Paper presented to the International Conference of Experts for the Support of Victims of Colonialism and Apartheid in Southern Africa, Oslo
April 9-14, 1973(1)
Almost since its inception the United Nations has been concerned with the problem of apartheid and white domination in South Africa. Over the years the subject has been discussed and debated repeatedly and numerous resolutions have been adopted on this question. Initially the resolutions concentrated on making calls and appeals to the white rulers to heed international opinion and abandon the policy of apartheid, only to be rejected by the Pretoria regime. Later, with more African States joining the United Nations, they began to demand international boycott action against the apartheid State and all its institutions, and more recently, there has been a trend towards recognising the legitimacy of the African liberation struggle and providing international political and material support for it.
The formation of the Organisation of African Unity in 1963 and its deep concern to end colonialism and racism in Africa helped to shift international policy in the direction described above. The OAU has always been committed to supporting the liberation struggle in African territories under colonial and race rule.
A major paradox of modern times is the fact that whilst United Nations resolutions against apartheid have gradually become stronger and enjoy more widespread support, it is also true that South Africa has never before enjoyed as much international trade with as many States. The links with the apartheid system have increased simultaneously with wider support for resolutions calling for an end to collaboration with that system.
It is appropriate that a joint conference of the United Nations and the OAU should consider the implications of such a development so that real progress in counteracting apartheid is measured not so much by resolutions adopted by ever-growing majorities but by action taken in support of those resolutions. This is particularly important since the international conference in Oslo takes place between the marking of the tenth anniversary of the establishment of the United Nations Special Committee on Apartheid and the celebration of the tenth anniversary of the formation of the OAU...
Apartheid and aggression
The apartheid system is universally recognised as constituting the most brutal and violent form of human exploitation and suffering, unsurpassed by any other type of tyranny in the contemporary world. The facts are well known and documented by the United Nations Unit on Apartheid as well as publications issued by non-governmental organisations such as the International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa and the Anti-Apartheid Movement. It is impossible for any serious study of the internal situation in South Africa to avoid reaching the conclusion that it amounts to a clear threat to international security, although the Security Council has so far desisted from advancing from its assessment several years ago that the situation amounted to a "disturbance" of the peace.
Second, on the issue of Namibia, the Pretoria regime has not only defied the United Nations but refuses to abide by decisions of the International Court of Justice and remains in control of the international territory of Namibia as an illegal occupying power.
Third, South African armed units have been operating illegally in Southern Rhodesia since 1967 in defence of the Smith regime and in clear violation of Britain's sovereignty over its colony.
Fourth, the operation of South African armed units in support of Portuguese colonial rule in Mozambique and Angola amounts to a further act of aggression, in battle against the oppressed African people fighting colonial rule.
Fifth, South Africa's rapid militarisation over the past decade and its present defence posture constitute a direct threat to the peace and security of independent African States, and force them to expend valuable resources on military defence rather than utilising them for the economic and social well-being of their people.
Finally, the incursions by South Africa's armed forces and its Air Force planes into neighbouring African States amount to direct acts of aggression against and serious provocation to these States.
Threat to the peace
On the above grounds it is abundantly clear that the policies of the South African regime as pursued within the Republic and outside its borders constitute a clear "threat to the peace, breach of the peace" and "act of aggression", in terms of Article 39 of the United Nations Charter. There is no doubt that South Africa's armed intervention in neighbouring territories in defence of the white power system in that region not only serves to increase the level of conflict in that area but also amounts to a clear and deliberate violation of fundamental principles of international law and open defiance of the United Nations and the world community. However, the prospect of any effective international action being taken under Chapter VII of the Charter is fairly remote in view of the growing support that South Africa receives from certain major Powers with the right to veto any measures proposed before the Security Council.
Nevertheless, it is important to draw the attention of the United Nations to the reality which exists in southern Africa and in this context to revive the policy of an international programme of sanctions against South Africa. One additional ground, not mentioned above, which makes such action imperative, is the open breach by South Africa of United Nations mandatory sanctions against Southern Rhodesia, thus substantially sabotaging their effectiveness. The Security Council should urgently discuss the various proposals and reports on sanctions tabled before it, including the report of the Expert Committee issued in 1965, which has not been debated since. In view of the situation in southern Africa as a whole, it is pertinent to suggest that a programme of sanctions covering South Africa, Portugal and Southern Rhodesia should be seriously considered by the Security Council if one is to avert a major catastrophe in Africa which could lead to an international conflagration.
