imagined community' in exile had its own political parties, mass media, sophisticated social stratification – and, of course, mythologies! Diasporic consciousness of national groups, it appears, often resorts to compensatory ideological constructions and defensive mechanisms that require references to history and geography in order to safeguard the status-quo or the superior position of a group in a heterogeneous cultural environment. Purposeful politics of émigré identity clearly resonated in Savitskii's idea of Russia as a unique *zamkutny* (closed) geographical world. It is also true that many of Trubetskoi's thoughts about Europe and Occidental cultural colonialism with its 'universal' values owed much to a peculiar position of Russian émigrés, whose choices oscillated between a number of forms of assimilation in the countries of asylum or return to homeland. Yet what comes closer to our problem is the way the Eurasianist scholars 'transcended' both options in imagining the "Russia No. 2" in an intellectual game with themselves, their compatriots, and imagined homeland. In such an intellectual form of communication, the psychological need to fix a new system of coordinates in order either to come to terms with situation of exile or transcend it, requires "an extension of the potential space" between the individual and his newly acquired environment. Viewed from the

interdisciplinary psycho-analytic perspective of *Exilforschung*, a person's strategy then depends on the way he or she acquires

> space between the two … the inside group (the group of origin) and the outside (receptor group) … The immigrant needs a potential space that he can use as the 'transitional space' and 'transition' period between the mother country/object and the new outside world: a potential space that grants him the possibility of experiencing migration as a game…. If he fails to create this potential space, the continuity between self and the surroundings is broken. Such a rupture may be compared to that caused by the prolonged absences of an object needed by child; as a result the child loses his capacity to symbolize and must revert to more primitive defensive mechanisms (Grinberg & Grinberg 1989: 14)

"Russian emigration," as one of the Eurasianist ideologues noticed in 1923, "is undoubtedly a political phenomenon": as long as an émigré cannot return to home he cannot avoid being entangled in politics. In one of his letters to Suvchinskii, Trubetskoi claimed: "Russian emigration is like a herd without a shepherd. The spiritual pasturage of this herd is indeed awful…. We have to write for the masses, for a 'middle-level man.' The time has come for writing handbooks. No more research, we need propaganda." (Trubetskoi 2003: 308). In late 1923, as far as can be judged from the archival materials, there began a gradual shift towards externalizing the Eurasianist world-view and making it, one might say, into a 'consumer-oriented' ideology. This shift triggered the long-lasting effect of cultural 'inclusion' and the actual participation of the exiled 'outsiders' in the processes taking place across the geographical 'boundaries' of emigration, that is, in Soviet Russia, their imagined homeland. As a minor working hypothesis, it may be stated that, in this case, the birth of the Eurasianist ideology signified crucial changes in self-identification and motivations of Russian émigrés-intellectuals. One can speak about explicit expectations anticipating the transformation of the 'forced migration' into 'diaspora,' a cultural-political extension of the homeland.[56] The Eurasianist ideology-makers

[56] To differentiate "diaspora" (phenomenon of modernity) from other types of migration I propose to focus, first, on conscious production of cultural capital in exile parallel to and competitive with production in homeland and, second, on socio-psychological attachment to the (constructed) myth of return and homeland based on collective memory of a community that found itself in a position of exile. It is quite possible to speak of certain formative stages of diasporic communities, progressing with enhancement of internal commune solidarity (Levin 2001) and appearance of intellectuals (entrepreneurs) who use ethnicity, cultural markers etc. as reference in mobilizing efforts aimed at transcending the 'inferior' status of exiled (Safran 1991; Cohen 1996). I agree with V. Tishkov's assertion: "What unites diaspora and maintains it is something more than merely cultural peculiarities. Culture can vanish while diaspora remains, for the latter, as a political project and life-situation, performs a function different from one which reserved for

played the pioneering role of the 'cultural entrepreneurs' who tried both to 'sell' this new identity and to create the illusionary conversion of its 'consumers' into the members of the imagined homeland.

Converting a *groupist* world-view into mass ideology[57] intensified the search for 'coherence-giving' concepts, though from the very beginning it was clear enough that it was scholarly language that might have helped to reach a visible/or imaginable consensus amongst émigrés in the conditions of the permanent political, religious, ethnic, and generational factionalism in Russia Abroad; in the conditions that made any overt political references to their homeland eminently painful. To make the picture coherent in structuralist terms, what was logically necessary was to reconcile the imagined geographical space (physiographical unity) of empire with the cultural-social space of the nation, that is, to make it commensurable with historical experience of statehood, imperial legacies, and colonization.[58] As a slogan, the notion of "empire" hardly

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ethnicity. This is a political mission of servicing, resenting, fighting and taking revenge" (Tishkov 2000: 221).

[57] In this case, I propose to treat the concept of 'ideology' as an operative (social action-oriented) set of beliefs that translates a group's identity into reality by referring to the epistemological insights of *Weltanschauung* and the system of meanings it produced. Ideology turns these insights into a 'template' focusing on socio-political arrangements, striving to identify itself with all social reality. Obviously, the character of ideology is externalized, for it tends not so much to maintain identity as to universalize it and to transcend the boundaries of a group. Ideology appears in the role of a consumer-oriented 'version' of the *Weltanschauung*; a version that can be, however, autonomous from world-view, once the latter had been transformed (reduced) in(to) a political program open to far going compromises with 'consumers.' In other words, though in many respects these two categories ('world-view' and 'ideology') are overlapping – both of them map and decode reality; both are sets of beliefs – their functional meanings and orientations are divergent. One can claim that the *Weltanschauung* makes a particular ideological project possible. In order to be socially functional in terms of institutions, an ideology legitimates itself in a world-view, whereas the latter strives to be socially significant by means of institutional affirmation as an organizing force.

[58] In terms of continuity in historiographical academic tradition, the matrix which the Eurasianist structuralists used was provided by the anthropogeographical approach towards a region developed by Russian historians in the late 1880s. Its basic premise, to quote Paul Claval's brilliant formulation of what is regional geography, "rests on a certain way of interpreting the view of the world at two levels; it starts from the ground level, where it notes everything that characterizes the physical and living environment, the infrastructure created by people … in short, all their activities. It continues by a change of scale which reveals how component parts fit together to form fairly extensive wholes, which are the real objects it describes and explains" (Claval 1997: 3). Thus the regional framework meant first of all approaching a given spatial entity as a territorial complex

complied with this ambitious task. Having no counterpart from the field of history in 1923–1925, Trubetskoi, in his new role of cultural theorist, resorts to the more elusive but still attractive idea of equating the boundaries of cultural and social world of Russia with Orthodoxy. In the early formative stages of the Eurasianist movement, Orthodoxy and its religious ethos, as archival correspondence between the Eurasianist ideologues shows, were the basic ideological points of departure. Later, in 1926 there were some attempts to systematize the precepts of this new ideology, with a great significance ascribed to the phenomenon of the cultural organic convergence, *soobrashchennost'*, that is, the hierarchic primacy of religion:

> Naturally, religion creates and determines culture, and culture is one of the emanations of religion, but not vice versa…. Cultural unity, in its turn, reveals itself as ethnologic unity, and geography corresponds to ethnology of the cultural whole. To find out the correlation, one may defend the thesis that … religion creates culture, which creates an ethnological type. The latter chooses or finds its territory and transforms it substantially (Evraziistvo 1926/1997: 36).

In Trubetskoi's provocative essay "Legacy of Ghenghis Khan," *bytovoe ispovednichestvo* (religious confessionalism rooted into every day social practices) constitutes continuity between the Moscovite and Petersburg periods in Russian imperial history. Post-Petrine empire (Trubetskoi consciously avoids the word "empire," substituting it for "anti-national monarchy") is a controversial two-level structure. At the upper level of elites and government it was undoubtedly Europeanized, but at the lower, the legacy of Byzantine was more popular among the masses. Both levels however were encompassed by the geopolitical frame of what was once the powerful Mongol empire. The ruling elite struggled with the necessity of securing this space, borrowing European governmental techniques and turning them into self-sufficient ends, whereas the people sustained traditionalist foundations and the remembrance of social cohesion of earlier times, a contrast that only contributed towards ever greater alienation of masses from the elites (Trubetskoi 1925/1995: 244–5, 247). In the final analysis, the Russian people, in his scheme, caught in their own trap, triumphed after imperial expansion and colonization was completed by the middle of nineteenth century in Asia. The revolution signified the violent overcoming of the rift,

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with the web of interactions inside it, between the environmental milieus, history of colonization, economical resources, patterns of cultural every day activities etc. The regional paradigm was promoted to the core of academic debates between Soviet geographers in the 1920s. Still, there is no research on the interplay of political agenda and geography (anthropogeography) both in the imperial and in the soviet periods. The only seminal work written in the genre of intellectual history, of interest mainly to geographers specializing in physiography and economics, is Sukhova (1981).

Trubetskoi claimed, but the outcome remained uncertain, even in the late 1920s. Having termed other nations as "Proto-Orthodox," Trubetskoi praised the homogenizing effects of traditionalism and equated Orthodoxy with Russia, just as he did in comparing the Enlightenment concept of 'Mankind' with Europe. However, in the eyes of readers, who were familiar with Eurasianism, crucial arguments might seem to be missing in Trubetskoi's theory. Where are Asiatic peoples? On the periphery of conceptually indivisible Russia-Eurasia? Then there should be a core… How did the politics of Russification drawn upon the European liberal models make possible imperial rule and secure the integrity of the state for quite a long time? Indeed, something was suspiciously unsaid both in the equations and in the missing answers to these questions.

An explanation for this inadequacy is partly expressed in Truberskoi's reflections about the missing role of the historical component in the initial Eurasianist structuralist project. "Our geographic and philosophical schemes are polished to such an extent that a historian cannot but utilize them easily, and he will automatically follow the path exactly in the direction we need him to proceed" (Trubetskoi 2003: 313). The technical burden of this task, as the leading ideologues confessed, had to be placed on the shoulders of so called *spetsy* (specialists), as they were labeled in the Eurasianist intra-group argot, that is, historians recruited from the Prague émigré academic milieu. Having joined the movement in 1925, Vernadskii in fact became one of the ranks of these "spetsy."

In his writings on imperial history, Verndaskii sought conceptual refuge in the term *mestorazvitie* (topogenesis, or place-development): it had to compensate for the repressed word "empire." He introduced this notion in a thin book that used to be a basic textbook for new émigré converts to Eurasianism, "Outline of Russian History" (1927). So, *mestorazvitie* was a "peculiar geographical environment that leaves its imprint on human communities developing in this environment" (Vernadskii 2000: 25). This impact meant the ethnographic unity of the landmasses due to the organic process of Russian peaceful colonization and eastward expansion, or in fact the congruence between colonial settlement and physiography. His train of thought about the homeland's history looked like that: physiography acquired its complement in biogeography, whereas the state, embedded in its environmental setting, embraced a single territorial massif of "Russia-Eurasia" as a large-scale *mestorazvitie*, or a historical-cultural homeland of Slavic, Finno-Ugric, and Turkik ethnic elements. Designated as a "geographical individual, a simultaneously geographic, ethnic, economic, and historical landscape" (Savitskii 1927),[59] this new synthetic category was

[59] In French, *lieu de dévelopment* and in German *Raumentwicklung* (Savickij 1929: 145). The term was initially coined by Savitskii.

perceived by the Eurasianists as one of the individualization of a so-called "symphonic personality," an entity with the high level of structural organization. Interestingly, Vernadskii points that there are no histories in the Eurasian space other than the history of a succession of empires since ancient times. The difference made by the Russian empire the end of the nineteenth century was that it fitted most fully into the structural organization of *mestorazvitie* on all the levels. Vernadsky also referred to the specificity of the historical experience of the peoples in this space. His geopolitical rhetoric, as distinctive as it affected to be, nevertheless affirmed the imperial memory, for, in his mind, the peoples were aware of the "historic and organic integrity of their *mestorazvitie*" (Vernadskii 2000: 35). In this sense, territory comes to be viewed as the reservoir of shared collective consciousness, the place with its own cumulative historical memory. That is how imperial history becomes a mere history of colonization before Russia's attempt at rounding out her 'natural' frontier in the nineteenth century. There is no need therefore to employ explicitly the concept of 'empire,' inasmuch as colonization itself is made to appear as quite a harmonious process.

The myth of 'return' that underlay the previously mentioned symbolic transcendence in exile (Safran 1991) proved to be resilient in its function of maintaining national identity even when religious identification lost its effect. By the end of the 1920s, the religious charge of the first post 1917 generation of émigrés lost its power, Orthodoxy, as both a marker of the Russian émigré identity and an umbrella for intellectual activities in European host-countries, was no longer universal, being soft-pedaled by new young generations of émigrés and relegated to the position of one more ethnographical peculiarity. Social shifts exacerbated implicit discrepancies in the Eurasianist dogma. "In our ideology," Trubetskoi once confessed in 1927, "we overdid it with Orthodoxy. Here we could not settle our earlier accounts. …In its current form, such a tendency hampers any talks with believers of other confessions (Muslims etc). The time has come… to secularize our tenets." (Trubetskoi 1927a).[60] A new cycle of transcendence resulted in the notion of "pan-Eurasian nationalism," that is, a "totality of nations" possessing their own nationalism as a "single substratum of statehood" (Trubetskoi 1927b: 28). Verndaskii turned to writing an ambitious history of Eurasia, quite in line with the Stalinist genre of "History of the peoples of the USSR," with no central place reserved for history of the Russian people as such. "The term Eurasia did not coincide completely with the term *Russian history*," he wrote in 1934 in "Sketch of History of Eurasia" (*Opyt istorii Evrazii*), the revised edition of his earlier "Outline." In his view, Russian history was

[60] I am grateful to my colleague, Sergei Glebov, who gladly shared with me his archival findings in Bibliotheque Nationale Française.

rather the history of the Russian people *in* Eurasia, which the Russians gradually colonized, whereas the history of Eurasia turned to be the "history of communities of different peoples and their biocoenosis on the soil of the Eurasian *mestorazvitie* …" (Verndaskii 1934: 7).[61] A careful reading of the book reveals some new factors accounting for the cohesiveness of the imperial space. Vernadskii explains it in psychological terms, referring to "congeniality of the Russian people towards Eurasian peoples and the persistence of 'Eurasian

[61] The general tone of historiographical assessments of Eurasianism viewed as a conservative political-philosophical movement could not but affect the scholarly perceptions of the major Eurasianist concepts. Savitskii's notion of *mestorazvitie*, as Milan Hauner, together with several prominent scholars, argues, "does not seem to be very different … from Friedrich Ratzel's concept of dynamic *Lebensraum*, which Karl Haushofer propagated in 1920s" (Hauner 1990: 61). To deny any connections between two national types of geopolitical imperial thinking is indeed a controversial, if not useless undertaking, given the fact that Karl Haushofer's *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik* explored the Eurasianist topics, and, what is more important, the fact that geopolitical thinking was stimulated psychologically in both cases: An important set of Germany's Weimar intellectuals felt uncomfortable in the country geographically mutilated after the Versailles, whereas the Russian émigrés found themselves in an even more insecure position abroad, searching for intra-group political consensus and ideological refuge in geopolitical-like colonial rhetoric and imagination. In terms of the intellectual pedigree, the relevance of the comparison seems to be unquestionable: both Ratzelian and Eurasianist constructs owed much to Hegelian organicism, Ritterian environmentalism, and Herderian vision of history. Yet the concept of *mestorazvitie* had little to do with Haushofer's and Ratzel's *Lebensraum*. The congruence between the concepts ends when Ratzel introduces *Völkisch* and Malthusian elements in his conceptualization, subjecting the structure of *Lebensraum* to ethnic homogenization. The Darwinian motifs best, demonstrate the points of divergence in these national quests. Traditionally, the Russian intellectual elite, regardless of its social and political orientations, treated Darwinian metaphors with a great suspicion. Besides, colonization looked more like a spontaneous process of ethnic absorption in Russia, rather than displacement. Although in rejecting *Lebensraum*'s 'demographic right' of expansion the Eurasianist *mestorazvitie* moved closer to another concept of *Geopolitik*, Carl Schmitt's *Großraum*, the relationship remained ambiguous. When Schmitt was constructing *Großraum,* his mind was preoccupied with the idea of 'political domination' by the core power, the Reich (Bendresky 1983: 251–57). According to this design, political control over the peripheral area excluded assimilation of nationalities in return for juridical protection from intervention by foreign powers. Schmitt's legal dialectics of 'enemy-friend' relations, anti-assimilationist and anti-universalist stances, embedded in *Großraum,* could hardly fuel political motivation of Vernadskii and Savitskii, who felt themselves anxious about the current affairs within Russia and stressed her geopolitical *status-quo*, though debates attached to the cultural controversy "Europe vs. Russia," much inherited from the Slavophiles, were recurrent in the émigré milieu.

conscious' in the mind of ruling elites" (ibid.: 131). Discussing the features of what he labeled as "political psychology" (ibid.: 13) of the peoples, he admits the crucial role of the state and their submissiveness to it. That is the way the "specificity of political psychic of the Eurasian people paved the way for creation of large political communities" (ibid.: 14). In 1933, in his address before the Connecticut Academy of Arts and Sciences, Vernadskii pushed the thesis further, stating that "harsh as Russian administrative methods in East have sometimes been, they never were imbued with social and racial discrimination against the natives such as was the characteristic of the methods of colonial administration of other European powers" (Verndasky 1933: 396). The cultural ingredient of cohesiveness presupposed also an existence of pan-Eurasian linguistic union: "Linguistic union," he explains, means "a combination of languages which have some features in common which have are not the result of common origins, but have been acquired because of subsequent intercourse in identical environments" (Vernadsky 1937: 14). Differentiation between the "hard" and "soft" syllables as well as between "hard" and "soft" consonants was the product of such an intercourse. Some additional arguments supporting his thesis of organic solidity of Eurasianist environmental structure at certain points go as far as the racial and biological markers of identity allow him: "there is a tendency amongst the anthropologists to classify both the Russian and the Turks with regard to their "bio-chemical index" as an "intermediate type," differentiating them, on the one hand, from the Eurasian type and from the Asiatic, on the other" (ibid.).[62] Finally, the process of expansion itself created the possibility of including all Eurasia in the realm of Russian statehood as the spread of commercial capitalism in Asia provided one more factor uniting the virtual space of Eurasian empire. It is quite probably that the processes of industrialization and ethnic homogenization in Soviet Russia resonated in Vernadskii's views. "Whatever the attitude towards the Soviet ideology and the Soviet policy one may choose, one cannot avoid recognizing the fact that, at least in the short term, Moscow is becoming a beacon for the exploited peoples not only in Eurasia," he noticed in 1934. "The planned economy and the new territorial distribution of industries … result in the tighter connection between the Eurasian regions…. In

[62] This seems to be quite an interesting aspect unnoticed by previous researchers: about the racial component in the Eurasianist theory see the contribution made by Vernadsky's wife, Nina Vernadsakaia-Toll' (V. T. 1927). The details of her anonymous publication, which was in many respects inspired by debates about the 'Jewish issue' in Russian history, were discussed in one of her letters to Savitskii in 1927 (see Savitskii's archival file in Gosudarstennyi arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii (GARF, Moscow), f. 5783, op.1, d. 417, l. 5).

this way, the unity of Eurasia may become unprecedented" (Vernadskii 1934: 179–80).[63]

To sum up, I suggest that, the Eurasianist writings on Russia's modern history and geography constitute one of the element in the ideological construction that had to sustain the diasporic identity of émigrés by constant referring to remembering, imagining, and, in the final analysis, nourishing the myth of return. Russian émigrés historians dismissed the ideological message of Verndaskii's and Trubetskoi's opuses, preferring to attack not so much the inconsistencies in the Eurasianist epistemology, but numerous inaccuracies in presenting the chronological development of medieval and imperial history, as is evident from the polemics triggered by the publication of Vernadskii's "Outline of Russian History" in 1927. If one wishes to reflect on the academic legacy of Eurasianists, one has to take care to decode their image of the homeland as one that emerged in a grid of exchanges among three mirrors: the émigré, the European, and the one of Stalinist Russia. With just one step outside this triangulated vision Eurasianist historical writings degenerate into a mere belles-lettres void, however scholarly it may appear, even when the linguist Trubetskoi tries on the clothes of an historian. In fact, many writings, published in the numerous Eurasianist periodicals, were perceived by émigrés as fashionable fiction by genre, given the dramatic experience of emigration and its inclination towards 'self-irony' with its healing effects (Raeff 1990: 161). Having produced a much stronger appeal in theorizing the colonialist discourse and enlarging the cultural frames of its application, the Eurasianist doctrine did not go beyond a sophisticated rhetoric of the half-said in mapping the concept of the imperial homeland. Struggling with the problem of rendering the concepts of empire and nation commensurable in terms of ethnic, territorial, and cultural constituents, they created one more hybrid superstructure.

Nevertheless, a study of the Eurasian paradigm can be helpful in outlining the contours of the discourse on political emigration that is "at home abroad," to

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[63] Since the mid-1920s, the shift toward a Soviet-looking perspective both in research and ideology was particularly striking in Eurasianism. Much of Savitskii's and Trubetskoi's writing mirrored political, economical, and national developments in Stalin's Russia. This was especially true of the pro-Soviet leftist (Clamart) wing of the movement that emerged after the split in 1929. Savitskii and his colleagues regularly read the Soviet press, and even seized the chance to travel to Russian provinces, having entangled themselves in a series of affairs with GPU-NKVD agents, who organized their illegal trips (see the files stored in Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi voennyi arkhiv (RGVA, Moscow): f. 308k, op. 3. d. 19, 154, 193). In 1929 Savitskii tried to raise money for his project of "Europoasian Social Institute," whose 'scientific' sections had to duplicate activities of Moscow governmental ministries (commisariates). See: GARF, f. 5783, op. 1, d. 354.

paraphrase the title of Gabriel Sheffer's recent book on diasporas (Sheffer 2003). It is also a stimulating starting point for returning 'exile' to the political vocabulary and 'political ideology' to sociology, as well as a good example to appeal to in debating the conditions and limits of political language.

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Béla Balázs: From the Aesthetization of Community to the Communization of the Aesthetic

Tibor Frank

ABSTRACT

Béla Balázs is an excellent example of the eager leap to the collectivity and the greater society made by a host of previously individualistic, egocentric, even narcissistic thinkers, many of whom embraced Marxism for the first time in exile. Some, such as Balázs and Lukács, even traversed the long "road to the party", which ultimately crippled their individual creativity and drastically simplified the originally rich subtleties of their *Weltanschauung*. As in many other situations, exile proved a mixed blessing, notwithstanding its undoubted contribution to a more inclusive perspective.

The spectacular yet somewhat forgotten journey of Béla Balázs (1884–1949), Jewish-Hungarian poet, author, playwright, film maker, film theoretician, took him from the Hungarian small town of Szeged through Lõcse (today Levoèa in Slovakia) to Budapest and then into exile in Vienna, Berlin and Moscow, until his return to Budapest for his last, post-World War II years. A striking feature of his thinking over the years is that while his identification with Hungary was the product of a complex negotiation conducted at a certain social and cultural distance, it stayed with him throughout a career in both cosmopolitan modernist and communist internationalist associations, so that he remained an exile and quietly cherished his unheralded return.

Balázs's career starts from the central experiences of his early years, "dream, sensation, fear, and secret", as he expressed it, and spans over the decades from the avant-garde artistry of fin-de-siècle Budapest through the experimentalism of Vienna and Berlin up to the dutiful socialist realism of his Moscow exile. A poet of great artistic sensitivity and philosophical receptivity, Balázs remained faithful to the legacies of his youth in the Hungary of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, while discovering fresh ways and new media to express his essentially idealistic philosophical worldview. His early diaries of 1903–1922, published so far only in

Hungarian (Balázs 1982: Vols. I–II), show him not only as a poet of the group *A Holnap* (Tomorrow), a friend of the

philosopher Georg Lukács, and his partner in organizing the unconventional Sunday Circle in Budapest and Vienna, but, increasingly, as an experimentalist on his way toward understanding and utilizing the new visual culture of film. He translated his sense of poetry into film of which he became the first theoretician (*Der sichtbare Mensch oder die Kultur des Films* [The Visible Man], Wien, 1924; *Der Geist des Films*, Halle, 1929). His *The Visible Man* presented film as the "folk art of our century", and the medium which enabled him to combine his love of the folktale, which he shared with Anna Léznai and others in the Sunday Circle, with the technologically advanced propaganda he thought would transform the mind of 20th century mass society.

A cultural leader in the short-lived Hungarian Communist experiment of 1919, Balázs had to leave Hungary for the entire interwar period. His transformation from a sensually aestheticising poet into a Communist Party spokesperson is one of many typical journeys of liberal-leftist Hungarian social critics in the broader realm of the arts and humanities. Though most of them never went so far as to join the Party, the social transformation of art history, sociology, and philosophy showed how a generation of fin-de-siècle Budapesters in post-World War I exile turned away from idealism and individualism toward communal thought and a disciplined mission of social responsibility.

It is challenging to examine the role that exile played in the process, how it increased the saliency of the new and broader vistas of thought, which had been more a matter of aesthetic appreciation in his life under the former Habsburg Monarchy. Balázs is an excellent example of the eager leap to the collectivity and the greater society made by a host of previously individualistic, egocentric, even narcissistic thinkers, many of whom embraced Marxism for the first time in exile. Some, such as Balázs and Lukács, even traversed the long "road to the party" (Lee Congdon 1991: 100), which ultimately crippled their individual creativity and drastically simplified the originally rich subtleties of their *Weltanschauung*. As in many other situations, exile proved a mixed blessing, notwithstanding its undoubted contribution to a more inclusive perspective.

Budapest: Hungary's Melting Pot

The new-born capital city of Hungary played the role of a Hungarian melting pot through the five decades preceding World War I. It attracted a vast number of migrant workers, professionals, and intellectuals from all quarters of the kingdom of Hungary and beyond. It became an energizing meeting ground of a

multitude of ethnic and religious groups with varying social norms, modes of behavior, and mental patterns. The mixing and clash of such diverse values and codes of behavior created an outburst of creativity, an explosion of productive energies. In this exciting and excited ambiance, a spirit of intellectual competitiveness was born favoring originality, novelty and experimentalism. Budapest expected and produced excellence and became deeply interested in the secret of genius. For so many of those who were later to be known as geniuses, both nationally and internationally, Budapest seemed the natural place to have been born.

Modernizing groups came to Budapest partly from the decaying landed gentry of feudal origins and partly from intellectually aspiring members of the assimilating (predominantly German and Jewish) middle class. While creating metropolitan Budapest in the intellectual sense, they constituted themselves into groups that proved to be unique social and psychological experiences.

Several economic and social factors contributed to the emergence of this gifted and creative professional community at the time of the rise and fall of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy (1867–1918). In a country where the long decay of feudalism had become visible and the political and social system based on huge landed estates had come under sharp attack, the beginnings of a new, capitalist society stimulated work in science, technology, and the arts. The transformation of the Habsburg monarchy and the creation of a "Hungarian empire" contributed to an economic prosperity that brought about a building and transportation boom, the advancement of technology, and the appearance of a sophisticated financial system. The rise of a new urban middle class affected the school system, which was already among Europe's best at the time, having been modeled after German examples. Around 1900 there was a creative spirit in the air throughout Europe, permeating literature, music, the arts, and sciences. In Hungary, a new generation of authors, musicians, philosophers, and critics offered a new and stimulating agenda for artistic and social discourse.

The approaching decline of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy seemed to generate unusual sensitivity and creativity (Mátrai 1976; Nyíri 1980, 1988; Hanák 1998; John Lukacs 1988; Gluck 1985). In many ways, the political and social decline of the Monarchy created a special opportunity for the Hungarian Jewry which had grown and flourished throughout the fifty years of Austro-Hungarian Dualism. The result was a professionally defined middle class instead of a feudally defined one in Hungary. Whereas the first generations of assimilating middle class Hungarian Jews concentrated on building up their material wealth, subsequent generations were able to attend the good universities of the Monarchy or of Germany and focus on the accumulation of knowledge (William O. McCagg, Jr. 1972/1986). Their characteristically strong financial background

enabled them to concentrate on their studies and eventually join the various scholarly or scientific groupings such as the *Társadalomtudományi Társaság* (Society for the Social Sciences), the *Galilei Kör* (Galileo Circle), or the journal *Huszadik Század* (Twentieth Century) where critical social issues were debated with a highly politicized focus. These circumstances provided good schooling for this generation of prospective émigré intellectuals. The period that ended with World War I saw relatively peaceful cooperation and true friendships between Jew and Gentile in Hungary. What historian Raphael Patai described as the love affair of the Jews and Hungary often resulted in intermarriages and other forms of close social ties and networking (Patai 1980: 68; Terao 1997). For those opposing the influx of Jews into Hungary, however, Budapest seemed a special, "un-Hungarian" case, out of line with Hungarian tradition. The popular conservative author Ferenc Herczeg expressed this sentiment in a straightforward manner when he spoke about "foreign elements in [the] chemistry" of Budapest (Horváth 1974: 205–6; John Lukacs 1988: 202). The emergence and exodus of that splendidly gifted generation in turn-of-the-century Hungary, of whom Béla Balázs became a prominent poetic voice, can be explained not only in terms of economic opportunity and political expediency but also in terms of social need and psychological disposition.

Father and Son: The Education of a Poet

Béla Balázs had a typical Jewish family with a dominating father who often resorted to spanking as an educational method. Though Balázs contextualized his father's strong hand as a protection "from other, more painful blows" (Zsuffa 1987: 10), his way of seeing the role of men and women was strongly influenced by his childhood experiences. Middle class and upper middle class Hungarian families, particularly Jewish-Hungarian ones in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, were based on the dominant role of fathers, with mothers relegated to preserving the German trinity of *Kinder*, *Küche*, *Kirche* (children, kitchen, church). Most families were supported by the single income of the father who reigned supreme in his family. More often than not, fathers had the final word in serious matters such as the children's education, as well as decisions about their marriages and jobs. Indeed, fathers loomed so large in middle class Jewish-Hungarian and Austrian families that one of the most significant psychological issues to be resolved for young people was their relationship to their fathers. Sigmund Freud's concept of the dominating father figure was characteristic of most middle class families, especially among Jews. The problem was conceptualized by Freud's notion of the "father complex." In his 1899 *Die Traumdeutung* (The Interpretation of Dreams), Freud observed that:

> even in our middle-class families, fathers are, as a rule, inclined to refuse their sons' independence and the means necessary to secure it, and thus to foster the growth of the germ of hostility which is inherent in their relation. A physician will often be in a position to notice how a son's grief at the loss of his father cannot suppress his satisfaction at having at length won his freedom. In our society today fathers are apt to cling desperately to what is left of a now sadly antiquated *potestas patris familias*; and an author who, like Ibsen, brings the immemorial struggle between fathers and sons into prominence in his writings, may be certain of producing his effect. (Freud 1965: 290)

After spending his early years at Szeged in Southern Hungary, Béla Balázs's father, Dr. Simon Bauer, had a quarrel with his school management, and was transferred to the northern city of Lõcse as a punishment. Perhaps unable to survive this humiliation, he died in 1897 when his son Herbert (later to chose the name Béla Balázs as a pen name) was just thirteen. His death and burial left a lasting imprint on the sensitive boy, yet, like the paradoxical dynamic described by Freud, in a symbolic act of becoming heir to his respected though dreaded father and in a sense ending his childhood, Herbert/Béla instantly took over his father's library: "Now it was me who headed this endless empire. I took out some of the books at random and turned the pages. No one will stop me or tell me what to do any longer." (Balázs 1946: 138–45, quote 146).

Dr. Simon Bauer's Family: The Cultural Road to Assimilation

Balázs's family followed the patterns of assimilating Jews in fin-de-siècle Hungary. Balázs' mother Jenny Levy came to Hungary from Elbing in Eastern Prussia, then near the Russian border. She was Jewish, but "a real German … fair haired, blue eyed and slim" (Balázs 1946: 12) who gave her children German first names and preserved her Germanness throughout her life. Béla spoke excellent German, "vom Haus aus", which made it easy for him to study in Germany and later to go into exile in Vienna and Berlin.

Young Balázs was preeminently a poet of women, singing the praise of their beauty and abilities. The women of Balázs are pale, sad, soft, secretive, enveloping; his men are tough, inflexible, remote, unapproachable – a likely mirror of his parents.

At Szeged, Lõcse, and then again back in Szeged, the Bauer family lived the life of assimilated Jews. In a country that before World War I provided an almost unparalleled measure of religious tolerance, assimilation often included language shift, name change, ennoblement, mixed marriage, and religious conversion. This was particularly the case in Budapest, a city referred to by the contemporary poet Endre Ady as "made by Jews for us." (Ady 1977: 520). The

change from German or Yiddish into Hungarian, from Jewish into Hungarian families, from Judaism to Roman Catholicism or various forms of Protestantism, all furthered Jews' integration into Hungarian society, yet these various forms of assimilation typically created a sense of spiritual vacuum, an aura of lost identity, a religious no-man's land.

Assimilation, along with its various manifestations in name change and conversion, reflects the measure of psychological insecurity, social uneasiness, and inner unrest of generations of assimilated Jews in the new capital city of Budapest, as well as elsewhere in the Austro-Hungarian empire and beyond (McCagg 1989; Ryan 1996: 24). Jewish insecurity led to, and was also produced by, assimilation. The insecurity of the assimilated Jew was particularly noticeable in converted individuals and families, revealing a tradition abandoned and a set of values yet to be conquered. The price of assimilation as demonstrated by religious converts was the loss of roots, social and psychological; its prize was promotion and social recognition. In the increasingly secularizing world of fin-de-siècle Budapest, it often seemed a reasonable bargain to exchange socially undesirable traditions for the psychological and commercial benefits of a seemingly secure position in gentile Hungarian society.

Assimilation into Hungarian society provided the Jewish middle class with a set of experiences that prepared them for successful immigration and naturalization in other countries. Their success in the foreign environment was conditioned by having already experienced comparable change in Hungary and the Austro-Hungarian empire. They represented a group that was adequately prepared for the typical problems of immigrants, having already experienced multiple values, double identities, and a sense of living in between different societies.

The single most remarkable symptom of assimilation in Hungary around the turn of the century (and a measure of its success) was *Magyarization*. The abandonment of the German language for Hungarian was rapid: the number of Jewish speakers of German dropped from 43 percent in 1880 to 21.8 percent to 1910, when the percentage of Magyar speakers reached 75.6 percent (McCagg 1989: 190). To some degree, name change, which had already become a frequent phenomenon in Hungary by the 1840s, was also part of this movement. Family name changes often were made, first from Hebrew to German under Joseph II, then from German to Hungarian in the 19th century, and once again occurred among U.S. émigrés and exiles from Hungarian to American.-

The Conversion of Herbert Bauer

Like so many of his generation, young Herbert Bauer often thought of converting to Catholicism in an ever more *magyarising* country where religion was part of the national identity. For this young man Jewry seemed to secure only a "non-identity" (Loewy 2003: 233–4). He considered the Hungarian lowlands, as sung by the 19th century national poet Sándor Petõfi, his "real Hungarian fatherland" (Balázs 1946: 147) and his 1910 letter to Georg Lukács reveals conversion as an important consideration for him: "It is a pity that I am a Jew, that I have not been converted a long time ago – as now I would be utterly incapable of it, from some unexplainable, though unbeatable 'defiance, self confidence or shame'." (Balázs 1982: 21; cp. Gluck 1985). Although ready for conversion, the act came only in the Spring of 1913 when he married the rich Edith Hajós who herself was a convert, and on this occasion Balázs officially "converted, Hungarianized his name, and got married. In other words, I changed all the accidentalities of my life. I dressed myself into a new skin. Now I am a Roman Catholic and am officially called Béla Balázs." (Balázs 1982, I: 601–2). In his diary, Balázs confessed that his conversion

> occurred from conviction. If you have to belong to a religion at all, this is most appealing to me. I do not feel anything in common with the Jews. Though this refers to Jewish men only, as I came to realize lately. Jewish women attract me much more, perhaps they alone attract me really. There is something I have just realized. It is the Aryan-Jewish intermingling, which is best for me. I suspect myself to be such a mixture…. However, there is a lot of Jewish in me…. But my final *intentions* are Aryan. (Balázs 1982, I: 602)

Later, however, Balázs was forced to realize that "my conversion had no use whatsoever. It only did damage. The Jews got angry, [and] in the eyes of the 'Gentiles' I remain a Jew. My brother lost his Jewish scholarship because of me." (Balázs 1982, I: 602).

More than perhaps any other change, religious conversion from Judaism to Christianity marked the deepest level of assimilation. Assimilation into Hungarian society in a way documented and predicted the later capacity to integrate successfully into German or, eventually, American society. Religious conversion seems a relevant dimension of this process, an indication of a type of mental pattern that enabled and prepared some of the émigré intellectuals and professionals to adapt quickly to emerging new challenges of life outside Hungary.

The number of conversions in Hungary was relatively small before 1910: in the twenty years between 1890 and 1910, 5,046 chose religious conversion. Thus, this

phenomenon was relatively new and limited before World War I, although contemporary urban authors such as Ferenc Molnár referred to it as a typical Budapest phenomenon and used it as a major theme as early as 1900 (Molnár 1900/1993: 6–7, 13–4, 165–6). It took great political upheavals such as the revolutions following the war to make religious conversion into a mass movement (P[éter] U[jvári] 1929: 65).

Mass conversion became a serious proposition by 1917: in a book on Jewish-Hungarian social problems law professor Péter Ágoston suggested that total assimilation and mass conversion should be the correct approach to solve the problems of growing anti-Semitism in Hungary (Ágoston 1917). As a reaction to Ágoston's proposition, the social science journal *Huszadik Század* (Twentieth Century) addressed some 150 leading intellectuals and public figures in spring 1917, focusing public attention on the Jewish question in Hungary (Hanák 1984b: 13–115).

The Jewish leader Ferenc Mezey considered conversion an act of cowardice, for such people would be looked upon as opportunists and conversion would not exempt them from racism (Hanák 1984b: 32–3). The phenomenon of conversion from Judaism seems to have been a major impetus toward modernizing the Jewish community and creating a Neolog section in addition to the Orthodox majority. And it turns out that psychologically, it became easier to convert from Judaism to Christianity for those whose families had earlier changed from Orthodox to Neolog theology (McCagg 1987: 142–64; Barany 1974: 51–98; Hanák 1984a: 235–50; Rozenblit 1983; Terao 1997).

The Act of Creation: Modernism in Hungary

It was in the decade preceding World War I that most modern trends in the arts and sciences swept across Hungary. These produced a renaissance of Hungarian national culture and the birth of modernism in the country. It started symbolically with the poetry of Endre Ady (1877–1919), whose *Új versek* (New Poems) made a literary revolution in 1906, and with the poetry anthology *A holnap* (Tomorrow) (Antal 1908–1909), with Ady, Mihály Babits, Béla Balázs, and Gyula Juhász among the most prominent names represented. The movement moved into full speed with the launching of the journal *Nyugat* (West) in 1908, which was to become the dominating organ of the modernists through World War II publishing groundbreaking modern poetry and prose by authors like Ady, Babits, Margit Kaffka, Frigyes Karinthy, Dezsõ Kosztolányi, Zsigmond Móricz, Árpád Tóth, and others.

