CDI Russia Weekly September 1, 2000

CDI Russia Weekly-#117

1 September 2000

Edited by David Johnson

Center for Defense Information

1779 Massachusetts Ave. NW

Washington DC 20036

phone: 202-332-0600; fax:202-462-4559

djohnson@cdi.org

The CDI Russia Weekly is an e-mail newsletter that carries news and

analysis on all aspects of today's Russia, including political,

economic, social, military, and foreign policy issues. With funding

from the Carnegie Corporation of New York, CDI Russia Weekly is a

project of the Washington-based Center for Defense Information (CDI),

a nonprofit research and education organization.

CDI Russia Weekly web page (with archive): http://www.cdi.org/russia/

Visit CDI's web site: http://www.cdi.org

Contents:

4. The Globe and Mail (Canada): Geoffrey York, Torpedo blast sank Russian sub: experts.

9. Moscow Times: Thomas Graham Jr., John B. Rhinelander and Alexander Yereskovsky, Caution on NMD.

*******

US steps up pressure on Russia over alleged American spy

WASHINGTON, Aug 31 (AFP) -

The United States on Thursday stepped up pressure on Russia to release an

American detained in Moscow on espionage charges, threatening to issue a

formal travel warning for the country.

State Department spokesman Richard Boucher said the case of Edmund Pope,

whose wife and other visitors say is in deteriorating health, raised serious

questions about Russia's commitment to safeguarding those in its custody.

"We're examining the implications of this for other Americans, business

people who might travel to Russia, and we are looking at the consular

information that we provide," Boucher said.

His comments followed similar but less severe remarks on the safety of US

travelers to Russia made earlier this week by another State Department

official who said Pope's treatment in jail "raises serious concerns about the

safety and security of American business travelers in Russia."

US travel warnings impose no legal restrictions on Americans but have in the

past resulted in the loss of significant amounts of tourist and commericial

revenue for countries they are issued for.

In addition, many nations resent the stigma attached to such warnings and

complain vigorously about having been identified as unsafe.

In addition to repeating Washington's insistance that there is no evidence

against Pope, a 53-year-old former naval intelligence officer who suffers

from a rare form of bone cancer now in remission, Boucher said Russian

authorities were being inconsistant in denying him access to an American

physician.

And, he cast doubt on reports in the Russian press suggesting that Pope's

health was fine.

"You can't say he's healthy and not let people go in and see him to see that

he's healthy," Boucher said of the Russians who have repeatedly denied

requests for a US embassy doctor to examine Pope.

"The people who have seen him, including his wife, say his health has

deteriorated seriously," he added.

On Wednesday, a day after Pope's wife, Cheri, visited her husband in Moscow's

Lefortovo prison where he has been held since April, a court scheduled for

September 11 a hearing for Pope to appeal for his release on health grounds.

But Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov insisted "there are no new

circumstances" permitting the government to order Pope's release.

The case has been raised by US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright with

Ivanov and by US President Bill Clinton with Russian President Vladimir Putin

to no avail.

The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) has denounced the US pressure,

saying the charges against Pope are of the utmost seriousness and maintianing

that Pope had been examined by doctors more than 10 times since his and

medical reports had shown his condition to be satisfactory.

Washington's concerns over Pope's health were brought into sharper focus when

another US citizen jailed in Russia, Yefim Shurkovich, died on July 31 after

having been denied medical treatment.

Pope is accused of contacting Russian scientists in Moscow and the Siberian

city of Novosibirsk, as well as other locations, with a view to gathering

information classified as "top secret."

He faces a jail sentence of 10 to 20 years for spying, and a term of four to

seven years for disclosing state secrets, if convicted under Russian law.

******

Moscow Times

August 31, 2000

DEFENSE DOSSIER: Drowning Reality of Kursk

By Pavel Felgenhauer

The attitude of the authorities to the tragic sinking of the nuclear

submarine Kursk, Oscar-II class, was very Soviet in nature: They withheld

information, distorted information, stretched the truth, denied the obvious

and presented xenophobic fantasies as solid facts. The present propaganda

whitewash campaign is also very Soviet in nature: Government-subsidized

media are rewriting the Kursk affair into a heroic saga of men that died

defending the motherland.

President Vladimir Putin has signed a decree that a monument be built to

honor the Kursk crew. All Kursk crew members have been awarded posthumous

Order of Courage medals. And the captain, Gennady Lyachin, was awarded the

Order of Hero of Russia.

The authorities traditionally have liked dead heroes, while neglecting the

living. Dead men cannot speak up for themselves. The nation is virtually

covered with monuments dedicated to dead heroes. In military barracks,

there are unoccupied bunks assigned to dead heroes who are officially

listed as if they were living members of military units.

Many of those men actually were heroes who perished defending Russia,

though it is hard to tell now who's who because their real stories were

distorted by official propaganda. The same is happening today with the crew

of the Kursk.

There is growing evidence that suggests that the torpedo stockpile in the

bow of the Kursk exploded, killing those on board almost instantly,

apparently after a botched test-firing of a torpedo or an underwater

rocket. A technical mishap, human error f or both f most likely caused the

blast. A lapse in the design of the ship could also be to blame.

It's hard to see anything heroic in the Kursk tragedy. And, if there was,

so what? Who cares about the truth? Last month, Putin dedicated a monument

in Pskov to 84 paratroopers wiped out in Chechnya in March by rebels in a

three-day fight while other federal troops were only 200 meters away. The

military authorities fudged about the incident, tried to cover it up,

failed, and in the end declared the paratroopers dead heroes.

