Walts
obsolescent foreign
policy is deeply rooted in the statism of a bygone
era. Richard Falk
8 I applaud virtually all of Stephen Walts lucidly
phrased, substantive recommendations for the revision of American
foreign policy, especially the restrictive recasting of the American
approach to nuclear weapons, the scaling back of threat perception,
the recognition of the potency of nationalism as an inhibitor
of American interventionary diplomacy, and most of all, the radical
change in Washingtons relationship to the IsraeliPalestinian
conflict. These reforms are sensible, pragmatic, and would enable
a much more successful pursuit of American goals in the world
than we have seen during the Bush presidency and, to some lesser
extent, in the entire course of Americas involvement in
world politics since the end of the Cold War. Relative to this
history, I would certainly feel better about the world if someone
following Walts advice were to be our secretary of state.
Indeed, I would go further. The world view and policy prescriptions
set forth by Walt seem better than we can hope for in the near
future given the orientation of the Democratic Party and the distorting
influence of status-quo pressure groups favoring Israel, a militarized
foreign policy, and corporate globalization. If the Kerry campaign
was any indication, America and the world are facing a long period
of lethal bipartisanship on foreign policy.
I am far less sympathetic to
Walts framing of the
foreign-policy debate. I find his uncritical attachment to American
primacy troublesome from a normative perspective (law and
ethics) and deficient from a functional perspective of global
problem-solving. As a highly credentialed realist analyst of
international relations, Walt takes his conceptual cues from the
uncrowned king of the realist tradition, John Mearsheimer, especially
by borrowing the orienting idea of offshore balancing from The
Tragedy of Great Power Politics. The strategy of offshore
balancing tells a state to refrain from entering contested
geopolitical domains except when a competing state threatens to
become a hegemon in a region of strategic importance (as Germany did
twice in Europe during the 20th century and the Soviet Union once,
each time provoking intervention by the non-regional actor, the
United States). Offshore balancing is also identified with
self-restraint, foregoing opportunities for expansion beyond existing
contours of control, as was the case with American failure to
maximize its power position in Europe or Asia after the two world
wars. Rather than offshore balancing, I think the position Walt
advocates for American foreign policy could be more clearly
communicated if labeled prudent realism, an outlook perhaps
most clearly formulated by the astute French commentator on world
affairs Raymond Aron, or possibly by George Kennan and Hans
Morgenthau, especially in their realist opposition to the Vietnam
War. But my bigger difficulty
with Walts embrace of realism is
that it appears to celebrate American-style regional hegemony of the
sort that has existed for more than a century in the Western
Hemisphere. It is here, among other places, that Walts disregard
of the relevance of international law and morality is exhibited
most blatantly, underscored by the absence of any criticism directed
at the bloody legacy of interventionism and authoritarian rule that
American diplomacy has facilitated, if not imposed upon the region
until very recently, especially in Central America and the Caribbean.
Walt writes as if American primacy is something to be cherished and
preserved rather than feared and avoided. It would at least have been
useful for Walt to include in his argument a principled defense of
American primacy. But it is here that realists almost always come up
empty, presuming what needs demonstration. It is also here that the
American bias of Walts perspective is most evident. It is
impossible to imagine a defense of American primacy being written in
any other part of the world without some elaborate accompanying
explanation. But my
difficulties with Walts framing of
foreign policy inquiry also extend to issues of historical
circumstance and the challenge of globalization. He writes as if the
Westphalian world order of sovereign states continues to be a viable
basis for thought, policy, and action. There is no mention of
globalizing developments covering a range of issues, including trade,
money, economic regulation, environment, immigration, information
technology, and crime, that can no longer be addressed by states
acting on their own. Similarly, the rise of transnational social
forces and non-state actors suggests that we have entered a
post-Westphalian world whether the focus is placed on responding to
global terrorism or promoting human rights and democracy. In this
respect, realism is living in a historical bubble that is oblivious
to the foundational changes that have been taking place for the last
several decades. In this
respect, my criticism of Walts
approach to American foreign policy can be reduced to a rather simple
assertion: if you fail to ask the right questions, it is impossible
to find the right answers. At this stage of history, realism is
incapable of asking some of the most important foreign-policy
questions, and therefore realists inevitably avoid a multitude of
issues that require resolution. This failure expresses itself, among
other ways, in the realist tendency to overlook the need for the
construction of a global architecture based on law, institutions, and
a cooperative ethos, including a gradual shift in understanding from
national security to human security. Walt gives us a
narrow band view of foreign policy that is certainly preferable to
the Bush administrations narrow band foreign policy. Walts
essay purports to advocate a mature foreign policy, but from my
perspective it could be more accurately be called an obsolescent
foreign policy because it is so deeply rooted in the statism of a
bygone era. Not that states are obsolete or that supranationalism is
about to reconstitute world order. States will remain significant
players for a long, long time, but they must increasingly share the
global stage with the likes of the European Union, the IMF/World
Bank, al Qaeda, the World Social Forum, the World Economic Forum,
Amnesty International, and the World Parliament of Religions.
Unfortunately, realists remain content to analyze world politics
and foreign policy as if the only political actors that matter are
sovereign states.
Realists lack an aspirational imagination.
Consider what Walt proposes as the only three worthwhile options
for American foreign policy: empire, balance of power, offshore
balancing. Each of these is preoccupied with the management of
power relations among sovereign states. None envisions normative
horizons associated with humane global governance, the only perspective
that has some prospect of saving humanity from a gradual slide
into catastrophe. For these reasons, even as enlightened a realist
as is Stephen Walt gives me little confidence that his recasting
of American foreign policy would lead us out of the wilderness
and in the direction of the promised land! In the end, despite
his agenda of sensible action and policy repair, he offers us
a counsel of despair. <
Richard Falk is
the chairman of the board of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation
and the author of Religion and Humane Global Governance
and The Great Terror War.
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New
Democracy Forum “In the
National Interest.”
Originally published
in the February/March 2005 issue of Boston Review
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