The literary pioneers had their counterparts in almost every other field. The art group *Nyolcak* (The Eight) with Károly Kernstok, Róbert Berény, and Béla Czóbel was as important to this new generation as Béla Bartók and Zoltán Kodály were

in music. Modernism was present in almost every field, usually ahead of many European countries. The very best left Hungary early, most during or right after the revolutions of 1918–1919. In photography Hungary lost André Kertész, Brassaï (Gyula Halasz), and Laszlo Moholy-Nagy; in film Sir Alexander Korda, Michael Curtiz, and Joe Pasternak, Lajos Biró, in addition to Béla Balázs.

This gifted and ambitious generation with politically liberal and sometimes leftist views was intent on changing the outdated social and political system of the country. Most of the people who left Hungary after World War I were members, students, or followers of leftist-liberal groups and often were Jewish. In music, they invariably came from the Music Academy, like the conductors Fritz Reiner, Eugene Ormandy, George Szell, Antal Dorati, Eugen Szenkár, Georges Sebastian, Ferenc Fricsay, István Kertész, and Sir Georg Solti, violinists Joseph Szigeti, Stefi Geyer, Ferenc (Franz von) Vecsey, Emil Telmányi, Ede Zathureczky, and Yelly d'Aranyi – all of them from the school of Jenõ Hubay.

For the post-World War I generation of Hungarian musicians, Bartók and Kodály were the great examples to admire and emulate. As Eugene Ormandy pointed out in a 1937 article for *The Hungarian Quarterly*, it was because of those two

> that Hungary has emerged as a musical entity. This Hungarian music of the twentieth century is intensely nationalistic and, while nationalistic art is of necessity limited and destined to a comparatively short life, paradoxically enough the worlds of these two composers in the very intensity of their nationalism transcend[ed] nationalistic bounds.

"In the dramatic inevitability of Bartók, we have a composer who might be compared to Beethoven…. Breaking away from the over-refined, essentially cerebral and decadent music of the post-Romantic period, Bartók has injected new life blood into his music. It has a savagery and yet withal a youthful vitality that makes it of universal importance …" Bartók and Kodály revived "the racial idiom of Magyar music," Ormandy acknowledged, "to portray the distinct individuality of Hungarian music." (Ormándy 1937: 165–7). Both Bartók and Kodály lectured in the important "Free School for the Human Sciences" organized by the Lukács Circle in 1917–18, and the conjunction between Bartók and Balázs in *Bluebeard's Castle* marked a high point of the modernist project in Budapest (Mannheim 1918/1970; Kettler 1967; Botstein 1995: 46–50; Leafstedt 1995).

In Search of Identity: From Poetic Imagery to Film

From early on, the work of Balázs shows him a dreamer, a poet, a creative experimentalist with an exceptional visual fantasy. He was not one of the great poets of his day, neither is he remembered today as a playwright. His philosophy is a product of Georg Simmel's school and he did not pursue it beyond his doctoral dissertation dedicated to Simmel "in enthusiastic remembrance" and entitled first "Az öntudatról" [On Self Consciousness], later, characteristically, as "Halálesztétika" [The Aesthetics of Death] (Balázs [Bauer] n.d.).

What made him special was his insatiable appetite for ever new media. He tried his hand at almost every genre. His early poems showed him a follower of the great Hungarian modernist poet Endre Ady (1877–1919) whose poetry was published together with some of Balázs's poems in the literary anthologies *A Holnap* [Tomorrow] in 1908 and 1909. Even the editor, Sándor Antal could not help "noticing, however rarely, the shadow of Ady" and Balázs himself admitted in the concluding piece, "Ady Endrének" [To Endre Ady] of his first book of poetry, *A vándor énekel* (The Wanderer Sings) his debt to Ady: "You alone are the poet." Nonetheless, the publication of Balázs's early poetry in *A Holnap* testified to his acceptance by the Hungarian avant-garde by the age of 24–25, and the anthology, publish at Nagyvárad (today Oradea in Romania), embraced him not only with Ady, but also with other leading poets of 20th century literature such as Mihály Babits and Gyula Juhász.

The first poetry book links Balázs not only to Ady, but also, perhaps even more strongly, to the composer Zoltán Kodály to whom the slim volume is dedicated. "Few are the men as comrades and friends, to accomplish, fight and understand," Balázs noted in the introductory poem, "Ajánlólevél egy muzsikushoz" (Letter of Recommendation to a Musician) and the statement became even clearer when he dedicated "Kékszakállú herceg vára" [Duke Bluebeard's Castle] in his 1912 *Misztériumok* [Mysteries] to Béla Bartók and Zoltán Kodály. It was Bartók who wrote music for the "mystery" and ultimately secured Balázs's lasting fame. "Where is the stage, outside or inside, gentleman and ladies?" asked Balázs in the prologue giving the highly symbolic story a Freudian twist (Balázs 1912: 7).

With his tribute to the leaders of Hungarian modernism in both poetry and music, Balázs emphatically joined modernism with what was *Magyar* in Hungarian culture, and expressed his desire to belong to a new *Magyar* (and gentile) cultural elite. In this way, he continued his search of identity, community and art form simultaneously. We might also suggest that he likewise continued his long journey from isolation as a Jewish schoolboy toward the embrace of some larger community that would reach out to him.

Much of Balázs's agenda was filled by this continuous search of identity. He continues changing his perception of the individual and the collective good until the end of World War I. Attracted by the Great War he celebrated courage as "the most beautiful human gesture" (Balázs 1916: 43). He indicated that he joined the war effort to sacrifice his own life and thereby "obtain the right to his privacy." (Balázs 1916: 47). Discussing the slogan "interest of the fatherland," he declared that "every human community knows (self-)interest *alone* and represents open, absolute egotism. There is only individual consciousness and individual responsibility. There is no focus on the community." (ibid.).

He found some time during the Great War to publish a collection of symbolic tales, "Hét mese" [Seven Tales] (Balázs 1917/1918) beautifully illustrated by Lajos Kozma who did his work in the war zone, and in these we find no traces of a change in Balázs's interest and politics in this last collection of short stories published before the end of the war (Balázs 1918). He discussed ordinary affairs of love, women, human conflicts, secrets of the soul and the body. There is very little politics involved. The same year his good friend, critic and philosopher Georg Lukács, published a passionate collection of his earlier criticism in defence of Balázs's work, praising his "poetic depth" and declaring, "the oeuvre of Béla Balázs is a phenomenon that brings a turn for our own literature and for world literature." (Lukács 1918: 16, 24).

Film as Art and Ideology

As part of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, Hungary lost the war and the social and geopolitical consequences were horrible. Two revolutions followed in 1918–19 and a "white" counterrevolution in 1919–20. In 1920, the country lost two-thirds of its territory and close to half of its population in the punitive peace treaty of Trianon.

Balázs's politics, thought, and art promptly reflected the historical changes. Though not yet a Communist, he enthusiastically joined the Republic of Councils in 1919 and became hyperactive in a variety of bodies such as the writer's federation, the people's commissary for education, and as leader of the theaters. He wrote articles and pamphlets, made plans and propaganda, and ultimately decided to join the Hungarian Red Army. He escaped Hungary in November 1919, equipped with a false moustache and beard, as well as the papers of his brother (Nagy 1973: 255).

This generation of Hungarian exiles, generally of Jewish background, fled Hungary because of their participation in the revolutions of 1918–1919. Like Béla Balázs, this group of émigrés shared a "Copernican turn." Their whole world changed when they left Hungary. Not only did Balázs migrate toward new and

more democratic countries such as Austria and Germany, he also started writing in a new language –German and, later, Russian. Ultimately, he entered into the realm of film, then a completely new field. Though he never left poetry completely behind, his new passion became the new medium. Also, he also became a Communist while in Vienna and Berlin, an ideological change of great significance (Nagy 1973: 254). Comparable changes of a "Copernican" nature also propelled many of his fellow Hungarians such as Michael Polanyi to fame (Frank 1993: 6).

Balázs's exile in 1919 heightened his political sensitivity and prepared him for future escapes. His multiple exiles were comparable to those of physicist Leo Szilard whose mind was imprinted in 1919 by an acute awareness of history's dangerous turns (Frank 2005).

The changing world of Béla Balázs resulted in his new passion, film, which he helped establish as a powerful new art form. He utilized his analyses of American films of the 1920s to become an influential social critic of capitalism.. "Film," he wrote in his 1924 *Der Sichtbare Mensch* "in all its detail is a product of capitalist big industry." (Balázs 1924, Hung. ed.: 111). He came to the conclusion that "the aura of capitalist culture contradicts the essence of film as art form" and urged "general changes in the surrounding world to create the intellectual environment that keeps film alive." (Balázs 1924, Hung. ed.: 111–2). In his 1929 *Der Geist des Films* (Balázs 1929) he emphasized the collective nature of the process of creating films. He attacked profit-oriented capitalist film production that made it necessary to create popular products. Balázs felt that the need to be popular would initially lower the level of artistic expression but he expressed confidence that this would ultimately change. In his view the film production in capitalist countries should be based ideologically on the small-bourgeoisie, which he saw as an apolitical and asocial layer of society. Balázs surveyed the typical motifs of (mostly German and American) films and suggested that their romanticized world view reflected simply the self-defence of the small-bourgeois (Balázs 1929, Hung. ed.: 270–94).

In 1931, Balázs became a member of the Communist Party of Germany (Nagy 1973: 332). Invited to the Soviet Film Academy, he left for the Soviet Union the same year and stayed there until World War II was over. That he survived Stalinism in Moscow seems like a miracle.

His *Der Geist des Films* was soon published in Russian. In it Balázs modified the text to please the Soviet leadership, and he also presented himself as the first to apply "socialist realism", the new theory of aesthetics proclaimed by A. A. Zhdanov and embraced by Stalin, to the cinema. Nonetheless, the book was poorly received. Balázs was accused of being a formalist – and thus, a reactionary – easily the kiss of death –quite literally – for someone in his field at the time.

Balázs courageously answered his critics in a harsh tone and refused any form of self-reproach. Yet, in an increasingly suspicious aura, and amidst great anxieties, he prevailed, escaping denunciation and its severe consequences in the Moscow of the time, when not a few of the Hungarian Communists were killed (Zsuffa 1987: 242–3).

In 1936, Balázs, published his "film ballad" "Internationalisten" [Internationalists] in the journal *Internationale Literatur* and sided with the prevailing "internationalist" forces in the conclusion of that script. Doing so, he emphasized that ideological obligations were more important than duty to one's own country (Zsuffa 1987: 245). From a man so deeply rooted in, and homesick for, his native Hungary, this was an enormous sacrifice; yet, to suggest anything else would have been fatal for him. Even so, a German party member falsely accused him of Trotskyism in November of that year, charges that were very hard for him to escape. He must have cringed when Stalin's new police chief Nikolai Yezhov declared that "exiles are full of spies …" (Hidas 1973: 283). Under those precarious circumstances, it was of no benefit that the *New York Times* found appreciative words for his film "Karl Brunner" in December of that year. Balázs tried to survive by zigzagging among his various political and film contacts, including Stalin's personal friend and Comintern Secretary General Georgi Dimitrov, as well as Soviet cinema chief Boris Zakharovich Shumyatsky who himself became a victim of Stalin's paranoia in 1937. Balázs quickly sided with his successor Semion Dukelsky, to whom the former Shumyatsky protégé conveniently confided that "it was not easy for me in the Shumyatsky era." (Zsuffa 1987: 252–55).

Balázs continued being active in many different ways. Along with Georg Lukács, he was one of the editors of *Új Hang* (New Voice), a literary and social magazine started in early 1938 in Hungarian. He showed surprising vitality and a rare ability to reinvent himself. Even at the height of Stalin's terror he kept writing, producing a Russian book on film, *Iskustvo kino* [The Art of Film] (Balázs 1945a), publishing juvenile books that sold nearly one million copies in many languages, writing a ballet pantomime, articles for *Új Hang* in Hungarian, *Das Wort* and *Internationale Literatur* in German, all the while making honest and courageous efforts to save compatriots such as Frigyes Karikás from certain death, and supporting Béla Bartók's realism and populism in an open letter to his composer friend (Zsuffa 1987: 260–83). During the entire period of his Soviet years he contributed only one poem to the mandatory adulation of Stalin, a weak and short piece on the burden this great man had to carry (Balázs 1944: 25).

Officially a "displaced person" without Soviet citizenship, he lived a precarious life, carefully balancing between the various political forces, always keeping himself apart, though always in the limelight. N. A. Lebedev noted in

his recollections, "I think Balázs did not have it easy in those years…. I suspect that Balázs did not live undisturbed." (Lebedev quoted by Zsuffa 1987: 258, translation mine). His conspicuous absence from the memoirs and letters of fellow Hungarian Communists in Moscow such as Antal Hidas, Béla Kun, Béla Illés, György Lukács, and Ervin Sinkó, suggests that one of the secrets of his survival was undoubtedly his willingness to stay away from their circles and not indulge in émigré infighting. Among German writers in exile he remained a Hungarian, though he angrily responded to an observation to this effect by Johannes R. Becher that had his activities in German literature not been considered the "richest and most important, twenty years of my literary work would thus be eliminated." (Zsuffa 1987: 275–6). Among the Hungarian authors he was a filmmaker, yet in the world of Soviet cinema, he was an exile – always the outsider.

In 1945, a newly reflective Balázs returned to Hungary. He published his collected poems in August that year in Budapest commenting poignantly, "What was the meaning of the resonant pains of my youth? What was the 'desire of desire for desire'? Who was that eternal alien wanderer, for whom 'all is a way and all is endless'? … Well this was a rebellion against the hollowness and unreality of the surrounding world. It was dissatisfaction that became weltschmerz [world weariness] as I did not know, (and) did not see that one could and should change this world in which I lived and (I just) wanted to get out of it: I, poor, turned into a bourgeois revolutionary." (Balázs 1945b: 2–3). The "new form of patriotism" he brought along was a pleasant surprise in 1945 for some who expected only internationalism from the returning Muscovites (Illyés 1986: 371–3, referring to Balázs 1944: 26–33).

Soon after, he concluded his work on film as an artform in his final publication, a book on film theory, *Filmkultúra* [Film Culture] (Balázs, 1948). In this work, he emphasized that he took many examples from Soviet film and that he had profited enormously from "one of the deepest, most interesting and educational processes of cultural history, *how a new art is created from the reality of a new society*." (Balázs 1948: 7). He was particularly enthusiastic about films that he considered "the epic poems of work." Surprisingly, the book is free of the usual outward signs of Stalinism, lacking the dutiful apparatus of citations and stereotyped formulations and denunciations.

Hungary's Communist leader, himself a Stalinist, Mátyás Rákosi, nevertheless noted that the "Muscovites," the group of Communist authors who returned from Moscow after decades in exile, were received with very little trust and confidence upon their return to Hungary. Several of them, including Béla Balázs, complained to Rákosi about the difficulties of finding their roots again in their homeland (Rákosi 1997: 945). Perhaps the explanation is that the soil in which

they had originally thrived was simply exhausted and could not be renewed (Cp. Kettler 2006).

The Heavy Heart

My own grandmother, once a young student at the Music Academy in Budapest, came to know Béla Balázs in 1909. He gave her his first books and listened to her play Béla Bartók's "Scherzo" at a concert in the Academy on May 19, 1909. He inscribed his dissertation *Az öntudatról* (which he carefully corrected as *Halálesztétika*) as follows: "'Die Kunst macht dem Denker das Herz schwer. Das Denken macht dem Künstler das Herz schwer' [Art makes the thinker's heart heavy Thinking makes the artist's heart heavy]. It seems that we are too light and the current throws us up, and the ballast with which we could go down deep is, it seems – das schwere Herz." They lost contact after World War I to meet only after more than twenty-five years, accidentally. My grandmother always remembered how very sad Balázs looked then, shortly before he was to die.

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Invisible Exile: Iraqi Jews in Israel

Zvi Ben-Dor

ABSTRACT

Iraqi Jews have been living more then five decades as Israeli citizens, and the overwhelming majority of them identify the Jewish state as their home. Yet many of them accept the notion that they are in a "Babylonian Exile." The very idea of such a second Babylonian exile in Israel, the supposed location of redemption for Jews, is extraordinarily problematic. Indeed, it seems to be an impossibility. How can the Jewish state, which promotes itself to the world as "the home of the Jews," – and which is accepted as such by the majority of world's nations and organizations – how can this be a place of Jewish exile? This essay explores the paradox of this overwhelming sense of "second exile," tracing some of its historical sources and pondering its significance. I am particularly interested in the meaning of Jewish migration to Israel in relation to the way in which exile is understood and framed by Zionism, the official state ideology of Israel.

I. Introduction: A Sense of Exile.

> "*raj'ona alafi snin, mit alafi snin raj'ona* …"
>
> ([In bringing us to Israel] they put us back thousands of years, hundreds of thousands of years they put us back).
>
> Samir Naqqash, interview in *Forget Baghdad* (Samir 2002).

An interview with the writer Samir Naqqash (1938–2004), one of the least famous Iraqi Jewish émigrés, provides the opening words of the recent documentary, *Forget Baghdad*. Speaking in the Iraqi Arabic dialect, Naqqash defines the outcome of the mass migration of Iraqi Jews from Iraq to Israel in the 1950s. *Forget Baghdad*'s maker, known publicly only by the name Samir, is the son of an Iraqi Shi'i Communist living in exile in Switzerland. As Samir explains, his father used to relate to him stories of his Jewish friends in Iraq, fellow members

of the Iraqi communist party. In 2002, Samir made the trip to Israel in search of them. While Samir did not manage to find the specific people whom his father used to mention, he found instead an Iraqi community that defined itself largely through the vocabulary of exile. And his film consequently turned out to be an exploration of the filmmaker's attempt to understand "what it's like to change your country, ***forget*** your culture and language," and "become the enemy of your own past" (cited in Holden, 2003; emphasis as in the original). Yet, as one reviewer of the film points out, the Iraqi figures profiled in the film have "scarcely forgotten their pasts or their culture" (Holden 2003). If anything, they are defined by its memory.

As Naqqash describes it, the move from Iraq to Israel represented not only a movement through space, but also through time. "They put us back hundreds of thousands of years" – a dramatic transformation from one universe to a different one, a dislocation far greater than covered by an airplane crossing a mere 600 kilometers from one Middle Eastern location to another. Naqqash recalls the precise moment of his departure: "When the airplane took off, I was looking down at the Tigris [river] and I was trying to 'swallow' as much of it as could with my eyes as it became smaller and smaller" (Samir 2002). Only thirteen years old when he left Iraq, Naqqash insisted on writing only in Arabic throughout his life, and never in Hebrew – though most of his life was spent in Israel. The departure from Iraq was, for Naqqash, the life-defining trauma (Alcalay 1996a: 100–132). Two years after arriving in Israel, Naqqash tried to escape with an older cousin, setting off for Iraq. They managed to cross the border to Lebanon, but soon thereafter were captured by an Israeli agent operating there. Naqqash's early writings, which he had with him, were confiscated and he never saw them again. Their contents reflect the expansive borders of his intellectual imagination: "stories and longings for Baghdad; also the translation of Hamlet I had done." The two youth were transferred to Beirut and after 6 months in Lebanon returned to Israel (Alcalay 1996a: 101–02).

Fantastic and unique as his story sounds, Samir Naqqash is not the only Iraqi Jew in Israel marked by a profound and acute sense of exile. Samir's other interlocutors, too, speak movingly of the rupture of being Iraqi in Israel. Sami Michael, a prolific and well-known Iraqi-Israeli writer, describes in poetic terms the inner struggle of his exilic state. "Since I came to Israel, there is a war between the 'State of Sami Michael' [*dawlat Sami Michael*], and the state of Israel [*dawlat Isra'il*]" (Samir 2002). Shimon Ballas, a professor of Arabic literature and accomplished writer who lives in Paris and Tel Aviv, speaks of exile as the main pivot in his life. His *Last Winter* [Horef Aharon] depicts the lives of Middle Eastern Communists living in exile in Paris. *The Other One* [ve-Hu Aher], to give another example, is based on the life of Ahmad Soussa, a Baghdadi Jew who

converted to Islam in the 1930s. The "real" Soussa chose through conversion to be part of new, and much more uniformly Muslim, Iraqi society. But Ballas' Soussa lives in a double state of exile all his life – both from the Jewish community which he left, and from the new Iraq. "Even though I am a Hebrew writer and I write in Hebrew, I am not affiliated with Hebrew literature," insists Ballas, who like Michael switched from writing in Arabic to writing in Hebrew after coming to Israel. The peculiar reality that lies behind this assertion is reflected in the title of his autobiographical interview with Ammiel Alcalay, "At Home in Exile" (Alcalay 1996b: 134).

Iraqis in Israel, then, seem to be the champions of exile. A glance at the Israeli literary scene reveals that virtually all its writers of Iraqi origin (and there are many) are obsessed with the theme. A sea of writings produced by Iraqi Jews – from fiction, to personal memoirs, to autobiographies; in Arabic, Hebrew, and English – is striking not only it is volume, but also in its obsessive focus on one specific moment and its meaning – the departure from Iraq. At issue here is not the memoir, as such – many Israeli writers, of Arab-Jewish but also of Ashkenazi descent – write about their former lives in their "old" countries. Iraqi writing, fiction and non-fiction, stands out rather for its focus specifically on the moment of departure from Iraq – the events leading up to it; the details of the specific moment. Departure is its very *topos*. As typified by Naqqash, the point is not arrival in Israel, but departure from Iraq; a crucial difference that makes of departure the most difficult event in one's life. "When a human being emigrates from one culture to another, the way I did when I came from Iraq [to Israel], it is as if the umbilical cord of the soul is cut out" says the poet Amira Hess of her experience (cited in Snir 2005: 406). Hess was born in Iraq in 1943 and came to Israel in 1951, when she was seven or eight years old. Iraq is very much alive in the consciousness of Iraqis in Israel even today, more than fifty years after their departure. A look at the recent Israeli book market catches the following titles: *Baghdad, Yesterday* (Somekh 2003), *In the Alleys of Baghdad* (S. Fattal 2003); *The Jewish Community of Basra* (Sagiv 2004); *By the Two Banks of River* [Tigris] (Na'or 2003), and *Dreams in Tatran, Baghdad* (B. Fattal 2006) each of which went into a second edition within months of initial publication. To these Hebrew titles can be added several in English, among them *The Last Jews in Baghdad: Remembering a Lost Homeland* and *Outsider in the Promised Land: An Iraqi Jew in Israel* (Rejwan 2004, 2006).

As Nancy Berg has shown in her *Exile from Exile: Israeli Writers from Iraq*, Iraqi Jews understand life in Israel, both implicitly and explicitly, as a form of exile

(Berg 1996).[64] In the last fifteen years, departure from Iraq has provided the central theme of three epic Iraqi Jewish novels: Sami Michael's *Victoria* (1992), Eli Amir's *Farewell Baghdad* (1993) and Ballas's aforementioned *The Other One*. They, along with a host of memoirs and novels, comprise what Berg aptly terms "a literature of Exile." As Berg concludes, the "return" to Israel [is] … at least temporarily – a "second Babylonian Exile" (Berg 1996: 156), a term that first appeared in *HaMa'abarah HaMaabarah* (The Transit Camp), Ballas' first Hebrew novel, published in 1964 (Ballas 1964; Berg 1996: 99).

This much talk about exilic sentiments and the preoccupation with the departure from Iraq is a bit puzzling. Iraqi Jews, after all, have been living more then five decades as Israeli citizens, and the overwhelming majority of them identify the Jewish state as their home. Studies have shown that, much like other Jews of non-European origins, Iraqi Jews strongly identify with the Jewish state, despite their acute awareness of their lower social status vis-à-vis Israel's citizens of European origin (Bensky et al. 1991: 291–302). Furthermore, as I detail further below, the very idea of a second Babylonian exile in Israel, the supposed location of redemption for Jews, is extraordinarily problematic. Indeed, it is an impossibility. How can the Jewish state, which promotes itself to the world as "the home of the Jews," – and which is accepted as such by the majority of world's nations and organizations – how can this be a place of Jewish exile?

This essay explores the paradox of this overwhelming sense of "second exile," tracing some of its historical sources and pondering its significance. I am particularly interested in the meaning of Jewish migration to Israel in relation to the way in which exile is understood and framed by Zionism, the official state ideology of Israel. In the effort to probe the tension of this relationship, I shall not attempt to catalog all the sources for the sense of exile, a task that is surely beyond this essay's scope, if not altogether impossible. Rather, I wish here to concentrate on one crucial event in the history of Iraqi Jewry: the moment of its departure from Iraq and its immigration to Israel. Much of the literature on exile revolves around the relationship between the site of exile and the original homeland. But what of the liminal moment itself, the very point of transition?

Anyone remotely familiar with Israel's internal social and ethnic problems and conflicts would probably attribute Iraqis' strong sentiment of exile to their

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[64] See Berg (1996) for a bibliography of "exilic" writings, both in Arabic and in Hebrew by Iraqi Jews. For a greater bibliography see the recent monumental study by Re'uven Snir (Snir 2005). I do not agree with Snir's basic premise – that Jewish and Arab identities are different and separate from one another. However, I cannot do enough justice here to Snir, an Israeli born Iraqi, whose book covers virtually all Iraqi Jewish writings, both in Hebrew and Arabic, both by Iraqi born and Israeli born Iraqis.

experiences as part of a broader category within Israeli society, that of "Oriental Jews" (*Mizrahim*), that is, Jews from Middle Eastern countries. Within the context of Israel – an aspiring European country dominated by an Ashkenazic Jewish elite, one might suppose that the Iraqi Jewish emphasis on exile is a way of expressing a sense of social dislocation. Indeed, in this regard, the Iraqis of Israel are not unique (Shohat 1988; Bensky et al. 1991; Shenhav 2003; Chetrit 2004). Many individuals in Israel do feel displaced or dislocated at the very least, and consequently engage in expressions of nostalgia for their former homes in other countries. Furthermore, Israel's "oriental Jews" have often tried to turn their cultural alienation from the state and their resistance to its discriminatory policies into political action.[65] But even in this broader context, Iraqi writing stands out in its expression of the particular relationship to the particular original homeland in question – Iraq. Israel's internal social problems and conflicts, I would agree, certainly make the Iraqi sense of exile more acute. But they cannot be the sole explanation for it.

This becomes clear when we discover that the potent sense of exile is not exclusive to the generation of Iraqis who left Iraq. Israeli-born Iraqis writers express themselves through a similarly exilic vocabulary. To give but a few examples: the film "Home," made by the Israeli Iraqi David Ofek in the wake of the first Gulf War. "Home" depicts an Iraqi family sitting in their living room in Ramat Gan, an Israeli town with a large Iraqi community. Gas masks on in anticipation of a SCUD, the members of family are obsessed with only one thing: Will they be able to identify their home in Baghdad, flashed on their TV screen by CNN? (Ofek 1994). The movie, based on Ofek's own family's experiences during the war, was clear in its message: "home" was not the comfortable abode in Ramat Gan, but the one likely being destroyed by American "smart bombs."[66] Ofek went on to explore the trans-generational pains of emigration in his

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[65] The scope of this essay is too short to allow a discussion concerning the many instantiations and manifestations of Israel's ethnic divisions of labor, housing, education, and health. See Menahem 1986; Shohat 1988; Kimmerling 1989, 2004; Swriski 1989; Haberfeld & Cohen 1995; Yiftachel 1995; Philipps-Heck 1998; Yiftachel & Meir 1998; Hever & Shenhav 2002. Nor does it allow a discussion of the history of the political struggle, on the part of Oriental Jews, against these conditions. See Hasson 1993; Chetrit 2004.

[66] Ironically, US bombing concentrated for a while on al-Batawin, a neighborhood in Baghdad where many high ranking Ba'ath party offices were located and where many party members lived. This neighborhood used to be heavily populated with affluent Jewish families until 1951 (Giladi 1992: 146). More on bombs in al-Batawin, see below.

successful drama series, "Bat-Yam/New York," which tells the story of an Iraqi family whose daughter emigrates from Israel to New York (Ofek 1995–1997).[67]

The Iraqi sense of exile is, perhaps not surprisingly, most prominent in the realm of poetry. Ronny Somek was born in Baghdad in 1951 and was brought to Israel shortly thereafter as an infant. Someck, whose first book of poetry is entitled simply "Exile" (Someck 1976), writes of the bombed city in his "Baghdad, February '91":

> In these bombed streets my baby stroller was pushed
> Maidens of Babylon pinched my cheeks and waved palm brunches
> above my blond down
> what is left since became very black
> Like Baghdad (Someck 1994).

Exile is a focal *topos* in the work of another prolific poet of Iraqi descent, Haviva Pedaya, born in Jerusalem in the 1960s. A professor of Jewish thought and Kabalah, Pedaya articulates in her recent literary work what she calls the "Exilic Voice" (Padaya, 2004). This is the voice of a person who is physically not in exile, but whose voice is:

> [...] And some go from Iraq to America
> And some from Lebanon to Nicosia
> And some from Israel to Palestine
> And some from Israel to Israel to Israel to Israel
> And finding naught, for Israel in Israel is absent
> You, who wanted to be free in your home
> Prepare the vessels of exile [...]
>
> Am I not a man robbed of words
> Expelled but not in exile
> But in my country, among my people
> Interred but not in the desert
> In the redundant is my coffin
> An exile not away [...]
>
> (Pedaya 1994. Dedicate to Subhi Hadidi, a Syrian journalist living in exile).[68]

Similarly, exile is central to the work of Ella Shohat, a professor of Art and Public Policy and Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies at New York University. Shohat, who was born in Petah Tikvah in Israel, is a prolific thinker and essayist

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[67] This drama, in which most actors are Iraqis, was aired in Israel's second channel for three years.

[68] At this point I would add my own contribution to the list exilic writings (Ben-Dor 2004, 2006).

who over many years engaged in an intense and direct dialogue with Edward Said that revolved around, among other issues, the idea of exile in the modern Middle East (Shohat 1988, 1992, 1993, 1995a,b, 1997, 1999a,b, 2001, 2003). In 2001, when a collection of her works was translated into Hebrew, she summed up her work as "thinking about migration, uprooting, exile, and the condition of being a refugee" (2001).[69]

One cannot, of course, speak of a clearly articulated or a coherent Iraqi Jewish sense of exile that will represent the entirety of Iraqi Jewry in Israel. And the historian, at least this one, cannot hope to do a better job of expressing it than the poet, novelist, or artist. The various expressions of the sense of exile with which I am concerned do, to an extent, "speak" in the name of a collective, and they probably speak *to* this collective, although in essence they are personal and particular. Yet what is striking is that this term, whatever its particular meaning to those who deploy it, looms large in Iraqi Jewish writings hailing from Israel. And when we look at what is produced by Israeli-born Iraqis we get the sense that the 'Second Babylonian Exile,' as Ballas termed it, has only grown thicker in meaning and multiplied in its modes of expression.

II. Israel as Homeland: Zionism, Exile, and Redemption

The phrase "Second Babylonian Exile," in [*Galut Bavel haShniya*], requires our careful attention. The first "Babylonian exile," of course, marks the final days of the first Judean kingdom in the 6th century BCE. In 586 BCE the armies of the Babylonian empire sacked Jerusalem and exiled its people to Babylon. This episode came after an earlier war, in 597 BCE, between the Judeans and King Nebuchadnezzar, during which the mighty Babylonian ruler spared Judea but took its king, Yehoyachin, and his entourage as captives back to Babylon (Kings II: 24–5). The "Babylonian Exile" or "Babylonian captivity" is a crucial moment in Jewish history, robed with a tremendous amount of suffering and pain,[70] and is commemorated in the 137th psalm:

> By the rivers of Babylon

[69] This is even suggested by the titles Shohat gave to her articles. A few years ago Shohat's seminal essays were translated into Hebrew and were published in a special anthology. In this book, sections that particularly deal with exile were grouped under the title "Hirhurim Galutiyim" (*Exilic Reflections*), clearly in dialogue with Said's own *Reflections on Exile* (Shohat 2001). Shohat certainly sees an exilic dimension to her life in New York, away from Israel and from Iraq (Shohat 1999a).

[70] The books of Jeremiah and second half of Isaiah record the pain and tragic journey to Babylon after the destruction of Jerusalem. In Babylon itself several prophets who comforted the people in exile such Ezekiel and Nahum, became central figures in Iraqi Jewish culture. Their tombs were for millennia major site of pilgrimage.

There we sat down and wept
When we remembered Zion
… How shall we sing the Lord's song in a foreign land?

It is the Babylonian exile that shapes and informs all Jewish and Christian theological elaborations of the concept since. Israel Yuval, for example, has recently demonstrated that the image of the expulsion of the Jews by the Romans after the destruction of the Second Temple in 70 CE was in fact shaped by a tendency to see this particular event as a repetition of the Babylonian exile, despite the fact that the Roman occupying forces did not, in fact, expel Jews (Yuval 2006). The first Babylonian exile denoting the destruction of the temple in Jerusalem and the deportation of the Jews became the template for the framing and understanding of the term exile from antiquity through the modern period, albeit with significant adaptations. Indeed, the Babylonian Exile is perhaps the most powerful event in premodern Jewish history and its impact on later Jewish thought and consciousness is without competition. As Yuval rightly points out, the myth of expulsion of Jews from the Land of Israel is a central component in the formation not only of Zionism, but also of "Western-Christian consciousness … and its stance toward the Zionist enterprise today" (ibid.: 32). In sum, the myth of the Jewish exile helped "create a justification for – an understanding of the necessity of – the Jewish return to Zion" (ibid.: 33).

But while the myth of exile has provided helpful justification for return to Israel, in its secularized modern understanding it is not sufficient to bring about or *cause* the Jewish "return" to the Land of Israel. An important part of the Jewish religious principle of "return" is the "Negation of Exile" [*Shelilat haGalut*]. It is one of the most important principles of Zionism as well, which holds that the modern Jewish state is the end of exile. Accordingly, the coming of Jews from all over the world to Israel marks the secularized, political incarnation of the fulfillment of divine promise known as the "Ingathering of all Exiles" [*Kibbutz Galuyot*]. By the same token, the coming of Jews to Israel is never understood simply as immigration [*Hagira*]. A special word, "*Aliyah*" [*lit*. "To go up"], which comes from the Bible, is reserved for it.[71] Israel is the place where the ultimate redemption of Jews occurs once they come to live there. In short, life in Israel is the end and the exact opposite of exile. The place and role of exile in Zionist thinking are, as we can see, robed with mythical, theological, and messianic overtones, but it is important to bear in mind that within the context of Zionism they are at same time political.

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[71] Only recently some circles in the Israeli academy started using the more neutral term "migration" instead of "*Aliyah*" (Kimmerling 2004). The word *Aliyah* is naturalized at least in American Jewish English.

In a seminal essay on the meaning of the concept of the negation of exile in Israeli contemporary culture and politics, Amnon Raz-Krakotzkin has convincingly shown that that it is not a relic from the more romantic phase of pre-state Zionism. Rather, the negation of exile is a "founding constituent in Zionist consciousness" (Raz-Krakotzkin 1994: 113). This principle – indeed, paradigm – dominates and shapes the ways in which Israelis view the Jewish past and their conception of Jewish history. Exile and the negation of exile also inform the ways in which they view and understand their present (Raz-Krakotzkin 1993/1994).[72] Furthermore, in Israel negating exile must mean the "denial of previous exilic histories and traditions" (Raz-Krakotzkin 2000: 305). This point is acutely relevant in the case of Israeli Jews from Arab lands. Ella Shohat has shown the degree to which the histories of Jews from Arab countries have been erased from the popular media and collective memory in Israel, emphasizing how this process, occurring on various levels at once, is accompanied by vigorous mechanisms that shape and control memories of the past homeland (Shohat 2003).

The exilic condition is understood as an ahistorical phase with only two possible endings: catastrophe – the Holocaust; or redemption – making *Aliyah* to Israel. That is to say, the practical meaning of the negation of exile, with regards to the question of Jewish migration, is the ultimate rejection of the place of origin as being a "homeland." It can only be a place of "exile," and only coming to Israel can be coming "home." Thus, to leave ones natal home and go to Israel is an expected, "natural" act for a Jew to undertake. In this respect, within the Zionist formulation, *departing* the false "homeland," the place of exile, is a meaningless, self-explanatory event. What is important instead is the moment of arrival – the culmination of an historical/mythical process that always leads in Israel's direction. The quintessential embodiment of the supposed "naturalness" of coming to Israel is the "Law of Return," which grants automatic citizenship to, indeed naturalizes, any Jew upon arrival in Israel. Thus, legally speaking, the arrival of Jews in the land of Israel is in effect an act of *repatriation*. It is the paradigm of *Aliyah* that makes Jewish migration essentially different from all other migrations in world history. While other people migrate, whether by their own volition or not, from one place to another, Jews make *Aliyah*.[73] The mythical

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[72] The best example for this point is the ways in which Israelis relate the peace process with the Palestinians. Being soft and dovish is often characterized as being "exilic." "Exilic behavior" is usually a code for being weak and servile.

[73] Similarly, Israeli discourse developed to the word "*yeridah*" (lit. "To go down") denoting the emigration of Jews *out* of Israel.

dimensions of *aliyah* as event displace any concrete history of a Jewish immigration to Israel and overtake it.

In the Biblical account, the Babylonian captivity ends with the rise of the Persian Empire and with Cyrus' decree in 518 BCE, by which the Judean exiles in Babylon are allowed to return to Israel. Following this decree, the Biblical Books of *Ezra* and *Nehemiah* tell us, 70,000 of the exiles return (make *aliyah*) to the land of Israel and build the second temple. They were led back to the land by one Ezra the Scribe. The Bible describes the Emperor Cyrus, Ezra, and Nehemiah as messengers operating on behalf of God. Similarly, the "*Aliyah* of Ezra" is depicted as the work of God himself. Thousands of years later, this powerful biblical story was harnessed by the founding fathers of Israel and the Zionist activists who brought the Jews of Iraq to Israel: the airlifts that brought Iraq's Jews to Israel were named "Operation Ezra and Nehemiah" (Ben-Porat 1980).[74] All Jewish migration to Israel had redemptive significance, but that of Iraqi Jews was particularly redolent of miraculous, semi-mythical fulfillment of divine promise. Thus, several years after Operation Ezra and Nehemiah, the Zionist Iraqi Jews most actively involved in it began using their role in it as the basis for establishing themselves as the official leadership of Israeli Iraqi Jewry. Virtually all "leaders" of the operation, particularly Shlomo Hillel and Mordechai Ben-Porat (both b. 1923), became prominent politicians in Israel (Ben-Porat 1996, 1998; Bibi 1983; Hillel 1985; Arbeli-Almoslino 1998). To this day, the veterans of the operation, now all in their 80s, run and control the state-funded Babylonian Jewry Heritage Center, the research center attached to it, and its main publication, *Nehardea*.[75]

The center, established in 1973 and since then headed by Mordechai Ben-Porat, the undisputed "hero" of the operation, understands its own very existence as both historical and mythical, just like the "redemption" the operation produced. In 1995 the Heritage Center initiated a special multi-year project dedicated to the study of Iraqi Jewish leadership. The two historians in charge, Professors Yitzhak Avishur and Zvi Yehouda, both Iraqis and historians of Iraqi Jewry, defined the subject as encompassing all leaders "beginning with Yehoyachin, King of Judea who was exiled [to Babylon] in 597 BCE, and ending with the renewed leadership of the [Iraqi] Jewish community in Israel today" (Avishur &

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[74] See also Saadoun 2002a. Virtually all the books dealing with the history Iraqi Jewry and its migration to Israel use this term also. Initially and for a very brief period a more cynical name, with the scent of racist overtones but perhaps more suitable, was given to this operation – "Operation Ali Baba."

