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**The Mindset of Iraq's Security Apparatus**

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## The Mindset of Iraq's Security Apparatus

In March 1991, a revolt that began in the northern Iraqi town of Rania sparked an uprising that spread rapidly through Iraqi Kurdistan. Kurdish militias, heeding a call by then President George Bush to revolt against the regime of Saddam Hussain, stormed Iraqi intelligence headquarters and Bath party branches in numerous northern Iraqi towns, among them Kirkuk, Dohuk, Sulaimaniyya, and Irbil. The militia members of the Kurdish Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan seized the confidential files within these buildings looking for information on the Iraqi government collaborators within their own militias. However, what emerged from these confiscated files had ramifications beyond a simple search for operatives of the Iraqi state.

This uprising in northern Iraq lasted no more than three weeks, after which advancing Iraqi Republican Guards brutally suppressed the insurrection. Nevertheless, the retreating Kurds took what documents they could with them. This episode eventually led to the transfer of four million Iraqi government documents to the US for analysis, scrutiny and classification. From within the documents emerged an unprecedented insight in to the mindset of Saddam's Iraq, a window into the workings of an impressive, yet repressive state security apparatus. These four million documents, over 10 million pages cover a wide array of security activities, from the mundane day to day duties of a bureaucrat to the detailed descriptions of a campaign of arrests and executions that marked the climate of insecurity and suspicion that prevailed in Iraq during the 1980s. The majority of the documents were produced by the four primary agencies that make up the Iraqi security apparatus, which include *al-Amn al-Khas* (Special Security), *al-Amn al-'Amm* (General Security), *al-Mukhabarat al-Amma* (General Intelligence) and *al-Istikhbarat al-'Askariyya* (Military Intelligence). The Iraqi Ba'th Party Northern Bureau produced the remaining documents, which was responsible for command and control of this security apparatus.

The documents that emerged from this uprising form a blueprint of an extensive state network's operations, organizations, chains of command, and divisions of power. The rhetoric and the discourse of the Iraqi state security apparatus, from patriotic Ba'th party slogans to terms reserved for enemies of the state forms the language that is so crucial to the understanding the mindset of Saddam's security network. While one can never fully ascertain of how this mindset functions, these documents reveal several trends. Overall, mindset of the Iraqi security apparatus is preoccupied with justifying its actions, through a

discourse designed to discredit enemies of the state and their activities, at the same time to glorify the actions of the regime against its foes. This mindset is dominated by Ba'athist political rhetoric, full of Arab nationalist symbols and other concepts based on a reinvented ethnic past, coupled with narrative devices used in this discourse sanitizing acts such as chemical weapons attacks, arrests, executions and deportations.

### ***“Enemies of the State”***

#### ***Iranians***

In order to understand the mindset of Iraq's security apparatus, one must analyse its rhetorical devices employed against internal and external foes. Most of these documents emerged during the Iran-Iraq War, which was not referred to as such but rather as *Qadisiyat Saddam*, the first battle between the Persians and Arabs, in which the Arab Muslims emerged victorious. The battle, which took place in 637 AD, led by the Arab general Sa'd ibn Waqqas lasted for three days, resulting in the death of both the Persian general Rostum as well as Persian Sassanian rule in Iraq. The collapse of the Zoroastrian Iranian forces at al-Qadisiyya allowed the Arabs to spread Islam eastward, thus giving this battle a religious significance. “The myths woven around al-Qadisiyya are a most instructive example of the Ba'athi technique of using an event with a core historical truth that is deeply etched into collective memory in order to further the party's ideology of Arab nationalism and to appeal to the public by means of a challenge of great emotional power.”<sup>1</sup> Thus Saddam ordered the employment of the term Qadisiyya to legitimate his war against the Iranians, in that it was a continuation of historic battle of Arab versus Persian. Saddam tried to undermine the Shi'a appeal of Iran's Islamic revolution by appealing to notions of an Iraqi-Arab nationalism, especially among the Iraqi Arab Shi'a who were most likely to be influenced by Iran's Islamic Revolution. Thus, any document produced by the state had to refer to the War as such.

While the majority of documents refer to the Iran-Iraq War as *Qadisiyyat Saddam*, the Iranians were subsequently referred to as *al-'adu al-ajami*. 'Adu is the word for “enemy” in Arabic, while the word 'ajam has more nuanced connotations. The literal meaning of 'ajam is “one who is illiterate in a language” and originally was used to refer to the non-Arab

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<sup>1</sup> Ofra Bengio, *Saddam's Word* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998) p.173.

peoples residing within the early Arab Islamic Empires who could not speak Arabic. Centuries later the word *'ajam* developed a derogatory meaning among Arabs when specifically referring to the Persians. Another racist term used by the security apparatus in the document set refers to Iranians as *majus*, which literally means “fire worshippers”. Such a term is an attack on the Zoroastrian faith and their use of the fire temple as a focal point of worship. By referring to the Iranians in these documents as *majus*, the security apparatus implies that the Iranians are not sincere Muslims, but rather covertly practice their pre-Islamic beliefs. Thus, in their eyes, Iraq’s war took on the dimensions of not only a struggle for Arab nationalism, but also a campaign in the name of Islam. The documents demonstrate the “bureaucratization” of such derogatory terms in the official correspondence of the security agencies.

### ***Kurds***

Ofra Bengio writes, “In a clash between two peoples or ethnic groups, the terminology employed by one side or the other is a barometer—even more accurate than in other areas—of the changing stages, the slightest nuances, and the mounting or diminishing sensitivities in their relationship.”<sup>2</sup> These documents demonstrate how the security organizations dealt with the question of ethnicity in Iraq. For example, there are papers that speak of punishments to be meted out to those who dared to change their officially-registered ethnicity from Arab to Kurd. There are other documents that list the means by which Arabs should be encouraged to move to the predominantly Kurdish city of Kirkuk, whose surrounding district contains Iraq’s most significant deposits of oil. There are policy statements concerning Iraq’s small Turkoman population, and also concerning the Yazidis, a non-Muslim sect who consider themselves Kurds but have been designated by the regime as Arabs. There are also documents about the Eastern Orthodox branch of Assyrians and Chaldeans, both ethnic groups adhering to the Christian religion who have similarly been defined as Arabs by the regime. The documents show how the mindset towards minorities evolved over time. One Ba’th Party file on a Chaldean soldier in the Iraqi army includes documents from 1982, in which the man is said to be an ethnic Chaldean; from 1985, in which he is said to be “Arab/Chaldean”; and 1990, by which time he was referred to as Arab.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Bengio, p.109

<sup>3</sup> File of Ghazi Shabo Ilia. Ba’athi Party, Einkawa, Erbil in Human Rights Watch, *Bureaucracy of Repression*.

