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Compliance and Growth -
NPT Review Conferences  he NPT mandates that five years after its entry into force, a review conference would be held; and after 25 years, a conference would be held to determine the duration of the treaty. Since the First Review Conference in 1975, one has been held every five years. States parties were able to reach agreement on a final declaration containing substantive language on the implementation of the NPT's various articles only in 1975, 1985, and 2000. The 1995 Review and Extension Conference agreed to extend the treaty indefinitely as part of a package with two decisions and a resolution, but the conference was not able to adopt a final document.
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2010 Review Conference (New York, May 3—28, 2010)
Parties: 189
Issues: Disarmament, security assurances, nonproliferation, peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the nuclear fuel cycle, IAEA issues, safety and security of nuclear materials, universality, NWFZs and regional issues, export controls, withdrawal
Preparatory Committee:
Third Session (New York, May 4-15, 2009)
Chairman: Boniface Chidyausiku (Zimbabwe)
Second Session (Geneva, April 28-May 9, 2008)
Chairman: Volodymyr Yelchenko (Ukraine)
First Session (Vienna, April 30-May 11, 2007)
Chairman: Yukiya Amano (Japan)
By the time of the Second Review Conference, the membership had increased to 112 parties, including Japan and West Germany. Implementation of nuclear disarmament under Article VI remained a challenge. |
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2005 Review Conference (New York, May 2-27, 2005)
Parties: 188
Participating states: 153
President: Sergio Duarte (Brazil)
Issues: Non-compliance, Iran, North Korea, withdrawal, nuclear terrorism (non-state actors’ possible acquisition of nuclear weapons or materials), clandestine nuclear supply network, negative security assurances, nuclear disarmament, peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the nuclear fuel cycle, enforcement mechanism
Resolved: The seventh Review Conference failed to reach any substantive agreement. The final document merely summarized the conduct of the meeting. This conference was characterized by a deep division between regional and political groups—the Western Group and Others (WEOG), Eastern Group, and Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)—and between nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states. Disagreement over procedural issues prevented negotiations on substantive issues until late in the second week of the Conference. States parties were only able to reach agreement on the agenda on Wednesday, May 11th, 10 days after the opening. The main committee meetings were supposed to start on Wednesday during the first week. Disagreement over the agenda stemmed from the United States and France backtracking on the nuclear disarmament commitments made at the 2000 and 1995 review conferences. This was unacceptable to the Non-Aligned Movement, and much effort was required to work around the ensuing impasse. Since the main committee meetings did not start until May 19, the allocated time for substantive negotiations was insufficient. None of the main committees was able to adopt agreed upon text with the result that no final document could be presented to and adopted by the final plenary. When the NPT states parties met at the 2005 Review Conference, they sought to find effective solutions to meet the most difficult challenges the NPT has faced in its 35 year history. Unfortunately they failed to do so. The failure of the Review Conference to respond collectively to numerous challenges facing the treaty today, has already led many to forecast that the treaty is doomed to fail, especially if the 2010 Review Conference has the same fate.
The states parties seem to have run out of options for dealing with the only three states that have not joined the treaty—India, Israel, and Pakistan—now armed with nuclear weapons. Despite North Korea’s announced withdrawal from the treaty in January 2003, the states parties have yet to collectively respond to this unprecedented challenge. This apparent inaction appears tantamount to tacit acceptance of yet another nuclear-armed state outside the treaty. Concerns have increased that some NNWS, such as North Korea, Iraq, Iran, and Libya, have in the past been, or continue to be, involved in clandestine activities related to nuclear weapons development. Moreover, concerns about the acquisition of nuclear material by sub-national terrorist groups and clandestine networks such as that of A.Q. Khan have intensified. Responding to these new nonproliferation challenges, new initiatives have been taken, of which some have generated debate over further restriction on the inalienable right of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The majority of states parties continue to be deeply concerned that despite the core bargain of the treaty—to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and promote the ultimate elimination of these weapons—more than 30,000 nuclear weapons continue to exist in the arsenals of the five NPT nuclear weapon-states and the three de facto nuclear capable states.