[75] *Nehardea* was for many centuries an important Jewish educational center in Babylon during the first millennium. See http://www.babylonjewry.org.il

Yehoudah 1995: 21).[76] In other words, today's Israeli Iraqi politicians are the direct heirs of the ancient king with whom the Biblical story of exile first began, and it is the leaders of "Operation Ezra and Nehamiah" who at long last brought the story of exile to its closure.

One of the central activities of the Center is the annual celebration and commemoration of Operation Ezra and Nehemiah. In winter 1980, on the date that was declared as the 30th anniversary of the operation, Ben-Porat addressed the "270,000 Babylonians living today in Israel" and declared that "about half [of whom] do not remember a thing or have a dimmed picture about the life, the existence, and the heritage [of Iraqi Jewry]." In order to make sure that everybody remembered things correctly, Ben-Porat and Hillel initiated a series of activities and celebrations designed to make sure that the Iraqis and their children in Israel would remember the miraculous story and thank the Zionist movement for bringing about its final, and happiest, chapter (Ben-Porat 1980: 4).

Here we see more clearly just how peculiar it is, this ubiquitous Iraqi-Israeli characterization of life in Israel as exilic; a "second Babylonian exile." Indeed, within Ben-Porat's parameters – which are the "official" ones – there is no space at all for any sense of Iraqi Jewish exile *while in Israel*. The deliberate phrase "Second Babylonian Exile" is both subversive and poignant in its diametrical opposition to the phraseology of the Zionist leadership.

But just as the biblical treasure trove has been deployed by Zionist leaders, Iraqi Jews, too, have found it a useful source of metaphors. But while the Zionist leadership has used it to paint the coming of Iraqi Jews to Israel as a redemptive and happy episode, Ballas has found in it a way to depict the departure from Iraq as a dark, and irreversible, calamity.

III. Living in Iraq

Histories of the Jews of Iraq often begin with the famous cliché: Iraqi Jewish history is a history of 2,600 years, perhaps more, and the Iraqi Jews are a people who have lived since the first Babylonian Exile in the territory known today as Iraq (Rejwan 1985). Yet, this history, long as it is, finds its most significant event only at its end – indeed, *with* its end. Paradoxically, the most significant moment in Iraqi Jewish history is when the Iraqi Jews cease, as it were, to be Iraqi – by leaving Iraq.

Around Mid-May of 1950, the Jewish community of Iraq comprised a little over 130,000 people. All were in Iraq. Just over one year later, by June 25, 1951,

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[76] See English translation of this essay in http://www.babylonjewry.org.il/new/english/nehardea/9/m24.htm.

123,371 of them were in Israel (Gat 1989: 174; Bensky et al 1991: 12).[77] A few thousands of them left Iraq on foot, walking to Iran where they boarded airplanes to Israel. More then a 100,000, however, were airlifted from Baghdad directly to Tel Aviv. A closer look at the tables of departure shows that the majority of the Iraqi Jews left between September 1950 and June 1951, with more than 60,000 airlifted in the last three months of that period alone. The Jewish community of Iraq virtually disappeared by air within a span of nine months. At the most basic level, the event stands out for the unique demographic circumstances at play. Iraq's 1947 census counted just over 118,000 Jews, 98,430 of them concentrated in the country's three biggest cities (Baghdad 77, 542; Basra 10, 537; Mosul, 10, 345). The rest lived in smaller rural townships and villages (Saadoun 2002b: 38).[78] Thus the overwhelming majority of Iraqi Jewry was made up of one big Baghdadi community, flanked by two other smaller urban groups. These Jews lived in close proximity to each other and shared the same communal institutions (Me'ir 1993, 2002; Saadoun 2002c). The Iraqi Jewish community was characterized by a very high degree of real familiarity among it members, and by a similar degree of homogeneity (Behar 2001: 181–84). It was both this demographic concentration and this social cohesion that made possible such a swift and huge airlifting operation.

The disappearance of a community of such a size, within such a short period of time, is a dramatic event. I would hazard a guess that in the history of Jewish migrations there are few episodes of *organized* migration in such numbers occurring within such a short span of time. Certainly, there was at the time no equivalent in the history of immigration to Israel. The larger communities of immigrants formed in Israel between 1948 and 1991, from Morocco (265,300), Rumania (263, 576), the U.S.S.R. (200,446), and Poland (169,017), were created over much longer periods of time (Bensky et al. 1991: 12–14). Jews from these countries arrived in Israel under varying historical circumstances, through different ways and means, and taking different routes on their way to Israel. Finally, in all these other cases, the country of origin retained some sort of Jewish community, despite the out-migration of many of its members. In Iraq, though, the Jewish community disappeared, almost literally overnight. From a Zionist

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[77] A few hundred immigrated to Israel between 1948 and 1950, and few thousands came after 1951. One cannot be completely accurate here, but most sources and studies speak of similar figures. Here I combine figures of departure with figures of arrival. Gat's table relies on American and British reports regarding the Jews leaving Iraq. Bensky et al. (1991) rely on the official number published by the Israeli government regarding numbers of Iraqi Jews arriving in Israel.

[78] The Jewish community of Baghdad was estimated in 1910 to be second largest community in the Ottoman Empire, after the one in Salonica (Kazzaz 1991: 27).

point of view, there is no happier story than this one. A whole Jewish community, almost *in toto*, comes at once to Israel. A most dramatic *Aliyah* that certainly justifies the Biblical name it was given. However, we must look at the reverse side of this history, which tells the story not of arrival, but *departure*. In 1951, Iraqis were the largest group of Jews to come to Israel. But they were by far and away the largest group or Iraqis to leave Iraq. The story of departure was the story not of a Jewish homecoming, but of an Iraqi exile.[79]

Modern Iraq was created in 1921 following a brief British occupation in the wake of the World War, and an Iraqi revolt against it. The British remained, however, directly or indirectly involved in the political goings-on in Iraq until at least 1958. Iraq was made up of the three former Ottoman provinces of Mosul, Baghdad, and Basra, thus bringing together the region's three main Jewish communities. Despite the dramatic upheaval of the period, Iraqi Jewry managed "to preserve [its] communal identity despite the many changes which the community witnessed and experienced" (Behar 2001: 188). The founding of Iraq gave rise to what some Israeli historians call "the Iraqi Orientation," an "ideology," as they put it, promulgated by the community's religious and secular leadership, which urged greater integration of Jews into economic, social, political and cultural life in Iraq (Kazzaz 1991: 54). A highly urbanized collectivity, Jews had played a key role in the country's commercial life since the late 18th century (ibid.: 26–30). After the founding of modern Iraq, Jews continued to play key economic roles through the mid-20th century ('Abd al-Rahman 2002; Shiblak 1986: 31–36; Darvish 1987).[80] Indeed, a March 1949 report issued by the

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[79] The historian looking at these events is walking on rather thin ice since the complex events leading to the departure of Iraq's Jewry, and its history in the twentieth century as a whole, are the subject of heated debates among Zionist and non-Zionist historians, Israelis and Arabs. Debates revolve around two basic questions, how inevitable was the emigration out of Iraq, and to what degree were Iraqi Jews Zionist (Shenhav 1999, 2003; Behar 2001). However, as Shlomo Swirski has shown in a brilliant inquiry of several such historiographical studies, while both "sides" debate the historical significance of different events and the overall course of history, there is a great deal of agreement on the main events leading the departure of Iraq's Jews. Specifically, while Zionist histories of Iraqi Jewry do not deny the attachment of Iraq's Jews to their country and their lack of sympathy for Zionism, they insist that their fate as Iraqis was sealed and their departure to Israel was inevitable (Swirski 1995).

[80] For example, Iraq's first minister of Finance in Iraq was Sir Yehezkel Shem-Tov (1880-1954) who is still remembered as "father of Modern Iraqi economy" ('Abd al-Rahman 2002: 17). More then half of merchants in country were Jews, and according to one estimate they controlled 95% of the Iraq's international trade (Kazzaz 1991: 98–9). Jews dominated the Iraqi chamber of commerce. During the two years of 1938-39 for instance, 212 of the 498 members of the chamber were Jews (Shiblak 1986: 31).

US embassy in Baghdad, estimated that "75% of Iraqi trade was in Jewish hands," and warned that "if the Jews leave, large sectors of the Iraqi economy might collapse" (cited in Kazzaz 1991: 114).

Iraqi Jews were also intensely involved in the cultural realm, and took active part in the modernization, and the Arabization, of the country. Re'uven Snir defines the high degree of Iraqi Jewish involvement in Arabic culture in the twentieth century as a "rare phenomenon in the history of Jewish communities under Islam" (Snir 2005: 487). Jews played key roles in the rise of modern Arabic literature from the later Ottoman period, when Arabic books, journals, and newspapers began to appear. With the rise of Modern Iraq, Jewish involvement in literary and cultural life grew tenfold (ibid.: 23–77). During the 20th century Iraqi Jews also experienced a dramatic surge in literacy and were one of the most highly literate ethnic groups in the Middle East (Shiblak 1986: 24–5).

The political history of the Jews seems to have followed similar patterns; Jews tended generally to express themselves in patriotic or at least "loyal" terms, and seem to have identified with the state. Many were active in the various Iraqi nationalist movements of the period (Shiblak 1986: 45–47; Kazzaz 1991: 54–74). Several Jews, running as Iraqi patriots, won in the elections that followed the creation of the monarchy. By and large Jewish representation in the Senate was slightly higher than in the general population (Kazzaz 1991: 134–39). Iraqi Jews, in short, were firmly established in all walks of life. The new nation state of Iraq was regarded by its Jews as their "homeland," and certainly not as a place of exile that must be eventually "negated," rejected, and escaped. Indeed, and precisely for this reason, the history of Zionism in Iraq was short and frustrated.

On June 1–2 1941, following the failed pro-German Rashid 'Ali revolt, and in the wake of the British reoccupation of Iraq, a wave of anti-Jewish riots swept Baghdad. The brutal assault, known as the *farhud*, was triggered by rumors of Jewish collaboration with the British and left over a 150 Jews dead and several hundreds wounded. Jewish property in the city was also severely damaged. In the wake of the *farhud* many Jews fled to Iran and India (Me'ir 1993: 11–12).[81] The events triggered different reactions amongst the Jewish populace. Most of the community's leaders sought to return to normal life as quickly as possible, and were by and large successful in restoring Jewish good social standing under the new pro-British Nuri al-Sa'id government. Faith in the success of the "Iraqi Orientation," even if temporarily shuttered, was renewed (Kazazz 1991: 242–45). Moreover, the prosperity Iraq experienced during these years led many of those who fled to return (Me'ir 1993: 12). Nissim Kazzaz, who has examined the

[81] Numbers of the injured in this event vary according to the political orientation of the historian.

political behavior of the leadership of the Jewish community in Iraq, concludes that "the leadership remained faithful to its Iraqi Orientation and rejected Zionism" (Kazzaz 1991: 286).

Up to 1942, after the *farhud*, there was no local Zionist activity in Iraq and only a few thousand Jews left Iraq to join the new Zionist *Yishuv* in British-governed Palestine (Lissak 1994: 236). Even here, ideology may not have been key; Ester Me'ir points out that these immigrants were not necessarily Zionist, and that their encounter with the *Yishuv* was not a happy one. It created "a complex of negative images mutually shared by both [Iraqi Jews and Zionists]." The Zionist establishment concluded that Iraqis were an "unproductive *Aliyah* that does not integrate with and does not contribute to the *Yishuv*" (Me'ir 1993: 7).

If the *farhud* did not change attitudes much in Iraq, it did make the Zionist leaders of the *Yishuv* in Palestine turn their attention, for the first time, to the Jews of Iraq. Yehouda Shenhav comments that the Zionist leaders assessed that "impact of the *farhud* would be to intensify Zionist feelings among Iraq's Jews and that the momentum should be exploited to bring the community to Palestine." Yitzhak Ben-Zvi (later second Israeli president) argued that "the sense of agitation being experienced by the Jews of Iraq should be exploited to transfer the young people and train them in productive work in Palestine, where they will serve as the pioneering vanguard for all the Jews of Babylon [Iraq]" (cited in Shenhav 1999: 607–8).[82]

The *farhud* was not the only reason for this Zionist attention. A few years later, as the horrific scope of the destruction of East European Jewry became clearer, the Zionist leadership had to turn to other sources of Jews – Middle Eastern ones (Shenhav 1999: 608; Me'ir 1993: 14–5). However, what seemed very logical in Palestine did not make much sense in Iraq, where Jews remained by and large indifferent to Zionism. One of the first Zionist emissaries to the country, Enzo Sireni, concluded simply that they "lack Zionist political awareness" (cited in Shenhav 1999: 609).[83] The local Zionist movement, made of up two organizations – *ha-Shura* [the Column], and *ha-Halutz* [The Pioneer] – remained very small

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[82] Ben-Zvi's words left little impact on the *Yishuv*'s educational institutions. In 1942 only 75 Iraqi boys, even less than in previous years, were brought to Palestine to be educated as pioneers. The *Yishuv*'s leaders preferred the rural Kurdish boys, which were perceived as more "productive" then the urban and middle class oriented Iraqis (Me'ir 1993: 12-13).

[83] Aryeh Eshel, one of the first emissaries sent to "exploit" the sense of agitation among the Jews of Iraq in 1942, expressed great disappointment "I was told that they are Zionists … and they are ready to make *alliya* … [But] all this is neither Zionism nor yearning for the Land of Israel no readiness for *alliya* … [It is] dreadful hypocrisy, the height of Levantism" (Shenhav 1999, 609).

during the 1940s. In 1944–45 it counted only about 1500 members, a figure that did not change significantly in later years and even declined.[84] By the late 1940s, then, no significant factor from *within* the Jewish community in Iraq was contributing towards leaving the country. Emigration out Iraq, then, did not express the rejection of Iraq as exile on the part of Iraqi Jews themselves.

These conditions were well understood by the leaders of the *Yishuv*. In July 1943 one Mappai (what later became the Labor Party) leader put it this way: "we can define our role with regards to this Jewry in one sentence: Zionist conquest of these Diaspora communities in order to liquidate them and transfer them to the land of Israel … we do not know how many Jews will remain in Europe following the campaign of annihilation [being waged by the Nazis] against them." Under these circumstances Iraq's Jews, the largest and nearest Jewish community, were the obvious target: "it is easier [for us] to get there [to Iraq] … and for them, too, it is easier to reach the Land of Israel" (cited in Shenhav 1999: 608). The size of the community and its proximity to Palestine proved to be crucial factors in the history that followed. Ben Zion Yisraeli, another Zionist emissary, wrote in 1943 that the Iraqi Jews would be "liable to be among the first to pay the price for our enterprise in the Land of Israel" (cited in Shenhav 1999: 610). As it would turn out, such predictions were right.

IV. Leaving Iraq

In the wake of the first Arab-Israeli war of 1947–49, events in Iraq began to unfold rapidly. Crucially, the Jewish community and its leadership did not, for the most part, take an active part in the course of events that led to its destruction. The conditions of Jews in general deteriorated, and while political persecutions of Jews were limited to Communists and Zionists, it seems that in the wake of Arab defeat in the war, Iraq developed its own "Jewish Question" (Kazzaz 1991: 250–60, 275–78; Me'ir 1993: 198). In early 1949 the possibility of expelling the Jews was already being debated in ultra-nationalist circles and newspapers in Baghdad (Kazzaz 1991: 294–97). But with astonishing rapidity, what had started as a wild wish on the margins of the Iraqi political spectrum turned into a real possibility, when Nuri al-Sa'id, the Iraqi prime minister, discussed this option with British and US representatives, who warned him against it (Kazzaz 1991: 245; Shenhav 1999: 610). On March 9th 1950 the new government under Tawfiq al- Suwaidy (who briefly replaced al-Sa'id) enacted a denaturalization law (1/1950) specifically targeted at Jews. The law specified that any Jew who tried to leave Iraq illegally would lose his citizenship; any who had

[84] If these numbers have any indication, it should be mentioned that between 1946 January 1st and May 15th, 1948, only 65 Jews emigrated from Iraq to Palestine (Schechtman 1953: 152).

already left Iraq illegally would lose their citizenship if they failed to return within two months. Finally the law specified that the government was free to expel anybody who had lost his citizenship (Shiblak 1986: 131–2; Gat 1989: 57). The law was to be valid for one year – the government hoping that during this period "certain elements" from amongst the Jewish community (the poor and the Zionists) would leave Iraq, and the crisis would be over. Nobody – the Iraqi government, the Zionist movement, the leaders of the community, or the British and American embassies – predicted that almost the entire community would leave (Kazzaz 1991: 299; Shiblak 1986: 133–43).[85] Indeed, it seems legitimate that the law primarily expressed the government's desire to reaffirm its control over Iraqi borders.

The denaturalization law was a striking step in Iraqi Jewish history. To this day the year 1950 is known in Iraqi Jewish memory as "*Sanat al-Tasqit*" (lit. 'year of denial [of citizenship]'; the Arabic term used for "denaturalization" was "*Isqāt al-Jinsiyya*," (lit. "Abrogation of citizenship", and in Iraqi colloquial, *Tasqit al-Jinsiyya*), (Shohat 2001: 247). Arguably, the crucial aspect of the law was not the implied suggestion that Jews should leave Iraq, but the fact that it was temporary. Valid for just one year, the law presented a cruel dilemma that one suspects was completely lost on everyone involved: Jews had to choose between losing their citizenship and leaving, or staying with the risk of further deteriorating conditions and the possibility of not being able to leave once the law expired. In a state of mounting uncertainties and confusion, people could not afford to adopt a "wait and see" approach. They had to make a decision quickly.

While there were debating they received an unexpected "encouragement" to make a certain choice. In the first few weeks after the enactment of the law it seemed that its designers had been right in their modest assessments of its possible impact: only 150 Jews registered to leave it the first five weeks after legislation. However, on April 12th the number of Jews registering to leave rose to 3,400, with a jump two weeks later to 23,000. Thereafter it grew steadily. The pace of the rise of these number correlates to a series of violent incidents that killed a number of Jews. On April 8th a hand grenade was thrown into a Jewish coffee shop, injuring several young Jewish men. On June 3rd, another grenade was thrown from a speeding car into a cafe in the al-Batawin neighborhood. The third and the most fatal incident came seven months later, in Baghdad's Massouda Shemtob, where on January 14th 1951, another bomb was tossed into a crowd of Jews waiting to register for departure. Five were killed and more than twenty wounded. Three more bombs exploded in other location in March, May,

[85] In fact the highest estimate was about 25,000 Jews. Abbas Shiblak provides the actual documents produced the foreign embassies concerning these estimates.

and June of that same year. The Iraqi police arrested two local Zionist activists, Yosef Basri and the youngster Shalom Salih, as responsible for the bombings. Both were tried and hanged in 1952 (Shiblak 1986: 119–27; Kazzaz 1991: 186–7; Me'ir 1993: 238–9; Giladi 1992: 142–59; Gat 1989: 116–18).[86]

By March 8th 1951, a day before the denaturalization law was to expire, 105,653 Jews had registered to leave, and about 40,000 had already left for Israel (Gat 1989: 174). On March 9th the Iraqi government enacted another law (5/1951) freezing all property of Jews who had registered to leave and were still in the country (Shiblak 1986: 152). Thus, more than 65,000 Jews were still in Iraq, deprived of both their citizenship and their property. The fate of the community was sealed. The implementation of the second law was immediate and brutal. Jews found their businesses locked and bank accounts confiscated. Electricity and telephone services were disconnected from homes, and people who wanted to sell their property were now unable to do so (Kazzaz 1991: 304–5).

In 1949 the Zionist movement in Iraq was made up of a very small local group of activists led by two emissaries from the *Yishuv*, Shlomo Hillel and Mordechai Ben-Porat (both b. 1923). Both were born in Iraq but had immigrated to Palestine in the early 1940s where they became active members of the dominant Zionist organizations. In 1949 both were sent to Iraq by the *Mossad* – which was then organizing all *aliyah* operation worldwide – to organize the *aliyah* of Iraqi Jewry and to negotiate its details with the Iraqi government. The two were specifically chosen because it was clear that local Zionism was failing. The hope was that, unlike previous emissaries, who had all been of Ashkenazi origin, their Iraqi background would help produce better results. They had some success, but did not change the community's basic indifference and hostility towards Zionism (Ben-Porat 1996, 1998; Hillel 1985, 1987). Shlomo Swirski's careful analysis of the various histories and memoirs, written inside and outside Israel, relating to these events convincingly shows that the activities of the Zionist movement in Iraq at the time were directed at two basic goals. The first was driving a wedge between the community and its leadership, thus undermining its own efforts to stabilize the situation within Iraq. The second was organizing the airlift. The latter goal was achieved mainly by bribing various Iraqi officials, among them al-Sa'id's son, Sabah, who made a fortune from the airlift providing "maintenance service"

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[86] Zionist historians do not deny that bombs exploded. However, they either mention these events in passing (Me'ir 1993: 239). Or deny wholeheartedly that the Zionist had anything to do with these events (Gat 1989; Kazzaz 1991). Naim Giladi, mentions in his book on this episode that quite suspiciously one of the leaflets calling the Jews to leave Iraq was distributed in the Jewish neighborhoods an hour and half after the first explosion in *Dar al-Baida* café. The leaflet warned the Jews that violence against them is coming soon and urged to register to leave (Giladi 1992: 144–5).

for the planes involved (Gat 1989: 111–2). Throughout the crisis, the Jewish leadership tried hard to pressure the government to put an end to the anti-Jewish atmosphere and hysteria on one hand, and on the other to inspire confidence amongst Jews that this pressure was succeeding. Zionist activities, such as organized strikes and violent demonstrations in front of the community's offices, rendered the leadership's efforts meaningless. Most effective was a propaganda campaign "promising" more "pogroms" and more bombs (Swirski 1995: 47–52). All told, during the crucial months between March 1950 and March 1951, the Jewish leadership lost all control of the events – it could not stop the government from moving ahead with its plans, could not stop the Jews from leaving, and could not quell Zionist propaganda. The Jewish Senator in the Iraqi Senate, Ezra Menahem Daniel, summarized the leadership's position best. On March 9th 1951 spent an entire day in senate arguing against the property law (he was the only one who voted against it). Upon returning home he remarked: "This is the end of the dream of building a rich community deserving of its past" (cited in Kazzaz 1991: 304). Not surprisingly, the few thousand Jews who remained in Iraq mostly belong to elite families socially connected to the leadership (Kazzaz 1991: 305–6).[87]

Having lost their citizenship and their property, Jews were given a laissez-passer issued by the Iraqi government. A black stamp with the words "shall not be able return to Iraq" [*la yastati' an yarja' ila al-'Iraq*], was stamped on the document.[88] The person was then flown to Israel by "Near East Transportations," a fake name given to El-Al, Israel's national air carrier. Upon arrival in Israel, several hours later, each immigrant became an Israeli citizen. The pictures were pulled out from the Iraqi laissez-passer, which was often confiscated, and placed inside an Israeli identity card. In most cases, particularly if one had an Arabic name, the individual was also given a "modern" Hebrew

[87] This group developed its own distinct identity as the "Jews who stayed in Iraq." See their website http://come.to/iraqijews.

[88] Iraq is hermetically closed for Iraqi Jews and this point makes Iraqi Jews again different than other sizable Jewish communities in Israel. Iraq, who took part in the 1948 war, was the only Arab state that refused to sign the armistice agreement that ended it, and the two countries are since then officially in a state of war. This situation makes it a criminal offense, under Israeli law, to have any contacts with Iraq. Conversely, European and American Jews can return to their homes of visit them. The fall of the Soviet block made it possible for eastern European Jews to do the same. Israelis from the former French colonies are allowed entrance to Morocco or, better yet, to France, their colonial "motherland."

name.[89] From the airport the new citizens were dispersed to transit camps (Hacohen 1994).

V. Repatriated and Redeemed yet still Refugees

In June 1951 Iraqis made up 18% of the total number of immigrants to the new Jewish state (Bensky et al. 1991: 13). The community's structure and institutions did not survive the migration to Israel. The Israeli government, which controlled immigration with a tight fist, settled all incoming Jews according to its needs and interests. The new Jewish state had no interest in helping Jews resurrect their older, "exilic," forms of communal organization or fostering the preservation of international Jewish cultures. All immigrants were first settled in transit camps from which they dispersed to different locations in the country. The Israeli government always tended to be harsher in implementing these measures when the immigrants in question came from Arab countries (Yiftachel 1995), and the camp residents were not so sure that coming to the camp marked a step forward. Indeed, Ballas' term, "Second Babylonian Exile" was coined in the context of these camps and captured to mood of the Iraqi residents.

In January 1952, six months after Operation Ezra and Nehemiah ended, the Iraqi government hanged two Zionist activists, Yosef Basri and Shalom Salih, for their alleged role in the bombings of Jewish sites. The Israeli government reacted by organizing assemblies of Iraqi Jews in Israeli cities to protest "anti-Semitism" in Iraq. As Yehouda Shenhav points out, these assemblies failed to arouse the expected sentiments among their participants (Shenhav 1999: 605). Instead, classified reports sent to the Middle East section of the ministry of foreign affairs indicate that upon hearing of the hangings in Baghdad, Iraqis in the transit camps remarked, "This is God's revenge on the movement that brought us to such depths" (cited in Shenhav 1999: 604). We cannot, of course, take this report as representing the attitudes of all Iraqi Jews in the transit camps towards Israel, or as indicative of the way in which they viewed the events of a few months prior. It is worth noting, though that the Israeli government, however, did take it as such.

Clearly, the specific details of the departure from Iraq do not conform to the Zionist formulation of negating and leaving exile. The supposed "heroes" of this story, the Iraqi Jews, did not have any control whatsoever over their fate. There was no law explicitly expelling the Jews from Iraq. Yet it is clear that a constellation of international transformations, shifting political atmosphere, and,

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[89] No one so far documented this transfer from the infamous Iraqi laissez-passer to the Israeli passport. Ella Shohat is the only one who discusses it using her own parents' documentation as example (Shohat 1992).

above all, hostile and thoughtless legislation, drove them out of the country. The "*Aliyah* of Ezra and Nehemiah" was not a miraculous event. It was more like a political hell and a bureaucratic nightmare.

The story of the expulsion from Iraq, and of the Babylonian Captivity, was supposed to end with the granting of Israeli citizenship to Iraq's Jews. The culmination of a long redemptive process, it was to supplant any history that came before it. After 1951, then, one would expect the Israeli government itself to celebrate the Iraqi *aliyah* and highlight the fact that Iraq's Jews were not in exile but redeemed, free citizens in their homeland. Paradoxically, though, it instead presented Iraqi Jews as refugees and exiles, thus highlighting the tragic elements behind Iraqi Jewish emigration/immigration and exposing its "non-Zionist" context. In claiming to have "rescued" Iraq's refugee Jews, cruelly "exiled" by Iraq, Zionism undermined its own narrative of triumphant redemption. So had Zionism allowed exiled Jews to come home? Or had it provided a refuge for exiled refugees?

In his recent studies Yehouda Shenhav has shown how Israel repeatedly raised the issue of the Jewish expulsion from Iraq as a counterargument against international demands that Israel assume responsibility for the Palestinian refugee problem and allow for Palestinian return. Israel thus sought to establish a parallelism between two unconnected historical events – the Jewish emigration out of Iraq and the Palestinian tragedy in Palestine. Since the 1950s Israel has in fact argued that what happened in the Middle East was basically a lopsided population exchange, Palestinians for Iraqi Jews. The implication of this argument was that just as Israel had made the Iraqi "refugees" citizens, the Arab countries should do the same with Palestinians (Shenhav 2002). Similar are arguments about property left by Iraqi Jews in Iraq, which is depicted as a sort of "pay-off" for Palestinian property left in Palestine (Shenhav 1999).[90] Following the freezing of Jewish property in Iraq in March 1951, when, again, most of Iraq's Jewry was still in Iraq and not in Israel, Israeli foreign minister Moshe Sharett declared that "we have taken into account the value of Jewish property that has been frozen in Iraq when calculating the compensation that we have undertaken to pay the Arabs who abandoned property in Israel" (cited in Shenhav 1999: 605). However false and cynical they are, these arguments expose the fragility of the Zionist *aliyah* story in the Iraqi case and underline its contested nature. By implying that Iraqi Jews immigrated to Israel as part of a "trade" with the Arab world, and by equating them to expelled, displaced Palestinians, Israel undermines its own formulation of any *aliyah* as the desired end of exile. While

[90] Israel has later "expanded" this argument to all Jews from Arab countries. But it began promulgating it with the Iraqi Jews.

the outcomes of the movements of Iraqi Jews and Palestinians in the Middle East after 1948 are by no means comparable, a certain cruel logic of exile pairs them together. The same specifics that make the Iraqi Jewish migration a "model *aliyah*" – massive numbers at once – make them the model candidates for a "refugee trade" with the Palestinians.

Astonishingly, the possibility of a double transfer, or "population exchange," (the deliberate exiling of peoples), was in fact discussed in some Zionist circles already in 1949. In March of that year, Joseph Schechtman (1891–1970), an American right wing Zionist and polemicist, published *Population Transfer in Asia*, in which he called for a population exchange to follow the "successful" model of Greek-Turkish exchange outlined in the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923. Iraqi Jews occupied special place in Schechtman's book: "An interstate Treaty on Exchange of Population would have be concluded between the governments of the Jewish State and of Iraq, providing for the *transfer* of Palestine Arabs to Iraq of Iraqi Jews to Palestine" (Schechtman 1949: 133–4; italics mine). Even more astonishing is that the book was in circulation in Iraq in 1949 and it ideas were debated in the same ultra-nationalist circles and journals calling to expel the Jews (Kazzaz 1991: 299).

Whether of not Schechtman's book influenced the line of argument adopted later by Israel for international consumption, in 1951 the Iraqi Jewish case unwittingly became the invisible "twin brother" of the Palestinian tragedy – of which the most prominent feature is the ongoing exile of a people. Iraqi Jews, thus, became an international legal anomaly – people who are at once repatriated free citizens and refugees. The Palestinians, are less of an anomaly in this regard, they are only refugees.

VI. The Invisibility of Exile

The odd condition of being at once a repatriated citizen and a refugee exposes the unbridgeable gap between the paradigm of Jewish return as expressed in Zionist ideology, and the concrete, lived history of many of those Jews who have migrated to Israel. It shows how Zionism, an ideology the foundations of which are redemption and the end of exile; return and repatriation, produces within itself new forms of exile which must remain invisible. These exiles must remain unarticulated and invisible because their subjects are the very ones whose redemption has negated the very possibility of exile. In this light, the permanent state of exile expressed by so many Iraqi Jewish writers is not only an exile from Iraq, but more an exile from resolution. Their anomalous understanding of themselves as exile is, in fact, entirely consistent with the dual narrative of the state of Israel. And just as the Zionist narrative leaves the exilic state of Iraqi Jews paradoxically unresolved, so too does the narrative shaped by the

commemorative activities of the self-appointed Iraqi Jewish leadership. Ironically, it is Iraq, Babylon, the exilic site par excellence, and the place that most potently shaped the western understanding of exile, that has produced the one category of people who are at once repatriated and refugees.

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In 1977, the prominent journalist Baruch Nadel gave an interview to a newsletter of very limited influence published by Israeli Jews of Arab descent. Addressing the issue of the Iraqi *aliyah* to Israel, Nadel raised the specter of its contested nature. Had the Zionist movement in Iraq tried in any way to "encourage" Jews to leave? Nadel was blunt in his reply:

> [R]egarding the matter of saving Iraqi Jews, there was an agreement [between Israel and Iraq] that said, "give us the people and take their assets." In Iraq the agreement did not work out: the Jews who lived in affluence had no desire to emigrate, so the Israeli state's emissaries exploded bombs in Jewish population centers to cause panic that led to the flight of almost all Iraqi Jews within six months (cited in Ben-Porat 1998: 267).

This was not the first time that such accusations had been raised. Mordechai Ben-Porat, head of the *Mossad* emissaries in Baghdad, says in his memoirs that such claims had made him "restless" for years (Ben-Porat 1998: 267). In the 1960s Ben-Gurion himself initiated an investigation within the Mossad in the wake of similar accusations made by Iraqi Jews. As Naim Giladi has shown, rumors and conspiracy theories about the role of the Zionist movement in the bombings in Baghdad continued to haunt the community for decades afterwards (Ben-Porat 1998: 250–66; Giladi 1992).[91]

Reacting to Nadel's accusations, Ben-Porat, now a minister in the Israeli government, sued the journalist in 1980 for slander. After several bruising rounds in court, Nadel was forced to concede defeat. Ben-Porat was to dictate the statement of the settlement. Its first article reads:

> The Iraqi Jewish immigration [*Aliyah*], within the framework of the Ezra and Nehemiah Operation, was accomplished due to the yearnings of the Iraqi Jews for the Holy Land, and also because of unbearable pressure put on them by the

[91] Giladi himself was a Zionist activist in Iraq. In exile in New York, he dedicated the past several decades to exposing Israel's role in the bombings. See his new version of the book online in http://tcbhatecrew.net/text/bengurionscandals.pdf

Iraqi Government which involved persecution, arrests, hangings and so on (Ben-Porat 1998: 268–9).[92]

In November 1981 the court accepted the statement and certified it. In this way, the Iraqi Jews managed to make another legal history. They became the only community of immigrants to Israel the negation of whose exile was ratified by a court order.

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[92] In his memoirs, Ben-Porat published all the papers related to the various investigations and trial relating this episode. His intent was "to put an end to it, once and for all" (Ben-Porat 1998: 267).

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Reflections on a Diremptive Experience and Four Theses on Origins and Exile

Peyman Vahabzadeh

ABSTRACT

This paper draws on the selective experiences and observations of the author to reflect on how a "paradigmatic" notion of exile tends to impose a political unity on a specific historical experience of exile. Based on the observations made, the paper submits four theses with respect to understanding origins and exile beyond paradigmatic discourses. While every exile remains inescapably political, it is argued that far from a unified experience, exile is varied and changing. Next, the paper contends that exile captures the shared condition of being forced out of original life project(s). Thirdly, it submits that exile cannot be defined in terms of the redemptive return of exiles to their homeland. Lastly, it is argued that while exile scars memories, with the loss of original life project(s), origins themselves release exiles.

"*Homeland lies where there is no persecution*."
From an Iranian saying

In the pages that follow, I will try to provide a partial response to the question once posed by Jerry Zaslove: "Why is the older discourse, based on European patterns of exile, loss of recognition, and loss of time and place weakened or displaced by a new discourse that emphasizes the 'hybridity' of postmodernity?" (Zaslove 2001: 51). This formidable question cannot be exhaustively answered by the following reflections, for it actually refers to a trans-civilizational condition of our humanity in this increasingly disjointed time of ours. I am not concerned about "hybridity" or "postmodernity" either, and I view such terms as a rhetorical, postcolonial counterpoint to historical discourses about exile, an opposition to which I do not subscribe. Here, I will succinctly draw on some experiences of mine as an "exiled" (or, literally, "self-exiled") Iranian political activist in order to reflect on specific aspects of what constitutes exile by offering four theses. The reason for the cautiously confessional reference rests in a certain distance from much of the predominant literature on exile – a growing distance despite undeniable political affinities that I would nonetheless wish to uphold –

that I have been experiencing in the past eighteen years, living an exilic and diremptive life. The observations made in this paper are, like my experience of exile, diremptive and parallactic: these otherwise fragmented observations are pervaded and joined together by my reflective gaze, here and now. By an admittedly sweeping and risky generalization, I would like to claim that the two defining historical paradigms of exile in the twentieth century, those of Russian anti-Communist and German leftist exiles, as well as the experience that stemmed from the Holocaust, need to be revisited if we are inclined, as I am, to consider exile as a general condition of humanity. Let this point stand as the first caveat of this paper. The second caveat regards the problematic and vague definition of exile, as David Kettler has shown (2004). The ambiguity that has inevitably accompanied the concept has invited attempts at narrowing it down. One might call my following contribution a "narrowing down" as well, but only in the sense of refining a rich concept, since I have no intention, nor do I find it feasible, to narrow down the concept of exile into an analytical category that would yield precise empirical (political or sociological) observations. Rather, I will situate the concept so as to let us to see exile as a major constituent of our human condition. As such, ambitious as it may sound and following earlier reflections on the subject (Vahabzadeh 2005), I will try to revisit the human condition in terms of exile. My references to Iranian exilic experiences are intentionally general since the vicissitudes I point out here can each be expanded into a sociological paper on its own right. Although I consider this contribution a study of the phenomenon of exile that has the Iranian exodus as its case, I do not aim at presenting, strictly speaking, a review or discourse analysis of the exile literature. I have granted myself the liberty of creating general categories (the Left, feminism, gay movement), and I have abstracted from the factual evidence in order to maintain the theoretical flow of this paper.

A Unified Experience?

As I inhaled the deep whiff of charcoal in the fume-laden air during the many gray mornings of autumn and winter of 1987–88 I spent outside the UNHCR headquarters in Ankara, Turkey, I grew aware of, as though violently awakened to, the multiple faces of exilic experience. Before becoming a refugee, which culminated some eight years of activism with the Left in the post-revolutionary Iran, I had constructed the naïve notion that exile was a microcosm of my world – one of uncompromising *political* objectives and activism. How wrong I was!

The *political referentiality* of my experience slipped into a state of abeyance, as my ears gradually opened to the stories of my fellow refugees. The interview process took a couple of months before the UNHCR granted me the status of "conventional refugee" – a status that eventually landed me in Canada, where I developed over the next decade a modest status in the Iranian diaspora as an

exile due to my writings and public presence. Reflecting back, I now realize that I fled Iran and suddenly became a refugee and not an exile, although categorically I classed myself as "self-exiled." My exilic status and existence was something to be *accomplished* later. Strangely, *exile is always an accomplishment of sorts*. "Refugee" is a given, a status that happens to one because of one's having been inserted in specific sociopolitical circumstances. The term "refugee" designates an ambiguously transient status, an interstitial existence, and a legal term that denotes the "temporarily stateless" character of individuals in a world obtusely unable to perceive human persons free of imposed national identities – it is, in short, any sovereign's juridical nightmare.

The Iranian exodus has involved so many different experiences and waves of asylum seekers that any unitary conception of exile can only appear as a reductive imposition, only registering an ideological concern of one kind or another. The changing demographics of ceaseless waves of Iranian emigrants, shown in one study, supports the argument that no unifying cause can capture the reason behind the exodus of over four million Iranians (exiles, refugees, or emigrants) since 1979, except that the varying, in some cases vague, measures of blame are justifiably laid upon the Revolution and the repressive regime which ensued (see Mirfakhraie 1999; Modarres 1998). Indeed, the Iranian exodus began in 1979 and 1980s with the monarchists, capitalists, high ranking military and security personnel of the *ancien regime*, and soon continued with the flight of followers of Baha'i Faith – whose status under the Islamic Republic is not dissimilar to that of Jews or the Jehovah's Witnesses during the early Nazi period: with several hundred Baha'is executed by the regime or murdered by the mob, today the country's largest religious minority remains deprived of social rights altogether. With the purging of the Left, militant Kurds, and radical Muslims beginning in 1981, the greatest wave of political refugees in contemporary Iranian history began and continued until the early 1990s. The flight of social refugees – i.e., westernized middle class, women, ethnic minorities, Christians and Jews, and by mid 1990s, writers, intellectuals, and professors – characterizes the late 1980s and the 1990s. Lastly, the social emigrants such as professionals, university students, or gays complete the mosaic in recent years.

