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BOX-FOLDER-REPORT: 53-3-12
TITLE:             the Problem of Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina during World War II
BY:                George Cioranescu
DATE:              1981-12-2
COUNTRY:           Romania
ORIGINAL SUBJECT:  RAD Background Report/329

--- Begin ---

RADIO FREE EUROPE Research

RAD Background Report/329
(Romania)
2 December 1981

THE PROBLEM OF BESSARABIA AND NORTHERN BUCOVINA DURING WORLD
WAR II (1)
(Part III)

The Soviet Claim Prevails (1943-1945)
By George Cioranescu

Summary: The Soviet victories in 1943 opened the
way to Romania and the Balkans for Soviet troops,
and made the question of Bessarabia's and Northern
Bucovina's status once again germane. Both Marshal
Ion Antonescu, through the agency of Foreign
Minister Mihai Antonescu, and Iuliu Maniu, head of
the democratic opposition, and prominent old-time
politician, tried to pull Romania out of a war
that had virtually been lost, while nevertheless
maintaining Romania's sovereignty over Bessarabia
and Northern Bucovina. Mihai Antonescu tried to
persuade Mussolini to take over the leadership in
setting up a bloc of small states that would
constitute a barrier against Soviet expansion into
southeastern Europe, believing that this project would
find approval with the Anglo-Saxon powers. Maniu
established contact with the British and Americans
in Cairo, offering to withdraw from the Axis,
provided that Romania's eastern frontier along the
Dniester were guaranteed.

But for neither London nor Washington was Romania
a subject of much concern in the war, and neither
traditionally played a major role in the area.
Given historical Russian, and later Soviet,
interests there, however, together with the primacy
of military concerns in defeating the Axis, the US,
and Britain in essence consigned Romania to the
Soviet sphere of influence.

-----------------------------
(1) Part I of this report, "From Soviet Annexation to Romanian
Reconquest,” appeared as RAD Background Report/61 (Romania),
Radio Free Europe Research, 3 March 1981, and Part II, "The
Diplomatic Negotiations on the Future of Bessarabia (1941-1942),"
RAD BR/136 (Romania), RFER, 12 May 1981.
This material was prepared for the use of the staff of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty.

[page 2]

RAD BR/329 

The progress of Soviet troops on Romanian
territory and the predominance acquired by the
Soviet Union in the armistice negotiations with
Romania, therefore, killed chances of preserving
Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina within the
borders of postwar Romania. The Soviet armistice
terms, submitted on 8 April 1944 in Cairo, also
included the demand to re-establish the
Romanian-Russian border imposed by the ultimatum of 28
June 1940. This clause was resumed both in
Article 4 of the Romanian-Soviet Armistice,
signed on 12 September 1944 in Moscow, and in the
peace treaty with Romania, signed on 10 February
1947 in Paris, despite the protests filed by the
Romanian democratic opposition with the peace
conference in Paris.

+ + +

Reorientation of Romania's Foreign Policy

Romania's sovereignty over Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina,
reacquired in 1941, did not last long, for in 1943 the Soviet
Army went on the offensive on the Eastern Front and was thus
poised to reconquer the provinces, to which it had never renounced
its claim. The Soviet victories at Stalingrad, on the Don, and
at Kursk opened the way to Romania and Poland for Soviet troops,
thus making the question of the USSR's frontiers with those
countries of immediate, practical importance. The Romanians, who
up to November 1943 had lost over 250,000 men of the Eastern Front,
saw the battle line draw nearer to the Dniester; they felt that
not only the future status of Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina but
perhaps also broader political issues would be raised very soon.
As a result, some Romanian leaders, to be found among both those 
in power and those of the opposition, sought a way to save Romania
by detaching it from the alliance with Germany and negotiating
with the Allies. The prime Romanian goal was, following the
example of the country's switch of sides in World War I, to move
to the winners' side as painlessly as possible and with as much
territory as could be secured. In concrete terms, this meant
the restoration of northern Transylvania, which was lost to Hungary
in 1940, and Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina, which had been taken
by the Soviets in 1940 but reassigned to Romania by Hitler in 1941.

With Marshal Antonescu's assent, Romanian Foreign Minister
Mihai Antonescu started negotiations to join Romania to its
neighbors in federations bordering on the Dniester River, while Iuliu
Maniu, a prominent Transylvanian politician, leader of the National
Peasant Party, a former Prime Minister, and at that time also head
of the national opposition, hoped to negotiate a separate peace
with the Western Allies, including recognition of Romania's claim
to Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina. Romania hoped the Western
Allies would be amenable to such a move, one that was obviously to
Moscow's detriment. Although Marshal Antonescu had promised Hitler

[page 3]

RAD BR/329 

at their 10-12 January 1943 meeting that Romania would continue
to fight alongside Germany and would supply 19 fresh divisions to
the Eastern Front, the Romanian leader had doubts that the
German Army could stop the Soviet offensive in the East, by then
supported by the allied offensive in the West, and was considering
informing the Allies of the newly created situation, and in a
scarcely disinterested vein warning them against the danger of
Soviet expansion. [2] Hitler himself admitted that the Romanian
army, which, after retaking Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina and
acquiring the newly designated "Transnistria" had to fight well
beyond its frontiers, was in a difficult predicament. He told
the Hungarian leader, Admiral and Regent Miklos Horthy: "It will
surely not be easy for the sons of Romanian peasants to understand
why they still should fight far away from their fatherland or
from the areas conquered by them." [3]

Iuliu Maniu had always maintained that "the political aims
of the Axis are not those of Romania," and had demanded that
Romania withdraw from the war once Bessarabia and Northern
Bucovina were regained, resuming friendly relations with Great
Britain and the USA. [4] The Soviet victories had confirmed
Maniu's forecasts that the Allies would win. The government made
use of the opposition's policy and to some extent cooperated with
it during the negotiations to obtain the territorial settlement
desired.

Mihai Antonescu's Attempts to Get Romania Out of the War

On 19 January 1943, a few days after his return from
Hitler's general headquarters, Wolfschanze, Mihai Antonescu
informed Renato Bova Scoppa, Italian minister in Bucharest, with
whom he was on good terms, that the atmosphere within the German
leadership was depressing and that the German leaders had been
forced to fall back from the idea of a blitzkrieg to that of total
defense of "Fortress Europa." Mihai Antonescu who, in November
1942, had arrived at the belief that Romania must keep in close
contact with Italy so that the two countries could detach
themselves from the Axis, decided to take steps. Accordingly,
Bova Scoppa prepared a memorandum in which he set forth the
Romanian minister's foreign policy views, winding up by saying that
"the essential point at this decisive time for our destiny is to
keep directly in contact," to save Europe from the threat of
communism and from anarchy. [5] In a practical manner, Mihai Antonescu

-----------------------------
(2) Andreas Hillgruber, Hitler, König Carol und Marschall Antonescu
(Wiesbaden: F. Steiner, 1954), pp. 153, 155, and 167.

(3) Record of the conversation between Adolf Hitler and Miklos
Horthy, Klessheim, 16 April 1943, in Andreas Hillgruber,
Staatsmanner und Diplomaten bei Hitler Vol. II,(Frankfurt:
Bernard and Grafe, 1970), p. 252.

(4) Iuliu Maniu's Letter to Ion Antonescu, Bucharest, 30 September
1943, in Margaret Carlyle, Documents on International Affairs
(1939-1946), Vol. II, Hitler's Europe (London: Oxford University
Press, 1954), pp. 32 7-328.

(5) Renato Bova Scoppa, Colloqui con due Dittatori (Rome: Ruffolo,
1949), p. 75.