The names the Ba’th security units gave to the Kurdish movement ranged from “that rebellious pocket of foreign agents” to “a liberating national movement” when relations between the Kurds and central government was improving.<sup>4</sup> For example, Saddam Husayn during a visit to the province named after Salah al-din, (himself a Kurd), said that Salah al-Din was an Arab and that there was no contradiction “between the Kurdishness of a Kurd and being part of the Arab nation.”<sup>5</sup> On March 11, 1970 Kurdish autonomy was proclaimed, with the area referred to as *mintaqat al-hukm al-dhati*, (“the area of autonomy”) opposed to Kurdistan.<sup>6</sup> In the first years of the proclamation the Kurdish Democratic Party was referred to as a *haraka taharruriyah*, “a liberation movement”, but soon hostilities began in 1974, when the agreement broke down after the Ba’th authorities failed to demarcate the boundaries of the Kurdish entity, the KDP was referred to as *al-jayb al-‘amil al-mutamarrid*, “the rebellious pocket of agents”. The term “agents” meant that they were in the service of the “enemy”, referring to the Iranians who were supplying them.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Bengio 109.

<sup>5</sup> Al-Thawra, 23 Feb 1979

<sup>6</sup> Bengio, p. 113.

<sup>7</sup> Bengio, p. 115.

## Document 1 - The Kurds

The Kurdish guerrillas, known as the *peshmerga* or literally in Kurdish “those who face death” were referred to in the documents as *mukharrab* (pl. *mukharrabin*) or “saboteurs”, literally “anyone who destroys anything” or they were referred to as *mujrim*, (pl. *mujrimin*), “criminals”. On the other hand, the Kurds who fought in the pro-government militias were known as *muqatil* (pl. *muqatilin*), “fighters” or “killers”. The Kurdish Democratic Party was rarely mentioned as such in the documents but rather was referred to as *salili al-khiyana* or “the offsprings of treason,” most likely refers to the leader of the KDP, Mas’ud Barazani, the son of Mulla Mustafa Barazani, who was branded a traitor by the regime for leading the Kurdish insurgency since the 60s. Any Kurd who was a member of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan was referred to as an ‘*amil*’ or “agent”, or “‘*umala*’ Iran”, (*umala*’ being the plural *amil*) referring to the alliance between the PUK and Iran. The following document demonstrates how enmity is represented by terms such as *al-‘adu al-‘ajami* and *al-mukharrabin*. The Iranians were helping its Kurdish allies by providing the latter with gear to protect themselves from chemical weapons attacks.

Urgent and Confidential Message

From: Security of Shaqlawa, Branch 3

10 May 1987

We have been informed of the following:

1- The Iranian enemy (*al-‘adu al-Irani*) has supplied the saboteurs' families (*mukharrabin*) in the villages and rural areas along the border with pharmaceutical drugs, especially anti-chemical medicaments; and they [Iranian enemy] are training them to use syringes for this purpose and to wear protective head masks.

2- There exist approximately 100 saboteurs from various gangs of saboteurs in Werta region, al-Sadeeq district. They are along Khanqawa route in order to stop the force accompanying the Village Deportation Committees, albeit most of the families in this region have left to Iran. Please verify information and notify us within 24 hours.

[Signature]

Security Major, Director of Shaqlawa Security<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> See IRDP-NIDS-812015, Arabic Appendix

## Document 2 – “Purification”

The actions of the government security services in the Kurdish areas systematically became mundane in the documents, perhaps as an attempt to justify or minimize the severity of the crimes committed. For example, the areas that would fall under the control of the Kurdish opposition were considered *manatiq mahdura amniyan* or “prohibited areas.” Expelling the rebel Kurds from these areas was termed *tathir*, or “purification”, thus giving an example of how in the Iraqi mindset the terms had to “sanitize” the actions of the security agencies.

The forced deportation of the inhabitants of the Kurdish villages was referred to as *tarhil* or “relocation”, giving the notion that such movements of peoples were voluntary. The process of moving the displaced Kurds into the government controlled housing areas, known as *qura ‘asriyya* (literally “modern villages”) is referred to *tajmi*’ or “amalgamation.”

Anyone who refused to move into the *qura ‘asriyya*, a term in itself made to seem as an attractive alternative to the village, was considered hostile and thus labelled *mukharrabin*, “saboteurs” regardless of the fact that they were combatants or not. However, civilians and combatants, who voluntarily moved from the “prohibited areas” to the government areas were known as *‘a’idin lil-saf al-watani*, or “the returnees to the national rank.” Villages that were destroyed by the government were referred to as *al-qura al-mazala*, or “removed villages.”

There was a standard procedure for what euphemisms could be used in the documents. In some instances, the terms were changed to disguise the severity of the actions committed by the government. In an internal memo from *lajnat mukafahat al-nashat al-mu’adi* “The Committee to Fight Hostile Activity,” the term *al-qura al-mazala*, or “eliminated village” was to replace the term *al-qura al-muhaddama* or “destroyed village”.

Another document details the act of deportation, which again is referred to as *tarhil* or “relocation”. In this document, the *tarhil* affects the parents of a military escapees or a draft dodgers, which in these documents are referred to as *mutakhallafin*, which is a literal term used for “those who are backwards” or “undeveloped.”



In the Name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful Presidency of the Republic,  
Secretary Directorate of General Security, Dohuk Governorate Security Directorate

Date: 21 Aug 1988

To: Security Directorate of the Autonomous Region

Subject: Deportation

On 18 Aug 1988 the parents of the escapee (*mutakhalif*) Hamid Abd al-Karim Suleiman Sheikhan, whose names are listed below, residents of Dohuk, Brushki quarter, were relocated (*tarhil*) after being stripped of all their official documents. Please be informed, respectfully.