Each of these social groups has more or less developed its own intellectuals – from monarchist intellectuals, to expatriate women's rights advocates, to a vast array of outspoken leftist exiles, and lastly, gay intelligentsia. Each wave has produced its own layer of, to echo Antonio Gramsci, exilic "organic intellectuals" whose intellectual work is linked with the exilic "life activities" of its constituent social group. The exilic intellectuals of each social group link the life project of the group in the homeland with the group's general conception of exile. What,

then, holds these heterogeneous experiences together? From the existing understanding of *exile as primarily a political phenomenon*, the answer would involve a variegated referentiality in relation to the Islamic regime as the cause and culprit of this historic movement of exodus.

Here is the problem: in my living among Iranian refugees and exiles, I gradually came to notice how the dominant discourse of exile, articulated and launched through various émigré publications, in fact resulted in the imposition of a unitary and reductively political account of exile upon the multiplicity of exilic experiences of various social and political actors. In the Iranian case, such unitary exilic discourse was launched by predominantly political intellectuals of the Left and propagated by various leftist journals and activists. Exile was generally deemed as a violent, exclusively political phenomenon and as the "punishment" of the historically superior (read: self-righteous) leftists by the reactionary forces of history, which the 1979 Revolution had somehow inadvertently conjured up. Esmail Khoi, a prominent Marxist exile and poet called this phenomenon "anachronism," indicating the historical contingency of the Islamic regime by separating the regime from the Revolution, and thereby to hint at the redemptive return of exiled progressive forces. Such poetic articulation, echoed in the works of other prominent leftist intellectuals and *noted exiles* such as psychotherapist and playwright Gholam Hossein Saedi (1936–1985), author and activist Nassim Khaksar, medical doctor and writer Massoud Noghrehkar (and many others), was supplemented by a range of leftist jargons in an array of references to diverse figures from Lenin, Trotsky, and Rosa Luxemburg to Edward Said and Theodor Adorno. The Europe based Iranian Writers' Association (in Exile) became the center for this genre of exilic discourse. With the decline of numerous leftist factions and their publications in exile, the Paris based *Arash* (established in 1991) grew into the unrivaled exilic publication of the Iranian Left. Not surprisingly, the 1980s expatriate leftist publications were filled with translations (mostly from German and Italian) of works on the lives of intellectuals or communists under Nazism, fascism, or other repressive regimes. Terms like "exile literature" or "exile poetry" not only began to flourish, they grew into the measure for evaluating the artistic merits of the emigrants' literature. Overall, a *paradigmatic* conception of *exile – understood as a political act and sanctioned by the Left* – emerged to reign over the experiences of those years.

But this conception of leftist exiles as the defeated (self-acclaimed) liberators who had now inherited the unique responsibility of sheltering a nation's conscience by enduring the torment of exile in the manner of Tantalus did not at all reflect the experiences of the middle-class democratic-minded intelligentsia, followers of the Baha'i faith, ethnic minorities, gays, or many other social exiles.

In the Iranian case, the discourse of *noted exiles* recognized the Left as the unique bearer of social justice, whose cause was simply assumed as universal and thus all-encompassing and self-legitimating. In strategic retreat from the regime's unimaginable brutality, the Left was now sheltered in exile, awaiting the glorious moment of return, a return that would eventuate a nation's redemption. Such was the discourse of the organic intellectuals of the Left.

During the 1980s, this notion of exile succeeded in becoming hegemonic, in part due to the absence of competing discourses of exile. Thus, the leftist paradigmatic exile by default emerged to dominate the scene for over a decade, until the mid-1990s. Interestingly, both Iranian émigrés and the regime simply came to accept this paradigmatic conception of a demographic minority (leftist activists turned refugees and then exiles) as equivalent to exilic experience as such. For the next quarter-century, this theoretical misunderstanding mainly shaped the uneasy social relationship between members of the Iranian diaspora and their compatriots in the country – including the regime.

As my own observation of the inconsistency between the paradigmatic discursive formation of exilic experience, on the one hand, and the memories and experiences of concretely diverse individuals, on the other, reached intellectually unsettling levels, I realized that I needed to fundamentally revisit the way in which exile governed a nation's imagination. The problem stemmed from the neglect by the organic intellectuals of one (exilic) social group (i.e., the Left, to treat it as unified, for now) to "make its own," as Gramsci would put it, the issues of (exilic) subaltern social groups. What made the situation so perplexing was that *despite* this neglect, the organic intellectuals of the Left *achieved* hegemony over the discursive field of Iranian exile.

It took me several years of soul-searching to arrive at the decisive distinction between "noted exiles" and "minor exiles." At least in our twentieth century experience, the depiction of exile has always remained the prerogative of *noted exiles* – Edward Said, Theodor Adorno, Leon Trotsky, or Carlo Levi, to name but a few. *The function of noted exiles is to unify a historical experience through the discursive production of "paradigmatic exile."* While such an experience can be traced back to specific socio-historical circumstances, its unity is in fact not historically given; rather, it is the effect of the articulation of intellectuals, of noted exiles. In other words, a common historical phenomenon – the violence with which groups or individuals are ousted from their homeland – can and in fact does produce a multiplicity of experiences among those affected. *The unitary political cause does not produce unitary effects on the exiled*. But the consequent articulations of noted exiles tend to hegemonize the multiple and varied exilic experiences of an era by fixing them all at a specific political act, one that is normally tied to the experience of only certain group(s). Thus, this hegemonic

conception grows into a paradigmatic notion that supplies political referentiality for historical analysis as well as political agendas. Paradigmatic exile produces hegemonized experiences. *Minor exiles* are thus given a standard way of expressing their own experiences, although their experiences may not accord with the principal political inclination of the *noted exiles*. *Insofar as a social group fails to articulate its particular experiences in a genuine way*, *however*, *it ends up adopting an articulation of others*. In principle, of course, minor exiles might challenge the hegemonic discourse of noted exiles by voicing their particular exilic experiences and existences and by rejecting the reductively political conceptions of exile, as did, however marginally, Iranian gay activists through their sweeping cultural critique of androcentric machismo and homophobia. In a sense, this amounts to stripping the exile of its "political" character.

While it is true that exile is a movement unleashed by political decisions of the sovereign, *exilic experience qua experience* cannot be entirely attributed to the specific politics of a given socio-historical moment. The hegemonic "political" articulation of exile has become increasingly costly, for it necessitates a certain reductive attitude. Impossible to capture within the overarching discourses of noted exiles, the multitude of experiences of Iranian expatriates dissipates in an ideologically sanctioned oblivion.

Discursively, then, the problem arises from the selective character of articulated experiences (see Vahabzadeh 2003: 41–72) and perceptions of exile by certain noted exiles whose articulation tends to grow into the paradigmatic exilic discourse of an era. In our case, *the discourse of noted exiles is the universalization of a particular experience* (hegemony) – a universalization achieved through sanctioned ideological maximization and at the cost of covering over or depreciating exilic experiences that do not accord to the universalized principles of noted exiles in the same era. This discursive effect – that a certain conception of exile becomes hegemonic within a given era and as such tends paradigmatically to frame diverse experiences – seems to have accompanied the very notion of exile every time a noted exile has tried to conceptualize this elusive phenomenon. This fact indeed unveils the key character of noted exiles as they (activists, intellectuals, humanists) succeed, almost by default, in capturing a common historical experience – an experience whose presumed unity can nevertheless only be achieved at the cost of overbearing or wholly excluding an entire array of experiences that do not exactly conform to the presumed principles of their paradigmatic conception.

This discursive difficulty invites us to go beyond the political-historical conceptions of exile, while acknowledging that exile always inevitably remains historically bound and consequent to violent political exclusion. In other words, to uphold the concept of exile in the face of irreducible multiplicity of exilic

experiences, *we must seek out the shared, ahistorical experience in the inevitable historicality of exile*. What is it, we must ask, that enables us to have a shared concept of exile despite our multiple exilic experiences? This question brings us to my first thesis:

Thesis 1: *A unified notion of a given exile, achieved through the paradigmatic discourse of noted exiles, historicizes the phenomenon in relation to certain existing political causes. Yet exile is, first, existentially varied and multiple, and, second, its many experiences reveal a shared human relationship with the sources of the self that are ahistorical and pre-political, although, admittedly, this implicit shared relationship is only brought to the surface when it is subjected to the trauma of exclusion, which is itself always the product of a historical and political act.*

But if the historical unity of exilic experience is only the hegemonic product of noted exiles, then how is it possible to speak of "shared human relationship"? And what is that mysterious "ahistorical and pre-political" source that is revealed through a historical and political trauma? What experience is it that penetrates both the discourse of noted exiles and the silence of minor exiles?

Origins: Shared But Never Unified

If the concept of exile could be exhausted by being causally attributed to a historical moment and a specific exclusionary (and violent) *political decision*, then, it would suffice to *analyze* exile, *stricto senso, politically*. Indeed, no exilic discourse can do away with political context and thus historical specificity. As such, exile always remains as ontic and given as it is sudden and disruptive of the matter-of-factness of one's course of life and one's life project. To this sudden and forced displacement, refugees and exiles awaken in existential shock.

This shock characterizes the mood that reigned over those Iranian refugees like myself who congregated, in an almost compulsive manner, outside the UNHCR office in Ankara in the 1980s. Anxious about their cases, the expiry of their documents, delayed allowances, upcoming interviews, or departure times, they all dreaded the somber prospect of exilic life, despite the promise of a better life in a western country, where they would be cared for with the humanity their homeland had denied them. Why so somber, despite the promise? *Because promise had emerged out of a displacement and thus was not originally deemed as a component of one's existential futurity*. This prospect, stated differently, was not in continuity with one's original life project. I personally witnessed, in myself as well as in many of my fellow refugees, *how acute attunement to exilic displacement and to the rupture in one's life prospects, when associated with a certain public persona, can elevate a refugee to the status of an exile, properly speaking*. It is precisely here that one needs to heed the varied character of exile: *a historically-bound political act violently inflicts the cut in a generation's life course, but it inflicts*

the cut in different places in the life course and projects of different social groups. The experience of this cut, the exilic experience *par excellence*, takes different individuals back to different (now) curtailed life projects in their reflections. As such, exile is a rupture in existential temporality, marked by a trauma that is burned into the exile's memory. This moment of rupture, allots the exile a split memory about how a past life project is cut off from the present one. As such, exilic life remains forever *diremptive*.

In the early 1990s, when the greatest wave of Iranian émigré from different walks of life eventually settled in their host societies, the earlier influence of paradigmatic Leftist exilic discourse gradually began to slacken. Sociologically, the reason is readily explainable: with the diminishing prospect of resuming original life projects in homeland, a new beginning in hostland required new life projects. This in turn necessitated a new, *future-oriented* mind-set, one that the *retrospective* laments of the Left failed to provide. Hence, the rise of various "minor exiles" in the Iranian diaspora, all disillusioned with the political opposition. The emerging organic intellectuals of the younger generation (in their thirties at the time but not exclusively so) began to launch their critiques of the Left and "noted exiles" – critiques that were oftentimes wholesale. I call the new voices "minor exiles" because they refused to put their trust in grand narratives, and were, in fact, quite realistic about their social or political marginality. What is interesting about this situation is that the intellectual abandonment of paradigmatic exile among many Iranians did *not* amount to rejection of exilic perception altogether (in favor of, say, "hybridity"). Rather, the emerging voices sought to initiate paradigms intended to be true to their existence before and after their exile. My depiction of "noted exiles" as opposed to "minor exiles" arises from my own reflections in the early 1990s. The expatriate gay community, women's advocacy groups, non-doctrinal or cultural leftists, to name the main figurations, each launched not only their narratives about what exile had done to them, but more importantly, raised the question *whether their exile had really begun with their forced departure from the beloved homeland*. Interestingly, the proponents of the new, "depoliticized" discourses of exiles soon found themselves accused of heresy as well as weakening the (supposed) united front of exile politics and its agendas. The reason could not be simpler. The minor exiles had disturbed the political dichotomy between "us"/here (the exiles who sheltered justice) and "them"/there (the regime that had caused injustice) that reigned over paradigmatic exile. With the weakening of the Left's paradigmatic notion of exile, the project of seeking out a *unitary* or hegemonic conception of exile steadily slipped into crisis. Now *exile was perceived as a shared experience only insofar as it situated specific individuals or*

social groups in terms of their specific varied relationships to what they regarded as their origins and their home.

A review of this experience leads to several observations. In the Iranian case, some of the defining elements of paradigmatic-political exile in fact contributed to its exhaustion. Here, further elaboration on what I mean by "political exile" is in order. Political exile is based on the premise that exile is brought about when a sovereign (state) seeks to totalize social life, which necessitates the purging of all "undesired elements" – that is, non-conformist or dissident social actors. As such, totalitarian politics imposes political closure upon the diversity of the social. The banishment of political dissidents, then, has indeed its source in a totalizing decision. For various leftists in our Iranian case, this decision means the *suspension of a collective life project*, a generation's project. The paradigmatic exilic discourse, in turn, takes the totalizing efforts of its suppressive opponent (which is the "source" of exile) as a political response to the growing power of the dissidents in representing "the people." The discourse of "anachronism," mentioned above, accordingly contended that Iran's Islamists had recourse to brutal purging of the progressive opposition precisely because of the latter's growing success in articulating a generation's future on a popular scale. And this makes perfect sense. Such a sweeping generalization enables political exile to become paradigmatic. Suddenly, by virtue of a simple assumption and thanks to its rhetorical practices, the political-leftist discourse of exile subsumes all social (and political) diversity under its banner by equating its (now disrupted) political project with an entire generation's life project.

Conceptually, this is achieved by replacing the specific *social relationship* of different groups to their perceived origins with an all-encompassing *political relationship*. Suddenly, banished or self-exiled gender, sexual, ethnic, or religious minorities find themselves amidst a discursive field in which exile is deemed as a disruption in universal-political project and *not* a plurality's shared but distinctive life projects. Collective origins and shared senses of identity could only be upheld insofar as they conformed to a paradigmatic-political conception of exile. Paradigmatic exile, in our case, could only be maintained through ignoring the irreducible diversity of Iranian exiles. As such, it remained more paradigmatic (in the Kuhnian sense) than, *stricto senso*, hegemonic. No wonder that with the maturity of exilic experience and with the emerging organic intellectuals of marginal groups and the minorities, the Left's discourse of exile gradually lost its discursive grip. In a way, the exilic discourses of gays or women were no less political in that they all unhesitatingly identified the regime as the source of their displacement. But minorities also identified the sources of their displacement to be pre-political – that is, ingrained in the social and cultural fabric of Iranian society. The emerging voices of minor exiles held that politics

only aggravated and brutally ratified the exclusionary process that had already begun even before the Islamic regime's rise to power. Hence, the rise of cultural politics and cultural critique amidst these new exilic voices. Hence also the growing notion that *one's exile might have already begun long before one's banishment and one's experience of the exclusion*. Existentially, then, exile does not necessarily arise from geographical displacement, although the latter mercilessly marks it with trauma.

Despite the diversity in specifying the grounds of a given collectivity's exile, all of these perceptions tacitly share a common conception about what it is that characterizes an exilic experience. And we have the emerging voices of minor exiles to thank for it, voices that (also) transformed refugees into exiles. They refused to allow their varied experiences to be fitted with the political referentiality that paradigmatic exile accorded to exilic experience, and they did so with much audacity in the face of accusatory fingers pointed at them for breaking away from the (assumed) exilic "united front" against the regime. Attending to a *shared experience* of exile does not require so much special insight as it takes shedding simplistic views of causality. Regardless of the force one identifies as the source of one's displacement, exile inflicts its cuts through the disruption of one's life project, and thereby in one's relationship with one's perceived origins. That is why I argue that *exile is shared but never unified: we share the sense of loss of origins without sharing origins themselves*. While one's sense of loss is shared in exile, origins remain irreducibly diverse, and *ergo*, the notions of exile forever varied.

Thesis 2: *Exile is the condition of forced distance from one's perceived origins and banishment from one's perceived home. In exile, one is barred from completing the life project presumed to have begun from one's origins. As such, remaining true to one's perceived original self becomes impossible after the experience of rupture. Exilic experience is the bitter experience of the cut inflicted upon one's original course of life and the continuity of one's life projects and potentials at home. While this experience of loss of origins remains ontological and existential, it is always (re-)enacted by ontic and political forces. Exile is therefore the perpetual return to the primal scene of violent removal from one's home.*

The above theses call for further reflections on continuity and rupture, to which we should turn now.

Diremption, Redemption

In unifying a historical experience, the discourse of noted exiles inevitably imports *certain tacit* ideas into the seemingly matter-of-factness of exile. If exile is a political decision that causes the forced displacement of individuals and groups, and if such displacement is deemed, in paradigmatic exile, as the

consequence of the clash of historical forces (progressive and reactionary, vivid in the Iranian case), then the exile of dissidents is not only an attempt at purging the unwanted and disturbing elements from the sovereign's territory, but also, symbolically, the exclusion of the *a generation's horizon of justice* which dissidents, now exiles, represent. *By virtue of displacement*, *ergo*, *exile denotes*, *loss of justice*. It is the task of exiles to shelter justice, keeping it alive for its historical homecoming. *There is no experience of exile that does not somehow incite a cry for justice* that is so clearly implicit in the existential cut from which every exile suffers. In other words, one's primordial relationship to the place one regards home must be humanity's tacit knowledge and humanity's common sentiment, such that one's banishment from home would reach deep in the souls of all those with ears open to others' plights. *The exilic cry for justice*, *I surmise*, *dwells in such a universal awareness*.

Equating exile with injustice thus leads to an overdetermination of the glorified moment of *homecoming*. Indeed, the homecoming of exiles now attains a metonymic significance. It is not just the exiled individuals or groups that return in that glorified and (usually) long-awaited moment; rather, their homecoming signifies the return of justice to homeland. Exilic life is the life endured only with the remedial dream of return. Only a homecoming that shelters the dignity of the exiles, a homecoming that redeems their departure, however forced, and their persistent endurance of the diremptive cut, can end exile. *Only a historical redemption can overcome the diremptive trauma of exilic existence*.

This adds a second dimension to the earlier observed articulation of paradigmatic exile as a unified historical experience. The paradigmatic discourse strives for *maintaining continuity with the exiles' origin(s) and past(s)*. As noted earlier, exile inflicts a traumatic cut upon the émigrés' memories. The paradigmatic discourse can be interpreted as an attempt to overcome the trauma by stressing the connections to one's homeland. Perceived continuity with one's home and origins often spontaneously takes the form of nostalgic laments. Paradigmatic exile turns lament into a political continuity by emphasis, quite justly, on the injustice of forced expulsion from homes. Nostalgia, however, remains socially and politically ineffectual. Only continuity can maintain, at least in theory, unity within the exilic community and succeed in transmuting the experience of a collectivity into a historical and hegemonic one.

Two assumptions make the paradigmatic discourse operational: first, a dichotomous notion of politics (in our case, progressive and reactionary forces; the irreconcilable "us" and "them") is deemed to be more fundamental than other supposed grounds of exclusion. Thus, the banishment of religious or ethnic or gender or sexual minorities, with their specific origins, is explained in terms of their inescapably political character. Second, the above political dichotomy

privileges an essentially political experience over other experiences, assuming the former to condition the latter. The paradigmatic articulation of exile creates a historical frame of reference, which by endlessly proclaiming the injustice of banishment perpetuates hope for the moment of return as the historical moment of redemption of exiles. *Redemption* is related to the supposedly uninterrupted presence of excluded political actors in the history of the homeland. Political exiles wish to remain a significant part of the history of a homeland from which they have been excluded. And redemptive return reassures them of their continuity and relevance in their homeland's history. If totalitarian closure renders acting and being in accordance with one's origins impossible, then the political opening that makes the return of exiles possible provides redemption for those origins that have been banished from social participation. But what in fact makes the aforementioned assumptions of political notion of exiles at all plausible is nothing but the basic characteristic of origins as shared and thus overlapping, relatable, and communicable. Yet paradigmatic exile departs from this tacit shared notion of origins to make a case for exilic experience as politically unified.

At this juncture a curious situation in the case of Iranian exodus is illuminating. Following the 1997 presidential election, the triumphant reformist President Mohammad Khatami launched cautious efforts to introduce openness to Iranian social and political life. With regards to Iranians abroad, the slogan "Iran for all Iranians" along with relaxed legal procedures – especially the less rigid procedure for issuing passports for expatriates without proper documentation – aimed at encouraging the return of expatriates, in whose expertise and capital the government had seen great opportunities. During the eight years of reformist government, thousands of expatriates and exiles returned to their homeland, mostly to visit and stay in touch. Those who used this opportunity to return were naturally of lesser status, as the noted exiles still treated the invitation with suspicion and publicly announced their refusal to return. A few prominent exiled intellectuals who visited Iran after many years indeed reported, upon return, great changes in the social life of their homeland. One can observe that the refusal of noted exiles to return stems from their redemptive impulse. A return of this kind would not inaugurate the return of justice as embodied in exiles. *For paradigmatic exile the return cannot but be redemptive*. As such, many noted exiles decided to uphold their perceived flag of "authentic exilic experience" in the face of an "inauthentic return." Indeed, equating the (return of) "professional exiles" (Simic 1999: 129) with the (return of) justice shows how frozen in time paradigmatic exile inevitably becomes. It is no longer able to account for the changing dynamics of the society that the exiles

had left years ago. *The course of the homeland's history changes precisely at the time of exiles' banishment.*

In December 2001, the Iranian Writers' Association (in Exile) went so far as writing an open letter to Edward Said and Jacques Derrida, who were invited by their Iranian colleagues to deliver public lectures, pleading that they should not lend credit to the Islamic regime, as though their trip would amount to that (Iranian Writers' Association [in Exile] 2001). As it happened, Said and Derrida did not go: Said was ailing at the time and Derrida was apparently committed elsewhere. But prominent scholars like Paul Ricoeur and Jürgen Habermas who did travel to Iran returned to confirm that their visit had nothing to do with any secret agendas and that they had witnessed a vibrant society intent upon outwitting and outliving its autocratic rulers in every respect (see Habermas 2002). Celebrity American actor and activist Sean Penn who traveled to Iran during the 2005 presidential election (which tolled the death knell of the legalist reform movement) published a 5-part report in the *San Francisco Chronicle* that confirmed the Iranian society as highly dynamic, a society impatiently awaiting the imminent moment of bursting out of its imposed theocratic skin with vivifying quest for the new (See Penn 2005).

For a discourse politically fixed at the existential moment of banishment and for a mindset that relives such tragic and diremptive moment time and again and can only overcome its trauma by an existentially soothing redemptive return, the above accounts must present conciliatory fables that undermine the homecoming of justice, as personified by the exiles, who by virtue of this metonymic significance, would receive their existential justice as well. But these accounts indicate that the exiles' dreamed-of return to homeland cannot be the return to the *existentially* frozen moment of their banishment. As such, paradigmatic exile relies heavily on the discursive intervention of the noted exiles *to perpetuate that moment as a historical and universal moment of injustice*. Exile is one generation's plea for justice, but a plea that can hardly move beyond the generation's intellectual lifespan unless it grows into a mythical representation of the "will to justice." The actual articulation of the will itself, though, remains generational. And, as concerns one's origins, *one can never return to the origins as such*, the home one had left. For, in the absence of the exiles, the places of origins they had left now house new actors with new life projects. Upon departure, in other words, origins begin to lose their homelike character. This brings us to our next thesis.

Thesis 3: *The inevitable diremptive experience of exile, itself enlivened by a quest for justice under the conditions in which one is forcibly removed from one's original relationship to one's home, eclipses the changing conditions of origins in the dichotomous political view of paradigmatic exile. The redemptive return of the exiles, as*

the privileged bearers of the wounds of lost justice, is thus impossible. The diremption, the cut, is decisive, and in time, as one's exile is protracted, it does away with the initial redemptive impulse that perceives the exiles' return as a return of justice to homeland.

But would the loss of redemptive return in exilic perspective diminish the effect of forced and painful diremption on the exilic life that has directly defined, and continues to define, the lives of many, including the author of these lines? Will such loss necessarily amount to an un-utopian celebration of hybridity? We still need a final engagement with the issue.

Releasing/Released Origins

In historicizing a shared experience, the paradigmatic discourse of exile tends to construct isolationist and puritan images of exiles both in political and existential ways. I call such images isolationist and puritan because the experience of banishment from one's perceived life project, a project that connects one to one's perceived origins (i.e., home), is isolated in the moment at which a bifurcated notion of politics as a pure division between "us" and "them" connects the loss of home and original life project to a specific political adversary in causal terms.

This is precisely the condition of emergence of Iranian émigré communities. Aside from a small segment, Iranian refugees, exiles, and immigrants trace their migration back to the repressive measures (political, social, religious, etc.) of the regime. Having their uprootedness in the political edifice of the country, however, Iranian émigrés soon scattered and proliferated in the process of forming communities. Through diaspora community formation of exiles and émigrés something interesting happened. While the future political exiles were still entangled in power struggles in the early 1980s, the country's monarchists, capitalists, entertainers, as well as liberal minded intellectuals, who had shrewdly envisaged the disastrous implications of the forthcoming theocracy, were in the process of settling abroad, forming inadvertently the largest Iranian diaspora community in Los Angeles, California. Soon, the Iranian community in the Californian liberal milieu became the epicenter of expatriate Iranians. With the influx of the leftist émigrés, the contrasts began to grow: while ascetic leftists perpetually struggled to maintain their sectarian organizations, parochial publications, and dogmatic squabbles, the entrepreneurial minds of monarchists, capitalists, and entertainers found goldmines in broadcasting radio and television programs. While the ideological puritanism of the Left did not allow it to view exile from a cultural point of view, Los Angeles-based Iranian media used culture and entertainment as their mainstay. As both the country and the émigrés communities moved away from the dark 1980s, the phenomenon of the Los Angeles media came to accentuate a distinctive mode of exilic opposition to

the Islamic regime, a *political opposition* with flamboyant cultural appeal instead of monotonous political jargon. Viewed from the viewpoint of prolific and far-reaching Iranian media in Los Angeles, the phenomenon of exile was subjected to major modifications. Hamid Naficy has cogently shown how different, even conflicting, notions of exile arose in this process (1993, 1998). The rise of exiled popular media bypassed the referential exile of the paradigmatic discourse *without* challenging the latter. This is important. Expanding satellite technology only boosted popularity of the expatriate media, as endless patrons of satellite television and radio, in a country where owning a satellite is illegal, ridicule their rulers by showing off satellite dishes on their rooftops and tuning to their favorite and often politically fiery programs day and night.

Popular Iranian media in Los Angeles redefined the whole experience of exile in a number of ways. They remained, for the most part, *acutely political*; they launched aggressive and insulting assaults on the traditional components of Iranian culture (Islam included); they furnished their compatriots in the country with endless barrage of pop culture (an exiled cultural component); and last but not least, they remained vividly nostalgic. Iranian media in Los Angeles in fact emerged as a shelter for the extravagant, flamboyant, and hedonistic aspects of Iranian culture that were excluded from the public life in post-revolutionary Iran. In other words, just as the paradigmatic exile tried to represent the excluded social and political ideals, so did the expatriate Iranian media aim at representing those cultural components of Iranian life that were "exiled" by the regime. Foreign-based satellite media kept broadcasting these components back into the country. The combination of cultural and political elements led to the propagation of a concept of exile that is metonymic, elliptic, and ideologically diluted. In conjoining exile with pop culture, the expatriate satellite media successfully tapped into the greatest stream for connecting to the younger generation in a country where 70% of the population is under 30 years of age. As such, their political messages rode on the stream of culture and entertainment. In our time, it has become possible to conflate the political origins of exile with cultural aspects. Thus, the political referentiality of exile finds myriad expressions.

With the prevalence of the Internet in the past few years, the notion of "banishment" has become problematic. While the paradigmatic political exiles did not really fare well with respect to satellite media, they championed the use of the Internet in connecting with the country. Iranian youth are keen web-browsers and Iran ranks fourth in the world in terms of the number of web-loggers. Nowadays, downloading dissident publications off the Net and participating in Paltalk virtual political conferences is within any keen Iranian's reach, despite futile government filtering. The leftist opposition based in Europe

has exploited the Internet effectively, as have exiled women and gay networks. Such cases perhaps tell us much about the conditions of exilic life in our time when, unlike much of the twentieth century, mass communications place exiles potentially in much closer contact with their homeland than even the forces that caused their exile. But like olden times, exiles are still the unenviable custodians of those unique aspects of life (political, intellectual or cultural) that are banished from their homeland. In our time of mass communication, by perpetually broadcasting and communicating the banished fragments of social life across feeble political borders, *exiles in fact play the role of origins*, the context of life plans, however intermittently, *for their exiled compatriots at home*. *Origins and exile change role* from time to time, oscillating between homeland and Outlandia.

These observations amount to showing that exile no longer pertains to a sheer removal from the homeland. Back to my earlier point, exile is now more about abruptly terminated life projects with a painful and shocking diremption that scars an exile's memory forever, despite the fact of new life projects that inevitably arise with such prolonged periods of exile as the Iranians have experienced. The above observations also illustrate something of an uneasy contrast: the exile communities in Europe have remained more vividly political than their counterparts in North America. The reason is sociological. The structural impediments to social integration in host societies like France and Germany, which are the bases of Iranian political opposition, intensify the exilic distance and one's feeling for the homeland because such societies systematically hinder, to varying degrees, the launching of a new life project by exiles. On the contrary, the presence of such integration, however aggrandized and ideological (as in the United States), produces a slackened connection to homeland. The prospect of integration, of finding a new "home" however "unoriginal," cannot diminish the pain of diremption and the longing for one's home, but it can disclose the possibility of new life projects and participating in the hostland's futurity. Should one long for home, however, the very knowledge and the pain of loss of one's origins always remain available to memory, just to hinder one from feeling at home in Outlandia.

Amidst all these vicissitudes, then, exile as such persists. My discussion comes full circle: a unified conception of exile is achieved by virtue of politicizing and historicizing a certain experience. The ontic and historical events that force one into exile only unleash one's ontological and ahistorical relationship to one's origins. Looking beyond their original life projects in their homeland and engaging in new projects, exiles separate diremptive existence from their vying for a redemptive return.

In embarking on new life project(s), one lets go of the original one(s). The exilic exclusion from origins inexorably amounts to a certain abandonment of origins.

Deprived of living their original life projects at home, the exiles attempt to somehow relive those projects here, where such reliving becomes implausible. *In letting go of our origins*, *however partially*, *our origins release us as well*. Thus, redemption is lost and exile becomes interminable, forever, with an incurably existential reference to a *conditioning*, *original*, *and yet unconfining*, *place and time* separated from the exiles through the trauma of banishment.

Thesis 4: *Exile reveals that banishment is also inevitably abandonment and that the exiles' origins let go of them since by virtue of expulsion they have stepped out of the ambit of their original life projects. As such, exile manifests itself in the vicissitudes through which an exilic memory is linked to home and only thus does it persist. Since exilic existence is permanently scarred by the (diremptive) trauma of banishment, the perceived (redemptive) return to origins does not end exile.*

With every historical experience, we see a new face of exile, yet something about exile never changes. We now need to revisit the initial question of this inquiry.

Exile: A Condition of Our Humanity?

Let me return to the inexhaustible question that motivated these reflections. Exile is never unified but shared as an experience. While every exilic experience stems from a violent, and historically specific political decision, no experience of exile can be reduced to its political meaning. Exiles represent the loss of justice, but the loss itself does not render their dreamed-of return redemptive. The diremptive experience of exile, intensely felt in terms of displacement of original life project(s), indicates that in reorienting one's life project in Outlandia, origins themselves let go of the exiles.

But do these theses, in the face of an older discourse of European exile, weaken the very concept of exile in favor of a happy postmodern celebration of hybridity? I think I have already indicated a negative answer. Exilic experience is, almost by definition, a refutation of hybridity, because it remains forever bound by a home where the exile's original life project(s) took shape. The origins, as argued, "let go" of exiles in that they allow redirecting life projects, but precisely because of the receding of origins in the course of exile, they become the inescapable context of one's life due to the diremptive experience of banishment. In time, to quote G. W. Sebald, diremption "makes me feel that I am a long way away, though I never quite know from where" (Sebald 1996: 89). The revitalization of the original life projects, best captured in the concept of redemptive return, therefore becomes impossible, although insofar as exile remains inevitably political, such return partially conditions every exile's dream. Exilic life moves toward a much-coveted and ever receding utopia that does not

allow for any happy and quick settlement for postmodern hybridism here and now. And this is precisely why, to repeat a reflection on my experience, *exile is strangely always an accomplishment of sorts*.

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Exile and Return: Forever Winter

David Kettler

ABSTRACT

This is a study of the vicissitudes of the leftist (notably Communist and pro-Communist) construction of anti-Fascism as the meaning of both exile and return from Nazi camps after the Second World War. The primary documents are two films made in the Netherlands, both oriented on their face to the psychological damage inflicted by the camps. Drawing on recent historical scholarship of the reception of returnees in the Netherlands, it reconsiders the relationships between the "anti-Fascist" and "traumatic" renderings of this exile and return. The surprising conclusion is that the films can better be understood as bids in the meta-bargaining for recognition of the anti-Fascist exile-and-return than as a total displacement of this design; and this resolution of what appears on its face as a very hard case will be taken to reinforce a larger theoretical perspective, according to which exile and return are invariably constituted by modes of power-and-resistance, whether in the form of hegemonic imposition or negotiated provisional settlements, which are produced, sustained, and modified by diverse political forms of meta-bargaining.

We could not unload our stories.

Geert Mak (1999: 369)

How do you cross-examine a film?

Lawrence Douglas (2001: 227)

But "Sachso" … was the great center of international solidarity and resistance against the SS, the defiance of their oppressors by the men in "zebra."

Amicale Oranienburg-Sachsenhausen[93]

[93] Advertisement for the book *Sachso*, collectively authored by the *Amicale des déportés et familles du camp de concentration d'Oranienburg-Sachsenhausen et sus kommandos* (1982/1995).

To the extent that exile is transmuted into a metaphor for a spiritually exalted, synchronic, emancipated, limitless, and creative state of estrangement from quotidian concerns, the concept of exile effectively ceases to pose several of the most persistent and difficult questions confronting exile as encountered in historical studies of actors banished from their native scenes of action. First are precisely the everyday concerns of asylum, livelihood, and isolation that engross all but the most privileged exiles. Second is the practical relation to the play of power and resistance that shaped their past and shapes their prospects. Third is the disrupted and unfinished business with those they are compelled leave behind, friends or foes, as well as the effort to negotiate new enterprises with their fellows and their hosts. Fourth, are the diverse and often alternating emotional stresses of rage, shame, confusion, and defiant missionary aspiration, under conditions of disorientation and uncertain recognition. Fifth, and often encompassing the others, is the consuming question of return, which is often understood as a necessary moment in the concept of exile, with the time of exile being charged with anticipation of return and the moment of return being correspondingly imbued with the remembrance of exile. On that reading, Exile and return are interdependent and even co-present.[94]

Yet against the contention that the metaphorical use impoverishes the terms of cultural or political discourse, it may be argued that the ascendancy of the metaphorical sense of exile is grounded in the ever greater elusiveness of return during the past century, as the binary opposition between exile and home has lost its meaning. The novel social regimes under which the displaced find themselves in politically generated exiles corresponding to the classical Ciceronian model (Kettler 2004), the rapid reclasssifications of social identities – which may appear as an opportunity in the case of reception in comparatively open cosmopolitan scientific or cultural elites or as a sentencing in the case of relegation to the swarm of bureaucratically administered refugees – may rapidly drain myths of return of their emotional or political relevance. The sense of redemptive mission which has often represented the prospect of return in the history of exiles appears to lose coherence or point. Corresponding to these rapid changes in the conditions of political exile are the swift and fundamental structural changes that typically accompany the transformations that open the way to "return," as the localized polities, societies, and cultures are incorporated in wider contexts of

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<http://www.gallimardmontreal.com/gallim/site/livre...>

94 The conjunction is well developed for the paradigm Western case in Neusner (1972). On the difference between the Jewish and Christian versions of the figure, see Yuval (2006). The spiritual hypostatization of the dis/location and the corresponding shift of "return" to a dimension beyond space and time is the historic distinguishing mark of the Christian rendition, notwithstanding the Jewish re-orientation to other aspects of the Christian transmutation of the exile paradigm.

power and meaning and as the politics of memory are subjected to control by agencies and technologies unknown to earlier times. Under all of these conditions, it might be reasonably contended that the political-cultural formation of exile-and-return in the familiar historical sense had become an anachronism, and that the sense of exile generally characterized as metaphorical in fact refers to the historical reconfiguration of an increasingly obsolete design. Whether that new formation may properly be called exile would then appear as a rhetorical question, and not as an issue directly relevant to cultural or political understanding.

Although the suggestion that the political sense of exile has become obsolete has gained special prominence in relation to dis/locations affecting non-Europeans in an era of post-colonialism, the problematic character of return is already evident in the case of the best-studied exile of the twentieth century, the removal of millions from the nations of National Socialist Europe. The overwhelming majority of Jewish emigrants and survivors from Germany rejected all thought of their native land as a place of return. They became emigrants and settlers, with no more than a nostalgic link. Among the exiled members of the cultural and intellectual elite, Jewish and non-Jewish alike, for whom the attractions of return might have been be heightened by the German habitus of their mental capital, a substantial proportion found an alternative in the open structures of international science or cosmopolitan cultural institutions. Yet there were degrees of estrangement, and another portion of the exiles certainly sought to make good the meaning of their years of banishment by a partial or complete return. The vicissitudes of that cohort especially test the limits of the complex of exile-and-return.

A key term in these stories is recognition, with a twofold application. First is whether the returnees recognize their geographical homecoming as a return from their exile, in terms meaningfully related to their understanding of the period of enforced absence, and with the claims and satisfactions that this implies. If political exile entails the disruption of some ongoing, arguably political business by acts of force, the question is whether that unfinished business is still recognizably present or possible. Second, and perhaps more fundamental, is whether they receive recognition as returned exiles (Mooij 2002;Withuis 2002). Such acts of recognition – like their withholding – are eminently political actions, and failures of recognition may be thought cumulatively to undermine the political meaning of exile. The failure to achieve a return that vindicated exile as meaningful was a recurrent feature of the post-Nazi period, but my thesis is that this was not because exile in the political sense has somehow lost its meaning due to an epochal historical change in the conditions constitutive of the concept, but much more mundanely because an important segment of this exile was defeated in the politics of memory and meaning. This applies above all to what can be called the anti-Fascist exile, a denomination appropriated by and largely conceded

during the 1930s to the adherents of the political Left. Their exile was retrospectively disvalued and denied (Kettler 2006).