[page 4]

RAD BR/329 

suggested that Italy sound out the Western Allies, together with
Romania, regarding a separate peace with them, one directed against
the USSR. Dino Grandi and Duke Pietro of Acquarone, who six
months later were implicated in an anti-Mussolini plot,
enthusiastically approved Bova Scoppa's memo. [6] In turn, Ciano submitted
the memo to Mussolini, to whom he presented his own views on
seeking a way out of the war. Mussolini retorted that he was
confident the Germans would be able to resist and rejected the
Romanian proposal, saying that "the Danube is not the road" for
Italy to follow. [7] Later, Ciano told Bova Scoppa that Mussolini
had removed him from the position of foreign minister because he
had approved of Mihai Antonescu's views advocating the
establishment of direct contact with the Western Allies, reproaching
him by saying that "your memo of January 15 has been responsible
for my demotion from the ministry." [8]

The Romanian foreign minister also suffered as a result of 
his initiative, for Hitler, upon learning about Mihai Antonescu's
schemes at his 12 April 1943 meeting with Marshal Antonescu
at Klessheim asked the Romanian leader to replace his foreign
minister. [9] Nevertheless, after a brief punitive "leave of
absence," Mihai Antonescu was able to revive his project of
saving Romania by attempting to pull it out of the war in a move
that would be initiated by Italy. On 5 June 1943 Bova Scoppa
submitted a second memorandum that contained the views of the
Roamnian foreign minister reiterating the suggestion that Italy
place itself at the head of the group of small countries, for
no one imagined that Great Britain and the USA would stand guard
in Europe against Slavism for several generations to come. Bova
Scoppa maintained that he himself had prepared the report which
had received prior approval by King Victor Emanuel III. He added,
however, that he had presented it to Undersecretary of State
Giuseppe Bastianini as conceived by Mihai Antonescu in order to
lend it more weight. He even reproached the Romanian Foreign
Ministry for failing to be up to such a historic mission and 
failing convincingly to present the ideas on which they had agreed
at their Rocca delle Camminate meeting with Mussolini. [10]

-----------------------------
(6) Ibid., p. 80.

(7) Galeazzo Ciano, Diario, 1937-1943 (Milan: Rizzoli, 1980),
p. 691.

(8) Bova Scoppa, op. cit., p. 109.

(9) Record of the conversation between Adolf Hitler and Marshal
Antonescu, Klessheim, 16 April 1943, in Hillgruber, Staatsmänner
und Diplomaten. . . , Vol. II. pp. 217-223.

(10) Renato Bova Scoppa, La Pace Impossibile, (Turin: Rosenberg
and Sellier, 1961), pp. 205 and 213.

[page 5]

RAD BR/329 

On June 15 Bastianini informed Bova Scoppa that "II Duce
had agreed with Mihai Antonescu on several points of your'
memorandum," but he would like to wait for two more months before
taking any action. Eventually, Mihai Antonescu succeeded in
presenting his plan to Mussolini directly, during a five-hour
conversation which he had with the Italian dictator on 1 July 
1943 at Rocca delle Camminate. By then Mussolini was apparently
more convinced by the Romanian foreign minister's plea and
promised to talk to Hitler in two months time about convening a
conference of neutral and belligerant states to discuss Europe's
destiny. [11] But the allied landing in Sicily killed the plan.

Mihai Antonescu believed that the foundation of a
bloc of the small states of the Danube Basin or the Balkans in
order to impede the Soviet advance would have been favorably
received by Germany, which was withdrawing from the Eastern
Front, as well as by the Western Allies, who, he felt, would not
be very keen to see Russia extend its sphere of influence to the
Danube Valley and the Balkans. Mihai Antonescu would also have
liked to get Italy's consent to a project of this type. Since
in this respect, at least, Romania's interest was identical with
Hungary's, Romania was ready to cooperate with its Western neighbor,
although the Transylvanian issue did not exactly make for an
atmosphere of mutual trust. Noting Romania's eagerness to cooperate
with Hungary, Count Ciano said that "the Germans would do well to
keep an eye on the Romanians, because the sudden desire to achieve
reconciliation with Hungary seems suspicious to me." [12]

Mihai Antonescu's project to pull Romania out of the war on
the best: terms possible by resorting to a political solution,
such as the setting up of a bloc of small states, had no chance so
long as none of the big powers supported it. Informing von
Ribbentrop of the Turkish project for a Balkan federation, Franz
von Papen, the German Ambassador to Ankara, expressed his opinion
that such a solution would be of considerable advantage to Germany,
were the retreat on the Eastern Front to be continued. Hitler
himself raised this point at his March 1943 meeting with Czar Boris
of Bulgaria, but no concrete results were achieved.

It was clear that this idea also interested British circles,
for on 10 March 1943 Anthony Eden sounded out Ivan Maiskii, the
Soviet Ambassador to London, on the Soviet Union's attitude to a
European federation. Maiskii retorted that Moscow might not
oppose the idea of a Balkan federation, provided Romania were ruled
out of the arrangement. (14) After the November 1943 Cairo
Conference, Turkish Foreign Minister Numan Menemencoglu complained
to Alexandru Cretzianu that "overnight, at a frown from Stalin," even
Churchill gave up the idea of a federative reorganization of Europe,
in which Turkey would have played a significant role, within a
Balkan federation. [15] Later, on 1 December 1943, during the

----------------------------
(11) Bova Scoppa, Colloqui , pp.107, 110, 113, and 114.

(12) Ciano, op. cit., p. 688.

(13) F. W. Deakin, The Brutal Friendship; Mussolini, Hitler, and the
Fall of Italian Fascism (New York: Harper and Row, 1962),
pp. 253-255.

(14) The Earl of Avon, The Eden Memoirs (London: Cassel, 1965, p. 371.

(15) Alexandre Cretzianu, The Lost Opportunity (London: Jonathan
Cape, 1957), p. 114.

[page 6]

RAD BR/329 

Tehran Conference, Churchill asked Stalin what he thought about
the project for a Danubian federation. Stalin replied that a
Danubian federation would not be viable, that the Germans would
take advantage of this "by putting flesh on something that is
only skeleton, thus creating a great new state." [16] The
Soviet dictator also wanted to know whether Romania and Hungary
would be members of such a federation.

Iuliu Maniu Places His Hopes on Negotiations with the Western Allies

Starting from the idea that the Germans and Russians would
decimate each other during the lengthy wear and tear of the war,
Iuliu Maniu thought that World War II would end in an Allied, but
especially Anglo-American, victory. Accordingly, after the
Romanians got beyond their pre-1940 border of the Dniester River,
Maniu made an effort to pull his country out of the war. But since
he was persuaded that he could not get the Kremlin's recognition 
of the border along the Dniester, he did not enter into direct
negotiations with the Soviet Union; he chose the indirect way,
negotiating with Great Britain and the USA.

Early in 1942 Maniu had established contact with Great
Britain, stating he wanted to engineer a coup d'ctat to overthrow
Antonescu's regime at an appropriate moment -- whenever the Allies
landed in the Balkans. In return for this change of alliance,
Maniu asked that the Allies guarantee the existence of an
independent Romanian state, with the prewar borders, including
Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina. [17] His British contacts did
not seem too optimistic, for they thought that the Soviet Union
would not give up the provinces concerned. That is why, when
in the summer of 1942 it was rumored that the Soviet Union had
agreed to setting up a plebiscite on Bessarabia and Northern
Bucovina, the British Foreign Office commented as follows: "We have
heard nothing to corroborate this . . . which strikes us as extremely
improbable. In any case, a plebiscite run by the Soviet government
would be as valuable a guide to opinion as an announcement that the
inmates of a German concentration camp had subscribed to a Christmas
present for Himmler." [18] Nevertheless, Maniu persevered in his
plans to save Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina through the agency
of the Allies and, in a note to the British Foreign Office, he
said that public opinion in Romania was favorable to the allied
cause, the border issue being the sole obstacle on which the
American and British governments would have to act to bring about
a change in Romania's alliance. He added that, were the
Anglo-Americans to guarantee Romania's border, the Romanian army would
also be won over for a change in the Allies' favor. [19] The answer

-----------------------------
(16) Winston Churchill, The Second World War, Vol. V, Closing the
Ring (New York: Bantam, 1977), p. 344.

(17) Paul A. Quinlan, Clash over Romania: British and American
Policy Toward Romania, 1938-1947 (Los Angeles: American Romanian
Academy, 1977), p. 83.

(18) Ibid.

(19) Aurica Simion, Preliminariile Politico-Diplomatice ale
Insurectiei Romane din August 1944 (Cluj-Napoca: Dacia, 1979),
p. 274.

[page 7]

RAD BR/329 

from the British Foreign Office was that Romania's eastern
borders would be determined by the United Nations, in conformity
with the Atlantic Charter and the provisions of the Anglo-Soviet
treaty. (20) Since the Anglo-Soviet treaty specified that the
need for Soviet security would be borne in mind, this meant
that the Soviet Union would have at least a broad say in setting
Romania's eastern borders.

