Paper submitted to the International NGO Conference for Action against
Apartheid, Geneva,
August 28-31, 1978(1)
With the collapse of Portuguese colonialism in Africa in April 1974, it became clear that the future course of events in southern Africa would seriously threaten and undermine South Africa's regional and internal security.
In the past South Africa's security rested on having a series of buffer States around its borders which protected it from serious challenge from the African liberation movement. The Pretoria regime collaborated with Portugal to maintain and defend a repressive white power system in southern Africa. South Africa refused to give up the international trust territory of Namibia to the United Nations and instead militarised that territory and consolidated its illegal occupation. When Rhodesia faced the formidable threat of international mandatory sanctions, South Africa came to its rescue and not only provided economic and financial support to the illegal regime, but also supplied it with armed manpower and military hardware. Thus, as part of South Africa's ambition to develop a regional Power role, it became the effective colonial Power over Rhodesia and the illegal occupying Power over Namibia.
With the independence of Angola and Mozambique, the Pretoria regime was faced with its long borders now being effectively transformed into security borders. At the same time the African liberation struggle made new headway in Namibia, Zimbabwe and South Africa itself. Nothing was the same now. The balance of power had shifted decisively in favour of the African liberation struggle and there was no easy way in which the Vorster regime or its allies could turn the clock back.
During the four years since April 1974, the white minority regimes of Salisbury and Pretoria have had to face a severe challenge to their white power system and have become increasingly desperate. The growing success of the African liberation movements has led to ever increasing internal repression and brutality and regular attacks against neighbouring African States such as Angola, Mozambique, Botswana and Zambia. The Vorster regime has responded to growing African demands for freedom by, in effect, declaring war against its own oppressed population, against the oppressed African peoples of Namibia and Zimbabwe and against the frontline States.
Whilst the Pretoria regime has over the past four years expanded and strengthened its war machine, it has also at the same time engaged in a series of manoeuvres, both independently and in collusion with the illegal Smith regime, aimed at offering various "settlement" schemes for both Rhodesia and Namibia. Indeed, Vorster even initially presented himself as Africa's supreme peace-maker, offering to help "decolonise" Namibia and Rhodesia in return for an international policy of "detente" with South Africa. All the settlement proposals emanating from Pretoria and Salisbury have predictably failed because of their inherent intention to cheat the African people of genuine independence. The South African invasion of Angola with the direct involvement of the United States Administration and its CIA was unable to destroy the MPLA Government in Luanda and various attempts to destabilise Mozambique have also failed. South Africa's policy of "dialogue" and "detente" with independent Africa is in ruins.
Western policy
Just as the strategic changes in southern Africa produced a serious crisis for the Pretoria regime, they also required a fundamental re-examination of established Western policy towards that region. The most important development has been the shift in the centre of Western policy-making from the United Kingdom to the United States. The Kissinger initiatives put an end to the United Kingdom's premier role over southern Africa and its "sphere of influence" has now to be shared with Washington. The growing resultant collaboration between the two countries is reflected in the Anglo-American proposals for Rhodesia as well as the plan for Namibia emanating from the wider grouping of five Western Powers.
The major Western Powers, South Africa's traditional trading partners and allies, share the concern of the Pretoria regime to maintain the stability and security of the Republic of South Africa. Thus various Western initiatives regarding Rhodesia and Namibia are declared to be for the purpose of bringing about genuine self-determination for those territories, but in the case of South Africa there is only to be gentle pressure to encourage reforms in the apartheid system so that it becomes less embarrassing for the Western Powers to defend South Africa as an independent sovereign State.
It is of vital importance to recognise that there is no Western commitment to help destroy the apartheid system in South Africa. Thus, as over the past two decades, Western policy towards southern Africa is governed by the primary consideration that South Africa's interests must be protected and its stability and security assured. There has been serious concern in Western capitals that, if the armed struggle was allowed to continue in Zimbabwe and Namibia, then there was the real danger that the new revolutionary African spirit would also sweep aside the apartheid system in South Africa itself. It is precisely because of this fear that we have witnessed in recent years the various high level initiatives by the major Western Powers to seek a "settlement" in Rhodesia and Namibia.
