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also available as Scanned original in PDF.BOX-FOLDER-REPORT: 53-3-12 TITLE: the Problem of Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina during World War II BY: George Cioranescu DATE: 1981-12-2 COUNTRY: Romania ORIGINAL SUBJECT: RAD Background Report/329 --- Begin --- RADIO FREE EUROPE Research RAD Background Report/329 (Romania) 2 December 1981 THE PROBLEM OF BESSARABIA AND NORTHERN BUCOVINA DURING WORLD WAR II (1) (Part III) The Soviet Claim Prevails (1943-1945) By George Cioranescu Summary: The Soviet victories in 1943 opened the way to Romania and the Balkans for Soviet troops, and made the question of Bessarabia's and Northern Bucovina's status once again germane. Both Marshal Ion Antonescu, through the agency of Foreign Minister Mihai Antonescu, and Iuliu Maniu, head of the democratic opposition, and prominent old-time politician, tried to pull Romania out of a war that had virtually been lost, while nevertheless maintaining Romania's sovereignty over Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina. Mihai Antonescu tried to persuade Mussolini to take over the leadership in setting up a bloc of small states that would constitute a barrier against Soviet expansion into southeastern Europe, believing that this project would find approval with the Anglo-Saxon powers. Maniu established contact with the British and Americans in Cairo, offering to withdraw from the Axis, provided that Romania's eastern frontier along the Dniester were guaranteed. But for neither London nor Washington was Romania a subject of much concern in the war, and neither traditionally played a major role in the area. Given historical Russian, and later Soviet, interests there, however, together with the primacy of military concerns in defeating the Axis, the US, and Britain in essence consigned Romania to the Soviet sphere of influence. ----------------------------- (1) Part I of this report, "From Soviet Annexation to Romanian Reconquest,” appeared as RAD Background Report/61 (Romania), Radio Free Europe Research, 3 March 1981, and Part II, "The Diplomatic Negotiations on the Future of Bessarabia (1941-1942)," RAD BR/136 (Romania), RFER, 12 May 1981. This material was prepared for the use of the staff of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. [page 2] RAD BR/329 The progress of Soviet troops on Romanian territory and the predominance acquired by the Soviet Union in the armistice negotiations with Romania, therefore, killed chances of preserving Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina within the borders of postwar Romania. The Soviet armistice terms, submitted on 8 April 1944 in Cairo, also included the demand to re-establish the Romanian-Russian border imposed by the ultimatum of 28 June 1940. This clause was resumed both in Article 4 of the Romanian-Soviet Armistice, signed on 12 September 1944 in Moscow, and in the peace treaty with Romania, signed on 10 February 1947 in Paris, despite the protests filed by the Romanian democratic opposition with the peace conference in Paris. + + + Reorientation of Romania's Foreign Policy Romania's sovereignty over Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina, reacquired in 1941, did not last long, for in 1943 the Soviet Army went on the offensive on the Eastern Front and was thus poised to reconquer the provinces, to which it had never renounced its claim. The Soviet victories at Stalingrad, on the Don, and at Kursk opened the way to Romania and Poland for Soviet troops, thus making the question of the USSR's frontiers with those countries of immediate, practical importance. The Romanians, who up to November 1943 had lost over 250,000 men of the Eastern Front, saw the battle line draw nearer to the Dniester; they felt that not only the future status of Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina but perhaps also broader political issues would be raised very soon. As a result, some Romanian leaders, to be found among both those in power and those of the opposition, sought a way to save Romania by detaching it from the alliance with Germany and negotiating with the Allies. The prime Romanian goal was, following the example of the country's switch of sides in World War I, to move to the winners' side as painlessly as possible and with as much territory as could be secured. In concrete terms, this meant the restoration of northern Transylvania, which was lost to Hungary in 1940, and Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina, which had been taken by the Soviets in 1940 but reassigned to Romania by Hitler in 1941. With Marshal Antonescu's assent, Romanian Foreign Minister Mihai Antonescu started negotiations to join Romania to its neighbors in federations bordering on the Dniester River, while Iuliu Maniu, a prominent Transylvanian politician, leader of the National Peasant Party, a former Prime Minister, and at that time also head of the national opposition, hoped to negotiate a separate peace with the Western Allies, including recognition of Romania's claim to Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina. Romania hoped the Western Allies would be amenable to such a move, one that was obviously to Moscow's detriment. Although Marshal Antonescu had promised Hitler [page 3] RAD BR/329 at their 10-12 January 1943 meeting that Romania would continue to fight alongside Germany and would supply 19 fresh divisions to the Eastern Front, the Romanian leader had doubts that the German Army could stop the Soviet offensive in the East, by then supported by the allied offensive in the West, and was considering informing the Allies of the newly created situation, and in a scarcely disinterested vein warning them against the danger of Soviet expansion. [2] Hitler himself admitted that the Romanian army, which, after retaking Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina and acquiring the newly designated "Transnistria" had to fight well beyond its frontiers, was in a difficult predicament. He told the Hungarian leader, Admiral and Regent Miklos Horthy: "It will surely not be easy for the sons of Romanian peasants to understand why they still should fight far away from their fatherland or from the areas conquered by them." [3] Iuliu Maniu had always maintained that "the political aims of the Axis are not those of Romania," and had demanded that Romania withdraw from the war once Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina were regained, resuming friendly relations with Great Britain and the USA. [4] The Soviet victories had confirmed Maniu's forecasts that the Allies would win. The government made use of the opposition's policy and to some extent cooperated with it during the negotiations to obtain the territorial settlement desired. Mihai Antonescu's Attempts to Get Romania Out of the War On 19 January 1943, a few days after his return from Hitler's general headquarters, Wolfschanze, Mihai Antonescu informed Renato Bova Scoppa, Italian minister in Bucharest, with whom he was on good terms, that the atmosphere within the German leadership was depressing and that the German leaders had been forced to fall back from the idea of a blitzkrieg to that of total defense of "Fortress Europa." Mihai Antonescu who, in November 1942, had arrived at the belief that Romania must keep in close contact with Italy so that the two countries could detach themselves from the Axis, decided to take steps. Accordingly, Bova Scoppa prepared a memorandum in which he set forth the Romanian minister's foreign policy views, winding up by saying that "the essential point at this decisive time for our destiny is to keep directly in contact," to save Europe from the threat of communism and from anarchy. [5] In a practical manner, Mihai Antonescu ----------------------------- (2) Andreas Hillgruber, Hitler, König Carol und Marschall Antonescu (Wiesbaden: F. Steiner, 1954), pp. 153, 155, and 167. (3) Record of the conversation between Adolf Hitler and Miklos Horthy, Klessheim, 16 April 1943, in Andreas Hillgruber, Staatsmanner und Diplomaten bei Hitler Vol. II,(Frankfurt: Bernard and Grafe, 1970), p. 252. (4) Iuliu Maniu's Letter to Ion Antonescu, Bucharest, 30 September 1943, in Margaret Carlyle, Documents on International Affairs (1939-1946), Vol. II, Hitler's Europe (London: Oxford University Press, 1954), pp. 32 7-328. (5) Renato Bova Scoppa, Colloqui con due Dittatori (Rome: Ruffolo, 1949), p. 75. [page 4] RAD BR/329 suggested that Italy sound out the Western Allies, together with Romania, regarding a separate peace with them, one directed against the USSR. Dino Grandi and Duke Pietro of Acquarone, who six months later were implicated in an anti-Mussolini plot, enthusiastically approved Bova Scoppa's memo. [6] In turn, Ciano submitted the memo to Mussolini, to whom he presented his own views on seeking a way out of the war. Mussolini retorted that he was confident the Germans would be able to resist and rejected the Romanian proposal, saying that "the Danube is not the road" for Italy to follow. [7] Later, Ciano told Bova Scoppa that Mussolini had removed him from the position of foreign minister because he had approved of Mihai Antonescu's views advocating the establishment of direct contact with the Western Allies, reproaching him by saying that "your memo of January 15 has been responsible for my demotion