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Algeria: Big deal in the desert?

 

 
 

as Algeria pursuing a nuclear weapons program in the 1980s? Did it abandon that program? Or might it still be developing a capability to make separated plutonium, a nuclear explosive material? We still do not have the answers to these questions.

Algeria began allowing the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to inspect its nuclear activities in the late 1980s, and it joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1995. But European and Arab governments alike continue to express concern--Algeria's nuclear program seems too extensive for civilian needs.

Three years ago, a confidential report by the Spanish intelligence service Cesid concluded that Algeria would soon be in an "advantageous position to restart a military program, if the corresponding political decision is taken." [1]  The reason, said Cesid: "The Algerian nuclear program, originally conceived with a clear military purpose, continues to equip itself with the installations necessary to carry out all the activities linked to the complete cycle for obtaining military grade plutonium, a key element in a nuclear arms program."

Algerian neighbors Tunisia and Morocco have reportedly been concerned that Algeria will soon be able to produce plutonium. [2]  Those countries have struggled successfully to minimize the influence of Islamic extremism in their societies. But the situation in Algeria is different. The civil war appears to have ended, but terrorist attacks continue and the regime has been slow to implement badly needed social and economic reforms, raising questions about the government's long-term stability.

These concerns are a lower-key replay of those expressed in 1991, when U.S. intelligence agencies first discovered Algeria's hidden nuclear site near the city of Ain Oussera, about 150 kilometers south of Algiers.

Since 1992, Algeria has permitted the IAEA to inspect the nuclear site, but it has not allowed the agency to delve deeply enough to answer all its neighbors' questions. The IAEA does not have the authority to inspect all of the facilities at the site, some of which are at the very center of the controversy over potential plutonium production.

If Algeria agreed to bring into force the IAEA's new, advanced-safeguards "Additional Model Protocol" ("INFCIRC/540"), which was developed in response to the failure of the agency to detect Iraq's secret nuclear weapons program before the Persian Gulf War, the IAEA would have the authority to inspect all the buildings at the site. That could go far in answering questions and alleviating suspicions about Algeria's plans.

 

Where no one was looking

In early 1991, routine satellite surveillance led U.S. intelligence photo interpreters to the serendipitous discovery that a nuclear reactor and associated facilities were under construction in a remote area of the Algerian desert. The country had been known to be building a small, civil nuclear infrastructure, and it had recently begun operating a 1-megawatt-thermal research reactor, purchased from Argentina, at Draria, about 20 kilometers east of Algiers.

Why would Algeria, with its extensive supplies of natural gas, want to develop nuclear energy, and why such a large site? Suspicions rose when Western intelligence services learned that China, which had provided secret support to Pakistan's nuclear weapons program, was supplying the reactor.

On the other hand, Algeria had no clear motive for acquiring nuclear weapons. It had been concerned about Libya, but Libya's nuclear-weapons efforts had been largely thwarted.

Algeria had refused to sign the NPT, citing the treaty's discriminatory nature in turning a blind eye to Israel's nuclear weapons as well as those of the five acknowledged nuclear weapon states. But that was not in itself a motive to acquire nuclear weapons.

The late president, Houari Boumedienne, reportedly considered the acquisition of nuclear energy part of an ambitious plan to transform his country into a regional superpower. [3]  Nuclear weapons could have been a component of his strategy.

Whatever its goal, Algeria was viewed as unstable. The first multi-party parliamentary elections were scheduled for later in 1991, and the Islamic Salvation Front was expected to win a large majority of parliamentary seats. Senior party politicians were suspected of harboring nuclear ambitions, and Western officials worried that a fundamentalist-dominated government might use the Chinese-supplied reactor for military purposes.

Some U.S. officials at the Pentagon and in the intelligence agencies concluded that the purpose of the reactor site was to produce plutonium for nuclear weapons. But State Department officials, although they were also concerned, challenged the claim. There wasn't enough evidence, they said, to conclude that Algeria had a nuclear weapons program. One State Department official asserted that Algeria was always secretive, and that it might have decided not to reveal the nuclear program even if it was peaceful, perhaps out of concern about the sensitivity of nuclear issues in the Middle East.