Officially, federal forces have lost almost 2,700 men in Chechnya in a

year. In fact, each month Russian troops have lost on average the

equivalent of two full crews of an Oscar-II sub or more. But Putin's

national approval ratings reached 75 percent after the Pskov monument

dedication. Not a single general has been reprimanded for any war crime or

any wrongful deaths of soldiers, or for anything at all in Chechnya. On the

contrary, dozens have been promoted and decorated. The dead heroes also got

their share of medals.

It is possible that pro-government propaganda will eventually convert the

sinking of the Kursk and the botched rescue into a heroic feat, with Putin

as the main hero. Television coverage has already suggested that Putin's

meeting last week with relatives of the Kursk crew was a heroic act.

The monument to the Kursk will soon be constructed on the shore of the

Barents Sea, and one may hazard a guess that that will happen sooner than

the ship itself will be salvaged. One may also easily guess that no other

engagements will prevent Putin from coming to lead the monument dedication

and say once more in public: "We will overcome it all and restore it all:

the military and the navy and the state."

The problem is that Putin cannot "restore" anything. The militaristic state

is crumbling around him, its basic military and civilian infrastructure in

disrepair. Even the seemingly omnipotent pro-government PR machine

sometimes goes on the fritz. The fire that gutted the Ostankino tower this

week seriously hampered the government propaganda effort to rewrite the

Kursk disaster. The authorities did their best to paint a rosy picture and

play down the damage to the tower,but Moscow television screens were blank

nonetheless.

The navy did its best to cover up the Kursk accident, but the ship was

dead, and nothing could change that. The Kremlin is covering up facts of

the war in Chechnya, but it cannot do so forever.

Propaganda is a powerful weapon, but hard facts surface in the end,

identifiable buoys in a sea of disinformation. I asked RTR television's

Arkady Mamontov, the only journalist the authorities allowed on the scene

of the Kursk sinking, the following question: "The 'foreign' green/white

buoys that the Russian military imply are evidence of a subversive 'enemy

sub' presence in the area were actually heads of cabbage?"

"No," he said. "I investigated and discovered it was a floating sack of

potatoes."

Pavel Felgenhauer is an independent defense analyst based in Moscow.

*******

No Change to Russia's Military Defense Budget

MOSCOW, Aug 31, 2000 -- (Agence France Presse) The Russian government will

not add further increases to the military budget for 2001 despite pressure

from the State Duma in the wake of the Kursk tragedy, Deputy Prime Minister

Ilya Klebanov said Wednesday.

Russian lawmakers are due to debate the draft budget on September 22, when

the Communist party is expected to spearhead calls for a hike in the

206-billion-ruble (7.2-billion-dollar, 8.3-billion-euro) sum already

earmarked for military spending next year.

But Klebanov ruled out such an increase after holding talks with Russian

President Vladimir Putin at the Kremlin Wednesday, ITAR-TASS reported.

"The budget has been prepared by the government and this figure of 206

(billion rubles) will not change," he added.

"We think that according to the terms of the reform and the 10-year weapons

program this sum is sufficient, in principle. Increasing it could lead to

very undesirable distortions of the budget."

In June, an earlier draft of the budget proposed a cut in spending on the

security forces, with a total of five billion dollars being allocated to

defense.

That sum was increased to just over seven billion dollars at a meeting of

Russia's Security Council on August 11, according to the AVN military news

agency.

In the wake of the Kursk submarine sinking, and the failure of Russian

rescuers to save the 118 seamen trapped at the bottom of the Barents Sea,

Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev criticized inadequate defense funding and

Putin pledged to reform the armed services.

Last week, the Russian leader instructed Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin to

send the draft budget to the Duma unamended, claiming windfall profits from

the high price of oil exports and a new flat-rate 13 per cent income tax

would make up the shortfall.

*******

The Globe and Mail (Canada)

August 30, 2000

Torpedo blast sank Russian sub: experts

Probably new weapon being tested that blew up Kursk, they speculate

GEOFFREY YORK

Moscow Bureau

Moscow -- Russia's submarine disaster was caused by the explosion of a faulty

torpedo, probably an experimental new weapon that the submarine was secretly

testing, according to a growing body of opinion among American, Norwegian and

Russian experts.

While some Russian officials still say a foreign submarine collided with the

nuclear sub Kursk, there is mounting international support for the theory

that the vessel was a victim of its own weaponry.

The sub exploded and sank on Aug. 12 during Russian naval exercises in the

Barents Sea, killing all 118 crew members on board.

The experimental-torpedo theory was first publicized last week by several

Russian newspapers and military analysts, including the daily Izvestia and

the weekly Moskovskiye Vedemosti, which cited sources in the Russian navy.

Alexander Nikitin, a former Russian submarine captain who was jailed for his

environmental research, said the Kursk was testing two new liquid-fuelled

torpedoes, which are cheaper and more dangerous than conventional

solid-fuelled torpedoes.

Mr. Nikitin said he is almost certain that the disaster was caused by the

explosion of the two experimental torpedoes in the forward section of the

submarine as they were being tested.

Two Russian politicians, Kursk regional governor Alexander Rutskoi and former

submarine officer Sergei Zhekov, have cited their own military sources as

supporting the same theory.

A similar explanation is favoured by Erinar Skorgen, the Norwegian admiral

who led the rescue mission that finally opened the submarine's hatch last

week. Dismissing Russian claims of a collision, Adm. Skorgen, too, said a

violent explosion on the Kursk was the likely cause of the sinking.