from the ministry." [8] The Romanian foreign minister also suffered as a result of his initiative, for Hitler, upon learning about Mihai Antonescu's schemes at his 12 April 1943 meeting with Marshal Antonescu at Klessheim asked the Romanian leader to replace his foreign minister. [9] Nevertheless, after a brief punitive "leave of absence," Mihai Antonescu was able to revive his project of saving Romania by attempting to pull it out of the war in a move that would be initiated by Italy. On 5 June 1943 Bova Scoppa submitted a second memorandum that contained the views of the Roamnian foreign minister reiterating the suggestion that Italy place itself at the head of the group of small countries, for no one imagined that Great Britain and the USA would stand guard in Europe against Slavism for several generations to come. Bova Scoppa maintained that he himself had prepared the report which had received prior approval by King Victor Emanuel III. He added, however, that he had presented it to Undersecretary of State Giuseppe Bastianini as conceived by Mihai Antonescu in order to lend it more weight. He even reproached the Romanian Foreign Ministry for failing to be up to such a historic mission and failing convincingly to present the ideas on which they had agreed at their Rocca delle Camminate meeting with Mussolini. [10] ----------------------------- (6) Ibid., p. 80. (7) Galeazzo Ciano, Diario, 1937-1943 (Milan: Rizzoli, 1980), p. 691. (8) Bova Scoppa, op. cit., p. 109. (9) Record of the conversation between Adolf Hitler and Marshal Antonescu, Klessheim, 16 April 1943, in Hillgruber, Staatsmänner und Diplomaten. . . , Vol. II. pp. 217-223. (10) Renato Bova Scoppa, La Pace Impossibile, (Turin: Rosenberg and Sellier, 1961), pp. 205 and 213. [page 5] RAD BR/329 On June 15 Bastianini informed Bova Scoppa that "II Duce had agreed with Mihai Antonescu on several points of your' memorandum," but he would like to wait for two more months before taking any action. Eventually, Mihai Antonescu succeeded in presenting his plan to Mussolini directly, during a five-hour conversation which he had with the Italian dictator on 1 July 1943 at Rocca delle Camminate. By then Mussolini was apparently more convinced by the Romanian foreign minister's plea and promised to talk to Hitler in two months time about convening a conference of neutral and belligerant states to discuss Europe's destiny. [11] But the allied landing in Sicily killed the plan. Mihai Antonescu believed that the foundation of a bloc of the small states of the Danube Basin or the Balkans in order to impede the Soviet advance would have been favorably received by Germany, which was withdrawing from the Eastern Front, as well as by the Western Allies, who, he felt, would not be very keen to see Russia extend its sphere of influence to the Danube Valley and the Balkans. Mihai Antonescu would also have liked to get Italy's consent to a project of this type. Since in this respect, at least, Romania's interest was identical with Hungary's, Romania was ready to cooperate with its Western neighbor, although the Transylvanian issue did not exactly make for an atmosphere of mutual trust. Noting Romania's eagerness to cooperate with Hungary, Count Ciano said that "the Germans would do well to keep an eye on the Romanians, because the sudden desire to achieve reconciliation with Hungary seems suspicious to me." [12] Mihai Antonescu's project to pull Romania out of the war on the best: terms possible by resorting to a political solution, such as the setting up of a bloc of small states, had no chance so long as none of the big powers supported it. Informing von Ribbentrop of the Turkish project for a Balkan federation, Franz von Papen, the German Ambassador to Ankara, expressed his opinion that such a solution would be of considerable advantage to Germany, were the retreat on the Eastern Front to be continued. Hitler himself raised this point at his March 1943 meeting with Czar Boris of Bulgaria, but no concrete results were achieved. It was clear that this idea also interested British circles, for on 10 March 1943 Anthony Eden sounded out Ivan Maiskii, the Soviet Ambassador to London, on the Soviet Union's attitude to a European federation. Maiskii retorted that Moscow might not oppose the idea of a Balkan federation, provided Romania were ruled out of the arrangement. (14) After the November 1943 Cairo Conference, Turkish Foreign Minister Numan Menemencoglu complained to Alexandru Cretzianu that "overnight, at a frown from Stalin," even Churchill gave up the idea of a federative reorganization of Europe, in which Turkey would have played a significant role, within a Balkan federation. [15] Later, on 1 December 1943, during the ---------------------------- (11) Bova Scoppa, Colloqui , pp.107, 110, 113, and 114. (12) Ciano, op. cit., p. 688. (13) F. W. Deakin, The Brutal Friendship; Mussolini, Hitler, and the Fall of Italian Fascism (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), pp. 253-255. (14) The Earl of Avon, The Eden Memoirs (London: Cassel, 1965, p. 371. (15) Alexandre Cretzianu, The Lost Opportunity (London: Jonathan Cape, 1957), p. 114. [page 6] RAD BR/329 Tehran Conference, Churchill asked Stalin what he thought about the project for a Danubian federation. Stalin replied that a Danubian federation would not be viable, that the Germans would take advantage of this "by putting flesh on something that is only skeleton, thus creating a great new state." [16] The Soviet dictator also wanted to know whether Romania and Hungary would be members of such a federation. Iuliu Maniu Places His Hopes on Negotiations with the Western Allies Starting from the idea that the Germans and Russians would decimate each other during the lengthy wear and tear of the war, Iuliu Maniu thought that World War II would end in an Allied, but especially Anglo-American, victory. Accordingly, after the Romanians got beyond their pre-1940 border of the Dniester River, Maniu made an effort to pull his country out of the war. But since he was persuaded that he could not get the Kremlin's recognition of the border along the Dniester, he did not enter into direct negotiations with the Soviet Union; he chose the indirect way, negotiating with Great Britain and the USA. Early in 1942 Maniu had established contact with Great Britain, stating he wanted to engineer a coup d'ctat to overthrow Antonescu's regime at an appropriate moment -- whenever the Allies landed in the Balkans. In return for this change of alliance, Maniu asked that the Allies guarantee the existence of an independent Romanian state, with the prewar borders, including Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina. [17] His British contacts did not seem too optimistic, for they thought that the Soviet Union would not give up the provinces concerned. That is why, when in the summer of 1942 it was rumored that the Soviet Union had agreed to setting up a plebiscite on Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina, the British Foreign Office commented as follows: "We have heard nothing to corroborate this . . . which strikes us as extremely improbable. In any case, a plebiscite run by the Soviet government would be as valuable a guide to opinion as an announcement that the inmates of a German concentration camp had subscribed to a Christmas present for Himmler." [18] Nevertheless, Maniu persevered in his plans to save Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina through the agency of the Allies and, in a note to the British Foreign Office, he said that public opinion in Romania was favorable to the allied cause, the border issue being the sole obstacle on which the American and British governments would have to act to bring about a change in Romania's alliance. He added that, were the Anglo-Americans to guarantee Romania's border, the Romanian army would also be won over for a change in the Allies' favor. [19] The answer ----------------------------- (16) Winston Churchill, The Second World War, Vol. V, Closing the Ring (New York: Bantam, 1977), p. 344. (17) Paul A. Quinlan, Clash over Romania: British and American Policy Toward Romania, 1938-1947 (Los Angeles: American Romanian Academy, 1977), p. 83. (18) Ibid. (19) Aurica Simion, Preliminariile Politico-Diplomatice ale Insurectiei Romane din August 1944 (Cluj-Napoca: Dacia, 1979), p. 274. [page 7] RAD BR/329 from the British Foreign Office was that Romania's eastern borders would be determined by the United Nations, in conformity with the Atlantic Charter and the provisions of the Anglo-Soviet treaty. (20) Since the Anglo-Soviet treaty specified that the need for Soviet security would be borne in mind, this meant that the Soviet Union would have at least a broad say in setting Romania's eastern borders. In February 1943 Maniu again informed the British government, through Suphi Tanrioer, Turkey's minister to Bucharest, that Romanian public opinion, which had favored entry into the war but then objected to the continuation of the campaign beyond the Dniester, now felt that Marshal Antonescu should be asked to bring back his troops and change the country's military and foreign policy, adding that "Romania's national movement would like to know the British and American viewpoint on Romania's borders and the role to be assigned to it in the future." [21] As time went by and the Soviet Army