[signature]

Dohuk Governorate Security Director

Names:

1-Abd al-Karim Suleiman Sheikhan al-Berwari/ born in 1904/ retired/ his father

2- Fatima Hamid Mur'an / born in 1918/ housewife/ his mother<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> see IRDP-NIDS-331118, Arabic Appendix

### Document 3 – House Demolitions

The following General Security document illustrates how the Iraqi regime demolished houses as a means of punishment for *mujrimin* “criminals”, as well as *mutakhallafin*. Islamic terminology at the heading (*Bismillah ar-rahman ar-rahim*, “in the name of God, most gracious, most merciful”) is employed rather than Ba’th Party slogans, but there seems to be no systematic measure of employing Islamic terms in the heading of some documents while using Ba’th party slogans in others. Again, to justify the action of demolitions, the security apparatus had to brand the victims as criminals (*mujrimin*).

In the Name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

Number: 11640

Date: 12 Sep 1988

Republic of Iraq

General Directorate of Security

Directorate of al-Balda Security

Branch 3

To: Directorate of Sulaimaniya Security, Branch 3 Confiscations

Subject: Information

[In reference to] your telegram number 107 of 1 Aug 1988. Sarshaqam Security Division has informed us that the house of the criminal (*mujrim*) Jamal Saber Saadoon was demolished in 1987 and that the municipality of Arbat took measures concerning the land upon which the house stood. Please be informed. Respectfully.

[Signature]

Security Major

Director of al-Balda Security

[Signature] 12/9<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> IRDP-NIDS-657524, Arabic Appendix

## Document 4 – Psychological Campaigns

The following document illustrates how the threat of deportation was combined with other psychological stress prior to the Anfal campaign. The rumours mentioned in the report, could have been started by the *al-Mukhabarat* (General Intelligence) which is responsible for disseminating rumours on behalf of the state.

Urgent and Confidential Telegram

Number: 6567

Date: 3 Jun 1987

To: Irbil Directorate of Security 78

From: Shaqlawa Security

[Subject]: Rumors circulated among citizens

First- It is rumored among the citizens of Hareer and adjacent villages as well as in Shaqlawa section that the State is still determined to deport Kurdish citizens to the Iraqi/Saudi/Jordanian border, where the state will inject the men with special needles causing their sexual impotence. Please be informed. Respectfully.

[Signature]

Security Major

Director of Shaqlawa Security

Farhan Jamil<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>11</sup> IRDP-NIDS-814757

## Document 5 – Scorched Earth Tactics

The following document shows how scorched earth tactics were used to deport Kurds from areas it considered “prohibited for security reasons”. The following documents demonstrate how the more sanitized terms “harvest areas” and “burning operation” are used rather than “scorched earth tactics”.

In the Name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful Directorate of General Security

Erbil Governorate Security Directorate

Number: Branch 2/10885

Date: 13 Jul 1988

Confidential

To: All Directorates of Security Branches

Subject: Harvest Areas

According to the letter of the Command of Northern Organization Bureau, Committee of Internal Security Operations, number 3821 of 3 Jul 1988, the following has been decided:

- 1) The Prohibited Areas (*manatiq mahdura amniyan*) must be isolated by tilling [leveling] and burning them.
- 2) The Commands of Erbil and Makhmur sectors are entrusted with executing the above order under the supervision of the Fifth Corps.
- 3) Inform us when the burning operation is over. We will subject the sectors to inspection following the mission.

Take necessary measures in coordination with the commanders of sectors within your areas. Please inform us of the results.

[Signer]

Security Brigadier General

Erbil Governorate's Security Directorat

2006/ 16 Jul 1988 <sup>12</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> IRDP-NIDS-749456 Arabic Appendix

## Document 6 – “The Necessary Measures”

Arrests and executions were referred to either directly or indirectly in the documents. While deportations and destruction of property employed more “delicate” terms, with implementing death, subtle bureaucratic terms such as “liquidate” were used, while on other occasions terms such as “decapitations” were used directly. For example, Directive SF/4008 of the Northern Bureau on June 20, 1987, gave instructions to execute persons aged 15-70 who had been arrested in the prohibited areas. However, subsequent memoranda, sometimes referring to unspecified Northern Bureau instructions, then simply stated the need to carry out "the necessary measures" (*narjou ittikhad ma yalzem*). In 1988, a letter from the Command of the Oil Protection Forces in Kirkuk to the Security Directorate of al- Ta'mim Governorate states:

We are sending to you the families -their numbers are given below -who surrendered to our forces in the area of Sofi Raza on April 15, 1988. Please take *the necessary measures against them* according to the directives of the Northern Bureau and acknowledge their arrival.<sup>13</sup>

While their fate is unknown, from other documents one may assume that those who surrendered in this area were most likely executed.

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<sup>13</sup> Bureacracy of Repression, p. 33.

## Document 7 – Collective Punishments

The following Ba’th Party document exposes the extent to which the regime goes to implement its policy of collective punishment. In this case, the regime metes out punishment according to the degree of influence exercised by one's own relatives. The documents usually start with an Arab Ba’ath party slogan, such as “One Arab nation with an eternal message.” The document then refers to any member of the Iraqi Shi’a opposition Al-Da’wa party as a “criminal”, *mujrim* and thus should be punished to death. This document reveals that that any relatives of the *mujrim* are also to be penalized. Since al-Dawa was sponsored by Iran, it always had to be referred to as the “collaborator Da’wa Party”.

One Arab Nation With an Eternal Message  
The Ba'th Arab Socialist Party, Iraq Qutr  
Erbil Branch Command

Number: 1/3039

Date 6 Apr 1982

Top Secret

To: Respected Comrade Members of Branch Command

Subject: Circulars

Comradely Salute:

Enclosed is Northern Bureau's letter number 13/1614 of 1 Apr 1982, including a copy of the circulars of the office of the Regional Secretariat numbers 19014 and 19540 of 15 Jul 1981 and of 20 Mar 1982. The circulars include the special measures regarding the treatment of the relatives of convicted criminals who are members of the collaborator Da'wa Party. Please be informed and work accordingly. Respectfully.

May you live long for the struggle.

Comrade

Walid Khalil al-Ayish

Deputy Secretary of Erbil Branch Command.