Current situation
In Rhodesia there is hardly any leading African or white citizen who believes that the internal settlement is likely to succeed. The African people meet only with increasing suffering and brutality and the system of white domination is still intact despite the recruitment by the Smith regime of certain African personalities to its side. At the same time, large sections of the white population are complaining that the internal settlement has not resulted in an end to the guerrilla war and even Ian Smith is accusing his African colleagues of having failed "to deliver the goods."
It is quite clear that there can be no solution to the problem of Rhodesia without the Patriotic Front and it is this factor which has so far prevented the major Western Powers from endorsing the internal settlement. The Anglo-American plan also contains some serious defects, but it can serve as a basis upon which negotiations can begin. Meanwhile the liberation movement in Zimbabwe continues to consolidate its control over most of the country and is making fresh gains every day. It is impossible for the Salisbury regime to retain even its present limited power during the next four months without further substantial external support.
The Namibian developments appear uncertain and the initial acceptance of the Western plan by South Africa in April 1978 is now subject to various qualifications. A United Nations team went to Namibia early in August to negotiate with the Pretoria regime the process of self-determination and independence for the territory, but it is not clear whether South Africa will in fact withdraw from Namibia completely. The issue of Walvis Bay remains unresolved and it is difficult to envisage firm Western action against South Africa in the future over this dispute if they are not prepared to put such pressure now.
In one sense all the evidence indicates that the people of Zimbabwe and Namibia will not have to conduct their armed struggle for many years before they win independence. But if some of the present initiatives regarding Namibia and the proposed all-party conference for Zimbabwe do not result in an effective transfer of power to the African majority, then the armed struggle will inevitably continue. In turn, the minority regimes in Salisbury and Pretoria will become even more desperate and South Africa may well unleash a major war in Namibia or Rhodesia. This will also mean even more desperate and persistent attacks against the neighbouring African States.
South Africa's military build-up
South Africa is undoubtedly the major economic and military Power in the region. During the past two decades it has embarked on a massive military build-up and prepared its entire white population for war against its own people. With an ever growing defence budget it has established a substantial domestic armaments industry and purchased modern defence equipment of all types from its allies abroad.
The defence budget of South Africa in 1960-61 amounted to 44 million rand and rose to 72 million rand in 1961-62. A few years later it reached over 250 million rand in 1966-67 and then rose sharply again so that by 1972-73 it stood at 350 million rand. Then, as the Portuguese forces began to suffer heavy defeat in Africa, it was increased substantially in 1973-74 to 480 million rand. But this was inadequate for the following year and it was increased to 700 million rand and again to 948 million rand for 1975-76. In 1976-77 defence expenditure reached 1,407 million rand and the figure for 1977-78 is 1,940 million rand.
Despite these enormous sums allocated for defence, they are in fact underestimates because actual defence spending is much greater and additional money is allocated from other government departments. Furthermore even these additions only reflect a partial picture because they do not take into account the finance available from defence bonds or the defence bond lottery. Also, they do not cover the millions of rand allocated for the local armaments industry, in particular for the Armament Corporation. Indeed, as the South African Defence Minister informed his Parliament in April 1977: "There are few, if any, government departments which are not concerned with one or the other aspect of national security."
All these defence preparations are primarily intended to maintain internal security since the greatest threat faced by South Africa comes from its own oppressed population. The massive security measures adopted by the Pretoria regime reflect directly the growing threat that is being posed by the African liberation struggle. Indeed, the first gunshots have begun to be fired within the Republic against its security forces. It is this development within South Africa which has made the Pretoria regime more uncertain and desperate.
Vorster's policy
There is no doubt, on the part of the Vorster regime, as to its present and future policy in relation to the African liberation struggle. It is determined to maintain its system of white domination in the Republic. Through the fraudulent bantustan system it claims to confer "independence" upon its African people, whereas in effect the African population is thereby effectively deprived of its citizenship. As Prime Minister Vorster repeatedly declared, South Africa is "the white man's country". He makes it clear that apartheid is there to stay and that all change within South Africa has to be acceptable to the Pretoria regime. The major Western Powers support this position and this is not surprising since the West has always assured South Africa that, if Pretoria helps the process of decolonisation in Rhodesia and Namibia, then that would be the best way to buy protection for South Africa and secure its future stability. But in the midst of high-level international manoeuvres at presenting Vorster as Africa's chief peace-maker and giving him time to encourage internal change, the children of Soweto gave their answer: The African people of South Africa will not accept that they should remain in bondage for the convenience of others. After the 1976 Soweto massacre and subsequent national upsurge, it could no longer be argued even by the most cautious observer that South Africa would change peacefully and gradually to eventual freedom in the far distant future. The oppressed people of that country will not accept their bondage for that long.