continued its advance toward Central Europe, however, hopes for preserving Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina with Anglo-Saxon support diminished. At least as far back as the spring of 1943 Great Britain considered that Romania fell predominantly within the Soviet sphere. Eden's briefing on Romania before his March 1943 visit to Washington stated: "Our policy toward Romania is subordinated to our relations with the Soviet Union and we are unwilling to accept any commitments or take any action except with the full cognizance and consent of the Soviet government." [22] During Eden's visit to Washington Roosevelt also agreed to the Soviet claim to Bessarabia on the ground that the Soviets would be entitled to regain this province "as it had been Russian throughout most of its history," [23] an assertion that is, of course, historically incorrect. Along with the efforts to persuade the Allies to guarantee Romania's eastern border along the Dniester, Maniu also started exerting pressure on Marshal Antonescu to convince him to withdraw Romanian troops to the same river line. On 10 July 1943, in a memo to the marshal also signed by Constantin I. C. Bratianu, Maniu reiterated his well-known arguments: "Romanian public opinion approves moves for the defense of its natural borders, but not conquest. At the same time, Romania cannot remain committed to an action directed against the Western democracies, which had provided decisive support for the creation of Greater Romania." (24) In another memo to Marshal Antonescu of 12 August 1943, the two Romanian democratic leaders reiterated their request for the Romanian army to withdraw "within the country's borders," that is, to the line of the Dniester. [25] Then, on 30 September 1943, in a letter to the marshal in which he condemned recognition of Mussolini's rump Social Republic, Maniu categorically declared: "Romania's most fervent wish has been to entertain friendly rela- ----------------------------- (20) Ibid., p. 2 75. (21) Ibid. (22) Quinlan, op. cit., p. 84. (23) Herbert Feis, Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin (New Jarsey: Princeton, 1957), p. 123. (24) Aurica Simion, op. cit., p. 312. (25) Ibid., p. 313. I [page 8] RAD BR/329 tions with those powers to whom it owes its national unity, through the liberation of Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina," [26] a reference to Western support in the post-World War I peace settlements . Former Romanian Foreign Minister Grigore Gafencu, who was then living in Switzerland and kept in touch with Iuliu Maniu, wrote in his diary on 15 December 1943 that the Romanian leader "was following a policy of national reintegration, instead of one of national salvation." Unlike Maniu, Gafencu advocated direct contact with the Russians, without seeking any Anglo-American mediation. (27) Nevertheless, Iuliu Maniu's perseverance yielded some results. Toward the end of 1943 Marshal Antonescu informed the National Peasant leader that he was ready to retire from the country's leadership and surrender his position to him, provided Maniu could obtain from Great Britain and the USA terms guaranteeing Romania's independence and integrity. Maniu replied that he could not obtain such terms as long as he, or someone representing him, had not contacted the Allies.[28] Therefore, Marshal Antonescu agreed to allow someone named by the opposition to go abroad to try to obtain the best political and territorial terms, in exchange for Romania's withdrawal from the war. The Soviet Union Enter into the Negotiations Alexandru Cretzianu was the first Romanian emissary to contact 0the Allies on behalf of Iuliu Maniu, of the opposition, and of King Michael. Cretzianu had been appointed Romanian minister to Ankara and entrusted with this secret mission by Foreign Minister Mihai Antonescu. Before leaving Romania he called upon the King, Maniu, and Marshal Antonescu, realizing that the latter two still hoped for an Allied landing in the Balkans to facilite Romania's pullout of the war. Marshal Antonescu revealed to him that Romania had reorganized its armed forces after the defeats in the Soviet Union and now had 21 properly equipped divisions available. This confirmed the foreign minister's belief that in an emergency Romania could cope with a German countermove. [29] When he arrived at Istanbul on 15 September 1943, however, Cretzianu realized that the real state of affairs in the world was entirely different from what the Bucharest politicians felt it to be. Turkish Foreign Minister Menencoglu informed him that Eden, whom he had met in Cairo early in November, did not mention ----------------------------- (26) Iuliu Maniu's letter to Ion Antonescu, Bucharest, 30 September 1943, in Margaret Carlyle, op. cit., pp. 32 7-328. (27) Simion, op. cit., p. 345. (28) Ibid., p. 352. (29) Alexandre Cretzianu, op. cit.., pp. 93-98. [page 9] RAD BR/329 any landing in the Balkans; neither did the Turkish official learn anything about any interest of the Western Allies in Soviet frontier questions in the Balkans. So far as Romania was concerned, Eden had told him that it had no choice but to capitulate. The Moscow Conference had decided that any capitulation was to be made to all three allies; no separate peace with the West would be possible. Some time later, on 1 February 1944, Cretzianu learned from Lieutenant Colonel Ted Masterson of the Middle East Command that the best Romania could hope for from the negotiations with the Allied countries would be a Soviet promise not to cross the line of the River Prut, which meant that Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina were going to be lost again. [30] The system of tripartite consultation among the Allies had been in operation since 1943, after the Moscow Conference. Therefore, on 21 November 1943 the State Department was informed by the British ambassador to Washington that in a message to Great Britain Iuliu Maniu had expressed his wish to send one or several delegates abroad to discuss arrangements for a political changeover in Romania. The State Department consented to have the USA represented at any conference that might be held in Cairo with Maniu's representative by Lincoln MacVeagh, ambassador to the Greek and Yugoslav governments in exile in Egypt.[31] Great Britain also informed the Soviet Union about Maniu's communication. In its answer, the Soviet government indicated that it considered "absolutely necessary the presence of a Soviet representative at any negotiations that might be held with Maniu's representative.[32] The fact that the presence of the Soviet Union was binding for the negotiations, in view of concluding an armistice with Romania, obgiously reduced the latter's chances of retaining Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina. Nevertheless, the State Department continued to express itself in vague terms on the future status of the above-mentioned provinces, and did not consider their occupation by the Soviet Union as an "ultimate settlement," although it cannot be said that official Washington gave much thought to the area, which, for America, was a backwater at best. In a document sent by the director of the State Department's Office of European Affairs to the American ambassador to London (a document that had been passed by the Working Security Committee and cleared through the State Department, ----------------------------- (30) Ibid., pp. 113, 125, and 126. (31) Cordell Hull's telegram to John Winant, Washington, 8 January 1944, in Foreign Relations of the United States (F.R.U.S). Diplomatic Papers 1944, Vol. IV, Europe (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1966), p. 134. (32) Averell Harriman's telegram to Cordell Hull, Moscow, ibid., 11 January 1944, p. 135. [page 10] RAD BR/329 but not yet by the Joint Chiefs of Staff) [33] mention was made of the evacuation of the occupied territories. These "Provisions for Imposition upon Romania at the Time of Surrender" stipulated that "without prejudice to the ultimate settlement of disputed territorial claims," the Romanian armed forces should be withdrawn from all areas other than the territory held by Romania on 21 June 1941. The withdrawal of Romanian forces would be conducted according to a schedule laid down by the "occupation authorities," [34] which meant the Soviet authorities. From this text it follows that, were the Soviet troops to advance in this area, the status of Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina was going to be that of a province under military occupation. In fact, the above-mentioned document added that the Soviet occupation authorities could retain in Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina those Romanian officials whose "presence was desired by the occupation authorities," whereas "individuals or units in such areas might be designated to be held as prisoners of war." The American stand was more clearly defined in an explanatory document in these "Provisions for Imposition Upon Romania," that provided the following: "If geographical and military considerations should make it inevitable for these disputed areas to be placed under Soviet occupation until the conclusion of the final settlement, it should be stipulated among the three principal Allies that these areas are to be occupied in the interest of the United Nations [a term that, at that time, effectively meant the US, Great Britain, and the USSR, but which was widely used at the insistence of the Roosevelt administration], and are not to be assimilated with the status of a national territory until their final disposition has been agreed upon as part of the general peace settlement."