12 Apr<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>14</sup> IRDP-NIDS-321561, see ArabicAppendix

## Document 8 – Collective Punishments

The document details specific punishments, so that the last line, *ittikhad ma yalzem* “..and take necessary measures” demonstrates the ambiguity of the punishment meted out to opponents or relatives of opponents to the regime, which could either be dismissal from work up to the death penalty. A follow-up letter to document 9 is as follows:

One Arab Nation with an Eternal Message

Date: 15 Jul 1981

The Ba'th Arab Socialist Party

Top Secret

To: Top Commands Throughout the Qutr

Subject: The Special Measures Regarding the Treatment of the Relatives of Convicted Criminals who Are Members of the Collaborator Da'wa Party

Comradely Salute,

Pursuant to our letter number 2873 of 13 Aug 1979, the measures mentioned below apply to the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Interior, Leadership of General Intelligence, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Organization of Nuclear Energy. The measures are as follow:

1- First degree relatives of the criminals sentenced to death will be removed from the aforementioned apparatuses.

2- Second degree relatives of the criminals sentenced to death will be appointed according to the degree of the kinship's influence. In light of this, the relatives will either remain in, be removed from, or be transferred from the aforementioned apparatuses.

3- Relatives of criminals who are not sentenced to death will be evaluated on the basis of the degree of the kinship's influence and of their loyalty to the Revolution and Party.

4- In general, one grade shall be added to theirs when they are transferred or retired.

Please be informed and take necessary measures.. May you live long for the struggle.

[Signature]

Ali Hasan Majid

General Director of the Region Secretariat<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>15</sup> IRDP-NIDS-321562, see Arabic Appendix

## Document 9 - Executions

This document shows the callous nature of the state when it informs the family of an executed *mujrim*, “criminal”:

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

Confidential and Personal

Directorate of Security, Irbil Governorate

Number: S2/13369

Date: 11 Sep 1989

To: Shaqlawa Directorate of Security

Subject: Death Certificate

Al-Sadiq Security Branch's telegram No. 2318 on 19 Nov 1988. Enclosed is the death certificate of the executed criminal Anwar Abdel-Rahman Aba Bakr Karim, resident of Diyana compound. Please receive it, inform his father of his fate and hand him the above certificate with utmost calm and secrecy. Let us know with a signed receipt from his father. Keep one copy at the above-mentioned branch and send us the second.

[Signature]

Security Colonel

Director of Security, Irbil Governorate

11 Sep 1989<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>16</sup> IRDP-NIDS-813282, Arabic Appendix



## Document 10 - Executions

As a follow up, this document illustrates the callous and brutal nature of executions, when notifying their families to receive the bodies:

Number: 1142

Date: 28 Feb 1987

To: Hareer Security

From: Shaqlawa Security/ [Ba'th] Party Branch

Please inform the family of the below-mentioned executed person to receive his body from the Faculty of Forensic Medicine/ Baghdad. Please inform us quickly.

1- Warah Shawrath/ Erbil resident/ Shaqlawa/ Hareer subdistrict/ Manikash village

[Signature]

Security Major

Shaqlawa Director of Security<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> IRDP-NIDS-815890, Arabic Appendix

## Document 11 – “Liquidations”

The following document uses the term “liquidate”, a more subtle term employed rather than specifically stating that a “criminal” was executed or beheaded. In this document, the “enemy” is referred to with the term *ru’us ‘afna*, as “rotten heads” and the term *tasfiyyah ma tabaqa minhum* is translated as “liquidation.”

Number: 8823

Date: Oct 1987

To: Erbil Security

From: Shaqlawa Security

[In reference to] your telegram to Al-Sadeeq Security [number] 4275 of 31 May 1987. Upon our directive, on the night of 1/2 Oct 1987, the criminal Ziyad Hasan Arab- the subject of paragraph two of our report of 25 May 1987 concerning the names of the rotten heads who have been causing disturbances in Rawanduz- has been liquidated. Accomplished and we are still serious about liquidating the rest of them. End.

respectfully.

[Signature]

Security Captain

For Shaqlawa Director of Security

Sender: [illegible]

Receiver: [illegible]<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> IRDP-NIDS-857794

## Document 12 – Decapitations

As a contrast terms such as “liquidation” are contrasted by the use of more graphic words such as “decapitation”. The above document uses a matter-of-factly town to refer to acts such as “beheadings of traitors”, employing the term *qata'a ru'us al-khawana*.

One Arab Nation With an Eternal Message

The Ba'th Arab Socialist Party

Northern Organization Bureau Command

Date 22 Aug 1987

-Confidential and Personal-

To: First Corps Command

Subject: Execution of Criminals

Comradely Salute,

The valiant comrade, Ali Hasan al-Majid, Commander of the Northern Organization Bureau, has commented as follows on your aforementioned letter:

"We do not object to the decapitation of traitors. But it would have been preferable had you also sent them to Security for the purpose of interrogating them. [Security personnel] could have found with them other significant information that could have been useful, prior to their execution."

Kindly review...Respectfully

[Signature]

Tahir Tawfiq

Secretary of Northern Affairs Committee

Copy to:

Command of al-Rashid Military Branch

General Military Intelligence Directorate

Please review the above Command's letter. Respectfully<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>19</sup> IRDP-NIDS-2379420

### Document 13- The “Heroic” Anfal

The Anfal campaign was launched as a response to Kurdish elements, who allied with the Iranians during the Eight-Year Gulf War. The following document reveals the terms to glorify the Anfal campaign launched against the Kurds, and the justification for such actions. The terms that are most striking in this document are the “heroic” reference to the Anfal campaign.

Number: [Illegible]

Date: 10 Sep 1988

To: All Divisions

From: Directorate of al-Balda Security Branch 3

We have been informed of the following:

As a result of the heroic Anfal campaign, which was crowned with the defeat and destruction of the bands of terror, we have noticed that members of these bands have been lately conducting acts of sabotage in the cities, targeting beauty salons and sewing factories. In order to stop these traitors and wipe them out, you are instructed to pay attention to such acts since terrorism has shifted from the mountain to the city. It is necessary that you mobilize your apparatuses in the city to handle immediately any emergency. Please be informed and take necessary action and inform us.