These rival opinions about Algeria's intentions spilled out in a series of leaks. On April 11, 1991, the Washington Times asserted that "Algeria is developing a nuclear weapons program with the help of the Chinese government." This was based, it said, on information from U.S. government officials. In reaction to the story, a State Department spokesman confirmed that China had provided "nuclear-related" but not necessarily "weapons-related" aid.

About a week later, Nucleonics Week reported widely different estimates of the size of the reactor. [4]  Some government analysts believed that, based on its six cooling towers, the thermal power of the reactor could be as great as 50--60 megawatts. That would be larger than needed for most nuclear research reactors and sufficient to produce enough plutonium for more than one nuclear weapon a year. Analysts were not sure, though; China had a history of building research reactors with disproportionate cooling.

It turned out that the Chinese government had given Richard T. Kennedy, then the State Department's special ambassador on nonproliferation matters, reports about the reactor deal in 1988 that Kennedy had apparently not shared with other government agencies. The information Kennedy had received included at least parts of the contract between China and Algeria, which listed the reactor's size as 15 megawatts-thermal and the fuel as low-enriched uranium. A reactor of that size, using low-enriched uranium fuel to irradiate uranium "targets," might produce a few kilograms of weapon-grade plutonium per year.

Henry Rowen, then assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, told the New York Times in November 15, 1991: "I was startled to learn the document had been in the hands of Kennedy's office for over two years. It seemed very important, and I was totally mystified it was not distributed earlier."

One former Defense Department official said that China had given Kennedy the information in case the United States learned of the reactor sale and interpreted it as a violation of China's 1984 commitment to export nuclear technology only if it would be subject to IAEA safeguards. Kennedy had withheld the information, he charged, to prevent unsympathetic officials from using it to question the policy of engagement with China.

This former official added that the information from China did not correspond completely with the satellite images. He said the photos revealed "rather suspicious excavations that looked like the making of a reprocessing area."

Satellite surveillance, said another official, had revealed a building with a 60-meter-high stack and the construction of a nuclear waste storage area that could hold an unusually large amount of liquid waste. A ditch, which may have been intended to hold pipes, ran between the building and the waste tanks. A roof was already in place on the building, preventing further identification.

In addition, a "hot cell" facility was being constructed next to the reactor. Such a facility was not uncommon, but some experts nonetheless said it could be part of a reprocessing plan.

One knowledgeable U.S. expert suspected that the site had a facility able to make uranium targets or fuel, but the evidence for this suspicion was weaker.

In response to U.S. speculations, Algeria denied it had a nuclear weapons program. However, it had fueled suspicion by expelling Britain's senior military attaché on April 10 after he was found with a camera near the site--the facility was being built in a military exclusion zone where photography is banned. [5]

Within Algeria, foreign news reports were viewed as creations of Western governments designed to deny developing countries like Algeria access to civil nuclear technology and to retaliate for Algeria's support for Iraq during the Gulf War. The foreign minister was quoted as saying that the subjugation of Algeria was in line with the "new world order"--a world dictatorship based on material power. [6]

The Western press reported that many Algerian citizens, concerned about the air raids carried out against Iraq and Libya, believed their country could be next. (Some Pentagon officials did talk about a cruise missile attack on the Algerian reactor, according to a former Defense official. But the idea was rejected as nonsense.)

 

Only some answers

Not until April 30, 1991, after international pressure had built substantially, did Algeria admit it was building the Es Salam reactor at Ain Oussera. The admission came with the promise that it would allow IAEA inspections once the reactor was completed.

Officials said project planning began in 1983, construction in 1986. [7]  They confirmed that the Es Salam was a 15-megawatt reactor and would use low-enriched uranium fuel. The government added that the reactor would be used for research and to generate electricity, with desalination of sea water and food preservation technology also included among the areas of research. [8]

Prime Minister Mouloud Hamrouche told Le Monde that the project had never been secret--that it had been announced in Algeria's Journal Officiel. [9]  He said purchase of a reactor had been negotiated first with France and Germany, but France had refused and Germany was too expensive. He also said that when the decision was made to acquire the reactor, Algeria created the Commission for New Energies (CEN) and a Scientific Center at El-Noussala, just next to the site. [10]  

Hamrouche said in another interview that nuclear research, started in 1983, was aimed at developing the national economy. [11]  Algeria was not interested in producing a nuclear bomb, he said, because it did not need one.