American military officials are now adding their support to the same theory.

Several news agencies yesterday quoted Pentagon sources as saying the

disaster was probably caused by a torpedo misfiring aboard the Kursk.

Data collected by U.S. surveillance ships in the Barents Sea showed no sound

of any collision, but instead confirmed that two explosions ripped a gaping

hole in the Kursk's bow within a period of two minutes, according to a report

yesterday in The New York Times.

The newspaper said the leading American theory is that the explosion was

caused by a misfired torpedo and is supported by data from the U.S. nuclear

submarine Memphis, which had been monitoring the Russian naval exercises.

Five days after the explosion, the Memphis docked in a Norwegian port and

unloaded its sonar tapes.

A report on the weekend in the Sunday Times of London said the Kursk was

carrying two civilian experts who were conducting secret tests of a new

torpedo system. The disaster was probably caused by the accidental ignition

of liquid propellant from one of the new weapons, the report said.

The submarine's commander had requested permission to test-fire a weapon on

the morning of Aug. 12, the exact time of the explosion, the report added.

Russian Deputy Prime Minister Ilya Klebanov staunchly denied the reports that

the Kursk was testing an experimental torpedo. "There were no new torpedoes

on the submarine," he insisted yesterday.

The Kremlin is hoping to begin recovering the bodies of the crew next month.

******

News Release Issued by the International Secretariat of Amnesty International

31 August 2000

AI Index EUR 46/041/2000

News Service Nr. 167

Russian Federation

Intimidatory raid on Glasnost Foundation

The special police raid on the premises of the Glasnost Foundation in

Moscow was an intimidatory act carried out with disproportionate use of

force, Amnesty International said today.

The raid was conducted on the evening of 29 August by masked law

enforcement officers. Staff and visitors of the human rights

organization were ordered at gunpoint to lie face-down on the floor.

Some of them were kicked and sworn at. Sergey Grigoryants, a veteran

human rights activist, reported being kicked in the head and back for

not lying down quickly enough.

"The ill-treatment of those present in the Glasnost Foundation may

amount to cruel or degrading treatment, in breach of the Russian

Federation's obligations under international law," Amnesty International

said.

The organization also expressed concern that the human rights activists

may have been arbitrarily detained in breach of the Russian Federation's

obligations under Article 5 of the European Convention for the

Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.

"This unacceptable incident must be promptly investigated in a thorough

and impartial manner," Amnesty International said, adding that any

officers reasonably suspected of human rights violations should be

brought to justice.

Background

According to information received by Amnesty International, seven or

eight officers broke down the back door of the Glasnost Foundation's

Moscow office shortly after 7pm on 29 August. All except one of the

officers wore masks and were dressed in camouflage uniforms, armed with

automatic weapons and pistols. They were led by an officer without a

mask, who has been identified as a lieutenant of the 18th Moscow police

precinct. Immediately prior to the raid this officer had presented

himself at the front door, but Glasnost Foundation Chairman Sergey

Grigoryants had not admitted him, as the officer reportedly identified

himself incorrectly and failed to produce a search warrant.

All the people present in the office at the time of the raid --

numbering about 12 and including a 10-year-old girl -- were kept lying

on the floor for about 30 minutes. The police lieutenant stated that he

and his colleagues were conducting a check on the identity documents of

everyone in the foundation's office. However, they reportedly did not

check the documents of all the activists.

Sergey Grigoryants is a human rights activist and former dissident, who

was adopted as a prisoner of conscience by Amnesty International during

the pre-glasnost years of the Soviet Union.

Among its activities the Glasnost Foundation conducts an annual

conference entitled: "The KGB: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow". On the

evening of the raid the foundation staff and visitors were planning the

ninth such conference, scheduled for late October or early November,

together with other events such as a human rights defenders' conference.

ENDS.../

Amnesty International, International Secretariat, 1 Easton Street,

WC1X 8DJ, London, United Kingdom

******

Jamestown Foundation Monitor

August 31, 2000

How genuine is Putin's fight against corruption and the oligarchs?

SWISS MAGISTRATE SAYS MOSCOW IS NOT HELPING HIS INVESTIGATION. Laurent

Kasper-Ansermet, the Geneva magistrate who is leading an investigation into

the alleged diversion of a US$4.8 billion International Monetary Fund

credit to Russia in the summer of 1998, has again accused the Russian

authorities of lack of cooperation in the investigation. In an interview

published today, Kasper-Ansermet said that he had told Russian Prosecutor

General Vladimir Ustinov last September that he planned to make an official

request for help in his department's investigation into the Bank of New

York (BONY) moneylaundering scandal, but that Ustinov never replied.

Kasper-Ansermet also said that Russian Deputy Prosecutor General Vasily

Kolmogorov failed to respond earlier this year to an official request for

urgent assistance in the case (Segodnya, August 31).

During last year's BONY scandal, anonymous Western law enforcement

officials were quoted as saying that billion of dollars in IMF aid to

Russia had been diverted to BONY. Last month, Kasper-Ansermet ordered raids

on banks in the Swiss canton of Ticino and in Geneva in connection with the

Swiss side of the BONY case. The Italian newspaper La Repubblica quoted a

letter written by Kasper-Ansermet as saying that part or all of the

stabilization credit was suspected of having been diverted to various

banks, including the Bank of Sydney, National Westminster of London, Credit

Suisse and BONY, after passing through the New York-based Republic National

Bank and several European affiliates of Russia's Central Bank. La

Repubblica also alleged that Mikhail Kasyanov, Russia's prime minister who

was a deputy finance minister in the summer of 1998, was responsible for

the IMF credit's strange movements (see the Monitor, July 17).