The means for international action exist but what is lacking is political will on the part of the major Western Powers who are permanent members of the Security Council. When the present confrontation in southern Africa results in a major conflict of global dimensions, then the Western Powers will bear the central responsibility for that disaster because they are among those Member States which block all effective international action and at the same time provide direct encouragement and support to the white power system.
Any prospect for action by the Security Council is dependent on a positive answer being given to the question posed at the Addis Ababa session of the Council in February 1972: "On which side are the major Powers?" That question has not been answered and all the evidence indicates that the Western Powers stand in close alliance with the colonial and apartheid regimes in Africa and in direct opposition to those struggling to advance the cause of African freedom and democracy.
The Security Council has been virtually paralysed by the majority of its permanent members. It is therefore inevitable that the African people should with added determination take on the responsibility of bringing about their liberation. This means that the United Nations system and other national and international bodies should be utilised far more in providing direct support for those actually engaged in the struggle. It also implies that the United Nations and the OAU should look much more towards supporting non-governmental organisations such as anti-apartheid movements, for it is they who have taken the lead over the years in organising action in support of United Nations policies. Many of them have acted with substantial and at times decisive impact in countries where the official policies of the governments have been hostile to those of the United Nations and have at times achieved a modification of those policies in consequence of the pressures exerted domestically and at an international level.
International collaboration
It is in the field of international economic relations that we find the most dramatic form of external intervention on the side of the white power system. According to the London Times of March 15, 1973, "70 per cent of South Africa's direct investment in 1970 came from abroad". Such investment capital is principally attracted to South Africa by the above average yield of between 12 per cent and 20 per cent, which is made possible by the super-exploitative apartheid system. Inevitably, those with a substantial stake in the preservation of that system defend South Africa internationally, and corporations and business organisations are amongst the staunchest allies of the white regimes. Since they have considerable influence over the decision-making system of Western governments, it is not surprising to find these governments taking the position that they cannot afford the cost of supporting international action aimed at counteracting apartheid.
As a result of several major campaigns against the role of international capital investment in apartheid and colonialism, conducted in recent years in Western countries, some companies have responded to the consequent exposure by announcing marginal increases in African wage rates, sometimes accompanied by other fringe benefits in order to divert public campaigns. The companies are even beginning to claim that far from being accomplices in the apartheid system, they are in fact placed in a special role to act as agents of change and should therefore be supported in their investment and trade operations in South Africa. It is a peculiar logic that claims that by investing in the oppression of millions of Africans they are somehow bringing about the liberation of the oppressed peoples. But this is not altogether unexpected from those who profit so handsomely from the system of apartheid and colonialism.
Nonetheless, these arguments are finding echoes through important public figures in Western countries who also suggest that economic links should be examined with a view to utilising them to promote peaceful changes within southern Africa and especially in the Republic. These responses have already found expression in various research and study projects being set up with the primary purpose of determining how economic links can be used to promote peaceful change. Inevitably they reject or distort the case for withdrawal and disengagement on the simple ground that it is impractical. But more important is the fact that they represent strong tendencies in favour of accepting the status quo and then working out tolerable options for international companies. These exercises have the effect of not only helping to legitimise the investment of foreign companies but also to create a powerful lobby suggesting that peaceful change is possible.
Indeed, it is often openly stated that these initiatives provide an alternative to supporting the armed struggle. This is a serious and dangerous development which though in its early stages is bound to receive substantial support from those in positions of power and influence because it can easily serve to subvert the anti-apartheid lobby in Western countries and reduce the level of potential support for the liberation struggle. It therefore becomes even more important not to allow the case for disengagement to be misunderstood and misrepresented to the general public by those who are opposed to it.
The European Economic Community
British membership of the EEC produced serious problems for South African exports to the United Kingdom, but the Conservative Government managed to secure the same concessions for imports from the Republic as for those from Commonwealth countries. Thus it is only in July 1977 that South African exports to Britain will be subject to the full EEC tariff on imports.
