Just a few quick thoughts having scrolled through comments from the last post on Georgia.

--I did not mean to necessarily make the case that all NATO expansion was an awful idea coming out of the Cold War. We won it, after all, and there were arguably some legitimate reasons to extend the security umbrella of the "West" to central European nations formerly coerced into the Warsaw Pact by the Soviets. But there is a huge difference between countries like Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia on the one hand, say, and then Ukraine, Georgia and Latvia on the other. For instance, the latter grouping either have very significant Russian minorities (eastern Ukraine, including Crimea, and Latvia, of course, not to mention Estonia) or else at least disputed regions where Russians have significant interests (Georgia, as recent events painfully showcase). This is not the case with the Czech Republic and Hungary, of course. The point is not too dissimilar to the one's I quoted Kennan and Kissinger as making, to wit, the latter again: "the movement of the Western security system from the Elbe River to the approaches to Moscow brings home Russia's decline in a way bound to generate a Russian emotion that will inhibit the solution of all other issues." Which is to say, it's one thing for the Russians to accept the Czech Republic entering NATO, quite another Georgia, and some of the other countries I mention above (Poland is a harder case, of which perhaps more another day, though let me at least say for now the timing of the announcement of the missile defense arrangements is terrible). Or viewed differently still, what matters more to us, the "freedom" of South Ossetia (whatever that means given the tangled ethnic make-up and allegiances in the province, where most local inhabitants really are hankering for unification with North Ossetia--even as an 'autonomous' Russian republic perhaps--rather than integration into Tbilisi's orbit), or say, strategic cooperation with Russian on nuclear proliferation issues, whether loose Russian nukes, Iran, North Korea or myriad other issues? The answer is pretty clear, no?

--Most fundamentally, an alliance is about defending countries that come under attack, at the end of the day. If Putin moved to invade Prague, would we as a NATO alliance move to counter this aggression? I think we might well, though I don't think Putin would in a thousand years (despite some of the alarmist cover art making the rounds of late!). But let's say Putin made a significant military move in a part of Crimea, or a heavily Russian populated part of Latvia? Would we really go to war over it? Cheap, empty bluster from our pitiable national security team apart, who here seriously thinks we would send American men to die for Georgian (or Crimean) 'freedom'? Let's cut the charade, no? Some will tut-tut I am setting up a straw-man with this image of a massive land war with us on the front-lines beating back the Russian neo-imperial Bear across the Ossetian frontier. Instead, we have analysts (even ones formally affiliated with the Council on Foreign Relations, which I find quite shocking) salivating about sending Stingers and Javelins to Georgia, apparently with nary a thought (save a hasty, and quite underwhelming, blog "update") regarding the massive implications that would ensue. Arming the Georgians in this fashion would be interpreted by the Russians as an act of war, and we can forget about any strategic relationship with them full stop, and then begin to see them inexorably move to deepen their relations with the Iranians, Syrians, North Koreans, anti-American factions in Iraq, and more, with nary a concern at all for our concerns. Of course the chorus will scream, they already are cozying up to all those bad guys, so screw the Ruskies and send in the Stingers! But this is not serious, but rather barely concealed hysteria, or perhaps more accurate, post-adolescent preening passing as policy-making. Indeed, the truth is we've already over-reached in Georgia, as this C.J. Chivers piece makes clear:

In his wooing of Washington as he came to power, Mr. Saakashvili firmly embraced the missions of the United States in Afghanistan and Iraq. At first he had almost nothing practical to offer. Georgia’s military was small, poorly led, ill-equipped and weak.

But Mr. Saakashvili’s rise coincided neatly with a swelling American need for political support and foreign soldiers in Iraq. His offer of troops was matched with a Pentagon effort to overhaul Georgia’s forces from bottom to top.

At senior levels, the United States helped rewrite Georgian military doctrine and train its commanders and staff officers. At the squad level, American marines and soldiers trained Georgian soldiers in the fundamentals of battle.

Georgia, meanwhile, began re-equipping its forces with Israeli and American firearms, reconnaissance drones, communications and battlefield-management equipment, new convoys of vehicles and stockpiles of ammunition.

The public goal was to nudge Georgia toward NATO military standards. Privately, Georgian officials welcomed the martial coaching and buildup, and they made clear that they considered participation in Iraq as a sure way to prepare the Georgian military for “national reunification” — the local euphemism of choice for restoring Abkhazia and South Ossetia to Georgian control.

All of these policies collided late last week. One American official who covers Georgian affairs, speaking on the condition of anonymity while the United States formulates its next public response, said that everything had gone wrong.

Mr. Saakashvili had acted rashly, he said, and had given Russia the grounds to invade. The invasion, he said, was chilling, disproportionate and brutal, and it was grounds for a strong censure. But the immediate question was how far Russia would go in putting Georgia back into what it sees as Georgia’s place.

In short, we giddily trained and equipped the Georgians, and they in turn got carried away that national unification was in the offing (under cover of fancy American and Israeli materiel). But it wasn't to be, the bluff got called, and here we are looking the naive chumps, with blood spilled and innocents dead. There are many words for making representations and promises that you can't and won't fulfill--say bandying to all comers the prospect of rosy NATO membership--and then not following through on the implications of those false representations. One of them is B.S., and there is indeed plenty of that making the rounds in DC, day in, day out.

--Next in comments some thought I was overly symphathetic to the Serbs re: the Kosovo situation. Let me be clear. As anyone familiar with my background knows, I served over two years with the International Rescue Committee in the former Yugoslavia, working on deliveries of humanitarian aid and refugee resettlement. I am well acquainted with the brutishness of the Serbian and Bosnian Serb militaries and militias, was deeply repulsed by same, which was why I spent time between university and law school doing this humanitarian work in the early 90s. So I hold no brief for the Serbs, but I have spent enough time in the region to realize none of the parties were (or are) unadulterated angels. Bosnian Croats (especially in and around Mostar) could be every bit as nasty as Bosnian Serbs, and I know that some Bosnian Muslims were radicalized (say in the Zenica area) and committed their own atrocities. Ditto too in Kosovo--while the Kosovars have been subjected to the major lion's share of oppression there historically--the KLA has also oppressed the increasingly beleaguered Kosovar Serb minority there of late. So given this complex picture, a relatively headlong rush towards independence (Serbs, not to mention Kosovars, look at the history of Kosovo back over many centuries, so a decade or so is just a blip in time), rather than thinking through 'deep autonomy' arrangements with longer transition periods, not only was an affront to Belgrade, but also of course to its historical patron Moscow. My point is only that we cannot be too surprised that Moscow would deviously wield this supposed nefarious precedent to retalitate in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, like it or not.

--I also saw in comments some rather excited folks thinking Putin over-reached and would have his comeuppance shortly. I couldn't disagree more. His move was quite expert, and, despite the horrific military excesses (the Russians typically conduct such campaigns in brutal fashion, as Chechnya showcased in spades), nonetheless well calibrated in terms of not crossing major red-lines that would have united the world in massive anti-Russian ire. Contrast this precise action with the continuing blunders of our hyper-ventilating stewards of state spouting inanities about how 'everything has changed now' (vis-a-vis the U.S.-Russian relationship), that the 'seige' of Georgia will be lifted, that NATO membership is still in the offing, and so on. To this hokum and bunk and empty cacaphony Mr. Putin has been reasonably silent, but meantime delivered some cold, hard facts. This is rather more effective. I couldn't put it better than long-time Times correspondent Michael Binyon:

Vladimir Putin lost several pawns on the chessboard - Kosovo, Iraq, Nato membership for the Baltic states, US renunciation of the ABM treaty, US missiles in Poland and the Czech Republic. But he waited.

The trap was set in Georgia. When President Saakashvili blundered into South Ossetia, sending in an army to shell, kill and maim on a vicious scale (against US advice and his promised word), Russia was waiting.

It was not only Mr Saakashvili who thought that he had the distraction of the Olympics to cover him; the Kremlin also knew that Mr Bush was watching basketball, and, in the longer term, that the US army was fully engaged in Iraq and Afghanistan. From the day that the Russian tank brigade raced through the tunnel into South Ossetia, Russia has not made one wrong move. Mr Bush's remarks yesterday notwithstanding, In five days it turned an overreaching blunder by a Western-backed opponent into a devastating exposure of Western impotence, dithering and double standards on respecting national sovereignty (viz Iraq).

The attack was short, sharp and deadly - enough to send the Georgians fleeing in humiliating panic, their rout captured by global television. The destruction was enough to hurt, but not so much that the world would be roused in fury. The timing of the ceasefire was precise: just hours before President Sarkozy could voice Western anger. Moscow made clear that it retained the initiative. And despite sporadic breaches - on both sides - Russia has blunted Georgian charges that this is a war of annihilation.

Moscow can also counter Georgian PR, the last weapon left to Tbilisi. Human rights? Look at what Georgia has done in South Ossetia (and also in Abkhazia). National sovereignty? Look at the detachment of Kosovo from Serbia. False pretexts? Look at Ronald Reagan's invasion of Grenada to “rescue” US medical students. Western outrage? Look at the confused cacophony.

There are lessons everywhere. To the former Soviet republics - remember your geography. To Nato - do you still want to incorporate Caucasian vendettas into your alliance? To Tbilisi - do you want to keep a President who brought this on you? To Washington - does Russia's voice still count for nothing? Like it or not, it counts for a lot. [my emphasis throughout]

So we know the winners here, but who are the losers in this sad affair? First and foremost, U.S. credibility (already eroded by the dismal Bush record on foreign policy), followed closely by Mr. Saakhasvili. Regarding the latter, even money the Georgians toss him out within 6-9 months, once the sense of unity borne of national emergency fades, as it likely will in coming months (barring new Russian forays into the south of the country). Saakhasvili badly blundered, betting that the cavalry was there for him. It wasn't, and won't be. Georgians will want more capable, realistic leaders. And so should we.

P.S. There is one other little item I meant to add here, as my initial post was quite anti-McCain, and some thought I gave Obama a pass. So, here's my unvarnished take on Obama...

For one, and it might sound silly, I would have liked Mr. Obama to don a coat and tie, get to an official-looking location in Honolulu (where I think he was vacationing), one that didn't seem right off the beach (or even get on a plane back to the continental U.S.), the better to give one serious, full-blown press brief/reaction to the events. Instead, we had a casually attired Obama give a somewhat halting-looking statement (or was it two? three?), with each time the goal-posts moving some.