In his interview, Kasper-Ansermet claims that an audit carried out by the

firm PricewaterhouseCoopers, which both the Russian authorities and the IMF

say shows that the IMF credit was not misused (see the Monitor, July 21),

in fact does not precisely show how it was used. He also says that while in

the United States he "unsuccessfully attempted to establish contact with

IMF officials," but that he had useful meetings with FBI officials and

members of Congress (Segodnya, August 31). Last month, in the wake of the

La Repubblica allegations, Martin Gilman, head of the IMF's Moscow office,

said that the Swiss authorities had not approached the Fund in connection

with an investigation of the alleged diversion of the IMF credit (see the

Monitor, July 21).

Last week, Nikolai Volkov, a top investigator in the Prosecutor General's

Office, was forced to resign. Volkov was leading the investigation into the

alleged diversion of funds from Aeroflot, the Russian state airline,

through two Swiss companies allegedly controlled by the tycoon Boris

Berezovsky. But in July, during a trip to Switzerland, Volkov also said he

would discuss with his superiors the possibility of investigating the

alleged diversion of the IMF credit (Moscow Times, August 23, July 29). He

later backed off the second statement. Several days after Volkov's sacking,

prosecutors in Montreux, Switzerland, raided the headquarters of Runicom, a

firm which acts as a trader for Sibneft, the giant Russian oil company

reportedly controlled by State Duma deputy and reputed Kremlin insider

Roman Abramovich. Bernard Bertossa, the chief prosecutor of Geneva, said

the raid was related to the investigation into the diversion of the IMF

credit (Segodnya, August 24; Moscow Times, August 25).

While it is true that the Russian police raided Sibneft's Moscow offices

and seized documents there the day prior to the Swiss raid on Runicom, some

observers said that they felt the Russian raid was merely an attempt by the

Kremlin to give the appearance of even-handedness in its dealings with the

country's powerful tycoons. In fact, the Russian authorities' lack of

cooperation with Laurent Kasper-Ansermet and the dismissal of Volkov raise

serious questions about President Vladimir Putin's ability or willingness

to mount a genuine fight against corruption and the undue influence of

powerful "oligarchs."

*******

The Guardian (UK)

1 September 2000

Dangerous dragons are lurking under the sea

Submarines are risky and expensive, but everyone wants them

By Martin Woollacott

The fate of the Kursk cast a fitful light on a drama beneath the waves to

which we normally give little thought. The 500 or so submarines of many

nations that ply their stealthy way through the oceans may not seem a large

number. But submarine competition between countries is a cause of problems

and dangers worthy of sustained attention.

This is an undersea world in which new technologies are barely under control

at the same time as old technologies decay and collapse. It is also a world

in which largely untested theories of offence and defence drive hugely

expensive developments which could engender the very conflicts governments

seek to avoid through the maintenance of naval strength.

Submarines represent at the same time the least vulnerable way of carrying

and launching nuclear weapons and the most effective way of limiting a

nuclear strike by destroying some of the other side's ballistic missile

submarines. Apart from their deterrent function, they are a vital element in

maintaining control of the high seas. They are also vital in sea-based

intervention - in the so-called "expeditionary" strategy to which most navies

now subscribe, whether they see their job as mounting such expeditions or

defeating them.

The submarine, in other words, underpins deterrence, sustains sea control,

and is critical in intervention. But one has to pause here to question the

logic of all this.

What was the Kursk doing in the Barents sea? It was presumably practising its

main job, which is to protect Russian ballistic submarines from American

attack submarines - perhaps also to attack American ballistic-missile

submarines, if the balance between the two navies were ever to permit that.

When you render down what the Kursk's captain wrote to the mother of one his

young sailors, with its impressive phrases like "battle capable", this is

what was meant: the Kursk's job was to ensure that Russia's ballistic

submarines could launch as many nuclear missiles as possible at North America

and western Europe.

Why is Russia still doing this, when a nuclear war between the west and

Russia has become inconceivable? The Russian navy has been run down to the

point where its surface fleet is about the same size as Britain's, but it

still has a large submarine force with deterrence as its main function.

In part, Moscow goes on with this because submarines are something it was

good at in the cold war. The new Akula class, extremely difficult to detect

and powerfully armed, was giving western admirals nightmares as that conflict

ended. In part, Moscow goes on with it because the United States' approach to

nuclear arms control is lackadaisical and compromised by the recent

infatuation with national missile defence. Those policies almost force Russia

to continue to deploy nuclear weapons to which it is "entitled," and which

can be seen as bargaining chips in negotiations with America. Finally, of

course, there is Vladimir Putin's desire to reform and strengthen Russia's

military forces as a means of restoring its prestige, influence, and national

pride.

Reasons in plenty - but are any of them good enough, singly or altogether, to

justify not just sending young men and boys to the bottom, but the risks run

by the whole world when a nation at an economic and technological low

attempts to keep a superpower navy at sea?

There is a dangerous irrationality here, but it is not just Russian. Nuclear

submarines are on the technological frontier. They are not easy things to

keep going, as the Royal Navy has found: one of our submarines has been

languishing unrepaired in Gibraltar since May, and some believe that nine of

12 of our non-ballistic boats are out of service at any one time. The French

probably have similar problems. Chinese nuclear submarines rarely put to sea.

When they do, fingers are crossed. Other countries, some of them even less

capable of controlling the technology, are beginning to hanker after nuclear

submarines.