[Signature]

Director of al-Balda Security

Sender: Master Sergeant Muhammad Majid

Receiver: Sergeant Badr<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>20</sup> IRDP-NIDS-657500, Arabic Appendix

## Document 14 – Chemical Weapons Attacks

During the Anfal campaign, specific actions such as chemical weapons attacks were not always mentioned directly. The documents do not say directly that chemical weapons were used, rather the Iraqis use a code name *'itaad al-khas*, meaning "special ammunition", rather than *islah al-kimawiyya*, the direct literal translation for "chemical weapons". Although there are many references to chemical attacks, Iraqi bureaucrats most often refer to chemical attacks either indirectly, by reporting that Kurdish sources have accused the Iraqi government of having carried out a chemical attack, or euphemistically, by referring to Iraqi "special attacks" *hujum al-khas* or attacks with "special ammunition" *'itaad al-khas*. Beginning in December 1991, Middle East Watch carried out extensive field research and, in conjunction with Physicians for Human Rights, exhumations of mass graves in the area over a period of almost two years to investigate Kurdish claims of genocide by the Iraqi regime in the 1988 *Anfal* campaign, and thus with this forensic evidence were able to check this against the captured documents.<sup>21</sup>

Some of the documents themselves establish the link between special attacks and the use of chemical agents, by stating, for example, that the KDP obtained 500 gas masks as a precaution against "special attacks." Ali Hassan al-Majid in one taped meeting in 1987, used the terms chemical attacks and special ammunition interchangeably.<sup>22</sup> Iraq's use of chemical weapons coincided with the multiple references to the Kurdish rebels obtaining protective devices, which is mentioned in the documents. In the spring of 1987, the PUK and KDP acquired gas masks and ampules with chemical antidotes. There are references to Iraqi "air strikes" that, according to the documents, caused people to lose their eyesight, probably from the deployment of chemical agents. For example, this document confirms the regime's use of chemical weapons in its air attacks on Kurdish villages, which resulted in the blindness and death of many people. Section 3 of this letter reveals that there were official bodies called Deportation Committees in charge of organizing such acts. In this section it is interesting to note how the Kurdish fighters are either members of the National Defense Battalions or "saboteurs".

Anyone who refused to move into the *qura 'asriyya*, a term in itself made to seem as an attractive alternative to the village, was considered hostile and thus labelled *mukharrabin*,

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<sup>21</sup> see Eric Stover, *Unquiet Graves : The Search for the Disappeared in Iraqi Kurdistan*. (Physicians for Human Rights : Middle East Watch, 1992).

<sup>22</sup> For a partial transcript of his speech, see: *Genocide in Iraq*, p. 349.

“saboteurs” regardless of the fact that they were combatants or not. However, civilians and combatants, who voluntarily moved from the “prohibited areas” to the government areas were known as *‘a’idin lil-saf al-watani*, or “the returnees to the national rank.” Villages that were destroyed by the government were referred to as *al-qura al-mazala*, or “removed villages.”

In the Name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

Confidential

Shaqlawa Directorate of Security

Subject: Information

We have been informed of the following:

- 1- On 27 May 1987 our planes struck the villages of Malkan, Talitan, Kandour, Yali al-Ulya (Upper Yali) and Yali al-Sufla (Lower Yali) of Khlefana subdistrict, where the saboteurs were to be found. As a result of the airstrikes, Omar Abdallah, the brother of the criminal Mustafa Abdallah, the advisor of National Defense Battalions 88, who recently joined the side of saboteurs, was blinded. In addition, as a result of the airstrikes, a number of saboteurs were killed and approximately 30 persons lost their eyesight, including the family of the criminal Kamal Haji Khudr Agha, who was in charge of Teep 12 Suran [PUK military unit]. Agha lost his eyesight as well. All the casualties were sent to hospitals in Iran.
- 2- Some families of the bands of saboteurs turned to the side of the Iranian regime. Compounds were created for them in the Iranian cities of Bakhtaran and Sanandaj.
- 3- Some members of the National Defense Battalions, especially the new formations that currently are to be found in the Hareer and Khlefana regions, say that if the regime destroys their villages they will confront the Deportation Committees and subsequently join the bands of saboteurs.

[Signature]

For Erbil Governorate's Director of Security<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>23</sup> IRDP-NIDS-856513

## Document 15 – Chemical Weapons Attacks

The following General Security (*Amn*) document demonstrates how derogatory terms were used for the Kurds but ironically non-ethnic resistance are referred to by their original names, such as the Communist Party. The document demonstrates how in the first two lines, the PUK are referred to as the “agents of Iran”, while a member of the Communist party is merely a “collaborator” and not a *mukharrab* or *mujrim*, reflecting the difference between the Communists who were Arab and not colluding with Israel or Iran. In this document, it is also evident how the security apparatus never takes direct responsibility for chemical weapons attacks but rather refers to them in the passive, in that the “Band of Iran’s agents (PUK) had been stricken with chemical agents....”.

Urgent and Confidential Telegram

Number: 2140

Date: 20 May 1987

To: All

From: Shaqlawa Security 78

General Security 78 informed us the following:

An organizing official of the collaborator Iraq Communist Party in Babel Governorate said that three political bureau members of the Band of Iran's Agents (*umala' Iran*) [i.e. the PUK] had been stricken with chemical substances during the recent attack mounted by our armed forces in the Northern Region. The respected [Director] General inquired [ordered] about the possibility of knowing their names. Please exert all efforts and verify the veracity of the information; and employ all your resources for this purpose in order to notify the respected [Director] General. Inform us urgently.

[Signature]

Security Major

Director of Shaqlawa Security<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>24</sup> IRDP-NIDS-814761

## Document 16 – Economic Blockades

Document 16 details the economic blockades imposed on the Kurds, prior to the Anfal campaign. These documents were written by “the valiant comrade” Ali Hasan al-Majid (euphemistically known as “Chemical Ali”), secretary general of the Ba’th Party’s Northern Bureau, and as they illustrate, following the Iraqi leadership’s decision to eliminate the villages that were prohibited for security reasons and to gather their Kurdish residents in government compounds. These procedures, reinforced by the measures taken to enforce the economic blockade, laid the groundwork for the Anfal campaign. The document employs all the terminology mentioned in prior documents. Thus it gives an outline, a plan of action for the whole scale destruction of large areas of civilian centres that may be aiding the *mukharrabin*.