I guess this happens after exhausting campaigns and when you have 300 foreign policy advisors. But it was not a particularly inspiring show, truth be told. This said, commenters who claim that the McCain and Obama positions were indistinguishable are simply blind. On the one hand we have one candidate declaring "We are all Georgians now", seemingly getting ready for another Cold War (“Russian aggression against Georgia is both a matter of urgent moral and strategic importance to the United States of America"), stressing again the NATO role ("In this country -- it's that little country, a country whose territorial integrity, independence and sovereignty NATO countries reaffirmed at their summit in April -- terrible violence has occurred."), and then this additional bit regarding NATO and the NATO Membership Action Plan: "NATO's North Atlantic Council should convene in emergency session to demand a ceasefire and begin discussions on both the deployment of an international peacekeeping force to South Ossetia and the implications for NATO's future relationship with Russia, a Partnership for Peace nation. NATO's decision to withhold a Membership Action Plan for Georgia might have been viewed as a green light by Russia for its attacks on Georgia, and I urge the NATO allies to revisit the decision." So McCain would have an emergency session convened and suggests the decision to withold a Membership Action Plan was viewed as a "green light" to Russia to attack Georgia, quite a dubious contention indeed, and with it of course the attendant naked cheer-leading to put Georgia right back at the head of the NATO membership line.

Meantime, contrast this with Obama's most forceful statement: "I have consistently called for deepening relations between Georgia and transatlantic institutions, including a Membership Action Plan for NATO, and we must continue to press for that deeper relationship". Forgive me if I cannot take commenters equating these statements as somehow identical seriously, even if I would have preferred Obama not mention the Membership Action Plan at all. And all these substantive differences apart, we should also mention the important differences in tone, which Jake Tapper spells out a bit here. Tone matters too, in all this. Indeed, very much so. Look, frankly I was somewhat surprised to see the quite heated views of people like Richard Holbrooke and Ronald Asmus on the Georgia issue, and so it is clear that a not insignificant number of Democrats were feeling rather hawkish on the issue, thus the tug and pull with Obama's statements. But make no mistake, even given this back-drop among some of his advisors (or more generally influential Democratic foreign policy voices like Holbrooke's), Obama's comments were significantly more sober than McCain's, and so I am more than happy to stand by my contention that Obama took McCain in the "3 AM test" (which, again, I consider laughable gimmickry, but nonetheless felt compelled to comment on), by the proverbial "mile."

We live in a season of risible "3 AM moments", where the breathless commentariat in this country overhear a strange overseas country's name--perhaps with tales of some military action underway--and rush off towards dim-witted debates about what candidate would better handle that resultant red-phone ringing in the middle of the night (this phenomenon I guess most immediately derivative of Mark Penn's desperately lame "positive ad"). This infantile fare passes for serious debate on generally well-regarded sites like Politico.com, or among the beard-stroking class chiming in from a Situation Room near you. There is really nothing we can do about it, this is the sad echo-chamber we dwell in, and it's not going to change anytime soon--so I won't belabor the point here.

This being said, if the horrors inflicted on varied Abkhazians, Ossetians and Georgians this past week (by both sides) must be seen from these provincial, grossly self-interested shores merely through the lens of the U.S. Presidential election, let me chime in very briefly within these contours. Regarding the 3 AM sweepstakes, Obama has taken it by a mile (if his Pavlovian movements to 'sound tougher' after his initial statement were a bit underwhelming, and sadly predictable). Witness this incredibly poor reasoning by McCain, jaw-dropping even by the standards of the mammoth policy ineptitude we've become accustomed to during the reign of Bush 43 and his motley crew of national security miscreants. Here is McCain:

Mr. McCain urged NATO to begin discussions on “the deployment of an international peacekeeping force to South Ossetia,’’ called on the United Nations to condemn “Russian aggression,’’ and said that the secretary of state should travel to Europe “to establish a common Euro-Atlantic position aimed at ending the war and supporting the independence of Georgia.’’

And he said the NATO should reconsider its previous decision and set Georgia – which he called “one of the world’s first nations to adopt Christianity as an official religion’’ — on the path to becoming a member. “NATO’s decision to withhold a membership action plan for Georgia might have been viewed as a green light by Russia for its attacks on Georgia, and I urge the NATO allies to revisit the decision,’’ he said. [my emphasis]

First, what does it matter in this context that Georgia was "one of the world's first nations to adopt Christianity as an official religion"? If it had been the first to adopt Islam, or Judaism, or Buddhism, would the situation be different? Perhaps this might get assorted Christianists in an excited tizzy or such, which come to think of it, might be why some clueless aide to McCain, fresh from a Google sortie, decided to plug this little factoid into his statement. But what is really mind-boggling here is that McCain would have us double-down, and cheer-lead having NATO "revisit" the decision not to extend membership to Georgia! It is precisely this type of profoundly flawed thinking (think too the League of Democracies crapola bandied about from centrist advisors to Obama to the fanciful Kaganites around McCain who want to pick and choose who the supposed good and bad guys are meriting membership in the splendid "League") that has gotten Georgia into this bloody mess.

As George Kennan had put it (would that we had a single diplomat in the entire foreign service of his stature and caliber today):

"(E)xpanding NATO would be the most fateful error of American policy in the entire post-cold war era. Such a decision may be expected to inflame the nationalistic, anti-Western and militaristic tendencies in Russian opinion; to have an adverse effect on the development of Russian democracy; to restore the atmosphere of the cold war to East-West relations, and to impel Russian foreign policy in directions decidedly not to our liking.

Or, related, as Henry Kissinger had recently written:

"Confrontational rhetoric notwithstanding, Russia's leaders are conscious of their strategic limitations. Indeed, I would characterize Russian policy under Putin as driven in a quest for a reliable strategic partner, with America being the preferred choice...But the movement of the Western security system from the Elbe River to the approaches to Moscow brings home Russia's decline in a way bound to generate a Russian emotion that will inhibit the solution of all other issues. It should be kept on the table without forcing the issue to determine the possibilities of making progress on other issues."

These are the systemic historic forces at play here, and McCain would just idiotically throw fuel on the fire. Meantime, my post here sketched out the specific bill of goods leading to this crisis, whether the ill-advised, rushed handling of Kosovo, or how Saakhasvili's over-reaching was a major factor in contributing to this Russian reaction, among other factors. On this last, C. J. Chivers recaps it well in this NYT piece:

Some diplomats considered Mr. Saakashvili a politician of unusual promise, someone who could reorder Georgia along the lines of a Western democracy and become a symbol of change in the politically moribund post-Soviet states. Mr. Saakashvili encouraged this view, framing himself as a visionary who was leading a column of regional democracy movements.

Other diplomats worried that both Mr. Saakashvili’s persona and his platforms presented an implicit challenge to the Kremlin, and that Mr. Saakashvili made himself a symbol of something else: Russia’s suspicion about American intentions in the Kremlin’s old empire. They worried that he would draw the United States and Russia into arguments that the United States did not want.

This feeling was especially true among Russian specialists, who said that, whatever the merits of Mr. Saakashvili’s positions, his impulsiveness and nationalism sometimes outstripped his common sense.

The risks were intensified by the fact that the United States did not merely encourage Georgia’s young democracy, it helped militarize the weak Georgian state. [my emphasis]

We know from Kennan that NATO encirclement of Russia is ultimately a poor idea (incidentally, what is the purpose of the NATO alliance anyway with the Soviet Union defeated--nation-building in eastern Afghanistan, or some such?). And Kissinger is right that Moscow has been in the hunt for a "reliable strategic partner, with America being the preferred choice" (remember the Spirit of Ljubljana!), so why push them away allowing a country on Russia's southern under-belly (one far less important to us strategically), to have become such a nettlesome U.S. proxy badgering the Kremlin?

Look, all of this would have been stupid and deeply flawed policy, but at least morally defensible, if we meant to actually defend the Georgians. But we don't, and never will, as this would mean a war with Russia. We've had a tough go of it fighting small militias and tribes in Iraq and Afghanistan, so even McCain would pull back from such unbridled folly (though doubtless some imbecile will pen an op-ed in coming days about the need for NATO airstrikes on Russian forces should they attack Tbilisi UPDATE: Sorry, I was a little off here--and putting aside the imbecile moniker, so as not to get too personal--but we're speaking of Stingers and Javelins, not airstrikes. Impressive 'contentions'!).

So here is where matters stand. Rather than talk and obsess about what we should do, it is the Russians, sad to say, who will determine the fate of Georgia in the coming days and weeks, and so we might take a moment or two and stop and think about what their next moves are likely to be. Will they stop at Gori (just south of Ossetia) as well as a bit to the east of Abkhazia (a similar 'exclusion zone'), or have they now decided to march into Tbilisi and unseat this Government whole stop (I think it's a closer call which way Russia will go than many of us realize at this hour, but won't hazard to make a call just yet. UPDATE: The latest Russian moves would appear to indicate the former). As a Georgian civilian put it more pithily: "The border is where the Russians say it is. It could be here, or it could be Gori". Or, indeed, it could be Tbilisi, as I say.

Meantime, a Georgian soldier tells a U.S. reporter in the same piece: "Write exactly what I say. Over the past few years, I lived in a democratic society. I was happy. And now America and the European Union are spitting on us." They are, aren't they? They had no business making the cheap promises and representations that were made. No business on practical policy grounds. No business on strategic grounds (though I guess it got Rummy another flag, near the Salvadorans, say, for the Mesopotamian "coalition of the willing"). And now our promises are unraveling and nakedly revealed for the sorry lies and crap policy they are, with the emperor revealed to have no clothes, yet again. This is what our foreign policy mandarins masquerade about as they play policy-making, in their Washington work-stations. It's, yes, worse than a crime, rather a sad, pitiable blunder.

And one McCain would have us compound, I stress, again! An honorable man who served his country well, it is clear his time has past and his grasp on the most basic foreign policy calls we'll need to make in the coming years is very tentative indeed. He'll be surrounded by second-tier 'yes-man' realists and residual neo-con swill, few with any ideas worth pursuing if we mean to take the national interest seriously with sobriety and freshness of perspective. So let us help him exit off-stage gracefully, as he served his country with dignity when called upon, but let us not sacrifice our children's future to ignorants with deludely romantic notions of empire. Been there, done that. Indeed, we have a President who has announced a pre-emptive doctrine which allows us to, willy-nilly, instigate regime change when and where we deem appropriate. Who are we to lecture Putin now? What standing do we have to do so? And what parochial and self-satisfied myopia has us indignantly thinking we are some unimpeachable arbitrer of right and wrong in the international system after the disastrous missteps of the past eight sordid years?