French officials disputed Hamrouche's claim that Algeria had publicly announced plans to build the reactor. Based on an interview with a French official, Nucleonics Week reported that Algeria had contacted France in 1982 for consulting engineering services associated with construction of a large research center at Ain Oussera, which was to host two research reactors, one for training and the other for isotope production. [12]  But at the end of 1982, the Algerian government told France it had decided to scale back and build only a small research reactor at its existing research center near Algiers. France bid to supply that reactor, but lost out to Argentina.

Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) personnel searched the Journal Officiel from 1982 to 1986, but found no announcement concerning plans to build a reactor near Ain Oussera, although we found decrees in 1982 creating CEN. Decrees in 1984 placed CEN under the direct authority of the presidency. In 1986, CEN was replaced by the High Commission for Research.

Unlike the purchase of the Chinese-supplied reactor, the acquisition of the small Argentine reactor was made public. CEN had started negotiating for that reactor in 1985.

 

An election gone bad

In late 1991, international concern increased dramatically when Islamic fundamentalists won the first round of voting in legislative elections. With a second round scheduled to decide seats not won by an outright majority, the expected outcome was a huge fundamentalist majority, which would permit the party to establish an Islamic republic. In response, the military-dominated government cancelled the second round of elections in January 1992, and Algeria's top military chiefs reportedly forced President Chadli Bendjedid to resign because they believed he had made a deal with the fundamentalists. [13]

The military government banned the fundamentalist party, which has retaliated with a decade-long campaign of violence in which some 100,000 people have lost their lives.

During the height of the election crisis, on January 5, 1992, the Sunday Times of London reported that Iraq had secretly sent uranium and scientists to Algeria, prompting Western concern that the two countries had formed a "nuclear axis" to build the Islamic world's first nuclear weapon. One U.S. nuclear expert told us he thought it was likely that uranium had gone to Algeria, and he continues to worry that the reactor could be used by countries like Iraq to make material for nuclear weapons.

Algeria has denied ever cooperating with Iraq, and in particular it has denied ever receiving uranium from the Iraqis. [14]  We at ISIS were able to confirm the existence of intelligence reports that nuclear material went from Iraq to Algeria, but we could not confirm whether any material had in fact been transferred.

The crisis abated in early 1992 after an agreement was made to allow inspections of the reactor. Algeria also made an off-the-record statement that it would eventually sign the NPT.

 

The first inspections

In January 1992, IAEA inspectors made two trips to the Es Salam reactor. The first was a technical visit, and the other was to verify the presence of fresh fuel before the reactor was loaded. The IAEA reported that construction was almost complete and commissioning tests were in progress.

In December 1993, Algeria said it would sign the NPT on the occasion of the reactor's inauguration; it acceded to the treaty in January 1995.

Inspections have been generally satisfactory, although several Western officials have complained that Algeria is reluctant to show anything to the IAEA within its nuclear center unless forced to do so by the terms of its "safeguards agreement."

Algeria signed an "INFCIRC/66-type" agreement, which applies safeguards only in connection with the supply of the reactor. One U.S. official said the Algerians had resisted IAEA efforts to include the hot cell laboratory in the agreement, which would have allowed immediate and near-continuous inspection of that facility. Another official added that Algerian officials initially wanted the hot cell facility to somehow be divorced from the reactor. However, the Algerians accepted that the hot cells had to be inspected when safeguarded material is there.

 According to Cesid, in 1995 the IAEA detected the non-declared removal of two fuel elements from the reactor, one or both of which may have been transferred to the hot cells. But no evidence of plutonium separation was detected, according to a Western government official.

After a more comprehensive safeguards agreement (the "INFCIRC/153-type") entered into force in January 1997, the IAEA visited the site to verify Algeria's initial declaration of nuclear material. The original declaration had omitted about 3 kilograms of enriched uranium, a few liters of heavy water, and some natural uranium pellets provided by China, according to the Cesid report. Such omissions are relatively common.

Despite the new safeguards agreement, questions still linger over the reactor's original purpose. The Cesid report says it was originally a nuclear weapons program, a conclusion shared by one U.S. expert knowledgeable abut the 1991 U.S. investigation of the Algerian program.

 

A deafening silence?

