Fire Control Tactics and Strategies

Fire control tactics are planned operational activities that determine exactly where and how to take specific action, as well as any other measures required to manage the fire that are consistent with the selected fire control strategy. The basic principle of all methods of attack is perimeter control (Clar and Chatten 1966). The most common tactic for perimeter control is the construction of a fireline using a crew with hand tools or mechanized equipment. Firelines are pathways where the fuels are cleared away and bare mineral soil is exposed. Using natural barriers, such as creeks or rock outcrops, as firelines can make the fire control operation more efficient. The fireline that is constructed to control a fire’s perimeter may be on the fire’s edge, nearby, or a considerable distance away. The intent is to completely surround the fire and any isolated spot fires apart from the main fire body. Trees and snags may be felled along the fire perimeter if they pose a safety hazard. Once constructed, the fireline must be held by burning out unburned fuel islands between the line and the fire’s edge, or by cooling off and mopping up hot spots until the fire is no longer a threat and considered controlled.

The optimal strategy for fire control includes the most cost-efficient use of personnel and equipment in light of the values threatened, legal constraints, and management objectives. Above all, strategy and tactics must not compromise firefighter safety. Fire control strategies include

• direct attack on the fire’s edge, starting on the flanks in order to minimize the fire perimeter
• indirect/parallel attack at a distance from the fire’s edge
• modified attack/confine strategy for troublesome parts of a fire where it makes more sense for suppression crews to work along the roads or waterways that provide defensible boundaries

A monitoring strategy might be invoked when weather conditions or inadequate suppression resources suggest low likelihood of control.

Direct attack

On a direct attack, personnel and equipment work close to the fire or on the edge of flames. The objective is to stop the fire at the point of flame contact with unburned fuel by suppressing flames with water, chemicals, or dirt, then scraping a line completely around the fire’s edge. Care is required so that embers or live fire are not scraped or transported to the unburned side of the fireline. Direct attack is usually chosen on small fires that can be suppressed and completely mopped up, on low-intensity fires where smoke and heat permit work along the fire’s edge, and at the rear if smoke is being blown into the burned area (Chandler and others 1983). On an extremely small fire, a pine bough or swatter could be used to beat out the flames.

Fire Anatomy

If the fire cannot be directly attacked at its head due to safety concerns, then the Incident Commander (IC) may decide to split the crew and directly attack the fire’s flanks after anchoring the rear, with the intent of eventual “pincer” action at the fire’s head. Crews working the flanks must remain aware of any changes in fire environment, especially the chance that a wind shift could turn a quiet flank into a roaring head fire.

Indirect attack

With an indirect attack, a fireline is constructed away from the edge and fuel is removed in the path of the spreading fire so that combustion ceases or slows when the fire runs out of fuel. Indirect attack is also useful when values protected do not justify an aggressive, costly attack. Indirect attack also may facilitate backfire operations, or intentional ignition(s) to remove fuel from an advancing fire and essentially redirect its spread direction. This is an aggressive tactic that should be attempted by skilled practitioners only, the result of deliberate calculation of likely success, not out of desperation or as a last resort (Chandler and others 1983).

Parallel attack

A parallel attack is a variant of indirect attack, with the line constructed at an intermediate distance from the fire. It is especially used when the fire’s edge is so irregular that direct attack would require an excessive amount of line building. Fire plows and bulldozers usually use parallel attack because of difficulty in working directly on the fire’s edge without risking the scraping or displacement of burning material outside the fireline (Chandler and others 1983).

Deciding on Attack Method

As part of the initial sizeup, the Incident Commander (IC) needs to decide whether personnel and equipment should be used close to the fire on direct attack, or some distance away in an indirect attack, or some combination of the two. Clar and Chatten (1966) outline the arguments for and against direct attack as involving answers to the follow questions:

• Will heat and smoke permit crews and equipment to work on the fire’s edge?
• Will crewmembers be safer on the edge, where they can step into the burned area, or are the larger fuels producing too much heat to provide a safety zone? Or is the fuel likely to flare up and trap personnel?
• Would trucks, hose lines on engines, and bulldozers be exposed to excessive risk at the edge of the fire?
• Where are the areas that should be kept from burning because of their economic value or effect on fire control?
• What are the tradeoffs between a winding line along the fire’s edge as opposed to shorter lines some distance away?
• Will the physical condition and skills of crewmembers permit direct attack?
• Is supervision available to enforce the required quality of line construction?
• Are significant parts of the fire already out so that crews can take advantage of this reduction in active fire perimeter?

Similarly, Clar and Chatten (1966) identify additional questions that will clarify the reasoning for and against indirect attack:

• Are there natural barriers (roads, streams, cultivated, or burned land) that can be used to advantage; for example in backfire operations?
• Are there topographic features near the fire that can be used as a defense line? For example, will a land bench or creek afford an advantage due to reduced heat distribution upon approach; because of difficulties in suppressing fire in the fuel type currently burning; or because of anticipated changes in weather favorable to holding the fire at defensive positions?
• Will the economic value of fuels consumed between the current fire location and holding or backfire line be so low that it is advantageous to back off to the cooler, safer, and cheaper holding line—especially considering the added cost of patrolling and mopping up additional burned area?
• Will unburned fuels left between the current fire edge and holding (or backfire) line create a later nuisance on this fire or later in the fire season?
• Would a backfire from the holding line be conducted safely, or could it escape and cause even greater damage?