If we mean to help the Georgians escape an even worse fate, we must summon up the intelligence and humility to have a dialogue with Putin, Medvedev, Sergie Lavrov, Vitaly Churkin and the rest of them based on straight talk (not of the McCain variety, and if we can somehow find a messenger of the stature and talent to deliver the message in the right way, hard these days), to wit: we screwed up overly propping this guy up and he got too big for his britches, we understand, but for the sake of going forward strategic cooperation (and don't mention Iran here, at least not as the first example)--as well as stopping further civilian loss of life--agree to work with us in good faith towards a status quo ante as much as possible, don't enter Tbilisi, and throw show-boats Sarkozy/Kouchner a bone with some possible talk of a going forward EU peacekeeping role (if non-binding, for the time being). This is roughly what we should be saying/doing now, not having the President step up to the White House mike fresh back from the sand volleyball courts of Beijing to gravely declare Russia's actions are "unacceptable in the 21st century." Such talk will get us nowhere, instead, it might just fan the flames more (as will Cheney's threats of "serious consequences", apparently a favorite sound-bite of his, but this time mentioned only in the context of the U.S.-Russian relationship). Let us be clear: these men's credibility is a sad joke, and Putin knows it only too well. So let's get real. Before it's too late, and more facts are created on the ground, mostly on the backs of innocent civilians throughout Georgia's various regions.

The commentary being churned out in the Western press regarding Georgia is rather pitiable in the main (most notably this dreary WaPo piffle, stinking of knee-jerk group-think as it does from beginning to end). A few quick points, in no particular order. First, let us disabuse ourselves from the notion that Mr. Saakashvili is some glorious democrat (the election he barely won in January included irregularities, and there continues to be endemic corruption in Tblisi). Second, let us recall that many south Ossetians and Abkhazians are not particularly keen to live under Tbilisi's yoke, indeed some prefer Russian influence to predominate there for the time being. Third, if there is any truth to Russian allegations that there are some 1,500 fatalities in the South Ossetian capital of Tskhinvali--and they were caused by a major initial over-reach by the Georgian military (we will need to wait for more details to emerge)--expect many more brutish bombardments like the Russians apparently have conducted in the Georgian town of Gori, alas. Fourth, some context: ever since the overly hasty recognition of Kosovo went live, Putin has been very keen to intimate what's good for the goose is good for the gander, having personally threatened Saakashvili that Russia would formally recognize as independent states Ossetia and Abkhazia. Unfair and inconvenient, at least to Georgian 'sovereignists' (or, to others, irrendentists)? Yes, to a fashion, as the perils of too breezy analogizing among these different situations is quite clear. Still, the Kosovo precedent was going to be used to Putin's purposes, of course, humiliating as the events in Pristina were to Moscow, and with the barely concealed breezy cheerleading from Brussels and DC adding insult to injury.

Which brings me to a fifth point, and perhaps a more proximate causal factor contributing to this explosion of misfortune in Georgia, namely, that of stupidity, or at least, severe miscalculation. Saakashvili, an apparently quite idealistic 40 year-old former NY lawyer, seems to have erred too much in thinking that giddy summitry with Western big-wigs might pay dividends (or too his far too excited involvement in the Iraq adventure which, incidentally, looks to be coming to a quite precipitous end) but unfortunately, insufficiently appreciated the disastrous waning in U.S. power these past years, despite his constant hankering for NATO membership (which a resurgent Russia will never accept regardless of Kosovo or whatever else, best I can tell), and thus has fallen short with regard to better appreciating a variable which would have been more apropos, namely, a harsh dose of realpolitik. And this despite Putin having warned Saakashvili rather pointedly: "On April 21, Mr. Saakashvili called the Russian leader to demand that he reverse the decision [possible Russian recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia]. He reminded Mr. Putin that the West had taken Georgia’s side in the dispute. And Mr. Putin, according to several of Mr. Saakashvili’s associates, shot back with a suggestion about where they could put their statements. Mr. Saakashvili, prudent for once, shied from uttering the exact wording, but said that Mr. Putin had used “extremely offensive language,” and had repeated the expression several times." Permit me to be less prudent than Mr. Saakashvili, who appears perhaps to be a poor prioritizer of where to be prudent and where not. Mr. Putin told him that he could (and excuse the crudity) stick American and Western European assurances regarding the territorial disputes in question up his rear end, I suspect, and I'm afraid that's not a too inaccurate assessment, if a bit biting and brusque (save if McCain trumps Obama and decides to ride the NATO cavalry up from Kabul to Tbilisi a few months hence--perhaps on the back of some more WaPo interventionist rhapsodizing--devoid of the merest smidgen of appreciation for historical context and subtlety, leading to another toweringly idiotic 'Washington consensus' of some sort).

What's needed now, rather critically, is rather a large dose of humble pie by Mr. Saakashvili (let Solana visit him to hand-hold some, and perhaps then send our own Condi-the-Great too, as face-saver, if she's not too busy showcasing our incompetence elsewhere), with an understanding that the main objective is an immediate cease-fire with the goal of returning to the status quo ante, which is to say, de facto Russian control of the provinces in question. We could do far worse (indeed Putin may be minded to just have them go ahead and declare their independence under Russian control, or simply annex them), and bloviating about the death of the Rose Revolution in far-flung Abkhazia and Ossetia, while doubtless fun cocktail chit-chat among the grandees of our favorite editorial pages, well, Putin might have an idea or two where to put such talk, and it won't save any lives at this urgent juncture either. Put differently, let's stop our fanciful reverie from points removed (and where the ramifications don't include rampant lost of life, say) in favor of trying to dampen back a bloodbath that is looming today in the Caucasus, especially should Saakashvili delude himself some quasi-cavalry might be in the offing, and push back on the Russians even harder. For there is no cavalry coming, save if cavalry can be construed as 'we must respect Georgian sovereignty' soundbites that will blanket around clueless anchors striving mightily to pose intelligible questions on the cable news circuit that might be overheard at the Tbilisi Marriott.

Last, and somewhat tangential, interesting to note in passing (though highly unsurprising) that when we are are not speaking of a hiccup in financial regulatory issues in Moscow or such (where Medvedev was taking to flexing some muscle), it is Putin who leaves Beijing for the staging ground of the operation, not Medvedev. All the more reason for Saakashvili to be concerned...

NB: Larison is on top of this as well, just keep scrolling over there--but this post might be a good starting point--as it's particularly cogent (especially his contention that "Kissinger and Cohen are right", with which I mostly concur, and helpfully saves me the trouble too of having to write about yet another Kagan).

UPDATE: WP: "U.N. Security Council met for the fourth time in four days, with U.S. Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad accusing Moscow of seeking "regime change" in Georgia and resisting attempts to make peace." You can't make this stuff up. You'd think a capable diplomat like Zalmay K. would steer clear of such phraseology, not least given the gross attendant ironies given the Iraq imbroglio, no? Incidentally, I've espied commenters at other sites (where this post has been picked up) who appear to find me unsympathetic to the Georgian side. Not at all. It's precisely because I care about innocent Georgian lives being needlessly spilled that I'm so dismayed by Saakashvili's recklessness, including notably his naive belief in Western support should Putin get nasty (by the by, and to stress again, the notion that Georgia would become a full-fledged member of NATO was always absurd fare, and shame on Brussels and Washington for playing pretend). I should say too, any concerted military action by the Russians south of Gori begins to well cross red-lines (Putin will argue Gori is too close a staging ground towards Tskhinvali--not necessarily false, though civilian apartments don't pose a threat, but again, if you believe Russian reports, Saakashvili's excesses in Tskhinvali were even worse). Meantime, Saakashvili might take a peek at his reward for 2,000 men in Iraq: here is our charming POTUS (courtesy of Andrew Sullivan, for which thanks) cavorting about the sand volley-ball dunes of festive Beijing during Misha's time of troubles. Nero meets Crawford meets NASCAR, I guess. Send the pic to other possibly interested parties in Kiev, Central Asia and the Baltics too....

Steve Clemons was kind enough to invite me to participate in an on-line "terrorism salon" discussion over at his excellent TWN. The other participants and their bios are here. Below I post what I think is my last contribution to the so-called 'salon' discussion. I argue that we may well be overstating the terror threat as paramount so that renewed emphasis on other pressing policy challenges is well merited. The post follows:

Before we fall into a consensus that terrorism remains at (or very near) the top of the heap, permit me to play contrarian among these terrorism experts.

Matt advises we face a "three-fold threat", namely: 1) core al-Qaeda, 2) 'franchise' players like al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, and 3) a motley gaggle of some 300 groups (most of them Sunni, reportedly) that have "less direct ties to al-Qaeda", per Matt.

Let us take each in turn, if very briefly. Core al Qaeda now sequestered in Pakistan, in the main, hasn't even been able to overturn the Pakistani Government, let alone materially threaten ours, at least not since the traumatic events of 9/11, getting on a decade ago. They threaten important cities like Peshawar in the NWFP, a shocking and worrisome fact, but not yet the central government in Islamabad, despite high profile assassinations like Benazir Bhutto's.

Regional al Qaeda affiliates of late, I'd argue particularly in the Maghreb, are gaining steam. A recent prominent attack on U.N. interests in Algiers is of concern, but again, I fail to see how these groups present a vital threat to these United States. An important one, yes (certainly in the context that they also happen to present a more direct threat to close European allies like Spain and Italy, say), but the primary one? I don't think so.

Then we turn to Matt's listing of some 300 terror groups we need be concerned about! But a brief perusal of Matt's linked National Counterterrorism Center document shows many of the incidents occurring in such forlorn spots as Chad, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Nepal, and dozens of course, in Iraq (there were far fewer there, indeed none, before our invasion, it bears noting, if its become somewhat tiresome to do so). Again, I query, is this the maximal primary U.S. foreign policy threat we will be confronting going forward?

Matt, to his credit (albeit after an obligatory reference to the Iranian threat, itself overblown, as General Abizaid and other have noted even a nuclear Iran could very likely be contained--and this without necessarily setting off an arms race with Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and others going nuclear) does mention too as important issues sky-rocketing energy prices (despite recent down moves in oil it remains exorbitant), as well as the "not-unrelated issues" of the U.S. economy.

Forgive me for saying it, however, but the capsizing depression in the U.S. housing market, highly worrisome food and energy inflation, massive credit crisis to which bulge brackets banks have been brutally buffeted since July '07, and generally dismal economic milieu (which I believe very likely to get worse, with more regional banks very likely failing shortly) I would suspect is rather unrelated to al-Qaeda and terrorism, with few exceptions like Nigerian militants on occasion impacting oil prices after successful attacks, or the "geopolitical risk premium" as tensions with Iran wax and wane impacting oil prices as well. I take the time to differentiate our economic turmoil from the terror threat as too often terrorism has served as an all-purpose bogey-man these past years, and I think this thinking deeply flawed with unfavorable ramifications for our policy-making process.

Eric in turn, while mostly agreeing with Matt that terrorism must be a "high priority" (re: which I don't necessarily disagree, but we must be less skittish to name others too) wisely suggests sucking out some of the excess from the anti-terror mantle brandished about with crusader-like zeal by too many in the Beltway. In this I couldn't agree more with his "1" through "5".