In the Name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

Number: 10427

Date: 27 Nov 1987

Shaqlawa Directorate of Security

To: All Area Securities

Subject: Economic Blockade

Enclosed is the study prepared for the application of the economic blockade against the bands of saboteurs, coupled with the approval of the valiant comrade Ali Hasan al-Majid, head of the Northern Bureau. Coordinate the implementation of the measures included in the study. Please inform us.

[Signature]

Security Lieutenant Colonel



Enclosures

Study

IRDP-NIDS-814977

The availability of foodstuffs, fuel and medicine and their easy supply to areas and places where the bands of saboteurs are found encourages them to settle down and mount acts of sabotage.

The decision of the leadership to eliminate the villages that are prohibited for security reasons and to gather their residents in residential compounds greatly affects the saboteurs. It isolates the saboteurs from citizens and makes it difficult for the saboteurs to obtain foodstuffs or sell the citizens' agricultural products in the cities by way of these villages. In addition, this decision deprives the saboteurs of foodstuffs, which these villages had provided to those saboteurs from the cities. The flight of many families from the eliminated villages to the saboteurs will form an additional burden as well. The bands of saboteurs will have to provide those who have joined them with needed food, at a time when these bands cannot compensate for the provisions they used to receive from neighboring countries, especially Iran, by way of these villages. There is a shortage of provisions in neighboring countries, prices are high and it is more difficult to smuggle and transport provisions than it was in the past.

In order for the economic blockade to succeed and to close its loopholes...[illegible] we recommend to the Committee the following:

- 1- Tightening control over the compounds and rural regions.
- 2- Reducing the number of agents [those appointed by the government to receive and distribute food rations] in the districts and subdistricts, as well as reducing their shares [of foodstuffs] by the amount allowed according to the system of ration cards.
- 3- Banning all leakage of foodstuffs, fuel and medicine in any form through the checkpoints, except what is allocated to the agents in the districts and subdistricts. Additionally, we recommend watching the arrival of foodstuffs to the districts and subdistricts as well as verifying their distribution to those who are entitled to them. We recommend paying attention to the secondary checkpoints in the subdistricts because their role is no less important than that of principal checkpoints overseen by the security committees along the entrances of cities.

- 4- Paying attention to the activities of checkpoints and developing their work, as well as reinforcing their crews with meritorious and loyal members.
- 5- Making a comprehensive evaluation of those who work at offices that deal with foodstuffs in the cities, suburbs, districts, subdistricts and all compounds.
- 6- Prohibiting administrative apparatuses from agreeing to provide the agents with more foodstuffs than needed under the pretext of using them for contingencies such as weddings and circumcisions to prevent foodstuffs from being smuggled to the saboteurs. Providing the families with foodstuffs for these events must be conditioned on the approval of the heads of administrative units.
- 7- Withholding approval to raise the share allocated to the citizen for any reason whatever, except after obtaining permission from the Security Committee.
- 8- Denying the fighters of the National Defense Battalions [Kurdish pro-government forces] additional amount of foodstuffs not consistent with the shares allocated to them, since they receive their provisions from the military sections.
- 9- Limiting the amount of provisions supplied to the owners of restaurants, bakeries, hotels and coffee shops and watching them.
- 10- Setting special procedures for the transportation of foodstuffs to military sections and National Defense Battalions, and placing them under the supervision of designated groups.
- 11- Absolutely prohibiting the access of fruits and other agricultural products to... [illegible]<sup>25</sup>

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<sup>25</sup> IRDP-NIDS-814978

## **Document 17 – The Plan for the Marshes**

The following document is a private and secret memorandum from the Director of Security for the Governorate of Arbil to the Shaqlawa Security Director. It reports on the security situation in the Marshes, which are being used by "deserters and subversives as bases to launch terrorist operations in accord with organized political directives received from Iran." After delineating the "terrorist activities" of the "hostile groupings," the report lists the steps to be taken "to end the enemy presence" in the Marshes, in line with the course of action decided on at a December 5, 1988, conference in Basra "attended by the respected Supreme Commander" and the plan of action for the Marshes adopted in 1987 and approved by "Mr. Leader President (May God Preserve him)." Steps include: "technical security operations against terrorist elements in the Marshes, such as poisoning, explosions, and burning of houses against friends and relatives of subversives in the Marsh areas as a lesson to others"; assassination of "hostile elements"; controlling traffic; burning and demolishing houses; use of planes; and "continuing the economic blockade more efficiently to limit provision of their daily living needs," by: withdrawing all food supply agencies, banning the sale of fish, "taking the most severe measures against those who supply food to deserters and unlawful and hostile elements," prohibiting the traffic of goods, and using tribes.

Ref: 871

Date: 8 February 1989

To: Arbil Security/Section 5

From: Shaqlawa Security

With reference to your letter 1657 of 30 January 1989:

We have studied and benefited from the information contained in our security plan of action.

For your information.

Regards

Signed: Security Lieutenant

Shaqlawa Security Director

## Public Security

Directorate of Security in the Governorate of Arbil

Private and Confidential, to be Opened in Person

Ref: Section 5/1657 Date: 30 January 1989

To: Shaqlawa Security Director

Subject: Plan of Action for the Marshes

Having assessed the current security situation in the Marshes and studied the outcome of the large-scale operations that have been carried out against deserters and hostile elements, we find that these elements are still engaging in subversive activity, using the Marsh areas as launch pads for their operations. It has also become clear to us that those groups are still operating in accordance with political organizational directives received from Iran through intermediaries who infiltrate for that purpose.

In fact, the criminal Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim, the head of the so-called "Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq", considers those elements to be the nucleus of the so-called "Islamic Army for the Liberation of Iraq" and has increased his support for them in his public statements.

Moreover, following the failure of their plans in the Northern Region, all the hostile movements based in Iraq are now concentrating their efforts on the dispatch of a number of their Iranian-trained agents to contact the hostile groups in the Marshes with a view to using them as a new tool to destabilize our country's security situation, particularly after the changes that have been made in the Iranian regime's policy as a result of its acceptance of the cease-fire agreement, which has affected the activities and operations of the hostile movements inside Iran. Accordingly, we must reassess our operations, study the plan of action that was approved last year, examine the positive action that has been taken, with a view to its intensification, and evaluate the negative results so that we can ascertain their causes.

