June 6, 1975(1)
I wish to thank the Security Council for this opportunity to make a statement, and in particular the delegations of the United Republic of Cameroon and the United Republic of Tanzania, for proposing a hearing. It is a privilege to address the Security Council, and in 1972, I was grateful to have had a similar opportunity in Addis Ababa, under the sponsorship of the Organisation of African Unity.
This privilege is a special one for me as a South African, and more particularly as a representative of the British Anti-Apartheid Movement, which was established in 1959 to campaign for an end to apartheid and white domination in southern Africa.
If I may say so, it is also perhaps appropriate and fitting that I should speak immediately after my friend Mr. Ivor Richard, who was an active supporter and member of the Anti-Apartheid Movement in the 1960s. Our movement has consistently supported the policies of the United Nations and OAU and, in so far as it has been within our power, we have done everything possible to alert public opinion in Britain and the world to the dangers inherent in the southern African conflict.
Since 1960, immediately after Sharpeville, where British Saracen armoured cars were used in the massacre of Africans at Sharpeville and Langa, we set about organising a world campaign for an international arms embargo, and to a certain extent we have some success to show.
I have not come to New York to tell the Security Council what to do about Namibia: that is for members of the Council and other Member States to decide on the basis of their own commitments to the people of Namibia, and of what SWAPO, the recognised and authentic representative of the Namibian people, asks of the United Nations. My purpose is to share with the Security Council our understanding of the Namibian problem and provide certain information which may assist it effectively to discharge its solemn responsibilities.
Our movement has, since its inception, been concerned with the problem of Namibia. In 1966 we held an international conference in Britain on South West Africa. That Oxford Conference, under the chairmanship of Mr. Olof Palme, the present Prime Minister of Sweden, reached the conclusion that there existed a clear moral, political and legal basis for securing South Africa's withdrawal from the international Territory, and recommended the termination of the League of Nations Mandate. It unfortunately also reached the conclusion that what was absent, what was lacking, to assert this responsibility was political will on the part of the major Western Powers.
In October 1966, the General Assembly terminated the Mandate, called on South Africa to withdraw from the Territory, and declared that the Territory was a United Nations responsibility. Since then, the persistent refusal of the apartheid regime to relinquish its control over Namibia, and its illegal and brutal actions in that Territory have, if anything, made stronger the grounds for international action against the illegal occupying Power.
Yet we witness once again a total absence of will on the part of the major Western Powers to take any meaningful action. With the assurance of this kind of Western support South Africa's letter to the Secretary-General, which I have read carefully, seems to reveal no desire on the part of the Pretoria regime to withdraw from Namibia and hand it over to the United Nations. Worse still, in that letter the Vorster regime claims to have found, between December and now, what it calls the "true leaders" in the Territory, and it is prepared to engage in discussions with those "true leaders" to facilitate South Africa's policies of apartheid in Namibia.
Pretoria, as we know, rejects SWAPO totally. There is talk of elections to reveal SWAPO's support here in the Security Council and elsewhere; but, in our view, we should be very careful to be clear as to whom we need to convince that SWAPO is the authentic organisation of the people of Namibia. The United Nations and the Organisation of African Unity have already recognised SWAPO. So are we here to try and prove to the illegal occupying Power the authenticity of SWAPO before it concedes the rights of the United Nations over that Territory? For South Africa, if it is genuine, the question is simple: withdraw from Namibia and leave it to the United Nations to conduct the process of decolonisation. This they reject totally.
In this Council and in other organs, South Africa has been characterised as a police State, and the full force of its terrorism has been inflicted on the Namibian people as well. However, in recent years, with rapid militarisation, that police State has also become a garrison State. In recent years, the occupying Power in Namibia has been forced to respond to the resistance of the Namibian people by sending ever-increasing contingents of the army and the air force in order to preserve its control. In June 1974 the Pretoria regime announced that large contingents of the Defence Force had been dispatched for duty in Namibia. Also, for the first time, the regime openly boasted about its military bases in the occupied Territory.
The South African Digest of June 21, 1974, issued in Pretoria by the South African Government - a copy of which I have here and will be pleased to provide to the Permanent Members of the Security Council in particular - stated:
"The South African Army is fully operational in the Caprivi area on an effective low-intensity war footing... From strategically situated bases in the area, trained National Servicemen are regularly lifted by helicopter to selected spots for patrol duty."
In a special report in the same journal about vigilance on the border, the Digest describes the situation dramatically and I quote from page 8:
"The South African Air Force giant C-160 Transall Troop carrier taxied to a stop at Mpacha Air Base, Caprivi... Hundreds of splendid-looking South African soldiers were perched atop armoured vehicles and trucks. Armed to the teeth, the casual-seeming attitude of the troops belied their obvious state of instant readiness.
"It was a wonderfully reassuring sight. Here indeed were solid men at the front. To the members of the official South African press party - the first such group allowed into the anti-terrorist war zone - the message was loud and clear: South Africa's fighting border is in good hands."
The report mentions the C-160 Transall aircraft, which is a joint French-German product sold by France to South Africa, and about which representations have been made by all our movements, by OAU and indeed by President Kaunda to the leaders of those countries.