And yet, nowhere in this discussion do we mention our tottering relations with great powers like Russia, where our policy has veered into incoherence as Putin has effectively reversed democratization there in favor of some variant of state-oligarch-driven capitalist autocracy, as we dilly-dally over missile defense systems on their western borders that are, all told, likely not even necessary, but certainly of huge concern to the Russians. Nowhere in this discussion do we broach the massive challenges posed by a rising China, whether integrating them better into the international economic system, digesting the implications of the largest rural migration into cities I think in history, the environmental challenges China presents to itself, the region and indeed the world, or even, the fact that new political and economic architecture is being cobbled together in the Pacific Rim, too often with not enough U.S. involvement (despite Chris Hill's laudable efforts on North Korea, of which the boos and hisses only crescendoed the closer he came to success, discrediting the arrayed neoconservative nomenklatura disgruntled that diplomats dare deign do their jobs).

Nowhere either is there talk of the future of our relationship with India, where even at this late hour it is far from certain, indeed likelier not, that an agreement on the nuclear issue between Delhi and Washington will be agreed. Nowhere either do we highlight the critical imperative of resuscitating the scandalously moribund Arab-Israeli peace process, which despite the cheap theater of Annapolis, seems to have been sub-contracted out of late--via a combination of gross amateurism and neglect--to countries like France, Turkey and, say, Qatar. Nor even do we mention but perhaps in passing the pressing need for something akin to a Manhattan Project on energy, for greater movement on climate change, for our neglected relations with Central and South America (notably that rising BRIC Brazil), or the devastation being wrought through Africa via ongoing chronic conflicts and disease. I could go on, but these challenges matter too, do they not?

We are a great power (yes, still), and there are more than Sunni terror groups to be concerned about on the world stage. Our national psyche was profoundly wounded after 9/11, and understandably so, but I fear we have stumbled into an age of gross paranoia and incompetence, myopically focused on one single threat we deem the existential one of the age, while around us critical relationships/issues flounder because of abject neglect. This is a sad testament I believe to a foreign policy elite that has lost its moorings, and is in critical need of fresh thinking. Perhaps hope beckons with a new Administration incoming, though I've learned these past years to restrain my optimism.

Anyway, excuse the quasi-rant, as well as the length of this missive, and consider this a provocation to our group about question prompt 3 [ed. note: see Matt's response here], keeping in mind I certainly don't believe terrorism to be an unimportant issue, it is very important indeed and requires continued maximal vigilance and sustained attention, but am flagging for discussion whether it is really the defining challenge of the 21st Century, say, which we seem to hear too often in think-tank conclaves, or on the campaign trail.

P.S. Some other 'salon' posts here and here (mostly some back and forth w/ Peter Bergen on the Afghanistan issue).

I'm very sorry this blog has fallen on hard times, and appears to be on something of life support these past months. I plead a truly manic schedule with simply no time of late to post on this site. Is this a good-bye? I don't think so, necessarily, but this site may have to become less of a 'blog', and more of a place where I try to post longer commentary once or twice a month. Somewhat related, I think it's fair to say events in the financial markets since the credit crisis hit in July have also been a distraction, which in turn has contributed to less time to focus on foreign policy developments. Anyway, this is a courtesy note put up in haste, as E-mails are increasingly coming in asking if I'm doing O.K. The answer is most assuredly yes, all is well, save again, no time to maintain the site for now. In coming weeks/months I promise to better explain what I can honestly represent might be in store here at B.D., but I'm afraid professional and family commitments look set only to become more intense, not less, which doesn't necessarily bode well for this space. Still, don't count me out just yet, since the inception of this blog back in Belgravia in early 03 I've enjoyed the freedom to post on matters foreign policy, and being able to wade into policy debates on occasion remains important to me. But to blog with the requisite frequency and depth takes tremendous energy, and I'm afraid even super-human efforts would have me coming up short hours-wise. So, a different way forward will need to be determined, and I'll be thinking through the ‘hows’ better once I come up for air. Again, however, apologies, not only for taking so terribly long to even get this basic 'placeholder' note up, but also for not having yet answered emails wondering if all is well...

P.S. Particularly given the financial sector turmoil of late, I should add this site is just terrific and very much worth checking in at daily.

Somewhat lost in all the domestic political hullabaloo of these past days was the news of several Iranian speedboats swarming US Navy ships in the Straits of Hormuz. While Bob Gates has reportedly suggested that similar occurrences have taken place in the recent past, this episode was apparently of a different degree. What explains this Iranian activity? Was it the uncoordinated act of minor, localized Revolutionary Guard players near the Straits (with the timing perhaps inspired to give President Bush a 'welcome greeting' to the region), or alternately were major national security players in Teheran aware of the action?

Put differently, was this provocation authorized by central authorities, or was it merely adventurism by lower-ranking personnel? I'd say (and this is obviously wholly speculative) perhaps something in between. Some in Ahamadi-Nejad's circle are better served by a continued tense external environment so may occasionally resort to such actions to stoke tension (particularly now in the post-NIE environment with economic grievances and assorted domestic discontent garnering relatively greater attention). Also a factor? There are parliamentary elections in the late winter, and then later the Presidentials loom, so the various factions are positioning themselves as best they can. My point is some hard-liners in Teheran may have authorized local commanders to behave this way, but it was very likely not an explicit directive emitting from Khamenei or such.

Regardless the danger, of course, is that the next time a U.S. Naval Commander (perhaps with radio communications between the parties as seemingly confused as this go around) may feel compelled to take more robust defensive measures, to include even a possible exchange of fire. A conflagration could quickly result with undetermined implications, including for our troops in Iraq. Yet another reason, in my view, to adopt (even if woefully belatedly) Baker-Hamilton's recommendations to attempt to launch meaningful dialogue with the Iranians (and at a level well above that of our Ambassador in Baghdad). Talking could well further weaken the extremists, while helping avoid renewed provocations and/or miscalculations by the parties. Which is probably a reason the residual Cheneyites in the Administration are so deathly opposed to bolder diplomatic initiatives along these lines.

Musharraf, to the Straits Times: "I challenge anybody coming into our mountains. They would regret that day".

Excerpts:

MR PERVEZ Musharraf, Pakistan's embattled president, warned that any unilateral intervention in his country by coalition forces fighting in Afghanistan would be treated as an invasion.

Unless agreed to by Pakistan, any entry by the United States or coalition forces into Pakistan's tribal areas would be resisted as a breach of Pakistan's sovereignty, Mr Musharraf told The Straits Times in his first interview with a newspaper since the assassination of Ms Benazir Bhutto on Dec 27.

Four American politicians, all Democrats contending for the party's nomination for the race to the White House, have called for US forces now in neighbouring Afghanistan to join the Pakistan Army's counter-insurgency campaign and to hunt down Al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden in Pakistan's tribal areas.

President Musharraf slammed the 'perception in the United States (that) what our army cannot do, they can do'.

Added the president: 'I challenge anybody coming into our mountains. They would regret that day.'

Mr Musharraf also took issue with US Senator Hillary Clinton's proposal, made on the eve of her New Hampshire primary victory, to place Pakistan's nuclear weapons under supervision by the US and the UK. Her statement, the president said, was 'an intrusion into our privacy, into our sensitivity... She doesn't seem to understand how well-guarded these assets are'.

And I can't help wondering what Pervez would make of op-eds like this one, so energetically penned by notables among our estimable Washington wunderkind class...

In haste, my rapid-fire gut on NH, undertaken at the risk of tarnishing my accurate calls re: Iowa.

Democrats

Obama: The big 'mo. Youth factor, independents and 'undeclareds' bandwagon. Something of a 'RFK factor' is propelling him now, so he'll continue to snowball (but let's not yet get overly complacent). He noses up to or clears the 40% mark. Range 39-43%. For a hard number, I'm going to say he goes north of 40%, let's say 42%.

HRC: Below 30%, say 27-29%. She's cratering now, and while one almost can't help feeling sorry for her, it's frankly hard to, not least knowing with near certitude how dirty the Clinton campaign will fight after a defeat in New Hampshire and heading into February 5th. But I'm afraid they'll be hard-pressed to find attack-lines that stick. Obama is not some totally omnipotent Teflon-Man, but it's going to take more than poo-pooing his ability to make good speeches, or saying he can't win a match-up in the general, or that he's no JFK, RFK or MLK. Such attacks will increasingly feel like thin, petty gruel. Nor will mawkish tears work, even if they're heartfelt and genuine, and/or born of exhausted frustration.

Going forward, if Obama snags Culinary Union Workers endorsement in NV and wins SC, Hilllary is reduced to Rudy-dom (fitting somehow, no?), that is, casting about for major (and increasingly improbable) turnarounds in some big states (CA, FL) after being closed out for all of the seminal events of Chapter 1. Grim tidings for the Clinton dynasty, I'm afraid, barring major surprises indeed.

Edwards: 17-19ish%. He turned in a good debate performance recently but is still a southerner way up north, and HRC still has loyalists aplenty (which isn't to say her campaign isn't in quasi-meltdown, per above). And I'd argue--despite Edwards trying to portray Obama as having some 'academic bent' (e.g. intimating he doesn't have the real fire in the belly to create so-called 'change')--many of the Edwards/Obama 11th hour waverers will end up tilting towards Barack.

Richardson: Energy prices are a particularly big deal in NH this go around reportedly (unsurprisingly), and Richardson seems to be benefiting a bit from this given people recall his related Cabinet gig. Also, some good exposure for him given he was in a relatively more high-profile debate w/ Kucinich not included and Dodd and Biden out. He clears 5%-6%, if just.

Republicans

McCain: 'No Surrender' in gritty NH Hampshire--with a long history of liking underdogs, a plurality of independents, and where many espy Mitt's essential phoniness--looks to be playing pretty well. I say McCain comes out the winner. Still, Romney is a New Englander from a next door state, and he's no idiot. This will be close, especially as rather a few independents will steer Obama rather than McCain. Nonetheless, I predict McCain clears 32%, perhaps even 34%.

Romney: See above, and so get ready for more 'silver medalist' talk. I'm going to say 27-29%. Also, he's got cash, of course, so isn't going away anytime soon. Still, he's bloodied, and pugilists like Ed Rollins for Huck will land real blows as campaigns head south, with McCain simultaneously strengthening. I'm not saying Mitt's on life support yet, but he's in increasingly real danger if he comes in second in NH.

Huck: Decent momentum from Iowa, and perhaps siphoning a bit of Ron Paul's support as something of a 'protest vote', but nevertheless a southerner far from home (like Edwards). Still, the guitar-strumming, late-night talk-fest shtick might sell in some quarters. Let's give him 13-14%. If he comes in at this level (basically an arguably respectable 3rd), or even a smigden stronger percentage-wise, I like Huck's chances in the near to mid-term with some of the key action heading south. And as I alluded to above, Ed Rollins is a brass-tacks pro, armed with a strong BS detector, and with an instinct for the jugular better than most in the business. I expect more surprises emitting from this camp, therefore.