The post-Soweto developments made the apartheid regime even more insecure and uncertain about the future. Its political and military leaders consulted hurriedly and worked out plans to expand the armed forces even further. Accordingly, the 1977 Defence White Paper conceded that its manpower was under strain and the defence force needed more recruits. It announced several measures to overcome the problem, including an expansion of the Permanent Force members, the extension of the compulsory call-up period of white males from 12 months to 24 months, increasing three-fold the number of white women to be trained and recruiting a large number of "non-white" volunteers for the defence effort.
The official 1976-77 figure for defence manpower was around 224,000 personnel - a considerable underestimate. Nevertheless, even this figure represents an increase of over 104,000 since 1974-75. The massive expansion of manpower has placed a severe strain on the apartheid economy which is in need of white skilled labour. But South Africa's first priority is to stand ready for a major war. In introducing the Defence White Paper in April 1977, Defence Minister Botha stated: "We are today involved in a war, whether we wish to accept it or not. The need for a total national strategy involving all citizens and State departments has already been recognised by the Government."
There is massive evidence of comprehensive preparations for a major war and apartheid's formidable armoury lends credibility to the threat made by Premier Vorster in 1974 that, if the African liberation struggle in South Africa is supported by neighbouring African States, then they will face a "catastrophe too ghastly to contemplate".
No one doubts the increasingly dangerous situation in southern Africa with the prospect of a major regional war which could easily involve external Powers with disastrous consequences for Africa and the world. The core of the problem is the determination of the Pretoria regime to perpetuate white domination and racist rule in the region. But the Pretoria regime would not have been able to carry on with its oppressive system if it did not receive the consistent and encouraging support of the major Western Powers, particularly in the field of economic and military relations.
The United Nations arms embargo
Ever since the Sharpeville massacre of 1960 the civilised world recognised the need to put an end to external military and police collaboration with the apartheid regime. The African liberation movement, independent African States and the United Nations General Assembly called for international sanctions and particularly an arms embargo. Organisations such as the British Anti-Apartheid Movement began to organise campaigns in support of an arms embargo before 1960.
After considerable international pressure United Nations Security Council adopted an arms embargo in 1963. But the manner in which that embargo was partially implemented by some Western Powers, whilst others ignored it completely, resulted in South Africa obtaining virtually all the equipment and cooperation it required to build up a formidable armoury. When these countries were confronted with evidence of their military collaboration, they responded by claiming either that the weapons were for external defence, or that they were not "designed for military use", or that they were not specifically covered by the embargo, or that they were obliged to supply "spares" because they had to honour their pledges and contracts to the apartheid regime - and when none of these were considered as adequate explanations, they pointed out that in any case the Security Council embargo was only voluntary and not mandatory.
Since 1963 the United Kingdom, the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany have supplied a wide range of equipment to the South African military authorities, claiming that that did not violate their interpretation of the embargo. In the case of France and Italy, both countries have totally ignored the embargo by supplying South Africa with all the weapons it ordered and also providing licences for aircraft and other equipment to be made in the Republic. More recently, Israel has become an enthusiastic defence collaborator with South Africa and supplied it with fast naval patrol boats as well as Gabrielle naval missiles, and some equipment is now to be made in the Republic under licence.