[35] It should, however, at all times be recalled that Eastern Europe, except perhaps Poland, was of minor importance in Washington's eyes, while Britain really cared only about Greece of all the countries in the area, going along with the Americans on Poland in order to obtain concessions elsewhere. Roosevelt's chief preoccupations were the Pacific War and the postwar international order, while Churchill concentrated on protecting time-honored British interests in Europe, the Middle East, and elsewhere. Romania, however, was a traditional concern of St. Petersburg, Vienna, and later Berlin, and following World War I of France, the USSR, and eventually of Hitler's Germany. The Problem of Northern Bucovina According to the explanatory document, a clear-cut distinction was to be made between Northern Bucovina and Bessarabia, for the first "had never been a part of Russia before 1940, and the ----------------------------- (33) James Clement Dunn's communication to John Winant, Washington, 2 February 1944, ibid., p. 136. (34) Provisions for Imposition upon Romania at the Time of Surrender (without location), 13 January 1944, ibid. p. 13 7. (35) Aspects of the Romanian Surrender Requiring Agreement Among the British, Soviet, and American Governments (no location), 14 January 1944, ibid., p. 143. [page 11] RAD BR/329 Soviet claim to it had never been recognized by any of the United Nations." Accordingly, the American proposal was that Northern Bucovina should be administrated under the United Nations military government in the interest of the United Nations, pending a general peace settlement. In any case, it was emphasized that "the disposition of Northern Bucovina is closely connected with that of Eastern Poland and both problems should be considered together as part of the general peace settlement."[36] Apparently, the American stand toward Northern Bucovina had been influenced by the views expressed by General Wladyslaw Sikorski, head of the Polish government in London, during the meeting held in Washington in 1942. On that occasion, the Polish prime minister condemned the stand adopted by Great Britain in the negotiations with the Soviet Union on the Western frontiers of the Soviet Union, for, giving in so far as the Romanian provinces were concerned, London was later to be "confronted by additional and greater demands, involving not only Soviet sovereignty over Bucovina and Bessarabia, but probably Eastern Poland and, eventually, the Dardanelles, the Balkans, and Iran."[37] In a memo submitted to Anthony Eden on 24 March 1942, Sikorski elaborated on the reasons why Poland had been against the surrender of Northern Bucovina. He said that that area had never belonged to Russia and represented a useful link between Poland and Romania, that the cession of Bucovina and Lithuania would put Poland squarely in the Soviet pincers from north and south, just as Germany had surrounded it earlier by occupying Slovakia, and that, accordingly, he could not agree to the surrender of a territory for which he had earlier offered guarantees. Finally, he felt that the security argument invoked by the Russians was not valid, for no sea or Danubian bases could be set up in land locked, non-Danubian Bucovina to threaten the Soviet Union. [38] In a conversation that he had with Eden, the Polish prime minister noted that, through the Anglo-Soviet draft treaty, Great Britain granted the Soviet Union borders analogous to those obtained under the Ribbentrop-Molotov Agreement of 1939, sacrificing the vital interests of a considerable part of Europe to the Soviet Union, whose ultimate objective was to provoke a worldwide revolution. [39] In a memorandum that has never been published, the exiled Polish government apparently asked the American government to approach the British government with Poland's request to be present at the negotiations about the borders of Bucovina and Lithuania. [40] ----------------------------- (35) Ibid., p. 144. (37) Memorandum on Conversation Between Wladyslaw Sikorski and Acting Secretary (Washington, 25 March 1942),ibid., p. 124. (38) Ibid., p. 128. (39) Anthony J. Drexel Biddle's telegram (American Ambassador to the Polish Government in Exile) to Sumner Welles, London, 24 April 1942, ibid., p. 141. (40) Sumner Welles to President Roosevelt, Washington 14 April 1942, ibid., p. 139. [page 12] RAD BR/329 In his conversations, General Sikorski put forth a strong argument: that the annexation of Bucovina and Lithuania by the Soviet Union had been a death blow to the project of a Central European federation. In turn, Count Edward Raczyinski insisted that confirming Soviet sovereignty over Bucovina would render more difficult the participation of Romania and Hungary in a future Central European federation. Since the project of that federation had not been implemented, however, this argument carried little weight. [41] The British foreign minister also rejected the idea that Great Britain was politically and morally responsible for guaranteeing Romania's territory, saying that, "As regards Bucovina, the British government rejects the legal Polish argument on that point. Romania rejected the British guarantee and chose to collaborate with Germany. Britain subsequently declared war on Romania and does not feel bound by obligations existing under its former guarantee." [42] Great Britain maintained the same negative attitude on the future status of Northern Bucovina when it received the American document suggesting that the United Nations be entrusted with the administration of that territory. The American ambassador to London informed the Secretary of State that the British were definitely opposed to introducing the provision that the withdrawal of Romanian forces from certain areas be without prejudice to disputed territorial claims, for "they do not wish to imply that such a settlement must await a general peace treaty, and they would ask that this subject not be raised in any way in connection with Romanian surrender terms." [43] The US finally came around to the British position, which regarded Romania as an enemy state whose interests could easily be sacrificed to Moscow in order to speed Germany's defeat and to wean diplomatic concessions from Stalin on other issues. When Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., went to London from 7-29 April 1.944 for discussions with members of the British government, the State Department's Division of Southern European Affairs prepared a memorandum on Romania which said that "the British and American governments might consider the desirability of reaffirming their expectation that Romania and the other Axis satellites should exist in future as independent [states] within reasonable frontiers," . . . "assuring as far as possible Romania's continued existence as a state with such territories as would enable it to make its way as an independent country." More exactly, dealing with the status of Bessarabia, the above-mentioned memorandum said that the US might contemplate the separation of that region from Romania, while the Soviet claim to Northern Bucovina was justified only on Soviet strategical grounds, supported by general ethnic arguments. The area's population is mixed, but chiefly Ukrainian. In the case of Bucovina, however, the memorandum added ----------------------------- (41) Anthony J. Drexel Biddle's telegram to Cordell Hull, London, 24 and 2 7 April 1942. (42) Anthony J. Drexel Biddle to Sumner Welles, London, 27 April 1942, ibid., p. 143. (43) John Winant's telegram to Cordell Hull, London, 15 February 1944, ibid., p. 145. [page 13] RAD BR/329 that "there is no indication that Moscow would permit this question to be opened." Therefore the State Department also considered Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina virtually lost for Romania, taking a firmer stand only in case the Soviet Union would claim still more Romanian territory. "It would [however] be difficult for us to acquiesce in any further extension of Russian claims to Romanian territory, even if Moscow were to offer to compensate the Romanians by supporting their demands for the return of Transylvania." (44) The Romanians Put Forward Their Claims Although Iuliu Maniu had expressed his wish to send a delegate abroad to discuss the terms for Romania's pulling out of the war as early as 23 November 1943, the negotiations did not start until March 1944. In fact, it was on 17 March 1944 that the meeting between Prince Barbu Stirbey, Maniu's representative, and those of the Allies, Walter . E. Guinness, Lord Moyne, British Deputy Minister of State for Foreign Affairs and Minister Resident in the Middle East,Lincoln MacVeagh, the American Ambassador to the Yugoslav government in exile, and Nikolai Vasilyevich Novikov, Soviet Ambassador to Cairo, began. Romania was conducting negotiations for an armistice under difficult conditions, for in the spring and summer of 1944 the balance of forces had changed markedly in favor of the Allies. On March 26 the Soviet Army on the Second Ukrainian Front reached some points on