It is probably true that the only navy that can run a fleet of

nuclear-powered submarines efficiently and safely is that of the US, but even

there accidents have happened. When we thought we all had to do these things,

such risks could be defended with a degree of plausibility that is lacking

now. The costs, meanwhile, are large. The next generation of American nuclear

submarines will cost $2bn each. Then there is the cost of disposing of

obsolete craft. The terrible scale of the Russian problem is known, but the

problem is not confined to them.

Acquisition of submarines by countries which previously had few or none goes

on. In most cases, governments seek to buy conventional submarines - but they

do so in part to counter the advantage of countries which have

nuclear-powered submarines. Developments initially to do with deterrence are

thus closely linked with those to do with conventional conflicts.

The strategy, or rather strategies, that have emerged divide the globe into

two classes - those who can project power, and those who wish to frustrate

that projection. Submarines are arguably the most important single instrument

for both classes. For the supreme power projector, the US, the submarine is a

valuable collector of intelligence, the safest platform for precision strikes

against land targets and a vital protector of surface ships.

Those who aspire to some capacity to project power, like Russia, China,

Britain and France, follow, at a huge remove, down this American road. But,

equally, for those who want to offer effective resistance to a descent on

their shores by the forces of the US, American-led coalitions, or other big

countries, the submarine is the weapon of choice.

Improved propulsion systems for conventional submarines which give them more

endurance and make them harder to detect, as well as better weapons and

targeting techniques, mean that relatively weak countries can mount a serious

threat to expeditionary forces, including the nuclear submarines that

accompany them. Where such intervention depends on an assurance of low

casualties, such threats might be effective.

As the cold war ended, a British naval officer wrote that "we are going to

need a strategy that doesn't start with the Threat". There have been, and

continue to be, ways in which sea power can enhance the security of the

nations, stop or limit conflicts, rescue people in trouble or bring aid to

them. But the pity is that we have held on to "the Threat" by maintaining, on

both sides, submarine forces built around the deterrent. Even if those forces

are somewhat reduced, they are surely still indefensible. At the same time we

could face a new naval race between intervening powers and those who would

resist them. There are indeed dragons under the sea.

martin.woollacott@guardian.co.uk

******

World Socialist Web Site

Moscow's Ostankino TV tower goes up in flames

By Patrick Richter

30 August 2000

On Sunday afternoon, Moscow inhabitants watched incredulously as the city's

landmark Ostankino TV tower, one of the technical miracles of the post-war

period, went up in flames. As the blaze spread through the tower the

stabilising steel cables inside were melting one after another in the intense

heat, threatening to send the whole building toppling over.

The fire in the 537-metre tower—the world's second tallest structure—was

finally put out at 17:40 local time on Monday.

The outbreak of the fire interrupted the broadcast of the most important

national television and radio programs and some smaller stations in the

European part of Russia. When the fire was finally extinguished 24 hours

later, the situation it left was devastating. More than half of the technical

systems on the TV tower were destroyed and everything combustible in the

parts of the tower hit by the fire was completely burned out. Only the

section below the 60-meter level remained largely intact due to the foam

barrier established by the fire brigade. All elevators in the tower failed,

plunging down their shafts as the fire hit their supporting steel cables.

According to recent reports, four people died in the fire: three fire

fighters and an operator suffocated as fire caused the elevator they were

riding in to stick in the shaft before plunging down. Visitors to the TV

tower, a popular tourist attraction, were evacuated in time, preventing an

even greater tragedy.

The cause of the fire is assumed to be a short-circuit in cabling at around

the 460-meter point.

A high-ranking fire brigade officer told the press that the short-circuit

could have been a result of the constant overloading of the electronic

systems in the tower. He said the capacity of the 33-year-old TV tower was

already exhausted at the beginning of the 1990s. Nevertheless further systems

were installed, which had led to technical installations overloading the

tower by 30 percent. In particular, the officer said the installation of

transmission equipment for pager systems had led to an overload and the

violation of fire regulations, which the fire brigade had warned of years

ago. In addition, the tower carried systems for broadcasting 11 television

and 12 radio programs.

The Russian television and communications industry, controlled by the

so-called oligarchs, established itself around the TV tower and has achieved

fantastic profits in recent years. The heedless installation of the lucrative

pager system, which probably led to the overload, is characteristic of the

penetration of capitalism throughout the country. Without fundamentally

renewing the decaying infrastructure, the conditions were created for the

enrichment of the new social elite—with no consideration for the possible

consequences.

The two-day failure of the TV tower is said to have caused losses of several

million dollars already.

The tower's leaning and its instability due to the loss of more than half the

149 supporting cables, which were an essential component of the special

construction of the tower, unleashed fierce arguments over whether the

structure would stay standing. For safety reasons, a 700-meter area around

the tower was evacuated during the fire-fighting operations. The top of the

tower is now leaning almost two meters outside its normal position.

Experts from the Special Steel and Concrete Constructions company, which

originally built the structure, believe that the 100-metre-long tip will have

to be dismantled in order to save the tower as a whole. This would only be

possible by means of a dangerous helicopter operation. Other experts are

talking about the complete demolition of the building. The short-term safety

of the tower will depend on there being no stormy weather over the next few

days.

Experts are also afraid that in cooling down, the tower could become

seriously deformed and metal parts might break off.