The Review Conference represented a missed opportunity for states parties to respond to these challenges, and address long-standing issues. But, a Review Conference should not only be judged by the ability or lack thereof by states parties to agree by consensus on a final declaration. Although short on substance, the Conference offered an opportunity to explore new ways to strengthen the Treaty, including ways to enforce compliance and to prevent further withdrawals. While the Conference could not find ways to deal collectively with these challenges, it did focus the spotlight on a number of pressing issues of common concern.
Preparatory Committee:
Third Session (New York, April 26-May 7, 2004), Chairman: Sudjadnan Parnohadiningrat (Indonesia)
Second Session (Geneva, April 28-May 9, 2003), Chairman: László Molnár (Hungary)
First Session (New York, April 8-19, 2002), Chairman: Henrik Salander (Sweden)
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2000 Review Conference (New York, April 24-May 19, 2000)
Parties: 187
Participating states: 158
President: Abdallah Baali (Algeria)
Issues:Nuclear disarmament, regional issues in the Middle East, South Asia, and North Korea, non-compliance, universality, IAEA safeguards
Resolved: This was the first review conference since 1985 to adopt a final document. The document included an unequivocal undertaking by the five nuclear weapons states to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament as part of "Thirteen Practical Steps" for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article VI.
The final document resulted from appeals to the NWS by the New Agenda Coalition (NAC), comprising seven NNWS countries: Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa, and Sweden. These countries were able to marshal consensus on both a "backward-looking" document on disarmament assessing compliance as well as a "forward-looking" document on disarmament proposing thirteen practical steps that would require the NWS to:
1. achieve the early entry into force of the CTBT;
2. establish a moratorium on nuclear test explosions pending the entry into force of the CTBT;
3. negotiate a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) at the Conference on Disarmament;
4. deal with nuclear disarmament in the Conference on Disarmament;
5. implement the principle of irreversibility with respect to nuclear disarmament measures;
6. undertake unequivocally to accomplish the total elimination of nuclear arsenals;
7. work toward the early entry into force of START II and the conclusion of START III as soon as possible,
while preserving and strengthening the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty as a cornerstone of strategic stability and as a basis for further reductions in nuclear weapons;
8. complete the Trilateral Initiative between the United States, Russia, and IAEA;
9. take specific steps agreed to by the NWS leading to nuclear disarmament:
- further unilateral nuclear weapon reductions;
- increased transparency with regard to nuclear weapon capabilities and the implementation of reductions under Article VI;
- further reduction of non-strategic or tactical nuclear weapons;
- concrete, agreed upon measures to further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons;
- a diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk of their use and to facilitate nuclear disarmament; and
- the engagement of all five NWS, as soon as appropriate, in the process leading to the total elimination of nuclear weapons.
10. place excess weapon fissile material from dismantled nuclear warheads irreversibly under IAEA or other international
verification arrangements to preclude the re-use of such materials for military purposes;
11. reaffirm that the ultimate objective of the disarmament process is general and complete disarmament under international control;
12. report regularly within the strengthened review process on the implementation of Article VI and the "programme of action"
outlined in Decision 2 of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference; and
13. develop further verification capabilities to assure compliance with nuclear disarmament agreements.
Concerns were also expressed over the importance of Iraq's and North Korea's compliance with IAEA safeguards, the tensions between India and Pakistan, and Israel's continuing opaque nuclear policies. All states in the Middle East were invited to take practical steps towards the establishment of "a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons as well as other weapons of mass destruction," and report their progress at the 2005 Review Conference. The conference deplored the nuclear test explosions carried out by India and Pakistan in May 1998. In efforts to achieve universal membership, the conference called on the remaining four states not party to the treaty (Cuba, India, Israel and Pakistan) to join the treaty.
The Conference also adopted the decision on "Improving the effectiveness of the strengthened review process for the Treaty." In this decision, the states parties reaffirmed that three sessions of the Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) should be held in the years prior to the review conference, and that if necessary, a fourth session would be held in the year of the review conference. In addition, the states parties recommended that specific time be allocated at sessions of the PrepCom to address specific relevant issues. They also agreed that the purpose of the first two sessions of the PrepCom would be to consider principles, objectives, and ways in order to promote the full implementation of the treaty, as well as its universality. At the third and fourth (if necessary) sessions, the PrepCom should make every effort to produce a consensus report containing recommendations to the review conference. The last session of the PrepCom should also finalize the procedural arrangements for the review conference.
