Contemporary work on philosophy of mind is largely driven by the naturalist intuition that the mind is part of the natural order. Hence, many contemporary philosophers have endorsed a physicalist conception of the mind, according to which mental phenomena are, or supervene upon, neurophysiological phenomena. But an aspect of mental phenomena is proving to be specially intractable in physicalist terms - namely, the qualitative feel, or subjective character, of conscious experience. Recent popular arguments for the explanatory gap between physicalism and phenomenal consciousness rely on the conceivability of beings exactly like us in all physico-functional respects who nonetheless lack phenomenal consciousness (the zombie argument); or on the gap between knowledge of physico-functional vs. phenomenal properties (the knowledge argument). On the basis of these arguments, some philosophers have defended a non-physicalist conception of phenomenal consciousness, which appears to be at odds with naturalism about the mind.

In 2008, a special issue of the Spanish philosophy journal teorema will be devoted to exploring the nature of phenomenal consciousness vis-à-vis naturalism about the mind. teorema welcomes submissions of original papers addressing the conceptual questions involved. Papers presenting relevant empirical research are also acceptable, although its significance for the underlying conceptual questions should be clearly stated. Book reviews and critical notices of recent relevant publications are also welcome.

Papers must be written in English or in Spanish, and should not exceed 15 double-spaced A-4 pages (circa 5000 words). For the presentation of their manuscripts, authors are requested to adhere to the details that can be found here. Authors must submit their papers both in electronic and paper formats.

All queries and submissions must be addressed to:

Ángel García Rodríguez
Departamento de Filosofía
Universidad de Murcia
E-30071 Murcia (Spain)
E-mail: agarcia@um.es

Deadline for submissions: 1st April, 2008.

George Santayana has passed to the history as a great thinker, novelist and poet. His work is an exceptional paradigm of effective creation in the fields of philosophy and literature. But it contains also an entire conceptual theory about the relationships between both fields. The purpose of the next issue of limbo, whose appearance is scheduled for autumn 2008, is to reconstruct the main pieces of this theory. We will pay an special attention to the most significant writings of Santayana on this matter, both the ones corresponding to his North American (Sonnets, ,Interpretations of Poetry and Religion, The Life of Reason and Three Philosophical Poets) as well as the ones corresponding to his European period(Soliloquies in England, Dialogues in the Limbo, The Last Puritan, Persons and Places and The Poet's Testament).

Papers must be written in Spanish, English, French, German or Italian. They should not exceed 15 DIN A4 double-spaced pages (or 5.000 words) and must be preceded by an abstract both in English and in Spanish. For the presentation of their manuscripts, authors are requested to adhere to the details which can be found here.

Authors should submit three hard copies of their manuscripts, as well as an electronic version in WORD. Please, send your contributions to:

 

Prof. José Beltrán Llavador
Departament de Sociología i Antropología Social
Campus de Tarongers. Ed. Dptal. Oriental
Universitat de Valencia
Avda. Tarongers, s/n, E-46022 Valencia, España
E-mail: Jose.Beltran@uv.es

 

 

Deadline for submissions: 1st April, 2008

 

www.hiperlimbo.com

 

Recently, the nature of animal minds has been the focus of increased interest and heated discussion among philosophers. The question philosophers have asked themselves is whether non-linguistic animals have minds; or more specifically, whether they have beliefs, perceptual experiences and other intentional states. The answers given are shaped by intuitions concerning the interplay between the notions of intentional content, language and rationality.

Thus, assuming that language is necessary for conceptual abilities, some philosophers have denied that non-linguistic animals have beliefs or perceptions, on the ground that they lack the conceptual resources required for intentional states. This view has been attacked from two directions. On the one hand, holding on to the thesis that language is necessary for conceptual abilities, it has been argued that non-linguistic animals can nonetheless be in states with intentional content (of a limited complexity, at least), because certain intentional states (eg, perceptions, or certain beliefs) do not require conceptual abilities. On the other hand, the thesis that language is necessary for conceptual abilities has been rejected, and on the basis of a more naturalist conception of a conceptual ability, it has been argued in favour of the attribution of conceptual abilities and intentional states to non-linguistic animals. Simultaneously, philosophers belonging in the last two groups have questioned the long-standing connection between language and rationality, and therefore the thesis that non-linguistic animals cannot count as rational beings.

Part of the interest of this research lies in the new insights offered into the notion of a conceptual ability, or the idea of rationality, due to the contrast between intellectualist versus naturalist accounts. But the development of these naturalist accounts carries the associated danger of settling the issue about animal minds, simply by changing the way our initial question is understood. One may wonder then whether there was a substantial question to begin with. Hence, the need for further research into this area.

In 2009, a special issue of the Spanish philosophy journal teorema will be devoted to exploring the nature of animal minds. teorema welcomes submissions of original papers addressing the conceptual questions involved. Papers presenting relevant empirical research are also acceptable, although its significance for the underlying conceptual questions should be clearly stated.  Book reviews and critical notices of recent relevant publications are also welcome.

Papers must be written in English or in Spanish, and should not exceed 15 double-spaced A-4 pages (or 5000 words). For the presentation of their manuscripts, authors are requested to adhere to the details that can be found here. Authors must submit their papers both in electronic and paper formats.

Prof. Luis M. Valdés Villanueva
Director de teorema
Departamento de Filosofía
Universidad de Oviedo
E-33071 Oviedo (España)
E-mail: lmvaldes@uniovi.es

Deadline for submissions: February 1st, 2009