Accident upon accident

The Ostankino fire is a further link in a chain of accidents, which make

clear the catastrophic condition Russia has fallen into after 10 years of

capitalist “reforms”. The country's population must increasingly reckon

with

falling victim to a technical disaster. For too long, investment has been

lacking, which is needed for the necessary maintenance of technical apparatus

and systems upon which millions depend.

Which visitor to Russia has not seen urban street scenes where bus drivers

must first repair their vehicle before completing their journey, or how in

the cold Russian winter jets of steam rise up through the streets, or grass

verges are still growing because the underground district heating supply

pipes leak? A situation of provisional, patchwork repairs and improvisations

characterises the life of the entire country. It is only a question of time

before the next, even worse, disaster occurs.

Conditions that were so apparent in the failed rescue of the crew of the

Kursk submarine—the lack of any divers able to go down 100 meters—became

clear again in the inability to deal with a fire 300 meters over the roofs of

Moscow.

First of all, the in-built fire-extinguishing systems failed. Then it became

apparent that neither the technical equipment nor trained fire fighters were

available for this exceptional case. There was a complete lack of the

necessary extinguishing foam. Hand-held extinguishers had to be collected

from around the city. The hoses of the urban fire brigade only reach 120

meters, leading to the usual improvisation which finally led to the largest

section of the TV tower burning out.

Then the fire brigade used sand and carbon dioxide, failing to prevent the

fire from travelling downward. According to press agency reports, from the

outbreak of the fire in the afternoon until nightfall the fire brigade was

only concerned with the rescue of those trapped inside the elevator. Only

later in the night did they think to cap off the electric cabling along which

the fire was moving downward, instead of taking this relatively simple

measure from the start. The cables were only finally capped off at the

64-meter mark and the ducting—which carries both cables used in

broadcasting

and those supplying the other technical systems on the TV tower—filled with

sand, concrete and asbestos.

Interior Minister Vladimir Rushailo, Minister for Exceptional Affairs Sergei

Shoigu and Media Minister Vladimir Lessin visited the accident site by

helicopter at 3:00 a.m., but did not speak to any journalists. The fire

continued to eat away at the tower, and yellow flames could be seen coming

from the viewing platform, underneath which is the famous revolving

restaurant “In seventh heaven”.

At 5:50 a.m. an explosion occurred at the 147-meter mark, after which black

smoke belched out. By the early morning, the fire had eaten its way down to a

height of 120-130 meters above ground. By 8:00 a.m. it had reached just over

the 100-meter mark, and at 10:00 a.m. was down to 66 meters, where it was

stopped by the foam barrier established by the fire brigade.

Until then, fire fighters and onlookers watched helplessly as smoke clouds

billowed out from ever-lower parts of the tower. Desperate cries could be

heard everywhere: “The fire cannot be stopped, the fire cannot be

stopped!”

A symbol of Soviet engineering

At 537 meters high, the Moscow TV tower is the largest structure in Europe

and second only in the world to the 553-meter-high CN Tower in Toronto,

Canada, finished nine years later. The Ostankino tower was completed on

November 5, 1967 on the fiftieth anniversary of the October Revolution. It is

considered one of the most symbolic buildings in Russia and the world due to

its reinforced concrete construction, unique at the time it was built. For

most tourists to Moscow, it ranks in second place after the Kremlin and has

attracted more than 200,000 visitors annually.

The construction of the 55,000-tonne giant was directed by the ingenious

architect Nikolai Vassilievitch Nikitin (1907-73). It represented an

important innovation in construction and gave a substantial boost to the

reputation of the Soviet Union in the post-war test of strength with the

United States. Using high-tension steel cables inside the tower, Nikitin

succeeded in building an extremely thin and high tower that needed only

comparatively small foundations. The use of high-tension cables meant the

oscillation at the top of the building could be reduced to just 1.5 meters.

This technique brought the construction of buildings of over one kilometre in

height into the realm of technical feasibility. There were even negotiations

with Japan about such a building, which failed because of the high costs

involved. Nikitin's work embodied the strivings and dreams of a whole

generation of technicians, engineers and technical designers. He is not only

famous for building the Ostankino tower, but for constructing the new main

building of Moscow's Lomonossov University in 1953 and the

“Mother-homeland”

monument in Volgograd, which commemorates the decisive battle of Stalingrad

against Hitler's fascist troops.

Nikitin also solved the problems of the foundations in a revolutionary way

when constructing the 242-meter-high Lomonossov university building. At

Stalin's request, the gigantic building, which dominates the whole city, was

constructed on a hill in the southwest of Moscow. The ground was soft and

therefore an enormously deep and expensive foundation would have been

necessary. Nikitin developed a foundation that resembles an inverted shoe box

and thus prevents the building from sinking into the ground by displacement.

The symbolic nature of the fire at the Ostankino tower recalls the fate of

the lighthouse at Alexandria—one of the Seven Wonders of the World. It was

built in 279 BC, about 50 years after the widest expansion of Hellenism under

Alexander the Great, and reached the fantastic height of 134 meters, till

then only exceeded by the Egyptian pyramids. It stood during the darkest

periods of the Middle Ages and only collapsed into the sea in 1326, almost

1,600 years later, during an earthquake.

The Russian version of contemporary capitalism requires no such natural

disasters in order to extinguish the symbols of historical achievement. It

has been able to do that of its own accord within the shortest period of time.

*******

Moscow Times

September 1, 2000

Caution on NMD

By Thomas Graham Jr., John B. Rhinelander and Alexander Yereskovsky

Recent media reports suggest that the administration of U.S. President Bill

Clinton may soon decide to move forward with a national missile defense that

would be scheduled for deployment in 2005. The proposed system has drawn

criticism focusing on its effectiveness, practicality and sensibility, but

little public attention has been given to the legal aspects of the decision.