In the same journal, the Digest, there are several photographs. One is a clear one of a helicopter used by military patrols in Namibia. I identify it as a Super-Frelon helicopter supplied by France. Whenever the French Government has been called upon not to supply weapons to South Africa it has responded by suggesting that French weapons are not to be used for internal suppression in southern Africa, and in any case the United Nations does not have a mandatory embargo. Last year we were heartened when the newly-elected President of France told the world that France would not supply weapons for use against people who are fighting for self-determination. I know that it often takes a Government a long time to implement its policies, but one year is a long time even for the French Government. Here is clear evidence of French weapons being used in Namibia to preserve South Africa's illegal occupation. These weapons are utilised to suppress the struggle of the Namibian people for self-determination and independence. In the light of this evidence - and there is much more that we can provide from South African sources - what has the French Government done? In the unlikely event that the Paris Government did not know of it, and in the light of this evidence that I am submitting today, what does it propose to do? I do not expect that the French Government wishes to behave dishonourably in this respect and it will, therefore, assure this Council that it will forthwith cease the supply to South Africa of all military equipment and spares for those weapons. I hope too that the French Government will, as a result of its own experience of the Pretoria regime, which has apparently violated French conditions regarding the supply of these weapons, immediately announce a complete arms embargo against South Africa and send South Africa's arms buyers, who I know are at this moment negotiating to buy more weapons at the Paris Air Show, back home to South Africa. This, in our view, is the minimum that the world and no doubt the French people expect of the Government of France, and we await the response from Paris.
Recently we have received certain documents which appear to be authentic evidence that the NATO system of codification of military equipment and spare parts now extends to South Africa. We have presented this material to the Chairman of the United Nations Special Committee against Apartheid, and it was released here in New York on June 4, 1975. The South African regime has installed a modern military communications system with headquarters not far from Simonstown, and a substation of this communications system is based in Walvis Bay in Namibia. This system, on which I have done considerable research, monitors and can establish contact with all aircraft, ships and submarines throughout the South Atlantic Ocean and the entire South Pole area and across the Indian Ocean well beyond India. Various military journals have reported that it is directly linked up to London and Washington. The documents we have show that the initial arrangements for the system were made by certain West German firms and the West German Defence Ministry. They show too that the NATO code for equipment and spares has been used for this Advokaat system. I refer to NATO form AC/125 No. 8 (Revised), which is the NATO form for the codification of spare parts. Since announcing this information a few days ago, our office has received a further document, which apparently is in the hands of the South African authorities, entitled, "NATO Codification of Equipment, Initial Exchange of Information". The number of this is described as NATO Form AC/135 No. 8 (Revised). These two forms are, therefore, complementary.
NATO has admitted in the past that it has prepared plans for operations around southern Africa, but all NATO members, as well its Secretary-General, have denied that South Africa has any links whatsoever with NATO. We should like to know how it has then come about that South Africa, which is not a member of NATO and is far outside its treaty area, should have this codification system which is only meant for NATO members. Who provided South Africa with the code? Does this mean that the principal NATO Powers have already placed such a high degree of reliance on South Africa's defence role in the southern hemisphere that they propose to treat South Africa as if it were almost a NATO member? Are we to conclude from the advertisements placed by South African embassies in NATO capitals that it is only a matter of time before Simonstown is used as a NATO base? There have been grave developments recently where certain Western Powers have indicated publicly their desire to rely on South Africa for south Atlantic and Indian Ocean security, thereby conferring upon the apartheid regime the role of a major regional Power in that hemisphere. These developments pose very real dangers for all the States in Africa and the littoral States not only in the south Atlantic but also in the Indian Ocean. This Advokaat communications system, as I have said, has one of its substations in Walvis Bay in the occupied Territory, so that those who are using this communications system are relying on South Africa's continued occupation of that region. In this connection we wish to draw the attention of the Security Council to a letter we received from a Minister at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in London dated April 3, 1975, which alarm us. That letter states:
"Her Majesty's Government have recognised that Walvis Bay is an integral part of the Cape Province of the Republic of South Africa and that the Caprivi Strip is part of South West Africa (Namibia). Walvis Bay was never part of the mandated Territory but was part of the Union of South Africa before the mandate was granted in 1920."
I submit that the British Government, therefore, should be pressed to explain what it understands by the need to preserve the territorial integrity of Namibia.
I have earlier referred to the militarisation of Namibia. The bases which are established in the occupied Territory are not only for the purpose of securing Pretoria's control; they are major bases equipped for attacks against African States to the north. The Johannesburg Star of 19 April has this quotation from Angola's Minister of the Interior, Mr. Kabangu:
"South Africa has installed near our district one of the most modern bases in Africa, in which rocket launchers have been installed - all pointing in the direction of our country."
South Africa has thus sent its armed forces in large numbers across the border of the international Territory of Namibia, which is subject to the legal authority of the United Nations. Bases established in the occupied Territory are to facilitate attack against neighbouring States as well as the Namibian people. In our view, the illegal occupation of Namibia, the militarisation of the Territory, the establishment of major military bases there and the admission of such establishment amount to a clear breach of the peace and constitute an act of aggression as well as a threat to international peace within the meaning of the Charter.