One of the anthems of the anti-Fascist Popular Front era in the mid-1930s was called "The Peatbog Soldiers," in honor of the political concentration camp inmates whose forced labor typically took the form of digging – in peat or in gravel or in sand, depending on the location of the camp. The song was also so well established in the camps themselves that the man-drawn carts in Dachau, where there was no peat, were called the "peat express." (Neurath 2005: 173–85) In the first two verses the collective voice describes the harshness of their condition, but in march tempo, however shuffling, and with the insistent refrain that they are soldiers on active service. The third verse, more militant and optimistic, avows that the song is no lamentation, however, since "winter cannot last forever." One day, the singers are certain, they will joyfully proclaim, "Homeland, you are mine once more." A complete rendition of all the verses of "The Peat-Bog Soldiers," demonstratively disrupting the scripted continuity, is a decisive feature of a Dutch documentary film by Louis van Gasteren, which will serve here as an approach to the unresolved dis/location of western European anti-Fascist returnees from National Socialist concentration camps, activists who had been exiled from their occupied native lands.[95]

The question may be raised whether this class of returnees should be classed as "exiles," rather than "survivors." Adding an edge to this question is the paradoxical fact that the only context in which individuals held in Germany during the Occupation were actually called "exiles," as far as appears from Pieter Lagrou's (2000) meticulous recent study of the Dutch, Belgian, and French cases, was first defined by Vichy France, where the authorities applied the term not to concentration camp inmates but to prisoners of war as well as to both voluntary and involuntary laborers in

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[95] *De Prijs van Overleven* [*The Price of Survival*] (Amsterdam: Spectrum Film, 2003), directed by Louis van Gasteren. The film is a sequel to *Begrijpt u nu waarom ik huil?* [*Do you understand now why I am crying?*] (1969). The "Peatbog Soldiers" ["*Das Lied der Moor Soldaten*"] is the second of the two songs inserted at full length into the sound track. The first, near the very beginning, is "Address to a Newborn Child," a song by Hans Eisler, which shares the provenance, pathos, and final defiance of the other: "Conquer the place you deserve/ Take it by storm." In a round-table on the film at Bard College on November 9, 2005, several of the participating scholars complained about the seemingly unmotivated disruptive effect of these songs, and these observations were among the many valuable contributions to my reading of the film arising from this discussion. (Available on DVD on site at the Olin Language Lab, Bard College). In private correspondence, Van Gasteren underlined his own understanding of the "Peatbog Soldiers": "The 'Song of the Moorsoldaten' was a known and common reality for the Dutch communists as those moor camps were just over the Dutch frontier. In 1934/35 I knew this song by heart as my mother Elise Menage Challa sang it at communist meetings."

Germany. Pétain's rationale is worth recording here, since, ironically, it represents an application of the "spiritualized" version of the concept, in a "mystical" form of the Christian idea of exile:

> [T]he hardships of captivity came to symbolize the theme of national redemption through sacrifice. The asceticism of prison life, separation and forced celibacy, rudimentary meals, manual work and male comradeship were idealized in pseudo-religious terms…. A whole generation of young French men was physically purged of the weaknesses, temptations and perversions of pre-war France, which Vichy denounced so vehemently as the causes of defeat, and thus prepared for the rebirth of a nation built on moral austerity and spartan discipline. (Lagrou 2000: 107)

Although De Gaulle's prime counter model was the generic category of the "deportee," the Vichy word use evidently influenced the terms of discourse in France, at least to some extent, especially in view of the residual availability of the old Republican myth, as exemplified by the brief and demonstrative exile of Victor Hugo during the last years of Louis Napoleon. More important than the actual language used at the time, however, are the correspondences between the characteristics of the returned we are considering and the criteria of the political concept of exile. We are talking about individuals active in the political sphere, who were expelled from their place of activity and relocated by force, on grounds unrelated to criteria or procedures of justice, and who remained oriented to the scene from which they were expelled.[96] It matters, of course, that they were harshly confined rather than being granted asylum, yet the internment did not preclude the social constitution of an exile experience or consciousness.

In van Gasteren's film, however, as the title suggests, the central figure is presented as a "survivor," a case for treatment, and the concentration camp appears not as a theater of solidaristic struggle, but as utter trauma, a breeding ground of psychopathologies, including obsessive fixations on the place of suffering and on the fellow-victims, living and dead. The documentation, in fact, mostly concerns the imposition of the lasting malign effects on the returnee's family – two adult sons, a daughter, and a wife – as testified to in the immediate aftermath of his death. In written testimony from the son and daughter who refuse to take part because they have broken with the family, and in extensive interviews with the youngest son, his wife, and the widow, the film tells a story of deep hurt.

Jan (Joop) Telling, a newly married, educated, clerical worker of 22, was arrested by the German security services in February, 1941, for circulating a crude leaflet urging fellow office-workers to join the short-lived political strike initiated by Amsterdam dockworkers and organized by the

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[96] Kettler (2004) proposes three attributes of exile: *status activus*, political justice, and the subjective/objective conditions of life as émigré.

underground Communist Party,[97] and, after a short prison term, he was held for the rest of the war in "preventive detention" in concentration camps in Germany, mostly in Sachsenhausen near Berlin, until liberated by the Russian army on April 30, 1945. According to the converging testimony of his family members, he spent the 57 years of his return preoccupied solely with this experience, which he saw as a collective one, shared and periodically renewed with the comrades from the camp and brought into the everyday life of his household as well; and this obsession, as it seems to them, he imposed not only on his wife but also on his children. His youngest son says:

> How did the family work? It didn't. You have to realize that we had no room for a family. There was a father and his life had plenty of room for solidarity with fallen comrades, living comrades, solidarity with the Third World, other struggling peoples. For us there was … I don't know about solidarity, but there was no love.[98]

The adult children tell of having their own interests and concerns overwhelmed by the need to defer to the constantly recalled past sufferings of the father, by fear of his determination to have them all dead rather than suffer again, and by the mother's collaboration in that repressive regime. The mother, Dina, expresses her deep regret at helping to inflict Jan's distorted order on her children, while admitting that her efforts to line up with him

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[97] The Amsterdam strike of February 25 was evidently precipitated by the first impressment of workers for service in Germany, as well as by the blatant anti-Jewish raids carried on in working-class Jewish neighborhoods in the center of town by the military formations of the Dutch National Socialist Movement. Among the seven slogans in the original Communist call to action, three refer to defense of Jews, although the campaign overall was directed against the power of the Dutch NSB. There were no anti-German slogans as such, in keeping with Communist policy during the time of the Hitler-Stalin Pact.
<http://www.superspike.scep.nl/verzet/februaristaking/73html>

In the film, Jan Telling's son reports his disillusionment with his father's claims to have been active in the "resistance" after seeing a copy of the strike leaflet he had distributed. Years later, he still sounds almost contemptuous: "As a child, my reaction to that was ... Well, the heroism ... (he laughs) I had another idea of resistance ... That should be more.... Just for handing out a leaflet. Heroic. A miserable folder. It cost him 4 years of his life and a lot more. No armed resistance, just a leaflet."([Gasteren, van] 2003: 6) Correspondingly, in the film made of Telling's LSD therapy in 1969, Telling says that the only time he ever broke down in tears prior to the erruption of the symptoms for which he was then being treated was "when my oldest son appeared unable to understand the reasons for the February strike." (cit. in Milikowski 1973: 93)

[98] [Gasteren, van] 2003: 8. The translation from the Dutch is by the producers. The term used in Dutch is "*Solidariteit*," which is, as in English, almost exclusively a term in the vocabulary of left-wing movements, derived from French political usage. The Dutch word for family, "*gezin*," is normatively highly charged.

were ultimately frustrated by the impenetrable enclosure within which he and his comrades lived. Like her children, at various times, the eighty-year-old woman reports, she is now receiving psychotherapeutic treatment at the special treatment facility, *Centrum '45*, first established in 1971, at least in part as a result of van Gesteren's 1969 film on Jan Telling's obsessions, *Begrijpt U nu waroom ik huil* [Now do you get why I am crying?],[99] which recorded Tellings's treatment by a unconventional psychiatrist, the foremost experimenter with LSD as therapeutic tool.[100] Intercut excerpts from the earlier film, in black and white, convey a sense of the unsmiling, defeated man and the glowering domesticity of the household, although the frank responsiveness of Dina in some of those earlier segments casts doubt on her later self-characterization, not to speak of the youngest son's judgment that she had abandoned her own life to her husband. Near the end of the film, a weeping Dina honors Jan's request to scatter his ashes on the site of his harshest duty during his years in Sachsenhausen:

> You always wanted to come back to your buddies, your comrades. You never freed yourself from this terrible place. Now I shall scatter your ashes here. Then you can be with your buddies. You always asked why did they have to stay while you could come home…. I hope you now find peace. Bye Jan. ([Gasteren, van] 2003: 23)

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[99] The foundation was originally called "Foundation Post-Concentration Camp Syndrome," but the therapeutic facility was established two years later as "*Centrum '45*." According to the film, Jan Telling was an honored guest at the opening in 1973 with Prince Bernard, the royal consort ([Gasteren, van] 2003: 23), all the more striking since Telling was an officer of a leftist organization, whose members' claims for recognition had been categorically rejected by public authorities since the war. In tracing the history, the website of *Centrum '45* speaks of the neglected needs of such "war victims" as "survivors from the resistance, as well as from concentration and internment camps, and Jews who had gone underground," indicating that Dutch returnees from Japanese internment in Indonesia were eventually included. There is an interesting contrast between two characterizations of the Center, side by side on the web page. One lists "victims of persecution" alongside victims of war and violence, while the other replaces the first of these categories with "members of the resistance." <http://www.centrum45.nl/ukdef1.htm> This ambivalence about recognizing anything but "victims" is important. See Withuis 2002, 2005; cp. Milikowski 1973: 87–122, and see discussion below.

[100] Dr. Jan Bastiaans, a psychiatrist at the University of Leiden who had been trained in Freudian psychoanalysis, adapted the term "Concentration Camp Syndrome" from Danish researchers and continued to rely on LSD long after the technique was discredited by the profession, not least on grounds of the political meaning it acquired after the rise of Provo and similar counter-cultural movements in 1966: "In his psychiatric practice … Bastiaans would identify himself with the problems of the former members of the Resistance. Like them, he regarded himself as an idealistic fighter." (Snelders & Kaplan 2002: 229). See also Snelders (2000: 161–210), Ploeg, van der (2000), Enning (2001).

Jan's comrades appear in the film mostly in a shuffling procession at a concentration camp reunion and in perfunctory encounters on this occasion with Dina after his death. The professor charged with balancing the commemoration of the Nazi era with the interest in memorializing Soviet and DDR uses of the site in the immediate post-war years speaks of the survivors in the language of Primo Levi, albeit in a remarkably soothing voice, as somehow metaphysically imprinted by this encounter with evil inflicted by their own kind and forever implicated in that extreme situation, a philosophical rather than psychiatric rendition of the conception of the camp as trauma.

The question subtly posed by the film, notwithstanding its provenance and its use, like its predecessor, as instructional film for clinicians and educational film for students, is about a different level of meaning attached to the camp experience by Joop Telling and his "comrades," the paradigm implied by the "peat bog soldiers" and programmatically expressed in the "*Amicale Sachsenhausen*" and similar political associations of returnees, initially under Communist or other Leftist leadership. Above all, the complexity of the film's meaning is signaled by the very fact of its being offered as a sequel to the earlier widely circulated and televised film, with its implicit promise about the therapy that it seeks to document. Joop Telling was manifestly not redeemed.

While the family members, especially the children, speak only of the oppression they suffered as a result of the father's insistence on having his camp experiences frame every conversation or event in the home, they also communicate their utter incomprehension – or blunt rejection – of the political stakes in the father's desperate efforts to recruit them for a battle they do not recognize.[101] The bright light on the psychological family drama, epitomized by the daughter's facile equation of her father with those who held him in alien subjection, with herself as his victim, also brings into view the deeply disturbing undifferentiated darkness all around. The shapes, designs, or justifications of neither the power nor the resistance in the camps appears to matter.

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[101] In a letter to the author, the film maker, van Gasteren, notes that Telling's children did in fact join their father in some of his political campaigns, in their youth, chalking political slogans and postering in the night. The most graphic illustration of the subsequent generational gap comes in a sequence in which the daughter-in-law fondly recalls her own father's joking manner when he noticed that the Telling home address also served the "We won't take it again Foundation." "We won't take it?" she remembered him saying, with a laugh, "What on earth would they want to take?" This sequence follows immediately after the performance of the "Peatbog Soldiers," which accompanies films of the 2001 Sachsenhausen Reunion, with Dina Telling crying in the foreground. ([Gasteren, van] 2003: 13–15). "We won't take it again Foundation" was in fact the name of the Communist-led Sachsenhausen *amicale* until the mid-1990s (Withuis 2005: 299, 324).

Both the prelude and postlude of the film, however, caution against an uncritical acceptance of the testimony of Reinier, the youngest son, and Rudi, the absent daughter. At the opening, the teacher, Reinier, is seen shuffling through the papers of his middle school history students. He reads aloud the rationale offered by two who wrote on "what happened in Auschwitz?" mocking their naive assumption that they could comprehend their subject, when in fact they gauge the things they write by the movies. Van Gasteren then inserts a moment of Rainier talking to his class, explaining that what Mohammed had in common with the Arabs was their "solidarity with the poor." That snippet shadows Rainier's later disparagement of the language of "solidarity." Rudi repeatedly identifies her father with his jailers. Having been quoted earlier as saying that "it was like being in the camp. I was ... a model prisoner," she is given the last word. She charges her parents with refusing responsibility "for raising their children" "Circumstances, others, and Hitler were responsible. That's a theory that sounds so familiar: 'We didn't know.'" She pines for "an apology." There is such a disconnect between the matters at issue and this hyperbolic self-pity that it is hardly possible to avoid reconsidering the surface meaning. Most important in this respect is the figure of Dina, the mother. In Reinier's statements, she is described as someone without a life of her own, and Rudi speaks of her as complicit in the father's destruction of her life. She herself speaks at times in a therapeutic language of guilt and expiation. Yet the stolid but strong character, reminiscent of a Van Gogh portrait, which is enacted on the screen – especially in some remarkable conversations taken from the 1969 film and as she disperses Jan's ashes – contradicts these portrayals. In short, the explanations of self and circumstances offered by the film's protagonists should be taken as documents of the situation, not as authoritative interpretations. The structure of the film invites a more distanced reading of its documentary meaning, and this includes careful inquiry into what is – so to speak – expressly not said, what is hidden in the dark.

Some reviewers, dismayed by the extent to which all the family members appear to deny their own lives, conclude that the film is pervaded by meaningless, self-inflicted death.[102] The present argument is, rather, that the family's pain, as presented, should be understood as the consequence of their implication in an exile that could not end. Joop could not achieve his "return." And this was not only because of mental debilities, although obviously different individuals bring different measures of emotional strength to such extended crises and "concentration camp syndrome" has

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[102] I am indebted here especially to Professor Nancy Leonard, Bard College. See DVD cited at fn. 4. For published reviews, see Jan-Hendrik Wulf, "Film Kommentar," *taz* Berlin local No. 7626, 30.3.2005, p. 25; and Igal Avidan, "Ashes to Ashes," *The Jerusalem Report*, Oct 18, 2004. p. 36

been widely observed elsewhere,[103] but also because he and his comrades were altogether repulsed in their search for "redemption." It is the latter, political dimension that is darkly present in the absences and aporia of van Gasteren's "*The Price of Survival*." The injuries on view are in important measure those of casualties in lost battles. If there is a death to be marked, beyond the mortality of this particular survivor and the apparent lifelessness of his survivors, it may have a wider – although by no means uncontestable – title to be mourned.

We turn then to the larger context of Joop Telling's return and his conversion into a suitable case for treatment. As indicated earlier, this brings us to the vicissitudes of the leftist (notably Communist and pro-Communist) construction of anti-Fascism as the meaning of both exile and return. We shall briefly extrapolate from information given in the film to indicate Telling's connections with this tendency. Then we shall then go outside the film to expand our understanding of the "socio-political setting," drawing especially on the work of Pieter Lagrou (2000).[104] Third, we shall reconsider the relationships between the "anti-Fascist" and "traumatic" renderings of this exile and return. This will permit us to review the yield of the case-study of "*The Price of Survival*" for the study of the "limits of exile." The surprising conclusion will be that Van Gasteren's films can better be understood as bids in the meta-bargaining for recognition of the anti-Fascist exile-and-return than as a total displacement of this design; and this resolution of what appears on its face as a very hard case will be taken to reinforce a larger theoretical perspective, according to which exile and return are invariably constituted by modes of power-and-resistance, whether in the form of hegemonic imposition or negotiated provisional settlements, which are produced, sustained, and modified by diverse political forms of meta-bargaining.

Joop Telling's connections with the Left can be traced throughout the film. The actions that led to his arrest, as noted earlier, were in concert with the Communist-led February strike movement, and the fact that he was put under "preventive detention"[105] in German camps, mostly in Sachsenhausen, after a brief prison sentence in Amsterdam and a transit stop in the camp at Amersvoort, suggests that the Germans did not consider him merely an eager young freelancer, as does his assignment to the high mortality-rate punitive

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[103] See especially abstracts of the pioneering Norwegian and Danish studies of the 1950s in Weisaeth & Eitinger (1991).

[104] Stephen Snelder and Charles Kaplan (2002) juxtapose the examination of "medical sets" and "socio-political settings."

[105] On the "preventative arrest and/or deportation of people suspected of hostile opinions against the occupier and liable to undertake resistance activities in the future" as "political persecution of pre-war anti-fascists and communists for an offence of opinion," see Lagrou 2000: 200–201.

detail in the "*Klinkerwerk*" after his arrival at Sachsenhausen. In this latter emergency, then, he was rescued, as Dina explains in the course of the film, by a Communist, who occupied a key position in the prisoner-run (capo) machinery of job assignments, variously controlled or at least contested by experienced Communist prisoners in almost all of the concentration camps.[106]

Van Gasteren notes, in a letter to the author, "You are correct that Jan's comrades were communists. Jan was arrested because he had his colleagues in the office, where he worked, aroused to strike. His widow says that he had been saved from working any longer in the stone quarry by a communist comrade, Rudi Larsch." Joop and Dina Telling insisted on naming their first-born Rudi, although Dutch law did not allow the use of a man's name for a girl. "The communists were the informal leaders in the camps," van Gasteren continues, "divided the work, decided in fact if a fellow prisoner had to die or to live. Some of them have been in the camps since 1933 and were very well organized."[107] Van Gasteren also confirms the indications in the film about Jan Telling's post-war activities:

> In the camps some prisoners turned from right thinking into left thinking, some prisoners during and after the cold war gave up their belief in communism. The Telling family stuck to their belief, to their religion, after Joop came back. His sons had to justify the absence of their father during the war, his role, and therefore as well the acceptance of the consequences. They went on to the street in the night, to chalk texts of protests, on the pavement. Jan was a very political person, he was secretary of the *Amicale* of the Sachsenhausers and active, going to meetings etc.[108]

The *Amicale des deportés et familles du camp de concentration d'Oranienburg-Sachsenhausen et ses kommandos* was founded by Charles Désirat, an inmate of the camp from 1943 to 1945 and a member of the French Communist Party since 1934.[109] A 1982 publication called *Sachso* credited collectively to the *Amicale* epitomizes the anti-Fascist construction of concentration camp exile:

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[106] This did not mean that the camps were any the less lethal. As training site of SS detachments, Sachsenhausen was an especially hostile place, and the scene of many executions, including members of the Dutch resistance. In May, 1942, 96 members of the Dutch "Ordredienst" were executed at Sachsenhausen, and in the fall of 1943, two young women from the legendary Dutch resistance group C-6, mostly students, were shot there. <http://afvn.nl/2004/pag8_14.htm>

[107] See also Neurath 2005: 141–53.

[108] Louis van Gasteren to David Kettler, December 6, 2005.

[109] <http://www.humanite.presse.fr/journal/2005-02-18/2005-02-18-456942> It should be noted that Pieter Lagrou concludes that western branches of this *Amicale*, perhaps

> Oranienburg-Sachsenhausen is the only concentration camp which the French deportees baptized with a diminuitive: Sachso. We very much hope that the readers of these pages understand why. Sachso confronts Sachsenhausen: it is the human confronting the beast, it is material and moral solidarity against the SS system of annihilating the prisoners. Sachso confronts Sachsenhausen: it is resistance in the face of Nazism, it is life finally stronger than death. (*Amicale* 1982/1995)[110]

It is no wonder that Dina reports about Joop: "When we went to France from time to time, for a week or so then he felt happy." ([Gasteren, van] 2003: 20)[111]

To understand why Joop could not feel "happy" in Amsterdam, it is necessary to know something about the contrast between the Netherlands, on the one hand, and both Belgium and France, on the other, in the reception of concentration camp returnees and other aspects of public policy towards the human legacy of the occupation, including the competing resistance movements, conscripted and "guest" workers returned from Germany, and internally displaced populations. Lagrou writes:

> The reaction of society in France and Belgium to the trauma of Nazi persecution … were broadly similar. In both societies the memories of persecution were central to the experience of the war years. This was so in ts immediacy, at the time of the repatriation, when the return of the 'national martyrs' was celebrated as a supreme moment of both national martyrdom and patriotic triumph. Representation of the extraordinary and extra-territorial suffering in the concentration camps was symbolic for national remembrance as a whole, and the survivors of the camp performed to perfection the role of the national *milieu de memoire*…. The anti-fascist identification of the Nation propagated by a broad left wing, but particularly promoted by the communist parties, implied an innovation in traditional concepts of patriotism, through the integration of previously excluded groups: communists, Jews, immigrants.

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including the Dutch, was not controlled by Communists to the same extent as other such organizations. Yet Désirat was also the head of the International Committee of Oranienburg-Sachsenhausen Camp, until his death in 2005. And Withuis (2005) treats the Dutch Sachsenhausen organization as a typical Communist group.

[110] Passage quoted translated by Bruce Jackson. <http://buffaloreprot.com/2005/020301.jackson.charlesdesirat.html> Jackson notes that the book was [re]published in "Jean Malaraurie's great Terre Humaine ethnography series" in 1995.

[111] This sentence occurs in the context of recalling the general importance of reunions with comrades, and, indeed, of her own exclusion; but the mention of France amid the film clips of Sachsenhausen events stands out.

Lagrou sums up the "altogether different … reaction of Dutch society to the legacy of Nazi persecution" by flatly recording "the absence [in the Netherlands] of inclusive policies inspired by the anti-fascist paradigm in the post-war reception of victims of Nazi persecution." (Lagrou 2000: 241–2).[112]

The explanations for this difference are manifold. In the Netherlands, the returnees from concentration camps were swallowed up in a flood of returnees from labor service and other displaced persons, all conmingled with the large internal population movements in response to the "hunger winter" in the most densely populated North, which the allied forces failed to liberate before the end, as well as the mass evasions of forced labor service in the last year of the war (Cf. Beening 2002). The leftist resistance groups were overshadowed by the strongly monarchist "order service," formed initially of military officers determined to protect against a communist rising at the liberation and throughout dedicated to an order that would place the "Orange atop," and the groups arising out of the strict and right-wing Protestant political party's youth groups. Especially the former of these burgeoned in membership at the very end of the war. Although the Communists gained some 10% of the vote in the first postwar elections, they were excluded from government, even when the conservative government-in-exile was displaced by a national unity government, including the Labor Party. Since the Netherlands had been neutral in the First World War, there were no veterans' organizations to provide an immediate model for activism and lobbying within civil society. The arrangements for granting recognition, pensions, and even commemorative statuary were closely controlled by state agencies or the semi-public agents that were created, under restrictive rules. Throughout, the account cultivated through the dominant politics of memory, was that of a unified and loyal nation under its heroic Queen (and her son-in-law, Prince Bernard, the nominal head of all resistance forces) resisting the occupiers and achieving her restoration.[113] While Belgium elevated "political prisoners" and France focused on "martyrs," Holland recognized only a nation of "heroes." This diminished not only the anti-fascist returnees from

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[112] Withuis differs from Lagrou in highlighting the Communists' responsibility for their exclusion, notably their unquestioning acceptance of Soviet directives to mobilize their authority against West Germany. She maintains as well that Lagrou underestimates the corresponding anti-Communist organizations (Withuis 2005: 425). See below.

[113] To an extent unanalyzed by Lagrou, the effective exclusion of leftists from the official version of the patriotic memory and its institutions was doubtless also furthered by the colonial component of the national recovery. Socially connected individuals returned from internment and prisoner of war camps from the Dutch East Indies, and the postwar years were taken up with two waves of ugly "police actions," as the Dutch government resisted first the emancipation and then the unification of its colony. See Mak (1999).

concentration camps, but also refused all recognition to the surviving Jews, and this from the nation which had known an exceptionally visible Jewish minority in its capital city and which had seen, with the help of its own state apparatus, the murder of 75% of its Jews, as against 40% in Belgium and 25% in France (Withuis 2002, 2005). Without acknowledging anything like the uniqueness later claimed for the genocide against the Jews, the Left nevertheless offered the only model that extended any recognition to those victims and their few survivors in the decades before the acceptance of the Holocaust construct. As Rudy Ann Telling complained about her home, according to her rueful mother, "The only visitors are from concentration camps, or Jews who had lost everyone."[114]

The virtual exclusion of the Left's anti-fascist resistance and imprisonment was institutionalized in the Dutch arrangement of support services for those in need as a result of their contributions to the "national effort." All public aid was channeled through a private agency, the "1940–45 Foundation," whose statute provided for "the care for the moral, spiritual and material needs of persons … who, during the occupation contributed to the internal resistance by deed or attitude, their families or next of kin." The foundation grew out of a confessional charity and retained its procedures and standards. As was widely the case in western Europe before the professionalization of social work at the beginning of the 20th Century, "care" was in the hands of volunteer home visitors, who "guided" the conduct of the recipients. 90 % of the home visitors were drawn from the religious congregations, with Communists wholly excluded after 1950. Financial support, moreover, was calibrated according to social class so that the recipients could "keep their standing," and either "concubinage" or marriage meant the end of a widow's support. As "passive beneficiaries," Lagrou concludes, "the victims of the Resistance were taken in charge."

The Left was not entirely without resources in the politics of memory. The Communist Party was able to organize effective commemorations of the February strike on its tenth anniversary and similar events during the early 1950s, shortly after they were expelled from the membership organization of

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[114] Indicative of the prewar integration of Jews in the lower middle and working classes of Amsterdam, Dina can add, "We ourselves had in-laws who were gassed." And then, implicitly apologizing for her own conduct, "And we said: 'Remember Uncle Ben?' 'Yes, he was gassed in Sobibor.' 'Remember going to see Grandma Jetje?' 'She was gassed in Sobibor too.'" The Dutch government refused to contribute to the Auschwitz memorial site until 1966, resisting what it construed as a Communist maneuver, long after all western countries with victims there had taken part, and it was 1972 before there was any Dutch compensation for the complicity of the wartime state machinery in the murder. (Lagrou 2000: 287f.) The Holocaust construct, of course, further marginalized the anti-Fascist memory.

political prisoners, and they led a campaign in favor of "equal treatment for all victims of persecution during the German occupation on behalf of their attitude, their political convictions, their origins or their resistance," but these efforts could not be sustained, not least because the party was torn apart by purges conducted by its Stalinist leadership. The ousters hit especially hard at the leading resistance figures within the organization, a number of whom were condemned in an official "Red Book" publication as having always been "English spies." Henk Gortzak, for example, who must have been well known to Joop Telling, both as a fellow inmate in Sachsenhausen during the horrible last winter of the war and as Chairman of the Communist Party in Amsterdam throughout the postwar period, was denounced in this fashion and expelled in 1958. (Lagrou 2000: 241–50; Withuis 2005: 180–82). It was not until the later part of the 1960s, with the change in generations and the rise of a non-Communist left largely indifferent to the old divisions, that the established and institutionalized memory of the war was challenged once more. But by then the original proponents of the anti-Fascist paradigm were effectively used up.

This is the context in which Joop Telling was persuaded to enter upon LSD therapy with Dr. Jan Bastiaans, to be treated for concentration camp syndrome. Strikingly, it was the director of the two documentaries concerning Telling, Louis van Gasteren, who actually set the action in motion. Having secured a commission from the Netherlands Federation for Mental Health in 1966 to make a film about the German concentration camps in which he would attempt to probe in depth someone who inflicted (SS) and someone who suffered the violence of that regime, he asked his friend, Herman Milikowski, a sociologist on the political Left, to relive his experiences under LSD, a technique already familiar in some Amsterdam circles. Milikowski declined, but referred van Gasteren's request to his friend (and political comrade), Joop Telling. Only after the latter agreed, according to Enning, did van Gasteren approach another of his friends, Jan Bastiaans, a psychiatrist who was foremost in experimenting with such therapy, to supervise the administration of the drug (Enning 2002: 29).[115] Telling's LSD sessions lasted throughout the summer of 1967, and the film, made without the planned SS segment and including scenes of excrutiating misery, was first shown to an invited audience, including the premier and the Queen, on

[115] Bastiaans' 1957 dissertation was already based on studies of resistance veterans: *Psychosomatic Consequences of Oppression and Resistance*. In time, he extended the concept of "concentration-camp syndrome" to include all individuals whose malfunctioning could be traced to similar periods of extended stress. See Snelders (2000: 169–72).

May 16, 1969.[116] Juliana is recorded as saying to the director that the film had induced her to look hard at her own conduct in these matters. [117] After making a tour of student audiences, the film played a prominent part in the 1972 controversy about a proposal by the Minister of Justice to release the three remaining German war criminals in Dutch custody, a moment widely conceded to mark a decisive shift in the "politics of memory."

The proposal to free the "Three from Breda" was less a conservative political gesture than an attempt to treat them in a manner consistent with ordinary Dutch administration of justice, where terms of life imprisonment, like theirs, normally ended after fifteen years. The minister's expectation that these cases had been normalized by time and could be treated as routine was a sign of the governing elite's failure to recognize that "the war" remained as unfinished business in Dutch society, especially after the easing of the Cold War, which had shifted the focus to a different enemy. On the motion of a representative from a left-liberal party founded in 1966, the lower house invited groups to a public hearing on the proposal. For the first time since the earliest postwar years, Communist-led, Jewish, and anti-Communist groups agreed in public. Of the 43 organizations that testified, including about a dozen pro-Communist ones, only the three or four comprising lawyers favored the release. The most common motifs, however, were the expressly unpolitical themes of "concentration camp syndrome" and "war trauma." The release of the war criminals would add dangerous insult to the sufferings of the present-day victims. To underline this argument, then, van Gasteren's "*Now do you get why I am crying*" was screened for the members of Parliament on the following day, and then immediately broadcast on the national television network, although it had always been described as too disturbing for public viewing (Withuis 2005: 292–303). Van Gasteren's film not only helped to crystalize opinion against these "Three from Breda" but also speeded action on the establishment of *Centrum '45*, as a therapeutic center for the treatment of concentration camp syndrome, a major token of the redefinition of the wartime experience in terms of the need for

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116 Excerpts from the transcript are to be found in Milikowski (1973: 93–97).

117 In complimenting van Gasteren, the Queen used a colloquial expression, which gains added meaning when joined to the public significance of the Queen's household, literally "I looked hard into my own household." [*Ik heb toch wel erg binnenskamers gekeken*.] When assessing the influence of a television showing in 1972, it is important to remember how small and densely populated a country this is, and that there was then only one Dutch-language television channel, with time divided among blocs of users, some of them in political associations.

welfare care. Joop Telling, in short, finally gained recognition for his return, but only as victim and patient, not as political agent or advocate.

This circumstance was graphically protested by the same Milikowski, who had first brought Telling to van Gasteren, and thus to Bastiaans. Telling and Milikowski, in fact, testified together at the parliamentary hearings of 1972 as joint spokespersons for the Sachsenhausen group. Withuis speaks mordantly of the "bizarre compromise" between the individual who personified the "concentration camp syndrome" for many and the leftist sociologist, who denounced the psychiatric perspective for its distraction from political issues. They maintained, she contends, that the disorder, whose prevalence they could not deny, was due to the conditions of "capitalist society" (2005: 300). If Milikowski's article on the subject in the book he published during the following year is examined, his analysis seems less "bizarre," if still "polemical." He speaks of a "reverse" concentration camp syndrome, which afflicts officialdom, much of the public, and the psychiatric profession. "It is asserted," he writes, "that a unbridgeable chasm has formed between the ex-prisoner and his surroundings, that he is powerless to tell what he experienced during the war. In truth, he is only rendered powerless when he learns how his warnings [about the continued threat of fascism] are ignored." In the film, he continued, the psychiatrist appears as a patriarchal, overpowering figure, and the patient is made into "a child, who does not want to disappoint his father, and who tells him what he wants to hear." (Milikowski 1973: 100–101; cf. Mooij 2002: 280-291). Citing a number of instances where Dr. Bastiaans failed to follow up statements by Telling that seemed to point beyond his past in his family or camp, he urged attention to the systematic failures of solidarity in modern societies and similar themes of the non-Communist newer Left of the time.

Not long after the publication of Milikowski's book, van Gasteren himself expressed doubts about Bastiaans' therapy. In a letter refusing permission to an author who wanted to use a still photo from *Now do you get why I am crying* in a book about another of Bastiaans' patients, van Gasteren wrote that he was now troubled by "Bastiaans' suggestive questions, … about psychiatry in general and this in particular, and by unanswered questions … posed by the patients themselves."[118] This uncertainty is not in fact resolved in *The Price of Survival*, since the basic fact, invoked by the repeated insistence that the film was a sequel to the earlier one, is that Telling was manifestly not "cured" of his concentration

[118] Van Gasteren to Wennekes, February 28, 1975. *cit*. in Enning (2002: 91, n229). The book in question was a counterpart to van Gasteren's first film, except that the supposed resistance fighter and concentration camp survivor, a prominent Labor Party politician, was soon shown to have invented much of his heroic record. This case is the subject of Enning's thesis.

camp syndrome. The questions implicitly raised by the film about its manifest level of meaning are made the more forceful by the contradiction between the damaged family it displays and the bourgeois marital contentment pictured in a scene appended to the earlier film when it was deployed in the 1972 struggles. Yet the diagnosis and the psychiatric statement of the issues are put in doubt only by the allusions to the lost political dimension.

In his recent film, then, I believe, Louis van Gasteren creates a raw memorial to a project whose legacy he does not accept as adequately recognized in the "war-welfare-management" (Withuis 2005: 421) established after 1972 or the soothing valedictory mode of the recently renewed Sachsenhausen site. The bitterness of the children remains as an unhealed wound, and Dina Telling expressly violates a benignly expounded regulation when she strews ashes on the field of the Klinkerwerk. The fierce and insatiable demand for an "apology" written by the daughter comes at the very end of the film. There has been no reconciliation. Yet van Gasteren does not allow that generation to sit in judgment, but seeks to agitate it, even if the agitation takes the form, as it did in 1969, of diagnosing a threat to public mental health. Although the author's "intentions" cannot be probative for the "documentary" meaning of a political-cultural production,[119] the following passages from a letter by van Gasteren suggests something about the uses of mental health issues as a resource of political critique:

> [Speaking to German psychiatrists] I posed the question why the government had sent 2500 Bundeswehr soldiers to Afghanistan, knowing that at least 10% of them would need help after their return. You are speaking about 10% at least of man hours of a psychiatrist and eventually hospital beds. Since we know more about the vagueness upon which your president started his military operation in Irak, people are wondering whether the populations of the various countries had been consulted before. As almost every country of our globe has turned into an open air clinic, I posed the question whether a government should voluntarily enlarge the nation's number of patients.

Pain and suffering as defined by psychotherapy stands in, as both indicator and metonymy of social-political injustice.

Just as the point of *The Price of Survival* is not identical with the unhappy testimony of Telling's children, so is van Gasteren's point in making films in the psychological mode, whether in 1969 or 2003, not identical with the projects of the psychotherapists. In the aporia of the film a political loss is enacted, and in the disjunctions between documentation and therapy, an undertaking to mediate a kind of "return," which was impossible on the sweeping terms of anti-Fascist

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[119] The largely self-explanatory distinction between "intentional" and "documentary" meaning comes from Mannheim (1921/1993).

redemption cf. Vahabzadeh 2006). While the painful and unresolved state achieved cannot make good the exile, it serves to keep some questions open. That is a political achievement too, in harsh, cold times. It is among the prime limits of exile that it is dependent on precisely such achievements.

At best, then, it is not in the nature of exile, however rightgeous, to celebrate the triumphal and redemptive return that a "political paradigm" (Vahabzadeh 2006) like that of the anti-Fascist Left postulated as the meaning of their exile and return. The question is only whether or not the returnees receive sufficient recognition to act as a party in the settlement that is negotiated after the end of the conditions that forced the emigration. The struggle for that recognition and over the rules that govern the settlement is a kind of meta-bargaining or constitutional politics (in an extended sense of that concept). Under the circumstances in the Netherlands, the paradoxical outcome was that Jan and his comrades were accepted as actors largely in the guise of patients, under tutelage and patronage. And often enough, posthumously. This is surely a limiting case of a limited, bitter political role.

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W.G. Sebald and Exilic Memory – His Photographic Images of the Cosmogony of Exile and Restitution

Jerry Zaslove

ABSTRACT

Exile is a shaping force in W.G. Sebald's essayistic writings devoted to personal and historical memory. His own photographs deconstruct the shape of memory and illuminate the incomplete restitution of memory work through storytelling, photography and the limits of the exilic unconscious. His work forms obstacles to self-glorification of the autobiographical self, because the unfictional biography of the exile shows that fragmented internalized selves have lost potential "public wholeness" common to traditional autobiography. Paralleling Sebald's hybrid essayistic texts and photographs with those whose affinities I find close to him – Adorno, Bakhtin, Jeff Wall, Gerhard Richter, the psychoanalyst Christopher Bollas – I arrive at six chronotopes in Sebald: (1) Zones of Contact with the Aura of Memory – Childhood of Memory; (2) Photographing the Transitional Object; (3) The Town that cannot be Photographed; (4) Photographing Memory – the Gestus; (5) Compilational Memory: The Riddle of Restitution and Exile as the Commonplace; (6) Vagabonds, homo migrans and Asylum.

> *The definition which Kafka here gives of Sancho Panza as a free man has a Utopian character. It points to a Utopia of the in-between – a terra incognita in the hollows between the lands we know.*[120]
>
> Kracauer (1969)

[120] Siegfried Kracauer citing a meditation of Franz Kafka:

"Without making any boast of it Sancho Panza succeeded in the course of years, by devouring a great number of romances of chivalry and adventure in the evening and night hours, in so diverting himself from his demon, whom he later called Don Quixote, that his demon thereupon set out in perfect freedom on the maddest of exploits, which however, for the lack of a preordained object, which should have been Sancho Panza himself, harmed nobody. A free man, Sancho Panza philosophically followed Don Quixote on his crusades, perhaps out of a sense of responsibility, and of them a great and edifying entertainment to the end …" (Kracauer 1969: 217).