Ron Paul: I admit this is aspirational, but he ekes out ahead of Rudy, 10ish%. Putting it bluntly, people are mighty pissed in this country, and he's capturing quite a bit of that zeitgeist, obviously.

Rudy G (aka Jimmy Breslin's 'Small Man In Search of a Balcony'): He's been mostly MIA of late in NH, and will be making his stand later into February. Still, a gory start, with a dismal finish in Iowa and just 8-9% in NH, just behind Paul, I predict. I could be wrong on this, as it's a very close call, and again, I'm prejudiced given Rudy's foreign policy is so outrageously wacko that--even given the many nasty surprises of the Bush years--I am still stunned a major Presidential candidate in this country could hold such views. Thus my desire for Paul to visit a further humiliation on him, while also serving to better showcase the outrage of Fox News not including Paul in the recent debate.

Thompson: Dead man walking up there. Why is he wasting his time amidst the frozen tundra, so far from the cheery homefires down home, one wonders? At best, 3-4%.

P.S. More substantively, expect a piece on my take re: Obama's foreign policy in this space soon...

UPDATE: Well, time for some humble pie over here at B.D. I got a lot of predictions wrong this go around. C'est la vie. Guess we're in for a long ride, for both parties, re: who'll be the nominee. Look, I won't pretend not to be disappointed about Obama's loss in N.H., not least because I think he'd have a superior foreign policy to HRC's. I'll try to explain why soon. Until then, as I said, humble pie time...

...I should also add I agree w/ Sullivan's take here:

Part of me is crushed. But part of me is happy to see two candidates forced to battle it out in a long slog. We find out more that way. They grow more. More people get a say. That's a good thing. And I should say that although I remain a passionate Obama supporter among the Democrats, I also feel little compunction in recognizing that Clinton did have something of a personal breakthrough in the last few days. The brittle exterior cracked. What was beneath is more human and less calculated. She was forced to explain from the heart why she really wants to win. People responded. As they would. I have no doubt that Obama is the better candidate, for America and the world. And I believe after this very close race, he will go on to Nevada and South Carolina stronger for not winning in a wave of euphoria. Nothing worth winning comes easily. But Clinton is learning from Obama as he has from her. And both are growing as a result. This is a good thing.

Put differently, you might say the tears helped her some. Now we're in for a long, hard slog, one where we'll get to know better each candidates strengths and weaknesses.

Spurred on by Larison, I'll risk showcasing my potentially pitiable prognostication skills too. Here goes. Obama wins Iowa tonight, if narrowly (but hopefully by more than 2-3%, so it feels somewhat convincing). Edwards comes in second, but just by a hair breadth or two north of HRC. Edwards spins this as the second coming, but of course Obama heads to NH w/ the most mojo. The Clinton camp speaks of early exuberances that will fade, and caution sobriety and, er, experience! They also stress they basically placed a de facto second, as they'll argue Edwards won't be able to maintain the momentum into NH (which is likely right, as lots of Edwards support post-Iowa--amidst the Barack-mania--may steer towards the Senator from Illinois). Also, Richardson comes in 4th. Dodd, notwithstanding the good guy that he is, doesn't pull off any miracles, nor the (cheerily loquacious) Biden.

On the Republican side? I'm going to say Huckabee pushes past Romney (love him or hate him, Huck feels real, and Mitt just screams phony), and Thompson and McCain battle it out for a lackluster third. While Thompson maybe ekes out a bit ahead of McCain, it doesn't matter, as McCain is able to portray for a NH audience a pretty solid 3rd place type finish, and deep down (isn't it painfully clear?) Thompson doesn't have the fire in the belly for this job regardless (and a good thing too, as he's terrifyingly mediocre). Meantime, Paul surprises clipping at Thompson and McCain's heels in Iowa perhaps more than expected, so is still positioned with reasonably strong momentum for a potentially higher than expected finish in NH (wouldn't 3rd be an earthquake, or even a strong 4th?). Oh, and the 'small man in search of a balcony' comes pretty much last, and waddles in NH too--helping erode going forward support in places like FL and NV (well, here's hoping).

Yes, some of the above handicapping is admitedly aspirational (I'd like to see Obama, Paul and McCain perform well--I still respect McCain as an honorable man--but one whose overarching strategic antenna on foreign policy have failed him, so can no longer support him). And to be sure, I still wish Hagel were running (when I see the passionate support for Ron Paul I wonder how much better Hagel might have done calling B.S. to Rudy's tired 9/11 nostrums at major debates instead?). Last, the Bloomberg, Nunn (and now, Hagel) etc. centrist players should keep bobbing around, as this field is too chaotic and in flux to not merit some close monitoring in the coming months in case of any strategic openings. All this said, my preferred candidate at this time (of which more soon) is Obama.

Going forward, I see this as becoming a HRC and Obama race coming out of NH pretty quickly, with McCain, Romney, and Huck becoming the three leaders in the Republican camp. Rudy and Thompson may stagger on for a while, but I can't imagine either goes the distance. And Paul keeps up the fight, as he's flush w/ cash, but of course won't be the nominee.

All right, so I guess we'll see how much I get wrong pretty soon....

UPDATE: This is so sweet, so sweet indeed! When the establishment of both parties is rotten--and the American people are awake enough to reward the anti-establishment insurgents--it gives hope. And helps make me proud to be an American again. Barack made history tonight, and if he can repeat the feat in NH, he may well be our next President (though let us not underestimate Huck, or the staying power of McCain or the Clintons, and yes, even a dissed Romney). So, I know. These are early days. But allow me some excitement on this incredible evening.

MORE: HRC is giving what feels like an uber-reluctant concession speech delivered through clenched teeth. Reading Bill's body language, I can't help feeling, deep down, he thinks the gig may well be up. And does having Madeline Albright stand behind a placard reading "Ready For Change" only feel oxymoronic to me?

STILL MORE: Obama's victory speech was a barnburner. He was on fire, and yet Presidential. There was a sense of history in the making. This guy is the real thing. And he's a tsunami rolling into New Hampshire now...

Niall Ferguson had an interesting op-ed recently in the FT, drawing comparisons between the 70s (that is, the 1870's) and present, more particularly, credit crises impacting the Ottoman Empire then, and the U.S. now. Some key passages:

In the aftermath of the Crimean war, both the sultan in Constantinople and his Egyptian vassal, the khedive, had begun to accumulate huge domestic and foreign debts...The loans had been made for both military and economic reasons: to support the Ottoman military position during and after the Crimean war and to finance railway and canal construction, including the building of the Suez canal, which had opened in 1869...The crisis had two distinct financial consequences: the sale of the khedive’s shares in the Suez canal to the British government (for £4m, famously ad­vanced to Disraeli by the Rothschilds) and the hypothecation of certain Ottoman tax revenues for debt service under the auspices of an international Administration of the Ottoman Public Debt, on which European bondholders were represented. The critical point is that the debt crisis necessitated the sale or transfer of Middle Eastern revenue streams to Eur­opeans.

The US debt crisis has taken a different form, to be sure. External liabilities have been run up by a combination of government and household dis-saving. It is not the public sector that is defaulting but subprime mortgage borrowers.

As in the 1870s, though, the upshot of this debt crisis is the sale of assets and revenue streams to foreign creditors. This time, however, creditors are buying bank shares not canal shares. And the resulting shift of power is from west to east.

Since September, Middle Eastern and east Asian sovereign wealth funds have made a succession of investments in four US banks: Bear Stearns, Citigroup, Morgan Stanley and Merrill Lynch. Most commentators have been inclined to welcome this global bail-out : better to bring in foreign capital than to shrink balance sheets by reducing lending. Yet we need to recognise that these “capital injections” represent a transfer of the revenues from the US financial services industry into the hands of foreign governments. This is happening at a time when the gap between eastern and western incomes is narrowing at an unprecedented pace. [my emphasis]

The perils of such historical analogizing are clear, and I'm typically dubious of drawing such broad parallels so easily (in fairness to Ferguson, he does point out commodity prices were trending down back then, not up, that major reserve currencies were reasonably stable, not steadily losing value as is the greenback now, etc--so he is conscious the analogy is imperfect at very least on those points) . And many Wall Streeters would remind markets go up, and they go down (to take one example, was it just the late 80's when the Japanese were scooping up Manhattan real-estate willy-nilly, including trophy properties like Rock Center?). So the position of U.S. financial institutions could be very different indeed within a few years, and perhaps for the better. Put differently, is there really some epochal shift at play here--simply because several foreign government affiliated funds are taking large positions in a handful of bulge bracket U.S. banks--given the U.S. economy's tremendous size, it's potent (well, to a fashion) military power, and other factors pointing to its overall resilience?

Still, I think the emergence of sovereign wealth funds of mammoth size (see China, Singapore, the Gulf States, Russia) is a phenomenon worthy of closer scrutiny going forward, with significant implications for the global economy (not to mention political anti-liberalization trends, with the growth of 'capitalist' autocracies) that have yet to be sufficiently understood. Nor should the historical irony that our forces are bogged down in Afghanistan and Iraq--at tremendous cost to this nation's blood and treasure--while Gulf States take major positions in some of our 'crown jewel' financials, go unnoticed. And with the dollar ailing, gold at historic highs, and oil pushing up near $100, certainly market participants (even with geopolitical risk premium having been lowered given the Iran NIE, though then countervailed much by the turbulence in Pakistan) are smelling dangerous spillage still from the subprime-fallout, credit/banking crisis, declining housing sector, and even chance of a recession in the world's biggest economy this year (not least if the American consumer finally surrenders to burgeoning inflationary pressures, the depression-like housing sector, and other financial strains).

Ferguson closes:

It remains to be seen how quickly today’s financial shift will be followed by a comparable geopolitical shift in favour of the new export and energy empires of the east. Suffice to say that the historical analogy does not bode well for America’s quasi-imperial network of bases and allies across the Middle East and Asia. Debtor empires sooner or later have to do more than just sell shares to satisfy their creditors.

Little matter, Rudy wants to surge into Afghanistan! Thank God his electoral prospects have taken a walloping these past months. But this type of 'I'm tougher than the next guy' crapola has permeated most of the Republican field (Mitt 'double Gitmo' Romney, Fred Thompson's primitive appeal to the 'Jack Bauer caucus', McCain's incredible singing of 'bomb Iran' in a display of ribald unseriousness). The American people, I think--and even after close to a decade of demagoging--can nonetheless espy that these wannabe emperors have no clothes, and that their proposed policies would only serve to damage even more our political, economic (see here for more on the possible implications of the weakening dollar) and moral standing around the world.

P.S. On related topics, don't miss Cunning on a newly identified form of BDS, as well as his take on varied inflationary pressures here. It's going to be an interesting year friends--and not just because of a Presidential election. Don your seatbelts...