It is our view that the United States should proceed cautiously and in

consultation with Russia in this area. The United States should avoid hasty

and unilateral decisions to interpret Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty

provisions related to such matters as construction and deployment of NMD

components that likely will directly affect any NMD decision at this time.

The 1972 ABM treaty prohibits the Soviet Union (now Russia) and the United

States from deploying a nationwide missile defense or from providing a base

for such a defense. In an attempt to justify the beginning stages of

construction on NMD deployment in Alaska that would not currently be

permitted under the treaty and that would need to start soon if a 2005

deployment deadline is to be met, it has been argued that treaty language

allows for some degree of construction short of the deployment of a missile

system.

Clinton administration lawyers have reportedly prepared legal arguments that

early site preparation and initial construction commencement would not

constitute a violation of the treaty. This interpretation would allow the

Clinton administration to authorize the beginning of construction while

passing the true deployment decision to the next administration and

ostensibly uphold U.S. commitments to the ABM treaty. It rests on an

interpretation of the treaty whereby they artificially dissect the term

"construction" into different stages, e.g., the pouring of a concrete pad on

the one hand and the raising of a concrete structure with metal tracks to

hold a radar on the other. Supporters of this interpretation seemingly do not

consider the first of these steps to constitute "construction" or the

"creation of a base" for NMD deployment.

Russia may oppose this interpretation of the treaty on the basis of the

Russian-language text as well as on precedent. The argument that the United

States can begin construction on NMD without violating the treaty is

apparently based on a strained English reading of the text and seemingly

neglects the equally valid Russian-language version of the treaty. Article I

of the treaty reads, "Each party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems for a

defense of the territory of its country and not to provide a base for such a

defense." In the Russian text, the term sozdavat is used for "to provide" in

Article I. Sozdavat has a broad meaning and is used in the treaty text as an

equivalent to multiple English terms: "to provide," "to construct," "to

develop" and "to create." The treaty includes in the definition of "ABM

system components" those that are under construction. The Russian word "for

under construction" - stroitelstvo - simply means those components that are

in the state of construction. However, in reading the two terms together, it

would appear that in the Russian-language text, all phases of the physical

"creation" of ABM components are included in the meaning of the term

"construction." Indeed, this is the more normal usage for the concept of

"under construction" in English (that is, it begins with ground-breaking),

and this is the usage that the United States employed in determining when the

construction of the phased-array early-warning radar at Krasnoyarsk in

western Siberia by the Soviet Union in the 1980s had become a violation of

the ABM treaty.

Russia may argue that breaking ground for a missile defense system component

constitutes a violation, as the United States did in insisting that the

Soviets dismantle the Krasnoyarsk radar. In that case, the United States

acted with caution, ultimately deciding not to formally declare the Soviets

in material breach of the ABM treaty because under international law such a

declaration would have jeopardized the validity and integrity of the entire

treaty, placing the strategic balance at risk. Here, too, both sides should

avoid hasty decisions.

The ABM treaty, like any other international commitment, is not sacrosanct

and is subject to change. The treaty specifically states that it can be

amended by mutual agreement and that interpretations of ambiguous treaty

provisions can be discussed and agreed among the parties. For one party

simply to declare that a certain interpretation of an ambiguous provision of

the ABM Treaty involving a controversial subject is correct without agreement

with its treaty partner is not good international treaty practice. This would

reinforce the view of the world community that the United States is acting

increasingly in a unilateral manner and turning its back on its international

undertakings.

Ambassador Thomas Graham Jr., special representative of the president for

arms control, nonproliferation and disarmament from 1994 to 1997, is the

president of the Lawyers Alliance for World Security, a Washington-based,

nonprofit organization that advocates prudent steps in nuclear arms control

and nonproliferation. John B. Rhinelander, legal adviser to the U.S. SALT I

delegation that negotiated the ABM treaty, is a vice chairman of LAWS.

Alexander Yereskovsky, a Russian arms control expert involved in such treaty

negotiations as the SALT I Interim Agreement, ABM treaty, START I and START

II, served as deputy commissioner on the Russian Delegation to the Standing

Consultative Commission of the ABM treaty. They contributed this comment to

The Moscow Times.

*******

Nezavisimaya Gazeta

August 31, 2000

[translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only]

MOSCOW FIGHTING FOR FINANCIAL INDEPENDENCE

Khristenko, IMF and World Bank discuss new initiatives of

the Russian government

By Sergei PRAVOSUDOV

On August 30, Vice-Premier Viktor Khristenko tried to

convince head of the IMF mission in Russia Martin Gilman and

director of the World Bank office Michael Carter that the

Russian government was still advocating liberal reforms.

Judging by reports provided after that meeting, the IMF and

World Bank representatives listened favourably to the arguments

of the Russian executive authority.

On the other hand, it would be premature to speak about

their support for the cabinet initiatives. The talks will be

continued and the verdict will be most probably passed only in

September, after the World Bank and the IMF hold sessions of

their boards of directors, who would discuss the situation in

Russia.

The dispute between representatives of the Russian

government and international financial organisations was

engendered by the cabinet decision to establish balance tasks

for the provision of fuel and diesel oil to the domestic market

by the oil companies. Although the IMF criticised the idea, the

Russian cabinet approved it the other day, and Viktor

Khristenko had to convince the IMF and World Bank

representatives of the correctness of that decision.

