Statement at Seminar on South Africa's Military Build-up and Nuclear
Plans, London,
May 30, 1978(1)
It is now over six months since the Security Council imposed a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. At that time we welcomed the decision and committed ourselves to work in support of its objectives. However, in our submission to the Special Committee against Apartheid on December 12, 1977, we stated that the mandatory decision had come much too late and pointed to the inherent weakness of the decision. Indeed we called for further action by the Security Council to seal the many remaining loopholes in the embargo and make it comprehensive and all-embracing. We have studied with great care all the responses from 90 Member States as well as the Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 418 issued last month. Most of the replies from Governments are very general and provide no real answers. In any case what the world is most interested in are the facts which we still do not have from the three Western permanent members of the Security Council as well as some of their allies such as the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy and Israel.
Arms exports
The Security Council has decided that "all States shall cease forthwith any provision to South Africa of arms and related material of all types..." Arms still reach South Africa - how? We would like to know how South Africa's traditional arms suppliers interpret the term "arms and related material of all types." We ask whether the British Government still maintains that electronic equipment such as the Marconi Troposcatter Communications System is not of military significance and whether they still supply it or are prepared to supply it to South Africa as before. To the Federal Republic of Germany, whether they still maintain that the Advokaat naval communications system is a civilian project which does not have military significance and whether they have at present any South African orders for similar equipment, and whether they would in future continue to supply such equipment to South Africa. We ask whether the United States still provides the South African regime with Cessna, Merlin and other aircraft and whether Washington still considers them to be essentially civilian craft? We want to know whether Italy has stopped providing Aermacchi and other aircraft to the South African Air Force. We must know whether France has in fact terminated the export of all "arms and related material of all types" and how it is operating the embargo. We want to know if Israel has stopped supplying South Africa with fast patrol boats and Gabriel missiles or are they still selling the boats separately from the missiles so as to claim that the boats actually deliver no armaments at the time. We also want to know whether South Africa continues to receive spares for military as well as so-called civilian equipment of the type which we have already mentioned. In short the world would like to know how South Africa's traditional military collaborators now define and interpret "arms and related material of all types" insofar as their dealings with South Africa are concerned. What have they done to stop supplying spare parts directly and what measures have they taken to ensure that intermediaries do not in fact divert equipment to South Africa? Are the penalties for such indirect offences severe enough to effectively deter the multinational corporations?
Transfer of technology
In resolution 418 the Security Council called on all States "to review... all existing contractual arrangements with and licences granted, to South Africa relating to the manufacture and maintenance of arms, ammunition of all types and military equipment and vehicles, with a view to terminating them."
The world would like to know whether and how many "contractual arrangements and licences granted" to South Africa for its domestic arms production have been terminated. What has France done so far about the licences granted for the Mirage F1-C interceptor and the F1-A ground attack aircraft? And what about the Panhard armoured cars? What has Italy done about licences granted for the Aermacchi MB326-Impala I, MB32K-Impala II, the AL6005-Kudu, Aeritalia AM3C-Bosbok? What have Britain and the USA done about the use of licences originally from their countries for aircraft engines and other components which have been redirected for South African use via Italy? What has Israel done about licences granted for constructing fast naval patrol boats in South Africa? What have Belgium and Israel done about the licensed production in South Africa of the FN-Uzi rifle?
The world and Africa would like to know what these Governments have done about these weapons being produced in South Africa - have they withdrawn all these licences? If not, why not? If it is the case that South Africa refuses to comply with the wishes of the licence granters what action are these governments taking to penalise South Africa for its violation?
What we have mentioned are the well-known cases of licences granted for internal arms production. But hundreds of such arrangements have been made over the years - in the mid-1960s the Pretoria regime claimed to have acquired over 150 licences.
What is needed, as we said in December last year, is for the relevant States to provide the Security Council with details of all transfer of patents, licences and similar arrangements made by corporations and other bodies in their own countries with South Africa so that in the light of that information we can also judge the extent to which these relationships have been ended. Nothing less will suffice.
The second aspect in this category relates to the operations of Western firms with subsidiary or associate companies in South Africa which are involved in assisting its military and defence establishment. Most of the Western Powers enjoy and encourage close economic relations with South Africa. Hundreds of overseas companies have substantial interests in the Republic, including enterprises which provide equipment and assistance to the military and police forces. We have in the past provided comprehensive lists of these companies to the United Nations. We would like to know what action the major Western Powers intend to take to put an end to the direct and indirect collaboration of their companies with the South African military.
In April this year anti-apartheid campaigners in Britain questioned the chairman of Imperial Chemical Industries who admitted to his annual meeting that its South African subsidiary, African Explosive and Chemical Industries (AECI), is manufacturing an ingredient used in CS riot control gas and went on to defend it by claiming that "the use of CS gas is a relatively safe and humane method of riot control". We know that AECI is even more deeply involved in making explosives and chemicals for the apartheid regime. We would like to know what Britain intends to do about ICI's operations in South Africa.
