Mirage 2000s Withdrawn As India's MRCA Fighter Competition Changes
Also on this day: 08-Mar-2006 »
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"It's the biggest fighter aircraft deal since the early 1990s," said Boeing's Mark Kronenberg, who runs the company's Asia/Pacific business. DID has offered ongoing coverage of India's planned multi-billion dollar jet fighter buy, from its early days as a contest between Dassault, Saab, and MiG for a 126 plane order to the possible entry of American competitors and even EADS' Eurofighter. What began as a lightweight fighter competition to replace India's shrinking MiG-21 interceptor fleet appears to have bifurcated into two categories now, and two expense tiers.
That trend got a sharp boost recently, when Press Trust of India (PTI) reported a surprise pullout by the CEO of Dassault on the eve of the RFP. The Mirage 2000v5 will no longer be fielded for the India deal, despite the fact that India already flies 40 Mirage 2000Ds and its senior officials have touted standardization as a plus factor. So, what's going on?
In a word, lots. The participants are changing, India's view of its own needs is changing, and the size and nature of the order may be changing as well....
Dassault's Move: The Rafale Option
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According to India Press Trust, Chacks Edelstenne, CEO of Dassault Aviation, visited the Minister of State for Defence Rao Inderjit Singh and The Deputy Chief of the Air Staff Air Marshal AK Nangalia on February 21, 2006. He informed his audience that "we are on the verge of closing the Mirage fighter assembly line and want to offer India a quantum jump in technology... Though India has not not floated the Request for Proposals (RFP), we have conveyed to India to supply 40 Rafale multi-mission fighters in single source deal."
In a related move, French engine maker Snecma, which is also bidding for DRDO's joint collaboration project on the Tejas LCA's Kaveri engines, has offered to mount Kaveri engines in Rafale fighters.
Media reports note that India's decision-making speed may have had something to do with the switch, as Dassault sources claimed that it would take at least three-four years for a contract to actually be signed with India. Word is that the French government thought that it would be too expensive to keep the Mirage factories running during that time without additional export prospects.
Dassault has reportedly assured India that its extensive Mirage repair and servicing facilities set up by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited at Bangalore would require only 'limited modification' to accommodate the Rafale, given its commonalities with the Mirage 2000s.
Dassault may be completely up-front about the reasons behind this choice. It may also have decided that the introduction of the F/A-18 Super Hornet, MiG-35, and changing requirements in the RFP make the Mirage a loser anyway, while boosting the Rafale's chance of securing an export order that would be critical to its long-term future.
Whichever way one leans, the withdrawal of the Mirage 2000 from the competition appears to be official and final.
India's MRCA (Multi-Role Combat Aircraft): Changes
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The original intent of India's fighter purchase was to replace hundreds of non-upgraded MiG-21s that India will be forced to retire, with a complementary force of 126 aircraft to go with India's high end Su-30MKIs, and its low-end Tejas LCA lightweight fighter. India is a large country, with coverage needs over a wide area (see map of airbases in "Order of Battle") and on several fronts.
Lightweight multi-role fighters that could make up for declining aircraft numbers with broader and better capabilities would appear to fit that need, and their initial shortlist followed that template. The Mirage 2000 and MiG-29 were already in service with India in this role, and the JAS-39 offered a fourth generation aircraft whose costs and profile place it firmly in the lightweight fighter category. These aircraft served as a hedge against the potential failure of the Tejas lightweight Combat Aircraft project, and also offered a more immediate solution to plussing up numbers as existing MiG-21s and MiG-23s/MiG-27s were forced into retirement.
Since those early days, sharply improved relations with the USA have introduced a pair of American planes into the competition, and India's view of its own needs is changing. Official sources told Jane's that RFPs are now to be issued to France's Dassault (Mirage 2000-5 and Rafale), BAE/Saab (JAS-39 Gripen), EADS/BAE (Eurofighter Typhoon), The American firms Lockheed (F-16 Block 70) and Boeing (F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet), and Russia's Rosonboronexport (MiG-29OVT with thrust vectoring, aka. MiG-35).