Thomas Kean and Lee Hamilton, chairman and vice chairman, respectively, of the 9/11 commission, writing in today's NYT:

As a legal matter, it is not up to us to examine the C.I.A.’s failure to disclose the existence of these tapes. That is for others. What we do know is that government officials decided not to inform a lawfully constituted body, created by Congress and the president, to investigate one [of] the greatest tragedies to confront this country. We call that obstruction.

Obstruction? This gang? Shocked, shocked...

...but help is on the way. Mukasey has his shortcomings, but he is certainly not the 'legal lickspittle' (Andrew Sullivan's memorable phrase) that was his predecessor. And so DOJ has appointed an outside prosecutor to investigate the above matter (though importantly, see Marty Lederman's cautionary notes here). He should be sure to focus, not only on CIA-dom, but also old friends like David Addington, and others of his ilk in and around OVP. It will doubtless be distressing for them if their typically arrogant circle the wagons M.O. gets called for what it is, that is, possibly criminal obstruction. But this isn't just about the destruction of a few tapes now is it? It's really about what the tapes showed, of course, otherwise why go the trouble of destroying them? Yes, it's high time we start getting to the bottom of who specifically in this Administration has been guilty of covering up likely war crimes. It's not pretty, I know, but that's where any sane constitutional republic must now head (the prosecutor's mandate will doubtless be more modest, and his real level of independence questionable, but one must start somewhere), if only to begin to clear the rot wrought by the shameless Sovietophiles among us...

The assassination of Benazir Bhutto comes at a terrible time for Pakistan, not least given the country was already lurching towards increasing instability. And for the Bush Administration--which had pinned its hopes for greater democratization and stability in Pakistan on an unlikely alliance between General Musharraf and Bhutto--it's high time to go back to the drawing board regarding Pakistan policy (and beyond simply trying to substitute Nawaz Sharif for Bhutto).

A few things, however, are now clear. Musharraf's position in Pakistan is increasingly untenable. While the assassination was very likely the work of al-Qaeda and/or allied parties, there is a widespread belief within Pakistan that, at best, Musharraf's government provided lackluster security to Bhutto, and at worst, that elements of the ISI (in cahoots w/ Musharraf) might have turned the other eye. I don't believe the latter, but the symbolism of the assassination occuring in Rawalpindi (the main garrison city for the Pakistani Army) certainly doesn't help. Bhutto's partisans (and others besides) are outraged at Musharraf, and this will not prove but a 24 hour phenomenon. Critical will be the reaction of the new Army Chief General Ashfaq Kiyani. While ostensibly a Musharraf loyalist, Kiyani will be observing very closely how Musharraf handles events in the coming weeks. If he declares another state of emergency and pushes back the elections currently slated for January 8th, Kiyani will be scrutinizing how Musharraf handles the inevitable disquiet that will result. On the other hand, if elections go forward--with the PPP (Bhutto's Party) casting about for a replacement leader (likely Ameen Fahim), and Nawaz Sharif threatening to boycott them--even a decision to proceed looks to be fraught with dangerous uncertainty.

What is also clear is that Pakistan is in desperate need of some measure of stability, as greater chaos will only serve to continue to strengthen Islamist radicals (including al-Qaeda, who as Bob Gates recently put it has increasingly of late "turned its face toward Pakistan and attacks on the Pakistani government and Pakistan people." Rather than solely focus on the criticality of elections and look to politick on behalf of perceived friendly proxies (likely the Pavlovian response of many "experts" in Washington), we should instead be scouring the ranks of high-ranking Pakistani Army brass for mostly secular (or moderately Islamist) personnel reasonably sympathetic to the West, so as to at least identify possible replacements to an increasingly discredited Musharraf as prophylactic measure (in case orderly elections in the near term prove impossible or lead to bouts of violence). If the Army ends up having to step in more forcefully, and after an appropriate caretaker period (hopefully relatively short), the U.S. could then more effectively use its good offices to push for a coherent electoral process once reliable replacements to Bhutto emerge (or at least the massive flux currently consuming Pakistani politics steadies itself some), with Sharif's position better understood as well.

All this said, and despite the obvious fact that much of the U.S. aid going to Pakistan meant to be directed towards the war on terror (that increasingly asinine phrase, as empty as the "war on drugs" or "war on poverty") is actually in material fashion being used to back-stop Pakistan's position vis-a-vis India and Kashmir, it's nonetheless not the time to pull the rug out from under Musharraf whole-sale, but rather put out discreet, if serious, feelers to other players in the military that they may need to step in the lurch if popular anger at the current Government (as embodied by Musharraf) becomes untenable.

One last thing (I've been on a forced blog hiatus and time is very limited, though I do hope to catch up and discuss the Iran NIE, Annapolis, Iowa etc. and more in coming weeks), this type of 'village' idiocy, which reads like post-adolescent masturbatory drivel (sorry...), does need to be kept to a minimum in coming weeks, lest our policy-making class get carried away again towards other epic blunders. More soon, time permitting.

UPDATE: Via an E-mail from Nikolas Gvosdev (who blogs at the informative Washington Realist), comes this piece from Anatol Lieven.

For the moment, though, it may not be too cynical to suggest—and cynicism in analyzing Pakistani politics is rarely misplaced—that none of the possible successors to Ms Bhutto as PPP leader want to burn their bridges to the military, and thereby destroy the possibility that they will replace Ms Bhutto as Washington’s candidate for Prime Minister in an alliance with Musharraf or a military successor.

For if mass violence does spread, then sooner or later the senior generals will form a delegation and politely and respectfully ask Musharraf to step down as president, just as they did with General Ayub Khan forty years ago. The military will then conduct a “transition to democracy”, and will almost certainly have already decided in private to whom the government should in fact be transferred. With Musharraf and his hostility to Nawaz Sharif out of the way, that could well be Sharif, but it could equally be some PPP leader.

Whatever happens, however, the army will remain the most important force in the Pakistani state, and a key factor in every future Pakistani administration. And as long as the army sticks together, it will fight successfully to prevent both Islamist revolution and ethnic secession. Only if the army splits will Pakistan be in danger of disintegration, as opposed to violent unrest....the U.S. needs to develop a strategy based on an understanding of the limitations on any Pakistani government’s support for the U.S. in Afghanistan, given the feelings of the Pakistani population and much of the army. Ms Bhutto’s rule would not have provided a magic key to solve this dilemma, and nor will any future “return to democracy”. Trying to force a Pakistani government too far down this road will only increase the chances of Islamist unrest spreading to the Pakistani military.

As I said, focusing discreetly on key Pakistani Army actors in the weeks and months ahead seems prudent.

I've been tremendously busy with non-stop work travel/meetings and haven't had time to put up a note mentioning same. When I can, I'll be back, hopefully reasonably soon. Thanks for your patience. Meantime, note Daniel Larison has been churning out a lot of very good content of late and I'd suggest any readers not already acquainted with him might well point their browsers over there (I owe him a response on Obama as well, which I'll try to get to in the coming days...)

"People who have realized that this is a dream imagine that it is easy to wake up, and are angry with those who continue sleeping, not considering that the whole world that environs them does not permit them to wake. Life proceeds as a series of optical illusions, artificial needs and imaginary sensations."

--Alexander Herzen, explaining better than I ever could the root of many of my frustrations of late, not least surveying the wreckage that is today's Jacobinized Republican Party. Related, another Herzen gem: "It is possible to lead astray an entire generation, to strike it blind, to drive it insane, to direct it towards a false goal. Napoleon proved this." Thank God only 24% seem this deluded still, in their desperately needy fantasies about Islam storming the ramparts of their neighborhood malls and congregations. And yet, a "small man in search of a balcony"-- of late fusing feigned televangical style Christianism to his woefully authoritarian tendencies--might still gain the Presidency. It appears fantastical fear-mongering is still a potent political tool. When will large swaths of the American public cease behaving like a cowering mass?

In this new war, the enemy conspires in secret -- and often the only source of information on what the terrorists are planning is the terrorists themselves. So we established a program at the Central Intelligence Agency to question key terrorist leaders and operatives captured in the war on terror. This program has produced critical intelligence that has helped us stop a number of attacks -- including a plot to strike the U.S. Marine camp in Djibouti, a planned attack on the U.S. consulate in Karachi, a plot to hijack a passenger plane and fly it into Library Tower in Los Angeles, California, or a plot to fly passenger planes into Heathrow Airport and buildings into downtown London. Despite the record of success, and despite the fact that our professionals use lawful techniques, the CIA program has come under renewed criticism in recent weeks. Those who oppose this vital tool in the war on terror need to answer a simple question: Which of the attacks I have just described would they prefer we had not stopped? [my emphasis]

--President Bush, speaking on October 23rd (Hat Tip: MP)

It is distressing in the extreme such transparently demagogic tactics are being used by a sitting President of the United States. I mean, where's the beef on all these supposed terror plots having been prevented as a result of torture (sorry, "enhanced interrogation techniques")? Are we really meant to believe that Karachi, Djibouti, Library Tower and Heathrow were all stopped because tactics like sleep deprivation and water-boarding were being employed on varied detainees? I think not.

Consider:

Djibouti: Bush was referring to Camp Lemonier, formerly a U.S. Marine Base in Djibouti, now a U.S. Navy Base. The (normally rather thorough) Wikipedia entry doesn't even mention a potential terror attack there, so we must look further afield for evidencing thereto. One of the few sources detailing a potential terror plot is Government-linked, from this "Summary of the High Value Terrorist Detainee Program", released by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence:

In early 2004, shortly after his capture, al-Qa'ida facilitator Gouled Hassan Dourad revealed that in mid-2003 al-Qa'ida East Africa cell leader Abu Talha al-Sudani sent him from Mogadishu to Djibouti to case the US Marine base at Camp Lemonier, as part of a plot to send suicide bombers with a truck bomb into the base. His information -- including identifying operatives associated with the plot -- helped us to enhance the security at the camp.

My my. Hardly the much ballyhooed ticking-bomb type case, eh? In "early 2004", so-called 'enhanced interrogation techniques' reportedly had one Gouled Hassan Dourad revealing that way back in "mid-2003" the U.S. Marine base at Camp Lemonier may have been getting cased some, and as a result, security at the camp was enhanced. For this thin gruel we are torturing detainees in our captivity? See too this article from '05, describing a rather quotidian existence at the camp, with nary a mention of an apocalyptic terror plot narrowly averted. Most tellingly, don't miss this piece from a Marine Corps Officer serving in Djibouti--written in January of '03 (before the alleged dastardly plot!)--complaining about the poor security at the camp. Frankly, one wonders if security measures weren't ameliorated for reasons quite separate from an alleged busted terror plot...i.e, grunts on the base ticked off (justifiably so) by the security short-falls.

US Consulate in Karachi: Ah, the Karachi consulate...such a rare target!