The secrecy surrounding the nuclear program continued throughout the 1990s. Cesid concluded that although Algeria signed the NPT, it did not rethink its original plan for the site, conceived with military ends. Cesid added that all the papers relating to the plan were still classified, "which is surprising given [its alleged] total peaceful use." [15]  Cesid also reported that the nuclear program has "an impressive staff of experts and scientists."

Chèrif Hadj Slimane, formerly the head of the High Commission for Research, said in late 1992 that about 2,000 people, of whom about 300 were highly qualified engineers, were active in the Algerian nuclear sector. [16]  Those experts should have generated a significant number of reports and articles. But in a broad search of open-source technical publications, ISIS found relatively few nuclear-related articles and very few articles or reports by researchers dealing with topics normally associated with the operation of a research reactor. [17]  Our survey located only two items by authors identified as working at the Es Salam reactor (formally known as the Center for the Development of Energy Systems). Both publications dealt with nuclear instrumentation.

Nor has there been a significant increase in the volume of articles by Algerian nuclear scientists in general. Compared to the steady increase in the number of publications in most other countries with civil nuclear research programs, including Egypt, Turkey, and Indonesia, the output of the Algerian scientific nuclear community seems unusually low. Possible reasons? There may have been a decrease in resources for the nuclear field, or the government may restrict the number and topics of open publications, or the scientific effort may have been diverted to classified work whose results cannot be published in the open literature.

A few studies, however, are suggestive. One study, published in 1994 but written in 1991 by A. Azzouz and M. Attou at the Center for the Development of Materials in Algiers, concerns the effect of high gamma radiation doses on tri-butylphosphate (TBP). [18]  Their study of the radiolytic decomposition of TBP at high radiation doses could imply an interest in plutonium production from spent fuel reprocessing. These authors have been interested in TBP for a long time and have published extensively.

A 1986 paper by a graduate student at the Center for Nuclear and Solar Studies, which is also under the High Commission for Research, concerns the problem of minimizing tritium discharges following the reprocessing of spent fuel. [19]

The literature also contains a number of publications by Algerian scientists on uranium processing and extraction. In the 1980s, personnel at the Center for Nuclear and Solar Studies, or its predecessor, the Center for the Development of Basic Technologies, published studies of uranium extraction from phosphoric acid and ore and uranium purification methods. In addition to Azzouz and Attou, other scientists from the Center for the Development of Materials published numerous studies on uranium extraction and purification in the 1980s and 1990s.

 

The site expands

Algeria has continued building at the Ain Oussera site throughout the 1990s. Although the program appeared unfocused after 1991 and suffered from a lack of money, said one European official, Algeria did not announce cutbacks.

The first phase of construction was completed when the reactor went critical in February 1992 and was commissioned in December 1993, but by 1995 it was being used only about 90 hours a year--remarkably little for a new research reactor that is reported to be operating successfully. It could have suffered teething problems or funding shortfalls.

A second construction phase ended by mid-1996, with the completion of the Chinese-supplied hot cell laboratory and an underground channel connecting the reactor to the hot cell facility. [20]

Underground nuclear waste storage tanks were also built during these phases. The first waste area has five tanks, set in reinforced concrete and brick, north of a suspected reprocessing building. In 1991 U.S. experts believed that these tanks were designed to store high-level liquid waste because at least the two larger tanks had stainless steel floor pans underneath. In 1994, other experts offered an alternative explanation: Namely, these tanks were for the storage of waste resulting from reactor operations.

A liquid storage building, containing six storage tanks, was also built. This facility roughly doubled the liquid waste storage capacity at the site, and was built to store waste from the hot cell facility and associated buildings.

In May 1997, China agreed to provide Algeria with the blueprints and plan for a third stage, which includes the construction of a radioactive isotope and radioactive pharmaceuticals production facility and other auxiliary facilities whose specifications China received from Algeria in October 1995. [21]

Algeria says the radioisotope production laboratory will produce cobalt 60 for sale to other African nations. European officials describe this plan as "curious," because cobalt 60 can be obtained cheaply from many sources.

China had considered supplying Algeria with a small heavy-water production plant to meet the reactor's requirements, but no evidence has emerged of such a sale.

The photo on page 49, taken from the July 5, 2000 Ikonos image, shows the area around the Es Salam reactor, with major facilities identified. This area is surrounded by a wall or fence, with watchtowers at the corners and at other points along the fence. It appears that radioactive material is handled inside the fence, and outside buildings may be involved in administration and support activities.