In November 1977 the Security Council imposed a mandatory arms embargo under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. This decision was adopted after many years of world-wide campaigns and diplomatic pressure, but the terms of the resolution are weak and there is no precise definition of "arms and related material" which is to be prohibited for export to South Africa. Thus, once again, individual governments have been left free to interpret the arms embargo as they see fit. We therefore face the remarkable situation that the United States claims to forbid the sale of computers to the South African defence and police authorities, whilst the United Kingdom refuses to restrict computer sales at all since they are deemed to fall within the category of "normal commercial trade" even though the purchase is made directly by the defence and police authorities. The United Kingdom firm, ICL, is a major supplier of computers to the South African Government, including its police and security forces. It has always refused to disclose details of its sales, but the Anti-Apartheid Movement revealed on August 20, 1978, that it had supplied a computer to the Atlas Aircraft Corporation which makes aircraft and other equipment for the South African armed forces. Disclosures of this kind enable public opinion to exert pressure on the Government to block loopholes in the embargo, but it is impossible for voluntary anti-apartheid organisations to know about all such deals which are generally confidential, if not secret.
All the experience since 1963 of trying to make the arms embargo effective confirms that there is an absence of political will on the part of all major Western Powers in making the embargo work; this is a very serious allegation to make when these Powers have formally committed themselves in favour of the arms embargo.
But in addition to violations of the embargo resulting from differing interpretations and deliberate withholding of information about licences granted and orders accepted, there is also the illegal operation of groups within countries which re-route equipment for South Africa and Rhodesia. For example, Canada has one of the best records for denying arms and military equipment to South Africa compared to other Western Powers. But now we have substantial and reliable information which shows that Canadian enterprises have been re-routing military equipment to South Africa via the Port of St. John by ingeniously using St. John in Antigua to disguise its place of origin.
The fact that South Africa is able to overcome the embargo by various methods involving individuals and groups operating within the jurisdiction of the major Western governments, without any significant prosecutions so far, reveals the complicity of these Western governments and their lack of concern to monitor and enforce the embargo.
The major Western Powers bear a very heavy responsibility for having so efficiently and effectively armed the apartheid regime in Pretoria as to enable it to unleash a barbaric war against its own African people and against neighbouring independent African States.
South Africa's nuclear capability
No one today doubts whether South Africa has nuclear capability or not - the question is whether it has already developed nuclear weapons and, if so, what type and how many?
South Africa has over many years developed close nuclear cooperation with the United States of America, the United Kingdom, France and the Federal Republic of Germany. The Pretoria regime began its nuclear research during the 1950s and in the mid-1960s it confirmed reports about its capability to produce nuclear weapons. A few years later South Africa boasted about its possession of uranium enrichment technology - obviously developed as a result of close collaboration with certain Western Powers, particularly the Bonn Government.
The Western Powers which provided South Africa with nuclear expertise and technology, and continue to do so now, claim that their assistance only relates to the peaceful application of nuclear energy. However, every nuclear expert confirms that it is virtually impossible to restrict information and technology in such a way as to prevent the "peaceful" methods from being used for the development of nuclear weapons.
Considerable efforts are made by the major Western Powers to restrict the transfer of nuclear technology to various third world countries for fear of encouraging the proliferation of nuclear weapons, but no such considerations apply in the case of South Africa. It is remarkable how easily the argument is changed when it applies to the Pretoria regime.
In August 1977, on the eve of the World Conference for Action against Apartheid held in Lagos, the world heard about South Africa's preparations for a nuclear explosion at a test site in the Kalahari desert. The United States, France, the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany urged South Africa not to proceed with the explosion. South Africa did not explode a nuclear device and probably decided to postpone it to a more opportune moment.
If South Africa is in fact on the verge of exploding its own nuclear weapon, the world has a right to know how it has achieved this level of capability. Who has enabled South Africa to become a virtual nuclear power? It is obvious that it is those who provided South Africa with nuclear technology, know-how and experts who are responsible for the development of an apartheid atomic bomb.
It is also precisely because of this long-standing nuclear collaboration between South Africa and the major Western Powers that the Security Council's resolution of November 1977 is so weak. It merely decided that "all States shall refrain from any cooperation with South Africa in the manufacture and development of nuclear weapons". No State will admit that it is, in fact, cooperating with South Africa to manufacture and develop nuclear weapons. Hence, the decision of the Security Council is meaningless in so far as it applies to the development of South Africa's nuclear capability. It is significant to recall that an earlier draft resolution submitted by the African States called upon all States to "refrain from any cooperation with the South African racist regime in nuclear development" - and it was blocked by a triple Western veto in October 1977.
