The
paper, produced by the Cabinet Office on July 21,
2002, is incomplete because the last page is
missing. The following is a transcript rather than
the original document in order to protect the
source.
PERSONAL SECRET UK EYES ONLY
IRAQ: CONDITIONS FOR MILITARY ACTION (A Note
by Officials)
Summary
Ministers are invited to:
(1) Note the latest position on US
military planning and timescales for possible
action.
(2) Agree that the objective of any
military action should be a stable and law-abiding
Iraq, within present borders, co-operating with the
international community, no longer posing a threat
to its neighbours or international security, and
abiding by its international obligations on WMD.
(3) Agree to engage the US on the need to
set military plans within a realistic political
strategy, which includes identifying the succession
to Saddam Hussein and creating the conditions
necessary to justify government military action,
which might include an ultimatum for the return of
UN weapons inspectors to Iraq. This should include a
call from the Prime Minister to President Bush ahead
of the briefing of US military plans to the
President on 4 August.
(4) Note the potentially long lead times
involved in equipping UK Armed Forces to undertake
operations in the Iraqi theatre and agree that the
MOD should bring forward proposals for the
procurement of Urgent Operational Requirements under
cover of the lessons learned from Afghanistan and
the outcome of SR2002.
(5) Agree to the establishment of an ad
hoc group of officials under Cabinet Office
Chairmanship to consider the development of an
information campaign to be agreed with the US.
Introduction
1. The US Government's military planning for
action against Iraq is proceeding apace. But, as
yet, it lacks a political framework. In particular,
little thought has been given to creating the
political conditions for military action, or the
aftermath and how to shape it.
2. When the Prime Minister discussed Iraq with
President Bush at Crawford in April he said that the
UK would support military action to bring about
regime change, provided that certain conditions were
met: efforts had been made to construct a
coalition/shape public opinion, the Israel-Palestine
Crisis was quiescent, and the options for action to
eliminate Iraq's WMD through the UN weapons
inspectors had been exhausted.
3. We need now to reinforce this message and to
encourage the US Government to place its military
planning within a political framework, partly to
forestall the risk that military action is
precipitated in an unplanned way by, for example, an
incident in the No Fly Zones. This is particularly
important for the UK because it is necessary to
create the conditions in which we could legally
support military action. Otherwise we face the real
danger that the US will commit themselves to a
course of action which we would find very difficult
to support.
4. In order to fulfil the conditions set out by
the Prime Minister for UK support for military
action against Iraq, certain preparations need to be
made, and other considerations taken into account.
This note sets them out in a form which can be
adapted for use with the US Government. Depending on
US intentions, a decision in principle may be needed
soon on whether and in what form the UK takes part
in military action.
The Goal
5. Our objective should be a stable and
law-abiding Iraq, within present borders,
co-operating with the international community, no
longer posing a threat to its neighbours or to
international security, and abiding by its
international obligations on WMD. It seems unlikely
that this could be achieved while the current Iraqi
regime remains in power. US military planning
unambiguously takes as its objective the removal of
Saddam Hussein's regime, followed by elimination if
Iraqi WMD. It is however, by no means certain, in
the view of UK officials, that one would necessarily
follow from the other. Even if regime change is a
necessary condition for controlling Iraqi WMD, it is
certainly not a sufficient one.
US Military Planning
6. Although no political decisions have been
taken, US military planners have drafted options for
the US Government to undertake an invasion of Iraq.
In a 'Running Start', military action could begin as
early as November of this year, with no overt
military build-up. Air strikes and support for
opposition groups in Iraq would lead initially to
small-scale land operations, with further land
forces deploying sequentially, ultimately
overwhelming Iraqi forces and leading to the
collapse of the Iraqi regime. A 'Generated Start'
would involve a longer build-up before any military
action were taken, as early as January 2003. US
military plans include no specifics on the strategic
context either before or after the campaign.
Currently the preference appears to be for the
'Running Start'. CDS will be ready to brief
Ministers in more detail.
7. US plans assume, as a minimum, the use of
British bases in Cyprus and Diego Garcia. This means
that legal base issues would arise virtually
whatever option Ministers choose with regard to UK
participation.
The Viability of the Plans
8. The Chiefs of Staff have discussed the
viability of US military plans. Their initial view
is that there are a number of questions which would
have to be answered before they could assess whether
the plans are sound. Notably these include the
realism of the 'Running Start', the extent to which
the plans are proof against Iraqi counter-attack
using chemical or biological weapons and the
robustness of US assumptions about the bases and
about Iraqi (un)willingness to fight.
UK Military Contribution
9. The UK's ability to contribute forces depends
on the details of the US military planning and the
time available to prepare and deploy them. The MOD
is examining how the UK might contribute to US-led
action. The options range from deployment of a
Division (ie Gulf War sized contribution plus naval
and air forces) to making available bases. It is
already clear that the UK could not generate a
Division in time for an operation in January 2003,
unless publicly visible decisions were taken very
soon. Maritime and air forces could be deployed in
time, provided adequate basing arrangements could be
made. The lead times involved in preparing for UK
military involvement include the procurement of
Urgent Operational Requirements, for which there is
no financial provision.
The Conditions Necessary for Military Action
10. Aside from the existence of a viable military
plan we consider the following conditions necessary
for military action and UK participation:
justification/legal base; an international
coalition; a quiescent Israel/Palestine; a positive
risk/benefit assessment; and the preparation of
domestic opinion.
Justification
11. US views of international law vary from that
of the UK and the international community. Regime
change per se is not a proper basis for military
action under international law. But regime change
could result from action that is otherwise lawful.