On 5 December 1988, a conference was held at the headquarters of the Directorate of Security in the Governorate of Basra in the presence of the Supreme Commander. The conference discussed the security situation in the Marsh areas, as well as courses of action to be taken in order to put an end to the hostile presence there, and the duties of the security

services in the Southern Region during the coming phase. The following topics were discussed:

A. The directives which the hostile groups in the Marshes have received from Iran through its agents, namely:

1. Action must be continued in the governorate, while maintaining operational security and secrecy.
2. The groups must inflict the greatest possible damage on the authorities without themselves suffering any losses.
3. Operations must be conducted outside the Marshes in order to deflect suspicion from the Marsh groups and maintain their operational security, i.e. one operation must be conducted in the Marshes in order to deflect suspicion and a number of operations must be conducted in other areas by the same groups.
4. The groups must be tested by instructing them to carry out an operation and then having it carried out by a different group in order to see whether any of the other groups claim to have carried it out themselves.
5. Details of operations must be reported accurately, giving special attention to time and place.
6. Information must be gathered on important personalities.
7. Every means must be used to discover the methods employed to expose the "freedom-fighters".
8. Relationships must be established with military personnel, giving special attention to their rank and units.
9. Information must be transmitted in code.

10. Liaison must be established between the groups dispersed in the Dhi Qar, Misan and Baera Marshes in order to coordinate their activities.

11. The groups must be instructed to obtain confidential telegrams, as well as the codes and transmission frequencies used by military units.

12. Persons who collaborate with the authorities may be killed and their property may be seized and used for Islamic action. When they are taken prisoner, they may be tortured in order to obtain information from them. Such prisoners may be killed and their children may be kidnapped in order to further the objectives of the "freedom-fighters".

13. Foreigners working for foreign companies may be kidnapped and killed, particularly those from non-Islamic countries, since they are working to strengthen the regime.

14. Persons who surrender to the authorities and inform on the "believers" may be killed.

15. Army deserters who are killed during the campaigns are to be regarded as martyrs whose bodies do not need to be washed and shrouded before burial.

B. Emphasis was placed on the plan of action for the Marshes, which was adopted in 1987 and approved by the President and Commander-in-Chief (may God preserve him) and which included the following:

1. Strategic security operations (such as poisoning, explosions and the burning of houses) must be conducted against the subversives in the Marsh areas through friends and trusted persons in order to show them that the Marsh areas are not safe havens.

2. A number of competent and trustworthy deserters living in the Marshes must be selected and assigned to assassinate hostile elements and carry out missions to further our security activities in return for the granting of a pardon in respect of their desertion or evasion of military services and all the legal consequences thereof, provided that they carry out the assignments.

3. Carefully planned operations must be conducted in areas in which hostile groups are concentrated, provided that we can guarantee the secrecy and effectiveness of those

operations and provided that their results are commensurate with the size of the military units participating therein.

4. The Popular Army duties of persons living in or on the periphery of the Marshes shall be confined to the maintenance of security in those areas, particularly in the governorates of Basra, Misan and Dhi Qar.

5. Vehicle traffic between the town centres and the Marsh areas must be controlled by the security committees in the governorate.

6. Punitive and deterrent operations, such as the burning and demolition of houses, must be conducted from time to time against residents of the Marshes who are found to have collaborated with the subversives.

7. The joint committees that have been formed to track down deserters and evaders of military service must intensify their activities.

8. The principle of economic blockade must be applied to the villages and areas in which subversives are operating. This will be achieved in the following manner:

- through the withdrawal of all food supply agencies;
- through a ban on the sale of fish;
- by taking the severest measures against persons who smuggle foodstuffs to deserters, outlaws and hostile groups;
- by prohibiting goods traffic from entering those villages and areas.

At the same time, the tribal chiefs and prominent personalities in those areas must be summoned and given to understand that these sanctions will not be lifted unless they cooperate effectively in the campaign against deserters.

9. Consideration must be given to the possibility of regrouping the Marsh villages on dry land (which is easy to control) and opening roads and points of access deep inside the Marshes.

10. Launches and motorized barges operating in the Marshes and nearby areas must be confiscated and totally banned.

11. Helicopters, supported by military aircraft, must be made available, if requested by the security directorates concerned, in order to help them to discharge their duties in this regard.

12. The Committee chaired by our comrade, the Secretary of the Bureau for the Organization of the South, shall be responsible for the full supervision of dealings with the inhabitants of the Marshes and for the formulation of clearly defined guidelines to which everyone must adhere.

13. Emphasis must be placed on the role of Party and mass organizations in educating the inhabitants of the Marshes and strengthening their nationalist spirit.

C. The above-mentioned conference stressed that the action taken during the coming stage must be in accordance with the following guidelines:

1. Action taken against the hostile groups in the Marshes must be commensurate with the threat that they pose, since they are disrupting security and stability in the Southern Region.

2. Continued efforts must be made to infiltrate those groups by sending undercover collaborators to join their ranks.

3. Sophisticated security operations must be undertaken against subversive elements in the Marsh areas.



## The Validity of the Documents

The Iraqi government officially challenged the validity of the documents arguing that the US and the respective Kurdish parties in fact forged the documents. In March 1992, the Iraqi Mission to the U.N. in Geneva wrote, “With regard to the letters emanating from security departments at Sulaimaniyya, Halabja and elsewhere, we wish to point out that, during the disturbances, hostile bodies succeeded in obtaining stationery bearing the letterhead of those departments, which they used to forge letters ostensibly emanating from official bodies.”<sup>26</sup> This raises two questions: Did the respective parties forge all the documents? or Did they forge only a select few implicating the Iraqi regime in partaking in the Anfal campaign?