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India's requirements are also changing. Jane's Defence Weekly notes that India wishes to 'significantly' augment their strike capability and range to deal with out-of-area contingencies (a trend noted by DID recently). This has delayed the MRCA RFP, originally expected in December 2005. Another contributor to these delays has been the need to refine and clarify the new industrial offset rules (perhaps US lobbying has made a difference).
Of even greater importance is Jane's belief that India will increase its initial requirement from 126 multirole combat aircraft (MRCA) to around 180-190 aircraft, with the additional number being considered for acquisition by the Indian Navy. Reports to other outlets vary, however, and some reports have India standing firm at 126 aircraft.
The naval requirement will be extremely significant because the current roster of competitors contains only two aircraft that qualify for future STOBAR1 carriers like the INS Vikramaditya (ex- Admiral Gorshkov) and the Vikrant Class (aka. Air Defence Ship), which will reportedly weigh in at 37,500 tonnes with a design that is heavily influenced by Italy's Cavour Class.
Those aircraft are the Boeing F/A-18 Super Hornet and Dassault's Rafale-M variant. Additionally, the MiG-35 is related to the MiG-29K naval variant slated for operation on INS Vikramaditya. If Russia wishes to invest in the idea, a carrier-capable MiG-35K may also be doable - if the extra weight of the new fuel tanks doesn't create a problem given the hard impacts of carrier landings.
Recall India's need to replace large numbers of aircraft. Given that both the Rafale and Super Hornet carry flyaway costs in the $55-70 million per plane range, and total program costs significantly higher than that, a naval requirement within the competition almost certainly means a split of the order between these high-expense platforms and a cheaper lightweight fighter contender. For instance, there's the possibility of a smaller F/A-18 E/F order and a large MiG-35 order.
India's defense procurement process is definitely a game for the patient, but an RFP that clarifies India's exact requirements and timelines is expected within the next few few months.
The Competitotrs: Analysis
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Recent changes in India's needs and the contest participants are changing the relative rankings of the contenders. Geopolitical considerations are also intruding, as most of these choices have the potential to improve relations with an important potential ally. As noted above, standardization arguments will also carry weight. India's Air Force currently operates 26 different types of aircraft, and India is not eager to add to its support headaches.
Rather than predict, DID will simply summarize the strengths and weaknesses of the current and potential competitors. These aircraft also group into two very different categories: single engine lightweight fighters in the $25-40 million flyaway range (F-16 Falcon, JAS-39 Gripen, MiG-35, Mirage 2000-5); and larger dual-engine mid-range fighters in the $55-70 million flyaway range (Eurofighter, F/A-18 Super Hornet, Rafale).
Lightweight Fighters
F-16 Fighting Falcon (Lockheed, USA). Presumably, Lockheed's "Block 70" offering would be an upgraded version of the F-16E Block 60 "Desert Falcon" currently serving with the UAE. Strengths include the widest multi-role capability among lightweight fighters, its AN/APG-80 AESA radar, a wide choice of proven avionics and systems, a long record of proven service so all issues are known, and widespread compatibility with potential allies in Asia and the Middle East who also fly F-16s. The combination of an AESA radar on a less expensive platform is also good news for cruise missile defense efforts, if that's considered a priority.
Yet the Indian Air Force has just never seemed interested in the F-16. Weaknesses include the fact that Pakistan also flies F-16s; the fact it's a new aircraft type so the entire support infrastructure would have to be developed; and the difficulty Lockheed would have complying with industrial offet provisions given their lack of penetration in India.
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JAS-39 Gripen (Saab, Sweden; marketed by Britain's BAE). True fourth generation lightweight fighter, significantly more capable than category competitors like the F-16 and Mirage 2000 though the MiG-35 may give it a run for the money. Other strengths include the fact that it has been designed for exceptional cost of ownership, and can operate from roads instead of runways if necessary. Its use of a modified F404 engine also indicates that it might be modifiable to use India's Kaveri engine if that project is successful (the Tejas LCA will use F404 engines until Kaveri is ready, if it ever is).