In February 1943 Maniu again informed the British
government, through Suphi Tanrioer, Turkey's minister to Bucharest, that
Romanian public opinion, which had favored entry into the war but
then objected to the continuation of the campaign beyond the
Dniester, now felt that Marshal Antonescu should be asked to bring
back his troops and change the country's military and foreign
policy, adding that "Romania's national movement would like to
know the British and American viewpoint on Romania's borders and
the role to be assigned to it in the future." [21] As time went
by and the Soviet Army continued its advance toward Central Europe,
however, hopes for preserving Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina
with Anglo-Saxon support diminished. At least as far back as the
spring of 1943 Great Britain considered that Romania fell
predominantly within the Soviet sphere. Eden's briefing on Romania
before his March 1943 visit to Washington stated: "Our policy
toward Romania is subordinated to our relations with the Soviet
Union and we are unwilling to accept any commitments or take
any action except with the full cognizance and consent of the
Soviet government." [22] During Eden's visit to Washington
Roosevelt also agreed to the Soviet claim to Bessarabia on the
ground that the Soviets would be entitled to regain this province
"as it had been Russian throughout most of its history," [23] an
assertion that is, of course, historically incorrect.

Along with the efforts to persuade the Allies to guarantee
Romania's eastern border along the Dniester, Maniu also started
exerting pressure on Marshal Antonescu to convince him to

withdraw Romanian troops to the same river line. On 10 July 1943,
in a memo to the marshal also signed by Constantin I. C. Bratianu,
Maniu reiterated his well-known arguments: "Romanian public opinion
approves moves for the defense of its natural borders, but not
conquest. At the same time, Romania cannot remain committed to
an action directed against the Western democracies, which had
provided decisive support for the creation of Greater Romania." (24)
In another memo to Marshal Antonescu of 12 August 1943, the two
Romanian democratic leaders reiterated their request for the
Romanian army to withdraw "within the country's borders," that is,
to the line of the Dniester. [25] Then, on 30 September 1943, in
a letter to the marshal in which he condemned recognition of
Mussolini's rump Social Republic, Maniu categorically declared:
"Romania's most fervent wish has been to entertain friendly
rela-

-----------------------------
(20) Ibid., p. 2 75.

(21) Ibid.

(22) Quinlan, op. cit., p. 84.

(23) Herbert Feis, Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin (New Jarsey:
Princeton, 1957), p. 123.

(24) Aurica Simion, op. cit., p. 312.

(25) Ibid., p. 313. I

[page 8]

RAD BR/329 

tions with those powers to whom it owes its national unity, through
the liberation of Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina," [26] a
reference to Western support in the post-World War I peace
settlements .

Former Romanian Foreign Minister Grigore Gafencu, who was then
living in Switzerland and kept in touch with Iuliu Maniu, wrote
in his diary on 15 December 1943 that the Romanian leader "was
following a policy of national reintegration, instead of one of
national salvation." Unlike Maniu, Gafencu advocated direct
contact with the Russians, without seeking any Anglo-American
mediation. (27)

Nevertheless, Iuliu Maniu's perseverance yielded some
results. Toward the end of 1943 Marshal Antonescu informed the
National Peasant leader that he was ready to retire from the
country's leadership and surrender his position to him, provided
Maniu could obtain from Great Britain and the USA terms guaranteeing
Romania's independence and integrity. Maniu replied that he could
not obtain such terms as long as he, or someone representing him,
had not contacted the Allies.[28] Therefore, Marshal Antonescu
agreed to allow someone named by the opposition to go abroad to try
to obtain the best political and territorial terms, in exchange for
Romania's withdrawal from the war.

The Soviet Union Enter into the Negotiations

Alexandru Cretzianu was the first Romanian emissary to contact
0the Allies on behalf of Iuliu Maniu, of the opposition, and of King
Michael. Cretzianu had been appointed Romanian minister to Ankara
and entrusted with this secret mission by Foreign Minister Mihai
Antonescu. Before leaving Romania he called upon the King, Maniu,
and Marshal Antonescu, realizing that the latter two still hoped
for an Allied landing in the Balkans to facilite Romania's pullout
of the war. Marshal Antonescu revealed to him that Romania had
reorganized its armed forces after the defeats in the Soviet Union
and now had 21 properly equipped divisions available. This
confirmed the foreign minister's belief that in an emergency Romania
could cope with a German countermove. [29]

When he arrived at Istanbul on 15 September 1943, however,
Cretzianu realized that the real state of affairs in the world
was entirely different from what the Bucharest politicians felt
it to be. Turkish Foreign Minister Menencoglu informed him that
Eden, whom he had met in Cairo early in November, did not mention

-----------------------------
(26) Iuliu Maniu's letter to Ion Antonescu, Bucharest, 30 September
1943, in Margaret Carlyle, op. cit., pp. 32 7-328.

(27) Simion, op. cit., p. 345.

(28) Ibid., p. 352.

(29) Alexandre Cretzianu, op. cit.., pp. 93-98.

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RAD BR/329 

any landing in the Balkans; neither did the Turkish official learn
anything about any interest of the Western Allies in Soviet frontier
questions in the Balkans. So far as Romania was concerned, Eden
had told him that it had no choice but to capitulate. The Moscow
Conference had decided that any capitulation was to be made to
all three allies; no separate peace with the West would be possible.
Some time later, on 1 February 1944, Cretzianu learned from
Lieutenant Colonel Ted Masterson of the Middle East Command that
the best Romania could hope for from the negotiations with the
Allied countries would be a Soviet promise not to cross the line
of the River Prut, which meant that Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina
were going to be lost again. [30]

The system of tripartite consultation among the Allies had
been in operation since 1943, after the Moscow Conference. 
Therefore, on 21 November 1943 the State Department was informed by
the British ambassador to Washington that in a message to Great
Britain Iuliu Maniu had expressed his wish to send one or several
delegates abroad to discuss arrangements for a political
changeover in Romania. The State Department consented to have the USA
represented at any conference that might be held in Cairo with
Maniu's representative by Lincoln MacVeagh, ambassador to the Greek
and Yugoslav governments in exile in Egypt.[31] Great Britain
also informed the Soviet Union about Maniu's communication. In
its answer, the Soviet government indicated that it considered
"absolutely necessary the presence of a Soviet representative
at any negotiations that might be held with Maniu's representative.[32]
The fact that the presence of the Soviet Union was binding for the
negotiations, in view of concluding an armistice with Romania,
obgiously reduced the latter's chances of retaining Bessarabia
and Northern Bucovina.

Nevertheless, the State Department continued to express itself
in vague terms on the future status of the above-mentioned provinces,
and did not consider their occupation by the Soviet Union as an
"ultimate settlement," although it cannot be said that official
Washington gave much thought to the area, which, for America, was
a backwater at best. In a document sent by the director of the
State Department's Office of European Affairs to the American
ambassador to London (a document that had been passed by the
Working Security Committee and cleared through the State Department,

-----------------------------
(30) Ibid., pp. 113, 125, and 126.

(31) Cordell Hull's telegram to John Winant, Washington, 8 January
1944, in Foreign Relations of the United States (F.R.U.S).
Diplomatic Papers 1944, Vol. IV, Europe (Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1966), p. 134.

(32) Averell Harriman's telegram to Cordell Hull, Moscow, ibid.,
11 January 1944, p. 135.

[page 10]

RAD BR/329 

but not yet by the Joint Chiefs of Staff) [33] mention was made
of the evacuation of the occupied territories. These "Provisions
for Imposition upon Romania at the Time of Surrender" stipulated
that "without prejudice to the ultimate settlement of disputed
territorial claims," the Romanian armed forces should be withdrawn
from all areas other than the territory held by Romania on 21
June 1941. The withdrawal of Romanian forces would be conducted
according to a schedule laid down by the "occupation authorities," [34]
which meant the Soviet authorities. From this text it follows
that, were the Soviet troops to advance in this area, the status
of Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina was going to be that of a
province under military occupation. In fact, the above-mentioned
document added that the Soviet occupation authorities could retain
in Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina those Romanian officials whose
"presence was desired by the occupation authorities," whereas
"individuals or units in such areas might be designated to be held
as prisoners of war." The American stand was more clearly defined 
in an explanatory document in these "Provisions for Imposition Upon
Romania," that provided the following: "If geographical and military
considerations should make it inevitable for these disputed areas
to be placed under Soviet occupation until the conclusion of the
final settlement, it should be stipulated among the three principal
Allies that these areas are to be occupied in the interest of the
United Nations [a term that, at that time, effectively meant the US,
Great Britain, and the USSR, but which was widely used at the
insistence of the Roosevelt administration], and are not to be
assimilated with the status of a national territory until their
final disposition has been agreed upon as part of the general
peace settlement."[35]

It should, however, at all times be recalled that Eastern
Europe, except perhaps Poland, was of minor importance in
Washington's eyes, while Britain really cared only about Greece
of all the countries in the area, going along with the Americans
on Poland in order to obtain concessions elsewhere. Roosevelt's
chief preoccupations were the Pacific War and the postwar
international order, while Churchill concentrated on protecting
time-honored British interests in Europe, the Middle East, and 
elsewhere. Romania, however, was a traditional concern of St.
Petersburg, Vienna, and later Berlin, and following World War I
of France, the USSR, and eventually of Hitler's Germany.