The radioisotope laboratory cannot be positively identified, but it is believed to be on the northern edge of the site. A 1996 Spot image does not appear to have a building at that location, and the tall stack (the site's second) and other attributes imply the processing of radioactive material. The building may not have been finished.

The building, suspected in 1991 of housing a small reprocessing plant, appears unused. The entrance appears to have vegetation growing on it, and there is little evidence of any recent activity. In general, the image shows little activity even taking into account that it was taken on a national holiday. Few vehicles can be identified.

The close-up below shows a new construction area with its own security fence just outside the southwest corner of the site. Its purpose is not clearly discernible. There are several buildings, some quite large. The design suggests a military or security base, laboratories, or other technical or industrial uses. At least one of the buildings under construction appears to have a double-walled design. There is no apparent opening to allow movement between this site and the main site.

Experts who reviewed the image at ISIS's request were attracted to the possible double-walled building and the site's proximity to the nuclear facility. Although they could not determine the exact purpose of the double-walled building, they speculated that it might be designed to handle dangerous materials such as high explosives or plutonium, or to produce sophisticated equipment, such as uranium enrichment gas centrifuges.

 

A plutonium scenario

Cesid's claim--that Algeria soon will be able to "restart a military program"--is based on the completion of the third phase of construction.

Cesid argues that the 15-megawatt reactor could produce as much as 3 kilograms of weapon-grade plutonium a year. Western officials have sketched three scenarios: irradiating natural uranium targets in the core, increasing significantly the number of reloads of low-enriched uranium fuel, or switching to natural uranium fuel.

But using extra amounts of low-enriched uranium fuel would be readily detected, and China would be likely to cut off the fuel supply. It would not be easy to obtain low-enriched uranium from other sources. The conversion of the reactor to natural uranium would also be difficult to do and easy to detect.

The use of targets is the most practical method, and it is difficult to detect. Assessments vary, but a typical estimate is that about 1.5 kilograms per year could be produced using target material. Production at this level would lead to an increase in the total heat output of the reactor, perhaps explaining the oversized cooling capacity.

The hot cells could be used to cut up the fuel or target elements, said one Western expert. Another expert believes that the facility could also be used to reprocess a limited amount of irradiated uranium. According to the Spanish assessment, however, the radioisotope laboratory is the most likely place to have the capability to dissolve the irradiated material and chemically extract the plutonium.

If this scenario were to be realized, the targets would need to be fabricated, but no fabrication facility is known to exist at the site. U.S. experts have speculated that a facility could be near the reactor. The Argentine-supplied fuel-fabrication plant in Draria could be used to make targets, but that facility, near Algeria's small research reactor, is subject to IAEA safeguards.

Algeria might be able to import sufficient natural uranium from other African nations. In addition, Cesid reported that Algeria has discovered uranium in Hoggar, in the southeast part of the country. Algeria could also attempt to produce uranium from its abundant phosphate ores.

Weapon-grade plutonium could be produced either covertly or openly, although it would be difficult for Algeria to hide production if it were continuous. Detection would be easier if safeguarded fuel were used, less easy if natural uranium targets were clandestinely irradiated and hidden or removed before inspections. If Algeria decides to bring into force the Additional Model Protocol, production would be more easily detected.

If all its activities and products were safeguarded, Algeria could produce plutonium overtly, yet remain in compliance with the NPT. In that case, however, supplier countries would probably pressure it to stop. If Algeria renounced the NPT, China would undoubtedly cut off its supply of enriched uranium fuel. In that case, a critical factor would be how much fuel was on hand.

Alternatively, Algeria could develop its own uranium-enrichment facility. But claims made in the late 1980s that Argentina was secretly providing uranium enrichment assistance were not viewed as credible. In addition, U.S. experts and officials have said they have found no indication of Algerian uranium enrichment activities.

 

Inevitable suspicions

Despite the information we have about Algeria's nuclear program, it is difficult to determine whether Algeria had a nuclear weapons program in the 1980s, or whether it continues to develop the capability to produce and separate plutonium today. Algeria has cooperated with the IAEA within the requirements of its current safeguards agreement, but it has not been open enough to allay widespread suspicions about its activities.

The lack of transparency does not mean that Algeria is seeking nuclear weapons or conducting undeclared nuclear activities in violation of the NPT. In an environment of partial transparency, however, suspicions are inevitable.