In 1960 we were campaigning on arms in Britain, as I have said, and on March 17, 1963, the newly-elected leader of the Labour Party and then a member of the Anti-Apartheid Movement, Mr. Harold Wilson, accepted an invitation from us to join our campaign to stop the supply of weapons to South Africa. He was the main speaker at a rally that we organised in Trafalgar Square at that time, and he had this to say:
"Act now" - this was an appeal to the British Government - "and stop this bloody traffic in the weapons of oppression."
He went on to say that there was not time for the Labour Government to get into office because the matter was supremely urgent and that Mr. Macmillan ought to act immediately.
Now I should like to know what has happened in southern Africa since 1963 to make it less of a threat to peace, to make this kind of action less urgent. I have already explained the position in Namibia. The representative of Britain spoke about the Rhodesian problem, but failed to mention under this section the supreme violation of British sovereignty over its colonial territory by the despatch of armed forces on the part of South Africa to Rhodesia. That is a clear breach of the peace. Why then no Chapter VII action on that question?
Thirdly, since 1963, the South African budget has shot up fantastically. We do not believe that the British leaders are those who support apartheid, and therefore we find it difficult to understand the difficulty they seem to have in determining that there is a threat to peace in southern Africa as a result of the military build-up and thereby asking for mandatory action with regard to the arms embargo. They already claim to implement the embargo. Indeed, when we were all at Kingston a few weeks ago the Heads of Government of other Commonwealth countries welcomed the strict arms embargo that is supposed to be implemented by Britain and also welcomed the announcement that the Simonstown Agreement was terminated. What then is the problem?
The United States has informed us about its decision since 1963 on implementing the arms embargo. We know that that decision is not complete and that there are major violations in that embargo. But nevertheless the United Kingdom and the United States say that they apply an arms embargo, unlike France. What then is the difficulty?
The great Powers in the West seem to be saying to us throughout that their policy with regard to Namibia, their policy with regard to Rhodesia and their policy with regard to South Africa is based on what is in the interests of South Africa, and therefore they reach the conclusion that they must have no confrontation with South Africa on any of these questions, whether it be Namibia or Rhodesia or apartheid. Over the years this policy has moved them to a position whereby they come into direct confrontation with the liberation forces in their anti-liberation policies. They describe those policies as peaceful change, which in effect means only that change which the South African Government will decide on, at the rate that the South African Government decides on, at the pace that the South African Government decides on. That is the only change they accept within the limitations of what the apartheid regime can do.
We feel that there is a more dangerous situation now because of the evolving military alliance between South Africa and the major Western Powers, which will with every day that passes make the prospect of international action even more difficult in the months and the years to come. It appears to us that whenever the Security Council has before it items on southern Africa, the Western permanent members immediately begin dusting their vetoes in readiness to block any meaningful action that is proposed. The permanent members of this Council have a sacred and solemn duty to preserve international peace and security, and just because of their close economic and other relationships with South Africa they are placing those interests above any objective assessment of the situation. Therefore, when the present threat to peace leads to a major conflagration of catastrophic proportions, the responsibility for that will not only rest in Pretoria, but also in London, Paris and Washington.
We believe that since it has been resolved that responsibility for Namibia rests with the United Nations, South Africa has to end its illegal occupation. It has refused to do so. This Council, in our view, therefore, has the clear duty to take steps to expel the occupying regime. That, we are told by people in higher positions, is impossible because the permanent members will never contemplate such action.
Meanwhile in recent years the Western Powers have claimed that their special relationship with Pretoria leads them to believe that changes are likely. That was also said at the special session of the Security Council in 1972. But we seem to be told even now that there is still a chance and that we should give South Africa yet another opportunity.
The South Africans say that they do not want a single inch of Namibia. But how is it that over all these years, with all the international pressures that have been put on South Africa, it has not seen fit to release to the United Nations one single inch of Namibia?
That is the central issue. Who controls the inches, the miles and the entire territory of Namibia? South Africa has to withdraw, and therefore the absolute minimum that needs to be done by outside Powers is to deny all military arms and equipment and end all military relationships so that the illegal occupying Power is denied the military assistance with which it is illegally occupying that Territory.
We are told about new changes, of movements in certain directions, of shifts in South African policy. But the issue is not one of ending some discriminatory policies only; it is one of ending white domination in southern Africa.
Finally, it is possible that the Security Council will once again be paralysed, and it appears so. In our view, we are not totally disheartened by this simply because we have faith in the fighting spirit and strength of SWAPO. We shall continue to support them. We shall continue to carry on the campaigns not only in Britain, but also in other parts of the world where anti-apartheid movements exist. We shall continue to support United Nations and OAU policy on this question.
But I should like to conclude by once again posing the problem on southern Africa with regard to the Western Powers with the same words with which we concluded our submission to the 1972 session of this Council. On whose side are the Western Powers? Are they on the side of Africa and the United Nations and the liberation struggle, or on the side of the racist regimes in southern Africa?
In our view, it is an answer to that question that will determine whether this Council can be effective in discharging its responsibilities with regard to southern Africa.