the River Prut and, continuing its offensive, crossed to Suceava and Botosani Counties, as well as part of Iasi County. (45) The political conditions were also particularly unfavorable, for Churchill and Roosevelt had decided in Casablanca (14-26 January 1943) that their adversaries would have to capitulate unconditionally; the Moscow Foreign Ministers' Conference (5-6 November 1943) had made consultation among the Allies compulsory, while at the Tehran Conference (28 November-2 December 1943) the idea of an allied landing in the Balkans was finally abandoned. On his way to Cairo Stirbey stopped over in Ankara where Alexandru Cretzianu told him about the seriousness of Romania's position. Cretzianu thought, just as those who had sent him, "that Romania would rather perish fighting than have history show that its current rulers had surrendered unconditionally to Russia." [46] At the first round of conversations, Stirbey informed the Allies that Maniu was willing to stage a coup d'état, but before undertaking it he wanted an assurance from the Allies not only that Romania's independence would be maintained but also that its territorial rights would be respected. When asked about "territorial rights," he said that this term covered Transylvania and that the future of Bessarabia should eventually be decided by a plebiscite. [47] ----------------------------- (44) Memorandum by the Division of Southern European Affairs, Washington, (no day) March 1944, ibid., p. 146. (45) Ion Enescu, Politica Externa a Romaniei in Perioada 1944-1947 (Bucharest: Editura Stiintifica si Enciclopedica, 1979), p. 28. (46) Lincoln MacVeagh's telegram to Cordell Hull, Cairo, 3 March 1944, in F.R.U.S., Vol. IV, p. 148. (47) A 17 March 1944 telegram, ibid., P. 150. [page 14] RAD BR/329 The Allies reacted in different ways to the message of the head of the Romanian democratic opposition. Lord Moyne considered that "if Romania will work its way home its independence would at least be saved, though boundary questions cannot be gone into at this time." [48] In its turn, the State Department thought that the proposals submitted by Stirbey were more encouraging than expected and specified the following American viewpoint on Romania's eastern border: "Romanian territorial rights will, in principle, be respected; the proposal for a plebiscite in Bessarabia (and Northern Bucovina) is reasonable. ..." [49] A different opinion was expressed by the Soviet government, through the agency of its Foreign Minister Vyacheslav M. Molotov, who insisted that there were no grounds for attaching importance to Stirbey's statements, because he did not appear to represent Maniu. Molotov added that it was now clear Maniu was not one of those leaders who might oppose Antonescu and that very likely his moves were undertaken with Antonescu's permission. [50] The Soviets had always been reserved toward Maniu, not only because the latter had preferred establishing contacts with Great Britain, instead of the Soviet Union, but also because the National Peasant leader proved to be inflexible on the Bessarabian issue. The information on his political stand was reported to Moscow by the Romanian Communist Party. As early as 26 January 1942 the RCP CC addressed an appeal to the Chairman of the National Peasant Party "to cooperate and join the common struggle to safeguard the Romanian people and its army, to create a National United Front of all patriots." Maniu demanded a prior guarantee by the Soviet government recognizing Romania's frontiers as they existed before the Soviet ultimatum of June 1940, as well as on a public RCP declaration to that effect, conditions for agreeing to "cooperation and joint struggles." [51] Later, in the spring of 1943, during a discussion with RCP CC delegates Mihai Magheru and Petre Ion, Maniu claimed that Romania could not be considered an aggressor state, in the sense adopted at Geneva, supporting this claim with the argument that the British and American governments had not taken a stand against Romania at the time it entered the war but only from the moment its army crossed the Dniester, i.e., moved beyond the country's pre-1940 frontiers. He added that his party would not give up the claim to Romania's old borders. [52] The guarantee of the frontier along the Dniester is a recurring theme in both the correspondence and in the negotiations between Maniu and the RCP, and a communist writer stated that "it testified once more to the head of the bourgeois opposition's lack of broad-mindedness and political realism." [53] Maniu had long ----------------------------- (48) A 18 March 1944 telegram, ibid., p. 151. (49) Memorandum of Cloyce Kenneth Hudson of the Division of Southern European Affairs, Washington, 21 March 1944, ibid., p. 152. (50) Averell Harriman's telegram to Cordell Hull, Moscow, 23 March 1944, ibid., p. 154. (51) A. Simion, op. cit., p. 426. (52) Ibid.. p. 433. (53) A. Simion, "Pina la Orice Sacrificiu in Interesul Poporului Roman," Maqazin Istoric Vol.X, No. 7, July 1976. [page 15] RAD BR/329 placed his hopes in an Anglo-American landing in the Balkans which would have led, he felt, to a tripartite occupation of Romania. When this hope was shattered after the Tehran Conference, Maniu turned to the Anglo-Saxons, through Stirbey, asking for airborne troops and air forces in a resistance area, in Oltenia and the Banat, in order to have the possibility of a retreat into Yugoslavia. [54] Nevertheless, Molotov sent a letter to the British Ambassador to Moscow in which, after calling Romania the worst of the satellites, he offered at the request of the British government to continue to deal with Stirbey. [55] The Soviet Union Assumes the Leadership of Negotiations The proposals Molotov advanced through the British government provided for the establishment of immediate contact between the Romanian and Soviet commands and the surrender of Romanian troops in contact with the Soviet army. The proposals further said that the Romanian Army formations in the Dniester and Crimea regions would be sent to the River Prut area after the surrender, to be returned to Romania for use against the Germans. [56] Denoting the River Prut as a dividing line between the Soviet Union and Romania suggests clearly that the Soviet Union intended to annex Bessarabia and northern Bucovina immediately, without awaiting the final decision of a peace conference. When examining the Soviet proposals, Admiral William D. Leahy said on behalf of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that "the Russian proposal in effect leaves the matter of Romania's surrender exclusively in Russian hands, but considered it from a military viewpoint; this is only natural and to be expected since Russian forces are the only ones prepared to implement and take advantage of the surrender terms." [57] Military considerations were thus still primary over eventual political ones. The Soviet proposal was approved by Great Britain as well, then subnitted by Stirbey to Maniu for Antonescu, via British channels, [58] which meant that all three Allies had indirectly agreed to having the River Prut constitute the frontier between Romania and the Soviet Union. As a matter of fact, at the time when these notes were being exchanged the Soviet Army had already reached the River Prut. On 2 April 1944 the Soviet press published a declaration of the Soviet government that began by stating that the River Prut was the frontier between Romania and the Soviet Union. The fact that the Red Army was approaching the River Prut "signifies the beginning of a full re-establishment of the Soviet state border established in ----------------------------- (54) Lincoln MacVeagh's telegram to Cordell Hull, Cairo, 25 March 1944, in F.R.U.S., Vol. IV, p. 156. (55) Memorandum of Cavendish Cannon (Assistant Chief of the Division of Southern European Affairs) to James Clement Dunn (Director of the Office of European Affairs), Washington, 27 March 1944, ibid., p. 159. (56) Ibid. (57) William D. Leahy to Cordell Hull, Washington, 28 March 1944, ibid., p. 161. (58) Lincoln MacVeagh's telegram to Cordell Hull, Cairo, 30 March 1944, ibid., pp. 162-163. [page 16] RAD BR/329 1940 by a treaty between the Soviet Union and Romania." [59] Reporting that Soviet troops had crossed the River Prut at several points, thus entering territory recognized even by the Soviets as Romanian, the communiqué of the Soviet government stated that it was not pursuing "the aim of acquiring any part of Romanian territory." Commenting on this communiqué, the Chief of the State Department's Division of East European Affairs noted that "as far as Romania is concerned, this statement sifnifies that the Soviet government intends to reincorporate all of Bessarabia and all of Bucovina into the USSR." [60] The arrival of Soviet troops on Romanian territory immediately enhanced the Soviets' role in the armistice negotiations with Romania. Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, British Ambassador to Moscow, informed the Soviet government that the British presumed that in negotiating with Romania for the surrender of the Romanian Army, the Russians would regard themselves as acting on behalf of the three principal Allies. [61] Cordell Hull expressed himself more subtly when he said that the Romanians should realize that the three principal Allies were acting after mutual consultation and in common agreement, and "that the future of the Romanian nation is not left exclusively in the hands of the one power with which Romania has been directly engaged in combat." [62] Following its enhanced role in the negotiations with Romania, on 8 April 1944 the Soviet Union submitted to the representatives of Great Britain and the US, through Novikov, the armistice terms proposed by the Soviet government. One of the main points of the Soviet document stipulated "the re-establishment of the Romanian-Soviet frontier in accordance with the 1940 agreement." [63] The State Department received the Soviet proposals with reservation, considering that "the terms are essentially Russian, not allied or tripartite; they are frankly based on the practical premise that the war with Romania is Russia's own business. . . . The Russian proposals differ drastically from those prepared in the State Department, worked over in the "Working Security Committee" and approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for submission to the "European Advisory Commission. . . ." "The Russian terms were at variance with the American views on territorial questions: a) whereas the Soviet government is acting on the assumption that Bessarabia and northern Bucovina lie within the Soviet state frontiers, we have entertained the view that the status of Bessarabia is at least open to question and that the basis of the Russian claim to Northern Bucovina is still more dubious. . . ." [64] Nevertheless, on 14 April 1944 Cordell ----------------------------- (59) Statement of the Soviet government issued to the press, Moscow, 2 April 1944, ibid., p. 165. (60) Memorandum of Charles Eustis Bohlen to Cordell Hull, Washington, 1 April 1944, ibid., p. 166. (61) Cordell Hull's telegram to Averell Harriman, Washington, 5 April 1944, ibid., p. 168. (62) Ibid. (63) Memorandum by Cloyce Kenneth Huston of the State Department's Division of Southern European Affairs, Washington, 11 April 1944, ibid., pp. 172-173. (64) Ibid. [page 17] RAD BR/329 Hull reported to MacVeagh that the American government had given its assent to the presentation to the Romanians of the proposed terms; however, it mentioned that "we should have preferred that the definitive settlement of the status of Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina be held over for later discussion." [65] Hull added that one must assume that the Russians would be unwilling to give any consideration whatever to a modification of the article concerning its frontiers with Romania, in view of the frequent public reiteration of Russian claims to those regions. A Maniu Government in Moldavia (Bessarabia)? On 14 April 1944 the Soviet armistice terms, approved by Great Britain and the US, were handed over to Marshal Antonescu and Iuliu Maniu. [65] The diplomatic notes published to date indicate that around April 14 Stirbey had made the unexpected suggestion to Novikov that, should the negotiations with Marshal Antonescu fail to yield the aniticipated results, Maniu should remove to Russian territory in Moldavia and establish a government in opposition to Antonescu. [67] This time Moscow did not object to the Romanian leader but asked Great Britain and the US to assent to a formal proposal to Maniu along that line. The instructions that Cordell Hull gave to MacVeagh included the following: "If he accepted the proposal to remove to 'Russian territory' in Moldavia, Maniu would be placing himself, as well as whatever governmental and administrative bodies he might set up, under the protection and auspices of the Soviet government, at least until the time British and American representatives could arrive. For this reason it is important that you should give Mr. Novikov clearly to understand the position of this government as set forth in the State Department's note of 23 April 1944, 'that, in conformity with the known American policy of deferring the settlement of boundary issues until the conclusion of hostilities, we have been unwilling to look upon any dispositions of territory effected during the course of the war as being definitive, preferring to regard them as pending final examination and settlement at the close of hostilities.1" [68] The suggestion of establishing a Maniu government in Moldavia again implicitly raised the issue of Romania's eastern border and that of the future of Bessarablia. The Soviets suggested that Maniu transfer to "Russian territory in Moldavia." Since Moldavia is the name given by the Soviets to Bessarabia, it was evident that they already considered Moldavia (Bessarabia) Russian territory. Reiterating this expression, the State Department put it in quotation marks, "Russian territory," which suggests that it had not adopted it. ----------------------------- (65) Cordell Hull's telegram to Lincoln MacVeagh, Washington, 11 April 1944, ibid., p. 174. (66) Lincoln MacVeagh's telegram to Cordell Hull, Cairo, 14April 1944. (67) A 16 April 1944 telegram, ibid., p. 175. (68) Cordell Hull's telegram to Lincoln MacVeagh, Washington, 18 April 1944, ibid., p. 176. [page 18] RAD BR/329 When he received the State Department communication Novikov asked "whether the State Department meant its remarks to apply to Bessarabia, altering its previous acceptance of the 1940 boundary." The American ambassador answered: "In my belief, the State Department was merely repeating its known policy of deferring boundary issues until the conclusion of hostilities with special reference to this particular proposal regarding Moldavia . . . and that the question of Bessarabia, already agreed, did not arise." [69] Moscow declared itself satisfied with MacVeagh's interpretation that suggested American acceptance of the Soviet position on Bessarabia and clearly answered that the territorial jurisdiction of the eventual Maniu government had no bearing on Bessarabia and must be based on the known declaration of Soviet Foreign Minister Viacheslav Molotov concerning the preservation of the Romanian-Soviet frontier, as established in 1940. [70] The discussions on the establishment of a Maniu government in Moldavia under Soviet occupation ended in the explanation given by Molotov to Harriman, the American Ambassador to Moscow. Molotov said that although that proposal was acceptable to the Soviet government, nevertheless, "it was not considered as having been made seriously." Molotov added that there were yet no definite indications that Maniu would follow such a course. [71] Apparently, this diplomatic episode was used by Maniu as a test of Soviet intentions, to check whether in case a government under Soviet aegis were to be established, the Kremlin would agree to leaving Bessarabia under Romanian sovereignty. A similar probing on eventual Soviet concessions over the issue of Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina had been done in December 1943, through the agency of Czechoslovak President Eduard Benes. Evoking in a conversation with Molotov the issue of Romania's postwar frontiers, Benes urged the restoration of northern Transylvania, but was more reticent regarding Bessarabia. He said: "I always show them [the Romanians] a map and say that no compromise is possible over your [Soviet] frontiers." [72] The Soviets' Own Negotiations On 11 April 1944, that is, a few days before the armistice terms had been reported to Marshal Antonescu and Iuliu Maniu, Frederic Nanu, the Romanian Minister to Stockholm, was informed by Aleksandra Mikhailovna Kollontai, the Soviet Ambassador to Sweden, under the seal of absolute secrecy, that "Stalin has realized that in order to achieve a lasting peace he has to win the friendship of neighboring nations. He therefore intends to treat Romania kindly and even to help it repair the damages of war." [73] These declarations came one ----------------------------- (69) Lincoln MacVeagh's telegram to Cordell Hull, Cairo, 24April 1944, ibid., p. 177. (70) Ibid. (71) Averell Harriman's telegram to Cordell Hull, Moscow, 25 April 1944, ibid., p. 177. (72) Vojtech Mastny, "The Benes-Stalin-Molotov Conversations in December 1943," new documents in The American Historical Review Vol. XVII, No. 5, December 1972, p. 392. (73) Frederic Nanu, "The First Soviet Double-Cross," Journal of Central European Affairs, Vol. XII, No. 3, October 1952, p. 249. [page 19] RAD BR/329 day after Semionov, the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires in Stockholm, had reproached Nanu because the Romanians preferred to deal with the Anglo-Saxons instead of directly dealing with the Soviet Union, which was their neighbor. Nanu's impression was that the Soviets, who were eager to deal with the Romanian government via Stockholm, and not with its opposition, tried to persuade those concerned of the advantages of direct negotiations over those conducted through the agency of the Western Allies. That Moscow was willing to talk to. the Antonescu government and offer better terms than were presented in Cairo shows the primacy the Soviets still attached to military, rather than purely political, considerations, even at that stage of the war. [74] On 13 April 1944, that is, one day after the armistice terms had been handed to the Romanians in Cairo, they were conveyed to Nanu in Stockholm as well. Certainly, these terms, edited by the Soviet Union also included the clause of re-establishing the 1940 Romanian-Soviet