Unless Algeria accepts additional safeguards, the IAEA will not be able to fulfill its mission in verifying the extent of Algeria's nuclear program. Algeria should bring into force the Additional Model Protocol. If it is not willing to do so, it should allow the IAEA to inspect all the facilities at and adjacent to the site, and any related to the activities at the site. Algeria should also describe in more detail its historical, current, and future nuclear program and activities. The acceptance of expanded safeguards could be crucial to alleviating concern in the case of a crisis in government.

 

1. M. Gonzalez and J. M. Larraya, "Cesid Warns that in Two Years Algeria Will Have the Capability to Produce Military Plutonium," El Pais, August 23, 1998 (Internet version), in Spanish; English translation in Foreign Broadcast Service FBIS-TAC-98-235; a similar translation can be found at www.isis-online.org.

2. Andrew Borowiec, "Algeria Advances Nuclear Program, Capability Worries Arabs, Europeans," Washington Times, June 3, 2000.

3. Qusay Salih Darwish, "Algeria Acknowledges Presence of Nuclear Reactor to Contain Campaign," Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (in Arabic), May 1, 1991; translation in Arab Africa, FBIS-NES-91-089, May 8, 1991.

4. Mark Hibbs, "Cooling Towers are Key to Claim Algeria is Building Bomb Reactor," Nucleonics Week, April 18, 1991.

5. "UK Attaché Quits Post in Algeria," The Times (London), April 15, 1991; "China Helps Algeria Build First Arab Atom Bomb," The Sunday Times (London), April 28, 1991.

6. Algiers Domestic Service in Arabic, April 28, 1991; translation in Arab Africa, FBIS-NES-91-082, April 29, 1991.

7. Algérie Presse Service, "'Peaceful Character' of Nuclear Effort Viewed," April 30, 1991, in English, see Arab Africa, FBIS-NES-91-084.

8. Howard LaFranchi, "Algerians Defend Nuclear Program," Christian Science Monitor, May 3, 1991.

9. Le Monde, May 17, 1991; English translation in Arab Africa, FBIS-NES-91-100, May 23, 1991.

10. We were unable to locate a Scientific Center at El Noussala.

11. Algérie Presse Service, in Arabic, May 26, 1991; English translation in Arab Africa, FBIS-NES-91-102, May 28, 1991.

12. Ann MacLachlan, "Algerian Leader Asserts Good Faith in Nuclear Research Reactor Plans," Nucleonics Week, May 23, 1991.

13. Agence France Presse, in English, January 13, 1992, available in Arab Africa, FBIS-NES-92-009, January 14, 1992.

14. Mark Hibbs, "Algeria Denies It Has Iraqi Uranium or Weapons Program," Nucleonics Week, January 9, 1992.

15. Gonzalez and Larraya, "Cesid Warns."

16. Agence France Presse, December 21, 1992 (in French).

17. This search was conducted by the ISIS staff and Mark Gorwitz, a specialist in open-source technical information.

18. Abdelkrim Azzouz and Mouloud Attou, "Radiolytic Decomposition of Tributylphosphate Effect of Gamma Radiation Dosage on Bonds Stability," Revue Roumaine de Chimie, vol. 39, no. 1 (1994), pp. 37--40.

19. L. Boumahraz, "Enrichment and Isotope Separation of Tritium between Hydrogen and Liquid Water in the Tikle [sic] Bed Reactor" (in French), Center for Nuclear and Solar Studies, High Commission for Research, Algiers, Algeria, September 1986.

20. Xinhua News Agency, "China: Nuclear Energy Official Signs Agreement," June 3, 1996; English translation in BBC Monitoring Service, Asia-Pacific, June 5, 1996.

21. Wang Jingcheng, Beijing Xinhua Domestic Service, "PRC, Algerian Official Discuss Nuclear Energy Cooperation," June 3, 1996, English translation in FBIS-CHI-96-107; Beijing Xinhua Domestic Service, May 21, 1997, English translation in FBIS-CHI-97-141.

 

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David Albright, a Bulletin contributing editor and a physicist, is president of the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) in Washington, D.C. Corey Hinderstein is a policy analyst at ISIS.

May/June 2001 pp. 45-52 (vol. 57, no. 03) © 2001 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

 

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