Weaknesses include short range, which is fine in Sweden but not so fine in India; the fact it's a new aircraft type so the entire support infrastructure would have to be developed; and a low volume of international orders to date raises questions about the platform's ability to modernize over the next 30 years. Saab usually handles industrial offets via its automotive group, which could represent either a difficulty or a market opportunity for the company. It also carries no spin-off geopolitical plusses, and this last weakness may be the final nail in its competition coffin.
MiG-29OVT, aka. MiG-35 (Rosonboronexport, Russia). This modified MiG-29 includes improved radar and avionics that give it multi-role capability, extra fuel in a new aircraft "spine," and thrust-vectoring engines a la India's SU-30MKIs. Their presence in India also makes compliance with industrial offets requirements easier. Strengths include compatibility with the existing and future MiG-29 fleet, its ability to carry advanced Russian missiles already in service like the revolutionary AA-11/R-73 Archer and longer range AA-12/R-77 "AMRAAMski." The MiG-29's biggest weaknesses were short range, engines that produce telltale smoke (very bad in air combat) and lack of true multi-role capability; the MiG-35 fixes them.
Its biggest weakness is the IAF's not-so-great experience with India's existing MiG-29s, which have had maintenance problems in addition to their other deficits. Secondary weaknesses include legitimate speculation about the future viability of the platform, which has been eclipsed by the SU-30 to the point that its design bureau's very industrial future is seriously in doubt. Some observers believe that without a win in India, RSK MiG will close or be merged.
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Mirage 2000-5 (Dassault). Withdrawn, for reasons that still aren't entirely clear. Richard Aboulafia points out that the history of global fighter purchases shows strong clustering at the lower-price end of the market; shutting down Mirage 2000 production would shut Dassault out of that niche. A Mirage 2000 entry would have had strengths that included compatibility with Mirage 2000s already in service, which performed very well in the 1999 Kargil skirmishes. An infrastructure already exists for industrial offsets, and its low end price could be raised along with its capabilities by adding equipment developed in the Rafale program.
The Mirage 2000's potential performance similarity to the Tejas LCA project is both weakness and strength. One the one hand, that makes it a good insurance policy if confidence in the Tejas is low. On the other hand, it may not be seen as adding enough to the force mix if confidence in the Tejas program is high.
Tejas LCA (HAL et. al., India). A lightweight, indigenously-developed fighter aircraft expected to enter service around 2010. Currently still in testing using GE F404 engine, while the accompanying Kaveri jet engine project remains in the R&D stage and has been forced to find foreign design help. The Tejas is not an MRCA competitor - but its development plans, the confidence in its success, its ability to stay under $25 million, the potential for a naval variant, et. al. will have a behind-the-curtains influence on every MRCA decision. See DID's in-depth coverage of the Tejas LCA program for more.
Mid-Range Fighters
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Eurofighter Typhoon (EADS/BAE, Europe & Britain). A fourth generation aircraft currently optimized for the air-air role through its performance characteristics and what is by all accounts an excellent pilot interface. Reportedly has "supercruise" capability of being able to exceed Mach 1 without using afterburners, though some analyses have cast doubt on how sustainable that is. Some observers believe that aside from the F-22A Raptor, the Eurofighter is the next-best in-service air superiority aircraft world-wide (a competition with the SU-30MKI would be interesting). Future upgrades will give it more mult-role capability. EADS Airbus might be able to handle the industrial offsets angle if things ever got that far.
Weaknesses include the fact it's a new aircraft type for the IAF so the entire support infrastructure would have to be developed; its lack of an AESA radar; it's lack of naval capability; and the non-existent geopolitical benefits of selecting it. Given the Eurofighter's performance and cost range, simply buying more SU-30MKIs would appear to make far more sense.