In the meanwhile, South Africa established a special mission to the EEC in 1971 and presented several notes to the EEC in order to secure special terms for several commodities. Already, South African citrus fruits have been granted a reduction in the EEC tariff from 15 per cent to 5 per cent for a transitional period of two years. There will no doubt be other concessions to follow and since great secrecy is maintained over the actual negotiations with South Africa, it is not easy to obtain the relevant information.
But if these developments are taken together with the fact that something like "80 per cent of South Africa's outside investment derives from the enlarged EEC",(2)
it is not difficult to reach the conclusion that favourable arrangements with the EEC are crucial to South Africa and are likely to be conceded unless effective pressure is organised against them. The situation has to be watched with great vigilance and more attention has to be paid to the EEC area as a major source of support for the white power system in Africa.
International arms embargo
The United Nations arms embargo against South Africa was once considered to be the most far-reaching decision of the Security Council on the question of apartheid. Certain countries like France have, from the very outset, violated the embargo and supplied South Africa with all the arms it needed; France has also collaborated on the manufacture of weapons within the Republic. Italy has to a lesser extent played the same role, and the current issue of The Military Balance, published in London, records an order of 40 Aermacchi AM-3C light transport aircraft for South Africa. Both the United States and Britain have relaxed even their limited embargoes. The South African military build-up has been facilitated by the readiness of Western countries to provide not only weapons but also military patents for the local manufacture of weapons within the Republic.
But this is not all. Sometimes costly, elaborate and circuitous arrangements are made to circumvent the arms embargo and avoid opposition from domestic and international public opinion. For example, the United States has concluded one such arms deal which, through third party involvement, avoids a direct link with South Africa. The Cactus missile system has been developed in South Africa by the joint collaboration of two French companies and the French Government. South Africa has offered this system to certain Western countries and the United States has tested it. When this happened over a year ago, strong protests were made to the State Department about the possible purchase of this system from South Africa. It has now come about that instead of buying it from the Republic the United States has obtained the patent rights for the missile system via France and it is to be manufactured within the United States.
The Security Council has the duty to take up the question of direct violation of its decisions regarding the arms embargo. It also needs to adopt a further resolution to cover the import of arms and other military equipment and patents from South Africa, whether directly or through third parties.
Strategic importance of South Africa
The Conservative Government in Britain has in recent years suggested that British arms supplies to South Africa should be maintained because of the growing strategic importance of the Republic to Western defence and security. Whilst in Opposition, Sir Alec Douglas Home had even predicted that the Simonstown Naval Agreement would in effect become an "informal" extension of NATO, since the NATO area does not extend to South Africa. There have also been other proposals for a joint South Atlantic Treaty Organisation with South Africa, Portugal, Brazil, Argentina and Britain as its members. No such formal arrangements have so far materialised but there is growing support in Western capitals for the idea that South Africa should be enlisted as a formal ally for the defence of Western interests.
Britain has been the principal advocate of this policy but it has received support in other Western countries such as the United States. For example, last October the American-African Affairs Association published the report of a fact-finding mission to South Africa which suggested that the United States Navy should use the naval bases in Simonstown and Durban. Several academic and other institutions in the United States have held special seminars and consultations on the subject. The South African press has also indicated that the London-based Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies has been holding consultations with military organisations in other NATO countries to convene a major symposium in 1973 to discuss a possible southern oceans military alliance with South Africa as the pivot.
Serious attempts are being made not only to integrate South Africa further into Western defence but at the same time to designate the southern African region as one of major strategic importance to the West. The implications of such a policy are highly dangerous because it would mean that the Western Powers would inevitably be committed to maintaining stability and security in that region. Defence decisions in the modern world are made, partly for technological reasons, with long term considerations in mind, and any decision to consider South Africa as a military ally must of necessity be based on a prior judgment that the Republic will be stable and secure for at least ten years. What will happen if in the meanwhile the struggle of the African people reaches a level which is perceived as posing a serious threat to the stability and security of the apartheid State, with consequent uncertainty and instability in a region which the Western Powers have decided is one of major strategic importance?