frontier, that is, the annexation of Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina by the Soviet Union. As the Stockholm negotiations continued, the Kremlin eventually granted the representative of the Romanian government more favorable terms than those offered in Cairo. After eventually accepting the Cairo armistice terms, Iuliu Maniu called on the Allies to improve their terms in the note he sent to Alexandru Cretzianu on June 12, along the lines of the concessions made by Moscow during the Stockholm negotiations. Commenting on Maniu's request for an improvement of the armistice terms, MacVeagh, who was not acquainted with the bilateral Romanian-Soviet negotiations, said: "The allied representatives are at a loss to understand the last sentence above, since they promised no amelioration to the armistice terms." [75] Maniu then notified them that "definite information exists that so far as Antonescu is concerned modifications were agreed to." [76] The Stockholm negotiations again provided the Romanian government with an opportunity to raise the question of the future status of Bessarabia, for in replying to the Soviet armistice proposals, Mihai Antonescu urged Nanu to demand that a plebiscite be held in Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina. The verbal instructions given by Mihai Antonescu on this point were worded as follows in the memorandum edited by Nanu: "Since it is our aim not only to re-establish peace but also to establish lasting friendship with Russia and since the Allies, including Russia, have solemnly supported the principle of self-determination, the Romanian government believes the fate of Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina should not be decided before the end of the war, when the methods of application of that principle will be decided for all disputed territories." [77] When he received the copy of the memorandum submitted to the Soviet Union, the Romanian Foreign Minister insisted on specifying that, in any case, "we could not give up Bessarabia and Bucovina." (78) Finally, in a new verbal message sent ----------------------------- (74) Vojtech Mastny, Russia's Road to the Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979), pp. 154-156. (75) MacVeagh's telegram to Cordell Hull, Cairo, 13 June 1944, ibid., p. 181. (76) A 29 June 1944 telegram, ibid., p. 183. (77) Nanu, op. cit., p. 251. (78) Ibid., p. 253. [page 20] PAD BR/329 to Stockholm on August 5 Mihai Antonescu added that the conduct of the Russians in occupied Moldavia had hardly been encouraging, and therefore it would be better to settle the fate of Bessarabia at the peace conference. [79] Certainly, the last moment attempt in Stockholm to persuade the Soviets to defer settling the problems of Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina had no chance of success, particularly since this time the Romanians could no longer rely even on a well-disposed attitude such as that displayed by the State Department. By that point, the Soviet Union was dealing directly with Romania, and with almost discretionary powers. The Soviets thought they were entitled to proceed in that way since on 5 May 1944 Eden had suggested that the Soviet Ambassador to London proceed to a demarcation of the relevant zones of activity in the Balkans, according to a line which left Romania and Bulgaria within the sphere of Soviet interest, while Greece and Yugoslavia remained in the British. [80] As early as May 18 the Soviet Ambassador to London reported to Eden that the Soviet Unions had tentatively accepted this division of the Balkans; on May 31 Churchill asked Roosevelt for his "blessing" to a plan to assign wartime responsibility for Romania to the USSR and for Greece to Britain. [81] Even before the October 1944 conference, when the Churchill-Stalin agreement was penned, giving the USSR 90% of influence in Romanian affairs, [82] Moscow, as the dominant allied military power in the area, made Single-handed decisions on the fate of Bessarabia and, within certain limits, even of that of the entire Romanian state. The Government and the Opposition on the Brink Neither the Romanian government nor the leaders of the opposition had any knowledge of the agreement concerning the inclusion of their country in the sphere of influence of the Soviet Union, although their knowledge of European diplomatic history and simple geopolitics should have rid them of any illusions. They wishfully believed until the last moment that the Anglo-Saxons, although heavily involved on other fronts, would not abandon a country still allied with Hitler and join in the military occupation of Romania, if not through troops landed in the Balkans, at least through symbolic airborne forces. In the last contacts Mihai Antonescu had with the Allies, he adopted the American viewpoint that the problem of the frontier with the Soviet Union be deferred till the conclusion of a peace treaty. In a message sent in July 1944 to Harrison, the American representative in Bern, through the agency of Vespasian Pella, Romania's Minister to Bern, Mihai Antonescu said that Romania was ready to cease hostilities with the Soviet Union provided its national sovereignty, its territorial rights, and its institutions were respected. If these terms were not accepted, Romania would be obliged to continue the struggle "with the risk of succumbing with dignity." In that case, however, "the Anglo-Saxon powers, would bear the responsibility for its sacrifice and the ----------------------- (79) Ibid., p. 254. (80) William Hardy McNeil, America, Britain, and Russia; Their Cooperation and Conflict, 1941-1946(London: Oxford University Press, 1953), p. 422. (81) Winston Churchill, The Second World War, Vol. 6, Triumph and Tragedy (New York: Bantam, 1977), p. 62. (82) Ibid., p. 197. [page 21] RAD BR/329 destruction of European equilibrium and having the war won only by the Soviets." In his message to the United States the Romanian Foreign Minister added that practical possibilities for getting out of the war would increase if a statement were made agreeing to leave to the peace conference the decision regarding Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina, and if the United States and Great Britain could, at the right: moment, provide effective military help by debarking troops, landing paratroops, and building air bases. Finally, according to the above-mentioned message, the Soviet Union offered in Stockholm to enter into bilateral negotiations on territorial questions, claiming that the 1941 frontier was primarily a question of prestige and in no way excluded the possibility that a peace conference would return Bessarabia and Northern Bucovian wholly or in part, and wound up with the statement that Romania was prepared to join new regional, continental, and worldwide organizations, especially a European or Balkan federation. [83] At the last meeting Hitler had with Marshal Antonescu on 5 August 1944 at his general headquarters in Wolfsschanze, he tried to persuade the Romanian leader that Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Turkey, and Finland could be saved from Bolshevism only by binding their fate to that of Germany, rather than under a British protectorate. [84] Despite Hitler's insistence, with many technical details, on the superiority that Germany would acquire over its enemies by turning out and using new destructive weapons. Marshal Antonescu declared to his assistants on the train taking him back to Romania that "Germany has lost the war. Now, we must concentrate our efforts on not losing it ourselves." [85] To be sure, Marshal Antonescu, who had declared war on the Soviet Union in order to conquer Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina, could not easily sign any armistice recognizing the loss of those provinces. That is why, at the decisive meeting he had with King Michael on 23 August 1944, he declared he would not accept an armistice unless assurances were given him that he could retain Bessarabia and Transylvania. For lack of such guarantees, Marshal Antonescu declared that he would then continue to fight in the Carpathians. [86] The acceptance of the armistice terms was one of the first foreign policy decisions made by the regime established after the palace coup of August 23; these terms provided that Romania's border would be that set under the Soviet-Romanian Agreement of 28 June 1940. Although the new Romanian government was willing to sign the armistice immediately, [87] the document was nevertheless not signed until 12 September 1944 in Moscow. Article 4 confirmed the Romanian-Soviet ----------------------------- (83) Harrison's telegram to Cordell Hull, Bern, 20 July 1944, in F.R.U.S., Vol. IV, p. 186. (84) Record of the conversation between Adolf Hitler and Marshal Antonescu, Wolfsschanze, 5 August 1944 in Hillgruber, Staatsmanner . . ., p. 493. (85) Gheorghe Barbul, Mémorial Antonescu, le Troisiéme Homme de l'Axe (Paris: Editions de la Couronne, 1950), p. 163. (86) Nicolette Franck, La Roumanie dans l'Engrenage (Paris: Elsevier Sequoira, 1977), p. 32. (87) Shanz's telegram to Cordell Hull, Cairo, 25 August 1944, in F.R.U.S., Vol. IV, p. 195. [page 22] RAD BR/329 border along the River Prut. [88] In Moscow the former democratic opposition, now joined by representatives of the Romanian Communist Party, realized that Romania was