F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet (Boeing, USA). Highly upgraded version of the F/A-18 A-D Hornet, enlarged and given new engines and avionics. Strengths include its powerful AN/APG-79 AESA radar, which has drawn significant interest from India. This radar could allow Super Hornets to play a unique role in India's fighter fleet as versatile "quarterbacks" (or better yet, "cricket captains") due to their radar's performance and information sharing abilities. Other advantages include carrier capability, a very wide range of integrated weapons, a design that is proven in service and in combat, and complete assurance in its future given the US Navy's commitment to it. The existence of a dedicated electronic warfare variant as of 2009 in the EA-18G Growler may also be a potent motivator, as long-range strike and carrier strike will increasingly require this. Last but certainly not least, this choice offers an opportunity to create an early "win" which would strengthen India's new alliance with the USA and prove its new status in the world. After all, no other nation has even been offered the F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet.
Weaknesses of the platform include poorer aerodynamic performance than the Eurofighter or Rafale due to inherent airframe limitations, and the fact it's a new aircraft type for the IAF so the entire support infrastructure would have to be developed. Industrial offsets could prove challenging, but the Super Hornet's Boeing connection may be able to solve this problem via the civil aircraft market.
Rafale (Dassault, France). Advantages include demonstrated carrier capability in the Rafale-M, which could be a very big factor if the RFP includes that as a requirement. The aircraft offers exceptional ordnance capacity for its size, and can have its range extended via conformal fuel tanks (unknown to DID whether this has been tested on the Rafale-M). It also offers superior aerodynamic performance over the F/A-18 family. The Rafale claims "supercruise" capability, but observers are skeptical and it has been chalenging to demonstrate this with the Snecma R88-2 engine. Installing the Kaveri engine may be possible, and would give that engine a broader fleet of aircraft that would amortize its costs better - albeit at a likely performance cost. The Rafale would have some equipment, maintenance and spares commonalities with existing Mirage 2000 fleet, which would probably increase if the Mirage 2000s were modernized later on.
Weaknesses include the fact that the Rafale has yet to win a single export competition worldwide, and its lack of an AESA radar. Rafale's failure to win export competitions means more than a perception of "also-ran" status; as DID noted in an update to our Singapore fighter coverage (the Rafale lost to the F-15SG Strike Eagle), it is already forcing cuts in future Rafale procurement to pay for modernization, a dynamic that could get worse over the next 30 years.
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F-35 Joint Stike Fighter (Lockheed-led, multinational). India's Chief Air Marshal recently specificaly noted that the JSF was not in their plans for this buy, a likelihood that DID's analysis had noted earlier due to probable lack of availability before 2015. If it were flying today, the F-35B would probably be by far the best fit for India's requirements. Strengths would include greater stealth than all other competitors, which is critical for both air-air dogfights and strikes on defended targets. The planes would be carrier-capable from all of India's naval air platforms, including smaller carriers the size of INS Viraat (ex-Hermes) or LHD amphibious assault ships, and could use roads and short field runways as well for maximum operational flexibility. F-35 JSFs would sport ultra-advanced systems that include the AN/APG-81 AESA radar, and incredibly advanced sensor systems and electronics that would make it India's most capable reconnaissance asset and even a potential slectronic warfare aircraft. The Super Hornet may be able to fill the role of an aerial cricket captain, but the JSF is more like Sachin Tendulkar.
India has been invited to F-35 events, and with potential US buys dropping it's very possible that they could end up accepted into the program if they pushed for it. The F-35's killer weakness is timing, though its advanced systems and established partnerhsip structure and program procurement policies could also make meeting the foreign purchase industrial offsets provisions nearly impossible.
Footnotes
1 STOBAR = Short Take-Off But Assisted Recovery. Means it has no catapult and so uses a "ski jump" in the front, but uses arrestor wires to catch returning aircraft because it flies conventional aircraft rather than STOVL (Short Take-Off, Vertical Landing) planes like the F-35B or V/STOL (Vertical/Short Take-Off and Landing) planes like the Sea Harriers on India's existing Viraat (ex-Hermes) carrier.