The Problem of Northern Bucovina

According to the explanatory document, a clear-cut
distinction was to be made between Northern Bucovina and Bessarabia, for
the first "had never been a part of Russia before 1940, and the

-----------------------------
(33) James Clement Dunn's communication to John Winant, Washington,
2 February 1944, ibid., p. 136.

(34) Provisions for Imposition upon Romania at the Time of Surrender
(without location), 13 January 1944, ibid. p. 13 7.

(35) Aspects of the Romanian Surrender Requiring Agreement Among
the British, Soviet, and American Governments (no location),
14 January 1944, ibid., p. 143.

[page 11]

RAD BR/329 

Soviet claim to it had never been recognized by any of the United
Nations." Accordingly, the American proposal was that Northern
Bucovina should be administrated under the United Nations military
government in the interest of the United Nations, pending a general
peace settlement. In any case, it was emphasized that "the
disposition of Northern Bucovina is closely connected with that of
Eastern Poland and both problems should be considered together as
part of the general peace settlement."[36]

Apparently, the American stand toward Northern Bucovina had
been influenced by the views expressed by General Wladyslaw
Sikorski, head of the Polish government in London, during the
meeting held in Washington in 1942. On that occasion, the Polish
prime minister condemned the stand adopted by Great Britain in
the negotiations with the Soviet Union on the Western frontiers of
the Soviet Union, for, giving in so far as the Romanian provinces
were concerned, London was later to be "confronted by additional
and greater demands, involving not only Soviet sovereignty over
Bucovina and Bessarabia, but probably Eastern Poland and,
eventually, the Dardanelles, the Balkans, and Iran."[37] In a memo
submitted to Anthony Eden on 24 March 1942, Sikorski elaborated
on the reasons why Poland had been against the surrender of
Northern Bucovina. He said that that area had never belonged to
Russia and represented a useful link between Poland and Romania,
that the cession of Bucovina and Lithuania would put Poland
squarely in the Soviet pincers from north and south, just as Germany
had surrounded it earlier by occupying Slovakia, and that,
accordingly, he could not agree to the surrender of a territory for which
he had earlier offered guarantees. Finally, he felt that the
security argument invoked by the Russians was not valid, for no
 sea or Danubian bases could be set up in land locked, non-Danubian
Bucovina to threaten the Soviet Union. [38] In a conversation
that he had with Eden, the Polish prime minister noted that,
through the Anglo-Soviet draft treaty, Great Britain granted the
Soviet Union borders analogous to those obtained under the
Ribbentrop-Molotov Agreement of 1939, sacrificing the vital interests of a
considerable part of Europe to the Soviet Union, whose ultimate
objective was to provoke a worldwide revolution. [39]

In a memorandum that has never been published, the exiled
Polish government apparently asked the American government to
approach the British government with Poland's request to be present
at the negotiations about the borders of Bucovina and Lithuania. [40]

-----------------------------
(35) Ibid., p. 144. 

(37) Memorandum on Conversation Between Wladyslaw Sikorski and
Acting Secretary (Washington, 25 March 1942),ibid., p. 124.

(38) Ibid., p. 128.

(39) Anthony J. Drexel Biddle's telegram (American Ambassador to
the Polish Government in Exile) to Sumner Welles, London,

24 April 1942, ibid., p. 141.

(40) Sumner Welles to President Roosevelt, Washington 14 April
1942, ibid., p. 139.
[page 12]

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In his conversations, General Sikorski put forth a strong
argument: that the annexation of Bucovina and Lithuania by the
Soviet Union had been a death blow to the project of a Central
European federation. In turn, Count Edward Raczyinski insisted
that confirming Soviet sovereignty over Bucovina would render
more difficult the participation of Romania and Hungary in a
future Central European federation. Since the project of that
federation had not been implemented, however, this argument
carried little weight. [41]

The British foreign minister also rejected the idea that
Great Britain was politically and morally responsible for
guaranteeing Romania's territory, saying that, "As regards Bucovina,
the British government rejects the legal Polish argument on that
point. Romania rejected the British guarantee and chose to
collaborate with Germany. Britain subsequently declared war on
Romania and does not feel bound by obligations existing under its
former guarantee." [42] Great Britain maintained the same negative
attitude on the future status of Northern Bucovina when it received
the American document suggesting that the United Nations be
entrusted with the administration of that territory. The American
ambassador to London informed the Secretary of State that the
British were definitely opposed to introducing the provision that
the withdrawal of Romanian forces from certain areas be without
prejudice to disputed territorial claims, for "they do not wish
to imply that such a settlement must await a general peace treaty,
and they would ask that this subject not be raised in any way in
connection with Romanian surrender terms." [43]

The US finally came around to the British position, which
regarded Romania as an enemy state whose interests could easily be
sacrificed to Moscow in order to speed Germany's defeat and to
wean diplomatic concessions from Stalin on other issues. When
Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., went to London from 7-29 April 1.944 for
discussions with members of the British government, the State
Department's Division of Southern European Affairs prepared a 
memorandum on Romania which said that "the British and American
governments might consider the desirability of reaffirming their
expectation that Romania and the other Axis satellites should
exist in future as independent [states] within reasonable
frontiers," . . . "assuring as far as possible Romania's continued
existence as a state with such territories as would enable it to
make its way as an independent country." More exactly, dealing
with the status of Bessarabia, the above-mentioned memorandum
said that the US might contemplate the separation of that region
from Romania, while the Soviet claim to Northern Bucovina was
justified only on Soviet strategical grounds, supported by general
ethnic arguments. The area's population is mixed, but chiefly
Ukrainian. In the case of Bucovina, however, the memorandum added

-----------------------------
(41) Anthony J. Drexel Biddle's telegram to Cordell Hull, London,
24 and 2 7 April 1942.

(42) Anthony J. Drexel Biddle to Sumner Welles, London, 27 April
1942, ibid., p. 143.

(43) John Winant's telegram to Cordell Hull, London, 15 February
1944, ibid., p. 145.

[page 13]

RAD BR/329 

that "there is no indication that Moscow would permit this question
to be opened." Therefore the State Department also considered
Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina virtually lost for Romania, taking
a firmer stand only in case the Soviet Union would claim still more
Romanian territory. "It would [however] be difficult for us to
acquiesce in any further extension of Russian claims to Romanian
territory, even if Moscow were to offer to compensate the Romanians by
supporting their demands for the return of Transylvania." (44)

The Romanians Put Forward Their Claims

Although Iuliu Maniu had expressed his wish to send a delegate
abroad to discuss the terms for Romania's pulling out of the war as early
as 23 November 1943, the negotiations did not start until March 1944.
In fact, it was on 17 March 1944 that the meeting between Prince
Barbu Stirbey, Maniu's representative, and those of the Allies, Walter
. E. Guinness, Lord Moyne, British Deputy Minister of State for Foreign Affairs
and Minister Resident in the Middle East,Lincoln MacVeagh, the American
Ambassador to the Yugoslav government in exile, and Nikolai Vasilyevich
Novikov, Soviet Ambassador to Cairo, began.