firmly within the Soviet sphere. Cordell Hull informed Ambassador Harriman in Moscow of the data supplied by American military sources about the immediate impact of the Romanian negotiations in Moscow. "Government officials and businessmen in Romania feel that Britain and the United States have broken their promises and have abandoned1 Romania to Russia." Returning members of the Romanian armistice delegation spread the story that the negotiations in Moscow were dominated by the Russians, with the British and American representatives refusing to discuss the terms without conferring first with the Russian representatives. [89] Moreover, Lucretiu Patrascanu, the communist representative of the Romanian delegation sent to Moscow, complained to American Ambassador Harriman that although Molotov had received him he had nevertheless not discussed the terms of the armistice with him. [90] The report supplied by American military sources emphasized that "Maniu is reported disappointed in Great Britain, having expected more consideration and easier armistice terms. [91] The extent of Iuliu Maniu's disappointment is clear from what he said two months later to Burton Berry, the American representative in Bucharest to whom, on the evening of 8 December 1944, he said that "if he had known the Soviets were to be given a free hand in setting the armistice terms he would not have advised the king to sign the armistice." He argued that his pressure and the Romanian action that resulted from it had actually advanced the Focsani-Galatz line, which might have been held a long time, to the very gates of Budapest." Berry's report went on as follows: "With considerable emotion, Maniu asked if America and Great Britain wished Romania to become a part of the Soviet Union? If so, please advise me accordingly, for this can easily be arranged and even today, late as it is, I could arrange it to the better advantage of Romania than can the Romanian Communists. Then he repeated that, it were our intention to abandon Romania, we owed him the obligation of telling him so and he owed the Romanian people the obligation of obtaining the best possible terms for them." After claiming that Maniu had been a steady friend of the Allies, Berry wound up saying: "Because of what he has been and what he is, it seems important that he be preserved from slipping into sharing the general conviction that the discussion of the Romanian state is now in progress." [92] ----------------------------- (88) Emil Ciurea, "The Armistice Convention with Romania," Traité de Paix avec la Roumanie, 10 Fevrier 1947 (Paris: Pedone, 1954), p. 236. (89) Cordell Hull's telegram to Averell Harriman, Washington, 30 September 1944, in F.R.U.S., Vol. IV, p. 243. (90) Averell Harriman's telegram to Cordell Hull, Moscow, 3 September 1944, ibid., p. 214. (91) Cordell Hull's telegram to Harriman, Washington, 30 September 1944, ibid., p. 243. (92) Burton Berry's telegram to Cordell Hull, Bucharest, 9 December 1944, ibid., pp. 279-180. [page 23] RAD BR/329 Conclusion The postwar fate of Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina had been established under the armistice terms submitted by the Soviet government through the agency of Novikov in Cairo on 8 April 1944. Since then the diplomatic documents dealing with this subject had merely reiterated the sentence which consisted in re-establishing the Romanian-Soviet frontier of 28 June 1940. At its 8 May 1946 meeting the Paris conference of the foreign ministers of the Soviet Union, the US, Great Britain, and France established that the Romanian-Soviet frontier would continue to be that of 28 June 1940. The representatives of the four major powers agreed comparatively quickly on this, for, generally speaking, the frontier problem was not a central point in the negotiations. [93] On 2 September 1946 Gheorghe Tatarascu, head of the Romanian delegation at the Paris conference, declared before that conference that "the frontiers assigned by the peace treaty to Romania remove all possibility of conflict in that part of Europe." [94] At the Paris peace conference the official Romanian delegation did not allude to the problem of Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina at all. The reason why the Romanian representatives behaved so passively was that they had agreed with the Soviet delegation to settle all issues of the treaty draft concerning Romania's relations with the Soviet Union in bilateral discussions either with that delegation or with the Soviet government in Moscow and not to raise them at the conference's plenary sessions?. [95] The only problem raised in connection with the Romanian-Soviet frontier -- and even this merely in the discussion held prior to the peace conference -- was the need for a more detailed and precise description of it, since the exact line of this frontier, settled under the so-called agreement of 28 June 1940, was only known after a small-scale map was prepared and published by Izvestiia, along with the Soviet ultimatum. Since the work on precisely defining the frontier and the question connected with the transfer of territory were still underway in 1940, when the Romanian-Soviet war broke out, it was especially necessary to specify the line of the frontier. Therefore, on 16 September 1946, Romania addressed a note to the Paris conference of the allied foreign ministers in which it asked that the Romanian-Soviet border be clearly marked on the map annexed to the peace treaty, but that note was hot even distributed among the members of the Political and Territorial Commission for Romania. [96] Since there were rumors in 1945 that: the Soviets had set up frontier posts across the Danube on the Romanian side and tried to establish control over the Sulina, the only navigable branch of the Danube, and eventually to bring about a territorial union with Bulgaria across the narrow Dobruja, the Anglo-Saxon Allies tried to obtain a promise from the Soviet Union that it would more precisely define its frontier with Romania. The fear lest the Soviet Union extend its sovereignty beyond the imprecise limits of the 1940 agreement grew when the Soviet chairman of the Allied Control Commission in Bucharest refused to permit (93) Ion Enescu, op. cit., p. 224. (94) Tatarascu's speech at the opening of the Paris Conference in F.R.U.S., Vol. III, p. 197. (95) Stefan Lache and Gheorghe Tutui, Romania si Conferinta de Pace de la Paris din 1946 (Cluj-Napoca: Dacia, 1978), p. 242. (96) Ibid., p. 270. [page 24] RAD BR/329 General Schluyer, the US representative on that commission, to visit the area on the grounds that it was under the jurisdiction of the Soviet High Command. [97] Under these conditions, on 24 September 1946 the US and British representatives noted at the Paris conference of the allied foreign ministers that the map indicating the Romanian-Soviet border was too small and reserved for themselves the right to express their remarks on a larger scale map. Eventually, the Soviets submitted a new map, and the problem was not subsequently raised at the New York allied foreign ministers' conference. This map became the appendix number 1 of the Paris Treaty, where it got approval without any objection. Despite this recognition the US was aware of the fact that "the frontier that had been forced on Romania in 1940 by no means corresponded to the ethnic dividing line between the Romanians and the Ukrainians." [98] Since the official Romanian delegation did not actively contest the Soviet position, the task of raising the problem of Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina at the Paris peace conference (1947) again fe[?] to the Romanian democratic opposition, particularly to Iuliu Maniu. The National-Peasant and National-Liberal Parties sent to Paris formal declarations reiterating their well-known views on Romania's eastern border, which they felt had to correspond to the ethnic dividing line. Iuliu Maniu's declarations and the comments of the National-Liberal Party were handed, along with an explanatory letter, to the various delegations at the Paris peace conference through the Paris émigré political group headed by one of former King Carol's foreign ministers, Grigore Gafencu. [99] Recently a Bucharest publication gave partly favorable mention to the campaign conducted by the democratic opposition at the Paris peace conference: "Although the representatives of the government coalition severely and justly criticized the campaign initiated by the opposition, nevertheless, they did not denounce the major problems correctly raised by the latter in the first documents or in the remarks to the draft treaty." [100] The American delegation to the peace conference could only take note of the stand expressed by the Romanian democratic opposition without embracing its viewpoint as regards the frontier question. ----------------------------- (97) John Campbell, "The European Territorial Settlement," Foreign Affairs Vol. XXVI, Nos. 1-4, October 1947-July 1948, p. 210. (98) Ibid., p. 199. (99) Grigore Gafencu's letter to Iuliu Maniu, Geneva, 8 September 1946, Hoover Foundation Archives. (100) Titus Georgescu si Matei Gheorghe, "Ajutorul Acordat Romaniei de Catre Uniunea Sovietica la Conferinta de Pace de la Paris (1946)," Studii Revista de Istorie si Filosofie No. 1, 1954, p. 105.
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