Preparatory Committee:
Third Session (New York, May 10-21, 1999), Chairman: Camilo Reyes (Colombia)
Second Session (Geneva, April 27-May 8, 1998), Chairman: Eugeniusz Wyzner (Poland)
First Session (New York, April 7-18, 1997), Chairman: Pasi Patokallio (Finland)
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1995 Review and Extension Conference (New York, April 17-May 12, 1995)
Parties: 178
Participating states: 175
President: Jayantha Dhanapala (Sri Lanka)
Issues: The treaty's duration, nuclear disarmament, Middle East, strengthened review, non-compliance of Iraq and North Korea
Resolved: The conference could not agree on a final document, but states parties agreed to extend the treaty indefinitely as part
of a package involving two other decisions and one resolution.
By the Fifth Review Conference in 1995, some states that once possessed nuclear weapons had renounced that option and had formally joined the NPT as NNWS. Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine agreed in 1992 to give up the nuclear weapons deployed on their territories by the Soviet Union and to join the NPT as NNWS. South Africa dismantled its six nuclear weapons and joined the NPT in 1991. Argentina and Brazil both had apparent nuclear weapon programs, but halted their development and joined the NPT in 1995 and 1998, respectively. In total, an additional 38 states had acceded to the treaty by 1995, including the NWS of China and France, increasing its total membership to 178 states. China and France were allowed to join the treaty as NWS because they manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967 (as provided for in Article IX of the treaty).
According to Article X.2 of the NPT, 25 years after entry into force, a conference of NPT members would decide whether to keep the treaty in force indefinitely or extend it for an additional fixed period or periods. While the majority of the states favored the treaty's indefinite extension, some NNWS wanted the treaty extended for a fixed period of 25 years as a way to maintain leverage over the NWS with regard to progress in nuclear disarmament. Thus, if the NWS did not comply with their obligations by continuing to make progress with disarmament, the NNWS had the option of not renewing the treaty. Those arguing for indefinite extension of the treaty saw any other option as undermining the authority of the NPT and of the nonproliferation regime, as well as weakening the basis for nuclear disarmament by the NWS.
After much debate, it was decided to extend the treaty indefinitely as part of a package that included separate decisions on the strengthened review process, principles and objectives for nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament, and a resolution on the Middle East.
In terms of Decision 1, "Strengthening the Review Process for the Treaty," the states parties agreed to hold preparatory committees (PrepComs) for the review conferences in each of the three years preceding a review conference. If necessary, a fourth preparatory committee meeting could be held in the year of a review conference. At the PrepCom meetings, states parties should consider principles, objectives, and ways to promote the full implementation of the treaty, as well as its universality. PrepCom meetings can also make recommendations for further action to the review conference.
Decision 2, "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament," was adopted in order to accomplish full realization and effective implementation of all the provisions of the treaty. This decision also called for the full realization and effective implementation of Article VI of the treaty, including through a program of action on nuclear disarmament. The program of action included the conclusion of a CTBT no later than 1996, a ban on production of fissile materials for weapons purposes, and systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons, with the "ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons."
The resolution on the Middle East called on all states in the region to join the treaty and put all nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. Although Israel was not named directly, it is the only state in the Middle Eastern region not party to the treaty. The resolution also required all states in the region to work toward a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons, as well as other weapons of mass destruction, and called on all NPT states parties, in particular the nuclear weapons states, to support this goal.
The Conference was unable to agree on a Final Document due to differences between NWS and NNWS on how to characterize past progress in achieving the objectives of the treaty, in particular in relation to Article VI.
Preparatory Committee:
Fourth Session (New York, January 23-27, 1995), Chairman: Pasi Patokallio (Finland)
Third Session (Geneva, September 12-16, 1994), Chairman: Isaac Ayewah (Nigeria)
Second session (New York, January 17-21, 1994), Chairman: André Erdös (Hungary)
First session (New York, May 10-14, 1993), Chairman: Jan Hoekema (Netherlands)
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1990 Review Conference (Geneva, August 20-September 14, 1990)
Parties: 140
Participating states: 84
President: Oswaldo de Rivero (Peru)
Issues: Implementation of nuclear disarmament, CTBT, safeguards agreements, security assurances
Resolved: No final document was produced because of disagreement over Article VI and negative security assurances
as well as frustration that CTBT negotiations had not progressed
At the fourth review conference in 1990, participants welcomed nine new members, to make a total of 140 parties. China and France participated as observers.