We would regard the use of force against Iraq, or
any other state, as lawful if exercised in the right
of individual or collective self-defence, if carried
out to avert an overwhelming humanitarian
catastrophe, or authorised by the UN Security
Council. A detailed consideration of the legal
issues, prepared earlier this year, is at Annex A.
The legal position would depend on the precise
circumstances at the time. Legal bases for an
invasion of Iraq are in principle conceivable in
both the first two instances but would be difficult
to establish because of, for example, the tests of
immediacy and proportionality. Further legal advice
would be needed on this point.
12. This leaves the route under the UNSC
resolutions on weapons inspectors. Kofi Annan has
held three rounds of meetings with Iraq in an
attempt to persuade them to admit the UN weapons
inspectors. These have made no substantive progress;
the Iraqis are deliberately obfuscating. Annan has
downgraded the dialogue but more pointless talks are
possible. We need to persuade the UN and the
international community that this situation cannot
be allowed to continue ad infinitum. We need to set
a deadline, leading to an ultimatum. It would be
preferable to obtain backing of a UNSCR for any
ultimatum and early work would be necessary to
explore with Kofi Annan and the Russians, in
particular, the scope for achieving this.
13. In practice, facing pressure of military
action, Saddam is likely to admit weapons inspectors
as a means of forestalling it. But once admitted, he
would not allow them to operate freely. UNMOVIC (the
successor to UNSCOM) will take at least six months
after entering Iraq to establish the monitoring and
verification system under Resolution 1284 necessary
to assess whether Iraq is meeting its obligations.
Hence, even if UN inspectors gained access today, by
January 2003 they would at best only just be
completing setting up. It is possible that they will
encounter Iraqi obstruction during this period, but
this more likely when they are fully operational.
14. It is just possible that an ultimatum could
be cast in terms which Saddam would reject (because
he is unwilling to accept unfettered access) and
which would not be regarded as unreasonable by the
international community. However, failing that (or
an Iraqi attack) we would be most unlikely to
achieve a legal base for military action by January
2003.
An International Coalition
15. An international coalition is necessary to
provide a military platform and desirable for
political purposes.
16. US military planning assumes that the US
would be allowed to use bases in Kuwait (air and
ground forces), Jordan, in the Gulf (air and naval
forces) and UK territory (Diego Garcia and our bases
in Cyprus). The plans assume that Saudi Arabia would
withhold co-operation except granting military
over-flights. On the assumption that military action
would involve operations in the Kurdish area in the
North of Iraq, the use of bases in Turkey would also
be necessary.
17. In the absence of UN authorisation, there
will be problems in securing the support of NATO and
EU partners. Australia would be likely to
participate on the same basis as the UK. France
might be prepared to take part if she saw military
action as inevitable. Russia and China, seeking to
improve their US relations, might set aside their
misgivings if sufficient attention were paid to
their legal and economic concerns. Probably the best
we could expect from the region would be neutrality.
The US is likely to restrain Israel from taking part
in military action. In practice, much of the
international community would find it difficult to
stand in the way of the determined course of the US
hegemon. However, the greater the international
support, the greater the prospects of success.
A Quiescent Israel-Palestine
18. The Israeli re-occupation of the West Bank
has dampened Palestinian violence for the time being
but is unsustainable in the long-term and stoking
more trouble for the future. The Bush speech was at
best a half step forward. We are using the
Palestinian reform agenda to make progress,
including a resumption of political negotiations.
The Americans are talking of a ministerial
conference in November or later. Real progress
towards a viable Palestinian state is the best way
to undercut Palestinian extremists and reduce Arab
antipathy to military action against Saddam Hussein.
However, another upsurge of Palestinian/Israeli
violence is highly likely. The co-incidence of such
an upsurge with the preparations for military action
against Iraq cannot be ruled out. Indeed Saddam
would use continuing violence in the Occupied
Territories to bolster popular Arab support for his
regime.
Benefits/Risks
19. Even with a legal base and a viable military
plan, we would still need to ensure that the
benefits of action outweigh the risks. In
particular, we need to be sure that the outcome of
the military action would match our objective as set
out in paragraph 5 above. A post-war occupation of
Iraq could lead to a protracted and costly
nation-building exercise. As already made clear, the
US military plans are virtually silent on this
point. Washington could look to us to share a
disproportionate share of the burden. Further work
is required to define more precisely the means by
which the desired endstate would be created, in
particular what form of Government might replace
Saddam Hussein's regime and the timescale within
which it would be possible to identify a successor.
We must also consider in greater detail the impact
of military action on other UK interests in the
region.
Domestic Opinion
20. Time will be required to prepare public
opinion in the UK that it is necessary to take
military action against Saddam Hussein. There would
also need to be a substantial effort to secure the
support of Parliament. An information campaign will
be needed which has to be closely related to an
overseas information campaign designed to influence
Saddam Hussein, the Islamic World and the wider
international community. This will need to give full
coverage to the threat posed by Saddam Hussein,
including his WMD, and the legal justification for
action.
Timescales
21. Although the US military could act against
Iraq as soon as November, we judge that a military
campaign is unlikely to start until January 2003, if
only because of the time it will take to reach
consensus in Washington. That said, we judge that
for climactic reasons, military action would need to
start by January 2003, unless action were deferred
until the following autumn.
22. As this paper makes clear, even this
timescale would present problems. This means that:
(a) We need to influence US consideration of the
military plans before President Bush is briefed on 4
August, through contacts betweens the Prime Minister
and the President and at other levels;
See also - UK
Ministers Were Told WMD Was "Excuse"
Copyright 2005 Times Newspapers Ltd.