When the major nuclear partners of South Africa - the United Kingdom, the United States of America, France and the Federal Republic of Germany - are confronted with evidence about South Africa's nuclear capability, they respond by claiming that, in the light of South Africa's advanced capability, it would be preferable to persuade it to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty and bring it under some international control. In the meanwhile these countries continue to supply South Africa with nuclear technology and know-how, equipment and plant, as well as fissionable material. No wonder that South Africa is able to continue increasing its nuclear programme with the active encouragement of the Western Powers.
With the rapid military build-up in South Africa, the apartheid regime poses a grave threat to international peace and security. With its costly nuclear development and weapons capability it takes on an even more menacing posture and directly threatens independent African States with an overwhelming military superiority. Indeed, it is not merely South Africa that presents a threat to world peace. Those Western Powers who have provided the apartheid regime with the most modern and destructive armoury in Africa are ultimately responsible for fulfilling South Africa's aggressive ambitions; hence it is the policies of the major Western Powers to assist South Africa's military and nuclear build-up that constitutes a grave threat to international peace and security.
Southern Oceans
The claim has always been made in military and political circles in the major Western countries that South Africa is a vital element in the overall Western defence system. It is argued that South Africa can help to counteract the alleged growing Soviet naval threat in the Indian and South Atlantic Oceans. The policy of close military collaboration with South Africa is often presented in the context of the security of the Cape route and possible Soviet blockage of Western oil supplies around that route. Thus, according to this argument, since South Africa is a vital component of Western defence and security, it is also of primary importance that its security and stability be preserved. They also point to South Africa's large supply of valuable minerals as another reason for defending the apartheid regime.
Presumably it is because of such considerations that various Western Powers have collaborated with South Africa in developing and installing sophisticated naval communications systems, such as the West German Advokaat system based near the Simonstown naval base. It is also now known that NATO organs have given serious consideration to expanding its area of operation to cover the South Atlantic and/or to promote close relations with South Africa during the early 1970s. There is also the SACLANT study covering possible NATO operations in the South Atlantic, although various NATO members have been quick to point out that it does not involve any close relations with South Africa.
The NATO codification system for spares and equipment continues to be provided to South Africa by certain NATO members. Despite repeated representations since 1975, the NATO Council of Ministers have not yet agreed to forbid the provision of the codification system to South Africa. Because of the secret nature of military arrangements it is not known whether South Africa has access to any other NATO data or information. But there are serious grounds for deep anxiety about a possible special role assigned to South Africa for Western defence and security in the Southern Hemisphere. If such a role has in fact been agreed for the Pretoria regime, then it would help to explain why Western policy is not committed to the destruction of the apartheid system and instead concentrates on trying to reform it.
Future
There is no doubt that liberation will ultimately come to South Africa as it will to Namibia and Zimbabwe. But the South African liberation struggle, which has been one of the most difficult on the continent, is likely to be long and protracted. The apartheid regime knows that with each day that passes it loses more and more legitimacy and political power - it tried to make up for this loss by placing more and more reliance on military power. As the liberation movement makes new advances and scores fresh victories, the Vorster regime becomes more insecure and indulges in desperate actions and manoeuvres.
Already we have seen considerable evidence of growing internal repression and external retaliation against those African States which support the liberation struggle. South Africa stands ready to unleash a major war against its own oppressed people as well as neighbouring African States even at the risk of provoking a major global confrontation.
It is crucial that the outside world stand firmly on the side of the African liberation struggle and the independent African States which are under constant threat.
The international arms embargo should be strengthened and those Governments and corporations which collaborate with South Africa should be exposed and condemned.
We need nation-wide campaigns in the collaborating countries to secure an effective arms embargo, the prohibition of all new investments and loans and the constant expansion of the international boycott so that we can reach the position when comprehensive international sanctions can be enforced against South Africa. It is important and urgent that we succeed soon so as to counteract South Africa's steady progress towards massive repression and militarisation and make a decisive contribution to the African liberation struggle and to peace and security in Africa and the world.
(1) United Nations Centre against Apartheid, Notes and Documents, No. 41/78, September 1978