The Karachi consulate attacks are a string of attacks against and plots to attack against the U.S. consulate in Karachi, Pakistan during the War on Terrorism. The consulate is a tempting target for Islamic fundamentalists, because it occupies a slightly vulnerable position in downtown Karachi, next to the Marriott Hotel and accessible from two sides by roads.

The same Director of National Intelligence report linked above states: "(i)n the spring of 2003, the US and a partner detained key al-Qa'ida operatives who were in the advanced stages of plotting an attack against several targets in Karachi, Pakistan that would have killed hundreds of innocent men, women, and children."

Interesting, this Wikipedia entry lists a June '02 attack on the Consulate in Karachi, as well as a Feb '03 shooting, nearby March '06 bombing (outside the Karachi Marriott Hotel), and even a thwarted March '04 bomb plot. But no mention of a "spring" (not even a month?) '03 alleged attack, regarding "several targets" in Karachi? Again, where's the beef? Outside of Jack Bauer fantasy-land at least, it appears a March '04 plot on the consulate in Karachi was interrupted--ostensibly by relatively routine Pakistani intelligence and police efforts--not a circa. spring '03 water-boarding fiesta meant to titillate the Camp Gitmo crowd of America's increasingly fascistic right.

Library Tower: This plot has also been described as "The West Coast Airliner Plot", and the Director of National Intelligence report describes it thusly "(i)In mid-2002, thanks to leads from a variety of detainees, the US disrupted a plot by 9/11 mastermind KSM to attack targets on the West Coast of the United States using hijacked airplanes."

Bush first described the plot in a February '06 speech:

Since September the 11th, the United States and our coalition partners have disrupted a number of serious al Qaeda terrorist plots -- including plots to attack targets inside the United States. Let me give you an example. In the weeks after September the 11th, while Americans were still recovering from an unprecedented strike on our homeland, al Qaeda was already busy planning its next attack. We now know that in October 2001, Khalid Shaykh Muhammad -- the mastermind of the September the 11th attacks -- had already set in motion a plan to have terrorist operatives hijack an airplane using shoe bombs to breach the cockpit door, and fly the plane into the tallest building on the West Coast. We believe the intended target was Liberty [sic] Tower in Los Angeles, California.*

Rather than use Arab hijackers as he had on September the 11th, Khalid Shaykh Muhammad sought out young men from Southeast Asia -- whom he believed would not arouse as much suspicion. To help carry out this plan, he tapped a terrorist named Hambali, one of the leaders of an al Qaeda affiliated group in Southeast Asia called "J-I." JI terrorists were responsible for a series of deadly attacks in Southeast Asia, and members of the group had trained with al Qaeda. Hambali recruited several key operatives who had been training in Afghanistan. Once the operatives were recruited, they met with Osama bin Laden, and then began preparations for the West Coast attack.

Their plot was derailed in early 2002 when a Southeast Asian nation arrested a key al Qaeda operative. Subsequent debriefings and other intelligence operations made clear the intended target, and how al Qaeda hoped to execute it. This critical intelligence helped other allies capture the ringleaders and other known operatives who had been recruited for this plot. The West Coast plot had been thwarted. Our efforts did not end there. In the summer of 2003, our partners in Southeast Asia conducted another successful manhunt that led to the capture of the terrorist Hambali.

It's odd that al-Qaeda would be specifically plotting to use shoe-bombs to breach cockpit-doors back in October of '01, especially as it wasn't even until November of that year that the TSA established requirements for "installing reinforced cockpit doors in aircraft." Regardless, al-Qaeda reportedly originally planned for approximately 10 airplanes to strike the East and West Coasts of the U.S. simultaneously--and perhaps not having the requisite amount of capable terrorists who had infiltrated the U.S--Osama prioritized the financial and political capitals of the country on the East Coast. So was the "Library Tower Plot" (Bush in his Feb '06 speech called it, somewhat amusingly, the "Liberty Tower" plot) really something new, or more residue of 9/11 that was far from imminently realizable, particularly given the massive post 9/11 ramped up security at the nation's airports?

As this article details:

But several U.S. intelligence officials played down the relative importance of the alleged plot and attributed the timing of Bush's speech to politics. The officials, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because they did not want to publicly criticize the White House, said there is deep disagreement within the intelligence community over the seriousness of the Library Tower scheme and whether it was ever much more than talk.

One intelligence official said nothing has changed to precipitate the release of more information on the case. The official attributed the move to the administration's desire to justify its efforts in the face of criticism of the domestic surveillance program, which has no connection to the incident [ed. note: Though note this past week Bush raised it in defense of the CIA interrogation program, whatever suits the moment, no?].

Bruce Hoffman, a terrorism specialist who heads the Washington office of Rand Corp., said Bush's account adds some interesting detail to the Library Tower episode. But he said it still leaves key questions about the case unanswered.

"It doesn't really give us any more indication of whether this was a plot that was derailed or preempted, or a plot that was more in the realm of an idle daydream," Hoffman said.

Sen. John D. Rockefeller IV (W.Va.), the ranking Democrat on the Senate intelligence committee, mocked the idea of raising the alleged Library Tower plot. "Maybe they're tired of talking about [the] Brooklyn Bridge and they're trying to find a different edifice of some sort," he said, referring to another alleged terrorist plot that some have said was inflated by the government.

But Frances Fragos Townsend, the president's chief counterterrorism adviser, told reporters that "there is no question in my mind that this is a disruption. It's not about credit; it's about protecting the American people. And the American people are absolutely safer as a result of these arrests." [ed. note: Of course the American people became safer as a result of some of these arrests, but did they become any safer as a result of any torture techniques employed with some of the alleged terrorists apprehended by the Southeast Asian nation in question?]

Bush first alluded to the incident in a speech in October when he said the United States and its allies had thwarted 10 serious planned al Qaeda attacks since Sept. 11, 2001. A White House list released at the time referred to a plotto fly a hijacked plane into an unspecified West Coast city in 2002. Citing unnamed sources, news organizations reported that the target was the Library Tower, since renamed the U.S. Bank Tower, and that the plot's author was Khalid Sheik Mohammed, the architect of the Sept. 11 attacks who was captured in 2003.

Mohammed's original plan for Sept. 11, as presented to bin Laden in 1998 or 1999, called for hijacking 10 jetliners on both coasts, according to interrogations of Mohammed cited by the commission that investigated the 2001 attacks. U.S. officials concluded that bin Laden had instructed Mohammed to initially focus on the East Coast because it was too difficult to recruit enough operatives to seize 10 planes. After the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center were knocked down, Mohammed set about putting his West Coast plan in motion.

Frankly, the discord in the intelligence community alone would seem to caution against using this plot as a centerpiece example for advocating using torture techniques to interrogate detainees, I'd think...

Heathrow Airport and buildings into downtown London: No, no--this wasn't the circa. '06 'liquid bomb' plot that has us all putting our shaving cream and toothpaste in zip-locs, but rather (again, per the National Intelligence document), Bush seems to have conflated two alleged attacks: 1) "the 2004 UK Urban Targets Plot--in mid 2004, the US and its counter-terrorism partners disrupted a plot that involved attacking urban targets in the United Kingdom with explosive devices...and 2) the Heathrow Airport Plot--In 2003, the US and several partners...disrupted a plot to attack Heathrow Airport using hijacked commercial airlines."

I'll grant some credence to a KSM-linked potential attack on Heathrow, perhaps, but the "2004 UK Urban Targets Plot" is tremendously vague indeed. But even with regard to the more documented prospective Heathrow plot, note the Times article mentions MI5 "received detailed intelligence in February 2003". The Director of National Inteligence report tells us KSM's network was behind this attack, and so we are led to believe water-boarding this human scum lead to an intelligence breakthrough. And yet, KSM wasn't captured until March of '03. Go figure...

Rarely has one seen such an edifice of half-truths, lies and obfuscations put in the service of a democracy turning its back on Enlightenment values to cheerlead use of torture against detainees in its captivity. But the President's repulsively loaded words are nakedly clear in their mendacity: "(w)hich of the attacks I have just described would they prefer we had not stopped?" If Bush genuinely believes he is telling the truth, his shabby mediocrity continues to defile the nation through abject ignorance. And if he is aware of the essential lack of real causation between a scandalous CIA interrogation program and these supposedly interrupted plots, he is purposefully lying to the American people on matters of the greatest import.

Either way, he is engaging in cheap demagoguery. With respect for the Office of the President of the United States, either possibility is deeply repugnant. As a fellow Andover grad, let me remind the President that Andover's 1778 Constitution tasks the school to prepare "(y)outh from every quarter" to appreciate that "goodness without knowledge is weak ... yet knowledge without goodness is dangerous." Bush would seem to fail on both counts. But regardless of whether the President is a weak, well-intentioned ignorant, or a dangerously pernicious dissembler--not least given the great power of his office and bully pulpit--he has proven a nastily effective demagogue indeed regarding issues of essential import to our moral fiber (at least with his increasingly authoritarian cultist base). This crude debasement of our 'better angels' and national honor will be his real legacy, along with his massive strategic blunders in the Middle East.

...my oath to preserve the constitution to the best of my ability, imposed upon me the duty of preserving, by every indispensable means, that government--that nation--of which that constitution was the organic law. Was it possible to lose the nation, and yet preserve the constitution? By general law, life and limb must be protected; yet often a limb must be amputated to save a life; but a life is never wisely given to save a limb. I felt that measures, otherwise unconstitutional, might become lawful, by becoming indispensable to the preservation of the constitution, through the preservation of the nation. Right or wrong, I assumed this ground, and now avow it.

President Abraham Lincoln, as quoted by General Pervez Musharraf in his speech to the Pakistani nation declaring a state of emergency (go to approximately the 4:50 minute mark):

And yet, as foreign diplomats recount, the General seemed (in a meeting with the diplomatic corps) much more consumed by domestic political enemies than the scourge of Islamist terrorists destabilizing the polity:

At the meeting, the general primarily railed against his political opponents, with special venom reserved for the Supreme Court. When asked by a diplomat to describe specific plans to crack down on terrorists, General Musharraf gave only a vague answer.

“He effectively dodged the question and turned to the military presence in the room and asked them to organize a briefing for ambassadors,” said one of the Western diplomats. “It wasn’t very clear in terms of what was actually being done.”

The second Western diplomat said: “There was serious concern that terrorism and security was not front and center. What was really amazing was him going on and on and on about how bad the judiciary was.”

Le plus ca change.

Apropos of nothing really, a little plug for the Turnley brothers collection of war photography "In Times of War and Peace". I'm no authority by any stretch (though my wife is a photographer and charitably dispenses wisdom to me on matters photography on occasion) but find myself pulling this book off the shelf quite often. And as brutish and horrific as the scenes of carnage from varied global hot-spots, there is a reason the book mentions "peace" too. The Turnley's, I believe, are based in Paris (or at least were for a spell around the time this book was published), and book-end the grisly front-line scenes with some pics of repose and merriment on the Left Bank during off-time. But the vital core and huge majority of work here are the war pictures, truly a powerful series of photographs. Many in our derrieres-on-couch interventionist cheerleader class would benefit from a glance through, I suspect...