In March this year the South African subsidiary of the Munich-based multinational corporation, Siemens, disclosed some information which reflects the growth of operations by certain types of overseas corporations in South Africa directly involved in the defence industry. In 1967-68 Siemens had an annual turnover of 20 million rand. By 1977 this figure rose to 190 million rand making Siemens one of the fastest growing enterprises in South Africa with eight factories in the country employing 7,000 workers. The company discloses that much of its business is with the State and covers public bodies as well as defence. In this case of Siemens we should like to know what the Bonn Government is doing to stop one of its companies from providing South Africa with much of its defence needs.
Like Siemens, many corporations which once sold defence equipment from overseas to South Africa have over the years established plants in South Africa to manufacture arms and related material locally. There is so far no single case which we know of where a Western government has intervened to stop this process of direct collaboration with the Pretoria regime aimed deliberately at undermining the arms embargo.
From all this it is clear that much remains to be done. We are disappointed that the Security Council has not yet begun to compile the facts about the nature and extent of international military collaboration with South Africa. All such information should be published and the governments concerned should be asked to answer the many questions which still remain unanswered - the world has a right to know to what extent South Africa's traditional arms suppliers have in fact ended their military collaboration with the Pretoria regime.
All the loopholes in the mandatory arms embargo adopted last November, which we pointed out in December 1977, remain. It means for example that several countries have defence attaches in South Africa and South Africa has similar representatives abroad.
According to information available to us, the following countries have defence attaches in South Africa: Argentina, France, Portugal, United Kingdom, USA. And South Africa has defence attaches in Argentina, Austria, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, United Kingdom and USA.
How can these countries seriously claim to have ended their military collaboration with South Africa and yet retain defence attaches?
We asked in December 1977 that all arrangements involving the stationing of defence attaches must be stopped - but that has not been done. And now we have reliable information from South Africa that during the biggest ever integrated military exercise carried out earlier this month under the code name "operation Quicksilver", the British defence attache, among others, was present. We have asked Her Majesty's Government for an urgent explanation.
There are a number of countries which do not require visas from South African passport holders who visit them: some are reciprocal arrangements such as with Ireland, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. But some Western countries extend this favour to South African passport holders unilaterally even though their citizens require visas to enter South Africa: these include Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Spain and Sweden. This means that South African military security personnel can enter these countries without any governmental control for contact with multinational corporations, defence centres and institutes, academic centres and other institutions with which they seek to establish cooperation. These visa-free entry privileges should be ended and all exchanges with defence and defence related personnel ended.
The Special Committee is aware of the argument that South Africa is vital to Western security because of the so-called importance of the Cape sea route. Those who advocate a closer alliance with South Africa are not abandoning their plans. In 1976 we drew attention to a suggestion made to this effect by Admiral Sir Peter Hill-Norton, then the Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, in November 1975. Now in a new book published a few days ago Sir Hill-Norton repeats his view that, because of the strategic importance of South Africa, in terms of its mineral and other resources, the Western countries ought to establish closer relations with the Republic of South Africa.
There are many examples. We think that it is important that the Special Committee and all those concerned with operating the arms embargo look at the wider question of military collaboration with South Africa and not just at particular items of hardware that may happen to reach the Republic.
South Africa has attacked neighbouring African States with impunity and the recent attack on Angola shows how contemptuous South Africa is of world opinion. Some of the weapons supplied to South Africa in the past for so-called external defence and naval security have been used by the illegal Rhodesian forces and South African forces to attack neighbouring States. France for example told the world that its Mirage combat aircraft were not for use internally or against African States - these Mirages have now been used against African States. What is France going to do about this? The Security Council needs to ask this question and to publish a reply.
We have warned since the late 1960s about the extent of Western nuclear collaboration with South Africa and will repeat the call that all forms of nuclear collaboration with South Africa should be ended.
The Special Committee has considerable information about the violation of the arms embargo. All this material should be forwarded to the Security Council for urgent action. But the matter is urgent. South Africa is a major threat to world peace and security, and in the six months which have passed since the decision of the Security Council South Africa is busy stockpiling not only military hardware but also oil and other strategic items. We should like to suggest that the Special Committee should give serious consideration to inviting representatives of Western governments to come to this Committee and to answer the questions raised by our submissions. If they want time, we are prepared to come back in a few weeks to hear their explanations.
We have informed you of our intention to organise a World Campaign against Military and Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa - we have received the patronage of several African Heads of State and other prominent public personalities and will begin our work in a few weeks.
We thank you for inviting us to participate in this session and assure you of our determination to continue to work for the objectives of the United Nations and the Organisation of African Unity.
(1) United Nations Centre against Apartheid, Notes and Documents, No. 26/78, September 1978