Preparatory Committee:
Third Session (Geneva, April 23-May 2, 1990), Chairman: Bariyu Adeyemi (Nigeria)
Second Session (Geneva, September 11-15, 1989), Chairman: Tadeusz Strulak (Poland)
First Session (New York, May 1-5, 1989), Chairman: Chusei Yamada (Japan)
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1985 Review Conference (Geneva, August 27-September 21, 1985)
Parties: 131
President: Mohamed Shaker (Egypt)
Issues: Horizontal proliferation to non-member states, especially Israel and South Africa; CTBT
Resolved:The final document urged expansion of nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs) and progress on nuclear disarmament. Consensus was only possible because the document reflected differences between states' views on disarmament.
At the review conference, some argued that horizontal proliferation, particularly in Israel and South Africa (neither of which was a member of the NPT), was threatening the treaty's objective of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. Review of the treaty's text was divided among three main committees for the first time. By 1985, several NWFZ treaties were in existence:
the Antarctic Treaty
of 1959,
the Outer Space Treaty
of 1967,
the Treaty of Tlatelolco
of 1967 in Latin America,
the Seabed Treaty
of 1971, and the
Treaty of Rarotonga
in the South Pacific. While the Antarctic, Outer Space, and Seabed treaties
relate to environments not inhabited by people, they, like the
Tlatelolco and Rarotonga treaties, represent efforts to prevent
the introduction of nuclear weapons into areas that up to this
time have been free of them.
Preparatory Committee:
Third Session (Geneva, April 22-May 1, 1985), Chairman: Jayantha Dhanapala (Sri Lanka)
Second Session (Geneva, October 1-11, 1984), Chairman: Milos Vejvoda (Czechoslovakia)
First Session (Geneva, April 2-6, 1984), Chairman: Ryukichi Imai (Japan)
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1980 Review Conference (Geneva, August 11-September 7, 1980)
Parties: 112
Participating States: 75
President: Ismat Kittani (Iraq)
Issues: Implementation of nuclear disarmament and halting of the arms race, peaceful nuclear assistance and cooperation
Resolved: Parties were unable to reach consensus on a final document.
Many NNWS called on the United States and USSR to ratify
the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) II
(which the United States had withdrawn from consideration following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan), and called for the conclusion of a
Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).
By the time of the Second Review Conference, the membership had increased to 112 parties, including Japan and West Germany.
Agreement on implementation of Article VI remained a challenge.
Preparatory Committee:
Third Session (Geneva, March 24-April 1, 1980), Chairman: C.G. Maina (Kenya)
Second Session (Geneva, August 22-24, 1979), Chairman: Gerhard Herder (East Germany)
First Session (Geneva, April 17-20, 1979), Chairman: R.R. Fernandez (Australia)
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1975 Review Conference (Geneva, May 5-30, 1975)
Parties: 91
Participating states: 58
President: Inga Thorsson (Sweden)
Issues: Treaty objectives, treaty implementation, and strengthened adherence, U.S.-Soviet arms race
Resolved: Review conferences would be held every five years. The final document reaffirmed commitment to treaty objectives and
urged nuclear weapon states (NWS) to comply with disarmament obligations.
The treaty stipulated that five years after its entry info force, a review conference would be held in Geneva, Switzerland. This conference convened in 1975 and decided that review conferences would be held every five years thereafter to review the implementation of the NPT and assure that its purposes and provisions were being realized. The work of the conference was divided among two main committees—one for disarmament and another for other issues. The most pressing issue at the conference was dissatisfaction with the continuing U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms race. The conference urged the NWS to pursue nuclear disarmament as required by Article VI of the treaty. A substantive final document was only possible through the "iron-fisted" leadership of the Swedish president.
Preparatory Committee:
Third Session (Geneva, February 3-14, 1975), Chairman: Lannart Eckërberg (Sweden)
Second Session (Geneva, August 26-September 6, 1974), Chairman: Eugeniusz Wyzner (Poland)
First Session (Geneva, April 1-8, 1974), Chairman: William Barton (Canada)
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