1. Zones of Contact with the Aura of Memory – Childhood of Memory

Since I have been unable to go out of doors, so that now I see almost nothing new, said Vera, the pictures we enjoyed so much at the time come back to me with increasing clarity, like pure fantasies … as if I were gazing at a diorama as I once did as a child in Reichenberg, seeing the figures inside a case filled with some strangely translucent aura poised motionless in mid-movement, owing their life-like appearance, oddly enough to their extremely diminutive size (Sebald 2001: 158).[121]

W.G. Sebald's world of recollection, remembrance, and restitution of the German-Jewish exiled past – the pastness of the past – is almost a devotional retreat into the chaos of the aesthetics of memory and exile. His writing should become paradigmatic for thinking about exile. Sebald came into historical view in the last number of years as if sudden waves of memory traces flood into an already memory-saturated world of German and Jewish exilic accounts. There is no end to the diaspora of memories and the uncertainty of how to keep the telling the same stories over again. What can they keep telling us that we do not already know?

What could be more quixotic at the end of the 20th century than to try to create a world, almost a cosmogony in which the unpredictability, rather than the certainty about the exilic imagination could be compelling? What turns out to be the case is that Sebald's very unpredictability, his 'Sancho Panza-ness', which is on the surface disturbingly un-predictable, allows him to develop an ecological-organic approach to memory and post-disaster thinking. He embodies memory of the unthinkable both in his characters and in his authorial voice. His characters, guided by the Virgilian narrator, suddenly begin to think again on their own, and learn to relate to new events, old traces, unsuspected associations as if their unconscious was suddenly released by some force of nature: coming to terms with the "unthought known".[122] His work seems diminutive in size, but creates its own aesthetic dimensions, where apparently small, unknown people begin to live again in a world-sized magnification of exile, loss and restitution of memory. In addition, Sebald's reception suddenly grows larger, more mythic and puzzling when questions about the images of his photographs begin to cast a

[121] References to *Austerlitz* in the essay will be designated by "*Austerlitz* 2001"; all other Sebald's work will be designated by the titles of the work or his name in the text with year of publication.

[122] This is a term from the psychoanalyst Christopher Bollas, whose work influences my several essays on the subject of exile and the exilic.

dark photographic light on our perceptions that have the effect of allowing us to think the impossible: that Sebald photographs memory.

Can we account for Sebald's impact in the post-unification era as simply a desire for new beginnings?[123] In the face of the memory wars, the memorials and museums, the films, the photographs of unbearable violence, the evidentiary collections of survivors' accounts of their and their relatives' emergence into the dark light of historical assimilation after escape or survival, and particularly in the face of the millions of stateless and homeless peoples in our own murderous world – new beginnings as the utopian other of exile is not a bad idea, but may ring false. But the utopian other of exile remembers violence; and it is this cosmogony of violence and restitution that Sebald creates. In this essay, I do not intend to summarize his colportagist[124] works, but I am following some configurations in his essayistic, fictional biographical prose in which exile, sanctuary, refuge and assimilation have played so much a part of his sense of where he belongs in this century of the exilic. Ultimately Sebald casts a light on the exilic unconscious, which extends to the reality of the refugees in tent cities whose new beginnings are the daily staples of their lives.[125]

Words alone are not the containers of memory; if they were we could have more respect for what T.W. Adorno claimed could not be rendered after Auschwitz – poetry that could compete with the horrors of the cultural assimilation of murder organized by the states and mediated by culture in a

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[123] This is the thesis of Andreas Huyssen (2001: 90). Other works on Sebald consulted that stress mainly the literary quality of his work and have extensive bibliographies can be found in: *Text und Kritik* (2003); Long & Whitehead (2004); McCulloh (2003).

[124] "Colportage", a word that Sebald uses in *Austerlitz,* is used here in the sense of Walter Benjamin's unfinished exile project, *Passagenarbeit*, *The Arcades Project*. Rolf Tiedemann describes it as a "system of distributing books by travelling pedlars in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in France." From *col*, "neck", and *porter*, "to carry they carried their wares on trays suspended from straps around their necks. The disseminated religious and devotional literature, manuals, almanacs, collections of folklore and popular tales, chivalric romances, political and philosophical works in inexpensive formats, and, after 1840, serial novels. In decline by the mid-nineteenth century, due to competition from the popular presses" (Benjamin 1999: 1023–4). More can be said about colportage especially as a nomadic form of cultural commodities in exile that move from city to city, from neighborhood to neighborhood. This important word appears in *Austerlitz* on p. 283, mistranslated as "melodramatic".

[125] I discuss this in the last section, "Vagabonds", of this essay.

variety of violent genres of sensation, evasion and resignation.[126] We are obliged, in Adorno's terms, to construct new genres of memory, which is what I believe Sebald is doing.

It is as if in the post-Auschwitz-Hiroshima-20th-century genocidal-massacres, Sebald set out to deny Adorno's claim, by wishing that poetry would transform itself and become thinkable in other forms than what society allows in the lyric.[127] What is often misunderstood about Adorno's embattled polemic against kitsch and the abuse of historical memory, is how his own thinking is connected to the inauthenticity he finds his theological-philosophical foe, Heidegger. This is Adorno's and our own enduring exilic story: the appropriation of the genocide against the Jews without consequence for other genocides, the carpet bombings of Germany, the Hitlerian solutions against the German people. Primo Levi's story is comparable to Sebald's; both write odes to Jean Améry ("The Intellectual in Auschwitz") who fought the "the disease that plagues Europe and threatened (and still threatens) the world; that of the philosopher of the Spirit, which in Auschwitz was absent" (Levi 1988: 142).[128] In this sense Adorno is not a freak of nature. With Sebald, the exiles become the freaks in a photographic history never before compiled in the way he does. The forms of culture that we relied on to transmit not only our own memories, but the cultural memories of others, vanished against the images of death that come back again and again, like a landscape, including brutal architecture, without a name, freakishly, without defendable cultural roots. We are left with the 'minima moralia' embedded in our childhood visions and childhood memories.[129]

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[126] A courageous study that attempts to make judgement about the validity of photographic assembling of holocaust scenes is Ulrich Baer (2002). My awareness of this book comes to late for me to take it into account, but the reader should know of it.

[127] Adorno's statement, however, is consistent with others of his denaturing of lyric poetry in "Lyric Poetry and Society", or his essay on "Valery's Deviations" where he writes that "an art that has divested itself of its vagabondage and its social odium, no matter how well sublimated it may be … this element of vagabondage, this lack of subjection to the control of a settled order, is the only thing that allows art to survive in the midst of civilization" (Adorno 1991: 149)

[128] Before anyone condemns Adorno completely for his comment, one should recall Levi's own words: "This boundless archive of defensive and thaumaturgic formulations in Auschwitz (and for that matter today in any hospital) was short-lived: death in Auschwitz was trivial, bureaucratic, and everyday affair. It was not commented on, it was not 'comforted by tears.' It is the face of death, in the habit of death, the frontier between culture and lack of culture disappeared" (Levi 1988: 148).

[129] This is a reference to Adorno's own exilic unconscious in his meditations, *Minima Moralia*, *Reflections from Damaged Life*. Sebald also uses Améry as paradigmatic of the

In the case of Sebald's construction of an exilic past, reconstituting childhood memory means the restitution and reconstitution of the past delivered through his essayistic, part fictional, part autobiographical hybridistic story telling world in which the silence of the photograph plays so important a mediating role. This world is the childhood of memory, the memory of once having learned to walk upright but now having to face the exilic unconscious, which is constituted both by an impermeable barrier between those who became stateless, and a permeable membrane through which childhood struggles for assimilation in the host nations. Exile becomes a shaping force for the silence of a never-ending impermeable assimilation to the rescuing of the exile. Exile is Sebald's Golem: the character he created of Austerlitz.

When Sebald describes his alter-ego, who is a created persona from the depths of Sebald's own spectral past, the persona, Austerlitz, searches for peace of mind that would be a physical and palpable refuge that would only become real when he could learn to remember the past, which *might* become the second breeding ground about the unthinkable. Austerlitz-Sebald's restitution of memory would have to take place in some location, in some place that is not a fantasy of remembering, but has the body of the memory. One thinks of Kafka's Sancho Panza following after a Don Quixote of memory. his relentless tales; both search for an architecture which would shelter the future from the past. The buildings might be railroad stations, museums, libraries, archives, manor houses, old factories, the "impenetrable fog" of language (*Austerlitz* 2001: 124), hospitals where he resists throwing himself over banisters, wanderings in remote parts of London where "Londerers of all ages lie in their beds in those countless buildings in Greenwich, Bayswater, or Kensington, under a safe roof they suppose …" (*Austerlitz* 2001: 126) all of which are shadowed by the fear of the corporeality of the past:

> The new library building, which in both its entire layout and its near-ludicrous internal regulation seeks to exclude the reader as a potential enemy, might be described … as the official manifestation of the increasingly importunate urge to break with everything which still has some living connection to the past. (*Austerlitz* 2001: 286)

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tortured captive for whom post-Auschwitz exile was not even half a life: "Verlorenes Land – Jean Améry und Österreich", in *Unheimliche Heimat*. Levi is also tormented by "the exodus of scientific minds from Germany and Italy … [who] "gave birth to nuclear bombs" … and the [desperate] Jewish survivors in flight from Europe after the great shipwreck [of survivors who] … created in the bosom of the Arab world … a portentous palingenisis of Judaism, and the pretext for renewed hatred" (Levi 1988: 201). Levi refers to Stalin's slave labor as the basis of the extension of the German state into the work camps.

Sebald's fictionalized characters and the authorial voice that listens carefully to their shattered monologues culminate in this character, Austerlitz, namesake of battlegrounds and train stations and the exiled Napoleon himself. Austerlitz is the allegorical man in search of his memory of childhood, who takes the reader into a Virgilian Danteesque epiphenomal pilgrimage into the post-Auschwitz world spirit where the politics of remembrance are displaced by the silence of the photographs interlacing his personal journey. The reader encounters the photographs as obstacles. They enact barriers within the Baroque expansive prose. Photographs neutralize and assimilate. At unexpected moments turning the pages of Sebald's yarns, the photographs break the prose rhythms into a mannerist, alienated, Kafkaesque mirroring of an inner turmoil interrupted by the uncanny refamiliarization of the prosaic, street wanderings. Concrete images of sinister architecture, people, or shabby scenes of vacant lots or plants, once city walls and marshy meadows, and insects are memorialized by the aura of the past embedded in characters' memory. Ferber, one of Sebald's inner voices of dialogical recall in *Vertigo,* comments:

> … purely in terms of time, I was now far removed from Germany as he had been in 1966; but time he went on, is an unreliable way of gauging these things, indeed it is nothing but a disquiet of the soul. There is neither a past nor a future. At least not for me. The fragmentary scenes that haunt my memories are obsessive in character. When I think of Germany, it feels as if there were some kind of insanity lodged in my head. Probably the reason why I have never been to Germany again is that I am afraid to find that this insanity really exists. To me, you see, Germany is a country frozen in the past, destroyed, a curiously extraterritorial place, inhabited by people whose faces are both lovely and dreadful (Sebald 2000: 181).

Ferber is one of Sebald's uncanny alter images through whom history speaks and Sebald listens. Ferber only reluctantly describes his childhood in Munich in the aftermath of the new order in 1933; in 1939 his parents escape to the Baltic and the child is sent into exile in England as a child transport. The memory is vivid, especially in the verbal-ideological recall of the event of departure. The 'verbal-ideological', as I am using it here is a term coined by Mikhail Bakhtin in the name of Russian semiotics and constructivist artistic movements. The inner dialogical quality of voice, image and text is projected by the artist who becomes both author and reader of the self reflexive inner image of language that is not just expressive or lyrical but is in the sense that I am using it: photographed memory. We are distanced from the memory by the formal and ideological obstacles to containing it but we are drawn into it.

The Sebaldian narrative is hindered from the preciousness by being both *photographically and optically vivid* because of the recall of those *transitional*

objects lodged in memory, and by allowing the release of meaning by storytelling: the generic limits are reached in that the story cannot yet become a true novel. The story hovers in a zone of contact between distance and proximity. The addressees of the exilic unconscious are the readers and listeners who in different times and spaces encounter the image of language in the limits of speech: "The speech of another is introduced into the author's discourse (the story) in *concealed form* that is, without any of the *formal* markers usually accompanying such speech, whether direct or indirect" (Bakhtin 1981: 303; Bakhtin's italics). Exile is an ideological chronotope, yet prevents any self-glorification of the autobiographical self, because the created biography of the exile shows that fragmented internalized selves have lost *both* the real and potential "public wholeness" common to autobiography. The world that is revealed to the reader in the photographs marks Sebald's conscious attempt to create a chronotope from the actual world of exile to one that disallows the exile the fruits of a composed autobiography that would pretend that the writer had at one time been a whole person. The author-creator of the story of others who pose as real human beings is the permeable membrane between exile as an ideological state of mind and exile in verbal storied reality. Bakhtin writes:

> ... there lurks beneath the specific question of the propriety of glorifying oneself a more general question, namely, the legitimacy of taking the same approach to one's own life as to another's life, to one's own self as to another self. The very posing of such a question is evidence that the classical *public wholeness* of an individual has broken down, and a differentiation between biographical and autobiographical forms had begun (Bakhtin 1981: 133).

The transformations of genres of autobiography into exilic frames of consciousness occur under the extreme circumstances of crisis embedded in the distance and proximity nature of threatening images.[130] The photographs in Sebald's works, therefore, function as transitional objects that reveal the surface exteriority of the individual within the public, composed world that proved to be a sham against the coming onslaught. The photographic quality or artistic intent should not be used to judge the photographs. They are verbal-ideological interventions into the mystery of the storytelling compulsions. They lurk beneath the story as image-traces and as fragments of a missing wholeness that cannot complete the life cycle of an individual. They do not glorify the scene of a murder or an atrocity. In this sense the photographs are saturated with the pathos of passing through time where we experience the transience of time and memory. We are guests of the image, which is infinitely falsifiable. In fact Ferber recalls his father looking at a newspaper clipping of a photograph of the book burning in

[130] These terms are derived from the protean work of Georg Simmel.

the Residenzplatz in Würzburg. Since it was dark on May 10, 1933 when the books were burned, the picture, Ferber's Uncle Leo recalls, had to be "some other gathering outside the palace" (*Austerlitz* 2001: 183). Ferber remembers this "fake" history and it gnaws at him the way a memorable photograph gnaws at one's desire to make the image real and true. But the photgraph is fake. Sebald's narrator finds the story improbable and tracks down the photograph in an archive in Würzburg, finding the story to be true. Sebald prints the photograph, which even an amateur's eye could recognize the smoke and fire as faked. What is important about this construction of a transitional object, the picture of a book burning, is the suspicion that all memory is fake, that memory itself is unreliable, in particular the historical memory of events seen from the fragmented exilic unconscious looking at the inorganic photograph.

To further make the point about unreliable memory, Sebald reminds us that the Residenzplatz, which is in the centre of Würzburg, ruthlessly bombed at the end of the war, is also the home of Tiepolo's ceiling fresco, that epical panorama of the glorious counter-revolution's celebration of the four realms of the world. To see the Baroque colonial masterpiece one enters the palace and views the long staircase mammoth enough for horses to prance up the marble stairs. What Sebald has missed is that the mirror rooms in the Residenz saturated with the Baroque passions for reflection of images were destroyed at the end of the war by Allied bombing. They were rebuilt and exist today as endless reflections for the unending surface memories, harbingers of the glass buildings of our international modernist styles of building the same structures wherever we find ourselves wanting more light and more reflections: the chronotope of narcissism mirroring light and images against the everyday Panzaic dullness of the photograph.

The boundary between historical memory, and the public memory in the pictures, lies in the zone of contact that Mikhail Bakhtin calls "the process of exchange" which "is itself a chronotope" of represented time and the narrator's "evolving contemporaneity" (Bakhtin 1981: 254–5), which includes many realms of literary experience semantically enriched by the photographs' silence in the face of the reader-viewer's facing both inward and outward toward the exile's own inner-outer world, in which the small world of the exile cannot yet see the large world of historical processes.

2. Photographing the Transitional Object

What is meant by this strange term 'exilic unconscious'? I began this essay by focussing on the exilic memory as part of the unconscious and the forms of restitution that the characters long for. Especially since Sebald's gallery of exiles, includes the narrator, Sebald, an exile whose own emigration to England made

him an exile without ostracism? Sebald confesses in his book of essays, *Campo Santo* 2005, that cities, streets, and buildings since his childhood have been a private world:

> The Cities Quartet marked not only the beginning of my career as a reader but the start of my passion for geography, which emerged soon after I began school: a delight in topography that became increasingly compulsive as my life went on and to which I have devoted endless hours bending over atlases and brochures of every kind. Inspired by Cities Quartet, [a children's card game – JZ]I soon found Suttgart on the map…. (Sebald 2005: 207–8)

In his later life, Austerlitz the exile adopts this tradition of remembering places and geography:

> If language may be regarded as an old city full of streets and squares, nooks and crannies, with some quarters dating far back in time while others have been torn down, cleaned up, and rebuilt, and with suburbs reaching further and further into the surrounding country, then I was like a man who as been abroad for a long time and cannot find his way through this urban sprawl anymore, no longer knows what a bus stop is for, or what a backyard is, or a street junction, an avenue or a bridge … (*Austerlitz* 2001: 123–4).

This aura of ostracism, distance from it and the intimacy of it, allows the characters to face themselves in the album like depictions of their pasts. Their ostracism is total, even as their 'exile' is historically bounded. I believe the mysterious, uncanny aura of his book's attraction to readers lies in Sebald's attraction and empathic understanding, indeed unending compassion, for the exiles who search for refuge in their assimilated and broken lives. Strategies of assimilation have made them into Marronized Jews, *Hochstaplers*, counterfeiters and in sense, would-be Moses's and ambitious Josephs, who live with the insecurity and ambiguity of their cultural accommodation with assimilation in the "Egypts" of their exile.

Almost himself tracing Freud's own trail to England, or even Thomas Mann's exilic Joseph's to Egypt, Sebald did not 'convert' to Judaism, but adopted, fictionally, the voices of those who had to develop strategies of assimilation, survival and accommodation to exile and ostracism. He is in this sense a *spiritual converso*; yet Sebald is not obsessed with the contemporary fascination with "identity", a signature of modern guilty self-examination and assimilation. Sebald became the transplanted "Joseph" who achieves a muted recognition, later fame, by identifying with the geographical landscape of the victors and working from that outpost to collect photographs and to "photograph", that is textually provide images of, the lost memory of the exiles. He constructs a family of his own with a range of literary texts that canonize the exilic as the chronotope of our time. In this sense the range of figures that Sebald incorporates into his

mythical, almost biblical canon – among others, Peter Weiss, Adalbert Stifter, Kafka, Nabokov, Jean Améry, Thomas Bernhardt – all those I am naming the "Marronos" and who appear in (Sebald 1995b). These writers are the dialogic way stations of his family of exilic writers who have left the duplicitous ghettos of German memory to accommodate themselves in the bourgeois world of the culture of those who have been transpossessed of the culture of the past but are fated to work within it. In fact the ghetto is a shadow that falls on all of his work.

So the childhood game that he plays becomes his adult obsession with the memory of others' losses in the cities of Europe and later on the streets of Terezín, which I will refer to below.

The attraction to Sebald is our attraction to the transitional object of his longing to learn what the attraction is to those who were deprived of homeland, family, landscape, and security. His obsessional attraction to memory is in the photographs the transitional object of his desire, noticeable for the absence of erotic desire. The characters we listen to through the authorial dialogic voice attempt to come to terms with the shadows in their lives. These shadows grow in shape and substance as the characters, with the readers' help in looking at the photographs – not mounted on a wall of memory or in a gallery – search for the integral object which will relieve them of their assimilated-accommodated identities. The energy of the inner longing, the search itself, is interrupted repeatedly by the photographs. These photographs, then, become what I am naming as a 'transitional object'.

Memory is photographed in transitory locations – the travels of the characters and Sebald's intrepid research into the history of Jewish figures, repeat this event of a transitional inner image of a home once whole. The search for an intimate place that has not been ruthlessly deprived of aura and context is passionately gone over again and again. The photographs *are* those places of recall. The passion in the books, muted and silent, is the place for empathic preserving, understanding, and recovering of the "disowned internal state" of childhood that Christoper Bollas describes in *The Shadow of the Object* (Bollas 1987: 115). Bollas writes that "It is one thing to mourn the loss of experience that has happened in one's past, it is quite another to lose the future . . . to be a failure had been [the patient's] greatest unconscious ambition. Not to succeed enabled him to remain 'at home' with his parents" (Bollas 1987: 106).[131]

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[131] I discuss this phenomenon of loss and recovery in several essays on Siegfried Kracauer. Christopher Bollas is a psychoanalyst whose writing on the "unthought known" and "violent innocence" have influenced my approach to Sebald and Kracauer. The "transitional object" is used by D.W. Winnicott to describe an object that disappears in childhood, but may return under the threat of loss and deprivation. The photograph as

The photographs are the transitional objects that allow the individual to lose subjectivity by falling into the obsessively repeated photographing of the lost objects, places, and people. The aura of the photographs, and the spell they cast over us, is, then, the passion for repeating in different forms, places, streets, passageways, placeways, insects, flowers and the scenes of the crime of the impending departures, the exits the exilic moments. In this way the photographs contain and communicate the aura of intimacy, while neutralizing the violence of the acts of exile themselves.[132] The Question of Questions, the portrayal and depiction in photographs of the violence of forced exile and murder of the prisoners of the Germans I take up in the next two sections.

3. The Town that cannot be Photographed.

Gavrilo Princip, 1894–1918, assassinated the Archduke of Austria and was imprisoned and died in the Terezín fortress. The town was remote from anywhere in the Austro-Hungarian empire although it was a crossroads, a kind of way station to the East, North and West, an Austro-Hungarian Siberian crossroads. The only trace of Princip today would be in photographs, some of them possibly falsified; his name was unknown to my students although their great grandfathers, maybe their grandfathers were touched by his act of revenge. I thought of Princip at various times in my many visits to the streets and museums of Terezín and other dilapidated – in the sense of fallen stones – cemeteries, many in little traveled rural regions. Often we scrambled through the underground tunnels that ring Terezín's archaic fortifications, although recent floods may have wiped them out along with the dungeons and cellars under the placidly ugly apartment houses on the streets graded flat and girded against memory. I thought of Princip as gestus, an emblem, for the entire process of remembering through photographs. In *Vertigo*, Sebald includes his photograph along with a number of other blurry archaic-seeming images. Sebald had come upon an exhibition in Frankfurt of the Litzmanstadt Ghetto (Lodz) of color photographs "tinted with a greenish-blue or reddish-brown" (Sebald 2000: 235), which had been discovered in 1987 in a small suitcase in an antique dealer's shop in Vienna. (Litzmanstadt was renamed after the German WW I general.)

These photographs are simply the topography of memory, images that are yet to discover a context: "the photographer had recorded the "exemplary organization within the ghetto" (Sebald 2000: 236), the industry, the planning, the very false utopia of the modernized feudalistic factory model towns that the

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such an object gains life due to its place in the stories told by the characters who experience transition and transitoriness in their lives. See Winnicott (1971).

[132] I use the term "placeways" as a form of "topistic consciousness", a "location of mutual immanence", of *Chora*: E.V. Walter, *Placeways*: 121.

German Reich was imposing on the eastern territories.[133] People are all around, he writes, but "strangely deserted pictures, scarcely one of which showed a living soul, despite the fact that at times there were as many as hundred and seventy thousand people in Litzmanstadt in an area of no more than five square kilometers" (Sebald 2000: 236). I also thought of these blurry pictures of heads and figures as unphotographical entities while thinking about Sebald's use of the silence of the photographs that resist self-glorification while at the same time constructing other people's stories, perhaps in order to underscore Adorno's claim that our fate is to forget and remember at the same time.[134]

We are seeing how Sebald creates a new chronotope of pictured time, photographed memory. Without glorifying himself or his subject he focuses sharply on the way the biographical – a staple of German letters in all its Bildungsroman scope – and the autobiographical approach each other. The risk of aggrandizement by the storyteller is diminished because of the nature of the Simplicissimus episodic form. Yet the urge to depict traumatic circumstances that define the photographic aesthetic interpenetrates his storytelling with researched facts. In examining the Litzmanstadt pictures, still in *Vertigo*, Sebald's attention falls on three young women who sit behind a loom:

> The carpet they are knotting, and even its colors, remind me of the settee in our living room at home. Who the young women are I do not know. The light falls on them from the window in the background, so I cannot make out their eyes clearly, but I sense that all three of them are looking across at me, since I am standing on the very spot where Genewein the accountant stood with his camera (Sebald 2000: 237).

Genewein was the accountant and photographer who took and collected the pictures. Sebald provides no photograph here for us, which we could familiarize ourselves with; the responsibility of the storytelling judgement is too close, too fraught with the risks of verisimilitude to risk an illustration. Rather use the poetic of the uncanny that builds up in the storytelling and the relationship of the story to the picture. The picture is not an objectivized image of the scene of the event in the story because the picture is not depleted of meaning by the story but aggrandizes meaning, adds to it a surplus of meaning.

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[133] For the Nazi blueprints of the camps and the plans for sanitatary lands, fields, farms and towns. See Dwork & Van Pelt (1996)

[134] See the blurred photographs on pp. 248, 249, 251, 253 some of which are copied from the film on Theresienstadt; Sebald's own photograph as a child in costume appears on p. 183: "as if pictures had a memory of their own and remembered us" (p. 182).

Like all depictions of great pictures that inhabit a zone of emotional recognition of the truth-value of a scene of recall, the image requires the reader's participation in the objectivity of the judgement on the scene of historical memory that a photograph might contain. Sebald, knows what he is doing by using photographs as emblems of once lived experience faced with the potential duplicity and inaccuracy, their lack of authenticity, in the face of the aura of the viewers' memories. The pictures that Sebald uses refer to the German past. The pastness of the past, reconstructs Germany's past by using commonplace scenes in order to show a family of forgotten or lost, and perhaps similar souls, often related to each other, who had suffered the same fate. Their identities live as archival memory.

In the guise of the author's voice, "Sebald", is, in the sense given by Kafka to the Quixotic rescuer, the one who follows the voices and exilic personas that appear around him. He portrays them as fictional characters – beings in history, small people in a large historical, Grünewald-like pathos. The amateur quality of the photographs adds to the pathos and poignancy of the scenes. In this regard the total effect of the literacy of exilic consciousness reminds of the blurred pictures of Gerhard Richter, or the album photographs of Christian Boltanski.[135] The *authorial* voice disappears into the dialogue of image, and story. In keeping with Bakhtin's theory of genre-breaking movements in the history of the novel, we can say now that Sebald's bold use of photographs as compilations of memory belong to the same genre-breaking tendencies as Gerhard Richter's and, to Boltanski recourse to vernacular-ideological materials.[136] Richter's and Sebald's photographs dramatize a crisis of visual perception after the exile of Jews and Germans. This is a crisis, which did not derive from prior Jewish historical writing or historical thought. It was not "the fruit of a gradual and organic evolution" but of a crisis precipitated from *without* that continued the struggle against Judeophobia and the problems of assimilation (Yerushalmi 1982:

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[135] I hope it is clear that I am claiming a particular exilic consciousness to Sebald's construction of photographed-memory. His constructions of memory are neither the "palimpsest" version of memory that Andreas Huyssen (Huyssen 2003) has written about, nor are they snapshots or portraits, like Boltanski's, placed on the walls of galleries or museums, which create the inevitable aura of a made-up poster like, static graffiti on the walls of domesticated monuments. Their use value is educational. Sebald's exilic storytellers are interrupted by the enigmatic photographs, which exist in the dynamic and dramatic no man's land between art, image, and text thus creating a more ecologically organic historiography of memory than Boltanski's. See Boltanski's archival obituaries, "The Reserve of Dead Swiss," (1990) of newspaper portraits of anonymous dead.

[136] In these cases we are approaching the problem of modern Jewish historiography of assimilation as discussed by Yosef Yerushalmi.

85). The very effort to exist and remember is revealed in the photographs' verbal ideological vernacular reality conveyed by the constructed intimacy of The Book's Photographs. Exile is also neutralized by constant search for the reparation of memory of the lived experience alluded to in the pictures.[137]

Looking at the images with the nomadic Austerlitz's relentless story in our mind, we imagine that the photographs also depict the fated future of the others who are depicted, or that the buildings we see depicted will soon fall into ruins. Sebald's own self-imposed exile lies behind their stories; however, he neutralizes himself in the narration, in the way the pictures depict neutralized lives. The authorial consciousness speaks to us from the road in *Campo Santo* where the stories uncover new exiles, or places where exiles passed through, almost as if Sebald refuses any form of assimilation and seeks places where assimilation cannot happen, as if, identifying with Kafka, he "yearns for his own dissolution, to perish almost imperceptibly in fugitive images running inexorably away like life itself …" (Sebald 2005: 160). The photographs are not pictorial (as in Boltanski); they are fugitive images, homeless, extraterritorial representations of memory.[138] Speaking of Nabokov, who never had a real home and lived, Sebald recounts, only in rented accommodations, Sebald refers to exile as a "looking-glass world of exile" (ibid.: 153).

The enigmatic photographs reveal the enigmas of living with memory traces. I myself have experienced the same haunting extraterritoriality of place and time in the locations that Sebald finds himself in, equally the German towns and villages of the Rhön, and the small villages behind the cities that surround the Isenheim Altar of Grünewald's paintings – the towns are backdrops to Grünewald's tormented and violent scenes of pain and humiliation. I have looked for and found every architectural building and location of his persona Austerlitz's childhood memory in Prague, including the old fortress town of Terezín whose auratic German name of Theresienstadt is associated with organized death. One of my own motivations to see "Theresienstadt" is that the

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[137] It's tempting to compare Sebald's photographs with the passion for collecting that raged throughout the 19th century. This context would include the intimate use of the postcard for recollection. Giséle Freund was one of the first to describe the ideological-vernacular place that photography has in society (in 1934, *Photography and Society* her doctoral thesis at the Sorbonne). The history of German photojournalism is another context. The moods of Eugéne Atget and Heinrich Zille's also have an affinity in the shock of *seeing* space and time. However the photographs should be seen as book illustrations in the way engravings and drawings accompanied 19th century books. Their archaic quality overwhelms all other aspects of depiction.

[138] It is unlikely that Sebald would not have known Hannah Arendt's views (1958) on assimilation and the pariah.

mother and aunt of Siegfried Kracauer, a writer whose sensibility parallels Sebald's were incarcerated in this fortress town and later transported and murdered in Auschwitz.[139] One difference however: Austerlitz visits The Small Fortress, the location of atrocities directed at political dissidents and other unruly prisoners, escapees, and would-be fugitives. I could not do that. I relied on photographs of that haunted place.

The town itself with its 18th century fortress – auratic and mapped with grid like streets and low buildings – is unlike any other Central European town I know. It reminded me of American towns built on a pattern of rectangular blocks, wide enough so wagons, horse drawn machines and tractors, and, if near a military base, trucks, artillery, or tanks could rumble through. Photographs of Terezín could not release the horror of historical memory built into the streets, blocks, river, old battlements. That was until my friend, the geologist environmentalist and writer, Václav Cílek, took us down several flights of stairs in an off-limits semi-abandoned apartment house. Down below were dark hallways with dungeon like doors and rooms with graffiti, Stars of David and other unreadable scrawls and names, melancholic brutal mementos and tracks of obscurity on the doors and walls. The little 8" x 8" windows in the doors with rusty hinges were like apertures about the size of photographic plates.

Nearby was another hidden place that won't give up its secrets to the photographic scene. It was a garden off-limits to contemporary Terezín's Czech-speaking citizens with a garage-like stucco structure where the interior walls were still visibly fading from the even then aura of pastel colors with scenes of sacred places, the hidden prayer house of Jews who had constructed a holy place under the eyes of the Gestapo and certainly a long way away from the International Red Cross contingent that examined Terezín in June, 1944 and pronounced it a healthy prison, a model camp complete with the accoutrements of culture and entertainment.

Terezín has been photographed and mapped countless times. It is a tourist-objective and has international figures like Václav Havel and scholars of memory, like James Young, on its board of directors. The two museums catalogue and display everyday life and the horrors that young and old scan the names on the walls for images of the dead souls. Any sign of an intimate sphere in the town is absent; it is an empty-seeming place blurring historical memory into its many disguises. Adorno's deeply worried "jargon of authenticity" seems to hover over the town. Sebald's own archival memory traces the circumstances of the vernacular-story-telling side of his characters who hover nearby in their

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[139] See my discussion of Kracauer's mother and aunt murdered in Auschwitz: Zaslove (2002). Also relevant is my essay, Zaslove (2000).

geography of exile in *Austerlitz,* Vertig*o,* and *The Immigrants* – those who wander outside the walls of the city. The German title, *Ausgewanderten*, holds onto the meaning of the word more securely than the Latinate 'immigrant'.

Exile is an inwardly directed reminder of the shaping force for the town and for Sebald's work on Austerlitz's memory. The photographs deconstruct the shape and illuminate the incomplete restitution of memory work. Sebald's attempt to rescue the forgotten, exiled individuals parallels Adorno's attempt to rescue the individual from the jargon of authenticity that makes forgetfulness a blurred aspect of historical accounts where the distancing effect that accompanies the photographs brings the idea of loss of sight emotionally closer to us. The half-Jew Paul Bereyter in *The Emigrants* experiences this growing blindness, but continued to read "writers who had taken their own lives or had been close to doing so" (Sebald 1995a: 58).[140]

4. Photographing Memory – the Gestus

The photographs come upon the reader as the uncanny, reminder that visualizing the past, as accurate and precise as the photograph yearns to be, cannot be complete without the story line, the narrative, the resistance to the finality of the photography. Siegfried Kracauer's brilliant comment clarifies the compilational-transitional nature of memory:

> Memory encompasses neither the entire spatial appearance of a state of affairs nor its entire temporal course. Compared to photography, memory records are full of gaps…. The meaning of memory images is linked to their truth content. So long as they are embedded in the uncontrolled life of the drives, they are inhabited by a demonic ambiguity; they are opaque, like a frosted glass which scarcely a ray of light can penetrate … (Kracauer 1995: 50–51).

The commodified image common now to the history of photography, album collections included, begins to have a life of its own, particularly when photography emerged along side of the modernity in the cities. Illustrated volumes of collective historical memory, including the transportable miniature or telescoped collectible objects that photography were catalogued in countlessly banal ways. Memory has its fetish character of cultural reproduction. The aesthetic and technical means to enhance nature with light, perspective, artistic auras is described by Siegfried Kracauer – one of the first essayist autobiographists of the city to relate the silence of the photograph to the rise of the unconscious of the city. He realized in part through George Simmel, that

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[140] Altenberg, Trakl, Wittgenstein, Friedell, Hasenclever, Toller, Tucholsky, Klaus Mann, Ossietzsky, Benjamin, Koestler, Zweig.

fetishized memory pervades the anonymity of the metropoles. Kracauer writes about the monogrammed pathos of the photograph:

> In order for history to present itself the mere surface coherence offered by photography must be destroyed. For in the artwork the meaning of the object takes on spatial appearance, whereas in photography the spatial appearance of an object is its meaning. The two spatial appearances – the 'natural one and that of the object permeated by cognition' – are not identical. By sacrificing the former for the sake of the latter, the artwork also negates the *likeness* achieved by photography (1995: 52).

Pathos and the Elegiac accompany the exile's search for constant reassurance that in the photograph there will be a legacy and remnant of memory – the *gestus* that will stop the wheels in the head from turning over and over again with the incomplete project of the inner world of trauma and forgetting, of holding memory and loss as if the two were commensurable. Wheels turn in our heads; the photographs repeat themselves in Sebald's labyrinthinean chronicles of the characters' dying everyday of forgetfulness. Memory threatens to become obsolete as an organ of knowledge of the self; memory is only a temporary refuge from the abysmal pits of cultural death. The photograph then becomes a reminder of shabby obstacles to recollection.

Perhaps, it is only the empathic viewer who can figure out the meaning of the word "shabby" in Adorno's well-known Jeremiad:

> All post-Auschwitz culture, including its urgent critique, is garbage. In restoring itself after the things that happened without resistance in its own countryside, culture has turned entirely into the ideology it had been potentially – had been ever since it presumed, in opposition to material existence, to inspire that existence with the light denied it by the separation of the mind from manual labor. Whoever pleads for the maintenance of this radically culpable and shabby culture becomes its accomplice, while the man who says no to culture is directly furthering the barbarism with our culture showed itself to be. (Adorno 1990: 367)

The light that bathes the shabby photographic image does not wash the mundaneness away. The aura remains: the demeaning quality and power of the remembered details of the trauma and the culture that did not provide a refuge from trauma. This is the dimmed light emanating from the exilic photographs of Sebald's chronicles of remembrance. The photographs do not bear witness, do not simulate the work of the prose, do not resemble or represent or appropriate the inner speech of the characters' monologues, or the author's working through, in the sense of the agony of writing, the obstacles to remembering those whose memories are obsessing him. Unquestionably, the Freudian construct of remembering: recollection, repetition working through the past is part of

Sebald's exilic unconscious that feels the forms of memory as forms of things unknown.[141]

Memory in Sebald is however closer to the German word "*Eingedenk*" which is closer to an aesthetic act: "to bear in mind", "to be mindful", to always risk the pathos of the recollection in regard to – regarding – the embodied *gestus* of the image that can look back at us with the falseness of familiarity and the peril of falling into the kitsch of remembering what one wants to remember. While the "other" of exile is in some respects the utopia of suffering at home, the violence of invasion of the person is ultimately dislodged from home by the aura of danger to the uncanny home that hovers over exile. Adorno's comment, perhaps even more mordant than his comment about Auschwitz, and which is, in part adapted from Kafka's "happiness is not for us", can be applied to Sebald's pictured depiction of pre-exile existence that enacts in some homely tainted aura a "happy end": "Even the most stupid people have long since ceased to be fooled by the belief that everyone will win the big prize. The positive element in kitsch lies in the fact that it sets free for a moment the glimmering realization that you have wasted your life." (Adorno 1992: 50). For Sebald's personas and characters, home has betrayed the children.

At a particularly pathos-ridden moment in Austerlitz's search for his origins in the children's transport from Prague, the breeding grounds of his forgetfulness of his cultural and personal myth of origins, as well as his obsession with architecture, railroad stations, streets and squares, he hears his former nurse, Vera, say:

> When memories come back to you, you sometimes feel as if you were looking through a glass mountain, and now, as I tell you this, if I close my eyes I see the two of us as it were disembodied, or more precisely, reduced to the unnaturally enlarged pupils of our eyes, looking down from the platform on the Petrin Hill (*Austerlitz* 2001: 158–61).

On Petrin Hill in Prague there is a replica of the Eiffel Tower, a kitsch duplicate on small scale made for the world's fair held in Prague at the end of the 19th century. The image fills Austerlitz with "grief previously unknown" to him (*Austerlitz* 2001: 161), but the book doesn't show a photograph of Prague's Eiffel Tower, which is still standing today and is an attraction for tourists and weekenders from everywhere to peer across the landscape believing that the city,

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[141] Freud's uncannny is closer to the word *Eingedenk* remembering internally as body-made insight as the projection of *inner images*, that is, as encountering the images as transitional objects. *Erinnern*, *wiederholen* and *aufarbeiten* can not happen without this mindfulness.

consciously constructed and geometrically built, is an act of Cartesian nature for nature's benefit. We do see, however, a few pages before (144) an image of neo-Baroque building that housed the Prague City Archives, a bizarre building with surveillance like arcades and balustrades that reminded Austerlitz of monasteries, riding schools, opera houses and lunatic asylums, or, in the framework of the exilic unconscious of this troubled man, of passengers waving from a steamer. (Today this building has been refurbished as a location for music recitals.)