Romania was conducting negotiations for an armistice under
difficult conditions, for in the spring and summer of 1944 the balance of
forces had changed markedly in favor of the Allies. On March 26 the
Soviet Army on the Second Ukrainian Front reached some points on the
River Prut and, continuing its offensive, crossed to Suceava and
Botosani Counties, as well as part of Iasi County. (45) The
political conditions were also particularly unfavorable, for Churchill and
Roosevelt had decided in Casablanca (14-26 January 1943) that their
adversaries would have to capitulate unconditionally; the Moscow
Foreign Ministers' Conference (5-6 November 1943) had made
consultation among the Allies compulsory, while at the Tehran Conference
(28 November-2 December 1943) the idea of an allied landing in the
Balkans was finally abandoned.

On his way to Cairo Stirbey stopped over in Ankara where
Alexandru Cretzianu told him about the seriousness of Romania's
position. Cretzianu thought, just as those who had sent him, "that
Romania would rather perish fighting than have history show that its
current rulers had surrendered unconditionally to Russia." [46] At
the first round of conversations, Stirbey informed the Allies that
Maniu was willing to stage a coup d'état, but before undertaking it
he wanted an assurance from the Allies not only that Romania's
independence would be maintained but also that its territorial rights would
be respected. When asked about "territorial rights," he said that
this term covered Transylvania and that the future of Bessarabia
should eventually be decided by a plebiscite. [47]

-----------------------------
(44) Memorandum by the Division of Southern European Affairs,
Washington, (no day) March 1944, ibid., p. 146.

(45) Ion Enescu, Politica Externa a Romaniei in Perioada 1944-1947
(Bucharest: Editura Stiintifica si Enciclopedica, 1979), p. 28.

(46) Lincoln MacVeagh's telegram to Cordell Hull, Cairo, 3 March 1944,
in F.R.U.S., Vol. IV, p. 148.

(47) A 17 March 1944 telegram, ibid., P. 150.

[page 14]

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The Allies reacted in different ways to the message of the head
of the Romanian democratic opposition. Lord Moyne considered that
"if Romania will work its way home its independence would at least
be saved, though boundary questions cannot be gone into at this
time." [48] In its turn, the State Department thought that the
proposals submitted by Stirbey were more encouraging than expected and
specified the following American viewpoint on Romania's eastern
border: "Romanian territorial rights will, in principle, be respected;
the proposal for a plebiscite in Bessarabia (and Northern Bucovina)
is reasonable. ..." [49] A different opinion was expressed by the
Soviet government, through the agency of its Foreign Minister
Vyacheslav M. Molotov, who insisted that there were no grounds for
attaching importance to Stirbey's statements, because he did not
appear to represent Maniu. Molotov added that it was now clear Maniu
was not one of those leaders who might oppose Antonescu and that very
likely his moves were undertaken with Antonescu's permission. [50]

The Soviets had always been reserved toward Maniu, not only 
because the latter had preferred establishing contacts with Great
Britain, instead of the Soviet Union, but also because the National 
Peasant leader proved to be inflexible on the Bessarabian issue. The
information on his political stand was reported to Moscow by the
Romanian Communist Party. As early as 26 January 1942 the RCP CC
addressed an appeal to the Chairman of the National Peasant Party "to
cooperate and join the common struggle to safeguard the Romanian
people and its army, to create a National United Front of all patriots."
Maniu demanded a prior guarantee by the Soviet government recognizing
Romania's frontiers as they existed before the Soviet ultimatum of
June 1940, as well as on a public RCP declaration to that effect,
conditions for agreeing to "cooperation and joint struggles." [51]
Later, in the spring of 1943, during a discussion with RCP CC
delegates Mihai Magheru and Petre Ion, Maniu claimed that Romania could
not be considered an aggressor state, in the sense adopted at Geneva,
supporting this claim with the argument that the British and American
governments had not taken a stand against Romania at the time it
entered the war but only from the moment its army crossed the
Dniester, i.e., moved beyond the country's pre-1940 frontiers. He
added that his party would not give up the claim to Romania's old
borders. [52] The guarantee of the frontier along the Dniester is a
recurring theme in both the correspondence and in the negotiations
between Maniu and the RCP, and a communist writer stated that "it
testified once more to the head of the bourgeois opposition's lack
of broad-mindedness and political realism." [53] Maniu had long

-----------------------------
(48) A 18 March 1944 telegram, ibid., p. 151.

(49) Memorandum of Cloyce Kenneth Hudson of the Division of Southern
European Affairs, Washington, 21 March 1944, ibid., p. 152.

(50) Averell Harriman's telegram to Cordell Hull, Moscow, 23 March 1944,
ibid., p. 154.

(51) A. Simion, op. cit., p. 426.

(52) Ibid.. p. 433.

(53) A. Simion, "Pina la Orice Sacrificiu in Interesul Poporului
Roman," Maqazin Istoric Vol.X, No. 7, July 1976.

[page 15]

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placed his hopes in an Anglo-American landing in the Balkans which
would have led, he felt, to a tripartite occupation of Romania. When
this hope was shattered after the Tehran Conference, Maniu turned to
the Anglo-Saxons, through Stirbey, asking for airborne troops and air
forces in a resistance area, in Oltenia and the Banat, in order to
have the possibility of a retreat into Yugoslavia. [54] Nevertheless,
Molotov sent a letter to the British Ambassador to Moscow in which,
after calling Romania the worst of the satellites, he offered at the
request of the British government to continue to deal with
Stirbey. [55]

The Soviet Union Assumes the Leadership of Negotiations

The proposals Molotov advanced through the British government
provided for the establishment of immediate contact between the
Romanian and Soviet commands and the surrender of Romanian troops in
contact with the Soviet army. The proposals further said that the
Romanian Army formations in the Dniester and Crimea regions would be
sent to the River Prut area after the surrender, to be returned to
Romania for use against the Germans. [56] Denoting the River Prut as
a dividing line between the Soviet Union and Romania suggests clearly
that the Soviet Union intended to annex Bessarabia and northern
Bucovina immediately, without awaiting the final decision of a peace
conference. When examining the Soviet proposals, Admiral William D.
Leahy said on behalf of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that "the Russian
proposal in effect leaves the matter of Romania's surrender
exclusively in Russian hands, but considered it from a military viewpoint;
this is only natural and to be expected since Russian forces are the
only ones prepared to implement and take advantage of the surrender
terms." [57] Military considerations were thus still primary over
eventual political ones.

The Soviet proposal was approved by Great Britain as well, then
subnitted by Stirbey to Maniu for Antonescu, via British channels, [58]
which meant that all three Allies had indirectly agreed to having the
River Prut constitute the frontier between Romania and the Soviet
Union. As a matter of fact, at the time when these notes were being
exchanged the Soviet Army had already reached the River Prut.

On 2 April 1944 the Soviet press published a declaration of the
Soviet government that began by stating that the River Prut was the
frontier between Romania and the Soviet Union. The fact that the
Red Army was approaching the River Prut "signifies the beginning of
a full re-establishment of the Soviet state border established in

-----------------------------
(54) Lincoln MacVeagh's telegram to Cordell Hull, Cairo, 25 March 1944,
in F.R.U.S., Vol. IV, p. 156.

(55) Memorandum of Cavendish Cannon (Assistant Chief of the Division
of Southern European Affairs) to James Clement Dunn (Director of
the Office of European Affairs), Washington, 27 March 1944,
ibid., p. 159.

(56) Ibid.

(57) William D. Leahy to Cordell Hull, Washington, 28 March 1944,
ibid., p. 161.

(58) Lincoln MacVeagh's telegram to Cordell Hull, Cairo, 30 March 1944,
ibid., pp. 162-163.