South Africa as a regional power
Events in southern Africa during the last decade and Western policy towards them reveal clearly that the policies of certain major Powers towards the territories in that region are increasingly governed by the consideration that South African interests in the area are of paramount importance. Even the most direct form of armed intervention by South Africa in neighbouring territories has produced no sharp protests in Western capitals, let alone any effective action to counteract such aggression.
The Pretoria regime has extended and intensified its security operations beyond its own borders and claimed the role of a regional Power in the southern hemisphere as well as the sub-continent - a role which has been conceded and supported by the major Western Powers. Hence, their policies with regard to southern Rhodesia, Namibia and Portuguese colonial rule in Africa have been dictated by the need to preserve white South Africa - a policy officially described as one of "no confrontation with South Africa."
It is precisely this recognition by the Western Powers of the supremacy of South African interests in the region as a whole that has given the apartheid State greater confidence in intensifying its repression both internally and in neighbouring colonial territories. This also accounts for its growing aggressive posture towards independent African States. The Pretoria regime knows that the major Western Powers will defend South Africa from effective international action via the Security Council and therefore continues to flout world opinion.
As a result of this massive increase in economic links with Western Europe and North America, together with the growing political and military alliance relationship with outside Powers, South Africa is part of a special type of international economic and political community which responds by providing it with such substantial external support as it needs in order to preserve and defend the white power system in southern Africa as a whole.
Not only have South Africa's international economic links with its traditional trading partners increased during the last ten years, but new ones have been established with other countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Israel, Japan and Iran. Thus the number of States with a vested interest in the maintenance of the apartheid system is steadily growing and effective action is required to counteract these trends and to win support for the United Nations policy on apartheid and colonialism in Africa.
Proposals for special action
Within the United Nations, the programmes for assistance have so far concentrated on helping the victims of colonial and race oppression. It is important to ensure that education and aid programmes are available for those in need of them, but in view of the developing situation it is vital to consider ways and means to making available international material support for those engaged in the struggle for liberation. However, it is absolutely crucial that all such programmes are only established after full consultation with the liberation movement. Unilateral projects set up without their support should be discouraged and firmly opposed.
At the level of international diplomacy there needs to be a serious and comprehensive study of the developments mentioned in this paper with a view to examining why United Nations policies are not implemented by so many Member States and what measures can be adopted to secure compliance by those States. In this respect one proposal for consideration is that the United Nations Special Committee in Apartheid (as well as the other two Committees responsible for Namibia and decolonisation) should act much more in a "watchdog" and "executive" capacity so that it becomes action-oriented: in this new role its Chairman should not only use that position but also the good offices of the Secretary-General to ensure compliance with United Nations policies by Member States.
But this action cannot succeed alone and therefore the Special Committee needs to develop closer working relations with anti-apartheid movements which have always carried the major responsibility for actively supporting United Nations policy in this area, both nationally and internationally. It is groups such as these which have consistently mobilised large sections of public opinion at home and abroad in support of the African liberation struggle and against international support for apartheid and colonialism in Africa, and are among the most reliable and dependent allies of the liberation movements, the United Nations and the OAU.
If steps along these lines are taken, then a related proposal should also be considered: that the United Nations, in cooperation with the OAU and the liberation movements, organise in 1974 a conference of anti-apartheid and other similar groups, principally from Western Europe and North America, so that effective public action in countries which are the major collaborators with apartheid and colonialism can be discussed by those primarily engaged in organising such campaigns. The tendency to rely unduly upon "experts" who may have little or no connection with such campaigning organisations should be avoided, since it is those engaged in actual campaigns who have the necessary experience to formulate effective action.
In terms of South Africa's growing international supportive links, urgent action should be mounted to reduce the level of external capital inflow in the form of loans and investment and to stop the high level of white immigration into the Republic. Moreover, if it appears almost impossible to shift the policies of the major Western Powers through diplomatic action, it does not necessarily follow that public campaigns in those countries will be unable to influence the policies of their governments in a more favourable direction. Of course, there can be no easy or quick victories but worthwhile results can be achieved by consistent and persistent activities conducted in support of the African liberation struggle and aimed at bringing about an end to international support for the apartheid and colonial regimes.
(1) United Nations Unit on Apartheid, Notes and Documents, No. 12/73, May 1973