Khristenko's press secretary Stanislav Naumov later

reported vice-premier as saying at the meeting that the

government's measures were "seasonal and temporary and should

not be regarded as a roll back from previous agreements reached

by Russia, the IMF and the World Bank." The vice-premier

explained the reasons that made the government take such

un-economic measures of regulation in the fuel and energy

sphere. The IMF and World Bank representatives in Russia will

soon receive copies of the government decisions on the

regulation of the oil products market. The talks will be

carried on after they analyse them.

In principle, this decision of the Russian government is

logical. The advocates of balance tasks are such strong

lobbyists as the agrarian and the power engineering industries,

whose business might seriously suffer if the state does not

support them with such measures. And a crisis in these

industries can negatively affect the general economic situation

in the country.

As for the potential negative reaction of the IMF, the

record-high oil prices allow the Russian cabinet to take into

account the recommendations of the international financial

organisations to a smaller degree. Marina Ionova, analyst of

the ATON Investment Company, thinks that with high oil prices

Russia can easily honour its obligations without taking more

loans. She said Viktor Gerashchenko, chairman of the Central

Bank, was against taking IMF money and President Vladimir Putin

is of the same mind.

However, the IMF and the World Bank should not be

disregarded completely either. Russia not so much needs the IMF

loan of 1.8 billion dollars, incorporated into the 2001 draft

budget, as its support at the talks on the restructuring of

Russia's debts to the members of the Paris Club.

As for the World Bank, its board of directors will meet on

September 12 to discuss the possibility of approving guarantee

operations of the bank in the coal and forestry sectors of the

Russian economy to the tune of 200 million dollars.

Experts think that it will be for the first time in the

past ten years that Russia will pursue an independent economic

policy without looking up at the IMF and similar organisations.

Besides, the IMF does not want to wreck relations with Russia.

Tom Dawson, director of the IMF foreign relations department,

said on August 30 that Russia's economic growth rates were

considerable. The possible conclusion is that the IMF does not

regard its mission in Russia as a failure and hopes to carry on

cooperation.

On the other hand, it is difficult to say how long this

trend will last. Many experts forecast a considerable fall in

oil pries, which will narrow the Russian government's room for

manoeuvre in talks with creditors.

*******

InsideDefense.com

August 28, 2000

[for personal use only]

U.S., Russia Putting Together Plan To Eliminate 120 Russian Nuke Attack Subs

Pentagon and Russian officials are putting together a plan that would

eliminate 120 Russian nuclear powered attack submarines as part of an

ongoing U.S.-Russian program to eliminate nuclear weapons of the former

Soviet Union, a senior defense official said.

In addition to the attack subs, work continues on dismantling 31 strategic

missile submarines, five of which are from the very large Typhoon-class.

The strategic sub reductions are outlined in the START Treaties, the

official said.

The plan, which is a joint effort between Russia and the Defense

Department's Cooperative Threat Reduction program, will outline the cost

and schedule of dismantling or de-fueling the submarines, along with the

expense of towing many of them to yet-to-be-named Russian shipyards.

Since ballistic missile submarines and the specified attack subs are both

about the same, the official said. The cost to dismantle a strategic

submarine is about $9.5 million, but because of the Typhoon's size its cost

rises to about $16 million, he said.

As of now, budget numbers have not been determined, he added.

"We have to decide whether it's in the United States' interests to provide

this assistance, what form it should take . . . the focus, whether

defueling or dismantling," the defense official told InsideDefense.com.

There is also the possibility of garnering support from other European

countries, he said.

Though CTR has been working with the Russians to figure out the best way to

deal with decaying general purpose submarines since 1998, concerns about

the environmental implications have resurfaced on Capitol Hill in the days

since the disaster involving the Kursk, a nuclear-powered cruise missile

attack sub that sank to the floor of the Barents Sea following what

appeared to be an onboard explosion. The Kursk lies about 350 feet below

the surface and environmentalists are raising concerns about the sub's

nuclear reactor leaking.

"The [world] community is somewhat mixed on how much of an environmental

threat there is," the defense official said. "Until we have some additional

information, it is really difficult to make any judgments and impossible to

implement a joint plan that we can have any faith in."

The question then becomes which boats should become a priority after the 31

ballistic missile subs are eliminated.

"I'm not worried so much about [subs] that don't run," a congressional

source told InsideDefense.com. "At the end of the day these are defense

dollars. You have to deal with the varying degrees of threat."

The Russians completed a draft of the plan in July and the completed

version including CTR's assessment is expected in about three or four

weeks, he said.

So far, 16 of the 31 ballistic missile subs, including one Typhoon, have

been contracted to Russian shipyards for elimination using $142.4 million

of CTR funds in fiscal year 1999. CTR officials are still awaiting word

from Russia on how many additional subs will be dismantled with $157.3

million set aside in FY-00. The defense official said it would most likely

be about four or five subs. The remaining ballistic missile submarines will

be dismantled with the $157.8 million set aside in the FY-01 budget.

The CTR program, which was spearheaded by former Sen. Sam Nunn (D-GA) and

Sen. Richard Lugar (R-IN) in 1991 to respond to weapons of mass destruction

dangers stemming from the collapse of the Soviet Union, has an annual

budget of about $450 million. Most of that money has gone to cutting up

Russian long-range bombers that carried nuclear weapons and dismantling

submarines.

CTR officials are expecting to complete the strategic submarine and bomber

work with the FY-02 funds and shift the program's focus to land-base

operations until CTR's projected completion in FY-07.

-- Gail Kaufman