[page 16]

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1940 by a treaty between the Soviet Union and Romania." [59] 
Reporting that Soviet troops had crossed the River Prut at several points,
thus entering territory recognized even by the Soviets as Romanian,
the communiqué of the Soviet government stated that it was not
pursuing "the aim of acquiring any part of Romanian territory." Commenting
on this communiqué, the Chief of the State Department's Division of
East European Affairs noted that "as far as Romania is concerned,
this statement sifnifies that the Soviet government intends to
reincorporate all of Bessarabia and all of Bucovina into the USSR." [60]

The arrival of Soviet troops on Romanian territory immediately
enhanced the Soviets' role in the armistice negotiations with
Romania. Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, British Ambassador to Moscow,
informed the Soviet government that the British presumed that in
negotiating with Romania for the surrender of the Romanian Army, the Russians
would regard themselves as acting on behalf of the three principal
Allies. [61] Cordell Hull expressed himself more subtly when he said
that the Romanians should realize that the three principal Allies were
acting after mutual consultation and in common agreement, and "that
the future of the Romanian nation is not left exclusively in the hands
of the one power with which Romania has been directly engaged in
combat." [62] Following its enhanced role in the negotiations with
Romania, on 8 April 1944 the Soviet Union submitted to the
representatives of Great Britain and the US, through Novikov, the armistice
terms proposed by the Soviet government. One of the main points of
the Soviet document stipulated "the re-establishment of the
Romanian-Soviet frontier in accordance with the 1940 agreement." [63]

The State Department received the Soviet proposals with
reservation, considering that "the terms are essentially Russian, not allied
or tripartite; they are frankly based on the practical premise that
the war with Romania is Russia's own business. . . . The Russian 
proposals differ drastically from those prepared in the State
Department, worked over in the "Working Security Committee" and
approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for submission to the "European
Advisory Commission. . . ." "The Russian terms were at variance with 
the American views on territorial questions: a) whereas the Soviet 
government is acting on the assumption that Bessarabia and northern
Bucovina lie within the Soviet state frontiers, we have entertained
the view that the status of Bessarabia is at least open to question
and that the basis of the Russian claim to Northern Bucovina is still
more dubious. . . ." [64] Nevertheless, on 14 April 1944 Cordell

-----------------------------
(59) Statement of the Soviet government issued to the press, Moscow,
2 April 1944, ibid., p. 165.

(60) Memorandum of Charles Eustis Bohlen to Cordell Hull, Washington,
1 April 1944, ibid., p. 166.

(61) Cordell Hull's telegram to Averell Harriman, Washington,
5 April 1944, ibid., p. 168.

(62) Ibid.

(63) Memorandum by Cloyce Kenneth Huston of the State Department's
Division of Southern European Affairs, Washington, 11 April 1944,
ibid., pp. 172-173.

(64) Ibid.

[page 17]

RAD BR/329 

Hull reported to MacVeagh that the American government had given its
assent to the presentation to the Romanians of the proposed terms;
however, it mentioned that "we should have preferred that the
definitive settlement of the status of Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina be
held over for later discussion." [65] Hull added that one must assume
that the Russians would be unwilling to give any consideration whatever
to a modification of the article concerning its frontiers with Romania,
in view of the frequent public reiteration of Russian claims to those
regions.

A Maniu Government in Moldavia (Bessarabia)?

On 14 April 1944 the Soviet armistice terms, approved by Great
Britain and the US, were handed over to Marshal Antonescu and Iuliu
Maniu. [65] The diplomatic notes published to date indicate that
around April 14 Stirbey had made the unexpected suggestion to Novikov
that, should the negotiations with Marshal Antonescu fail to yield the
aniticipated results, Maniu should remove to Russian territory in
Moldavia and establish a government in opposition to Antonescu. [67]
This time Moscow did not object to the Romanian leader but asked
Great Britain and the US to assent to a formal proposal to Maniu
along that line. The instructions that Cordell Hull gave to MacVeagh
included the following: "If he accepted the proposal to remove to
'Russian territory' in Moldavia, Maniu would be placing himself, as
well as whatever governmental and administrative bodies he might set
up, under the protection and auspices of the Soviet government, at
least until the time British and American representatives could
arrive. For this reason it is important that you should give Mr.
Novikov clearly to understand the position of this government as set
forth in the State Department's note of 23 April 1944, 'that, in
conformity with the known American policy of deferring the settlement
of boundary issues until the conclusion of hostilities, we have been
unwilling to look upon any dispositions of territory effected during
the course of the war as being definitive, preferring to regard them
as pending final examination and settlement at the close of
hostilities.1" [68]

The suggestion of establishing a Maniu government in Moldavia
again implicitly raised the issue of Romania's eastern border and
that of the future of Bessarablia. The Soviets suggested that Maniu
transfer to "Russian territory in Moldavia." Since Moldavia is the
name given by the Soviets to Bessarabia, it was evident that they
already considered Moldavia (Bessarabia) Russian territory. 
Reiterating this expression, the State Department put it in quotation marks,
"Russian territory," which suggests that it had not adopted it.

-----------------------------
(65) Cordell Hull's telegram to Lincoln MacVeagh, Washington,
11 April 1944, ibid., p. 174.

(66) Lincoln MacVeagh's telegram to Cordell Hull, Cairo, 14April 1944.

(67) A 16 April 1944 telegram, ibid., p. 175.

(68) Cordell Hull's telegram to Lincoln MacVeagh, Washington,
18 April 1944, ibid., p. 176.

[page 18]

RAD BR/329 

When he received the State Department communication Novikov
asked "whether the State Department meant its remarks to apply to
Bessarabia, altering its previous acceptance of the 1940 boundary."
The American ambassador answered: "In my belief, the State
Department was merely repeating its known policy of deferring
boundary issues until the conclusion of hostilities with special
reference to this particular proposal regarding Moldavia . . . and that
the question of Bessarabia, already agreed, did not arise." [69]

Moscow declared itself satisfied with MacVeagh's interpretation
that suggested American acceptance of the Soviet position on
Bessarabia and clearly answered that the territorial jurisdiction of
the eventual Maniu government had no bearing on Bessarabia and must
be based on the known declaration of Soviet Foreign Minister
Viacheslav Molotov concerning the preservation of the Romanian-Soviet
frontier, as established in 1940. [70] The discussions on the
establishment of a Maniu government in Moldavia under Soviet occupation 
ended in the explanation given by Molotov to Harriman, the American
Ambassador to Moscow. Molotov said that although that proposal was
acceptable to the Soviet government, nevertheless, "it was not
considered as having been made seriously." Molotov added that there
were yet no definite indications that Maniu would follow such a
course. [71]

Apparently, this diplomatic episode was used by Maniu as a test
of Soviet intentions, to check whether in case a government under
Soviet aegis were to be established, the Kremlin would agree to
leaving Bessarabia under Romanian sovereignty. A similar probing on
eventual Soviet concessions over the issue of Bessarabia and Northern
Bucovina had been done in December 1943, through the agency of
Czechoslovak President Eduard Benes. Evoking in a conversation with
Molotov the issue of Romania's postwar frontiers, Benes urged the
restoration of northern Transylvania, but was more reticent
regarding Bessarabia. He said: "I always show them [the Romanians] a map
and say that no compromise is possible over your [Soviet] frontiers." [72]

The Soviets' Own Negotiations 

On 11 April 1944, that is, a few days before the armistice terms
had been reported to Marshal Antonescu and Iuliu Maniu, Frederic Nanu,
the Romanian Minister to Stockholm, was informed by Aleksandra
Mikhailovna Kollontai, the Soviet Ambassador to Sweden, under the
seal of absolute secrecy, that "Stalin has realized that in order to
achieve a lasting peace he has to win the friendship of neighboring
nations. He therefore intends to treat Romania kindly and even to
help it repair the damages of war." [73] These declarations came one

-----------------------------
(69) Lincoln MacVeagh's telegram to Cordell Hull, Cairo, 24April 1944,
ibid., p. 177.

(70) Ibid.

(71) Averell Harriman's telegram to Cordell Hull, Moscow,
25 April 1944, ibid., p. 177.

(72) Vojtech Mastny, "The Benes-Stalin-Molotov Conversations in
December 1943," new documents in The American Historical Review
Vol. XVII, No. 5, December 1972, p. 392.

(73) Frederic Nanu, "The First Soviet Double-Cross," Journal of
Central European Affairs, Vol. XII, No. 3, October 1952, p. 249.