In no part of the Constitution is more wisdom to be found than in the clause which confides the question of war or peace to the legislature, and not to the executive department. ... War is in fact the true nurse of executive aggrandizement. In war, a physical force is to be created; and it is the executive will which is to direct it. In war, the public treasures are to be unlocked; and it is the executive hand which is to dispense them. ... It is in war, finally, that laurels are to be gathered, and it is the executive brow they are to encircle. The strongest passions and most dangerous weaknesses of the human breast; ambition, avarice, vanity, the honorable or venial love of fame, are all in conspiracy against the desire and duty of peace.

-- James Madison.

This via Anthony Lewis, who writes:

There is a profound oddity in the position of the presidentialists like Yoo, Cheney and Addington. Legal conservatives like to say that the Constitution should be read according to its original intent. But if there is anything clear about the intentions of the framers, it is that they did not intend to create an executive with more prerogative power than George III had. Not even in time of war.

Don't miss this interesting snippet from Lewis' piece either:

In an interesting comparison with Franklin D. Roosevelt’s sweeping power in World War II, Goldsmith says Roosevelt relied on persuasion, bargaining, compromise. “The Bush administration has operated on an entirely different concept of power that relies on minimal deliberation, unilateral action and legalistic defense. This approach largely eschews politics: the need to explain, to justify, to convince, to get people on board, to compromise.” [my emphasis throughout]

And sadly, in the face of a largely supine and/or under-qualified legislature, the Cheney approach has 'worked' quite well indeed.To our grave and collective detriment.

Barack Obama makes some very good points in this NYT interview. A couple quick highlights, one on Iraq, the other Iran. First, Iraq:

Q. If you saw that the Iraqi government, under the duress of American withdrawals, was not making progress or if sectarian violence was beginning to increase in Iraq, would you call a halt to withdrawals or proceed anyway?

A. I think that it is important to understand that there are no good options in Iraq. There haven’t been for a very long time. I’ve said previously that I would not be surprised to see some spikes in violence as we begin the withdrawal. It is not going to be a perfectly smooth transition. But I think there is a way of managing this that keeps this violence contained. Now, at some point the Iraqis are going to have to respond to a change in the security situation inside Iraq, one way or another, and those in the region are going to have to respond as well.

During that 16 months, I’m engaging in very systematic, tough diplomacy, not just with the various factions in the region, but also with Iran, with Syria, the Saudis, Jordan, with the United Nationals Security Council program members. Once it’s clear that we are not intending to stay there for 10 years or 20 years, all these parties have an interest in figuring out how do we adjust in a way that stabilizes the situation. They’re all going to have a series of complex differences and we’re going to, obviously, have to monitor it carefully about what those interests are to make sure our interests are protected. But what I don’t want to do is to make our withdrawal contingent on the Iraqi government doing the right thing because that empowers them to make strategic decisions that should be made by the president of the United States.” [emphasis added]

Exactly.

And on Iran:

Q. The Bush administration has little influence on Iranian behavior in Iraq. How would you elicit cooperation from Iran and Syria that the Bush administration has failed to obtain? Would we offer assurances that we would not be engaged in a policy of regime change. What would you do?

A. I think you foreshadowed my answer. You’ve got the Bush administration expecting Crocker to make progress on the very narrow issue of helping Shia militias at the same time as you’ve got Dick Cheney giving a speech saying it is very likely that we may engage in military action in Iran and the United States Senate passing a resolution, suggesting that our force structure inside Iraq is dependent in someway on blunting Iranian influence. You can’t engage in diplomacy in isolation. There’s got to be a broader strategic context to it.

The Iranians and the Syrians are acting irresponsibly inside Iraq. They perceive that it is a way to leverage or impact or weaken us at a time when they’re worried about United States action in a broader context. I’ve already said, I would meet directly with Iranian leaders. I would meet directly with Syrian leaders. We would engage in a level of aggressive personal diplomacy in which a whole host of issues are on the table. We’re not looking at Iraq, just in isolation. Iran and Syria would start changing their behavior if they started seeing that they had some incentives to do so, but right now the only incentive that exists is our president suggesting that if you do what we tell you, we may not blow you up.

My belief about the regional powers in the Middle East is that they don’t respond well to that kind of bluster. They haven’t in the past, there’s no reason to think they will in the future. On the other hand, what we know, is that, for example, in the early days of our Afghanistan offensive, the Iranians we’re willing to cooperate when we had more open lines of dialogue and we were able to identify interests that were compatible with theirs.”

Q. So what assurances would you offer them to get them to be more cooperative – try to convince them that the U.S. would not pursue regime change?

A. There are a series of serious problems that we have. Iraq is one. Their development of nuclear weapons is another. Their support of terrorist activities – Hezbollah and Hamas are a third. On all these fronts, we’ve got severe issues with their actions. We expect them to desist from those actions, but what we are also willing to say is as a consequence of their changes in behavior, we are willing to examine their membership in the W.T.O., we are willing to look at how can we assure that they’ve got the kinds of economic relationships that can help grow their economy.

We are willing to talk about certain assurances in the context of them showing some good faith. I think it is important for us to send a signal that we are not hell bent on regime change, just for the sake of regime change, but expect changes in behavior and there are both carrots and there are sticks available to them for those changes in behavior. Where those conversations go is not yet clear, but what is absolutely clear is that the path that we are on now is not going to make our troops in Iraq safer. Iran has shown no inclination to back off of their support of Shia militias as a consequence of the threats that they’ve been receiving from the Bush and Cheney administration. If anything, it probably accelerates their interest in trying to make a situation in Iraq as uncomfortable as possible for us.”

Q. Would you be seeking a comprehensive rapprochement or if Iran insisted on pursuing their weapons programs, which is entirely possible, would you still try to carve out some sort of side arrangement that would pertain to stability? And what would you be prepared to offer?

A. I can’t anticipate what their response would be. What I can anticipate is that the act of us reaching out to them in a series [sic] way, empowered by the Oval Office, not that we’ll have Crocker over here doing something, while we do something else, but a serious, coordinated diplomatic effort will, if nothing else, change world opinion about our approach to Iran and will strengthen our ability should they choose not to stand down on the nuclear issue, for example, or to continue to engage in hostile activity even if directly inside Iraq, that it greatly strengthens our position with our allies – both in the region and around the world and strengthens our capacity to impose tougher economic sanctions and take other steps, not in isolation, but as part of a broader international effort.

I suppose it's no secret I'm something of a one-issue voter when it comes to Presidential elections. That is, I vote for the candidate I think will pursue the best foreign policy. Taxes go up and down, domestic policy reforms move in various directions with varied policy trends, but my heart and intellect focus on the foreign policy of this country (this of course includes fundamental 'human rights' issues such as detainee rights and torture policy). And so far, especially with Chuck Hagel not running, I think we are seeing the strongest foreign policy enunciated by the Obama campaign. Roue cynics might protest I'm damning with faint praise given the competition (almost the entire Republican field has become something of a primal goose-stepping brigade chanting on about 'Islamofascism', and I've not been particularly blown away by HRC, Edwards etc on the other side of the aisle), but be that as it may, I think he's the best we've got running so far.

B.D. will try to keep monitoring the ebbs and flows of the foreign policy debate as the election proceeds...to include what we might call the Bill Clinton and Dick Holbrooke factor (powerful players who can do what the current Administration has proven unable to, that is, actually negotiate with skill, determination and persistence). Still, for now, count me as an Obama fan, in the main. I know his almost patrician bearing and reticence to land knock-out blows have annoyed some, and there are other issues with him, of course, not least his relative youth. But boy, Rumsfeld and Cheney were sure experienced, and I'm hard-pressed to identify worse national security players in my lifetime. And his youth is also an advantage somehow, there is a freshness and openess to bucking some of the most tired bromides (save 'carrots and sticks', but that's for another day, and regardless he isn't the worst offender on this score!) that feels refreshingly honest.

Chuck Schumer: "No nominee from this administration will agree with us on things like torture and wiretapping...The best we can expect is somebody who will depoliticize the Justice Department and put rule of law first, even when pressured by some of the administration. If Mukasey is that type of person, I’ll support him.” [my emphasis]

Mr. Schumer, "putt(ing) rule of law first" means outlawing torture. I well understand that (especially compared to Gonzalez) Mukasey is a veritable paragon of competence. And I know how desperately the Department of Justice needs fresh leadership of such caliber. But torture speaks directly to the civilizational values of this country in most fundamental fashion. There can be no compromise on this point, even on behalf of a very talented lawyer from your home state. Torture belongs to the pre-Enlightenment era, hundreds of years past. The notion that the U.S. Congress would approve as Attorney General--the chief law enforcement officer of the United States--a man who can not declare an ancient, disgraced torture technique such as water-boarding illegal is simply unacceptable. Please stand firm on behalf of our country on this point.

UPDATE: Re-reading this post, it feels almost desperately mawkish, to a fashion, not least given the likely reality John Cole points out so well here. Still, what would Andrew say, "know hope"? Meantime, Scott Horton registers his protest too, quite significant, given Mukasey works at his firm. But Scott (who I know personally) simply has too much integrity to do otherwise. He writes:

I have very strong conflicting views about the vote which is coming in the Judiciary Committee. I believe that Mukasey, as an individual, is exceptionally well qualified to serve as attorney general. I would approve the Mukasey who says he “personally” finds waterboarding abhorrent. But I am troubled by the “official” Mukasey who is being trotted out as something different. And I believe that the nation cannot, at this stage, accept the appointment of an attorney general who refuses to come clean on the torture issue. In the end this is essential to national identity, and to the promise of the Justice Department to serve as a law enforcement agency. Too much of what the Justice Department has done of late has little resemblance to law enforcement. Rather it looks to be just the opposite.

If the Bush Administration wants to turn torture into a litmus test, so must Congress. The question therefore ultimately becomes one of principle and not personality. The Judiciary Committee should not accept any nominee who fails to provide meaningful assurance on this issue. And, though it saddens me to say this, Michael Mukasey has not.

When good men get too close to the orbit of this deeply corrupt, wayward Administration, they almost inexorably get sullied in the process. That's the sad reality, alas.

MORE: Gig's up.... And so the Congress, even with a Democratic majority, continues apace towards rubber-stamping Duma status. Frankly, if we had fewer "constitutionally illiterate" (Bruce Fein's phrase) representatives, impeachment charges for Dick Cheney would likely be getting drawn up. Instead, we're confirming as Attorney General of the United States a man who won't declare water-boarding illegal, and this with the opposition party controlling the Judiciary Committee. We are living through one of the saddest chapters in U.S. history. The question is, how and when will it end?