The letter goes on to say, “Investigations have shown that those official letters were not issued by the departments referred to and the information contained therein is wholly fabricated. The manner in which one of these letters was drafted shows that it was written by a person with a poor command of the Arabic language, thereby confirming its spurious nature.”<sup>27</sup> As for the poor Arabic of the reports, it is possible that the documents were written by Kurds or Turkomans in the service of the *mukhabarat*. In a second letter reproduced by Middle East Watch, the Iraqi government states:

“It is well known that Iraq’s eastern and north-eastern borders were the scenes of military operations. It is therefore impossible to verify what went on during that period, especially with regard to activities of the saboteurs, which were fully cooperative with the hostile Iranian military forces. Government departments with all their stores of printing machines, stationery and official stamps bearing signatures of Iraqi officials fell in the hands of the saboteurs and American, British, French forces of occupation. By force of weapons, the invading forces assisted the irresponsible elements and the saboteurs in assuming control of the area. Moreover, many officials, who worked in those departments, fell under the mercy of saboteurs’ gangs and carried out their orders. Furthermore, the violent and successive events which were imposed on Iraq, during the Iran-Iraq war or during the aggression perpetrated by the allied forces against Iraq, along with the control by the saboteurs of the northern area, and the preceding riots, have all inflicted damage and loss of most of the official documents in the northern area, rendering the competent Iraqi authorities unable to verify the validity of any information or claims requiring response.”

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<sup>26</sup> *Situation of Human Rights in Iraq*. United Nations General Assembly, A/47/367/Add. 1, 13 November 1992, p.16.

<sup>27</sup> *Situation of Human Rights in Iraq*,

Given US animosity to Iraq since the occupation of Kuwait, these claims must be addressed. The claim by the Iraqi government presupposes the US has the detailed knowledge to forge four million Iraqi government documents. If one were to assume that the US would go through the effort of forging four million Iraqi government documents, why then would the US have an interest in forging documents that detail the very mundane day-to-day activities of the *mukhabarat*?

Even if the US could not have fabricated all of the documents, we cannot preclude the possibility of the fabrication of some of the most damning documents, inserted with authentic ones. This raises an important methodological question for researchers consulting this archive and that is how to eliminate the risk of forgery. For example, another assumption is that the most of the documents are in fact real but the documents dealing with the Iraqi use of chemical weapons were in fact falsified. This claim however raises the question why would the US forge documents that detail the very chemical weapons attacks that the US turned a blind eye to. At the same time, the documents do not say directly that chemical weapons were used, rather the Iraqis use a code name *'itaad al-khas*, meaning "special ammunition" is used. Now if the US wanted to indict the Iraqi government for using chemical weapons, it would have forged the documents to say *islah al-kimawiyya*, the direct literal translation for "chemical weapons". Although there are many references to chemical attacks, most have not been explicit. For reasons that still remain unclear Iraqi bureaucrats most often refer to chemical attacks either indirectly, by reporting that Kurdish sources have accused the Iraqi government of having carried out a chemical attack, or euphemistically, by referring to Iraqi "special attacks" *hujum al-khas* or attacks with "special ammunition" *'ita ad al-khas*. Middle East Watch has been able to establish that "special attacks" are in fact, chemical attacks. They have been able to match the documentary evidence of specific "special attacks" with their testimonial evidence of particular chemical attacks. Beginning in December 1991, Middle East Watch carried out extensive field research and, in conjunction with Physicians for Human Rights, exhumations of mass graves in the area over a period of almost two years to investigate Kurdish claims of genocide by the Iraqi regime in the 1988 *Anfal* campaign.<sup>28</sup> The organization was greatly aided in this effort when, in the spring of 1992, it came in possession of this archive set.<sup>29</sup> Additionally, there is also documented Iranian evidence of

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<sup>28</sup> see Eric Stover, *Unquiet Graves : The Search for the Disappeared in Iraqi Kurdistan*. (Physicians for Human Rights: Middle East Watch, 1992).

<sup>29</sup> See a follow up work on this issue, *Ten years After Anfal : Causes and Consequences of the Politics of Genocide in Iraq* : June 5, 1998 (Amsterdam : [RECIPE, University of Amsterdam, 1998)

Iraqi chemical weapon deployment which corroborates the work that has been conducted by these human rights organizations.<sup>30</sup>

Although Iraqi bureaucrats clearly tried to avoid making direct references to chemical attacks, evidence shows that slips did occur. There may have been a general order forbidding them from using the term chemical attacks in direct reference to Iraqi forces. One document orders assignment of the classification "Top Secret" (*daraja 'aliya min al-kitman*) to documents that contain information about the production of chemical weapons.<sup>31</sup> Second, some of the documents themselves establish the link between special attacks and the use of chemical agents, by stating, for example, that the KDP obtained 500 gas masks as a precaution against "special attacks." It is also worth noting that Ali Hassan al-Majid in one taped meeting in 1987, used the terms chemical attacks and special ammunition interchangeably.<sup>32</sup> One can also draw conclusions about Iraq's use of chemical weapons on the basis of the timing of multiple references to the Kurdish rebels obtaining protective devices. It is clear from the documents that suddenly, in the spring of 1987, the PUK and KDP began acquiring significant quantities of gas masks and ampules with chemical antidotes. This was not a coincidence: it occurred on the heels of what we know, through testimonies obtained in the field, were the first Iraqi chemical attacks against the PUK headquarters at Bergalou-Sergalou, near the Iranian border, on April 15, and on the villages of Balisan and Sheikh Wasan one day later. Finally, there are references to Iraqi "air strikes" that, according to the documents, caused people to lose their eyesight. The only logical explanation for a medical complaint of that sort would be the use of chemical agents.

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<sup>30</sup> War Information Headquarters, *Bi'kar'giri-i Silah-i Shimiya'i Tatavassut-i Rizhim-i Iraq (Use of Chemical Warfare by Iraqi regime)* (Tehran :, Supreme Defence Council, 1985

<sup>31</sup> Memorandum from the *Amn* directorate in Erbil to *Amn* sub-directorates, ref. S5/19299 of December 17, 1988; MEW 91/25-A.

<sup>32</sup> For a partial transcript of his speech, see: *Genocide in Iraq*, p. 349.

## **Conclusion**

This work serves as a study in mindset of Iraq's security apparatus, as well as the propaganda and state rhetoric produced by a police state which glorified both military, sometimes even criminal activities and revealed the arrogance and chauvinism of an state unwilling to recognize its multi-ethnic status. The mindset of this apparatus is obsessed with criminalizing the regime's enemies and their activities, while justifying their exploits to the Iraqi leadership. The documents are marked by euphemistic terms to glorify obviously criminal acts, and the use of Arab and Iraqi nationalist symbols based on a reinvented cultural and ethnic past. The language employed is dry and formal indicating the rigidity of this bureaucracy of repression, yet offer an window into the inner workings of a sophisticated one-party police state.