[page 19]

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day after Semionov, the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires in Stockholm, had
reproached Nanu because the Romanians preferred to deal with the
Anglo-Saxons instead of directly dealing with the Soviet Union, which
was their neighbor. Nanu's impression was that the Soviets, who were
eager to deal with the Romanian government via Stockholm, and not
with its opposition, tried to persuade those concerned of the
advantages of direct negotiations over those conducted through the agency
of the Western Allies. That Moscow was willing to talk to. the
Antonescu government and offer better terms than were presented in
Cairo shows the primacy the Soviets still attached to military,
rather than purely political, considerations, even at that stage of
the war. [74]

On 13 April 1944, that is, one day after the armistice terms had
been handed to the Romanians in Cairo, they were conveyed to Nanu in
Stockholm as well. Certainly, these terms, edited by the Soviet Union
also included the clause of re-establishing the 1940 Romanian-Soviet
frontier, that is, the annexation of Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina
by the Soviet Union. As the Stockholm negotiations continued, the
Kremlin eventually granted the representative of the Romanian
government more favorable terms than those offered in Cairo. After
eventually accepting the Cairo armistice terms, Iuliu Maniu called on the
Allies to improve their terms in the note he sent to Alexandru
Cretzianu on June 12, along the lines of the concessions made by
Moscow during the Stockholm negotiations. Commenting on Maniu's
request for an improvement of the armistice terms, MacVeagh, who was
not acquainted with the bilateral Romanian-Soviet negotiations, said:
"The allied representatives are at a loss to understand the last
sentence above, since they promised no amelioration to the armistice
terms." [75] Maniu then notified them that "definite information
exists that so far as Antonescu is concerned modifications were agreed
to." [76]

The Stockholm negotiations again provided the Romanian
government with an opportunity to raise the question of the future status
of Bessarabia, for in replying to the Soviet armistice proposals,
Mihai Antonescu urged Nanu to demand that a plebiscite be held in
Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina. The verbal instructions given by
Mihai Antonescu on this point were worded as follows in the memorandum
edited by Nanu: "Since it is our aim not only to re-establish peace
but also to establish lasting friendship with Russia and since the
Allies, including Russia, have solemnly supported the principle of
self-determination, the Romanian government believes the fate of
Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina should not be decided before the end
of the war, when the methods of application of that principle will be
decided for all disputed territories." [77] When he received the copy
of the memorandum submitted to the Soviet Union, the Romanian Foreign
Minister insisted on specifying that, in any case, "we could not give
up Bessarabia and Bucovina." (78) Finally, in a new verbal message sent

-----------------------------
(74) Vojtech Mastny, Russia's Road to the Cold War (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1979), pp. 154-156.

(75) MacVeagh's telegram to Cordell Hull, Cairo, 13 June 1944,
ibid., p. 181.

(76) A 29 June 1944 telegram, ibid., p. 183.

(77) Nanu, op. cit., p. 251.

(78) Ibid., p. 253.

[page 20]

PAD BR/329 

to Stockholm on August 5 Mihai Antonescu added that the conduct of
the Russians in occupied Moldavia had hardly been encouraging, and
therefore it would be better to settle the fate of Bessarabia at
the peace conference. [79]

Certainly, the last moment attempt in Stockholm to persuade the
Soviets to defer settling the problems of Bessarabia and Northern
Bucovina had no chance of success, particularly since this time the
Romanians could no longer rely even on a well-disposed attitude such
as that displayed by the State Department. By that point, the Soviet
Union was dealing directly with Romania, and with almost
discretionary powers. The Soviets thought they were entitled to proceed in that
way since on 5 May 1944 Eden had suggested that the Soviet Ambassador
to London proceed to a demarcation of the relevant zones of activity
in the Balkans, according to a line which left Romania and Bulgaria
within the sphere of Soviet interest, while Greece and Yugoslavia
remained in the British. [80] As early as May 18 the Soviet Ambassador 
to London reported to Eden that the Soviet Unions had tentatively 
accepted this division of the Balkans; on May 31 Churchill asked
Roosevelt for his "blessing" to a plan to assign wartime responsibility
for Romania to the USSR and for Greece to Britain. [81] Even before
the October 1944 conference, when the Churchill-Stalin agreement was
penned, giving the USSR 90% of influence in Romanian affairs, [82]
Moscow, as the dominant allied military power in the area, made
Single-handed decisions on the fate of Bessarabia and, within certain limits,
even of that of the entire Romanian state.

The Government and the Opposition on the Brink

Neither the Romanian government nor the leaders of the opposition
had any knowledge of the agreement concerning the inclusion of their
country in the sphere of influence of the Soviet Union, although their
knowledge of European diplomatic history and simple geopolitics should
have rid them of any illusions. They wishfully believed until the
last moment that the Anglo-Saxons, although heavily involved on other
fronts, would not abandon a country still allied with Hitler and join 
in the military occupation of Romania, if not through troops landed 
in the Balkans, at least through symbolic airborne forces. In the
last contacts Mihai Antonescu had with the Allies, he adopted the
American viewpoint that the problem of the frontier with the Soviet
Union be deferred till the conclusion of a peace treaty. In a message
sent in July 1944 to Harrison, the American representative in Bern,
through the agency of Vespasian Pella, Romania's Minister to Bern,
Mihai Antonescu said that Romania was ready to cease hostilities with
the Soviet Union provided its national sovereignty, its territorial
rights, and its institutions were respected. If these terms were not
accepted, Romania would be obliged to continue the struggle "with the
risk of succumbing with dignity." In that case, however, "the
Anglo-Saxon powers, would bear the responsibility for its sacrifice and the

-----------------------
(79) Ibid., p. 254.

(80) William Hardy McNeil, America, Britain, and Russia; Their
Cooperation and Conflict, 1941-1946(London: Oxford University
Press, 1953), p. 422.

(81) Winston Churchill, The Second World War, Vol. 6, Triumph and
Tragedy (New York: Bantam, 1977), p. 62.

(82) Ibid., p. 197.

[page 21]

RAD BR/329 

destruction of European equilibrium and having the war won only by
the Soviets." In his message to the United States the Romanian
Foreign Minister added that practical possibilities for getting out
of the war would increase if a statement were made agreeing to leave
to the peace conference the decision regarding Bessarabia and
Northern Bucovina, and if the United States and Great Britain could, at
the right: moment, provide effective military help by debarking troops,
landing paratroops, and building air bases. Finally, according to
the above-mentioned message, the Soviet Union offered in Stockholm
to enter into bilateral negotiations on territorial questions,
claiming that the 1941 frontier was primarily a question of prestige and
in no way excluded the possibility that a peace conference would
return Bessarabia and Northern Bucovian wholly or in part, and
wound up with the statement that Romania was prepared to join new
regional, continental, and worldwide organizations, especially a
European or Balkan federation. [83]

At the last meeting Hitler had with Marshal Antonescu on
5 August 1944 at his general headquarters in Wolfsschanze, he tried
to persuade the Romanian leader that Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria,
Yugoslavia, Turkey, and Finland could be saved from Bolshevism only
by binding their fate to that of Germany, rather than under a British
protectorate. [84] Despite Hitler's insistence, with many technical
details, on the superiority that Germany would acquire over its
enemies by turning out and using new destructive weapons. Marshal
Antonescu declared to his assistants on the train taking him back to
Romania that "Germany has lost the war. Now, we must concentrate our
efforts on not losing it ourselves." [85] To be sure, Marshal
Antonescu, who had declared war on the Soviet Union in order to
conquer Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina, could not easily sign any
armistice recognizing the loss of those provinces. That is why, at
the decisive meeting he had with King Michael on 23 August 1944, he
declared he would not accept an armistice unless assurances were
given him that he could retain Bessarabia and Transylvania. For lack
of such guarantees, Marshal Antonescu declared that he would then
continue to fight in the Carpathians. [86]

The acceptance of the armistice terms was one of the first

foreign policy decisions made by the regime established after the palace
coup of August 23; these terms provided that Romania's border would
be that set under the Soviet-Romanian Agreement of 28 June 1940.
Although the new Romanian government was willing to sign the
armistice immediately, [87] the document was nevertheless not signed until
12 September 1944 in Moscow. Article 4 confirmed the Romanian-Soviet

-----------------------------
(83) Harrison's telegram to Cordell Hull, Bern, 20 July 1944, in
F.R.U.S., Vol. IV, p. 186.

(84) Record of the conversation between Adolf Hitler and Marshal
Antonescu, Wolfsschanze, 5 August 1944 in Hillgruber,
Staatsmanner . . ., p. 493.

(85) Gheorghe Barbul, Mémorial Antonescu, le Troisiéme Homme de l'Axe
(Paris: Editions de la Couronne, 1950), p. 163.

(86) Nicolette Franck, La Roumanie dans l'Engrenage (Paris: Elsevier
Sequoira, 1977), p. 32.

(87) Shanz's telegram to Cordell Hull, Cairo, 25 August 1944, in
F.R.U.S., Vol. IV, p. 195.