And shortly after we see this image of the picturesque and postcard like diorama of Prague, Austerlitz recalls a garden in Gloucestershire county of wildflowers – "shade loving anemones" – that he had examined with a beloved, now dead, teacher, Hilary. The same flowers were lodged in his memory of childhood Prague, *only the aesthetic memory* that emerges for the reader, who is following this chronicle from European city to European city, remains muted to the status of being a 'gestus' in the way that great photographs are a gestus.

Jeff Wall, a great photographer-artist whose work technically, formally, psychologically and aesthetically reveals the influence of cultural and historical memory as a contemporary aesthetic problem describes one aspect of his work that I quote in full, because Jeff Wall's concept comes closest to what I am trying to show what is in part an allegorical aesthetic, which can illuminate Sebald's use of photographs as an ecological photography of memory.

I cite Jeff Wall who radically undercuts the presumptions of montage and surrealist approaches to show how the aesthetic literacy of memory in Sebald – both organic and inorganic – reveals an understanding of what he is doing with photographs, which reveal the passing of time as an act of judgement within the exilic unconscious on itself, an act of self-accusation about loss, and about the spatial configurations that constitute memory.

Memory as gestus is a representation of spatial events that freeze time and appear again and again as an uncanny representation of the flight from death.[142] This is both an ontological representation of the dialogical nature of story, as Walter Benjamin described it in his famous essay, "The Storyteller", and, further,

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[142] I have pursued the issue of the tacit knowledge of violence in memory construction in the dialogical world of Jeff Wall's pictures in a recent essay (Zaslove 2006, forthcoming). Some of Wall's photographs that depict interior space are: Volunteer 1996, Insomnia 1994, Odradek 1994, Invisible Man 1999/2000, Morning Cleaning 1999, Office Hallway 1997, Housekeeping 1996, The Luggage Depot – Monument to Emigrants and Immigrants 1996–2000 (sculpture).

a revelation that in depiction of intimate and private worlds the aesthetic act depicts interior space in story in the picture. The pictures see us and speak to us. Jeff Wall writes:

> My work is based on the representation of the body. In the medium of photography, this representation depends upon the construction of expressive gestures, which can function as emblems. "Essence must appear", says Hegel, and, in the represented body it appears as a gesture which knows itself to be appearance. 'Gesture' means a pose or action which projects its meaning as a conventionalized sign. This definition is usually applied to the fully realized, dramatic gestures identified with the art of earlier periods, particularly the Baroque, the great age of printed drama. Modern art has necessarily abandoned these theatrics, since the bodies which perform such gestures did not have to inhabit the mechanized cities which themselves emerged from the culture of the Baroque. Those bodies were not bound to machines, or replaced by them in the division of labor, and were not afraid of them. From our viewpoint, therefore, they express happiness even when they suffer. The ceremoniousness, the energy, the sensuousness of the gestures of Baroque art are replaced in modernity by mechanistic movements, reflex actions, involuntary, compulsive responses. Reduced to the level of emissions of biomechanical or bio-electronic energy, these actions are not really 'gestures' in the sense developed by older aesthetics. They are physically smaller than those of older art, more condensed, meaner, more collapsed, more rigid, more violent. Their smallness, however, corresponds to our increased means of magnification in making and displaying images. I photography everything in perpetual close-up and project it forward with a continuous burst of light, magnifying it again, over and above its photographic enlargement. The contracted little actions, their involuntarily expressive body movements which leant themselves so well to photography are what remains in everyday life of the older idea of gesture as the bodily, pictorial form of historical consciousness. Possibly this double magnification of what has been made small and meager, of what has apparently lost its significance, can lift the veil a little on the objective misery of society and the catastrophic operation of its law of value. Gesture creates truth in the dialectic of its being for another – in pictures, its being for an eye. I imagine that eye as one which labors and which desires, simultaneously, to experience happiness and to know the truth about society. (Wall 2005: 294–5)

Sebald's photographs have a dialogical "gestus" force beyond their presence in a story that winds its way through biography and autobiography by resisting, painfully, the dramatic effect of the memory of death and the search for happiness. And even if the apparently random gestures, the small gests, of Sebald's images appear to be banal, trivial, household pictures without compositional sophistication, they should remind us of the more conscious artists in the German tradition of photography as I have said, of Gerhard Richter, or Jochen Gerz, and Thomas Struth who materialize memory into transitional

objects that do not allow memory to be stolen from the spectator who come to life again viewing their own pictures as traumatized citizens.[143] Their work resists being a book on a wall, as Sebald's work is embedded in the reality of a Book. Richter's comments in an interview with Benjamin Buchlow that

> I looked for photos that showed my actuality, that related to me. And I selected black-and-white photos because I noticed that they depicted that more forcefully than color photos, more directly, with less artistry, and therefore more believably. That's also the reason why I preferred those amateur family photos, those banal objects and snapshots.[144] (Neff 1988: 20).

Jeff Wall's statement might remind us, as it reminds me, of Richter, or of Walter Benjamin's attempt to write a book that would heal the condition of traumatic memory that neither the genres of tragedy nor comedy could do. Benjamin's solution was the colportage Book of Remembrance, *The Arcades Project*, where he created out of the aura of the fragment, a genre-breaking image of the book that recycles melancholy into an integration of story, image and projection of exile into history:

> When, as is the case in the *Trauerspiel* [Sorrowplay – JZ] history becomes part of the setting, it does as script. The word 'history' stands written on the countenance of nature in the characters of transience. The allegorical physiognomy of the nature-history, which is put on stage in the Trauerspiel, is present in reality in the form of the ruin. In the ruin history has physically merged into the setting. And it this guise history does not assume the form of the process of an eternal life so much as that of irresistible decay. Allegory thereby declares itself to be beyond beauty. Allegories are, in the realm of thoughts, what ruins are in the realm of things (Benjamin 1999: 77–178).[145]

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[143] Some of the points I make about misappropriation of violence in photographic representations of memory are prevalent in much art-historical criticism, but this problem is typically referred to as an effort to place and periodize art movements within the institutionalization of art that cannot overcome the reification of the photographic object as a commodity and the naming of memory as abjection unless there is politicized content. Wall criticizes this tendency in his *Dan Graham's Kammerspiel*, Art Metropole, 1991.

[144] It is also unlikely, although I have no evidence for this that Sebald would not have known of Richter's paintings and photographs, which begin their blurry epiphenomenal lives in the 1960s when Richter moved to West Germany. The comment is in an interview with Benjamin Buchlow in 1988; this is repeated many times much to Buchlow's chagrin as he tries to pin Richter down. Richter's "Forty-eight Portraits" appeared in 1971. His "City Scape" in 1970. "Helga Matura" in 1966. "Chair" in 1965.

[145] Benjamin's influence on Sebald is undoubtedly profound and yet unrecounted. It certainly occurs around the totality of violence framing the memories of his characters. But if violence is allegorized and totalized, the essayistic yarns of his characters will be

Benjamin's book was a product of the reading room of the Paris National Library. *The Arcades Project* is a book that retains the illusion of both the archive and quotations from memory quoted from an unconscious exilic memory. Austerlitz in his search for lost information about his dead father daydreams his way into diverse landscapes, while in the grip of the Cartesian library systems. His mind becomes a simulacrum to Sebald's writing: colportage materials that portray the exilic unconscious from "the border between life and death" that is "less impermeable than we commonly think" (*Austerlitz* 2001: 283). He escapes from his relentlessly churning thoughts about finding evidence of his father's death by opening an American architectural journal that showed the 'Cartesian' records room of the Terezín Small Fortress. The reader sees the terrifying picture of the well-organized office chamber of death whose files, neatly placed in pigeonholes, some of the files gently leaning against other files as if in comradeship, quantify each victim's recorded 'space'. If Exile in photography and painting can simply be represented by the allegorical then the "ruin" of the person and the reduction of the intimate sphere to transitional objects, like a file folder, reaches for the status of a 'Gestus'.

The photograph of The Small Fortress office is an ante-room to hell: it is an Xray of a condition of memory, the reminder of the children's transport, and for Sebald-Austerlitz, the transporting of his memory into reveries: the fear of loss, the horror of state violence, permanent exile in a camp, ostracism within the structure of the camps, the loss of time, the mystery of the familiar bird or flower, the memory of others' losses, the lost architectonics of the cities that see us and speak to us, the discovery of Jewish settlers in every part of Europe (Manchester, Würzburg, Brussels, Amsterdam, Bruges, Antwerp), remembered Gypsies in his home village of W., and exiles knotted and notated everywhere from visits to Napoleon's town of Ajaccio, Napoleon's birthplace, to Grünewald's altars. Everywhere he turns he finds exilic writing as second nature that returns images of mental travel to Kafka, Nabokov, Conrad. He writes of a dead Alpine guide: At "times the figures of memory come back from the ice more than seven decades later and are found at the edge of a moraine, a few polished bones and a pair of hobnailed boots" (Sebald 1995a: 23). Here Sebald is referring to the remains of an Alpine guide lost since 1914, released by the melting glaciers only

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seen as resigned to the fate of the Hegelian world spirit, history as decline or fragmented. Sebald's dialogical world of ruins does not cause life to flow out of the totality of the "petrified primordial landscape" (Benjamin 1999: 166) but allows, as Peter Bürger says of Benjamin's use of allegory: not 'avant-garde' inorganic art, but "the expression of a fear of a technique that has become too powerful, and of a social organization that severely restricts the individual's scope" (Bürger 1984: 72).

to finally reappear in a newspaper photo reminding the sensationalized readers of origin and glaciated unfinality of memory.

The unfinality of memory is pursued to the bitter end in Sebald's recounting of his return to his home village Wertach from a journey to Italy. He remembers his erotic daydreams about his female teacher, who writes on the blackboard the numbers that "chronicle … the calamities which had befallen W. over the ages and underneath it drew a burning house in coloured chalk" (*Vertigo* 2000, "Il Ritorno in Patria": 240.)

The historiography of numbers are compiled and domesticated into the history of Wertach by the teacher: from 1511 on, Black Death, burned houses, more fires, ashes, Swedes burning villages, plague deaths, volunteers falling in liberation struggles, famines, more conflagrations, 68 fallen in WW I, 125 in WW II echoing the mysterious quality of photographs that are compilations of what Martha Langford calls in an insightful phrase "the afterlife of memory" (Langford 2001: 122–57). One of the few of Sebald's character's other than Austerlitz, who speaks is Vera, Austerlitz's childhood nurse. He finds her in Prague through the magic of the Baroque city archives, pictured on page 144. Together they examine a photograph of a play in which his mother is pictured standing before a kitsch painted mountain scene. Austerlitz hears the painting "speaking of the mysterious quality peculiar to such photographs when they surface from oblivion. One has the impression … of something stirring in them, as if one caught small sighs of despair, *gémissements de désepoir* was her expression, said Austerlitz, as if the pictures had a memory of their own and remembered us, remembered the roles that we, the survivors, and those no longer among us had played in our former lives." (*Austerlitz* 2001: 182–3).

Overwhelmed by the "laws governing the past", and fascinated by the history that is both buried and extinguished by the architecture of the city, Austerlitz says he is not there at all. His memory is now emblematic of the historically emptied out past; his desire to compile memory takes him to Terezín and an encounter with the inalienable mourning, stoically examined in the Ghetto museum:

> skimming over the captions … Austerlitz stared at the photographic reproductions, could not believe [his]
>
> … eyes, and several times had to turn away and look out at the garden behind the building, having for the first time acquired some idea of the history of the persecution which avoidance system had kept me for so long and which now, in this place, surrounded me on all sides (*Austerlitz* 2001: 198).

Austerlitz's topographical compulsions trace the maps of the history of Maria Theresa's town, the namesake of Terezín. Sebald then moves Austerlitz's exilic

unconscious into various locations in Prague and the region, not least the neo-Gothic turn of the century Trade Fair Building on Prague's Exposition Grounds in the district of Holosovice, which was the "compiling" location where the Jews were assembled and 'collected' with all their belongings before being transported to Terezín. To my knowledge, having visited this building many times, there is no commemorative plaque on the Trade Fair. Automobile shows and every conceivable commodity are displayed there, including the annual Book Fairs. On the same grounds is the magnificent Archeological Museum with its collection of medieval statues, some are the originals from Charles Bridge where millions of tourists parade and photograph themselves with the saints. The neighborhood around the Trade Fair was heavily flooded in the August, 2002 flood, and many precious books housed in the buildings were damaged. A little farther north, the Zoo; many animals perished in the flood, some floating down the Vlatava in the direction of Dresden.

The flow of images doesn't stop for Austerlitz and he gazes at winter pictures in an album at his former home and muses about a childhood question about the squirrels in the photographs: "How indeed do the squirrels know, what do we know ourselves, how do we remember, and what is it we find in the end" (*Austerlitz* 2001: 204). Official memory stops for him at the Trade Fair when his mother is interned at Terezín with perhaps 140,000 prisoners, in 1943, 3,367 children. Of the 87,000 prisoners transported to Auschwitz-Birkenau fewer than 4000 survived. Compiling figures is, for Sebald, a monstrous crime. Collecting the horror through documentary pictures might be another genre of crime. However, the drawings that have been collected in books like The *Artists of Terezin* by Gerald Green, or Mendel Grossman, *With a Camera in the Ghetto* (1977), come much closer to the hybrid genre-breaking forms that Bakhtin declared to be the breeding ground of the dialogical.[146] These collections of ghetto and concentration camp photographs must be seen as essayistic prosaic images, not reportage, or documentary journalism. They are, in Bakhtin's sense of the word "dialogical" expressions of fate that frame *the slave-serf exile* and its relationship to master races and unmastered pasts. Socratic dialogues, in Bakhtin's terms, are the origin of the form of the novel, because of the capacity of the dialogue to break with myth and project a sense of the unfinalizability of the image of the human, an image of human freedom.

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[146] Martha Langford writes: "The photographic grotesque, as a restless, hybrid genre, thrives in the borderlands of normative states, the various contexts which it mimics, infiltrates, transforms." (Langford 2001: 111).

This, too, is what Adorno is referring to when he relates the genre of the essay to the silence of the victims who have no genre to speak for them. In Adorno's "The Essay as Form" there might be an epigraph to Sebald's essayistic compilational stories. Adorno writes:

> Out of fear of negativity, the subject's efforts to penetrate what hides behind the façade under the name of objectivity are branded as irrelevant. It's much simpler than that, we are told. The person who interprets instead of accepting what is given and classifying it is marked with a yellow star of one who squanders his intelligence in impotent speculation, reading things in where there is nothing to interpret … letting oneself be terrorized by the prohibition against saying more than what was meant right there means complying with the false conceptions that people and things have of themselves (Adorno 1991: 4).

Sebald's encounter with Terezín produces a sense of the photographic image that interprets. While this might remind us of Boltanski or Richter, as I have said, more to the point are the Terezín drawings of Karel Fleischmann, Leo Haas, Bedrich Frita from the Terezín prison (Green 1969). The graphic illustrations are the framework we should recognize as Sebald's tradition.

In the aftermath of reading Sebald, and encountering these graphics in a book, we recognize that his photographs, as with the fated Terezín illustrations, are not 'art' but communications with the "unknown known" – the silent outside world. Sebald's photographs yearn to communicate with the outside world in the new context that he provides for them. The Terezín artists hoped that if the drawings reached Switzerland they would convince the authorities of the evidence of the atrocities. But nothing convinced them, nor did eye witness accounts or official photographs convince "the other" that mass murder was taking place. What the photographs have in common with the graphics from Terezín is the aura of violence pervading an institution where crowds, mobs, gossip, rumors, disease, rivalries, powerful individuals with a past of power push themselves into positions where they benefit from others' suffering, figures rising up in resistance to the graves or the railroad tracks in the town. The Berlin film of the choreographed and sanitized Terezín shown to the Red Cross emissaries is entitled *Der Führer schenkt den Juden eine Stadt (The Führer gives the Jews the gift of a city)*: the film flickers before Austerlitz-Sebald's eyes.

The limits of the photograph deprived of the oral account, the story, spread boundaries around the dialogue of the depicted individuals in landscapes behind which is the massively amassed identity, negating the cultural values that had not yet been, as Adorno announced, funneled into the great ruined metropoles of the West as collective memory. But in those Metropoles, as Sebald shows in his compilational series of photographs, almost like flickering outtakes of silent films, there is also the denial, the ruins, the inner reservations of previously

exiled peoples and individuals who have, like Joseph in Egypt, Sebald in England, preserved the memory of other histories through images of a language of cultural memory of exile that has become the lingua franca of our time.

5. Compilational Memory. The Riddle of Restitution and Exile as the Commonplace[147]

Sebald's characters do not think of returning permanently to home, nor does Sebald reside again in Germany. The photographs as we see them beckoning from the past, speak of an innocence about the coming future of misery. Such photographs could easily turn up in some shop where colportage albums are sold – fading and stuck together in their anonymous resting-place.

In one poignant discovery, Sebald finds a postcard of Stuttgart in a Salvation Army junkshop in Manchester that shows the Bonatz railway station that he remembered from his childhood "German Cities Quartet" game. A young girl visiting Germany, writes glowingly of a festival with the Hitler Youth. She writes on August 10 1939. Sebald is struck by the thought that on that date his own father was on a convoy approaching the Polish border. The association almost drives him mad. He then recalls and compiles memory traces about his childhood friend Tripp the painter lived in Stuttgart:

> At the time Tripp gave me a present of one of his engravings, showing the mentally ill judge Daniel Paul Schreber with a spider in his skull – what can be more terrible than the ideas always scurrying around our minds? – and much of what I have written later derives from this engraving, even in my method of procedure: in adhering to an exact historical perspective, in patiently engraving and linking together apparently disparate things in the manner of a still life.
>
> I have kept asking myself then what the invisible connections that determine our lives are, how the threads run. What, for instance, links my visit to Reinsburgstrasse with the fact that in the years immediately after the war it contained a camp for so-called displaced persons, a place which was raided on March 20, 1946, by about a hundred and eighty Stuttgart police officers, in the course of which, although the raid discovered nothing but a black market trade in a few hen's eggs, several shots were fired and one of the camp's inmates, who had just been reunited with his wife and two children, lost his life.
>
> *Why can I not get such episodes out of my mind* [italics mine, JZ]? Why, when I take the S-Bahn toward Stuttgart city center, do think every time we reach the Feuersee Station that the fires are still blazing above us, and since the terrors of the last war years, even though we have rebuilt our surroundings so

[147] By "riddle" I mean that exile is a riddle because of its inextricable and incommensurable connection to human rights and the incomplete assimilation of rights into a globalized world. See Gary Teeple (2004).

> wonderfully well, we have been living in a kind of underground zone (Sebald 2005: 200–201)?

Passages such as these are related to other atrocities committed by the Germans revenging the resistance in France. For example, Sebald follows Hölderlin to the locations where these murders had occurred; Hölderlin had been there on one of his exilic journeys.

A non-Jew, Sebald, writes a series of essay-novelistic like treatises on exilic consciousness and unconsciousness from the standpoint of the Jews and the Germans and those others, he writes in "Attempt at Restitution" (2005), whom he finds live are under the same stars as the rebuilt 'Stuttgart', the Daimler factories, the constellation of stars "spreading all over the world". "Why? " he writes, "wherever columns of trucks with their cargo of refugees move along the dusty roads, obviously never stopping, in the zones of devastation that are always spreading somewhere, in the Sudan, Kosovo, Eritrea or Afganhistan … can I not get such episodes out of my mind?" (Sebald 2005: 210). Sebald's "fresco" like episodes are echoed in his own personal reading of Grünewald's paintings, or those blurred and hurried photographs of Ghetto suffering which we have come to see as our cultural memory. I am also thinking that the inclusion of the map of Terezín in *Austerlitz* is along with the photographs one part of the compilational technique of his work. Sebald is right: one needs to look at the maps, architectural and engineering drawings, city planning documents, and sanitation blueprints of the Reich's plans to turn Eastern Europe into a garden city with protocols for clean industrialized "Planning and Reconstruction." Such chilling plans as these that looked to the future of the aftermath of the war are collected in *Auschwitz, 1270 to the Present* (1996) and show the "blueprints of genocide".

In 2002 the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees installed an exhibit of paintings and photographs, *Exile in Art* in the Prague Castle, curated by Ivona Raimanova. The Prague floods came, predictably if one knows the history of the river, the same summer. The exhibit documented exile and flight with original works sequencing biblical scenes from the expulsion and persecution of Christians and Jews, to the columns of refugees on the road searching for protection and assistance, to specific battles that produced exiles and banished minorities and individuals. The flight to Egypt, religious exile, revolutionary events, massacres indexed with paintings by Cranach, Delacroix, Goya, Poussin, Barlach, Bílek, Mucha, Jenewein, Pann, Henry Moore and many more, and with photographs and paintings placed next to each other to show how both painting and photography used the same configurations.

The U.N. didn't blanche at introducing ideas of basic human rights illustrated by standard journalistic photographs of modern diasporas: Albanians, Serbs, Croats, Jews, Slavs, Rwandans, Roma and Sinta peoples, Germans, Czechs,

Hungarians: the spectacle of the exilic. The intimate world of Sebald's pictures of the search for restitution does not fit very well into this chronicle that historicises exile. Exile, in his text and image, interrelates two interpenetrating dialectical others: on the one side the utopian desires to recover what is lost from the destruction of what we can call homeland as a location within nation or state. On the other, to come to terms, repair in the sense of reparation the damaged life, created by the invasion of the material body, the Gestus, illuminated by the "laws governing the return of the past" (*Austerlitz* 2001: 185). The person in Sebald is invaded by history, by the violence-making powers of the state against persons and to the violence of the decomposition of the cities and the expansion of the planning agendas into the global mobility when the borders of states break down and the poorest of the poor suffer "*Ausgrenzung*" as they move or are moved. The end result: the other of exilic unconscious is the violent innocence about the everyday vagabondage inside of the structural inequalities of the world.

The zones of contact of the settled peoples within nation-state boundaries with the ever-increasing numbers of peoples exiled and ostracized has shifted the political borders and cultural and ethnic boundaries in our century of neo-panic in such a way that it may be impossible to define what the classic form of the exile is from all the other ways, in the wake of globalization, that the states inflict violence on peoples by excluding them from the possibility of a settled life. The United Nations classification of human development indices, Charters and protocols have no limits on the way to describe the ways that departures and arrivals, movements of peoples from the city to city are categorized, named, measured and labeled. The refugee carries the exilic consciousness that remains a shaping force, a zone of contact, with a rights-based consciousness that is the unthought known within the "other" of exile: the exilic unconscious. It is clear that this author was having a continuous crisis over the question of the exile and the exilic. The very title of his last book *Unerzählt, Unrecounted,* beautifully translated by Michael Hamburger, himself a German exile translates in the one word, 'unrecounted' the idea of this essay: compiling, telling, unspoken thoughts, the unthought known of the unconscious in the pinpoint silences of the photographs, and yet the wishful thinking toward the future. Andrea Kohler describes this process accurately: "Much as the painter withdraws things from time and gives them the melancholy aura of mementos, these last texts of Sebald's function as inscriptions" (Sebald & Tripp 2003: 99).

My approach throughout this essay has been that Sebald set out to photograph this process and create an inner dialogue about it with his exiled character Austerlitz and his exiled semi-fictional companions, vagabonds, in a world where now capital transects nations with vagabond economics.

6. Vagabonds, homo migrans and Asylum[148]

From the perspective of the UNHigh Commission on Refugees, the official conscience of our time, Sebald's photographs allow us to think about the mobility of refugees in a world of weak institutions of asylum: about persecution based on race, nationality, religion, politics, cultural identity, and the way historical memory still constructs the idea of exile as the normative power that neutralizes memory.

Behind the implementing of state violence on citizens lies warfare and displacement by force, rivalry, and revolution that cause the internal and then international migrations that have marked the evolution of states. Vagabonds: they search for employment often created by environmental disasters, degradation of the means of subsistence, the upheavals to the home work force caused by the increased production of resources and the privatization of massive resources like oil, coal, minerals. The forced resettlement of settled peoples who are forced to make way for roads, dams, powerplants, urbanization, not to say the 'outsourcing' of work to poorer countries just across the borders of nation-states or far away through hypernetted systems of communication as the jargon of authentic mobility to paraphrase Adorno.

Redrawing borders and territories creates new political entities grounded on old symbolic ethnicities, or remembrances of cultural wars from previous times, centuries, and grievances. Political disempowerment means no protection for self or family or businesses, which are isolated or attacked. Welfare structures decline and health, education, hospitals, disease control, population expansion, and lack of farming supplies, infant mortality, aids and malaria are the breeding grounds of the exilic unconscious. It means the furious mobility of capital and homo migrans (Narr 1995: 31).

The proliferation of studies of memory, memorialization of lost dimensions of culture, holocaust and genocide studies have displaced the classic studies of individual exile. The classic paradigm of the exile so deeply embedded with the violence of persecution, ostracism, banishment, expulsion, escape, flight, refuge, being welcomed as a guest, simply having someone to talk to, resettlement, and in some cases redress or restitution, but in a world with walls, in the flight to asylum.[149] The reception of Sebald's writing is certainly affected deeply by the

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[148] In Germany, over the past several decades the most vocal and trenchant speaker for rights and against slave-trading in all its forms in a world of walls and limited asylum has not been Jürgen Habermas but Wolf-Dieter Narr. Narr's writing, well known in Germany, is not known in Canada or the United States.

[149] The Canadian experience with destabilized citizenship and fragmented identities in regard to restitution is similar to many nations, although redressing the Japanese-

waning of the classic exile paradigm. Exile has been refurbished in post-colonial studies as diasporic studies and the proliferation of studies of memory and the memorialization of lost dimensions of culture. Perhaps holocaust and genocide studies have displaced the classic studies of exile for reasons that have as much to do with the overwhelming nature of the subject as the overwhelming nature of the displaced peoples, migrant labor and squatters hardly blocking our worldview.[150]

The relocation, transformation and movements of peoples into temporary subsistence cultures in the cities, or strategic parasitic existences in the margins of the metropoles produce diverse forms of pauperization in the megacities written about by countless writers that go unnamed in this essay. The abandoning of towns that have become superfluous, decentralization of regions that have no regional autonomy, in short the creation of vast regions of extraterritoriality have changed the way the classic forms of exile have to be understood. We know very well that the classic paradigm of the exilic is deeply embedded within western culture and religion and we know, now, with Sebald's writing, that we live in a world where there are too many photographs, too many exiles. His archival memory of text, image, story gives us a cosmogony of exile

There are too many photographs in our world, too many exiles, and Sebald's archival consciousness of the compilational nature of memory uses the cosmogony of exile and restitution to photograph memory – again. He has become one of the paradigmatic exiles for our time when the word has become a ruin of meanings. Exile evolves and will continue to evolve into many other forms. There are and will be other vagabonds like him.

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Canadian internment during the second world war has now became part of the collective negotiating practices of the state, and was finally settled in 1988. See Miki (2005).

[150] See Neuwirth (2005).

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Exile without Borders*

Eduardo Subirats

ABSTRACT

This article offers an extended reflection on the institutional ambiguity of the intellectual, between privilege and exile, exploring its sources, notably in the clash between Pauline Christianity and freedom, and its contemporary articulation.

1. Knowledge; autonomy

The coming together of human knowledge and autonomy in the Copernican discovery of the "revolutions of the heavenly spheres," which represented both a reform of thought and a renewal of humanity, left its imprint on the character of philosophers, scientists, and modern intellectuals. One can observe that new confluence of knowledge and freedom in their artistic, literary, and scientific output. Yet the changes in the intellectual landscape inaugurated by the new human sciences was not merely an emancipation of thought from ecclesiastical and monarchic control. Philosophers and scientists such as Luís Vives, Sebastian Franck, and Paracelsus conceived of the new knowledge as a medium for an explicit critique of feudal absolutism, Christian imperialism, and the human suffering and misery that these institutions imposed *per totum orbis terrarum*.

Vives questioned the brutality of the imperialism of the Cross. Franck spoke out against the European wars of religion. Paracelsus (1952: 310 ff.), physician, botanist, astrologer, and metaphysician, bitterly denounced a Roman papacy that, while professing to spread the doctrine of Christ throughout the world, employed death and slavery to achieve its ends and indulged in orgies of corruption and contempt for the Christian masses. All three thinkers based their opposition to Christian absolutism on a belief in the autonomy of reason, in the capacity of humanity to build a historical world in accord with the divine harmony of the heavens. From Judah Abravnel to Giordano Bruno, the humanism of the sixteenth century sustained a belief – even to the point of enduring the ultimate consequences of holding such a belief: persecution,

* Translated by James A. Lorié.

torture, and death – in the possibility of reestablishing this accord between the historical world and the cosmos. Similarly, the new humanism held out the possibility of restoring spiritual order through a millenarian tradition that integrated Vedic philosophy with the cosmology of the Egyptian magi and with Talmudic wisdom, a tradition that dialogued simultaneously with Sufi mysticism, the Cabala, and modern astronomy. Works such as the *Encyclopédie* and the *Déclaration des droits de l'Homme et du citoyen* are late products of this unification of human knowledge and autonomy.

The institutional ambiguity of the intellectual – privileged by nobles and kings, and indeed by the Renaissance church itself, and at the same time subject to persecutions and exile – is inherent in this two-fold foundation. The unification of knowledge and liberty elevated the humanist to a level of understanding "like that of the prophets," as Abravanel wrote when he fled from Spain (Sloush 1928: 19). But at the same time, the autonomy of knowledge signifies domination: "*scientia et potentia humanae in idem coincident*," in Francis Bacon's formulation. The very same unity of knowledge and autonomy that raised Erasmus and Bruno to the rank of intellectual and social reformers of thought and society also conferred the status of "useful" knowledge on the new sciences, whose "fruits," mythologically identified with the divine feminine and with the fecundity of nature, Bacon had already assigned to the category of capitalist lucre derived from industrial enterprises and colonial expansion. The grand systems of modern philosophy are the architectonic expression of the fragile equilibrium between scientific reason and technological, economic, and social transformations, transformations linked to the ambivalent human meanings of industrial and postindustrial progress.

One of the highest expressions of the unity of knowledge and freedom is found in Goethe. In his botanical and minerological studies, as well as in his critique of Newtonian physics, Goethe combined a rigorous theory of scientific knowledge with humanity's most ancient literary and philosophical wisdom. But Goethe's project, which saw its poetic crystallization in the figure of Faust, was nonetheless destined to founder both politically and epistemologically on the shoals of the mechanical conception of nature, which superimposed itself on the "Spinozan" interpretation of plant morphology, and on Goethe's "romantic" theory of color as well, without any stronger rationale than its congruence with the imponderables of mechanical production and the progress of instrumental reason. Moreover, the economic and political conflicts at work in Goethe's *Faust* announce the reasons for the project's interior dissolution, a truth formulated explicitly in later versions of Faust, including Nikolaus Lenau's in the nineteenth century and Klaus Mann's in the twentieth.

In the end, capitalist progress carried off the beatific vision of cosmic and social harmony contemplated by modern science in the age of Paracelsus and Kepler. It abolished the dialogue between muse and machine that positivists still dreamed of in the great European industrial expositions of the nineteenth century and dissolved the unity of human knowledge and autonomy on which the socialist revolutions of that same century were built. From the moment that American Independence and the *Grande Révolution* evolved into the political and military apparatus of a new secular and technocratic imperialism and the industrial revolution converted scientific epistemology into an instrument of neocolonial subordination on a global scale, from the moment that the learned work of education and enlightenment was shifted into a global system of cultural production and media-transmitted contempt, the modern intellectual has become socially secluded, linguistically fractured, and internally divided. Hölderlin first represented this crisis in the figure of Empedocles, pursued by brutalized masses who could not comprehend the emancipatory value of his critique. An unbroken strand of testimonials to the resulting solitude and desolation stretches from Goya to Munch to Beckman.

Marx, Bachofen, Nietzsche, and Freud, each set about to transform the constituent political and metaphysical elements of the decadent and imperiled civilization in which they found themselves. With the radicality of Renaissance humanists or Enlightenment philosophers, they embraced a wide spectrum of disciplines, including epistemology and natural philosophy, hermeneutics and anthropology, and social theory conjoined with literary and aesthetic criticism. Their work restored the unity of knowledge and human freedom found in Spinoza or Bruno. All of them attested to the need for social and cultural rebirth that could put an end to the suicidal march of nineteenth – and twentieth – century industrial capitalism, and to the cultural decadence that capitalism brought in its wake. Marx reshaped the legacy of a European socialism that had struggled to reestablish harmonious relations in the social and natural realms. Bachofen uncovered matriarchal cults that had stood in non-destructive relationships to nature and had preserved democratic traditions eliminated by the patriarchal order. Nietzsche fixed his gaze on the regenerative possibilities of Greek art and philosophy which Christianity had laid to waste. And Freud developed a method for reeducating a modern consciousness that was choked with guilt, anxiety, and internal division.

The twentieth century has seen an uninterrupted series of reforms and revolutions that have sought to create an alternative to the globally devastating effects of colonialism, to the proliferation of warfare, and to social differences of ever-increasing enormity and social conflicts of ever-increasing intensity. In a manner that is as much aesthetic as philosophical or social, this tradition of

resistance has redirected the waters of artistic and philosophical thought through a profoundly transformative channel. The Russian Revolution of 1917, the liberation of India and China from colonial rule, the national independence movements that arose across the expanse of Africa, and the revolutions in Mexico and Cuba have stood as historic milestones in this endeavor. Out of the crucible of these social changes a new type of intellectual emerged. Rosa Luxemburg, Leon Trotsky, Antonio Gramsci, Mahatma Gandhi, Patrice Lumumba, and Che Guevara all started as writers, philosophers, or journalists and subsequently converted their awareness of the inhumanity of industrial capitalism, and of colonialism, into a social praxis that included methods for political enlightenment, strategies for resistance to authoritarian political systems, and a vision of human solidarity.

At the same time, the twentieth century has also been assaulted and held captive by an unbroken succession of totalitarian systems, imperialist wars, and genocides. Along with a concentration of power in the hands of corporations and the military, the twentieth century has witnessed the development of a complex institutional machinery of propaganda, ideological control, and control effected via mass media. One consequence of the development of this machinery has been the coercion and persecution visited upon intellectuals. Soviet Stalinism, European National Socialism, American McCarthyism, and the various fascisms of Latin America have all offered, on a grand scale, a veritable montage of violations of intellectual autonomy, some flagrant and others covert. The inevitable outcome has been the constant infringement of intellectuals' rights, their permanent exile, and their infinite silence, ultimately resulting in the quarantining of the intelligentsia, heretofore excluded from a public reality monopolized by political authorities, from the commercial means of communication, and from the corporate domain of the techno-sciences.

The new concentrations of power have, for their part, been accompanied by new techniques of production, new systems of propaganda, and the astonishing growth of information technologies that have altered the forms and idioms of intellectual praxis. The unity of knowledge and moral consciousness that once formed the backbone of intellectual praxis has long since disintegrated into a thousand fragments. Intellectuals are now experts and specialists. The scope of their responsibility is limited entirely to instrumental activities, their role reduced to a type of professionalism subject to corporate vigilance and departmental discipline. The conditions of the academic and industrial production of knowledge locate the intellectual within a circumscribed system of micro-domains that, in the best of circumstances, tolerates ethics only as a means to institutional legitimation. In the final analysis, the micro-political networks governing intellectual conduct strangle the expert to the point of complete

intellectual nullification. It is for this reason that the academy continues to validate the disappearance of critical discourse, the paralyzation of reflective consciousness, and the alleged messianic arrival of the postintellectual.

But the intellectual's destiny does not end there. If corporate dominion molds an expert who is pedestrian and disciplined, then in a complementary manner, the culture industry casts the intellectual in the role of professional performer. The former sacrifices all socially responsible communication in the name of professionalism; the latter sacrifices all conceptual and moral rigor for the sake of a mindless cultural spectacle. Both are ruled by the same norms of monetary rationality, but whereas the technocrat is submerged in administrative anonymity, the cultural performer is exhibited throughout the global village with all of the fetishistic glamour once reserved for media stars.

This is the stigma borne by modern intellectuals. Throughout the twentieth century, one attempt after another to organize a democratic and egalitarian society has been crushed. Again and again, political contempt has triumphed over the mass of humanity reduced to impotence and hopelessness. Continually and impassively, we have countenanced concentration camps and refugee camps, the implementation of organized torture and rape, the genocidal use of weaponry, and the dislocation of entire populations by military force. We have been confronted directly with the most extreme forms of human degradation. From the First World War to the global war on terror, modern and postmodern intellectuals have witnessed all of these epiphenomena of capitalist civilization in ever growing proportions. And every time the same pattern of silence, indifference, cowardice, and retreat is repeated; the same stance of implicit collusion and explicit cynicism with regard to totalitarian policies and corrupt regimes is enacted; the same complicity and silence are duplicated and sealed with the politically correct semiotics of sublime patriotisms, impeccable democracies, or perfect communisms.

Julien Benda described the affiliation of European intellectuals with nationalist political movements, which opened the door to fascism and Stalinism, and ultimately to the Second World War, as "le trahison des clercs." But since that time, the charge has acquired global resonance, and its reach now extends far beyond the limited political spectrum that was the concern of Benda's original essay. The passivity displayed both by intellectuals and the academy in the face of the ascent of fascism in the 1930s, the muteness of professionalized intellectuals in the face of the development of nuclear and biological weapons during the Cold War, and the complicity of the "global professor" in the face of the ecological and social destruction of the Third World, are successive examples of an intellectual consciousness thoroughly immobilized by fear, diminished by

opportunism, intimidated by patriotic and nationalist populisms, and contaminated by decadent aestheticism.

No modern depiction has made the poverty of the intellectual – a poverty of many dimensions, moral, artistic, sexual, and political – manifest in a more disturbing fashion than Klaus Mann's *Mephisto*. Mann's novel sought above all to portray both the precarious position of intellectuals who opposed the National Socialist state in Germany and the human vicissitudes caused by persecution, banishment, and exile. But Hendrick, an actor and the novel's protagonist, makes manifest something else that is as dismal as the persecutions and genocides perpetrated by modern fascism: the paralysis of the intellectual faced with the coercive power of the state, and the transformation of an independent artist into an agent fully incorporated into and identified with the performatization of fascist political machinery. *Mephisto* testifies to the annihilation of the modern intellectual as a sovereign consciousness at the very moment in which he is triumphantly elevated to the summit of global power as spectacle.