[page 22]

RAD BR/329 

border along the River Prut. [88] In Moscow the former democratic
opposition, now joined by representatives of the Romanian Communist
Party, realized that Romania was firmly within the Soviet sphere.
Cordell Hull informed Ambassador Harriman in Moscow of the data
supplied by American military sources about the immediate impact of the
Romanian negotiations in Moscow. "Government officials and
businessmen in Romania feel that Britain and the United States have broken
their promises and have abandoned1 Romania to Russia." Returning
members of the Romanian armistice delegation spread the story that the
negotiations in Moscow were dominated by the Russians, with the
British and American representatives refusing to discuss the terms
without conferring first with the Russian representatives. [89]
Moreover, Lucretiu Patrascanu, the communist representative of the
Romanian delegation sent to Moscow, complained to American Ambassador
Harriman that although Molotov had received him he had
nevertheless not discussed the terms of the armistice with him. [90]

The report supplied by American military sources emphasized that
"Maniu is reported disappointed in Great Britain, having expected
more consideration and easier armistice terms. [91] The extent of
Iuliu Maniu's disappointment is clear from what he said two months
later to Burton Berry, the American representative in Bucharest to
whom, on the evening of 8 December 1944, he said that "if he had
known the Soviets were to be given a free hand in setting the
armistice terms he would not have advised the king to sign the armistice."
He argued that his pressure and the Romanian action that resulted
from it had actually advanced the Focsani-Galatz line, which might
have been held a long time, to the very gates of Budapest." Berry's
report went on as follows: "With considerable emotion, Maniu asked
if America and Great Britain wished Romania to become a part of the
Soviet Union? If so, please advise me accordingly, for this can
easily be arranged and even today, late as it is, I could arrange it
to the better advantage of Romania than can the Romanian Communists.
Then he repeated that, it were our intention to abandon Romania,
we owed him the obligation of telling him so and he owed the Romanian
people the obligation of obtaining the best possible terms for them."
After claiming that Maniu had been a steady friend of the Allies,
Berry wound up saying: "Because of what he has been and what he is,
it seems important that he be preserved from slipping into sharing
the general conviction that the discussion of the Romanian state is
now in progress." [92]

-----------------------------
(88) Emil Ciurea, "The Armistice Convention with Romania," Traité
de Paix avec la Roumanie, 10 Fevrier 1947 (Paris: Pedone, 1954),
p. 236.

(89) Cordell Hull's telegram to Averell Harriman, Washington,
30 September 1944, in F.R.U.S., Vol. IV, p. 243.

(90) Averell Harriman's telegram to Cordell Hull, Moscow,
3 September 1944, ibid., p. 214.

(91) Cordell Hull's telegram to Harriman, Washington, 30 September 1944,
ibid., p. 243.

(92) Burton Berry's telegram to Cordell Hull, Bucharest,
9 December 1944, ibid., pp. 279-180.

[page 23]

RAD BR/329 

Conclusion

The postwar fate of Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina had been
established under the armistice terms submitted by the Soviet
government through the agency of Novikov in Cairo on 8 April 1944. Since
then the diplomatic documents dealing with this subject had merely
reiterated the sentence which consisted in re-establishing the
Romanian-Soviet frontier of 28 June 1940. At its 8 May 1946 meeting
the Paris conference of the foreign ministers of the Soviet Union,
the US, Great Britain, and France established that the Romanian-Soviet
frontier would continue to be that of 28 June 1940. The
representatives of the four major powers agreed comparatively quickly on this,
for, generally speaking, the frontier problem was not a central point
in the negotiations. [93] On 2 September 1946 Gheorghe Tatarascu,
head of the Romanian delegation at the Paris conference, declared
before that conference that "the frontiers assigned by the peace treaty
to Romania remove all possibility of conflict in that part of
Europe." [94] At the Paris peace conference the official Romanian
delegation did not allude to the problem of Bessarabia and Northern
Bucovina at all. The reason why the Romanian representatives behaved
so passively was that they had agreed with the Soviet delegation to
settle all issues of the treaty draft concerning Romania's relations
with the Soviet Union in bilateral discussions either with that
delegation or with the Soviet government in Moscow and not to raise them
at the conference's plenary sessions?. [95]

The only problem raised in connection with the Romanian-Soviet
frontier -- and even this merely in the discussion held prior to the
peace conference -- was the need for a more detailed and precise
description of it, since the exact line of this frontier, settled
under the so-called agreement of 28 June 1940, was only known after
a small-scale map was prepared and published by Izvestiia, along with
the Soviet ultimatum. Since the work on precisely defining the
frontier and the question connected with the transfer of territory were
still underway in 1940, when the Romanian-Soviet war broke out, it
was especially necessary to specify the line of the frontier. 
Therefore, on 16 September 1946, Romania addressed a note to the Paris
conference of the allied foreign ministers in which it asked that the
Romanian-Soviet border be clearly marked on the map annexed to the
peace treaty, but that note was hot even distributed among
the members of the Political and Territorial Commission for Romania. [96]
Since there were rumors in 1945 that: the Soviets had set up frontier
posts across the Danube on the Romanian side and tried to establish
control over the Sulina, the only navigable branch of the Danube, and
eventually to bring about a territorial union with Bulgaria across the
narrow Dobruja, the Anglo-Saxon Allies tried to obtain a promise from
the Soviet Union that it would more precisely define its frontier with
Romania. The fear lest the Soviet Union extend its sovereignty beyond
the imprecise limits of the 1940 agreement grew when the Soviet
chairman of the Allied Control Commission in Bucharest refused to permit

(93) Ion Enescu, op. cit., p. 224.

(94) Tatarascu's speech at the opening of the Paris Conference in
F.R.U.S., Vol. III, p. 197.

(95) Stefan Lache and Gheorghe Tutui, Romania si Conferinta de Pace
de la Paris din 1946 (Cluj-Napoca: Dacia, 1978), p. 242.

(96) Ibid., p. 270.

[page 24]

RAD BR/329 

General Schluyer, the US representative on that commission, to visit
the area on the grounds that it was under the jurisdiction of the
Soviet High Command. [97] Under these conditions, on 24 September
1946 the US and British representatives noted at the Paris
conference of the allied foreign ministers that the map indicating the
Romanian-Soviet border was too small and reserved for themselves the
right to express their remarks on a larger scale map. Eventually,
the Soviets submitted a new map, and the problem was not subsequently
raised at the New York allied foreign ministers' conference. This
map became the appendix number 1 of the Paris Treaty, where it got
approval without any objection. Despite this recognition the US was
aware of the fact that "the frontier that had been forced on Romania
in 1940 by no means corresponded to the ethnic dividing line between
the Romanians and the Ukrainians." [98]

Since the official Romanian delegation did not actively contest
the Soviet position, the task of raising the problem of Bessarabia
and Northern Bucovina at the Paris peace conference (1947) again fe[?]
to the Romanian democratic opposition, particularly to Iuliu Maniu.
The National-Peasant and National-Liberal Parties sent to Paris formal
declarations reiterating their well-known views on Romania's eastern
border, which they felt had to correspond to the ethnic dividing line.
Iuliu Maniu's declarations and the comments of the National-Liberal
Party were handed, along with an explanatory letter, to the various
delegations at the Paris peace conference through the Paris émigré
political group headed by one of former King Carol's foreign ministers,
Grigore Gafencu. [99]

Recently a Bucharest publication gave partly favorable mention
to the campaign conducted by the democratic opposition at the Paris
peace conference: "Although the representatives of the government
coalition severely and justly criticized the campaign initiated by
the opposition, nevertheless, they did not denounce the major
problems correctly raised by the latter in the first documents or in the
remarks to the draft treaty." [100] The American delegation to the
peace conference could only take note of the stand expressed by the
Romanian democratic opposition without embracing its viewpoint as 
regards the frontier question.

-----------------------------
(97) John Campbell, "The European Territorial Settlement," Foreign
Affairs Vol. XXVI, Nos. 1-4, October 1947-July 1948, p. 210.

(98) Ibid., p. 199.

(99) Grigore Gafencu's letter to Iuliu Maniu, Geneva,
8 September 1946, Hoover Foundation Archives.

(100) Titus Georgescu si Matei Gheorghe, "Ajutorul Acordat Romaniei
de Catre Uniunea Sovietica la Conferinta de Pace de la Paris
(1946)," Studii Revista de Istorie si Filosofie No. 1, 1954,
p. 105.

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