The historical situation perceived by Mann should in no way be discounted as a simple nightmare of a now defunct authoritarianism. His novel, along with the ban it was subjected to in the postwar years and its subsequent cinematic recuperation by Istvan Szabó, make bring to light a very contemporary problem.[151] *Mephisto* describes the transformation of intellectuals and artists – once mediators of a social process of apprenticeship and of liberation in the sense described by humanists such as Leibniz and Diderot – into stars of the cultural industry, politico-artistic fabulists and producers of politics as work of art. The classic model of this process is still undoubtedly the theory of culture developed by Goebbels – the executive producer of National Socialist propaganda and the man who first connected film production and modern communications to the military-industrial complex and its political representatives, all under an aesthetic conception of political power as absolute spectacle. McLuhan too might be viewed as a minor postmodern pseudo-prophet who recycled the romantic visions of older European fascisms, reshaped by modern technological changes such as Sputnik and the television, and presented them in their North American guise of democracy as talk show. In any case, at the dawn of the twenty-first century, the fascist project of staging politics as spectacle, with its attendant universe of semiologically manufactured triviality, has crystallized into a globally triumphant second nature whose consequences are found in the landscapes of genocidal wars and in the deterioration of humanity.

At the site where culture is diluted in a variety of commercially degraded productions, where the design, production, and promotion of spectacle invades

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[151] The novel was published in the DDR in 1956 and banned in West Germany until 1981.

every expression of human existence, there too the intellectual has ceased to function as an independent intellect, as a socially oriented consciousness, as a moral exemplar, or even as a public figure. Klaus Mann's vision was prescient in this respect as well. His 1949 manifesto *Die Heimsuchung des europäischen Geistes* describes a postwar Europe entirely in ruins and utterly foundering in historical time, a Europe that had lost its faith in progress and watched its most sacred hereditary values collapse. The concepts Mann used to describe portrayed this historical condition were eloquent in themselves: "permanent crisis," "rubble and ruins," "dislocation …" These metaphors have a long history within a European intellectual tradition, stretching from Nietzsche to Adorno, that recognized of the phenomenon of cultural impoverishment depicted by Mann. Mann adds a new dimension to their observations: *Heimsuchung*, a word that designates the condition of being persecuted, captured, entrapped within one's own walls, a word that ultimately alludes to complete political and moral defeat (Mann 1993: 21ff.).

The figure of the modern intellectual has been molded by a series of revolutions that have shaped the modern world in general as well. Jefferson and Paine were philosophical voices raised against colonial European power. Miranda, Bolívar, and Martí were men of letters who envisioned the liberation of the peoples of Latin America. Proudhon, Saint-Simon, and Marx devised categories of thought intended to overcome the cycles of social destruction set in motion by nineteenth-century capitalism. Lenin and Rosa Luxemburg defined a political means of resistance to modern imperialisms. The new political will of the Blanquistes and the Saint-Simonians, of anarchists and communists, of Third World national liberationists and partisans of various anti-colonial fronts, all are encompassed by one word, a military metaphor: the vanguard. Intellectuals assumed the role of pioneers in the march of history toward the final emancipation of the proletariat, the condemned of the earth, the masses of humanity assembled by industrial capitalism and then made superfluous. Their critique of society and their vision of history were conceived under the banner of justice. Theirs historical spirit was animated by Jewish humanism and messianism, strengthened by the heretical eschatologies of medieval revolutionary Christianity, and then secularized by the scientific rationalism and anti-clericalism of the encyclopedists. The conceptual framework for a rational harmony between the natural and historical worlds, together with the strategies and tools for its political realization, all flow together in the consciousness of the modern intellectual.

Nobody has defined the idealism of this revolutionary consciousness as fully as György Lukács, in his classic work *Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein* (1968). According to Lukács, scientific knowledge of the conflicts experienced by society,

together with the moral will to emancipate humanity from its chains, gave revolutionary intellectuals a normative function. Their social criticism and their ability to orchestrate a collective process of enlightenment and subsequent emancipatory action signaled the birth of a new historic consciousness: "the consciousness that does not develop into a completely passive spectator … nor into the power of a subjective arbiter" (Lukács 1968: 252). According to Lukács' social theory, once the governing intellectuals' liberating function reached its fulfillment, once the project of establishing a community of the free and self-aware subjects of a humanized history reached its completion, the intellectuals would renounce their detached stance and dismantle their transcendental epistemology for the sake of democratic self-rule.

By the end of the twentieth century, though, the construction of a global order under corporate control, together with the global extension of colonialism and the concomitant propagation of war on a planetary scale, has revealed the opposite historic tendency. And intellectuals have not been immune to this inversion. Intellectuals have been devoured by administrative and financial bureaucracies; vaporized by the productive systems of instrumental rationality; and transfigured by the fetishistic glory of media spectacle. The principle of autonomy that had defined their noble humanist past, their function as social liberators during the Enlightenment era, and their tenaciously reformist thought has been derailed by the rocky scarps of the post-political, the post-historical, the post-human, and the end of philosophy. Ultimately, the autonomous and liberating characteristics of the intellectual vanished without a trace into the vacuity of the administratively domesticated knowledge industries, into the deconstructionist labyrinths of academic production and reproduction.

The intellectual dependence on corporate and governmental administration identified by Charles Wright Mills in the middle of the last century, as well as the parallel fossilization of the intellectual in the figure of *Homo academicus* described by Pierre Bourdieu in the 1980s, have in the meantime effectively become a *fait accompli*. Professionalism and specialization, the codes of administrative discipline, the universal subordination of intellectual activity to the principle of economic return, all have conspired to create the moral apathy, the pandemic of theoretical mediocrity, and the sonorous public silence that characterize intellectual life at the start of the twenty-first century. The norms of administrative efficiency and profitability have enclosed the corporately organized knowledge professions within the limits of a blind technocratic pragmatism, in the case of the technical-scientific faculties, and within a tightly circumscribed field of irrelevant intertextualities, in the case of the humanities.

Within the academy now, it is deemed impertinent to protest the corporate monopolization of information, the eco-cidal and genocidal effects of industrial

biology, or the degradation of democracy into spectacle. In an age of massive commercialization and trivialization of culture, to debate the crisis in the sciences or at the institutional frontiers of the humanities is to take a considerable risk. To question the globalization of violence or the devastating policies enacted in the developing world is a dangerous transgression. Socially responsible reflection in an age defined by atrocities, the massive denigration of human rights, and the construction of global systems for the totalitarian control of civil society, profanes the hallowed neutrality of the lecture hall. Thinking is not politically correct. Faced with the manifest absence of meaning in the discourses of economic development, industrial progress, and national security, the academy and its "last intellectuals" have become mute witnesses to their own eclipse.

When there is nothing to say, when nothing can be said or no one wants to say it, the best remaining option is to talk about language. The fetishization of language, which began in 1960 with the Saussurian School of the Parisian left and culminated in the deconstructionist hysteria at Yale University, compensates for the muteness of intellectuals in the face of the crisis of legitimacy in the postmodern sciences. None of the great dilemmas of modern critical theory have escaped this omniscient semiological customs-house. According to its axiomatic precepts, the Freudian unconscious is a grammatical construction of the subject, the struggle between the classes merely a meta-historical allegory, the corporate control of information a *fata morgana* and a system of simulacra. Everything begins and ends in discourses, constructions, representations, performances, allegories, and semiotic strategies. Nuclear war is an ambiguous referent, global warming merely an interdisciplinary hypothesis, the irreversible destruction of cultures across the planet a matter of semiotic hybridism. The ultimate consequences of this linguistic turn among intellectuals have been the propagation of systems, the proliferation of jargon, and the fragmentation and decay of academic discourse, until what results is a fraudulent chatter that makes the pedants ridiculed by Bruno in his dialogues seem dignified by comparison.

Moreover, the semiotic vaporization of critical theory has gone hand in hand with its micro-political dismemberment. Feminism, queer theory, cultural studies, studies of subaltern subjects and local identities delineate the space in which postwar European critical theory has been dismantled and scrapped. These developments have eliminated any genuinely theoretical perspective on the various conflicts that are springing up at the start of the new century; meanwhile, ponderous critiques of representation and tedious analyses of performance continue to echo throughout the academy.

The banners of pluralism and multiculturalism have also waved superciliously over the rhetorics of the global academy. The watch-words, dressed up in the avant-garde sex appeal of the ethereal newest left, never advance beyond eclectic

semiologies of hybrid representations. Under the cloak of such banalities, technocratic monolinguism, corporatized spectacle, unidimensional political thought – not to mention military armaments and the global violence they fuel – continue to circulate effortlessly off campus, the consequences of which have been devastating in every way for those cultures that are not white, Western, or Christian. Ultimately, one cannot ignore the extent to which the academy's institutionally circumscribed and philosophically irrelevant thought has been characterized by two fundamental attributes: the nonexistence of any genuine intellectual agenda, and the resulting absence of any authentic political projection.

In the context of classic totalitarianisms, Klaus Mann laid open the fatal dilemma faced by the modern intellectual: a disjunction between political opportunism on the one hand, and autistic isolation on the other. C. Wright Mills (1963) denounced the vaporization of the intellectual by the machinery of production, by bureaucratic apparati, and by the entire corporate system, a phenomenon visible from public administration to the industrial laboratory. Having endured the mutilation inflicted by McCarthyism, the intellectual has now been utterly devoured by the structures of academic administration, resulting in the sub-departmental deconstruction of the intellectual detailed by Russell Jacoby (1987) in his account of his long agony on the campuses of North America. The commercialization of intellectual production by the cultural industry has reduced the intellectual's creativity to the lower limits of mercantile triviality and media manipulation. At the same time, in the developing world, the combined effects of criminal dictatorships, of the destruction taking place under the auspices of the World Bank and the countries' own national universities, and of the colonization of the most vital indigenous artistic and intellectual traditions as sub-products of the Western culture industry, all foreshadow a violent denouement (Volpi: 327ff.).

In this age of "organized irresponsibility," in which great decisions devolve upon corporations and anonymous bureaucracies, the intellectual as an exemplary individual consciousness has been ruthlessly cut down (Mills 1963: 298). The deconstruction of intellectual discourse, the subordination of intellectuals to the stereotypes of industry, and the enlistment of intellectual activity as a productive component in various cultural industries, in financial and or administrative mega-machineries, have mired intellectuals in a condition of conspicuous impotence. They do not see, or do not want to see, the disaster that befalls them. Thus even when intellectuals are confronted directly with the crisis of our time, their institutional confinement drives them into passivity and emptiness. Like the Angel of History depicted by Benjamin, the intellectual can do nothing. In our age, the electronically dispensed blindness of the global

village forms a necessary condition for the survival of corrupt political, military, and financial leaders; thus, intellectuals' expertise regarding structural conflicts of ecological or social origin, their full awareness of the systemic irrationality of economic policies and economic development programs, and their scorn for mass media reduce them to a condition of marginality.

2. Unbounded exile

In his *Retablo de las maravillas* [*The Altarpiece of Marvels*], Cervantes (1921) presents an allegory of society as spectacle. His protagonists are a company of performers of comedy and farce. One day, they arrive in a certain village and announce that they will present a miraculous show; the show will include biblical episodes, an appearance by the Grand Turk, even an attack by a terrifying bull. But the company of actors imposes one condition: only men and women of clean blood can attend the show. In Catholic Spain, to have clean blood is to be free of Muslim or Jewish lineage.

Everyone accepts the challenge. Everyone turns up at the theater. Everyone acclaims the miracle. Everyone enthusiastically applauds an empty stage.

Suddenly, a soldier appears. No one expected his arrival, and no one recognizes him. Like Cervantes himself, he carries within himself memories of voyages to distant lands. But he has arrived late for the performance, and he knows nothing of the stipulations regarding who can witness its hyperreal visions. Without hesitation or doubt, the foreigner exclaims that there is nothing to see on the stage, that the miracles are a farce, that the spectacle is an empty sacrilege.

The crowd hears the affront; it rises up and cries with one voice:

> '*¡Basta: de ex illis es! ¡De ex illis es! ¡De ex illis es!*
> *¡Dellos es, dellos, dellos es!...*
> *¡Basta: dellos es, pues no ve nada!*' (*Cervantes*: 151)
>
> ['That's enough! He is ex illis! He is ex illis! He is ex illis!
> He's one of them, one of them!
> That's enough! He's one of them, so he sees nothing!']

Cervantes denounces Hispano-Christian racism and calls into question the very concept of faith, which has been recast as obedience by means of ecclesiastic intimidation. The foreigner who sees that there is nothing to see embodies the cognitive structure and the enlightening social function of the modern intellectual. Cervantes' comedy also marks the intellectual as a negative consciousness. The intellectual's reflective critique is founded on a double negation: it is the denunciation of emptiness; the negation of nothingness; a "no" to non-being.

This critique of the emptiness of representation, of the falseness of propaganda, of the nothingness of spectacle, also encompasses a social dimension, inasmuch as it lays bare the constitutive principle of a false national consciousness – the connivance of an entire people with the subterfuge of purity of blood. On top of, or perhaps beneath, all of that, Cervantes places the intellectual under the stigma of "ex illis." The intellectual is a foreigner, one of the others: the exile.

"Ex illis" is not the etymological root of the word "exile," but it signals the social stigma, the constitutive wound of exile. Banishment and extradition, like ostracism, expatriation, and exile, are words that designate social exclusion and segregation, and hence the confinement and isolation of the intellectual. Indeed, not only do these words denote the reflective consciousness's dislocation in social and political space, they also reveal precisely the excision of that consciousness from its historic time, together with the deep wound that results. Exile defines modern intellectuals' social isolation, their politically and linguistically besieged condition, and consequently their social impotence and existential precariousness. How has this excision of the intellectual consciousness from modern cultural history come about?

Cervantes' comedy is illuminating in this respect as well. The segregation of the intellectual, first as a foreigner, then as an exile, and finally as an outlaw – the three phases experienced by the soldier in *Retablo de las maravillas* – is shown to be a consequence of an absolutist political system, one that founds its patriotic identity on the compulsory principle of imperial Catholic universalism and, equally, on an illusory – and hence necessarily genocidal – ethnic identity.

This politico-theological definition of exile generates series of important ramifications. One is the system of persecution by means of which national identities have been forged. Another is the epistemological and mystical "body" of inquisitorial torture, which constitutes yet another chapter in the transcendental configuration of Christian "ethnicity." Today, it is necessary to emphasize anew the truth that all nationalisms and patriotisms are built upon proscription, deportation, and exile as their necessary constituent conditions.

On the other hand, these persecutions and banishments give rise to migrations of intellectuals in search of more open social spaces. The social and cultural deterioration that ensues from this banishment of intelligence, from this exile of cultural idioms and memory as well, is another germane consequence of the politico-theological definition of exile. Cervantes in particular throws this false principle of Hispano-Christian identity into sharp relief in his oeuvre: a principle that demanded the sustained performance of sacramental acts and acts of faith; that succeeded in extirpating Hispano-Judaic spirituality and Hispano-Islamic mysticism from Spain; that persecuted the scientific and philosophical humanism of the Renaissance with fire and blood; that continued to sponsor inquisitorial

orgies right up until the moment of the Great Revolution; and that never ceased satiating, by means of its incessant witch-hunting of liberals and romantics during the last two centuries, its hatred of anything reminiscent of the open spirituality it had wiped out.

The bloody historic panorama of Western progress prompts one final line of inquiry: What kind of energy lit the bonfires in the first place? What was the source of the original flame that set off this continual destruction of life, knowledge, tradition, and sacred sentiment? What profound rancor has nurtured and continues to nurture the thirst for the destruction of everything that is most noble in the cultures of the past? Why have spiritual men and women been systematically eliminated throughout the expansion of Christianity and the West?

The persecution of liberals in the Soviet Union, the suppression of intellectuals in the United States by McCarthyism, the exile of the intellectual vanguard by European fascism, the persecution and mass extermination of intellectuals in Latin America under the auspices of the Cold War: all of these examples seem to point to an intimate relationship between the exile of the intellectual and modern totalitarianism. But to contemplate exile from this exclusively political point of view would be as limiting as viewing it solely from the legalistic perspective of human rights, as confining as interpreting it as an anomalous episode in comparative literature. What, then, are the deep sources of this radically enslaving and annihilating force that has persecuted, banished, expatriated, and eliminated both enlightened mystics and learned intellectuals, both shamans and rabbis? Why are the instruments of torture and the cells of the Inquisition a constitutive moment in the paradigm of the exiled modern consciousness?

If a singular model of the persecution, dismemberment, and destruction of spiritual legacies and their intellectual leaders throughout the history of the West is provided by the Christian Church, then an important source for understanding the originary meaning of the Christian exile of the intellect is provided by its founder Paul. Two or three citations from Nietzsche will be illuminating in this respect.

Nietzsche's critique of Christianity, which is at base a critique of Pauline theology, is motivated by three primary considerations. The first, and undoubtedly the most important, is the dialectic of sacrifice and transcendence out of which the *kyrios kristos*, the Messianic Lord, is constructed. Nietzsche focuses on the sense of nothingness affixed to the cross of being as the absolute principle of Christian transcendence. Nietzsche's second critique of Paul concerns his allegorical falsification of biblical history, his tergiversations regarding its most universal spiritual values, and his subversion of the Judaic

conceptions of the cosmos and of being. But Nietzsche raises still another objection to Paul: his exile.

Paul's biography is the biography of an archetypal exile. From Tarsus to Damascus, from Antioch to Ephesus, from Jerusalem to the capital of the Empire – the city that was his final destination, the city in which he sowed discord and disorder – wherever he went he was accused of betrayal by Jewish communities and of undermining established custom by gentile communities. Wherever he went, in the end he was persecuted as a divisive presence, beaten and stoned as a meddler, and ultimately driven out as a malefactor. And yet his sectarian mission grew in visionary intensity as each new persecution purified him, enabling him to conceive of a perfect community of the factious, an *ekklesia* founded on the sovereignty of the Messiah, the *kyrios kristos*.

This erratic existence, an existence of being repeatedly banished and outlawed – that is to say, the originary condition of Christian exile – was based on four firm principles: the concept of an absolute and originary debt, the transcendence of being effected by means of the sacrifice on the cross, the suppression of Jewish law and memory, and the establishment of the new faith as a system of credit based on the settlement of debts after death.

In every pre-Christian religion, from the cosmological Celtic and Mayan religions to Buddhism, the cross is, together with the circle, a symbol of the unity, plenitude, and harmony of being as conceived from the point of view of its conflict and dynamism. But Paul lifted the messianic and transcendental meaning of the torture, agony, and sacrificial death of Jesus – a death effected through the cruelest and most humiliating method of intimidation and slaughter applied to the political enemies of the Empire – onto this same cross of being. And it was on the site of this messianic, or, more precisely, Christological, sacrifice that Paul built the architecture and the logos of a new consciousness, a new humanity, and a new universal spirit of history. Paul thus established a new *ekklesia* in space and time, a *sui generis* entity that refused to accept the contingent being of human communities, of their spiritual memories and knowledge, of their laws and sacred forms of life.

Culpability, or more precisely, the narrowing of the multiple meanings encompassed by the *Bereshit* to a single and absolute postulate of debt, this was the great Pauline concealment. In the first instance, this guilt or debt thrusts death into the edenic heart of being; at the same time, it raises an absolute barrier between the human and the divine and between consciousness and the cosmos. But according to the Pauline politico-theological program, the cancellation of this originary debt through grace (*karis*) – that is to say, justification through the sacrifice of the Messiah (*kristos*) – can only take place within the space opened by a rupture with the Law (*nomos*), which Paul identifies with sin (Romans 6:14;

Galatians 5:4). And that rupture entails the abandonment of Jewish memories and forms of life, as well as the Jewish conception of being and of the cosmos, the full sense of which is encompassed by the notion of *halakha*. This is the blackmail imposed by the Pauline concealment. From the absolute and originary debt, a new obligation arises as a necessary condition for reconciliation with being and with the divine: the abandonment of traditional norms of life, first for the Jews, then for the gentiles, and ultimately for all of humanity.

This is also what exile signifies for Paul: a fraudulent double condition – the separation of consciousness from being (*oussia*) as a consequence of the principle of debt, and the simultaneous separation of human existence from its communities and its ways of life (*halakha*) as a condition for the settlement of the debt by means of sacrificial grace. This Pauline Christological exile is the point of departure for Paul's concept of transcendence: a new humanity, the heavenly Jerusalem, the power (*dynamis*) of the Messiah over all sovereignties (*arche*), authorities (*exousia*), powers (*dynamis*), and dominions (*kurietes*) in the present and future of all of humanity (Ephesians 1: 19–21).

The Pauline double exile carries within itself the category of the second Moses, enthroned as the founder of a new divine people (Taubes 1993: 58). It is the foundational condition of the Christian "ethné" (Ephesians 2: 14–16; 1: 22), not least because it establishes the Messiah as the principle of absolute power, universal judge, and the spirit of history, the meaning of which has been reformulated time and again in the papal bulls of the imperial Christian era, in philosophical systems of universal history and, equally, in the use of the notion of *one world* as its ultimate secularized rendering in colonial corporate propaganda.[152] This exile ultimately crowns itself with the conciliation of the heavens and the earth under the sign of *pleroma kairos*: the divine plenitude of historic time (Ephesians 1: 10).

Exile from the community and from being is likewise the ontological condition of the syllogistic constitution of the *je pense*. The Cartesian rational subject is the logical definition of a consciousness cut off from its eyes, its hands, and its body. It is a logical subject segregated from its own existence, a subject that severs all of its links with nature and community. Its descendant, Kant's transcendental logos, is itself the result of the dislocation of thought from the community of speakers, from their interests, and from their forms of life. *De nobis ipsis silemus*

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[152] The concept of the Christian *ekklesia* as a uniform "Third Race," distinct from Judaism and paganism, was formulated in Patristic literature and was rooted in Paul's political theology (Tomson 1990: 3). It was also the criticism that Hellenistic and Roman intellectuals directed at the Christian sect during the first two centuries of its history (Harnack 1902: 197ff.).

are the opening words of the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*: the universal capacity of the transcendental Kantian consciousness ignores itself as a contingent existence; it is in exile from society and cut off from the very nature that it dominates. Similarly exiled is the intellectual as defined by Marx, the intellectual as universal historical consciousness, as revolutionary leader, and as the apostle of the universal egalitarian community. Marx's doctrine of a universal revolution that would ultimately suppress all class differences is itself heir to the Pauline doctrine of a community of Jews and gentiles mingling together in the universal church under the sign of Christ (Agamben 2005: 30ff.).

The same postulates of separation from being and the suppression of community drive the aesthetic of the artistic avant-garde of the twentieth century. Both the Dadaist anarchists and the futurist fascists silenced cultural memory as zealously as the Christian iconoclasts did. Functionalism – with its utopias, its crystalline cities and its skyscrapers whose radiant towers illuminate the firmament – affirmed the structural and material bases of absolute abstraction from nature and from being. The idealized geometric cities envisioned by the pioneers of modern architecture were the metastasis of the celestial Jerusalem depicted by Paul. Moreover, the artist installed in the historical avant-garde by Malevich and Mondrian rose from the ashes of history and from the devastation wrought by modern industrial warfare, and thus the avant-garde held itself up linguistically and theologically as the inaugural moment of a spirit of redemption bestowed by a transcendent, universal, and absolute normative power.

The separation of consciousness from the linguistic community and the postulation of an absolute origin by always reiterated history and writing "degree zero" redefine intellectual exile as a constituent principle of Christian civilization, as the force that configures the discursive identity of that civilization, and as a sacred institution. Intellectual exile is likewise the point of departure for the modern utopias of nation, republic, or communism, and for the postmodern global village as well. Exile is the metaphysical condition of the subject of universal domination.

In his commentary on the *Letter to the Romans*, Giorgio Agamben articulates an interesting series of etymological associations. For example, he mentions *klesis* in the sense of calling, of messianic vocation – *klesis* as a private call in a reflexive dimension, as revealed in the miraculous conversion of Saul into Paul by divine will when his horse tossed him to the ground. But while *klesis* signifies a divine call, it also anticipates *Beruf*, which, in barely secularized languages like Castilian, must still be translated by coupling the meaning of mystic vocation, corresponding to the word "Ruf," with the sense of being missionary by profession: "professional vocation." This meaning is further associated with an

ascetic monastic discipline that makes visible a secret link between the professional concept of the modern intellectual and Pauline Christology. Finally, *Klesis* also signifies the investment of a priestly class through the abandonment of the law, and it is thus related to the construction of an *ekklesia* conceived as the community of the called, of those bound together by the sacrificial suspension of the law and the sacrificial conversion of being.

In short, the condition of modern intellectual is the necessary apostolic and missionary consequence of the Pauline inversion. Agamben's commentary on the Pauline origins of modern exile permits us to understand the defection of modern intellectuals in the face of the great modern political crises as indeed constituting a "*trahison des clercs*" in the literal sense of the word *klesis*: cleric and clergy. It permits us to understand the defection as a clerical abandonment of the contingent being of society, with its conflicts and memories, for the sake of an idealized transcendental city. What Agamben ultimately makes evident is the intimate relationship between this ecclesiastical vocation on the one hand and spiritual theocracy – or the theocratic universalism of the spirit – on the other, a relationship that extends from Paul to the Hegelian and Marxist philosophies of history (Agamben 2005: 20ff., 98ff.).

At the time of its formation, this exiled intellectual consciousness was a divine soul; it elevated itself to the summit of eternal spirituality and ultimately transformed itself into the self-conscious subject of the universal history of reason. In Paul this exiled consciousness is evidently bound to the dream of a transcendent community and a universal empire. The Augustinian utopia of the *City of God* is an expression of this same Christological ideal. Baroque mysticism, philosophic and artistic humanism, scientific rationalism, and modern philosophies of social revolution all share certain fundamental traits – the heroic grandeur of the individual consciousness, of an exiled group advancing in the vanguard – with the errant wanderer Paul. But modernity is faced with the reverse of Paul's celestial exile. Modernity witnesses the collapse of this principle of domination into an abyss of solitude, anguish, and emptiness, an abyss in which nothing can give meaning to the culpability that underwrites the transcendence of being, to its failed redemption, or to its wretched consciousness.

Der fliegende Holländer raises the clamor of its fanfare to this Christian consciousness. Wagner's mariner is the embodiment of the infinite freedom and the absolute individualism delineated by Fichte and Hegel. In this eternal pilgrim, Christian exile is carried out to its most extreme consequences: the Dutchman's dominion extends over an ocean without borders, and his existence rises to an intangible dimension of being and time. Yet the Dutch mariner is also a capitalist subject. His mythical ship is a metaphor for infinite technological power. Over the course of his interminable adventures across the perilous seas,

he accumulates treasures from every culture. He is for that reason also the colonizing subject; his eternal existence grants him the absolute power that belongs to death.

But in contrast to the Christian interiority of Paul, Ignatius of Loyola, or Luther, and in contrast to the Cartesian rationalist or the phenomenological secularization of this interiority, the absolute character of the Dutchman's subjective power and infinite consciousness no longer blazes under the sign of grace, of unity with the absolute. The meaning and destiny of Wagner's mariner are the death, nothingness, and the void. Exiled from the very nature he subdues, exiled from the community he has dissolved in his infinite consciousness, and exiled from his own existence, which he has transformed into a mere instrument of his chimerical wanderings, his empty consciousness no longer desires anything except for its own extinction. The same social separateness, the same mortification of contingent being celebrated by baroque mysticism as the splendor of the absolute subject, dissolves this subject's consciousness in the center of cosmic catastrophe.

3. No to non-being

Cervantes' *Retablo de las maravillas* does not take up in any way the Christological dialectic of sacrifice and transcendence, of exile and redemption, that is at work in the bloody reign of the spirit of history. Quite the contrary: at the dramatic culmination of the work, the crowd exclaims, "Dellos es … pues no ve nada" ["He's one of them … so he sees nothing"].

"To see nothing": to say no to the nihilistic spectacle of a transcendent being that in actuality encloses the mystery of the void within itself; no to the spectacle of a negative and false nothingness; no to the negative spectacle of devalued and subverted being. This is the double negation that defines the soldier's illuminating action.

The soldier knows that the village knows that there is nothing on the stage. But instead of acclaiming it as a theophany, a *deus ex machina*, a spectacular miracle, the soldier rejects this nothing. The soldier, as intellectual, places his reflective negation of the emptiness of being in opposition to the spectacular sacramental affirmation of transcendence and the justification of being. This negation in turn calls into question the order of Western and Christian false consciousness.

For this reason, it has to be an outsider who enacts the negation. Only those who have received the stigma of difference, of otherness, are truly foreigners and exiles. By these means are they despoiled of being: a consciousness that knows itself to be nothing and nobody is a consciousness in exile. But the negation of its being is precisely the spiritual condition that enables this consciousness to negate nothingness. Cervantes's intellectual is a foreigner and an exile, but not in the

sense of one who deserts the community of the law, halakha, or dharma. On the contrary, he represents the negation of that negative consciousness, the double negation of the isolated consciousness and the alienated community.

Where the horizons of this reflective exile lie becomes clear in the definition of the modern intellectual presented by Günther Anders (1951) in his interpretation of Franz Kafka's literary oeuvre. The two primary categories he employs are *Entfremdung* and *Verrücktheit*. The first, the concept of "alienation," proceeds from Marx and makes manifest the double condition – exiled from being and despoiled of existence – that obtains under the conditions of labor, social coexistence, and biological survival created by capitalism. To this referent Anders adds certain other related concepts: *Befremdung*, *Enstellung* … distanciation, the estrangement from and deformation of reality viewed precisely as facets of the same process of capitalist alienation. *Entfremdung*, like alienation, makes manifest a pathology of modern consciousness: it designates the excision of consciousness from the real and its division from itself as well. *Verrücktheit*, the other concept Anders uses to define to condition of the contemporary intellectual, radicalizes this pathological, schizophrenic dimension of modern consciousness. But in addition, *verrücken* connotes distancing, parting, turning one's back. According to Anders' interpretation, Kafka constructs a gaze founded upon displacement and distancing, upon estrangement and a separation from all that exists. Only in this sense is he able to reflect the insanity, the schizophrenia, that reigns in industrial civilization (Anders 1951: 15ff.).

The Kafkaesque intellectual is thus also an intellectual in exile, but in an entirely different sense from that inaugurated by Paul: this intellectual resides precisely in that unique point of view capable of disarticulating the charismatic subject of transcendence, particularly the transcendence conceived by Christian theology. The most eloquent examples of this are found in those works with animals as protagonists: the chimpanzee in *Ein Bericht für eine Akademie*, the beetle in *Die Verwandlung*. The reflective intellectual must assume the extreme alienation of animal irrationality in order to manifest the horror of the rational human world.

But in Cervantes' comedy, the soldier does more than denounce the irrationality of Christian reason and capitalist reason. On the night of this false nation, which constitutes itself sacramentally in the theater of marvels, Cervantes not only says no to spectacle through the character of the soldier, but also reawakens the spectators to the very cultural memories that the spectacle obliterated. In this way Cervantes sketches the elements of a concept of *Aufklärung* that does not close itself off, as Kant's did, from the autonomy that pure reason possesses as the exiled constituent principle of consciousness, community, and being; instead it remains open, as Herder's did, to the memory

of origins. Through his comedy, Cervantes presents himself as the intellectual who says "no" to non-being in order to open consciousness to knowledge of the origins of being.

There are four possible responses to the question of memory and to the question of the hermeneutics of being and its origins: those modeled by Karl Marx, Johann Jakob Bachofen, Sigmund Freud, and Paul Klee.

The most important component of Marx's thought from a contemporary perspective is certainly not its Pauline dialectic, the postulated revolutionary conversion of existence into a reign of the spirit in which all differences of race, class, language, memory, and norms of life vanish. The only component of Marx's theory that still has force is his critique of *Entfremdung*. It is a critique of humanity's banishment and estrangement from nature, from community and memory, viewed as a constitutive moment of the spirit of capitalism. From this point of view, Marx rejects Paul's theology to the extent that he conceives of the salvation of humanity as transpiring not through the alienation of its own nature and memory, but rather through their re-appropriation. For Marx, liberty is not to be found in the negation of "*man*" in the name of a purportedly authentic being-for-death, to recall the metaphors operating in Heidegger's Christian nihilism. The emancipation of humanity, alienated and exiled as the global proletariat, consists for Marx in the reintegration of humanity into a historic community, in the reestablishment of humanity's own nature, and in the regeneration of its norms of life. In this sense, it might be said that Marx reintegrates a liberated humanity into a historic community and into the reality of its own historic contingency, the same reality that the psychoanalytic theories of Georg Groddeck and Freud call "*Es*," and that comprehends the biological, physiological, historic, and spiritual substructures of human existence.

With regard to Bachofen, it is possible to make a similar point. His work *Das Mutterrecht* uncovers the cultural base consisting of mother goddesses that lies beneath the subsequent patriarchal religions and juridical systems. But the fundamental question marked out by Bachofen is not simply concerned with those same goddesses or their icons; rather, it is concerned with the conceptions of time and the cosmos, the unity of humanity and being, that they guaranteed. In the face of countless expressions of the disequilibrium and chaos that follow from patriarchal domination and its theological subversions, Bachofen's archaeological reconstruction recovers forms of productive exchange between humanity and nature, models of social organization and conceptions of the sacred capable of preserving the harmony of being.

Freud should be viewed from this same perspective. What is at issue is not his theory of the unconscious, but rather his analysis of the libido and its relation to the primordial principle of energy: Eros. It is to this notion of Eros that Freud's

critical theory owes its importance. By situating neurotic and psychotic constructions of consciousness, psychic traumas, and even social organization itself on the foundation of this principle of energy, which is also spirit, Freud introduces into modern reflection on the world a philosophical tradition that achieves the sublimity of the Vedas and the Song of Songs, of Renaissance Platonism and the Iberian Cabala. In so doing, Freud devises a newly harmonic conception of the unity of humanity and being.

Klee represents the lyrical and metaphysical reconciliation of alienated consciousness with being. His work reestablishes a visual, physical, and spiritual unity between human eyes and the colors, materials, and emblems of the poetic and pictorial universe.

4. Consciousness under siege

The postmodern liquidation of the reflective intellectual traditions of the twentieth century has provided justification for the micro-political deconstruction of rationality, which in turn has been irresponsible in the face of posthuman strategies for economic genocide, for biological and electronic domination, and for nuclear holocaust that have arisen in modernity. When the identity of human knowledge and autonomy coincides with systems of destructive exploitation and brutal domination on a planetary scale, intellectual reflection is suppressed. The identity of philosophical criticism and social reform that was central to the work of modern intellectuals from Spinoza to Marx has drifted into a system of electronic hyper-information the ultimate consequence of which is the paralysis of the historic consciousness. This media-induced, and academically induced, impotence has restricted the intellectual to an inactive function of delivering irrelevant testimonials to random human or ecological horrors. In previous eras, exile delineated the jurisdictions of national political authorities, but it has now been generalized throughout the space of global control, encompassing everything from television channels to academic departments and to their own "ready made" idioms. It is no longer possible to speak with any rigor of the exiled intellectual because exile has become a universal condition. Hence the metaphors favored by contemporary academic jargon: borders and frontiers, transcultures, displaced subjects, hybridisms; hence also the contemporary intellectual gaze, polarized between the micro-politics of subalternity at one extreme of the global discourse, and the production of the posthuman at the other extreme.

In the best of circumstances, a minor intellectual presence is tolerated in the irrelevant position of marginalized dissidence, from which it can offer a micro-political critique that does not question aggregate systems in their full amplitude. A Nobel Prize winner can protest the systematic rape of women along the US-

Mexico border as a gender issue, for example, as long as silence is maintained regarding the corrupt military and global-financial networks of which these crimes are but traces. By means of the degraded media figure of the "left-wing intellectual," the culture industry and the academy carry out the ultimate validating function of staging scenes of freedom of expression in the midst of the spectacle of a politically mutilated democracy.

An independent intellectual – an academic at a global university in the West, for example, or a journalist at a local media enterprise in the developing world – necessarily faces a crucial dilemma: censorship and confinement or administrative instrumentalization and media exploitation. The cultural politics of the twentieth century offer countless examples of intellectuals liquidated by the same media that they themselves employ as experts and advisers. Such is the case in the paradigm of the American postmodern: *Citizen Kane*. Kane represents the synthesis of financial power and the power of spectacle. Under his zeitgeist, we see the baptism of a new type of intellectual, the post-modern agent of negated negativity, the anti-human post-subject shaped by structuralist positivism, the ascetic-semiotic renouncer of reality, the exalted priest of the nothingness of the void.

And yet everything appears to work in favor of this great absent figure. On every side, meetings, conferences, and congresses are held for intellectuals and about intellectuals. Describing the public role of writers or artists at the beginning of the twenty-first century entails recognizing that their glory is celebrated everywhere. Their photographs appear on the front pages of newspapers; the Internet publicizes their biographies; both television and the academy maintain a veritable cult of the intellectual. As the intellectual's institutional confinement and divided consciousness pass across the stage of cultural spectacle, they are miraculously transfigured by the semiologies of glamor and excitement.

The transfiguration of intellectuals into media stars is not contradicted by their evident social desertion; their transfiguration actually complements the desertion. The very same media that turn the intellectual into a public fetish also silence the intellectual in the face of the great dilemmas of our time. It is often forgotten in this connection that the function of the intellectual, whether in academic departments or in the information complex, is not one of reflection. The spiritual universe represented by Andy Warhol or the *Nouvelle Philosophie* is fictitious transcendence. It is spectacle.

The debasement of the intellectual as "public man" occurs in direct proportion to the valorization of the journalist as the performer of reality. While the former is privatized and consigned to the roles of commercial author and corporate academic, the journalist is exalted as the meta-author of the culture of spectacle.

Journalists are to grant significance to any given piece of news or current of thought, to decide hierarchies of values, to establish focal points for both intellectual and anti-intellectual attention, and, consequently, to channel, concentrate, and discharge the media-absorbed masses via electronic conduits. The power of journalists is absolute because the "miraculous" function of producing reality in all of its possible meanings devolves entirely on them. Of course, at the same time this performative function subordinates journalists to political and financial bureaucracies; their independent judgment and activity are restricted to an even greater extent than are those of academics, whose institutional confinement at least guarantees a modicum of irrelevant freedom.

Nonetheless, institutional subordination is not the principal restriction faced by journalists. The journalist's professional work is ultimately governed by the epistemological boundaries of information, which do not reside primarily in censorship or in propagandistic manipulation. Even in those cases, or perhaps precisely in those cases, in which a journalist's clean intellectual conscience enables him or her to reveal true crises, extreme crimes, social disasters, or evident abuses of human rights – as we see happening throughout the global village today – the journalist's most radical testimony still will not challenge the condition of passivity that structurally defines the information media. When it comes to reports on genocide, or video clips of torture and executions, the greater the journalist's professional integrity – delimited as always by the formats and idioms operant in the communications industry – the more apparent the journalist's complicitous position as a narrator, as a betraying witness, as an onlooker reduced to impotence, becomes. The paradox of journalism in a society founded on spectacle is that professional competence as meta-author of the real is nevertheless not enough to move journalists beyond the same "watch 'n' wait" condition that already condemns their humanist and techno-scientific counterparts to a state of irresponsibility and aphasia.

The intellectual: unlimited exile. Stranger to political and corporate power in this age of contempt and destruction; alienated from a culture of *prêt-à-porter* forms, categories, and values; expatriated from various pre-designed idioms; censured, confined to heavily monitored channels of information and fields of culture; bystander to the spectacular wreck of the bloody spirit of history; expelled from the sacred origins of being; condemned to testify to the annihilation of the human. And yet it is still necessary to say no to non-being; no to exile; in the silence of being.

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